

International Handbooks of Quality-of-Life

Richard J. Estes  
M. Joseph Sirgy *Editors*

# The Pursuit of Human Well-Being

The Untold Global History

 Springer

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# **International Handbooks of Quality-of-Life**

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Richard J. Estes • M. Joseph Sirgy  
Editors

# The Pursuit of Human Well-Being

The Untold Global History

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ISSN 2468-7227                      ISSN 2468-7235 (eBook)  
International Handbooks of Quality-of-Life  
ISBN 978-3-319-39100-7              ISBN 978-3-319-39101-4 (eBook)  
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-39101-4

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016960752

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Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by Springer Nature  
The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG  
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

*This book is dedicated to Harry Halloran and Joseph “Tony” Carr—two remarkable visionaries who appreciate the rich contributions made by quality-of-life and well-being scholars. Without their investment and dedication to the science of well-being, this work would never have been possible.*

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## Foreword

Developing a history of human well-being has been a passion and core belief of mine for years. As a businessman, I have been fortunate to be associated with colleagues who are committed to making our world a better place. I believe strongly that people want to improve their lives for themselves, their families, and their communities. It is with these beliefs that I, along with my lifelong friend Tony Carr, began Halloran Philanthropies. Our mission was then, and continues to be, “creating the world we all want”—a world different from the one we live in today.

As we began in 2007 to set in motion the vision of Halloran Philanthropies, we knew early on that we wanted to focus on and support innovation and remarkable innovators who demonstrated a wide range of visions to improve the human condition across various areas of health, education, and livelihood. As this strategy unfolded, I realized that creating a plan for the future of well-being required a deep understanding of the history of well-being. We needed to look at change with a wider, more inquisitive lens. As we investigated further the concepts of human well-being and quality of life, we found a dearth of research specifically centered on the history of human experience. By the latter, I mean an analysis that transcends the academic definition of good economies, good trade, good incomes, and good governance. How can we move forward in our thinking and doing without a comprehensive understanding of how human happiness and well-being have evolved? How can we design our strategies and our collective global agenda for raising the bar for the greatest number, when our opinions, thoughts, and feelings are shaped largely by the media—media that fail to champion a systematic focus on research and analysis?

Let me reflect for a moment on why Halloran Philanthropies decided to fund this project. I have been unimpressed and uninspired by the lack of perspective of the popular media. By lack of perspective, I mean the failure of the media to report stories and events in the context of a well-researched, complete picture of what is really going on in the world. Unfortunately, policy makers and the public depend primarily on the mass media for information and analysis of world events. Although there are certainly many exceptions, what keeps the media alive is their ability to sell negative stories, but not necessarily balanced critical thinking. The media often have neither

the money nor the orientation to do the research required and to do justice to the many complex social issues that confront humanity. And we have all heard the expression, good news does not sell.

I take a contrarian and a “change-maker” view about the human condition and the improvements in the world. I am challenged by the question: **Are things improving in health, education, and human welfare in a few regions of the world, many regions of the world, or all regions of the world?** The answer to this question has a lot to say about the ideal goals for the future: How do we get to the world that we all want? Or, as Buckminster Fuller would say, the “100 % world,” where 100 % of humanity enjoys the “good life.”

The question “... **are things improving in the world?**” has become the driving force behind my commitment to support this research led by the extraordinary editorial team of Professors Richard J. Estes and M. Joseph Sirgy. Our editors selected well-respected specialists from every major region of the world to examine the questions from a common point of departure, agreed upon from the beginning as the basic indicators of the Human Development Index. With the HDI indicators as the starting point, each team was “challenged to explore the extensive data that underlie the rich fabric of human experience documented in this research.” Through analysis we uncovered a complex tapestry that integrates Western, Near Eastern, and Eastern philosophical conceptions of what it means for humans to live “well”; our editors examined in detail the socioeconomic, political, and historical experiences of every region, incorporating the major religions and the historically disadvantaged populations. Above all, every aspect of this project is rooted, to my delight, in data.

In every corner of the world, in both objective and subjective arenas, the core questions about the scope of improvements in human development hold a vital key to our collective future. For me, this is paramount for the following reason: If life is improving in a few, many, or all of the regions of the world, particularly over the last 70 years or so, then getting to the “world we all want” in these regions or all regions will be a lot more probable than if we find that life is deteriorating in core areas of health, education, and welfare in the regions we have studied. In such a scenario, forging a path ahead will obviously be far more difficult. If we find the former scenario to be true, confirming that well-being is improving in all regions of the world, this outcome for me is nothing short of a revelation that can create optimism that human progress and betterment are being achieved. It may be a revelation that we can enthusiastically stand behind and strongly support. Whatever one’s faith tradition, I believe that we are all connected by a common force for good with a desire for continued improvement.

I will not give away the conclusions of this research journey here or the richness of what I have learned; I invite all readers of this work simply to benefit from the amazing opportunity for immersion and learning that this book represents. We plan to update this body of research every 5 years to determine whether the trends we have discovered endure, and we will do so with all the humility and good faith set in place by our editors. We will endeavor to tell this story widely, to share the outcomes of this robust body of

research, and to translate the information into as many literal and visual forms as possible for the benefit of all who care to read it. This book provides the untold story of human well-being: the truth about our experience as human beings in our search to create the world we all want.

Halloran Philanthropies  
West Conshohocken, PA, USA

Harry Halloran



Chuisco—a man’s memory of his childhood farm and the wall he is not sure he had ever climbed over (© Brian Fernandes-Halloran. Used with permission)

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## Preface

Organized human history has been unfolding for more than 40,000 years. Indeed, evidence exists that *Homo sapiens* has been a major force on the planet for at least as long as 6–8 millennia, albeit many scholars suggest even longer. In either case, “modern” men and women are of comparatively recent origin and postdate the period of the great dinosaurs by millions of years. *Homo sapiens* appeared around the beginning of the current global ice age, the Pliocene-Quaternary glaciation, an ongoing period that is largely responsible for the creation of a broad range of social, political, economic, and technological innovations (especially those designed to keep the people living in northern countries warm). The current ice age, with all of the challenges that it presented and continues to present to humanity, has compelled people throughout the world to live in highly interdependent communities; to share in advancing the well-being of one another, but especially that of their families and local communities; and to create forms of housing, energy sources, transportation sources and networks, and communication systems that keep people in close proximity to one another.

This volume covers developments in human well-being that have taken place worldwide over the past 3000 years. We have limited our focus to this time period, given the absence of written or other interpretable records prior to 2500 before the Common Era (BCE). We do, of course, have archeological evidence of human well-being prior to 2500 BCE, but many of those records are only fragments of more complete documents that have been lost to history or, as of now, remain largely uninterpretable. Future generations of scholars are expected to gradually extend the boundaries of the history of well-being beyond what is known today, but, as of now, only the major centers of these most ancient of civilizations are known to us, e.g., the Olmec people of Central America (Fig. P.1) (1500 BCE to about 400 BCE centered on the San Lorenzo Tenochtitlán site near the coast in southeast Veracruz in Central America), as well as the Sumerians of Mesopotamia (the portion of modern Iraq situated between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers) (c. 5500 BCE and 4000 BCE), long considered to be one of the progenitors of human civilization (Fig. P.2) (Running Reality 2015). More specifically, we have drawn on the component measures of the United Nations *Human Development Index* (HDI)



**Fig. P.1** San Lorenzo Monument 3 (also known as Colossal Head 3), from San Lorenzo Tenochtitlan, 1200–900 BCE (Museo de Antropología de Xalapa, Veracruz, Mexico) (Photo by Maribel Ponce Ixba; Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license; [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/San\\_Lorenzo\\_Monument\\_3.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/94/San_Lorenzo_Monument_3.jpg))



**Fig. P.2** The statues, known collectively as the Tell Asmar Hoard (Early Dynastic I–II, ca. 2900–2550 B.C.), were unearthed in 1933 at Eshnunna (modern Tell Asmar) in the Diyala region of Iraq. Despite subsequent finds at this site and others throughout the Greater Mesopotamian area, they remain the definitive example of the abstract style of Early Dynastic temple sculpture (2900 BC–2350 BC) (Photo source unknown; <https://onefuriousslama.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/sumerian-gods.jpg>.)

Text (covered by Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported license) from: Tell Asmar Hoard. (2015, October 6). In *Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia*. [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tell\\_Asmar\\_Hoard&oldid=684416774](https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Tell_Asmar_Hoard&oldid=684416774)

as the basis for framing our analysis—human advances over the long term related to improvements in the quality of and access to health and health care, education, and income.



The book is divided into five parts. *Part I* focuses on the history of well-being as expressed by the world's major and most influential philosophical and religious traditions: Western traditions of well-being beginning with the ancient Greeks; South Asian, mostly Hindu traditions of well-being; well-being as viewed from an East Asian perspective, mostly Confucian, Daoist, and related religions; and Islamic traditions of well-being beginning with the seventh century forward. *Part II* discusses the conceptual framework, types of data, and levels of analysis used in *Parts III* and *IV*. The largest and most detailed portion of the book is *Part III*, which analyzes the history of well-being since the end of the Second World War to the present for each of the world's major geopolitical regions, namely, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, North America, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe, Oceania, countries that are the successor states to the former Soviet Union, North Africa and West Asia, and the geographically large but sparsely populated transpolar Arctic region. *Part IV* deals with transregional population groups (girls and women) and with the critical contribution to well-being made by technology. *Part V* concludes with a summary of the major national, regional, and transregional findings reported elsewhere in the book. *Part V* also introduces new content into the analysis and, most importantly, pulls together all of the human development themes and patterns discussed in *Parts I–IV*.

The book concludes with a series of appendixes that focus on particular aspects of well-being of special interest to both general and specialist readers. Appendix A, for example, reports national and regional scores on the HDI for the 15-year period 1980–2014. These data permit the reader to identify HDI scores and changes in these scores over time, for countries of special interest to them. Appendix F contains a supplemental reading list. Readers also will find Appendixes B, C, D, and E of interest, given that they identify and describe major objective and subjective measurement tools used to assess well-being across most of the world's nations.

Finally, throughout the book, we have published a series of commissioned Maya paintings that depict the first 5 days of the Maya calendar. Our artist, Lylia Carr, did a phenomenal job in capturing the essence of these numerals. The use of Maya numerals to separate the book's five sections is appropriate in a volume that details history of well-being from ancient to modern times. The Maya civilization reached its peak around the sixth century in the area of modern Guatemala, Belize, and southeastern Mexico. The Mayans were a highly religious people, and many of the stone buildings in Maya cities had religious significance. Maya people continue to exist and, in the main, comprise large portions of the populations of Central and South America, i.e., the region of Latin American referred to as Mesoamerica.

We hope that you will find the material in this book useful in understanding the varied conceptions of human well-being and capturing the state of human



well-being in various world regions and population groups. We believe that much of the information reported in this book can be useful not only for educational purposes but also in public policy decision making.

Happy reading!

Philadelphia, PA, USA  
Blacksburg, VA, USA

Richard J. Estes  
M. Joseph Sirgy

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## Acknowledgments

This book project was an enormous undertaking. The success of this project cannot be attributed to the editors alone but to the combined efforts of the project's entire team. The team of contributors included the editors, the authors, the reviewers, the consultants, advisory board members, support staff, the publisher, and above all the philanthropy that provided the inspiration, vision, and financial resources required to complete this Herculean task. We, the editors, Richard J. Estes and M. Joseph Sirgy, would like to acknowledge each of these individuals and institutions by name and the exact role each played in this project.

First and foremost, we would like to express our profound gratitude to the Halloran Philanthropies team. This book was envisioned by *Harry Halloran*, a generous philanthropist who dedicates his life to the enhancement of well-being. Halloran Philanthropies has a magnanimous record of supporting many projects designed to enhance well-being in different walks of life. We were fortunate that this book project was selected for support among his many other humanitarian projects. Harry Halloran has provided not only the financial resources but also the vision and inspiration. *Joseph Anthony (Tony) Carr*, president of Halloran Philanthropies, was also an inspiration to us. He helped translate Harry's vision into a set of concrete guidelines that shaped the nature of the project. *Audrey Selian*, the program officer at the foundation, further translated much of Harry's and Tony's vision and guidelines into an operational plan. She worked very closely with us to make this project bear fruit. Audrey has considerable expertise in technology and well-being research. She rolled up her sleeves and provided us with useful input that helped better shape the chapters into a coherent whole—an untold story about the history of human well-being worldwide. Audrey also coauthored two chapters—Chap. 6, “How We Measure Well-Being,” and Chap. 19, “Technology and the History of Well-Being.” Her contribution to this project cannot be overestimated.

Next, we owe profound gratitude to the authors who wrote the chapters. They not only produced chapters that captured the history of well-being but also endured the pain and hardship that is customarily inflicted by editors with high expectations. They had to revise and re-revise their manuscripts to meet the high standards of the reviewers and the demands we placed on them

to revise, revise, and again revise with no time to spare. We tip our hats to our authors. They have done a fantastic job, and they deserve our heartfelt gratitude. Thanks and many thanks again. The authors of the chapters are the following:

- One of the editors, *Richard J. Estes*, authored the introductory chapter, “The Search for Well-Being: From Ancient to Modern Times.”
- *Alex C. Michalos* and *Dan Weijers* coauthored the chapter “Western Historical Traditions of Well-Being.”
- *Shawn Arthur* and *Victor Mair* coauthored the chapter “East Asian Historical Traditions of Well-Being.”
- *Isabelle Clark-Decés* and *Frederick M. Smith* coauthored the chapter “Well-Being in India: A Historical and Anthropological Report.”
- *Mohsen Joshanloo* authored the chapter “Islamic Conceptions of Well-Being.”
- *Audrey Selian* joined us (*M. Joseph Sirgy* and *Richard J. Estes*) to coauthor the chapter “How We Measure Well-Being.”
- *Valerie Møller* and *Benjamin Roberts* coauthored the chapter “New Beginnings in an Ancient Region: Well-Being in Sub-Saharan Africa.”
- *Mariano Rojas* and *Jose de Jesus Garcia* coauthored the chapter “Well-Being in Latin America.”
- *Kenneth C. Land*, *Alex C. Michalos*, and *Rhonda Phillips* joined us (*Richard J. Estes* and *M. Joseph Sirgy*) to coauthor the chapter “Well-Being in Canada and the United States.”
- *Takashi Inoguchi* joined *Richard J. Estes* to coauthor the chapter “The History of Well-Being in East Asia.”
- *Vijay Kumar Shrotryia* and *Krishna Mazumdar* coauthored the chapter “The History of Well-Being in South Asia.”
- *Mahar Mangahas* and *Edilberto C. de Jesus* coauthored the chapter “The History of Well-Being in Southeast Asia.”
- *Wolfgang Glatzer* and *Jürgen Kohl* coauthored the chapter “The History of Well-Being in Europe.”
- *Robert Cummins* and *Tanja Capic* coauthored the chapter “The History of Well-Being in Oceania.”
- *Carol Graham* and *Aurite Werman* coauthored the chapter “Well-Being in the Transition Economies of the Successor States of the Former Soviet Union: The Challenges of Change.”
- *Habib Tiliouine* and *Mohammed Meziane* coauthored the chapter “The History of Well-Being in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).”
- *Birger Poppel* authored the chapter “Well-Being of Circumpolar Arctic Peoples: The Quest for Continuity.”
- *Elizabeth Eckermann* authored the chapter “The History of Well-Being and the Global Progress of Women.”
- *Audrey Selian* and *Lee McKnight* coauthored the chapter “The Role of Technology in the History of Well-Being: Transformative Market Phenomena Over Time.”
- Back to the editors, *Richard J. Estes* and *M. Joseph Sirgy* coauthored the epilogue chapter “The History of Well-Being in Global Perspective.”

Our gratitude also extends to our support staff. *Pamela Fried* played two roles in this project—copyeditor of the entire book and technical production manager. She has done a great job managing these roles. *David Walker* also played two roles—that of graphics designer and that of webmaster. He created all of the graphics and has done a wonderful job. He also excelled at developing the Web site for the project (click on History of Well-Being in MIQOLS' Web site at [www.miqols.org](http://www.miqols.org)). *Pamela A. Jackson* and *Emmaline G. Smith* provided the administrative talent. Pamela oversaw the finances of the entire project and Emmaline managed the day-to-day administrative aspects. Also, Emmaline contributed to the book by doing library research to help create several of the appendices. We couldn't have completed the project efficiently and on time without their invaluable administrative skills.

We also have to express our gratitude to members of the editorial review board, the advisory board, and consultants. Advisory board members helped with the envisioning process and chapter reviews. They include *Andrew Clark*, *Elizabeth Eckermann*, *José de Jesús García*, *Wolfgang Glatzer*, *Takashi Inoguchi*, *Kenneth C. Land*, *Krishna Mazumdar*, *Alex C. Michalos*, *Valerie Møller*, and *Habib Tiliouine*. Editorial review members and consultants helped us with the review process. Members of the editorial review board include *Ryan T. Howell* and *Brian Spooner*. Consultants (i.e., ad hoc reviewers) include *Ali B. Ali-Dinar*, *Jacqueline Njeri Kagoth*, *Don R. Rahtz*, *Daniel Shek*, *Vijay Kumar Shrotryia*, *Peter Lee Schmitthenner*, *Ramya Sreenivasan*, *Eduardo Wills Herrera*, and *Jeroen Boelhouwer*.

Our gratitude and special thanks also go to our publisher team at Springer. The publisher team includes *Esther Otten*, *Hendrikje Tuerlings*, *Myriam Poort*, and the production team, particularly Ms. S. Madhuriba, Project Manager, SPi Content Solutions—SPi Global. Esther Otten played a prominent role in the development of the book prospectus and heralding it through Springer's executive committee.

We would also like to recognize the contribution of our benefactor, *Harry Halloran*, for writing the Foreword; *Kevin Halloran*, for providing the sectional quotes in the book; *Neil Halloran*, for providing a graphic illustration of the historical trend of violent death resulting from wars; *Lylia Carr*, for providing the original artwork used to separate Parts I through V; and *Brian Halloran*, for providing an original photograph of sculpture that follows the book's Foreword.

This project was administered through the Management Institute for Quality-of-Life Studies (MIQOLS; [www.miqols.org](http://www.miqols.org)) with some assistance from the Buckminster Fuller Institute (BFI at [bfi.org](http://bfi.org)). MIQOLS is a think tank devoted to the generation of knowledge related to the science of human well-being and the dissemination and utilization of such knowledge by societal institutions worldwide. BFI also supports an international network of Fuller-inspired innovators through the maintenance of a comprehensive information clearinghouse on R. B. Fuller's work on sustainable design.

Much of the data used in this book came from international statistical bodies such as the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Values Survey, and the Social

Weather Station, among many others. We are much indebted to these institutions for collecting data at regular intervals on human well-being.

Last but not least we would like to recognize the support of our academic institutions (University of Pennsylvania and Virginia Tech) and of course that of our own spouses (*Gail Luyster Estes*, wife of Richard Estes, and *Pamela Jackson*, wife of M. Joseph Sirgy). We couldn't have done this project without their moral support and encouragement. Thank you! Thank you! Thank you!

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## Part I

# Historical Conceptions of Well-Being over the Long Term

*Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for self and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that by means of them we shall be happy. (Aristotle – Aristotle. (1996). *Nicomachean Ethics*. In D. Feby (Ed.), *Classical Selections on Great Issues, Series 2, Vol. 4, Faith and Moral* (p. 88). Lanham, MD: University Press of America.)*

*It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong. (Jeremy Bentham – Bentham, J. (1988). *A Fragment on Government* (p. 3). In J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart (Eds.). *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.)*





***Imix'*** - *First day of the Maya calendar.* Mixed media on paper—22" × 30". © 2015. Lylia Forero Carr. Used with permission.

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# The Search for Well-Being: From Ancient to Modern Times

# 1

Richard J. Estes

*The past is never dead. It's not even past.*

(Faulkner 1950)

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## 1.1 Introduction

The search for well-being is central to the process of becoming a more fully developed human being. At the center of well-being is a deep sense of peace, personal satisfaction, and happiness within ourselves and in our relationships with others. All four of these states of being—peace, personal satisfaction, happiness, and well-being—are outcomes achieved through a combination of personal reflection and interpersonal exchanges. They also are associated with the often complex interplay of the social, political, economic, religious, ideological, and other forces that surround us. Hostile environments, for example, typically breed fear, suspicion, a heightened sense of self-protectiveness, and isolation from others. Mutually supportive and nurturing environments, on the other hand, add to our own efforts at self-consciousness that enhance our capacity for attaining progressively higher levels of well-being. Thus, our experience of well-being results from a combination of the varied internal and external experiences that impact our lives each day.

The process of attaining well-being is ongoing and, for many, frequently proves to be an

elusive one. But is this understanding of the nature of well-being the same for *all* people living today and for those who have lived in the past? Is the fundamental nature of well-being the same the world over or are there important differences in the way that people living in different societies and cultures experience well-being? Has the conception of well-being changed over time, and how do the data we have support the truth about our collective trajectory in attaining well-being? Does the nature of well-being differ by age, gender, race, religious beliefs, cultural traditions, income level, and the like? Is well-being a continuous process or is it a state of being that, once attained, remains the same? How does our search for well-being influence others who are important to us—our spouses, children, friends, and others? In what ways does their search for well-being influence our own? Are there alternative pathways to the attainment of well-being or is there a time-tested, single, well-trodden path that all of us need to follow to achieve it? What happens if our search for well-being proves uneventful and we do not succeed in achieving the levels of peace, harmony, and balance that we seek? And within the context of societies worldwide, to what extent have leaps forward been made in our collective well-being, especially since the end of the two great wars that dominated much of the twentieth century?

This book is an attempt to answer these and other questions related to the nature of well-being

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over the long expanse of human history and to identify our collective successes and challenges in attaining well-being over the centuries. Thus, the focus of the book is both historical and contemporary and draws heavily from alternative conceptions of well-being formulated by people who lived during earlier time periods and under very different social, political, economic, religious, and ideological circumstances. We are particularly interested in documenting similarities and differences in well-being between men and women, children and adults, those living at the center of society and those that survive only along its periphery, and those characterized by different racial, ethnic, religious, sexual orientation, and other identity-defining characteristics. The book examines the history of well-being over a long period and gives particular attention to those individuals and groups characterized by sociodemographic characteristics over which they have little or no control and that serve as the basis for discrimination, e.g., age, gender, race, physical impairment, and the like. The intellectual journey we take in this book is a fascinating one and frequently contains some surprises.

Our goal is to provide insights into the varied forces that contribute to a sense of well-being for people living everywhere in the world. We seek to identify the accomplishments and obstacles revealed by our collective history toward the attainment of well-being and, as possible, to use the wisdom of the ages to inform us about how national and international achievements in well-being can be furthered. This book, however, is not a self-help book. Rather, it is based on serious scientific inquiry into the nature and state of well-being as far as it can be discerned from a wide range of past and contemporary perspectives. The major ideas contained in this book reflect ideas concerning the nature, dynamics, and potentials associated with well-being. We draw our ideas from all areas of the arts and sciences, the humanities and philosophy, the performing arts, and from different faith traditions. The book is also based on historical analysis of the major themes that have informed our contemporary ideas concerning well-being. At the same time, the book is contemporary in that it examines the

nature of well-being as it is understood today, among people living across many regions of the world.

We purposefully avoid making assumptions regarding elements that should be regarded as either essential or mandatory for attaining well-being. Nor do we assume that the nature of well-being is the same for all people living now and in the past, nor that well-being is the same for people living under different social conditions. We hope, however, that the book provides considerable objective evidence concerning both the nature and dynamics of well-being within our diverse human family.

We know for sure that the pursuit of well-being continues to be a major goal of people throughout the world. We also know with certainty that the various pathways that have been followed to attain well-being are not a singular reality but, instead, are correlated with different approaches to and different levels of the attainment of well-being. We believe that all people experience some measure of well-being but that comparatively few experience the deep sense of joy that accompanies the attainment of the highest level of well-being. That level of well-being appears to be reserved for those who attain remarkable levels of consciousness, self-awareness, and compassion for others. Some of these persons are identified in this chapter, but most, owing to the absence of written documentation, will never be known to us. Indeed, for most people, their experience of well-being is an internal one that is reflected in the quality of the relationships with their children and friends and in the quiet contributions they make to the lives of others who cross their paths.

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## 1.2 Organizing Questions

A strange passion is moving in my head.  
My heart has become a bird which searches  
in the sky. Every part of me goes in different  
directions. Is it really so that the one I love  
is everywhere? (Rumi 1996)

The purpose of this book is to apply a historical lens to the most significant well-being changes that have occurred over the long expanse of history. In doing so, we bring together a large body of empirical data related to changes in five critically important sectors of well-being that are universally considered to be among the most important: health, education, social welfare, income and wealth distribution, and subjective assessments of well-being. We examine these data from the perspective of the world as a whole as well as with respect to particular regions, countries, and population groups within countries and regions. In doing so, we have drawn on the contributions made by eminent scholars concerning the nature and meaning of and the pathways to well-being as reflected across time, geographic space, culture, and philosophical and faith traditions. We have asked our scholars of well-being to address, among others, the following questions:

- What are the key points of data that capture the journey of well-being in your area of study, especially within the context of the major indicators captured by the United Nations three-item *Human Development Index*?
- What is well-being and what is its relationship to other much sought-after states of being—life satisfaction, fulfillment, and, ultimately, happiness?
- How would one recognize well-being when it does exist? How would one recognize its absence?
- What do various philosophical and faith traditions teach us about well-being and the pathways that should be followed in seeking its attainment?
- Have the historical meanings associated with well-being remained constant over time? Or have they fluctuated in response to the unique social, political, or economic conditions that have characterized people and their societies at particular moments in their history?
- Does well-being differ for different population groups, i.e., for men versus women, for children versus the elderly, for the poor versus the rich, or for groups that nearly everywhere

have been historically disadvantaged on the basis of age, race, ethnicity, language or accent, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, region or country of origin, and the like?

- On the balance, what have been the major gains in well-being experienced by people over the long expanse of human history as reflected in both subjective and objective measures of well-being but especially with respect to health, education, income, social welfare, and subjective assessments of personal and collective well-being?

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### 1.3 Our Analytical Framework

Throughout the book, we pursue a number of closely interrelated questions pertaining to well-being. First, we explore the major conceptions of well-being associated with different philosophical and religious traditions. We identify the ancient philosophies of Eastern (mostly Confucian) and Southern Asia (mostly Hindu, Islamic, and Buddhist) related to well-being as well as the equally ancient conceptions of well-being associated with Western societies (mostly Greek and modern Europe). We discuss Islamic views of well-being and cover the full period of Islam's development since the death of the Prophet in 632 Common Era (CE). Together, these chapters provide a rich introduction to the many conceptual perspectives that have informed our understanding of well-being from the past to the present. They also identify the origins of the many similarities and differences that exist in our understanding of well-being across philosophical and religious traditions, cultures, and geographic location.

Second, we trace the historical development of the concept of well-being over time. We discuss the similarities that exist between the various conceptions of well-being discussed in Part I of the book and other concepts that are used to capture more or less comparable states of being, e.g., quality of life, life satisfaction, and happiness. The meanings associated with each of these concepts vis-à-vis the concept of well-being have not remained frozen in history but have shifted in

response to the changing social, political, and economic realities that have existed for people at different points in history. Thus, it may be more productive to think of well-being, quality of life, life satisfaction, and happiness as states of internal being that are continuously evolving in response to the dynamic interaction of internal and external forces. Certainly there is nothing in the historical record to suggest that well-being is a prize that, once attained, remains fixed and immutable.

Third, we attempt to bring new ideas to the understanding of well-being and its attainment by examining contemporary patterns that exist in different world regions and among different population groups. Indeed, the largest number of chapters in the book is devoted to discussions of worldwide historical changes in well-being that have occurred largely since the end of the Second World War. Within these chapters, much of the discussion focuses on changes in well-being that are still emerging. Some chapters are devoted to contemporary reports of well-being for only a small number of countries, such as those for North America and Oceania, but most focus on regional groupings of substantially larger numbers of countries. Another chapter focuses on well-being for one half of the world's population, women, whereas another examines the contributions of technology and technological innovation in shaping well-being both today and in the past.

Fourth, we examine the ever-changing well-being status of the many population subgroups that make up every society. As editors, we were especially interested in the differences and similarities in the experience of well-being of people grouped on the basis of their age, gender, race, ethnicity, language, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and the like. The rich data related to these population groups help provide a well-defined picture of the changes in well-being that have taken place within these groups during our own time. For some population groups, we can pinpoint exactly when changes in well-being occurred; for other groups, we can identify changes in well-being only in terms of changes in society as a whole.

Fifth, we discuss the role of technology and technological innovation in shaping well-being in the distant past, the recent past, and today. Imagine today's world without electricity, purified water, indoor plumbing, immunizations, electronic telecommunications, tightly woven transportation systems, and the like. The world would be far more austere without the presence of these innovations that were introduced during only the past 100 or so years. We continue to live in a world of scientific and technological innovations that are emerging at a pace far more rapid than most of us can absorb. The prospects are that newer and even more quickly introduced technologies and technological innovations are just around the corner—in the near celestial speed of microprocessors, the mapping of the human brain and genome, DNA sequencing and editing, nanotechnology, the use of drones, ultra-efficient forms of wind and solar energy, the commercialization of space, the creation of new and more private smartphones, among many others.

Comparable technological advances are also occurring in our *social architecture* as evidenced by the rapidly increasing urbanization of the world's population (including the development of urban population megacenters), the emergence of new family and community patterns arising from population migration, and the extension of more participatory forms of political governance to an ever-increasing percentage of the world's peoples. Even our economic and monetary systems are changing rapidly, with the result that cash and currency will be used less and less in the conduct of financial transactions. We can easily see the benefits of these technological innovations in substantially longer average years of life expectancy, improved preventive and curative health care, more advanced levels of basic and advanced education, the steadily increasing extension of basic human rights and protections to larger numbers of the world's vulnerable populations, and improved and more cost-efficient social safety nets for children, the elderly, persons with severe disabilities, and others who cannot provide fully for their own needs, e.g., persons who are chronically ill, the millions of



people who each year become refugees from national and regional wars.

Sixth, we discuss the implications of the findings reported in the first four parts of the book for accelerating the pace of the attainment of well-being for a steadily increasing share of the world's population. Though this topic is not the primary focus of the book, our purpose in doing so is to focus on three sets of interrelated issues that reflect both historical and contemporary realities: (1) to aggregate and summarize the major advances and challenges to well-being observed throughout history and in our own time; (2) to formulate a set of principles concerning well-being and its attainment that emerge for those analyses; and (3) to construct an initial framework reflective of historical patterns that may be used by others for accelerating the pace of individual and collective well-being for steadily increasing numbers of people. All three purposes are key outcomes focused on by all of the book's authors.

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## 1.4 Our Point of Departure

Our point of departure in exploring the history of well-being is that associated with the three component elements that make up the United Nations' Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is the new GDP (gross domestic product) of sorts and reports changes in country and world patterns of well-being in health, education, income, and wealth distribution—all factors that are considered to be core, though not complete, elements of well-being. We have also added a fourth dimension to the mix—that of subjective well-being, or individuals' self-assessments of their personal sense of well-being within the context of family, community, and large social entities such as nation-states and geopolitical regions. This approach recognizes that personal well-being is highly dependent on the overall sense of well-being of the larger social units of which individuals are a part, e.g., having a seriously ill spouse or children experiencing great difficulty impacts directly on the individual's sense of well-being in much the same way that a happy, healthy,

and financial secure family influences one's own assessment of his or her well-being.

Country and regional reports of subjective well-being were collected through sample surveys and polls, conducted as part of the *World Values Survey* and of the worldwide Gallup polls, that examine virtually every aspect of personal and collective well-being. The question most typically asked in these self-assessment polls of well-being is some variation of "Taken all together, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?" Thus, the chapters contain reports of both the objective conditions needed to achieve well-being and of the subjective well-being experiences of people organized at different levels of analysis. We have made every effort to help the reader see the relationships that exist between subjective measures of well-being and their objective counterparts, such as average years of life expectancy, trends in infant and child mortality rates, income levels and disparities between the very rich and the very poor, and the contribution of education to both objective and subjective well-being.

Much of the content of the following chapters is supported by rigorous scientific research. Some of the analyses, especially those in Part I, are textual. Other analyses draw on a wide range of quantitative and qualitative social indicator data, which are presented as simply as possible. Most of the tables, charts, and figures, for example, provide easily understandable visual representations of the varying states of well-being that characterize people and societies at different moments in time. Readers are invited to join with the book's authors in reviewing the wide range of objective and subjective data that reflect historical and contemporary milestones in attaining well-being.

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## 1.5 Personal and Collective Wisdom of the Ages

Though it has been undertaken under different names—life satisfaction, quality of life, happiness—the pursuit of well-being has been one of the most enduring quests of human civilization.



**Fig. 1.1** Socrates (470/469 BCE–399 BCE). (Photo by Wilson Delgado; bust of Socrates in the Vatican Museum; public domain; <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Vatsoc.jpg>)

The search for well-being permeates our philosophies, religions and religious traditions, rituals and rites of passage, music, visual arts, and, of course, the performing arts in all their varieties. It is reasonable to suggest that all human beings have sought at least some measure of well-being and others have regarded its pursuit as a central life interest. The ancient Greek philosopher Socrates (470/469 Before the Common Era [BCE]–399 BCE), writing nearly 2500 years ago, taught us that “the unexamined life is not worth living.” This statement is particularly powerful inasmuch as he suggests that lives characterized by the absence of self-reflection and self-analysis are significantly impoverished (Fig. 1.1). Saint Augustine of Hippo (354 CE–430 CE) (Fig. 1.2), living some eight centuries after Socrates, expressed more or less the same dilemma concerning well-being and the human condition (Augustine of Hippo 2009):

Men go abroad to wonder at the heights of mountains, at the huge waves of the sea, at the long courses of the rivers, at the vast compass of the ocean, at the circular motions of the stars, and they pass by themselves without wondering.



**Fig. 1.2** Saint Augustine of Hippo (354 CE– 430 CE). (Painter: Antonio Rodríguez; public domain; [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Antonio\\_Rodr%C3%ADguez\\_-\\_Saint\\_Augustine\\_-\\_Google\\_Art\\_Project.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Antonio_Rodr%C3%ADguez_-_Saint_Augustine_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg))

In this section, we identify some of the major thought leaders throughout time and across all of the regions of the world who have given considerable attention to the nature of and factors that contribute to well-being. Though many of these ideas are presented as simple declarative statements, they actually constitute questions about the nature and meaning of and the historical pathways leading to the attainment of well-being. We do not assume that the answers provided apply to people everywhere in the world or for all people that have ever lived. We certainly do not consider them to be complete answers to the riddle of well-being. Rather, we introduce them as part of the body of wisdom concerning the human spirit that has been passed on to us by persons now living as well as those who have preceded us. We urge you, the reader, to keep these qualifications in mind as you and we begin to unravel the mysteries associated with well-being described throughout the book. Use these observations and data analyses to challenge the ideas presented in the text but also to put together your own thoughts on the course of and state of well-being and examine their accuracy or validity in terms of your own life experience.

### 1.5.1 Are Peace, Harmony, and a Refined Sense of Balance Central to Our Attainment of Well-Being?

Lord Buddha (c. 480 BCE–400 BCE) (Fig. 1.3), in seeking personal enlightenment some 2400 years ago, taught us that to be at peace with oneself is to be at peace with the world and to be at peace with the world is to make the world a more peaceful place (Estes 1998). For Buddha, the attainment of consciousness, or *awareness* in a more general sense, involves the suppression of egoistic wants, needs, desires, and demands. In their place, Buddha emphasized quietude, stillness, a lack of personal desire, and an absence of the need to control the actions of others. Most fundamental of all is the recognition of our oneness with all elements of the universe in whatever form those elements or beings exist. Each of us and, in turn, each element of the search for well-being constitutes a part of the whole in much the same way that we, in our short life spans, are just

one part of a much larger, ever-expanding universe. Respect for life and existence in all of its forms is essential to the attainment of true inner peace and harmony. The avoidance of violence toward other living things is also at the heart of “Buddha consciousness,” inasmuch as violence and peace are understood to not be able to coexist with one another.

Husband and wife musical team Jill Jackson and Sy Miller expressed the sentiments conveyed by Buddha even more simply in the lyrics of their song, “Let there be peace on earth. And let it begin with me” (1955). Tenzin Gyatso (Fig. 1.4), the 14th and current Dalai Lama, reinforced the importance of the peace, harmony, and balance message of Buddha as prerequisites for attaining well-being by affirming that these principles need to be carried over into our daily lives and into our interactions with others (Dalai Lama XIV 1989):

Because we all share this planet earth, we have to learn to live in harmony and peace with each other and with nature. This is not just a dream, but a




**Fig. 1.3** Statue of Buddha located near Belum Caves, Andhra Pradesh, India (Photo by Purshi; Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license; [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/Buddha%27s\\_statue\\_near\\_Belum\\_Caves\\_Andhra\\_Pradesh\\_India.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/Buddha%27s_statue_near_Belum_Caves_Andhra_Pradesh_India.jpg))



**Fig. 1.4** Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th and current Dalai Lama (1935–). (Photo by Christopher; Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dalailama1\\_20121014\\_4639.jpg#/media/File:Dalailama1\\_20121014\\_4639.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Dalailama1_20121014_4639.jpg#/media/File:Dalailama1_20121014_4639.jpg))





**Fig. 1.5** Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948). (Photo: <http://flickr.com/photos/55638925@N00/255569844/>; public domain)


necessity. We are dependent on each other in so many ways that we can no longer live in isolated communities and ignore what is happening outside those communities.

Even the reluctant revolutionary and Indian political and spiritual leader, Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) (Fig. 1.5), emphasized through his words and deeds that “happiness is when what you think, what you say, and what you do are in harmony” (Michelli 1998). Confucius (c. 551 BCE–479 BCE), writing long before Lord Buddha, also taught us (Confucius n.d.a),

To put the world in order, we must first put the nation in order; to put the nation in order, we must first put the family in order; to put the family in order; we must first cultivate our personal life; we must first set our hearts right.

The popular children’s television host and Presbyterian minister, Fred Rogers (1928–2003) (Fig. 1.6), in his book, *Important Things to Remember*, wrote (Rogers 2003):

When I say it’s you I like, I’m talking about that part of you that knows that life is far more than



**Fig. 1.6** Fred Rogers (1928–2003). (Photo: <http://www.memorialmatters.com/memorials.php?page=Fred-Rogers&section=bio>; Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license)


anything you can ever see or hear or touch. That deep part of you that allows you to stand for those things without which humankind cannot survive. Love that conquers hate, peace that rises triumphant over war, and justice that proves more powerful than greed.

Thus, peace, harmony, and a sense of balance in thought and actions are essential elements in the search for personal and collective well-being. Many scholars of well-being believe that we naturally gravitate toward such qualities through a process borrowed from biology referred to as *homeostasis* (Cummins 2014). Minds and lives that are in disarray or that are filled with distractions beyond any semblance of order rarely can achieve a heightened sense of well-being. To attain that goal requires a high degree of introspection, self-reflection, focus, and the ability to place the daily events of one’s life into a meaningful context. These internal capacities for consciousness raising constitute one branch of the pathway to progressively higher levels of well-being.

### 1.5.2 Does the Attainment of a Heightened Sense of Well-Being Require Introspection and Self-Reflection?

Well-being is not something that is revealed to us or experienced at a given moment in time without effort on our part. Nor is it a physical object or some “thing” that, once possessed, can be admired, polished, and tucked away for safekeeping. Rather, our awareness of well-being results from a process of continuous introspection, self-reflection, and thoughtful analysis. Inner quietness, rational thought, and an openness to the experience of well-being are prerequisites for attaining it—if, at times, only for brief moments. Indeed, the process is not unlike that associated with the Islamic concept of the personal struggle against hedonistic wants and needs in favor of meeting the needs of the larger *Ummah* of which the individual was a part.

Viennese psychiatrist and concentration camp survivor Viktor Frankl (1905–1997) (Fig. 1.7), in his widely read book *Man’s Search for Meaning* (1946), put it this way, “When we are



**Fig. 1.7** Viktor Frankl (1905–1997). (Photo by Prof. Dr. Franz Vesely; Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license Germany; [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/Viktor\\_Frankl2.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/Viktor_Frankl2.jpg))

no longer able to change a situation, we are challenged to change ourselves.” Frankl clearly understood the need to confront oneself with the contradictions that we face and, as a result, he integrated this core understanding of the human personality into his perspective of philosophical, psychological, and even therapeutic inquiries. Confucius (n.d.b) perceived the same reality and recognized the importance of self-reflection as the first and most important step to be taken in attaining well-being: “There are three methods to gaining wisdom. The first is reflection, which is the highest. The second is limitation, which is the easiest. The third is experience, which is the bitterest.”

All four of these essential ingredients for attaining a heightened sense of well-being—internal struggle, balance, self-reflection, and the attainment of inner peace—are life affirming and are located centrally within ourselves and, to a great extent, are amenable to change. Viewed from a philosophical perspective, these processes simply “are.” As such, they can be cultivated and strengthened for use in pursuing progressively higher states of well-being. Indeed, many of these qualities are at the center of our existence as conscious beings who are continuously engaged in sensing, observing, analyzing, and organizing our inner and outer experiences so as to give them meaning within a coherent psychophilosophical framework. Even those who are the most materially deprived among us possess these qualities in abundance and can achieve high states of well-being, albeit their state of material deprivation may also be high.

### 1.5.3 Does a Heightened Sense of Well-Being Depend on Our Ability to Be Present in the Moment and a Willingness to Act Within Those Moments with Intentionality and Purpose?

The Spanish-born stoic Roman philosopher and dramatist, Seneca the Younger (c. 4 BCE–65 CE), wrote,

True happiness is to enjoy the present, without anxious dependence upon the future, not to amuse ourselves with either hopes or fears but to rest satisfied with what we have, which is sufficient, for he that is so wants nothing. The greatest blessings of mankind are within us and within our reach. A wise man is content with his lot, whatever it may be, without wishing for what he has not (Seneca 1803/2010).

Lord Buddha, teaching some 500 years before Seneca, instructed us on the central importance of living, thinking, and feeling in the present so as to be able to unite past and future in the immediacy of the moment. According to Buddha, “The secret of health for both mind and body is not to mourn for the past, worry about the future, or anticipate troubles but to live in the present moment wisely and earnestly” (Buddha 2014).

Viennese-born psychoanalyst and initial designated intellectual heir to Sigmund Freud, Otto Rank (1884–1939), emphasized the importance of the *present moment* in his treatment of patients trapped in neuroses that Freud and others considered to be rooted in the patients’ pasts. Citing from the entry that appears for Rank in *Wikipedia* (Rank 2014), the authors remark:

According to Rank, all emotional life is grounded in the present. In *Will Therapy* (1929–1931), Rank uses the term ‘here and now’ for the first time in the psychotherapeutic literature: ‘Freud made the repression historical, that is, misplaced it into the childhood of the individual and then wanted to release it from there, while as a matter of fact the same tendency is working here and now’ (Rank 1929–31: 39). Instead of the word *Verdrängung* (repression)...Rank preferred to use the word *Verleugnung* (denial), which focused instead on the emotional will to remain ill in the present: ‘The neurotic lives too much in the past [and] to that extent he actually does not live. He suffers ... because he clings to [the past], wants to cling to it, in order to protect himself from experience [*Erlebnis*], the emotional surrender to the present’ (Rank 1929–31: 27).

These are powerful insights into human nature and do, indeed, offer important clues into the dynamic nature of the relationship that exists between the past, the present, and the pursuit of well-being. Rank’s insights are especially helpful in clearing the path on which we must travel in pursuing well-being freely and openly. For Rank,

life is something that can be lived only in the immediacy of the moment. All else is just past memories, however painful or unwanted the events that led to the memories may have been. The solution to this dilemma, as identified by Rank, is to move from the past to the present using the well-honed emotional skills that are already available to us—sometimes unseen, but present nonetheless. Past pains and grievances are just that—they are of the past, not of the present. Past pains may form scars, but the scars, though often unattractive, reflect healing, not a continuation of injury. Similarly, the attainment of well-being requires that we use the opportunities available to us in the here and now to move forward toward our ultimate goals.

Lord Buddha also recognized that the only things we can change in life are those of the present inasmuch as the past is already history and the future has not yet arrived. In the larger scheme of life, what matters most is how we experience ourselves in the present, albeit the quality of our present actions can benefit substantially from an understanding of our past lives, that is, our personal histories as well as those of others.

A powerful example of these principles is to be found in the life of Mother Teresa of India. Working each day with the terminally ill and dying on the streets of Calcutta, Mother Teresa (1910–1997) taught through her deeds and words that, “Yesterday is gone. Tomorrow has not yet come. We have only today. Let us begin.” (Mother Teresa, n.d.)

Famed American scholar of myths and mythology, Joseph Campbell (1904–1987), emphasized the importance of the present moment in man’s search for “bliss,” a variation of the state of well-being, a bit differently. Speaking in an interview in the television series *The Power of Myth* with journalist-clergyman Bill Moyers, Campbell (1988) said,

People say that what we’re all seeking is a meaning for life. I don’t think that’s what we’re really seeking. I think that what we’re seeking is an experience of being alive, so that our life experiences on the purely physical plane will have resonances with our own innermost being and reality, so that we actually feel the rapture of being alive.

These remarkable Western and Eastern scholars of the distant and recent past all agree that the attainment of well-being is predicated on our ability to be fully alive in the present moment. They do not suggest that we forget the past nor do they recommend that we put our hopes for the future on hold. Instead, each of them suggests that we consciously use our past and our hoped-for futures to inform today's thoughts, feelings, and actions with deliberateness and intentionality.

Further, none of the thought leaders identified here was deterred from his or her own search for bliss (well-being) by the events of daily life, however challenging those events may have been. Instead, most welcomed the challenges of daily living as the source of energy needed to propel forward their movement to the goal of a heightened sense of well-being. Each writer and activist met the challenges that confronted him or her in a different way but all agreed on the importance of moving forward in the immediacy of the moment to achieve what otherwise would not be attained. The richness of the encounter with the past, present, and future in the same moment is discussed at length by French Buddhist Matthieu Ricard (Action for Happiness 2011). His views have also been captured on a series of videotaped lectures that are now easily accessible on the Internet at *YouTube.com*.

#### 1.5.4 Is Forgiveness an Essential Component of Well-Being?

Forgiveness of others for wrongs that have been committed against us is not a natural or easy process; indeed, forgiving others for their offenses toward us is extremely difficult. In an effort to forget or minimize the pain caused by these events, many people attempt to put their feelings of anger in an emotional “black box”—seemingly safely hidden from others and themselves. But such efforts ultimately fail inasmuch as even deeply suppressed feelings of anger ultimately find expression. Often, our feelings of disappointment are inappropriately projected onto others, which in turn only compounds the difficulties involved in granting forgiveness to those who



**Fig. 1.8** Desmond Tutu (1931–). (Photo by Libris Förlag; [https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Desmond\\_Tutu#/media/File:Desmond\\_Tutu\\_2013-10-23\\_001.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Desmond_Tutu#/media/File:Desmond_Tutu_2013-10-23_001.jpg); Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license)

have injured us. Human feelings are there, and they will not be denied. Only true forgiveness, undertaken out of a sense of compassion for the other (and for ourselves), can relieve the human being of the sense of anger, hatred, and feelings of disappointment that consume many.

Episcopalian archbishop emeritus of Cape Town and 1984 Nobel laureate for peace, Desmond Tutu (Fig. 1.8), has given a lot of thought to the relationship between forgiveness and well-being. Not only from his long years as a priest and bishop to the poor and oppressed in South Africa, but also in his years of service as head of that country's *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* following the collapse of *apartheid*,<sup>1</sup> Tutu listened repeatedly to literally thousands of requests for amnesty from White, Black, and

<sup>1</sup>Apartheid was a system of state-sponsored and enforced [racial segregation](#) introduced into [South Africa](#) at the end of World War II. The system seriously curtailed the civil liberties and political freedoms of the country's majority black inhabitants and others through the use of strictly enforced identity cards, cruel punishments, torture, imprisonment, and state-sponsored executions and murders of dissident leaders (Apartheid 2014).



“Colored” South Africans for the brutal crimes they committed against their fellow citizens during the period of apartheid (1948–1994). The litany of the variety of ways in which men seem capable of torturing, murdering, and otherwise oppressing their neighbors seemed to be without limits and outside the capacity of most people to grasp. What made the nature of these crimes even worse was the fact that nearly all of them were sanctioned by the state and initiated against its own citizens, including against Tutu himself. Ultimately, Tutu, much like Nelson Mandela (1918–2013) before him, determined that forgiveness, rather than punishment, was the most effective approach for helping victims and their victimizers rebuild their lives in a new, more pluralistic, society. Concluded Tutu (n.d.a):

Forgiving is not forgetting; it’s actually remembering—remembering and not using your right to hit back. It’s a second chance for a new beginning. And the remembering part is particularly important. Especially if you don’t want to repeat what happened.

Elsewhere Tutu (n.d.b) elaborated on the complexities involved in taking the path of forgiveness in seeking to come to terms with those who have injured us:

Forgiving and being reconciled to our enemies or our loved ones are not about pretending that things are other than they are. It is not about patting one another on the back and turning a blind eye to the wrong. True reconciliation exposes the awfulness, the abuse, the hurt, the truth. It could even sometimes make things worse. It is a risky undertaking but in the end it is worthwhile, because in the end only an honest confrontation with reality can bring real healing. Superficial reconciliation can bring only superficial healing.

### 1.5.5 Does Forgiveness Also Necessitate Forgiving Ourselves for Our Own Imperfections and for the Injustices That We Have Inflicted on Others?

The act of forgiveness does not just involve forgiving others for their misdeeds. Forgiveness also

involves *self-forgiveness*, a process that is infinitely more complex and more emotionally draining than that associated with the forgiveness of others. Forgiving the self means forgiving our imperfections, our transgressions, and other negative acts committed against others, our failure to carry out our responsibilities appropriately, and our unwillingness to assist others who sought our help in solving difficult problems or situations they were confronting.

Feelings of guilt, shame, embarrassment, and humiliation frequently are associated with self-forgiveness. But such feelings must be acknowledged, confronted, and resolved if we are to achieve a heightened sense of well-being. Holding on to such feelings only gives them more power over our lives than they deserve.

The recently deceased American poet and social observer, Maya Angelou (1928–2014) (Fig. 1.9), a victim of child sexual assault by her mother’s boyfriend, spoke touchingly of the connection that exists between forgiveness of others and the forgiveness of one’s self. In an interview



**Fig. 1.9** Maya Angelou (1928–2014). (Photo by York College ISLGP; [https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Maya\\_Angelou#/media/File:Maya\\_Angelou\\_visits\\_YCP\\_Feb\\_2013.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/?title=Maya_Angelou#/media/File:Maya_Angelou_visits_YCP_Feb_2013.jpg); Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license)

with Linda Harris of the Context Institute, Angelou (Wolf, 1995/1996: 45) reflected,

I don't know if I continue, even today, always liking myself. But what I learned to do many years ago was to forgive myself. It is very important for every human being to forgive herself or himself because if you live, you will make mistakes—it is inevitable. But once you do and you see the mistake, then you forgive yourself and say, 'Well, if I'd known better I'd have done better,' that's all...and then you say to yourself, 'I'm sorry.' If we all hold on to the mistake, we can't see our own glory in the mirror because we have the mistake between our faces and the mirror; we can't see what we're capable of being...The real difficulty is to overcome how you think about yourself.

For neither Bishop Tutu nor Dr. Angelou does a separation exist between well-being and forgiveness. Both states of being are understood to be intertwined, much like the two sides of a coin are integral to its properties as a coin. Both processes are mutually reinforcing. But the process of forgiveness must be undertaken if we are to relieve ourselves of the feelings of blame, anger, hatred, guilt, shame, and humiliation that are so intricately tied to the absence of forgiveness. Holding on to such feelings only disadvantages us in the search for well-being and, for many, may prevent its attainment entirely (Worthington et al. 2007).

### 1.5.6 Is Gratitude an Essential Component of Well-Being?

Gratitude has only recently been recognized as an essential element in our search for well-being (Emmons 2013; Toussaint and Friedman 2009). Referring to our feelings of thankfulness and appreciation for that which we already have—life itself, family, friends, being able to contribute to events larger than ourselves, the beauty of the environment that surrounds us, and so on—gratitude acknowledges and reinforces the positives that occur in our lives. French journalist, critic, and novelist Alphonse Karr (1808–1890) noted in his collection of essays *A tour round my garden* (Karr 1856/2008), “Some people grumble that roses have thorns; I am grateful that thorns



**Fig. 1.10** Greek philosopher Epicurus of Samos (341 BCE–270 BCE). (Photo by Keith Schengili-Roberts; bust of Epicurus, from the Pergamon Museum, Berlin; <https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epicuro#/media/File:Epicurus-PergamonMuseum.png>; Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license)

have roses.” Writing more than 2200 years earlier, the Greek philosopher Epicurus of Samos (341 BCE–270 BCE) (Fig. 1.10) urged us, “Do not spoil what you have by desiring what you have not; remember that what you now have was once among the things you only hoped for.” For Epicurus, the purpose of life was to attain a happy, tranquil, and peaceful existence characterized by *aponia*, i.e., the absence of pain and fear and by living a self-sufficient life surrounded by friends (Epicurus 2014). To have achieved this state of comfort was more than sufficient for attaining well-being. For Epicurus, it was well-being itself.

Cicero (2013), writing two centuries after Epicurus (c. 106 BCE–43 BCE), told us, “Gratitude is not only the greatest of virtues, but the parent of all others.” Iconic American poet Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882), writing 2000 years later, enjoined us to, “Cultivate the habit of being grateful for every good thing that



comes to you, and to give thanks continuously. And because all things have contributed to your advancement, you should include all things in your gratitude.” (Emerson, as cited in Goodreads, 2015). The martyred German Lutheran pastor and theologian Christian Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906–1945), in his *Letters and Papers from Prison* (Bonhoeffer 1953), written only months before his execution at the hands of his Nazi jailors, told us,

In normal life we hardly realize how much more we receive than we give, and life cannot be rich without such gratitude. It is so easy to overestimate the importance of our own achievements compared with what we owe to the help of others.


Continuing in the same tradition as Bonhoeffer and the Ancients, Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th and current Tibetan Dalai Lama (n.d.), instructs his followers:

Every day, think as you wake up, today I am fortunate to be alive, I have a precious human life. I am not going to waste it. I am going to use all my energies to develop myself, to expand my heart out to others; to achieve enlightenment for the benefit of all beings. I am going to have kind thoughts towards others, I am not going to get angry or think badly about others. I am going to benefit others as much as I can.

Gratitude, then, is an essential building block in constructing our internal sense of well-being. To feel otherwise is to miss out on many of the wondrous experiences that life offers us on a daily basis.

### 1.5.7 To What Extent and in What Ways Do Gratitude, Forgiveness, Intentionality, and Purposefulness Combine to Increase the Likelihood of Attaining a Heightened Sense of Well-Being?

The interactions that occur between these four cornerstones of well-being join with the need for purposefulness and intentionality in advancing toward steadily higher levels of well-being. It is the variations that emerge from these interactions



**Fig. 1.11** Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807–1882). (Photo of a painting by P. Krämer published by Friedrich Bruckmann Verlag München Berlin London; reproduced by Günter Josef Radig; public domain)

that make possible movement toward heightened states of well-being. Though sometimes slow to manifest themselves, such forces are nonetheless present and at work within us. They are never passive.

The nineteenth century American poet Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (1807–1882) (Fig. 1.11) commented on the interactive nature of gratitude, forgiveness, intentionality, and purpose as elements of well-being by referring to the sense of emotional coldness, or aloofness, that some people project in their relationships with others. Wrote Longfellow, “Every man has his secret sorrows which the world knows not; and often times we call a man cold when he is only sad” (Longfellow 1988). In the context of our discussion, the sadness that Longfellow refers to emanates from repeated disappointments in life. It also results from the frustrations we feel in false starts toward the quest for well-being, life satisfaction, and happiness.

Of importance, too, is that these frustrations are related to our unwillingness to let go of past disappointments. Ultimately, though, all of these feelings must be put aside if we are to advance in our search for well-being. The more of these

seemingly “magical” ingredients that we can bring together in the immediacy of the moment, the less sadness we will feel and, in turn, the greater the likelihood of our success in attaining heightened levels of well-being. Longfellow’s sad man need not be an archetype or characterization of ourselves, but we must clearly work at it not becoming so.

### 1.5.8 Can One Be Selfish and, at the Same Time, Attain Progressively Higher Levels of Well-Being?

Indeed, selfishness is associated with the immature behavior of children and, most often, is abhorred in communities of adults. Selfishness is recognized widely to be the antithesis of well-being even in highly competitive, individualized, and consumption-centered societies. Societies simply cannot function as effectively when some members of the community insist that their needs are greater than the needs of others and must be satisfied first. Societies would simply crumble under the weight of personal expectations. Mature societies do not function this way, especially if there is to be an essential level of organization and orderliness in the ways they conduct their public affairs. In due course, everyone’s needs can be expected to be met—from the simplest to the most complex—but not at the same time, in the same way, and without steady infusions of new resources to finance the meeting of those needs.

American playwright Tennessee Williams (Kazan 1988: 326) (Fig. 1.12) addressed the poisonous aspects of selfishness in collective life in this way,

Nobody sees anybody truly but all through the flaws of their own egos. That is the way we all see . . . each other in life. Vanity, fear, desire, competition—all such distortions within our own egos—condition our vision of those in relation to us. Add to those distortions to our own egos the corresponding distortions in the egos of others, and you see how cloudy the glass must become through which we look at each other. That’s how it is in all living relationships except when there is that rare



**Fig. 1.12** Tennessee Williams (1911–1983). (Photo by Orlando Fernandez, World Telegram staff photographer; reproduction rights transferred to Library of Congress through Instrument of Gift)

case of two people who love intensely enough to burn through all those layers of opacity and see each other’s naked hearts.

### 1.5.9 Is Benevolence, Rather Than Selfishness, the Currency of Well-Being?

If not selfishness, then what must be the guiding principles upon which to organize our search for a heightened sense of well-being in our relationships with others? The answer to this question is straightforward—charity, benevolence, and a willingness to postpone the satisfaction of our “wants” until the “needs” of other are first met. Irish playwright and *bon vivant* Oscar Wilde (1854–1900) wrote (Wilde 1909):

Selfishness is not living as one wishes to live; it is asking others to live as one wishes to live. And unselfishness is letting other people’s lives alone, not interfering with them. Selfishness always aims at uniformity of type. Unselfishness recognizes infinite variety of type as a delightful thing, accepts it, acquiesces in it, and enjoys it.

In stressing the need for benevolence in human relationships, English evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins (1976) wrote, “Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish.” Martin Luther King Jr. (1929–1968), in addressing a civil rights gathering in March 1963, said, “Every man (and woman) must decide whether he will walk in the light of creative altruism or in the darkness of destructive selfishness” (King 1963). Aristotle (384 BCE–322 BCE), in writing about the importance of benevolence in strengthening social solidarity between the different classes of people found in every society, taught us in the *Politics* (Aristotle 356 BCE),

Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy; measures therefore should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the interest of all classes, the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among its poor, if possible, in such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade or husbandry.

So important is the commitment to selflessness and benevolence in community life to our attainment of well-being that their centrality has become enshrined in the religious teachings of all major faith traditions. The twelfth century rabbi, philosopher, and physician Moses Maimonides (1135–1204), living in Islamic Spain, for example, reflected on the importance of charity (*Tzedakah*) toward others and identified an eight-level hierarchical system of more preferred and less preferred forms of charitable giving. He identified the second most pure form of charity (literally “love”) as anonymous gifts made by anonymous benefactors to anonymous beneficiaries (*Tzedakah* 2014).<sup>2</sup> Gifts to the unknown stranger were preferred over gifts made to intimates and others with whom the benefactor

<sup>2</sup>For Maimonides, the first, or purest, form of charity entailed “Giving an interest-free loan to a person in need; forming a partnership with a person in need; giving a grant to a person in need; finding a job for a person in need; so long as that loan, grant, partnership, or job results in the person no longer living by relying upon others” (*Tzedakah* 2014).

already had a relationship. A similar expectation is expressed in the *Qur’an* as revealed to the Prophet Mohammed by the angel Gabriel between 610 and 632 of the Common Era,

If you give charity in public, it is worthwhile (for it will persuade others), but if you hide and deliver it to the poor in secret that is (far) better for you. And Allah will remove from you some of your sins (due to this charity). And Allah is Aware of all that you do” (Al-Baqarah 2:271).

The expectations associated with religiously inspired charity, especially private or anonymous charity, are stated over and over again in Jewish, Christian, and Islamic sacred texts as well as in the summaries of the life and teachings of the Prophet contained in the *Sunnah*. All Abrahamic religions teach that it is far “better to give than to receive,” even in situations in which what we have to give is very little. The lesson of the widow’s mite in the New Testament amply illustrates this point.<sup>3</sup>

All three Abrahamic traditions have formulae concerning the percentage of an individual’s wealth that is to be shared with the poor and with the community at large (tithing). The Islamic tradition of the *zakat* also requires that charitable donations be made for the building of mosques and to support religious clerics and religious schools (madrasas) (*Zakat* 2014). The expectation also exists for Islamic giving in support of the mandatory journey of Muslims to Mecca at least once in their lifetime (the *hajj*) and to support the collection and redistribution of religiously prepared food (*halal*) to poor people living in areas where it otherwise would not be available in the quantities needed. All of these voluntary, though prescribed actions, increase the individual’s sense of well-being and raise the level of well-being for the Muslim community as a whole.

Charitable giving in Buddhism, Taoism, Hinduism, and other major faith traditions also reflects more or less the same principles, albeit with the prescriptions that even larger shares of

<sup>3</sup>The lesson of the widow’s mite is presented in the Synoptic Gospels (Mark 12:41–44, Luke 21:1–4), in which Jesus is teaching at the Temple in Jerusalem.

one's wealth should be given to the poor and others engaged in religious pilgrimages of various types. The same principles that inform Abrahamic traditions of benevolence inform these faith traditions as well: "Again I tell you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for someone who is rich to enter the kingdom of God" (Matthew 19:24).

Thus, religiously inspired charitable giving leads to a heightened sense of spiritual well-being that in turn leads to more generalized well-being for the alms givers as well as for those who benefit from the giving. This dynamic part of the reciprocity requirement for well-being fits comfortably with societal norms and expectations concerning individual and collective acts of charity. The experience of well-being, even happiness, that many of us have in giving to others in need is instructive of the central role that giving plays in our journey toward a heightened sense of well-being. And these feelings are associated with more humanitarian giving as well, especially for persons who do not adhere to particular faith traditions.

### 1.5.10 Is Personal Wealth a Guarantee of Well-Being?

Preeminent star of the American musical theatre, Sophie Tucker (1884–1966), is widely quoted as saying (Tucker n.d.), "I have been rich and I've been poor. Rich is better." A popular slogan appearing on posters in college dorm rooms states, "Poverty sucks!" (The poster also typically portrays a man dressed to the hilt in horse riding clothing holding a glass of champagne, with his foot lifted onto the bumper of a Rolls Royce.) On a more serious note, Plato (c. 428/427 BCE–348/347 BCE) wrote in the *Republic* (2005), "No wealth can ever make a bad man at peace with himself." Aristotle, writing in Book 6 of the *Politics* noted, "Poverty is the parent of revolution and crime" (Aristotle 356 BCE). In each case, and by implication, wealth is something that is to be managed on behalf of others. Wealth holders experience a great sense of responsibility in this regard, and many of the richest men and women

in the world devote the bulk of their fortunes to socially productive investments and philanthropy (Bellah et al. 2007).

We know from social science research that wealth and well-being are positively correlated with one another, at least up to a point. Beyond a certain level of accumulation, however, more wealth contributes little or almost nothing to our sense of well-being (Easterlin et al. 2010). Indeed, too much wealth, combined with overconsumption, can actually diminish our prospects for attaining a heightened sense of well-being inasmuch as so much of our energy is poured into acquiring and managing assets. This situation is especially apparent when we substitute "things" for "people" and, in the process, attempt to convince ourselves that things matter more than quality interpersonal relationships.

Wealth can also frequently serve as a negative force in our relationships with others by placing a distance between them and ourselves or by the attraction of others to us for the wrong reasons. Many wealthy people accommodate to this situation in one of three ways: (1) devaluing the importance of wealth as wealth and, instead, looking on wealth as a measure of their social standing among their peers; (2) overconsuming their wealth to the point that whatever they own or possess has comparatively little meaning thereafter (after all, how many houses can one live in or how many luxury cars can one drive?); or (3) redistributing the wealth to others—including to family and friends, persons known to them who are in special need, or by becoming philanthropists who support major community projects. The latter activity is especially popular as wealthy people age and wish to (1) divest themselves of the fortunes they have accumulated; or (2) use their wealth to do good on behalf of the community, e.g., supporting charitable organizations, building extensions to hospitals and universities, endowing scholarships for promising young people, or investing in social entrepreneurs whose work will substantially increase the value of the initial investments. Viewed from the perspective of well-being, the possession of great wealth can pose significant challenges to the well-being of the wealth holders.

The situation for poor people is quite different. English poet, essayist, moralist, novelist, literary critic, biographer, editor, and lexicographer Samuel Johnson (1709–1784) wrote (Johnson 1782): “Resolve not to be poor: whatever you have, spend less. Poverty is a great enemy to human happiness; it certainly destroys liberty, and it makes some virtues impracticable, and others extremely difficult.”

As illustrated by Johnson, well-being for the poor is contingent on possessing at least the minimal levels of wealth needed to meet their most basic needs and wants. Beyond that threshold, increasing levels of income or wealth may or may not positively affect their sense of well-being.

Of interest, too, is that much of the “wealth” of the poor is not in money or material possessions but rather in the nature, extent, and quality of their social relationships with others, but especially with family members and kinship systems. Research has shown repeatedly that many poor people have huge stores of “social” capital even in the absence of “fiscal” capital. Of the two types of capital, the former, as reflected in the recent award-winning film directed by Roko Belic, *Happy* (2011), is perceived to be more important. This view likely accounts for the high rankings reported by Gallup and other polls on measures of happiness, life satisfaction, and well-being reported by people living in societies with only low to moderate income levels (Clifton 2012; Veenhoven 2014). Money and material possessions simply do not matter as much to these people relative to the importance they place on the strength of emotional attachments to family, friends, and the larger community (e.g., their churches, schools, and credit unions).

On balance, then, one should not expect that large sums of money are going to result in proportional increases in happiness levels or in a heightened sense of well-being. One’s material needs will be more than amply met but, still, each of us must embark on an internal journey that is far less materialistic. Money is important for rich and poor alike but only to an extent and always in ways that reflect those things and people about which the rich and poor care most deeply. American economist Richard Easterlin refers to

this phenomenon as the “wealth paradox” (Easterlin et al. 2010). Other major thinkers in the happiness studies field—psychologists Robert Cummins (2014), Ed Diener (Diener and Biswas-Diener 2008), Joseph Sirgy (2012), and Ruut Veenhoven (2014)—refer to it as a state of “eudaimonia,” i.e., a contented state of being happy and healthy and prosperous first identified by Aristotle.

### 1.5.11 Are Socially Constructed Forms of Discrimination Obstacles to Well-Being?

The practice of apartheid in South Africa and the Nazi persecution of the Jews during the Second World War were among the most onerous forms of discrimination to manifest themselves during the century that just ended. But they were not the only large-scale atrocities that occurred during the century. Indeed, the century began with the brutal cleansing in 1915 of Christian Armenian minorities from much of Ottoman Turkey, culminating in the century’s first genocide in which more than 1.5 million people perished. Others have occurred, and some, such as those currently taking place in the name of Islam in Syria and Iraq, are still emerging as this book is being written. All are deeply rooted in regional historical realities and a general lack of acceptance of the differences that exist between people. In all cases, discrimination and persecution to the point of genocide (largely on the basis of factors over which people have no control—age, gender, race, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation), are life-denying forces for all involved. Discrimination on the basis of factors over which people can exercise a degree of control, but should not be asked to do so, is also life-denying, e.g., religion and religious beliefs, language and dialect. All of these practices severely limit our capacity for attaining the level of well-being that we seek.

The American novelist, essayist, playwright, poet, and social critic James Baldwin (1924–1987) (Fig. 1.13) captured the inherent contradictions of discrimination and well-being for the oppressor in his 1965 essay *White Man’s Guilt*:





**Fig. 1.13** James Baldwin (1924–1987). (Photo by Allan Warren; [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/James\\_Baldwin\\_37\\_Allan\\_Warren.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/James_Baldwin_37_Allan_Warren.jpg); Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license)



**Fig. 1.14** Anne Frank (1929–1945). (Photo by TEDx NJLibraries; <https://www.flickr.com/photos/tedxnlbraries/4609595373/>; Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license)

This is the place in which, it seems to me, most white Americans find themselves. They are dimly, or vividly, aware that the history they have fed themselves is mainly a lie, but they do not know how to release themselves from it... This incoherence is heard nowhere more plainly than in those stammering, terrified dialogues white Americans sometimes entertain with that black conscience, the black man in America.

The nature of this stammering can be reduced to a plea: “Do not blame me. I was not there. I did not do it. My history has nothing to do with Europe or the slave trade. Anyway, it was your chiefs who sold you to me.”

Other authors have also reflected on the contradictions that exist between overt forms of discrimination and the attainment of well-being. One such reflection is that voiced by a 16-year German Jewish girl hiding from Nazi persecution in the carefully hidden space of an Amsterdam home. Writing in her diary just months before her capture and subsequent death in a concentration camp, Anne Frank (1929–1945) (Fig. 1.14) wrote (Frank 1944/1952),

Who has inflicted this upon us? Who has made us Jews different from all other people? Who has allowed us to suffer so terribly up till now? It is God that has made us as we are, but it will be God, too, who will raise us up again. If we bear

all this suffering and if there are still Jews left, when it is over, then Jews, instead of being doomed, will be held up as an example. Who knows, it might even be our religion from which the world and all peoples learn good, and for that reason and that reason alone do we have to suffer now. We can never become just Netherlanders, or just English, or representatives of any country for that matter; we will always remain Jews, but we want to, too.

Eventually more than 11 million people would perish in this unimaginable holocaust (1939–1945), the majority of whom were European Jews of Czech, Dutch, French, Hungarian, Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, and even German extraction. Others who perished during this holocaust were members of sexual minority groups, persons with mental illnesses and other disabilities, the impaired aged, Catholics, and political dissidents. The list of “social undesirables” under Nazi administration was long and continuously increased to include new groups of people until virtually no group lived without fear of becoming a target of genocide.

The Jewish holocaust of the Second World War followed on the heels of the brutal Armenian genocide that took place in Ottoman Turkey in



1915. The then U.S. Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau Sr., commented in 1919 concerning his reflections on the genocide,

When the Turkish authorities gave the orders for these deportations (of the Armenians from Turkey), they were merely giving the death warrant to a whole race; they understood this well, and, in their conversations with me, they made no particular attempt to conceal the fact...I am confident that the whole history of the human race contains no such horrible episode as this. The great massacres and persecutions of the past seem almost insignificant when compared to the sufferings of the Armenian race in 1915.

Discriminatory behavior toward others, especially the mass murders or systematic acts of violence directed at entire population groups, is contradictory to collective well-being. Such behavior also impedes personal well-being, given the enormous sense of guilt that many perpetrators of such violence experience. The English preacher, essayist, and poet, John Donne (1572–1731), captured the essence of this contradiction in the opening lines of his frequently cited poem “No Man Is an Island” (Donne 1995):

No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main. If a cloud be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were: any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom the bells tolls; it tolls for thee.

Donne clearly understood at least two features of the human personality: (1) that ultimately all of us are joined together through our common humanity; and (2) what good or ill we do toward others ultimately will come back to us. Thus, in Donne's words, no man is an island unto himself and none of our actions are taken in isolation from others. All have direct consequences for our sense of well-being, life satisfaction, and the extent of happiness that we share with others. To the extent that we poison these relationships through intolerance of others, we poison ourselves.

### 1.5.12 What Are the Contributions of Choice and Decision to Well-Being?

The steps that must be taken toward attaining a heightened sense of well-being are neither passive nor submissive. One must repeatedly and actively seek well-being in a manner that requires discipline and persistence. In doing so, we engage in all of the elementary steps already identified as well as those that have not yet been introduced.

The multifaceted processes involved in attaining well-being are not unlike those we engage in when seeking higher levels of life satisfaction or happiness. Each involves many people each contributing something that is unique to the process. And the outcomes of these efforts result in unique well-being profiles—some more complex and elaborate than others. The internal and social skills available to individuals to carry out this process also are unique, albeit their most general pursuit shares many characteristics that are held in common. The task can be made simpler and richer, of course, when others join with us in seeking mutually beneficial levels of well-being. Indeed, the interactive nature of the search for well-being is one of its most common features among people worldwide, especially when the most basic steps are expressed in the form of religious practices or cultural rituals. Such communal experiences can effectively launch us on our own, more personal, search for heightened levels of well-being, a pattern that is typical for people everywhere and is frequently referred to as a “quest journey” or even “the search for identity.” The pattern of personal searches undertaken alone or in combination with communal searches, or both, has always typified the search for well-being, life satisfaction, and happiness. Indeed, such searches form the substance of our most enduring mythologies and stories from Gilgamesh to Odysseus of ancient times, to the search for the Holy Grail of the Middle Ages, to the cross-laden pilgrimages undertaken by Christians walking in the steps of Christ along the streets of the Via Dolorosa, to the public rituals engaged in by young people conferring them with adult status.

All of these personal quests, searches, sacrifices, and forms of public recognition have the pursuit of a heightened sense of well-being as their principal objective.

Common to all of the preceding actions is the role of personal choice in meeting the challenges that confront us. The challenges are real, as are the choices. Each has profound consequences for our pursuit of well-being. The same patterns exist among the Aboriginal people of Australia, the pygmies of Central Africa, and the young Native Americans of Canada and the United States who are engaged in their own quest for recognition and a heightened sense of well-being in the eyes of their families and the larger community. The search is a universal one, albeit many qualities necessarily are adapted to the unique needs, preferences, and choices of local cultures. The outcomes sought in all situations, though, are the same, i.e., a heightened sense of well-being, life satisfaction, and happiness. The work of the Australia-based International Wellbeing Group (2015) has been particularly instrumental in identifying the common and different psychological dimensions of well-being across many societies.

Each society has found its own communal gateway to help people gain or restore the conditions that are necessary for achieving well-being within the context of their own sociocultural realities. Undertaking the Haj to Mecca, for example, is one socially sanctioned approach to attaining spiritual well-being for Muslims everywhere in the world. In India, the world's second most populous country after China, fully a third of the country's population lives along the banks of the Ganges river—the river of life, death, and renewal in Hindu religious tradition. To die in Benares (Varanasi) is one of the major milestones in life to which many religious Hindus aspire. To do so, families frequently make many extraordinary sacrifices to travel to Benares with their near-dead relatives so that they can die there and have their cremains join with those of thousands of others in the swift currents of the Ganges River (McBride 2014).

All of these actions require intentional personal choices to realize. And those choices are possible only under conditions of freedom and in

situations in which others are able to join with us in carrying out the prescribed tasks needed to achieve the desired levels of well-being. None of these choices can be exercised under conditions of controlled freedom or in situations where personal freedoms are denied entirely.

### 1.5.13 Is the Attainment of Well-Being a Solitary Journey?

The search for well-being is not a solitary journey. Even persons living in cloistered communities seek to attain well-being in relationship with other members of their communities. Certainly there is a time and a place for solitude in advancing well-being, but isolation only sets the framework that is needed for introspection and the development of an enlightened sense of gratitude. The latter, as we shall learn, is an especially important element in the quest for well-being. All of these “inward-looking” processes are carried out in the context in which each of us makes a discrete contribution to the well-being of others.

The importance of “the other” in our search for well-being is reflected in the African philosophy of Ubuntu, which teaches us that “...individuals become real only through their relationships with others, in a community or group” (Okolo 1992). That is to say, personhood, the Ubuntu ultimate expression of humanity, can only be achieved through meaningful relationships with others. Such persons have given us life, functioned as our families, served as fellow members of our more or less closed communities, and have transferred to us the norms, values, traditions, and history of our people as a collective. They were our teachers, our doctors, our caregivers when young or sick and, in the end, will be the persons who dispose of our mortal remains following death. Our families and communities have even given us the name by which we are known to others. Everywhere in the world, even in the anonymity of impersonal urban areas, the communities that we create perform many of the same functions as families and kinship systems in more rural communities. The attainment of a heightened sense of well-being is possible in

either situation inasmuch as each one can provide the quality of emotional relationships needed to advance our maturation.


But relationships in large communities depend less on formally prescribed hierarchical roles and more on the sense of equality that characterizes much of life in larger communities.

Writing from this perspective, the French existentialist philosopher and Nobel laureate for literature, Albert Camus (1913–1960), in a quote often attributed to him, remarked, “Don’t walk behind me; I may not lead. Don’t walk in front of me; I may not follow. Just walk beside me and be my friend” (Camus n.d.). Even the German existentialist Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) (Fig. 1.15) tells us that, “It is not a lack of love, but a lack of friendship that makes unhappy marriages” (Nietzsche n.d.). Both Nietzsche and Camus are tapping into the same elementary forces necessary to attain well-being albeit the level of intimacy involved in the relationships

between ourselves and others varies considerably. The prescribed formula for attaining well-being may differ in some respects by locale but, in the end, the sense of well-being draws on the same set of internal and interpersonal coping skills. Ancient Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu (c. 604 BCE–531 BCE) (Fig. 1.16), in discussing more or less the same phenomenon, cautions us to “Manifest plainness, Embrace simplicity, Reduce selfishness, Have few desires” (Tzu 1913). Thus, the end purpose of all of these interactions with others, whatever their nature, is precisely the same, i.e., to suppress the personal supremacy of our own egos to permit others into our lives. The critical social contributions that are made by each party to the relationship are precisely “the stuff” of which well-being is made.

#### 1.5.14 To What Extent Is the Attainment of Well-Being a Reciprocal Process Between Ourselves and Others?

Viewed from the perspectives already identified, that which others gave freely to us—love, nourishment, caring, protection—in due course is expected to be returned. Those to whom we give those gifts, of course, are not likely to be the same persons that gave them to us originally inasmuch as many will have passed away as we mature. Instead, most of us will pass on those gifts to the members of the families that we form (spouses, children, and others), to the organizations that we join, and to the communities in which we live. Many will return the gifts through exceptionally productive careers whose activities benefit others in ways that are both seen and unseen. Still others will engage in recurring acts of benevolence undertaken on behalf of persons unknown to them and whom they will never meet. All of these “gift exchanges” can be expected to add measurably to our sense of well-being and, for many of us, the returns received often are far greater than those originally given to us.



**Fig. 1.15** Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900). (Photo taken at studio Gebrüder Siebe, Leipzig, around 1869; scan processed by Anton, 2005; [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich\\_Nietzsche#/media/File:Nietzsche187c.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Friedrich_Nietzsche#/media/File:Nietzsche187c.jpg); public domain)

**Fig. 1.16** Lao Tzu (c. 604 BCE–531 BCE). (Photo by Grace Wong; some rights reserved by tom@hk; <https://www.flickr.com/photos/gracewong/2175595214/sizes/o/>; Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license)



The author is frequently reminded of the unique nature of the relationship that takes place when we give blood to others. What gift can be more unique and life giving than that of blood to a person in need. British social policy specialist, Richard Titmuss (1907–1973), wrote extensively on this topic and always recognized it as one of the most selfless acts in which people can engage (Titmuss 1970). The same relationship exists between organ donors and the recipients of those organs. The relationships are highly unique and can only be appreciated through the eyes of those who have received these life extending gifts—often as a result of the death of another. Organ gifts from live donors are especially valued and contribute substantially to the well-being of both the living donor and the living recipient, including those situations in which neither party is known to the other.

The successful pursuit of a high level of well-being is indeed reciprocal. The reciprocity may take place between people who are known to one another but, more frequently, neither the giver nor the receiver is known to the other, as occurs in acts of charity, benevolence, and philanthropy that are made through intermediaries who bring the resources donated together with the persons and institutions most in need of those resources. Both benefactors and recipients experience a

heightened sense of well-being as a result of these exchanges.

### 1.5.15 To What Extent Is the Pursuit of Well-Being a Linear or Curvilinear Process?

Life is too full of surprises to permit anything as important as the attainment of well-being to be realized without taking into account the obstacles that occur in all of our lives—sickness, disability, broken relationships, the death of loved ones. The process of attaining well-being also requires that we take into account the almost always uncontrollable, social, political, and economic patterns that exist in the wider environment. Recurring civil conflict, wars, major natural disasters, and even expressions of discrimination slow dramatically our attainment of a heightened sense of well-being. Each in its way either contributes to or inhibits our progress toward well-being.

In addressing the fluctuating nature of human progress, American entrepreneur and professor of marketing, Tim J. Smith (2003), wrote,

Progress is highly non-linear and sometimes non-existent. Onlookers may have trouble identifying it and, justifiably, may discount that progress is being



made. It often looks more like a hodgepodge of confusion or activities without tangible results.

Referring to historical events, each of us takes pride in the blossoming of knowledge associated with the Renaissance but find many to blame for the fall of Rome. After Rome fell the concept of zero and negative numbers, introduced to the collective human knowledge by ancients of Mesopotamia and India, became non-existent in Europe until the rebirth of knowledge in the Renaissance. If it weren't for northern Africa and Islamic culture, (we) might have lost this knowledge altogether during the European Dark Ages.

Smith's observations are equally applicable to the many "ups" and "downs" associated with the search for well-being. For every peak experience that we achieve there is often a concomitant valley, or even a series of valleys, resulting in significant interludes between peak experiences of well-being. However, the search for heightened levels of well-being must continue even if such experiences do not occur in a predictable and orderly manner.

Scholars in the social sciences describe the up-and-down pattern of attaining well-being as being either U-shaped (Graham 2012) or S-shaped (Estes and Wilensky 1978). The shapes represented by the letters U and S reflect changes that occur in well-being over the course of the human life cycle. The mismatch in our attainment of well-being is greatest when the demands for personal and family consumption are at greatest odds with the availability of resources to meet those demands. This period typically occurs following marriage and the appearance of children, albeit many couples today choose to have children without the institution of marriage. Pressures to find secure work, to obtain affordable housing, and to generate sufficient cash flows to meet the ever-increasing demands for health care, child-care, and the like are greatest during this stage of the adult life cycle.

Not surprisingly, this stage is also when couples fall into increasing levels of indebtedness (mortgages and consumer debit), all of which further intensify the mismatch between resources and consumption. This developmental trend, or life cycle "squeeze," continues for about two decades during which time children gradually mature and attain an emotional and economic

self-sufficiency from parents. Most leave the home of their family of origin entirely, thereby freeing couples to invest more in themselves and their delayed aspirations. The disparity between resources and consumption also occurs during the later stages in the adult life cycle as couples age, leave the economically active work force, and begin to live on what are for most people limited, increasingly meager, savings acquired over a lifetime of earnings.

Conversely, the pressures associated with the life-cycle squeeze are at their lowest among single people, employed couples without children, and couples whose children have left home. Periods of life-cycle squeeze are especially intense among the very elderly (80+) in most societies—persons who have survived the departure of children, the death of close friends, and often the death of their spouse. This stage is also when many very elderly persons have all but exhausted their life's savings and are living on minimal, even subsistence level, incomes (mostly pensions and, for some, episodic support from their children).

The ups and downs associated with each stage of the adult life cycle are more or less predictable. Obviously, couples with greater social and financial resources can use these resources to help absorb the emotional and financial shocks associated with periods of life-cycle squeeze. They can do so with more equanimity and self-respect. Most can also sustain relatively high levels of morale for long periods of time or until other, more overwhelming, emotional, economic, or health shocks occur in their lives (Zolli and Healy 2013).

The great majority of people, however, endure the shocks associated with periods of life-cycle squeeze with less composure; they seek, instead, to cope "as best they can." Some handle the stressful situations with calm, equanimity, and perseverance whereas others never fully recover from life-altering experiences such as the death of a spouse or the depletion of their financial resources. Those persons characterized by generally positive attitudes prior to major life-altering events are more likely to retain a high sense of well-being—referred to as "resiliency"—




**Fig. 1.17** Bobby McFerrin performing at the February 28–March 4, 2011 TED Conference. (Photo by Steve Jurvetson at <http://www.flickr.com/photos/jurvetson>; Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license)

whereas others feel crushed by major life events and experience agitation, anger, or depression (Frisch 2006; Lickerman 2012).

In approaching the on-going challenges and struggles associated with life, a quote frequently attributed to the American writer and cartoonist, Theodor “Dr. Seuss” Geisel (1904–1991), seems particularly appropriate. “Don’t cry because it’s over,” teaches Dr. Seuss, “smile because it happened.” Similarly, the popular American jazz-influenced vocalist and conductor Bobby McFerrin (Fig. 1.17) also is instructive on how to keep potentially negative forces from crushing us during periods of high stress or incapacitation (Clemson et al. 1988). Simply said in his popular 1988 song, McFerrin told us “Don’t worry, be happy...when you worry you make it double, don’t worry, be happy.”

Legendary American poet Carl Sandburg’s (1878–1967) (Fig. 1.18) quiet observations on the nature of happiness also add to our appreciation of the naturally occurring cycles of life and their relationship to happiness. Wrote Sandburg (1916),

I asked the professors who teach the meaning of life to tell me what is happiness. And I went to famous executives who boss the work of thousands of men. They all shook their heads and gave me a smile as though I was trying to fool with them. And then one Sunday afternoon I wandered out along the Desplaines River. And I saw a crowd of Hungarians under the trees with their women and children and a keg of beer and an accordion.



**Fig. 1.18** Carl Sandburg (1878–1967). (Photo by Al Ravenna, World Telegram staff photographer, from Library of Congress: New York World-Telegram & Sun Collection. Reproduction rights transferred to Library of Congress through Instrument of Gift; [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Carl\\_Sandburg\\_NYWTS.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Carl_Sandburg_NYWTS.jpg))

Writing from an equally more positive perspective, American thought leader Christian D. Larson (1874–1962) wrote (Larson 1912):

Promise yourself  
To be so strong that nothing  
can disturb your peace of mind.  
To talk health, happiness, and prosperity  
to every person you meet.

To make all your friends feel  
that there is something in them  
To look at the sunny side of everything  
and make your optimism come true.

To think only the best, to work only for the best,  
and to expect only the best.  
To be just as enthusiastic about the success of  
others  
as you are about your own.

To forget the mistakes of the past  
and press on to the greater achievements of the  
future.

To wear a cheerful countenance at all times  
and give every living creature you meet a smile.



To give so much time to the improvement of  
yourself  
that you have no time to criticize others.  
To be too large for worry, too noble for anger, too  
strong for fear,  
and too happy to permit the presence of trouble.

To think well of yourself and to proclaim this fact  
to the world,  
not in loud words but great deeds.  
To live in faith that the whole world is on your side  
so long as you are true to the best that is in you.

### 1.5.16 To What Extent Is Well-Being the Same for All People Everywhere in Both the Present and the Past?

Conceptions of the “good life” in the past may or may not have varied significantly for people bound by different cultures or different economic or political constraints. Well-being and its attainment may also have varied in response to the introduction of new technologies that appreciably altered the quality of life for tens of millions of people, e.g., indoor plumbing, central heating systems, the predictability of electricity, the introduction of telephones and other electronic forms of telecommunication, to name just a few. Certainly in our own modern societies we are impacted daily by the introduction of ever newer means of work productivity, communications systems, innovations in transportation and energy conservation, and the like. Even our use of currency as a form of economic exchange is rapidly disappearing along with our use of paper checks and paper-based accounting systems.

The world just ahead of us promises to be an exciting one, especially as we continue our exploration of nearby stars and planets. All of these dramatic innovations in science and technology are likely to significantly impact our sense of well-being as well as the variety of pathways that lead to its attainment. The internal search for a heightened state of well-being, however, is not likely to change in response to these technological innovations. As exciting and satisfying as new forms of transportation, telecommunications, and other inventions may be, they are not

substitutes for the equally exciting inner discoveries that lie ahead for each of us. Our journey toward a heightened state of well-being ultimately will prove as challenging as our journey to the stars. Certainly, the attainment of such inner discoveries will be essential to our continuous development into a more fully actualized collective of happy human beings.

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Alex C. Michalos and Daniel Weijers

*What is the highest of all the goods achievable in action? ...  
most people ... call it happiness, ...  
But they disagree about what happiness is ...*

(Aristotle 1934)

## 2.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a brief historical overview of Western philosophical views about well-being or quality of life from the eighth century before the Common Era (BCE) to the middle of the twentieth century. A comparison of the views discussed here with Eastern views described by Joshanloo (2014) reveals a number of similarities. However, since there has not been an enormous amount of cross-fertilization between Eastern and Western conceptions of well-being, the topics are discussed separately in this volume. We present diverse views of a family of well-being concepts emanating from questions about the best sort of life to lead, the best sort of person to be, the general world views from which these questions arise, and the best sorts of paths put forward leading to the desired goals. Because well-being itself is a complex concept, we begin by explaining how well-being and its cognates are related. Then, we introduce a framework for

understanding well-being as a broad concept that involves subjective and objective qualities of life.

This chapter presents a selection of the major notions of well-being from the known history of the Western world. Although this review is necessarily incomplete, we discuss some of the most salient and influential contributions from ancient Greece: the aristocratic values that were considered central to leading a good life, notions of personal and more expansive harmony as the key to well-being, and the idea that the experience of pleasure is all we should really care about. We also explain some of the major religious conceptions of the good life and their progression through the Middle Ages and beyond. More recent secular conceptions of well-being include several views on the importance of personal and public happiness. Finally, we discuss views to the effect that happiness is not enough for the good life and that we should strive for loftier goals.

### 2.1.1 Family of Well-Being Concepts

Since at least the fifth century BCE, the family of concepts connected to ideas of well-being has not been well-defined. From the earliest recorded writings of the most notable scholars in the Western world until the twenty-first century, a wide variety of terms have been used with an equally wide variety of explicit or implicit definitions. Indeed, leading scholars and policy makers

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continue to disagree about the most basic conceptual distinctions, such as whether health is a component of well-being or various forms of well-being constitute health (Michalos 1969). For example, the widely cited *Constitution of the World Health Organization* preamble says that “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (World Health Organization 1946). But, there are good reasons for not treating health as a synonym of well-being or quality of life. Michalos et al. (2005; 2011) provide empirical evidence that most people would not identify good health with a good life. It is enough to point out that identifying health with well-being or quality of life would mean that it would make no sense to ask “What is the impact of health on a person’s quality of life?” Yet, ordinarily, this question makes as much sense as “What is the impact of wealth on a person’s quality of life?” or “Regarding the quality of a person’s life, is it more important to be healthy, wealthy, wise or morally good?”

Recognizing the great variety of meanings assigned to basic terms in research on subjective well-being, Diener (2006) tried to bring some order and consistency to standard usage. Fifty scholars endorsed his short text. However, most of those who endorsed it only did so when acceptable caveats were added to proposed definitions or characterizations. There were so many caveats that order and consistency were not brought to the field. Following is an example from his guidelines:

Happiness has several meanings in popular discourse, as well as in the scholarly literature. For example, happiness can mean a general positive mood, a global evaluation of life satisfaction, living a good life, or the causes that make people happy, with the interpretations depending on the context. For this reason some researchers avoid using the term altogether. Scholars in some fields use the term frequently because of its important historical and popular roots, whereas scholars in other fields prefer to use more specific terms for the different aspects of well-being (Diener 2006: viii–ix). (All Diener quotes are used with kind permission from Springer Science + Business Media: *Journal of Happiness Studies*, Guidelines for national indicators of subjective well-being and ill-being, 7(1), v–xii; Diener, E.)

Some scholars think that the term *subjective well-being* is more precise than the term *happiness*. But, an unpublished survey of 74 leading researchers led Robert Cummins to conclude that subjective well-being was understood in a wide variety of ways, including contradictory ones. Diener (2006: viii) noted that “The term *well-being* is often used instead of *subjective well-being* because it avoids any suggestion that there is something arbitrary or unknowable about the concepts involved.” On the other hand (there is almost always another hand), some scholars use well-being and quality of life as rough synonyms. For these scholars, the idea of using well-being to designate only subjective well-being would be a huge mistake because well-being has many relatively objective as well as subjective features. As Diener (2006: ix) wrote, some scholars use quality of life in a broad sense “to include not only the quality of life circumstances, but also the person’s perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and reactions to those circumstances.” For these scholars (e.g., Michalos 2003), well-being and quality of life are essentially synonyms and require subjective and objective indicators for adequate measurement.

We use well-being and quality of life in this broad sense to mean what makes a person’s life go well for him or her or what makes the lives of members of a group go well for them. Therefore, when we discuss health, happiness, or other good features of lives, we take pains to be clear about whether they should be understood as one of many components of well-being, as the one and only component of well-being, or as a synonym for well-being.

### 2.1.2 A Framework for Understanding Quality of Life

One may think of the quality (or qualities) of life of an individual or community as a function of two variables: the actual conditions of that life and what an individual or community makes of those conditions. What a person or community makes of those conditions is in turn a function of



		<b>Subjective Features of Life</b>	
		Good	Bad
<b>Objective Features of Life</b>	Good	Real Paradise	Fool's Hell
	Bad	Fool's Paradise	Real Hell

**Fig. 2.1** Possible ways to describe or explain well-being

how the conditions are perceived, what is thought and felt about those conditions, what is done, and finally, what consequences follow from what is done. People's perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and actions, then, have an impact on their own and others' living conditions.

These two main variables (conditions of life and what people make of them) can be combined to construct four scenarios that, with a little exaggeration, may be described as different kinds of paradise and hell. The scenarios are explained below and the framework is depicted in Fig. 2.1.

1. If people's living conditions are good, and people accurately perceive and think about them, feel good, and act appropriately, we describe that as Real Paradise.
2. If people's living conditions are bad, and people accurately perceive and think about them, feel bad, and act appropriately, we describe that as Real Hell.
3. If people's living conditions are bad, and people inaccurately perceive and/or think about them, feel good, and act inappropriately, we describe that as the classical Fool's Paradise.
4. If people's living conditions are good, and people inaccurately perceive and/or think about them, feel bad, and act inappropriately, we describe that as a Fool's Hell.

Given the fragmented remains from the work of many of the writers considered here, it is impossible to rigorously apply this fourfold set of distinctions to everyone's views. Nevertheless, we use this framework to elucidate the views discussed in this chapter when we think it appropriate. By so doing, it is easier to understand where various thinkers located the determinants of well-being: in our heads or in our circumstances.

### 2.1.3 Historical Records

Choices must be made regarding exactly which historical records about well-being or the good life should be included and how they should be interpreted. Because literacy rates were very low compared to contemporary standards, what records we have were produced by relatively distinguished, elite individuals. Then, as now, such individuals tended to neglect socially disenfranchised groups like women, the poor, the elderly, the young, and foreigners.

Dover (1974) wrote a fine book dealing with what he called "popular morality" in the time of Plato and Aristotle (around 428– 322 BCE). The historical records he used included "(i) forensic oratory; (ii) political oratory; (iii) drama and epideictic oratory; (iv) epitaphs and dedicatory epigrams." He deliberately omitted any discussion of philosophical works except for occasional remarks made by philosophers in which the masses of ordinary people were characterized. In general, he thought (probably correctly) that philosophers tended to talk mainly to other philosophers and mainly about relatively theoretical issues concerning a good life, whereas authors from the four categories just noted more often talked to more ordinary people in less theoretical language. One could not expect that the characterizations of authors in the four groups were always more accurate than those of philosophers. After all, dramatists, lawyers, and politicians wrote for effect, often creating fictional characters and events designed to impress or persuade others. Granting the differences in historical records used and the pictures painted by diverse groups of authors, we have drawn mainly from



the works of a highly salient, influential set of philosophers. In principle at least, philosophers aim to discover and say what is true, whether or not it is particularly impressive or persuasive. Truth and persuasiveness are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but we are following the footsteps of those whose aims are most similar to our own.

The literature review that follows is incomplete and based on partial and imperfect sources. In many cases, we only have fragments to go on, and many of those fragments are likely to have been translated from a paraphrase of a quotation that was based entirely on hearsay. Indeed, were it not for the excellent analyses of scholars like McKirahan (1994), McMahon (2006, 2013), and others cited here, this overview would have been greatly impoverished, especially in regard to the views of the ancients. Finally, some passages about the ancient philosophers in this treatise have been adapted from Michalos and Robinson (2012).

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## 2.2 Major Philosophical and Hypothetical Conceptualizations of Well-Being

In this section we review some major conceptualizations of a good life, the good life, the quality of life, happiness, and well-being from Western historical tradition and provide specific examples of scholarly writings illustrating each conceptualization. We begin by discussing ancient views of well-being, drawn mainly from before and around the times of Socrates in ancient Greece. This discussion is focused on the aristocratic values that were considered central to leading a good life, notions of personal and more expansive harmony as the key to well-being, and the idea that the experience of pleasure is all we should really care about. Next, we explain religious conceptions of the good life, and their progression through the Middle Ages and beyond. Then, we discuss secular conceptions of well-being, including several views on the importance of personal and public happiness. Finally, we dis-

cuss views to the effect that happiness is not enough for the good life and that we should strive for loftier goals.

### 2.2.1 Aristocratic Values

Among the writers of the Archaic Age (c. 750–c. 480 BCE), questions about the best life for an individual, or about the best kind of person to be, had paramount importance. The heroes of the epic poems ascribed to Homer (eighth century BCE), the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, lived in societies governed by hereditary monarchies with the support of members of the aristocracy. They were larger-than-life characters, born to and raised in privileged, noble, and wealthy families, occasionally boasting gods or goddesses in their family trees, displaying physical attractiveness and dexterity as well as the qualities of practical and wise leadership, strength of character, courage, justice, generosity, and piety. These are the characteristics and values of those aristocrats. The best kinds of people were aristocrats, and the best kind of life was aristocratic. Enjoying all the advantages of nobility, such people would have a clear sense of *noblesse oblige* and act accordingly.

It is important to note that, whereas the characters and the general background stories that Homer was working with were inherited from centuries before (composed in a much more straightforwardly aristocratic time), Homer himself was writing at a time when society was transitioning to more democratic values. In Homer's time, people's vision of a good life began to change from that of competitive to cooperative success.

... the various strands of the Homeric heroic ideal began to unravel. In particular, good birth, wealth, and fighting ability no longer automatically went together. This sort of situation forced the issue: what are the best qualities we can possess? What constitutes human *arete* [i.e., excellence, virtue or goodness]? The literary sources contain conflicting claims about the best life for a person, the best kind of person to be, and the relative merits of qualities thought to be ingredients of human happiness (McKirahan 1994: 358).

The poems of Hesiod of Ascra (late eighth/early seventh century BCE) provide assessments of what was thought to be good or bad. In his *Works and Days*, along with some references to the deities Peace, Famine, and Disaster, readers are offered themes of the good life that are familiar and still attractive, i.e., flourishing and prosperous communities, populated by honest people, living in peace, enjoying the fruits of their labors, without worries about where the next meal will come from, with an absence of disease, and with justice for all. Later in the same poem, Hesiod describes the antithesis of a good society through a kind of inversion of these themes. In contemporary terms, one might say that Hesiod's bad society is one in which the institution of morality has been totally undermined, including people's sense of justice, resulting in the total destruction of its social capital.

## 2.2.2 Harmony

Harmony (*harmonia*) is probably the most frequently mentioned preferred feature of a good life in the period 550 to 250 BCE. Joshanloo (2014: 477) remarks that "One of the fundamental differences in Western and Eastern notions of happiness and a good life is that in the former, attempting to change, master, and control the world (including various aspects of one's life, relationships, and nature) is praised, whereas in the latter, adjustment to the environment, achieving harmony with others and the cosmos is prioritized."

If one compares contemporary Western psychological theory with Eastern philosophical theories, as Joshanloo did, the particular difference he describes in this passage is accurate. However, a comparison between Western ancient philosophical theories with Eastern philosophical theories reveals that diverse forms of harmony are common to both traditions.

We have already seen harmony in the poets' references to peace. It appears in a variety of forms from most of the important philosophers across the whole period. In fact, harking back to the games' ancient roots, the International Olympic

Committee (2007: 12) describes one of its Fundamental Principles as follows: "The goal of Olympism is to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity." Following are nine views about harmony in some sense and a life of good quality: (1) a soul's harmony within itself; (2) harmony among the nature of one's species, nature in general, and ideal law; (3) harmony as blending *daimones* with a Supreme Being; (4) a harmonious balance among an individual's internal atoms and the external atoms of his or her environment; (5) a harmonious balance among an individual's particular constitution, humors, diets, exercises, geography, seasonal climates, heavenly bodies, and government; (6) a harmonious combination of well-ordered souls in well-ordered cities; (7) ascetic harmony with nature; (8) a harmonious mixture of an active life with goods of the soul, goods of the body, and external goods; and (9) harmony with nature through virtuous action.

### 2.2.2.1 Soul's Harmony with Itself

Pythagoras of Samos (c. 570–c. 490) BCE imagined that the universe, which he called the *kosmos*, was an "intelligible, ordered whole," somehow held together or connected by *harmonia*, i.e., by some sort of principle of harmony, which he had shown was intimately related to numerical analysis (McKirahan 1994: 115). He apparently believed that all animals have immortal souls that at death transmigrate among diverse species, trading up or down as it were, depending partly on each individual's behavior and character. The aim of the relatively ascetic Pythagorean way of life was to bring increased harmony to an individual's soul, thereby improving that individual's chances for trading up rather than down in the next life. The good life we seek is the unobservable harmony of that unobservable entity, the immortal soul. This notion of a harmonious soul or a soul at peace with itself is to some extent a feature of our contemporary popular psychology, as revealed in remarks about people having or needing to "get it all together," "pull themselves together," and "getting your heart and head together."

### 2.2.2.2 Harmony Among the Nature of One's Species, Nature in General, and Ideal Law

Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 540–c. 480 BCE) posited a world constantly undergoing changes while preserving identities, e.g., the Nile River remains the Nile River across time though its waters undergo continuous change. For any of his contemporaries interested in defining “the” good life, the descriptive and evaluative relativism of some of his fragments would have been deeply disturbing. Possibly the most disturbing of all would have been this one: “to God all things are beautiful and good and just, but humans have supposed some unjust and others just” (McKirahan 1994: 125).

The good life is one lived in communities in which people willingly follow customs and obey conventional laws that are consistent with an ideal law sometimes referred to as “the divine law.” By linking behavior that is appropriate to the conditions of the world and to one’s own nature with ideal law, Heraclitus was perhaps the first ancient philosopher to articulate the basic premise of ethical naturalism (Michalos 1981). The harmony he sought was not merely within a person’s soul, but among a person’s nature, the nature of the world, and a universal ideal law.

### 2.2.2.3 Harmony as Blending *Daimones* with a Supreme Being

According to Empedocles of Acragas (c. 492–c. 432 BCE), human bodies were supposed to be wrapped around *daimones* as “an alien garb of flesh.” The *daimones* animating such bodies function like souls but have a special status that is grander than souls. *Daimones* are less exalted than the gods, but much more so than mortal flesh. Love and strife are names used to describe cosmic forces that are not only physical but psychological and moral as well. Love is sometimes referred to as friendship, joy, and harmony. Love, friendship, harmony, peace, social esteem and self-esteem, and joy are all positively valued, whereas strife, quarrels, murder, war, and human distress are all negative. Most importantly, love is a cosmic force that brings together the four elements (earth, air, fire, and water) in a kind of

orchestrated harmony producing a world in which *daimones* are blended with a Supreme Being.

### 2.2.2.4 Harmonious Balance Among an Individual’s Internal Atoms and the External Atoms of His or Her Environment

According to Democritus of Abdera (c. 460–c. 370 BCE; Fig. 2.2), the ultimate material building blocks of the universe were atoms, which were too small to be observed by human senses but were theoretically imagined to be unlimited in number, shape, and size and to be constantly in motion in an unlimited void. Human beings were thought to be unique clusters of compounds consisting of body and soul atoms that were equally material. According to his theory, good health was a function of a kind of dynamic equilibrium



**Fig. 2.2** Democritus of Abdera (c. 460–c. 370 BCE). Fresco transferred to canvas, Pinacoteca di Brera, Milan originally from the home of Gaspara Visconti; now in the Casa Panigarola, Milan: Crying Heraclitus and Laughing Democritus, 1477. [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bramante\\_heraclitus\\_and\\_democritus.jpeg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bramante_heraclitus_and_democritus.jpeg)

or harmonious balance among the internal atoms of an individual and the external atoms of his or her environment. In short, all observable mental and physical disorders could be explained by unobservable disordered and discordant atomic activity, whereas observable well-being could be explained by unobservable orderly and harmonious atomic activity. The Real Paradise that one aimed for required a harmonious balance among an individual's internal atoms and the external atoms of his or her environment.

Democritus was the first philosopher to recommend downward comparisons as part of a strategy for attaining happiness, i.e., judge your well-being by comparing yourself to someone worse off (Kahn 1998: 34–35). Insofar as he believed that this strategy was based on some aspect of human nature, Democritus' view should also be regarded as an ancient root of downward comparison theory as elucidated, for example, in Wills (1981). Because this theory is a species of the more generic social comparison theory (Merton and Kitt 1950), Democritus may be considered a pioneer of the latter as well. The idea of social comparison is to judge your well-being by comparing yourself to average people like yourself or to people in general.

### **2.2.2.5 Harmonious Balance Among an Individual's Particular Constitution, Humors, Diets, Exercises, Geography, Seasonal Climates, Heavenly Bodies, and Government**

The views of the Father of Medicine, Hippocrates of Cos (c. 450–c. 380 BCE), about the nature of well-being and ill-being are buried among the conflicting views of a variety of authors of the 60 books included in what is now called the Hippocratic Corpus (hereafter Corpus). There was no agreement on how many essential elementary building blocks the world required. Options ran from Thales's single watery substance to Democritus's infinite number of atoms and the void. Several authors of the Corpus drew on the work of Empedocles, especially his idea that the basic building blocks of the world were

the four elements—earth, air, fire, and water. These cosmic elements were supposed to be connected to four fluids called humors—fire to yellow bile, air to blood, water to phlegm, and earth to black bile.

In contemporary terms, one could say that the body of a man or woman was imagined to be like a cake whose appearance, texture, taste, and nutritional value depended upon each ingredient being of the right amount and proportionate to all other ingredients, blending together into the whole cake in accordance with nature's design. The default position of a human being was to be disease-free and healthy, “the greatest human blessing,” according to one author of the Corpus. Emphasizing again the themes of harmony and balance, departures from health were the result of departures from our natural formation and functions. It is a wonderfully optimistic view of the natural state of things, a state offering a quality of life that would be absolutely at odds with the “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” life of one in the state of nature imagined by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). A good life required a harmonious balance among an individual's particular constitution, humors, diet, exercise, geography, seasonal climates, heavenly bodies, and government.

Because of the complexity of individuals' constitutions, the diversity of foods, the seasons, ailments, and so on, it was impossible to find successful treatments without “some measure.” As some contemporary proponents of subjective well-being indicators and/or health-related quality of life measures might have written today, “... no measure, neither number nor weight, by reference to which knowledge can be made exact, can be found except bodily feeling [i.e., patients' self-reports]” (Hippocrates 1923: 27).

### **2.2.2.6 Harmonious Combination of Well-Ordered Souls in Well- Ordered Cities**

Plato of Athens (427–347 BCE) is probably best known for his magnum opus, *The Republic*. The central questions of *The Republic* are concerned with the nature of the best sort of life to live, the good life, “the life that for each of us would make



living most worthwhile” (Plato 1930: 71) and, more precisely, whether “the life of the just man is more profitable” than that of the unjust man (p. 83) or “whether it is ... true that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier” (p. 101).

On the analogy of the nature of justice in the city, given the city’s structure and functions, he concluded that justice in the human soul must occur when “each part is doing its own work” and the rational part is allowed to rule, “since it is really wise and exercises foresight on behalf of the whole soul, and for the spirited part to obey and be its ally” (p. 117). Justice in the city and in the human soul is the great harmonizer, bringing disparate parts together so that they become “entirely one, moderate and harmonious,” and injustice is “a kind of civil war between the three parts” (p. 119). Such is the interdependent relationship between an ideal city and an ideal individual that it is impossible for the latter to exist apart from the former. Well-being is constituted by the harmonious combination of well-ordered souls in well-ordered cities. This relationship is about as much of a reconciliation between the interests of any individual and the public interest, self and other, as one could hope to have.

### 2.2.2.7 Ascetic Harmony with Nature

Diogenes of Sinope (c. 400–c. 323 BCE) believed that the best life was that lived according to, recommended by, or in harmony with, nature. Such a life would be a life lived well, thriving on virtue and enjoying happiness (Diogenes Laertius 2000: 67, 73). His most frequently used model for living according to nature is the familiar behavior of stray dogs. Such animals could flourish, apparently with the blessing of the gods, by eating, drinking, grooming, urinating, defecating, and copulating in public without shame. So, contrary to conventional understanding, he thought human beings should be able to shamelessly engage in the same sorts of behaviors. Diogenes Laertius (2000: 109) “used to say that it was the privilege of the gods to need nothing and of god-like men to want but little.” He would have argued that if the gods are worthy of admiration and emulation and if they are without needs and wants, then a

person desiring to become more godlike ought to (morally and prudentially) try to eliminate his or her needs and wants. The world is full of animals that apparently live comfortable, happy lives by living in conformity or harmony with nature, doing what comes naturally to them, without any socially constructed conventions. So this is how people should live, i.e., in an ascetic harmony with nature.

### 2.2.2.8 Harmonious Mixture of an Active Life with Goods of the Soul, Goods of the Body, and External Goods

Aristotle of Stageira (384–322 BCE) accepted the common sense understanding that a good life required as a determinant and/or a constituent “internal goods ... of mind and body” and “external goods ... [like] noble birth, friends, wealth, honor.” “To these,” he wrote “we think should be added certain capacities and good luck; for on these conditions life will be perfectly secure.” Goods of the mind include things like wisdom, temperance, courage, justice, and pleasure, whereas goods of the body include things like health, beauty, strength, athletic talent, and a long life with a good old age (Aristotle 1926: 47–49).

Answering the question “What is the highest of all the goods achievable in action?”, Aristotle famously wrote “As far as the name goes, most people virtually agree; for both the many and the cultivated call it happiness [*eudaemonia*], and they suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy. But they disagree about what happiness is, and the many do not give the same answer as the wise” (Aristotle 1999: 3).

Regarding living well, Irwin (Aristotle 1999: 175) wrote that it had the sense of “having a good life” and that it was intended to capture the idea that *eudaemonia* “involves one’s life as a whole.” Aristotle “did not find it natural to speak of someone being *eudaemon* for a few minutes and then ceasing to be *eudaemon*,” i.e., happiness did not designate a pleasant mood as it often does nowadays. Rackham (Aristotle 1934: 10) remarked that his translation of “*eudaemonia* can hardly be avoided, but it would perhaps be more accurately rendered by ‘Well-being’ or ‘Prosperity’; and it

will be found that the writer [Aristotle] does not interpret it as a state of feeling but as a kind of activity.”

Regarding doing well (*eu prattein*), according to Irwin, Aristotle is saying that “*eudaemonia* ... consists in action.” Alternative English expressions are “acting well” or “faring well.” Much like the ordinary English expression, doing well can be used in an active sense, as in “A job worth doing is worth doing well,” or in a passive sense, as in “Generally, I am doing well, all things considered.” In the contexts we are looking at, it is the active sense of doing well that Aristotle intends. The importance of Aristotle’s assumption that happiness involves life as a whole has particular significance for contemporary scholars. Because the most frequently studied and measured aspect of people’s lives in quality-of-life research over the past 30 years has been satisfaction or happiness with life as a whole (Michalos 2005), we seem to have been following an old, distinguished tradition. There is, however, a difference in the connotation of “life as a whole” for the ancients and for us. For the ancients, the phrase was used to provoke reflection on the whole of one’s life from birth to death, whereas for us, it is used primarily to provoke reflection on all of the salient domains or features of one’s life as currently lived. It is possible that some respondents would mix the ancient with the contemporary connotation of “life as a whole” and craft their responses to our question based on a somewhat different array of things from birth to death, but we do not recall seeing any evidence of this.

All things considered, Aristotle’s characterization of a good or happy life is the clearest example we have from the ancients of the view that the quality of a person’s, or of a community’s, life is a function of the actual conditions of that life and of what a person or community makes of those conditions. Conceptually, Aristotle could clearly distinguish Real Paradise and Real Hell from a Fool’s Paradise and a Fool’s Hell. Most importantly, he regarded human action as essential. A good or happy life is not simply given by nature, God, or gods. It requires internal and external gifts and good luck beyond

our control, but it also requires individual and communal initiative. A good or happy life, according to Aristotle, consists of a harmonious mixture of internal and external goods in the first place, and regarding the former, an equally harmonious mixture of reason, appetite, and emotion.

### 2.2.2.9 Harmony with Nature Through Virtue

Zeno of Citium (c. 333–c. 261 BCE) was the founder of the philosophy of Stoicism. For Stoics, “An animal’s first impulse ... is self-preservation” and “pleasure ... [is] a by-product ... an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom.” Plants and animals are by nature disposed to behave in ways that contribute to their well-being. Human beings possess reason and “for them life according reason rightly becomes the natural life.” For Zeno, the proper end for humans was described as “life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature) which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us” (Diogenes Laertius 2000: 193–195).

In these passages we find the ethical naturalism of the Stoics in plain view, proceeding from an “is” to an “ought.” The word nature is used in both a descriptive and an evaluative sense. We are by nature disposed to behave in certain ways to promote the well-being of ourselves and the universe, and we ought to live virtuously or excellently to achieve the aims assigned to us by nature. *The good life we seek involves living in harmony with nature through virtuous action.*

In a passage attributed directly to the Stoic Chrysippus (c. 280–c. 207 BCE) from his book, *On the Means of Livelihood*, the philosopher boldly wrote that “virtue in itself is sufficient to constitute happiness” (Diogenes Laertius 2000: 297–299). Our translator, R.D. Hicks, treated virtue, well-being, and happiness as synonyms, whereas health is treated as designating a more specific additional good. Apparently, because a virtuous person knows what is good and what is evil, is disposed to and will choose what is good, he or she will inevitably find happiness. Finding happiness, then, implies that one is happy.



The most troublesome feature of Stoic views about goods concerns their treatment of things that they regard as morally “neutral (neither good nor evil)” and thus “indifferent” or “morally indifferent” but nevertheless have value and are to be “preferred” because “they are typically appropriate, fitting or suitable for us [as rational agents]” (Baltzly 2004: 10). Many people might grant that moral virtue cannot be measured against or traded off with nonmoral virtue. For example, such people would say that someone’s excellence (i.e., nonmoral virtue) at mathematics or painting cannot be used as a plausible reason for allowing him or her to escape condemnation for the morally wrong (i.e., morally evil) act of killing an innocent person. Others might be willing to allow people who are extraordinarily brilliant at something to get away with moral indiscretions. Comprehensive indexes of the quality of life or well-being are called compensatory if they allow all kinds of virtues or goods to be traded off against all other kinds of goods and evils. In fact, most indexes developed over the past 50 years are compensatory. The Stoics considered here would have rejected such indexes.

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### 2.3 Pleasure

As a determinant and/or constituent, pleasure in various forms is included or at least discussed in practically all accounts of a good life coming from the period 550 to 250 BCE. Below we describe four views: (1) a life of personal pleasure regardless of its impact on others; (2) a life of measured pleasures exceeding pains; (3) a life filled with experiences of particular, transient pleasures; and (4) pleasure in the form of peace of mind and a healthy body.

McKirahan (1994: 396) considered Antiphon of Rhamnous (c. 480–c. 411 BCE) as “possibly the earliest advocate of hedonism in Greek philosophy,” i.e., the first recorded philosopher to regard the pursuit of pleasure or a pleasurable life as the final end (telos) or good life for humans.

Provided that things are “thought of correctly,” he claimed, what is pleasant is naturally, universally life-enhancing and what is painful is life-

destroying. More precisely, provided that one thinks “correctly,” one’s experiences of pleasure and pain ought to be regarded as nature’s reliable guides to appropriate human action. So, the best sort of person makes careful and accurate observations of nature, thinks “correctly” about what causes “distress” and “joy,” successfully apprehends nature’s guides to a long and pleasant life, and scrupulously follows those guides. Consequently, such a person enjoys the best sort of life, i.e., a life filled with personal pleasure.

Protagoras of Abdera (c. 490–c. 420 BCE) was well-known for his skeptical relativism and agnosticism. Of the few fragments reliably attributed to him, the most famous is “A human being is the measure of all things – of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not” (McKirahan 1994: 379). Although we have seen elements of skeptical relativism in fragments attributed to philosophers before Protagoras (e.g., in Heraclitus), this fragment is a particularly bold statement of the relativity of all assertions, including those concerning what is just or unjust, beautiful or ugly, and even true or false.

Combined with the idea that whatever is experienced as pleasant is life-enhancing and whatever is experienced as painful is life-destroying, such principles suggest that the best life and the best sort of person to be are entirely dependent on individual preferences guided by experienced and anticipated pleasures and pains. Among pleasures and pains, Plato’s protagonist Socrates thought that variations could only be assessed “when the one is greater and the other smaller, or when there are more on one side and fewer on the other” (Plato 1924: 237). So, for example, weighing pleasures and pains, one would naturally prefer greater and/or more pleasures to smaller and/or fewer pleasures and the latter to pains of any size or numbers. He did not suggest that people should calculate what we now call discount rates according to which the proverbial bird in hand might be worth two or more in the bush, but he did observe that regarding “size,” “thickness and number,” and “sounds,” things appear “greater when near and smaller when distant” (p. 239). To address this

problem, he recommended precise measurement. In language that would have warmed the hearts of hedonists from Bentham (2000) to Kahneman (1999) (not to mention number-crunching social indicators researchers), he wrote, “Now if our welfare consisted in doing and choosing things of large dimensions, and avoiding and not doing those of small, what would be our salvation in life? Would it be the art of measurement, or the power of appearance? Is it not the latter that leads us astray .... Would men acknowledge, in view of all this, that the art which saves our life is measurement, ... [indeed, not merely measurement but] knowledge of measurement, ... the salvation of our life depends on making a right choice of pleasure and pain – of the more and the fewer, the greater and the smaller, and the nearer and the remoter – is it not evident ... (Plato 1924: 239–241).

Creating space for faulty appearances versus reality, these remarks clearly reveal an appreciation of the differences between a Fool’s Paradise or a Fool’s Hell and the real things. Of course, there is nothing here about applying measurement to produce the greatest net pleasure, happiness, or good for the greatest number as in the utilitarians Bentham (2000) and Mill (1957), but a clearer defense of the role of “knowledge of measurement” in the pursuit of pleasure and a good life could not have been made. The good life is a life lived with measured pleasures greater than measured pains.

Aristippus of Cyrene (“the Elder,” c. 436–c. 356 BCE) was the founder of the Cyrenaic philosophy. Cyrenaics had a radically subjectivist view of knowledge. They believed that all our knowledge comes from transient experienced affections that are unique and infallibly perceived by each individual. Thus, the only sort of well-being or ill-being they could imagine would be subjective well-being or ill-being, and the idea of a Fool’s Paradise or a Fool’s Hell would make no sense to them.

Because the Cyrenaics believed that their knowledge was limited to transitory experiences or affections and that, so far as they knew, there were no essential natures, they saw no point in reflecting on life as a whole and no point in trying

to conduct their affairs in the interest of achieving the end supremely identified by those natures. So far as they were concerned, the only end that was intrinsically valuable and achievable was pleasure, not some sort of abstract, generic pleasure, but concrete, particular pleasures of the sort we all experience. Hence, one might say that the epistemological views of Cyrenaics obliged them to pursue a good time rather than a good life because the latter presumed that there are relatively long-lasting personal selves existing across time, selves of which they had no evidence. For Cyrenaics, a good life was simply a life filled with particular, pleasant, and transient experiences.

Given their epistemological views, they could not have any confidence in the existence of or see any value in past or future pleasures. For them, the proverbial bird in hand was not worth two in the bush, discounting an unobservable bird’s value by 50 %. For Cyrenaics, the discount value of birds in the bush, in the past or future, was 100 %.

The idea that “happiness is the sum total of all particular pleasures” of one sort or another has been explored in the past 20 years under various names, e.g., affective happiness (Helliwell et al. 2012), momentary happiness (Howell et al. 2011), hedonia (Deci and Ryan 2008), hedonic enjoyment (Waterman et al. 2008), hedonic happiness (Seligman 2002), and objective happiness (Kahneman 1999). The pleasures are typically regarded as time-limited or transitory and somehow connected to particular feelings or experiences. Although there do not seem to be any contemporary researchers who would follow the Cyrenaics in disregarding other views of happiness, momentary happiness seems to be regarded as a legitimate species worthy of continued research.

Epicurus of Samos (c. 341–c. 271 BCE) believed that the chief end or aim of human beings was peace of mind or tranquility and a healthy body. For present purposes what has to be emphasized is that he regarded scientific knowledge and methods as the essential vehicles for the journey to peace of mind and a healthy body. As did Democritus, Epicurus believed that both human bodies and souls are composites of differ-

ent sorts of atoms and when people die their atoms are totally dispersed.

The peace of mind or tranquility that Epicurus insisted was the final aim for humans was in some ways similar to and in other ways different from all those who came before him. Diogenes Laertius (2000: 543) said that “in his correspondence” Epicurus “replaces the usual greeting, ‘I wish you joy,’ by wishes for welfare and right living, ‘May you do well’ and ‘Live well.’” This language is practically the same as that we saw Aristotle using earlier, i.e., “the many and the cultivated ... suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy.” Aristotle’s emphasis on “internal goods ... of mind and body” and “external goods” like “wealth and honor” is similar to views expressed by Epicurus.

What, then, is the nature and role of pleasure in the good life envisioned by Epicurus? We have seen that Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus often refer to the final aim or end of life as happiness, although the happiness they are referring to is not exactly the same thing. On the role of pleasure, there appears to be a fundamental difference between the views of Plato and Aristotle on the one hand and those of Epicurus on the other. For the former, pleasure was at best a “handmaiden to virtue” and never the final goal. However, in his *Letter to Monoecus*, Epicurus claimed that “We call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing” (Diogenes Laertius 2000: 655). In short, for Epicurus, the good life is a life filled with peace of mind and good health.

The clear implication of Epicurus’ remark that “By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul” is that, contrary to the views of Socrates and Plato, there is no neutral point between pleasure and pain. So far as the latter exists, the former does not, and vice versa. Because people are not always in pain, they must sometimes experience pleasure. What’s more, one of Epicurus’ Authorized Doctrines says that “The magnitude of pleasure reaches its limit in the removal of all pain” (Diogenes

Laertius 2000: 665). For example, once one’s hunger or thirst is satisfied with food or drink, the pain of wanting both is removed, leaving one in a state of pleasure. If the pain of wanting anything at all, mentally or physically, is removed, then one’s life would be “complete and perfect.” Once one experiences freedom from physical and mental pain that is as good as it gets. Just as one has no interest in eating more or drinking more when one’s hunger and thirst are satisfied, one should have no interest in living more because extending the length of time one is in the state of being free of physical and mental pain will not make it more pleasurable. It can only bring more of the same. If nothing else, this is a hardy view of human mortality.

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## 2.4 Religion

Against the prevailing Ancient Greek view that one’s well-being depends entirely on the will of the gods, most of the foregoing thinkers recast well-being as something that individuals could influence through purposeful actions. But, the extent to which one’s well-being could be influenced was still limited by luck (not everyone lives in paradise), and the actions required to achieve well-being were often too onerous to perform consistently throughout one’s life (maintaining one’s virtue while on the rack is doubtless no easy task). The combination of these two stark features of reality, which persisted through classical antiquity and have only begun to fade to any noticeable degree in recent years, provided space for a new view of well-being that continues to fill that gap. The rise of Christianity during the final stages and collapse of the Roman Empire popularized the views that true well-being was spiritual well-being and that it was only available in Heaven (McMahon 2013).

In this section, we discuss the following religious views of well-being: (1) true well-being is full possession of God, something that is only available in Heaven (Augustine); (2) in addition to true well-being in Heaven, those who follow the religious path toward God will enjoy similar but less exalted experiences on Earth (Aquinas);

and (3) although true well-being resides only in Heaven, earthly well-being is characterized by the pleasant satisfaction of our desires (Locke 1975).

### 2.4.1 Otherworldly Happiness as True Happiness

Saint Augustine of Hippo (354–430 Common Era [CE]) argued that otherworldly happiness was true well-being. Augustine synthesized the philosophy of Plato and other Ancient Greeks with the Christian thought of his time. As a result, he played an important role in shaping Western philosophy, Catholicism, and Western conceptions of the good life throughout the Middle Ages and, to a lesser extent, even today. Much like Plato, Augustine argued that wisdom was the key to well-being. But, unlike Plato, Augustine thought that wisdom came from God and that hoping to live a good life on Earth was ill-advised. Indeed, Augustine derided “philosophers [who] have wished, with amazing folly, to be happy here on Earth and to achieve bliss by their own efforts” because he believed that our original sin prevented us from experiencing any kind of happiness on Earth and that “true happiness” was only available in Heaven *after we die* (Augustine 1984: 852). Wisdom was the key to well-being for Augustine because he thought it kept our souls in equilibrium by steering them away from the transient earthly goods of riches and power and toward God by encouraging us to live in accordance with His will (Augustine 1948). In essence, if you strive to reach God you will be happy because you will be wise enough to want nothing more than your wisdom, and you will know you are on the path to true happiness (full possession of God) in Heaven.

In some ways, viewing the best kind of life—true happiness—as being available only in Heaven seems likely to relieve some of the tensions that the Ancient Greeks might have experienced. Consider that Augustine’s view of well-being explains why life was so hard during the living of it, while simultaneously providing hope for living the good *afterlife*. Moreover, liv-

ing a life in accordance with God’s wishes—the path to God’s kingdom—was potentially attainable by both the lucky and the unlucky. So, for Augustine, life on Earth was a kind of Real Hell, but a life lived correctly could lead to Real Paradise in Heaven. This dour view of our prospects for a good life on Earth persisted as the dominant Christian view for hundreds of years and lost its standing only when another great synthesizer of theology and Ancient Greek philosophy reconsidered our chances for earthly happiness (McMahon 2006).

### 2.4.2 Spiritual Well-Being on Earth

Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 CE) combined insights from Augustine and Aristotle to emphasize the dual benefits of living well: imperfect beatitude, a positive but imperfect kind of well-being available on Earth, and perfect beatitude, a perfect kind of well-being that is only available in Heaven. Following Aristotle, Aquinas argued that the contemplation of truth is the highest good (or virtue) for intelligent animals (McInerney 1993). More specifically, and unlike Aristotle, Aquinas referred to the perfect contemplation of truth as perfect beatitude and described it as “seeing” God directly with one’s soul and experiencing “perfect pleasure—a more perfect delight of the senses than that which animals enjoy, since the intellect is higher than the senses” (Aquinas 1988: Book 3, Chapter 48). So for Aquinas, perfect beatitude and the perfect contemplation of truth are more about knowing God through direct experience than through rationally thinking about God’s truths as set down in scripture.

Also following Aristotle, whom Aquinas referred to simply as “the philosopher” (McMahon 2006: 127), Aquinas held that humans cannot hope to achieve godlike or perfect contemplation of truth on Earth. However, and moving away from the teachings of Aristotle, Aquinas believed that higher, but still imperfect, contemplation was achieved by following the teachings of Jesus and that perfect contemplation could only be achieved through the grace of God. God

may show his grace by blessing the righteous with the religious virtues of charity, hope, and faith, thereby enabling them access to Heaven and the experience of perfect beatitude (perfect contemplation of truth) in union with God. So, for Aquinas, true well-being is otherworldly, but we can also achieve an imperfect spiritual well-being on Earth.

The most notable difference between Aquinas and Augustine is that Aquinas saw the extent of the immediate benefits of following the dictates of the church that Augustine did not. Aquinas thought that life on Earth could fall somewhere in between Real Paradise and Real Hell for those willing to live well, that is, to live a moral life in accordance with the right religious doctrines. This difference in view marks a steady change in Western thought from passively accepting earthly suffering—which was viewed as necessary for salvation or at least inescapable—to viewing earthly suffering as a harmful thing that should be avoided where possible.

### 2.4.3 Earthly Happiness from a Religious Perspective

The Aquinian notion that some kind of positive, but imperfect, well-being can be achieved on Earth by living a morally good life in accordance with religious teachings was adopted by many important thinkers through the early modern period. For example, the key Enlightenment figure, John Locke (1632–1704 CE), who famously espoused the individual right to pursue happiness, hoped that people would use such a right to tread a Christian path to *imperfect* happiness on Earth and perfect happiness in Heaven. Locke's liberalism was motivated by his understanding that people have different tastes ("Cheese or lobsters, ... though very agreeable and delicious fare to some, are to others extremely nauseous and offensive"; Locke 1975: Book 2, Chapter 21, Section 55). He argued that forcing a particular notion of the greatest good on a group of people detracts from the freedom of all to pursue their own notion of well-being and particularly punishes those whose view of the good life is mark-

edly different from that of the majority (Schneewind 1994). So, Locke advised that governments should provide their citizens with the necessary freedoms to pursue their own brand of happiness. Nevertheless, Locke thought that the offerings of Heaven would suit everyone's palate (Locke 1975), making religious freedoms particularly important.

Despite this similarity with Aquinas, Locke had a different view of the nature of earthly well-being. In his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke (1975) described earthly well-being as happiness, constituted by a life of many pleasurable satisfactions and few painful dissatisfactions. Locke argued that experiences and predictions of pleasure and pain effectively drew us around the world by instilling desires in us. He described a cycle in which uneasy desire leads to pleasurable satisfaction that, in turn, leads to a new uneasy desire, i.e., what some people now call the hedonic treadmill (Smith 2014). For Locke, this cycle of desires was inexorable for all people because either the current unease-causing desire is pleurably satisfied, in which case a new unease-causing desire looms into consciousness, or the current unsatisfied desire eventually fades from consciousness as it is replaced by a new unease-causing desire. However, because different people experience more or less pleasure and pain from the same stimulus, people tend to be drawn in many directions and develop idiosyncratic views on what will provide them with a good life. For Locke, predictions of pleasure and pain were useful guides in this way, because they illuminated each individual's path to happiness. Indeed, believing both our ability to reason and our experiences of pleasure and pain to be God-given, Locke concluded that God wanted us to be happy on Earth and gave us the tools we needed to achieve earthly happiness (McMahon 2006). Locke was concerned, however, that people too often made the mistake of failing to use their reason by neglecting the immense pleasures of Heaven when presented with opportunities for immediate, but immoral, pleasures. For Locke, well-being is happiness and happiness can be found in Heaven and, to a lesser degree, on Earth.



This more Lockean view of the positive life available on Earth as a pleasurable one rather than a contemplative one marks the gradual resurgence in the West of the association of pleasure and happiness with well-being. Indeed, of the range of contemporary religious views in the West, the ones that promote the pursuit of a moralistic, but pleasurable, happiness on Earth seem to be becoming more popular than those which advocate suffering on Earth for the sake of perfect well-being in Heaven (Ehrenreich 2009). As we shall see, the Enlightenment and its attendant questioning of religion weakened the dominance of the view that true or perfect well-being is not available on Earth. However, many people in the West, and especially in the United States, still claim to hold something like this view (Exline 2003). Similarly, being able to practice their religion is still important for many people in the West, demonstrating that spiritual well-being is an important component of earthly well-being for some Western people (Cohen 2002), although not as important a component as it is in the East (Joshanloo 2014). Despite the superiority of heavenly well-being professed by some, our inability to *know* infallibly whether Heaven exists while we live on Earth makes spiritual well-being on Earth seem like the better social indicator for any contemporary group of individuals.

We saw how, for Augustine, true well-being is full possession of God, something that is available only in Heaven. Similarly, Aquinas held that being in Heaven with God was the ultimate positive experience. However, unlike Augustine, Aquinas thought that similar but less exalted experiences were available on Earth for those who followed the religious path toward God. Finally, Locke argued that, whereas true well-being resided only in Heaven, earthly well-being was characterized by the pleasant satisfaction of our desires.

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## 2.5 Happiness

During the Enlightenment, amassing and communicating knowledge was seen as an important route to securing well-being. Indeed, if the

Enlightenment had a motto, it might have been what was engraved on the 1772 edition of the *Encyclopédie*: “If there is something you know, communicate it. If there is something you don’t know, search for it.” Following the tradition of many of the ancient writers, it was recognized that knowledge and effective education to distribute that knowledge could promote well-being by debunking harmful superstitious beliefs, promoting material living conditions, improving health care, and even breaking the bonds of tyrannical power (McMahon 2006). It was also common during this period to view happiness as well-being. As we shall see, some disregarded any notion of spiritual well-being and focused on the pursuit of personal happiness or public happiness, whereas others worried about the tensions between personal and public happiness.

More specifically, we explain the following views: (1) that the possibilities for well-being are limited to happiness on Earth and that happiness is a preponderance of pleasure over pain (La Mettrie and the utilitarians); (2) that true happiness is a tranquil state, much more dependent on avoiding pain than on experiencing pleasure, and one that is hard to achieve for the greedy and the immoral (Smith, Rousseau, and Jefferson); (3) that public happiness should be maximized (the utilitarians); and (4) that some strategies for increasing public happiness could make it harder for individuals to achieve a tranquil and moralized personal happiness (Smith, Rousseau, and Jefferson).

### 2.5.1 Sensory Pleasure Without Religion or Morality

Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709–1751 CE) trained and worked as a physician, which led him to perform many operations and autopsies on humans and other animals (McMahon 2006). Struck by both the similarity of human and non-human animal organs and the mechanistic nature of these organs and their subcomponents, La Mettrie argued that, just like non-human animals, humans do not need souls to animate them because they are effectively “self-winding



machine[s]” (La Mettrie 1994: 30). In *Treatise on the Soul*, La Mettrie (1996a) argued that, just as in nonhuman animals, pleasure and pain, which combine to make up happiness, are the motivating forces of the human machine. As a result of these beliefs, La Mettrie saw happiness as the natural state of all animals: “Nature has created us uniquely to be happy, yes every one of us, from the worm who crawls, to the eagle who loses himself in the clouds” (1994: 53). La Mettrie was also a prudential hedonist; he viewed pleasure as the ultimate good in life. And, although Epicurus was a major influence on him, La Mettrie understood pleasure as sensory pleasure—luscious experiences of delight that arise from the arousal and satisfaction of sensual desires (Thomson 1996). Indeed, La Mettrie saw the Lockean cycle of “desire to pleasurable satisfaction to new desire” as our greatest gift from nature because it provided constant opportunities to experience the pleasures of satisfaction and anticipation.

Believing pleasure to be *the* source of well-being and having rejected the existence of immortal souls, La Mettrie saw no need for Heaven or God. La Mettrie rejected the existence of Heaven and God because he believed that nothing could exist outside of the physical universe. Although antireligious sentiment was growing during this stage of the Enlightenment, La Mettrie was one of the first to challenge the contemporary theistic beliefs so strongly and perhaps provided the most articulate discussion of the implications of these antitheist claims for well-being (McMahon 2006). For La Mettrie, the implications were clear: Even the religions that did not demand suffering on Earth still required at least occasional toiling and foregoing of pleasure in this life to ensure true happiness in the afterlife, but the promises of religion were empty, so foregoing pleasure on Earth would mean missing out on the only chance one has for happiness. Adherents’ religious beliefs and voluntary moral restrictions were making a Fool’s Hell out of what might be a Real Paradise.

In addition to completely rejecting any God-given aspect of the good life, La Mettrie’s hedonistic views also broke with one of the oldest

traditions of scholarship on well-being; he pointed out that virtue was not a necessary or singularly important route to happiness. Depending on their character, La Mettrie (1986) argued in *Anti-Seneca*, some individuals would be happiest wallowing in filth, some reveling in depraved debauchery, and others committing evil deeds: “Happiness is individual and particular, and may be found in the absence of virtue and even in crime” (La Mettrie 1986: 263) Even more antithetical to dominant historical views of the good life, in *System of Epicurus*, La Mettrie (1996b) disapproved of more than the necessary use of reason because he thought conscious deliberation diminished the capacity to experience concurrent pleasure. His disregard for these long-established views about well-being might explain why secular and religious critics alike openly mocked La Mettrie upon hearing that he might have died young from hedonistic overindulgence; they were pleased that this peddler of repugnant ideas got his just deserts (McMahon 2006). So, for La Mettrie, well-being is secular and amoral sensory pleasure.

### 2.5.2 Public and Personal Happiness

Like La Mettrie, several other Enlightenment thinkers began arguing that happiness on Earth was the most important good for humans and perhaps even our natural state. Voltaire claimed that “Paradise is where I am” (2003: 295) and that “the great and only concern is to be happy” (c.f. Craveri 2005: 258). Adam Smith argued that happiness is our “natural” or “usual” state (1982: 149). Jean-Jacques Rousseau saw happiness as the natural end of “every being which senses” (Rousseau 1997a: 442). In effect, the Enlightenment saw a transition in the ultimate question from the religious “How can I be saved?” to the pragmatic “How can I be happy?” (Porter 2000). But the Enlightenment was also a time of social and political change and, as such, a time when some thinkers were also asking “How can *we* be happy?” Several Enlightenment thinkers offered answers to this question, although

many also saw the inherent difficulty in bringing about both private and public happiness.

The Enlightenment saw the fruits of the industrial revolution begin to ripen alongside advances in agriculture and trade (McMahon 2006). As a result, wealth above subsistence levels was spreading to an increasingly large proportion of society, and the associated disposable income and increase in markets replete with a variety of goods led to the “birth of consumer society” in Europe (McKendrick et al. 1985). A growing economy and more readily available goods would be viewed by most people (and especially economists) as beneficial for public happiness because these things can increase people’s ability to satisfy their most essential needs for things like food, clothing, and shelter. It should be no surprise, then, that Adam Smith was a great proponent of the commercialization that was occurring during the Enlightenment.

Adam Smith (1723–1790 CE) believed that governments should be valued to the extent that they “promote the happiness of those who live under them,” because that “is their sole use and end” (Smith 1982: 185). Apparently believing that a society is minimally the sum total of its inhabitants, he declared that no “society can be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable” (Smith 1981: 96). So, Smith argued for governments to aim for economic progress because increases in wealth would reduce suffering. In addition to this benefit, Smith strongly approved of the economic trends of the Enlightenment because he thought that they were important drivers of security and liberty (Smith 1981: 412). Rasmussen (2006) argued that Smith likely thought of increasing security and liberty for people as the best way to improve well-being because living in a “continual state of war with their neighbors, and of servile dependency on their superiors” (Smith 1981: 412) were causes of great suffering to people. Nevertheless, Smith was concerned that, although commercialized societies could raise living standards and reduce misery (to the benefit of public happiness), they also exacerbated an old barrier to attaining personal happiness.

Essentially, Smith worried that the frivolous temptations of consumerism would appeal to our natural “desire of bettering our condition” that “comes with us from the womb,” and that we would succumb, chasing the illusion of happiness instead of enjoying the happiness that might already be at hand (1981: 341). Smith had a very different view of happiness from La Mettrie, describing it as a state of “tranquility and enjoyment,” and as our “natural” or “usual” state—what we revert to when our desires, fears, and anxieties are resolved (1982: 149). Smith’s view of happiness was more like a combination of the views of Epicurus and the Stoics. He viewed happiness as a rare but blissful state of being free of (especially psychological) perturbations and of not wanting for anything and as inherently bound up with being virtuous. Also, like Epicurus, Smith saw pain as more important than pleasure: “Pain ... almost always, depresses us much more below the ... natural state of our happiness, than [pleasure] ever rises us above it” (1982: 44). Smith also viewed wealth as much more important for mitigating pain than promoting pleasure, because, between the natural state of our happiness “and the highest pitch of human prosperity, the interval is but a trifle; [but] between it and the lowest depth of misery the distance is immense and prodigious” (1982: 45). For Smith, once a basic-need-satisfying level of material wealth is reached, additional money (or power) makes little difference to happiness.

In his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, Smith (1982: 113) set out what can help people achieve the “inward tranquility and self-satisfaction” of happiness. Smith thought “warranted praise from others and self-approbation” (Rasmussen 2006: 310) are the best sources of happiness because “the chief part of human happiness arises from the consciousness of being loved” (Smith 1982: 41). Naturally, virtuous behavior goes much further to engender true appreciation from others than amassing wealth and power. Given all of these views, Smith concluded “What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health, who is out of debt, and has a clear conscience? To one in this situation, all accessions of fortune may properly be said to be superfluous”

(1982: 45). For Smith, wealth or economic well-being was not a constituent, but a determinant, of well-being, one that loses most or all of its well-being-generating effect at the level at which basic needs are satisfied. So, although Smith was a proponent of economic growth for reasons of public happiness (security and liberty from suffering), he was concerned that the resulting consumer society might lead individuals to forego the happiness that was readily available to them in favor of the illusory happiness of wealth and power.

A contemporary of Smith, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778 CE), held several similar views, including on what happiness is and that happiness is our natural end. Furthermore, and contrary to La Mettrie, Rousseau was adamant that “Happiness is not pleasure” (Rousseau 1994: 40). Rousseau argued that pleasure could not be equivalent to happiness or well-being because it would be absurd to put so much value in “a fleeting state which leaves our hearts still empty and anxious, either regretting something that is past or desiring something that is yet to come” (1979b: 88). For Rousseau, happiness was “a single lasting state” (1997b: 88) in which Locke’s uneasiness was never felt, in which one was completely immersed in one’s own momentary existence, without a care in the world (*cf.* the concept of *flow* in Csikszentmihalyi 1997). Like Smith, Rousseau’s conception of the best possible life was more similar to that of the Ancient Greeks than to that of most of his contemporaries because he viewed happiness as a kind of permanent self-sufficiency—a state in which one wants for nothing (Rousseau 1997b). It is no wonder, then, that pleasure was insufficient for Rousseau. As La Mettrie would have attested, there is no amount of pleasure that couldn’t be improved by adding a little more.

Compared to Smith, Rousseau was less positive about the economic trends of his day. Rousseau viewed maintaining happiness in a world that constantly presented new desirable possibilities and accoutrements as an extremely difficult task: “As soon as man’s needs exceed his faculties and the objects of his desire expand and multiply, he must either remain eternally unhappy or seek a new form of being from which he can

draw the resources he no longer finds in himself” (1994: 82). Rousseau recognized what Epicurus and the Stoics had argued for before him: If well-being requires something outside of oneself, then any brief achievement of happiness or success is so tenuous that it brings anxiety about losing the new-found good along with itself. In particular, well-being based on external goods (e.g., power and wealth) was considered extremely tenuous because the gods or other people were liable to disrupt their good fortune (Joshanloo et al. 2015). Rousseau did not, however, believe that gods would undo earthly good fortune; He thought that his theory of social contract might allow us to “form a new kind of being” by providing a blueprint for building a society stable enough to vastly reduce the anxiety caused by living in proximity to our fellow humans.

In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau (1782) argued for various forms of democracy based on the idea that the only legitimate subjugation to power is voluntary subjugation and only then when the volunteer is also a part of that greater power. For Rousseau’s social contract idea to work, everyone had to give themselves entirely to the state, which meant consciously to become a part of one new being—the society—and to act accordingly (i.e., with society’s interests in mind). In such an ideal society, force would only have to be used by the whole on the few if the few had not fully given themselves to the state and were attempting to free ride on the many. With this security from oppression obtained, Rousseau thought that the benefits of large-scale community living might outweigh the desire-enticing consumerist problems that came along with it:

The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked .... Although, in this state, he deprives himself of some advantages which he got from nature, he gains in return others so great, his faculties are so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted ... (1782: Book 1, Section 8)

Furthermore, Rousseau (1994) believed that fully giving oneself to society would make achieving the tranquil state of happiness easier because it

would prevent the disquieting internal tensions that result from being caught between our natural tendencies and desires on the one hand and our duties and the watchful gaze of social institutions on the other hand. Even for those who did fully give themselves to the state, however, Rousseau believed that the government could not force its citizens to be happy, concluding that “the best [government] puts them in a position to be happy if they are reasonable” (1994: 41).

Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826 CE) and the signatories to the Declaration of Independence were also aware of the importance of happiness:

We hold these truths to be **self-evident**, that **all men are created equal**, that they are endowed by their **Creator** with certain **unalienable Rights**, that among these are **Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness**.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the **consent of the governed**,—That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the **Right of the People to alter or to abolish it**, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

This preamble to the Declaration uses the language of rights, popularized during the Enlightenment, and essentially claims that, as willed by God, everyone is born with the freedom to pursue happiness in whatever way they wish. On the basis of this idea, the Declaration states that free individuals may choose to create a government so as to further protect these rights and that if the government is not allowing the pursuit of happiness as it should, then the people can dissolve or restructure it. These ideas, perhaps without the religious root, have doubtless played an important role in shaping the widespread contemporary Western belief that governments should arrange institutions and manage conditions in a way that makes it easy for people to pursue happiness. But, which kind of happiness?

McMahon (2006: 330–331) has argued that Jefferson intended the newly anointed citizens of the United States of America to pursue both public and personal happiness. He hoped, like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, that they would

realize that virtuous and socially beneficent behavior would engender happiness in the individual as well as for society. According to McMahon, Jefferson and his colleagues believed that many of the main themes we have discussed would help prevent individuals from pursuing happiness in the way Smith feared they might in a consumer society, thereby preventing happiness: “In religion, in classical virtue, in the education of reason, and in the public-mindedness of the moral sense, Jefferson and his contemporaries saw the forces that would perform this essential task, ensuring that the pursuit of private pleasures did not veer off the thoroughfare of public good” (McMahon 2006: 330).

Unfortunately, Smith’s concerns appear to have been realized in the nation that rushed to economic dominance because “No one could work harder to be happy” than its citizens, who could not relax “for fear of missing the shortest cut leading to happiness” (Tocqueville 1988: Volume 1, 243). Still today, the United States is viewed as the land of abundance, but if happiness surveys are anything to go by, it could not rightfully be viewed as the land of happiness.

### 2.5.3 Utilitarianism

Utilitarians also thought they had the answer to the question of how to engender public happiness, but they took a more direct route than that taken by Jefferson. Like many Enlightenment thinkers, utilitarians were disposed to pronouncements such as, “Every authority that is not exercised for the happiness of all can only be founded on imposture and force” (Chastellux 1772; c.f. McMahon 2006: 217). These pronouncements were based on the increasingly widespread Enlightenment belief that the proper role of legislation was to benefit people, but also on the still contentious belief that happiness (variously defined, if at all) on Earth was ultimately the only thing of value for people. On the basis of these premises, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832 CE) set out the principle of utility (more commonly known as the greatest happiness principle) to discern whether the actions of individuals and gov-

ernments are moral: “By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question ... I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government” (Bentham 2000: 14).

Essentially, both individuals and governments morally ought to act in whichever ways seem likely to bring about the most happiness for everyone concerned. The motivation behind utilitarianism is simple enough: If every person and institution acted in a way that created the most happiness, then there would be much more happiness to go around. Furthermore, because utilitarians also believe that everyone’s happiness should be afforded equal moral value (Weijers 2011), the gains in happiness should not be concentrated among the elite few. In this way, utilitarians might be thought of as aiming for Real Paradise on Earth by encouraging individuals and institutions to create as much happiness as possible. However, because happiness was an entirely internal state for most utilitarians, they would prefer a Fool’s Paradise to Real Paradise if there was more pleasure to be had in the former. Nevertheless, these moral elements of utilitarianism made it much more palatable than La Mettrie’s egoistic view of pursuing one’s own happiness. After all, who could argue with more happiness for everyone? Well, that depends at least on how happiness is understood.

Most utilitarians believe that happiness consists in a preponderance of pleasure over pain (Weijers 2011). Although it might seem myopic to account for all that is good for people in terms of pleasure, utilitarians usually understand pleasure broadly, to include psychological pleasures as well as sensual bodily pleasures. Indeed, Bentham (2000) understood pleasure synonymously with satisfaction, bliss, ecstasy, well-being, and 50 other terms that roughly equated to feeling good. Because Bentham (2000) was a quantitative hedonist, increasing happiness meant simply increasing the quantity of pleasure or decreasing the quantity of pain, along the lines

suggested in Plato’s Protagoras. Bentham (2000) laid out in detail the aspects of pleasure that contribute to its quantity. In essence, the quantity of pleasure felt at any moment could be calculated by summing the intensity of each of one’s concurrent pleasures; pain could be calculated in the same way. Then, momentary happiness would be the total concurrent pleasure less the total concurrent pain. Notably, Bentham’s quantitative hedonism allowed pleasure from different sources to be of equivalent value if they had the same intensity: “Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnishes more pleasure, it is more valuable than either” (Bentham 1825: 206). The failure to distinguish a difference between the value of sensual pleasures on the one hand and that of moral and intellectual pleasures on the other led Bentham and other quantitative hedonists to be accused of peddling a philosophy of swine (Weijers 2011). Even Bentham’s protégé criticized him on this point.

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873 CE), who studied under and was godson to Bentham, used a different notion of pleasure in his version of utilitarianism. Mill (1957) developed a qualitative hedonism that was similar to Bentham’s quantitative hedonism, except that it also took the quality of pleasures into account when calculating their value. For Mill, the quality of a pleasure had to do with how bodily or cerebral it was: Bodily or lower pleasures, such as those from eating, were of a lower quality than higher pleasures, such as those from acting virtuously or listening to opera. The following famous, but often misquoted, statement from Mill demonstrates this view: “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides” (Mill 1957: 9). For utilitarians, well-being is happiness, understood as a preponderance of pleasure over pain (broadly construed).

For the thinkers discussed in this section, well-being was earthly happiness. Like La



Mettrie, the utilitarians viewed happiness as a preponderance of pleasure over pain, but they had differing views about what kinds of pleasure were more valuable. Smith, Rousseau, and Jefferson held more tranquil and moralized conceptions of happiness that focused more on avoiding pain than experiencing pleasure. All of the thinkers in this section were concerned with increasing happiness in the public sphere, but it was mainly Smith, Rousseau, and Jefferson who saw how some strategies for increasing public happiness could make it harder for individuals to achieve a tranquil and moralized happiness.

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## 2.6 Loftier Goals

Although Mill's qualitative hedonistic utilitarianism was more acceptable than Bentham's quantitative version, many critics still worried that happiness (whether defined as pleasure, satisfaction, or tranquility) was not the be all and end all of a good life. As we shall see, critics clamored for morality, community, meaning, religion, and authenticity to be considered as essential aspects of well-being as they had in ancient times. We discuss the following views: (1) that there is more to well-being than happiness and that, as such, public happiness should not be the goal of society (Carlyle, Weber, and Huxley); (2) that moral, social, and religious ends were more appropriate goals for public policy (Carlyle and Weber); (3) that meaningfulness and authenticity were better public goals than happiness (Huxley).

### 2.6.1 Morality, Community, Meaningful Work, and God

Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881 CE) lamented the public pursuit of happiness, shaped by utilitarians in Great Britain, decrying utilitarianism for failing to appreciate the differences between humans and beasts (Carlyle 1965). Carlyle also attacked the economic markets inspired by Smith for destroying morality: “Our life is not a mutual helpfulness, but rather, cloaked under due laws-of-war, named ‘fair competition’ and so forth, it

is mutual hostility” (1965: 148). At heart, Carlyle was bemoaning the past 200 years of earthly happiness worship that had been eroding traditional values since Locke suggested that God wanted us to be happy on Earth. Carlyle pined for a return of the days when community, meaningful work, and an intimate sense of God were the values that people held highest (McMahon 2006).

After visiting the United States and observing the forefront of capitalism and consumerism, Max Weber (1864–1920 CE) held many of Carlyle's worries. By this time, Smith's markets had done much to raise living standards, but the cost of this progress, according to Weber, was a disastrous shift in societal goals. The happiness that was being pursued had lost its connotations of virtue, religion, and meaning, and replaced them with wealth. To an outsider, like Weber was, it looked like the American dream was to work hard in order to pursue the greatest good of wealth. In Weber's view, Smith's greatest fear about the commercialization of society had been realized: “Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life” (Weber 1976: 53). Like Carlyle before him, Weber lamented what he saw as an erosion of moral and religious values in the United States, where “the pursuit of wealth ... [had] become associated with purely mundane passions, which actually gave it the character of sport” (Weber 1976: 181). Weber observed people working out of a sense of duty but without knowing to what or to whom the duty was owed; they just worked out of blind devotion to work itself. Without religious and moral motivations, Weber thought both work and nonwork activities were meaningless. Targeting the goal of public happiness (with its strong materialistic connotation) as part of the problem behind these events, Weber suggested that better legislation would focus on what is valuable in humans: “I believe that we must renounce human happiness as a goal of social legislation. We want something else and can only want something else. We want to cultivate and support what appears to us valuable in man: his personal responsibility, his deep drive towards higher things, towards the spiritual and moral values of mankind ...” (Weber 1804/1993: 339–340; c.f. McMahon 2006: 359).



Both Carlyle and Weber articulated views of well-being that ran contrary to the increasingly happiness- and wealth-centric views of their times, but neither was confident that there was much hope for a return to the older conceptions of well-being that stressed the importance of virtue and religion. Weber warned that everything “opposed to the culture of capitalism was going to be demolished with irresistible force” (c.f. Mommsen 2000: 105). What Carlyle in particular mused over, although without much success, was the problem of how to get people to realize that there was more to life than happiness as utilitarians defined it (McMahon 2006). Carlyle and Weber seemed to understand well-being as a life full of morality, community, meaningful work, and God.

### 2.6.2 Unhappiness, Authenticity, and Meaning

In the process of writing *Brave New World*, Aldous Huxley (1894–1963 CE) came to share Carlyle’s belief that happiness as pleasant satisfaction or tranquility must not be our main personal or societal goal (Huxley 1959). In *Brave New World*, Huxley (1932) depicts an advanced society that has taken the greatest happiness principle to its logical extreme: All of its institutions and technologies are geared toward engendering a passive, contented, and pleasant populace. One of the most important technologies put to use in the service of these goals is soma.

Soma is a readily available drug that is used as a reward to control the lower castes and as an antidote for whatever psychological ailments the upper castes might experience. A small dose relieves minor psychological perturbations and produces pleasant feelings. A large dose provides a soma holiday—a complete escape from present troubles into a joyous dreamlike state. As explained by World Controller Mustapha Mond, soma not only makes the imbibers feel happier and less anxious, it also helps virtues to shine:

There’s always soma to calm your anger, to reconcile you to your enemies, to make you patient and long-suffering. In the past you could only accom-

plish these things by making a great effort and after years of hard moral training. Now, you swallow two or three half-gramme tablets, and there you are. Anybody can be virtuous now .... Christianity without tears—that’s what soma is (Huxley 1932: 238).

As well as making individuals happy, the placating and moralizing effects of soma also help keep society peaceful and stable. As Mustapha Mond makes clear, “The world’s stable now. People are happy; they get what they want, and they never want what they can’t get ... And if anything should go wrong, there’s soma” (Huxley 1932: 220). In this respect, soma ensures both the public security that Smith and Rousseau desired and the personal tranquility that results from being free of fear and anxieties. In the appropriate dose, soma also provides the luscious pleasures that La Mettrie desired. Mill would likely not have held the lower pleasure provided by soma in very high esteem, but if quantitative hedonistic utilitarians like Bentham were true to their theory, they would certainly legislate in favor of this happiness-increasing and pain-decreasing drug.

Of course, what Huxley achieved in *Brave New World* was to help us imagine what society might be like if particular conceptions of well-being were used as the goal of society. Indeed, Huxley himself was worried that the dominant conceptions of well-being in the West would result in the kind of society on which his story was based (Huxley 1959). Even though the offerings in this futuristic society seem to satisfy the well-being requirements of many of the thinkers discussed in this chapter, most would likely balk at the opportunity to live in such a dystopic society. But why?

A key character in *Brave New World* shares the view that the happiness-oriented society is dystopic. John the Savage was raised on a reserve for the humans who did not wish to join the happiness revolution. On the reserve, all modern technology had been lost or abandoned, and life had reverted to a tribal and spiritual affair. John was unusual because he was born to and raised by a civilized human who, after becoming pregnant, was left at the reserve. As a result, he was fairly

intelligent and could speak the language of civilized society. A certain turn of events led John to experience the happiness-centric society first hand, and he did not like it. In the end, John voiced his concerns about the brave new world through a recognition of what he wanted that it could not provide: “I’m claiming the right to be unhappy ... the right to grow old and ugly and impotent; ... the right to be lousy; the right to live in constant apprehension of what may happen to-morrow [sic]; ... the right to be tortured by unspeakable pains of every kind.” (Huxley 1932: 240).

John wanted a real and interesting life, replete with the whole range of states experienced in an unexpected way. There was something meaningless and inauthentic about a somafied life. It certainly lacked drama or a narrative worth retelling. Because Huxley began increasingly to identify with John (Huxley 1959), it is clear that he believed well-being to require a degree of meaning and authenticity that was impossible in a life filled only with happiness. Indeed, most readers of *Brave New World* are likely left with the impression that the happy people in Huxley’s fantastic society are living in a Fool’s Paradise because they lack the basic freedom to be unhappy, to find their own way, and to pursue a


real and authentically meaningful life. Huxley viewed well-being as a meaningful and authentic life, which may well require unhappiness.

Carlyle, Weber, and Huxley all argued that there was more to well-being than happiness and that, as such, public happiness should not be the goal of society. In particular, Carlyle and Weber thought that moral, social, and religious goals were more appropriate. In a similar vein, Huxley argued that meaningfulness and authenticity were better goals than happiness.

## 2.7 Summary and Discussion

As we have seen, Western thinkers have presented a wide variety of conceptions of well-being. Although some conceptions seem to have died completely, many of the oldest conceptions have gone in and out of fashion and still inform contemporary views. Following is a brief description of the major trends over the last two-and-a-half thousand years. A schematic visual representation of this summary can be seen in Fig. 2.3.

The ancient view of well-being as excellent personal traits and aristocratic trappings was less



**Fig. 2.3** Schematic outline of Western views of well-being from ancient to modern times

prevalent in the Middle Ages but resurged in modern times. In the Middle Ages, excellent personal traits were replaced mainly with religious virtues. In modern times, the emphasis has shifted more to the possession of wealth and power and away from being a morally good person.

Ancient views of well-being as some sort of harmony mainly went out of favor, except during the Enlightenment, when the balance between public and personal happiness was being discussed, and perhaps in notions of internal psychological harmony, such as in Smith's view of personal happiness as pleasant tranquility.

Pleasure, a dark horse in ancient times and through to the end of the Middle Ages, was usually seen as a positive feature in a life, but never a very important or worthy one. From the times of Locke and La Mettrie onward, the spread of more secular world views and more scientific views of the mind appear to have made valuing pleasure more acceptable. The height of pleasure's role in conceptions of well-being seems to have been at the time of British empiricism, when Bentham and his utilitarian colleagues held both academic and political sway (Sumner 1996). Pleasure still plays an important role in conceptions of well-being, although usually as part of happiness, which tends to be understood as "satisfaction with life and a preponderance of positive over negative emotions" (Joshano and Weijers 2014: 718).

Religion and, in particular, Christianity, which swept to dominance after the fall of the Roman Empire, only began to lose sway over philosophers and nonphilosophers alike during the Enlightenment. As science continues to reveal the secrets of the universe and as economic progress continues to reduce the number of people struggling, religious beliefs and religious conceptions of well-being continue to fall slowly out of favor in the West (Diener et al. 2011). However, moderate religious views of well-being, such as those of Locke, probably remain important because significant numbers of people in many Western nations still report being religious.

Happiness, usually understood in the relatively utilitarian way as satisfaction with life and a preponderance of positive over negative emotions, played only a minor role in the history of

well-being (despite many translations of ancient texts appropriating the word) until the Enlightenment. In contemporary Western society, happiness is possibly the most common understanding of well-being or at least the most commonly named component of it. However, how to define happiness is still hotly contested, especially because it has become a synonym of well-being in common usage. For these reasons, measures of happiness that are worded generally, or other generally worded evaluations of life as a whole, might best represent the contemporary Western view of well-being.

Despite this approach, and in line with Rousseau and Jefferson, the idea that a government would attempt to force people to be happy is as much reviled today as it was then. This fact at least partly explains our revulsion at Huxley's brave new world in which society was arranged in such a way that there was literally no right to be unhappy and perhaps no chance to lead a meaningful existence. Furthermore, the contemporary idea of governments measuring happiness and using happiness research to guide policy is likely unpopular among the older generations partly because their longer view of history has taught them that being forced to be free is a much better guarantor of their well-being than any roughshod attempt to force them to be happy. State force has been abused so many times in the past (and even still now) that many people prefer that their governments provide them with the tools they need to pursue their own view of well-being in their own way, a way that is meaningful to them. For this reason, useful proxy measures of well-being might be thought to be measures of health, education, civil and political liberties, and wealth, because these are the basic enablers of the freedom to pursue well-being in all of its forms.

Throughout this chapter, we have referred to the four-part taxonomy of the objective and subjective qualities of life (Fig. 2.1). The most important point regarding this framework is that the classical notion of a Fool's Paradise, which survives today, requires at least the sort of two-variable model mentioned in Sect. 2.1.2. This notion is based on the common sense view that

there is a real world, however roughly apprehended, and that there are good reasons for believing that some perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and actions are more appropriate than others in that sort of world. As the remnants of the works of ancient authors reveal and as one would easily discover by examining the works of contemporary authors, the common sense view of the human condition is not universally appreciated and accepted. In particular, some scholars are troubled by the fact that a person's personal assessments of his or her life (i.e., self-reported health) may conflict with relatively objective assessments (e.g., measures of blood pressure and heart-valve functioning). Although anyone with any democratic sensitivity would grant that each person's assessment of his or her own life should be accorded some kind of privileged status, it is far from obvious that such privilege should override all other considerations.

The best way to address the problem of what to say when relatively objective conditions are not consistent with subjective assessments is to claim that *normally*, or in the standard case, objective conditions and subjective assessments are each necessary and jointly provide a clear *sufficient condition* of a life being bad or good and should be regarded as such for good reasons. Then, if someone's perceptions, assessments, and actions are inconsistent with relatively objective conditions as a result of his or her ignorance, disability, disease, substance abuse, or some sort of duress, we are reasonably warranted in overriding his or her judgments. As well, if what we regard as relatively objective conditions are not as we think they are (which often happens, including disagreements among well-informed people), it would be unreasonable to insist that our claims about them are true and that we must act accordingly. In both kinds of cases, the normal or standard conditions for assuming the necessity of objective conditions *and* subjective assessments are not met. When the normal or standard conditions are not met, we have the possibility of a Fool's Paradise or Fool's Hell. We must therefore adjust our judgments to fit these cases. Readers may wish to keep this in mind while reading the rest of this volume.

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*[T]here are the five (kinds of) happiness (福 fu). The first is long life; the second is prosperity; the third is soundness of body and serenity of mind; the fourth is the love of virtue; and the fifth is ultimately fulfilling one's destiny. Of the six extreme evils, the first is misfortune shortening the life; the second is sickness; the third is distress of mind; the fourth is poverty; the fifth is wickedness; the sixth is weakness. (The Book of History, Shang shu 尚書 or Shu jing 書經, one of the ancient Chinese Confucian classics, ch. 11.9, our translation; see Waltham 1971)*

## 3.1 East Asia as an Integrated Macroregion

In general, East Asia encompasses the areas that are now called China (a large continental country, including Tibet and Taiwan), Japan (an island nation), and Korea (a peninsular state that lies between them). Though the boundaries and ruling entities changed greatly through the centuries, for the last three millennia, East Asia may be thought of as having consisted of these three main cultural and political traditions. Although each had its own language, they shared the same writing system—the Chinese characters (Ch. *hanzi* 漢字, Jap. *kanji*, Kor. *hanja*)—during the medieval and late imperial periods until Japan created its own syllabaries (such as *hiragana* ひらがな and *katakana* カタカナ) and Korea devised its own outstanding alphabet (*hangul* 한자). Japan has continued to use characters alongside its syllabaries, and Korea still has a strong cultural memory of the characters that deeply colors much of its vocabulary. Moreover, they

participated in a common religious and intellectual discourse, with Confucianism providing a foundation for sociopolitical thought, Buddhism fostering spiritual introspection, and Daoism nourishing mystical insights.

Consequently, although their political boundaries may have been, and still are, contested, and they possessed unique cultural characteristics of their own, China, Japan, and Korea nonetheless participated in a joint philosophical and social sphere. We find that China, Japan, and Korea possess a common fund of conceptions and practices with regard to well-being (Fig. 3.1). We point out where the similarities lie but also note the differences in the way ideas about well-being are elaborated and realized.

## 3.2 Well-Being in China and East Asia

The concept of well-being seems fairly intuitive, but when directed to provide examples of well-being in East Asia—including the areas of China, Japan, and Korea—one quickly recognizes the need for a good definition or at least a thoughtful list of characteristics that one could examine. In developing a set of such characteristics, we turned to recent quality-of-life and subjective well-being studies focused on East Asia. Clearly,

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**Fig. 3.1** Praying with incense. This group of people is on kneeling cushions in front of a deity shrine hall offering incense and praying to the god therein. Many people per-

forming these actions in temples across East Asia are praying for their well-being and that of their family (Credit: Shawn Arthur, China 2013)

contemporary concerns do not correspond exactly with early historical periods in China; yet, research on well-being issues can direct us to a selection of perspectives that should be addressed in order to contribute to current dialogues about well-being through a discussion of the history of East Asian ideas about well-being and quality of life.

Recent research in China indicates that there are a significant number of factors involved in people's well-being, such as having safety, economic security, an effective and noncorrupt government and legal system, wealth, affordable health care, education, a clean environment, a fulfilling family life, a good job, happiness, satisfied material needs, harmonious social relationships, children with filial piety (i.e., respect for their elders), pleasure, a satisfactory sex life, religious belief, moral integrity, a sense of self-control, ease with life, kindness and helpfulness

when interacting with others, and respect from others (Li 2006: 223; Lu 2001: 407; Lu and Shih 1997: 185<sup>1</sup>). This range of data indicates that well-being encompasses multiple and complex facets of life and cannot be simplified to one particular area of concern.

If we turn to Chinese historical sources, there is a scarcity of data, as well as much variety of opinion, regarding how most people felt and thought about these issues (Poo 1998); it is only recently that researchers and policy makers have focused on well-being. We must rely on the data that are available to us, all of which were compiled by literate members of early societies,

<sup>1</sup>Due to limited space, only sources used multiple times or provided as translation examples are cited and included in the bibliography. All other relevant sources, along with additional items, are found in a supplemental bibliography.

which means that we are only reading the perspectives of those wealthy enough to afford an education. However, many surviving texts do address issues of the common people and do discuss ideas that would have been well-known by nonliterate members of the culture.

In fact, throughout China's history, people have used a wide range of terms that Westerners have more recently translated as *well-being* or *happiness*, but each is somewhat more nuanced, and none directly corresponds to the Western concept of well-being. One reason for this situation is that traditional East Asian terms that partially overlap with well-being tend to be more objective or external in nature and tend to focus on the person's wealth, children, produce, and fortune, whereas Western conceptions tend to focus more on subjective and internal states that elicit how happy, content, healthy, and lucky one feels. For example, some of the best Chinese and Japanese equivalents for well-being are *fuli* 福利 (Jap. *fukuri*; Kor. *bogli* 복리) and *fuzhi* 福祉, both of which refer to blessings, happiness, welfare, good fortune, and felicity. Other terms include the modern subjective ideas of *shunshi* 順適 (lit., agreeable or comfortable) or *shunsui* 順遂 (lit., everything is going well); the ancient single character *fu* 福 (Jap. *fuku*; Kor. *bok* 복), which can mean blessing, blessed happiness, and auspiciousness; the popular term *xingfu* 幸福 (Jap. *kōfuku*), meaning happiness, eudaemonia, and good fortune; and *haoshenghuo* 好生活 (lit., having a good life).

The final three terms have the common thread of integrating both sides of the Chinese person: the physical health and wealth of one character and the psychological and spiritual contentment of the other character: *ankang* 安康 (lit., peaceful/secure and in good health), *anle* 安樂 (lit., peaceful/secure and happy, or comfort and ease), and their equivalent term *kangle* 康樂 (lit., healthy and happy) are important for our discussion. In fact, we find these last three terms in a range of early Chinese religious texts and dictionaries, including Chinese Buddhist sources, where the terms came to mean relaxation, bliss, and harmony. Given the age and popularity of these terms in the ancient texts, their implica-

tions of physical and mental health might well be the core of well-being in ancient China and Japan.

Other Korean equivalent terms include *annyeong* 안녕 (lit., to be peaceful and tranquil; Chi. *anning* 安寧) and *pyeong-an* 평안 (lit., peaceful and harmonious; Chi. *ping'an* 平安). Since the early 2000s, South Koreans have been particularly enamored with the term *welbing* 웰빙, an imported word meaning wellness or more obviously well-being, which they use to refer to all manner of physical health circumstances such as fad foods and exercise trends. In a 2004 campaign to rid the language of foreign terms, the National Institute of the Korean Language ([www.malteo.net](http://www.malteo.net)), with the help of some Koreans, created a new more accurate term, *chamsari* 참살이 (lit., a pure, good, life/living condition), which is used to mean a morally and/or physically good life or lifestyle. However, people overwhelmingly prefer *welbing* instead of the "official" term (Mair 2014).

Because this chapter focuses on the history of well-being in East Asia, however, we suggest framing our examination with foundational East Asian concepts, as with our chapter's opening quote that was first presented in the ancient Confucian classic, the *Book of History*, which was well-known across East Asia and Vietnam by the third century C.E. and which discusses five sources of happiness: longevity, prosperity, good health and peace of mind, love of virtue, and seeking to fulfil one's destiny (Great Plan, ch. 11.9; see Waltham 1971). We address these markers of well-being in an altered order to facilitate organization of our thoughts and the materials. Because concerns about wealth and virtue are found predominately within the construct of Confucian sociopolitical structures, we discuss them first. Second, we examine health ideals and the Chinese medical system, followed by Daoist religious expansion of medical theories as a means to achieve longevity and immortality. Finally, we address destiny and the Will of Heaven. We contend that all of the well-being ideas and terms described above can be located within this set of five concerns. Examining each indicator in turn, we can discuss the ways that



East Asian history has developed regarding its idealized presentations of personal and social well-being.

### 3.3 Prosperity and Wealth

Peoples' key desires across all levels of East Asian societies and histories have been prosperity and wealth; but how were these measured? A good indicator of prosperity was to have many offspring, especially male descendants, and to be able to have the extended family live in a single compound or nearby, which is why many Chinese villages and hamlets, for example, consisted of people with a single surname who were all closely related. To be able to live this way, however, required sufficient wealth, which was always an aspiration of Chinese families.

The importance of gaining wealth and affluence reified throughout Chinese society in many ways, including repeating the traditional New Year's greeting, *Gongxi facai* 恭禧發財 (Cantonese: *Konghei fatchoy*; lit., Congratulations and may you become wealthy); hanging colorful paintings of groups of male children playing amidst gold and silver ingots, which symbolize the ideas of wealth, prosperity, and giving birth to future generations; and displaying images of the God of Wealth in one's home, in retail shops, in business offices, and in all manner of religious temples. Even in a modern city like Hong Kong, images of the God of Wealth are commonplace—virtually every shop and restaurant has one, and incense is seen burning in front of it (Fig. 3.2).

One of the best ways for a family to become wealthy was for one of its sons to pass the civil service examination, which would ensure official employment that in turn meant a steady, secure, and sufficient income for the whole family. But significant resources had to be spent on the education of the aspiring candidate if he was to pass the examination. Thus, among families who could afford it, there was a heavy emphasis on education—which throughout East Asian history has been based on learning the texts associated with the Great Master Kong (Kong Fuzi 孔夫子, born Kong Qiu 孔丘, 551–479 BCE), the man



**Fig. 3.2** The god of wealth. A contemporary god of wealth shrine on Mount Tai in Eastern China (Credit: Shawn Arthur, China 2013)

whose name was Latinized by Jesuit missionaries in the sixteenth century to become Confucius.

Because Confucianism became the official sociopolitical principle of China by 135 BCE,<sup>2</sup> education meant memorizing and applying multiple so-called Classics<sup>3</sup>: the *Book of History*; the *Book of Odes* (*Shijing* 詩經; Waley 1937/1996), with its poems, songs, and hymns; the *Book of Rites* (*Liji* 禮記), with its ancient rituals and etiquette directions; the *Book of Changes* (*Yijing* 易經; Ritsema and Karcher 1995), the ancient divination manual based on the fluctuations of cos-

<sup>2</sup>As a result of war, the despotism of earlier totalitarian leaders, and the outcry of the larger public sphere, Han dynasty leaders chose to adopt an approximation of the teachings of Confucius in order to foster the growth of an ideal, harmonious, social state. Through trade, expansion, and other movements, the Chinese brought Confucianism to Korea by the late second century CE and then to Japan by the third century CE, where it went through phases of acceptance, sometimes directed by military and political powers.

<sup>3</sup>At least one version of each of these classics, including the Chinese characters as well as outdated but useful translations in most cases, has been made public by the China Text Project at <http://ctext.org/pre-qin-and-han> and the Internet Sacred Text Archive at <http://sacred-texts.com/cfu/index.htm>.



mic and earthly energies; and the *Spring and Autumn Annals* (*Chunqiu* 春秋; Legge 1872), which chronicled many of the important events in Confucius' home state of Lü from 722 until 481 BCE. These examples are all from among the ancient Confucian classics or canonical texts whose origins lie in the period before the imperial unification by the Qin (which gives us the name China) in 221 BCE. Because the first emperor of the Qin hosted a massive burning of books and because there were multiple editions of ancient texts from different areas, reliable dating of pre-Qin texts is difficult at best.

As China developed, Daoism and Buddhism became more prominent and influential and also gradually spread across East Asia and even south into Vietnam. Confucian political leaders found it increasingly difficult to relate to people's lives; as a result, in the later part of the Song dynasty (960–1279 CE), Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200 CE) led a much needed reform to highlight the central issues of the system and to regain focus on morality. Zhu's *Four Books* became the curriculum of study to become an official or civil servant from this period until 1905: the *Analects* (*Lunyu* 論語), the sayings and teachings of Confucius (Slingerland 2003); the collected conversations of the second most important Confucian scholar, Mencius 孟子 (372–289 BCE; Van Norden 2008); and two sections of the *Book of Rites* that epitomized the importance of learning, self-cultivation, and obtaining perfected virtue (Gardner 2007).

Another way to build wealth, and therefore well-being, was through mercantile activity. This goal usually involved travel and networking, which accounts for the spread of Chinese communities throughout Asia and Southeast Asia. Even though, in the traditional scheme of social classes—scholars, farmers, craftsmen, and then merchants—merchants were looked down upon, their ability to amass large fortunes meant that they could live well, and they were often the ones who were responsible for sponsoring theater performances, the printing of mass literature, art, architecture, and so forth. The merchants were also often the patrons of Buddhist monasteries and Daoist temples. On the other hand, for those

who were unable to accumulate large amounts of wealth, there was always the larger cultural precept that one should “be content with what one has” to comfort oneself.

## 3.4 Love of Virtue

### 3.4.1 Confucian Virtues

Aside from education and diligence, another means to ensure well-being was to cherish virtue and maintain moral integrity. The Confucian tradition taught that adhering to the ideals of benevolence and justice was instrumental for success in life. The ideal pattern for Confucian life was outlined in one of the most famous passages of the *Analects* when Confucius apparently claimed that his self-cultivation took the following trajectory:

The Master said: ‘At fifteen, I had my will set on learning. At thirty, I took my stand [in the world of ritual propriety]. At forty, I was never conflicted [between virtue and circumstance]. At fifty, I understood the Mandate of Heaven [and knew social context while being open to novel circumstances]. At sixty, my ear was attuned [to the proper understanding and use of names as titles to guide meaningful relations]. At seventy, I followed my heart's desire without overstepping the line [because I had trained myself only to pursue what was right and good for society].’ (Analects, ch. 2.4; see Slingerland 2003)

Much has been written about Confucian virtues, and authors Yang and Cheng divide them into four major groups relating to family responsibilities and obedience; commitment to and acceptance of group norms, solidarity, and harmony; commitment to hard work and education; and the cultivation of a proper disposition including austerity, humility, self-control, and frugality. Enacting these values during one's life should lead to happiness and well-being of self, family, village, and society (as cited in Ip 2013: 699–700; see also Lu and Shih 1997: 183–184). In other words, one could picture these groups as concentric rings with the individual in the center—although the individual was never a particularly important feature of East Asian society; followed

by the family, the crucial center that formed individuals into productive members of society; followed by the larger family and village; and outward to the province and country. One learns to be virtuous in the family and practices what one learns in one's closest environment, with the intent that it becomes a universal tendency among families throughout the country. Yet, one of the keys to this model is that it is supposed to work in both directions.

Subsequently, the Chinese also have a viral concept of virtue in that it is supposed to spread naturally from the person who is full of moral power (*de* 德)—the ruler, the gentleman, the perfected person (male or female), and also the parent—outward toward others, who ideally will want to adopt virtues and morals for themselves when they witness how genuinely happy, fortunate, prosperous, and well-adjusted the person is—no matter their lot in life, current state of physical ability, lack of wealth, or closeness of relationship to the person. Ideally, if a virtuous ruler does his job well, his ministers and representatives in provincial and local governmental offices should follow suit, as should the other officials who interact with them, all the way down to local policemen and magistrates, who should be able to ensure harmony and well-being for the local populous by acting with virtue, avoiding corruption, and deterring crime. As common people see this model, ideally they should want to emulate it because of the good it produces.

The core of Confucianism is its virtue ethics, which are based on mutual obligations and respect between both sides of all relationships, including the five main pairs: parent-child, husband-wife, older-younger sibling, friends, and ruler-subject. Confucian virtues begin with benevolence or humaneness (*ren* 仁), the most important of the virtues because all other social conventions are built upon this concern. When a student asked Confucius what *ren* meant, he replied: “Those who are benevolent establish others in seeking to establish themselves and promote others in seeking to promote themselves. Understanding others by analogy to oneself can be called the method of becoming benevolent” (*Analec*s 6.30; see Slingerland 2003). The sec-

ond major Confucian figure, Mencius, defines *ren* as “being human” (*Mencius* 7B16; see Van Norden 2008), and he argues that *ren* grows from the seeds of compassion, without which we could not be human (*ren* 人) (*Mencius* 2A6; see Van Norden 2008).

Additional Confucian virtues include propriety and etiquette (*li* 禮)—or properly putting benevolence into action—filial piety, trustworthiness, wisdom, righteousness, loyalty, and honesty, among others. Working privately and publically to embody these principles and virtues is the basis for Confucian self-cultivation and becoming fully human, which will lead to one's well-being and happiness, to the betterment of one's family, and to the overall improvement of society (see Lu and Shih 1997: 183). Moreover, the fundamental Confucian orientation toward mutuality, respect, and propriety has continued until today in the guise of strong social networks, relations, and connections: *guanxi* 關係, a term so pervasive in China and throughout East Asia that it has even become known outside the region as an essential means for success.

### 3.4.2 Daoist and Buddhist Virtues

Although the happiness of virtue is grounded in the Confucian sociopolitical system, moral integrity is also an important feature of Daoism and Buddhism and is crucial to their teachings about reaching their desired goals. From the proto-Daoism of the fourth to third centuries BCE to the institutionalized Daoist religion beginning in the second century CE and continuing today, Daoist thinkers have always been concerned with performing moral actions and maintaining virtuous attitudes. Rather than the forced virtues they associated with Confucianism, proto- and early Daoist teachings emphasized emulating the patterns of the Dao 道 (literally, *the Way* that things proceed naturally; *the Way* the universe and local environments work) to naturally embody and enact the important virtues of equality, consideration, respect of diversity, contentment, noncompetitiveness, humility, patience, quietude, and simplicity (see Huang 2010).

As organized Daoism emerged in the second century CE, it used the ideas of proto-Daoist thinkers and supplemented these with ideas about morality and virtuous action being divinely mandated, with transgressions being punishable by a shortening of one's life. Well-being for these groups grew to involve the virtues of perfecting one's health, nourishing and extending life, living harmoniously, and reaping the benefits of upholding moral integrity yet not being limited by ever-changing social conditions and norms. Combined, these goals were meant to help advanced practitioners achieve experiential union with the Dao, the amorphous, undifferentiated potential that is the essence of the cosmos.

Buddhism entered China in the first century CE and began to spread and gain popularity in all strata of society by the second century CE. Buddhism offered a different understanding of virtue than Confucianism and Daoism. Due to its popularity, some Confucian and Daoist thinkers in the eleventh and twelfth centuries eventually integrated Buddhist ideas into their practices and teachings. Buddhist virtue begins with the first five precepts that laity and clergy take as a promise to uphold a moral life according to their circumstances, which include abstaining from killing, stealing, lying, intoxication, and illicit sexual activities. These avoidances are the root of self-control and the first step toward the cultivation of virtue and emulating the example set by the Buddha, who is thought to have understood the impermanent nature of his true self and thus have gotten rid of egotism; become accustomed to change; become free of delusional thinking; and developed an abiding sense of well-being and happiness based upon contentment, compassion toward others, equanimity, generosity, patience, and honesty.

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### 3.5 Good Health and Peace of Mind

To describe the happiness related to good health and peace of mind, we outline China's cosmological correlative worldview and early understanding of the human and discuss how these

form the foundation of the indigenous medical system of China, which subsequently became important throughout East Asia. After examining concepts of well-being related to the Chinese worldview and medical traditions, we turn to a discussion of wellness ideas related to peace of mind in the Daoist and Buddhist religious traditions.

#### 3.5.1 Correlative Cosmologies

The ancient Chinese developed an understanding of the cosmos that was based on patterns, cycles, and interrelated facets that linked the myriad aspects of life into a comprehensible whole. The most fundamental concept of the cosmos is the Dao, the Way. The manifestation of the Dao is the most basic building block of this system: *qi* 氣, variously translated as *breath*, *vapor*, *pneuma*, *energy*, but better understood as the *organic*, *material energy* that infuses the cosmos, motivates movements, and forms the basis of life. This theory stipulates that during the formation of the cosmos, primordial *qi* differentiated itself, began to move in patterned ways, and shaped the myriad parts of the universe.

The most basic patterned movements of *qi*, which became fundamental to Chinese thinking about life, are *yin* 陰 and *yang* 陽, which originally referred to the shady and sunny sides of a hill, respectively. The cosmologist Zou Yan 鄒衍 (305–240 BCE), whose works are now only preserved as quotations in other texts, presented *yin* and *yang* as the quintessential manifestations of cosmic *qi* rather than as merely descriptions of sun and shade. Zou argued that all aspects of the cosmos should be able to be categorized according to their embodiment of *yin* or *yang* principles, where *yin* signifies calming, conserving, and tranquil energy movements, and *yang* signifies active, producing, dynamic, and transforming energy movements (see Arthur 2013: 18n3).

With this bimodal model, a cosmologist could ideally correlate, connect, and compare any aspect of life; however, it was not sufficiently nuanced to be particularly efficacious, so Zou Yan expanded this system to include five

**Fig. 3.3** Rubbing the dragon for health. In this temple picture, lay visitors rub this dragon’s head and hope to transfer the auspicious, healing energies of the dragon into their own head (ears, eyes, nose, jaw, teeth, forehead, and neck) where they encounter pains and illnesses (Credit: Shawn Arthur, China 2013)



constituents, the Five Phases (*wuxing* 五行; formerly translated as Five Elements): Wood (minor *yang*), Fire (major *yang*), Earth (a balance between *yang* and *yin*), Metal (minor *yin*), and Water (major *yin*). Whereas *yin* and *yang* had connotations of complementarity opposition, the Five Phases are thought of as a model of cyclical processes of transformations between the five natural materials upon which life and well-being rely. One direction of this process explains that wood burns to make fire, fire creates ash that becomes earth, earth condenses to make metal, metal draws condensation to make water, and water feeds plants to make wood. This new map of the ordered cosmos evolved by the time of the Later Han dynasty (25–220 CE) into a more complex and comprehensive system that included some 317 different categories of correlation based on a fivefold schema that made connections between the cosmos, the state, agricultural concerns, the human body, its organs, emotions, the senses, colors, sounds, and many other things (Arthur 2013: 9–10). Zou Yan’s correlative cosmology influenced a wide range of traditions including astrologers, diviners, *fang-shi* 方士 (Masters of Esoterica or Recipe Masters), and the emerging tradition of medical specialists, “all of whom [interacted and] shared a common interest in understanding natural phenomena and their consequences for humankind” (Harper 1998: 10, 44).

### 3.5.2 Concepts of the Body

The ancient Chinese believed that the universe, as well as the human body, consisted primarily of *qi*, the same organic, material energy of the previous section, which provided the energy of movement and the ability to function by flowing through the body’s complex internal pathways. In this way, harmonious and balanced *qi*-flow could lead to health and well-being, whereas disrupted and inharmonious *qi*-flow could lead to illness (Fig. 3.3). The oldest textual evidence that provides details about the human body and illness from an early medical viewpoint is found in the fourth century BCE text, *Zuo’s Commentary* (*Zuo zhuan* 左傳; Watson 1989), traditionally written by Zuo Qiuming 左丘明. In the chapter about the 10th month of Duke Zhou’s first reign year in 540 BCE, the Marquis of Jin became ill and a physician discusses the origin of disease in terms of the six forms of atmospheric *qi*—*yin*, *yang*, wind, rain, darkness, and brightness—which are produced in excessive amounts that disturb natural limits and cause illness. It claims:

The heavens have six forms of *qi*, which descend and produce the five tastes, issue forth and become the five colors, and call up the five sounds. When excessive, they produce the six illnesses. The six *qi* are called *yin*, *yang*, wind, rain, darkness, and brightness. Separated, they become the four seasons, and ordered, they become the five festivals. Exceeding the norm, they become calamitous.



Excess *yin* causes cold illness, excess *yang* causes hot illness, excess wind causes illness of the extremities, excess rain causes abdominal illness, excess darkness causes mental illness, and excess brightness causes cardiac illness (see Needham and Lu 2000: 42–43, 48).

The fourth to third centuries BCE witnessed further elaborations of ideas of the body, its vital functions, and techniques for cultivating health and preserving life, as well as the early development of the Chinese medical system and its physiological theories about health and well-being. An important fourth century BCE text, the *Inward Training* (*Neiye* 內業, c. 350 BCE) chapter of the *Works of Master Guan* (*Guanzi* 管子; Roth 1999), which contains the first reference to breath control, is the oldest Chinese meditation text and also provides the earliest extant presentation of fundamental medical theories about *qi*, blood, vital essence, spirit energy, heart/mind (*xin* 心; thinking and emotion were both rooted in the heart organ, much like contemporary Valentine’s Day sentiments), vessels, and *qi*-circulation (Harper 1998; Roth 1991; see also Engelhardt 2000: 74; Lu and Needham 1980: 23).

The basic idea is that people are born with a certain amount of primordial, cosmic *qi* that they use throughout their lives.<sup>4</sup> This cosmic *qi* is stored in the kidneys as vital essence and is used by the body as base *qi*, which is circulated around the body with other fluids such as blood. *Qi* and vital essence can be lost through excessive activities and emotional agitation. To avoid their loss—a problem that leads to confusion, illness, and death—the text advocates calming the heart-mind, which is associated with emotional and cognitive functions. According to the text, *qi* can be replenished through proper eating, breathing, and meditation techniques. *Qi* also can be manipulated to bring about health and longevity through

absorbing it into the body from the heavens and the environment, guiding it around the body, aligning internal *qi* with cosmological patterns, and purifying it. The cosmicization and refinement of *qi* are thought to lead the adept to store *qi* in its more subtle form, spirit. Thus the *Inward Training* provides a physiological basis to bio-spiritual self-cultivation and links this directly to cosmological phenomena by claiming that all aspects of the cosmos are manifestations of the Dao. As a result, the text advocates a life of moderation, tranquility, and harmony in order to achieve a state of health and well-being.

### 3.5.3 The Chinese Medical Tradition

Awareness of the movements and patterns of *qi* within the body and in the environment, as promoted by texts such as the *Inward Training*, became fundamental to the development of both Chinese medicine and longevity practices. Medical practices in pre-Han China were often guided by recipes, incantations, magico-religious rituals, and ascetic dietary regimens that were passed through familial lineages (Harper 1998: 45, 56, 149). As the tradition began to coalesce in the second century BCE, medical literature emerged in four main categories: stories of illnesses and their treatment, theories about physical bodies and their relations to a variety of correspondences, therapeutic speculation, and early pharmacological *materia medica*.

By the second century BCE, rather than the body only being divided into *yin* and *yang* aspects, new perspectives discussed six pairs of organs and speculated about six main energy meridians that run on each side of the body. Additionally, acupuncture points—important *qi* nodes on the surface of the body that can be stimulated to cause changes in the *qi* flow throughout the body—were recognized and correlated to the constellations of ancient astronomy (Lu and Needham 1980: 15). Curative therapies further integrated herbs and other drugs that were being compiled in pharmacopoeias such as the *Divine Farmer’s Pharmaceutical Classic* (*Shennong bencao jing* 神農本草經; Yang 1998), which dis-

<sup>4</sup>When born, a person has a certain amount of *qi* from both the father and the mother, which allows for the gestation of the embryo and its connection to primordial *qi*. Different later Chinese medical and religious theories claimed that if the parents lived an unvirtuous life, then this would affect the embryos of future generations and could cause disability, a propensity for illness and weakness, misfortune, and poverty. Conversely, virtuous parents could improve the destiny of their lineage.



cusses the usage and efficacy of over 700 herbal and mineral drugs.

In the Early Han dynasty (206 BCE–9 CE), the growing Chinese medical system began to unify itself by integrating various therapeutic methods and theories from around the country. We have two major sets, among others, of evidence of the results: the 14 medical and nourishing life texts found in the Mawangdui tomb cache dated to 168 BCE in Changsha (in south-central China) and the three volumes of the *Yellow Emperor's Internal Classic* (*Huangdi neijing* 黃帝內經; Veith 1972). These texts illustrate a burgeoning medical tradition that was supported by the elites of this time, who interacted with, and in many cases actually were, physicians.

From the contents of the Mawangdui manuscripts, it is evident that the authors approached longevity practices, early alchemical ideas, *fang-shi* recipes, and medical techniques as part of a single conglomeration of theories and practices (Harper 1998: 7n1; Penny 2000: 111). Many Mawangdui texts describe, in much more detail than any previous text, how to achieve well-being through popular techniques such as acupuncture, moxibustion (burning *artemesia vulgaris*, mugwort), dietetics, breath circulation, *qi* purification, virtue cultivation, gymnastic exercises, hygiene techniques, and sexual practices, as well as daily activities such as sleeping and cleansing the physical body (Engelhardt 2000: 85). These texts, although they had not yet incorporated *yin-yang* and Five Phases theories, do present relevant physiological and pathological theories that later formed the foundation of acupuncture therapy.

The most important text of classical Chinese medicine, however, is the *Yellow Emperor's Internal Classic*, a dialogue between the mythical Yellow Emperor and various medical masters who instruct him in the proper ways of understanding the body and of diagnosing and treating illness. Founded upon earlier theories of the Dao, *qi*, *yin-yang*, and the Five Phases, this text syncretizes correlative theories with more subtle perceptions about the body's internal cyclical *qi*-flow through meridians that run throughout the body:

the 12 internal organs<sup>5</sup> that are connected to the energetic meridian system; bodily functions and processes; and multiple physical and psychological aspects of the body, including the organ systems, the senses, emotions, mental aspects (such as will, intellect, and spirit), bodily fluids, virtues, movements, breathing styles, and others. In this way, the body becomes extremely complex, and perfecting its health requires that many systems maintain satisfactory functioning, that proper resonance (*ganying* 感應; mutual influence between similar and opposing categories of phenomena) between correspondences is maintained, and that individuals work to have balanced actions, thoughts, and emotions (Arthur 2013: 70; Kohn 2005: 76–77; see also Brindley 2006: 7n13).

The classical Chinese medical tradition that emerged from this period is predicated on the idea that the body's internal order is dependent upon the changing dynamics of *qi*-flow within the body: Stagnant or blocked *qi*, improper functioning of the Five Phases within the body, inharmonious circulation patterns, pollution, and a poor diet all cause illness; in comparison, balanced, strong, smooth-flowing *qi* along the body's energy pathways brings health, well-being, vitality, internal resilience, and an extended life expectancy. The tradition recommends not only immediate cures via acupuncture, moxibustion, herbal remedies, and massage, but also long-term adjustments in lifestyle through calming the spirit, regulating the diet, doing proper exercise and breathing, limiting strong emotions, and avoiding excessive sexual activity (Arthur 2013: 11).

<sup>5</sup>Chinese medical theory understands the body's most important organs (the liver, heart, spleen, lungs, and kidneys) as *yin*-functioning storehouses for maintaining healthy levels of *qi*, and its other organs (the gall bladder, small intestine, stomach, large intestine, and bladder) as *yang*-functioning transformative organs of the digestive tract. To this they added two organs, the pericardium and triple heater for symmetry. These are understood, not as physical organs, but as internal nexuses of energy ("orbs" that correspond to specific bodily functions) that house the body's internal administration system (see Engelhardt 2000, p. 98).

As Kohn argues:

As ‘to heal’ means ‘to make whole,’ [all the methods of the larger Chinese health care system] serve to transform human beings from simple discrete entities separate from the outside world into active participants in the triad of heaven, earth, and humanity. Chinese health methods not only cure and vitalize people’s bodies and minds, but aim to join them harmoniously with the larger cosmos. Health accordingly does not just mean the absence of illness or symptoms, but is an integrated balance of physical well-being, personal happiness, good fortune, and harmony. (Kohn 2005: 3)

Similarly, personal well-being and health comprise the first step to ensuring health and harmony in the social and natural worlds, among families and the state, and with the cosmos. This idealized peaceful, orderly *qi*-flow is what the Chinese, especially Confucians and Daoists, call Great Peace (*taiping* 太平).

This medical tradition focused predominately on the care and cultivation of the body, ideas with which most of the elite would have been familiar (Harper 1998: 142–143, 147). However, throughout much of China’s history, the illiterate peasants and poor people would be much less familiar with all of these theories; they would use folk ideas passed down through the generations and would purchase remedies from the *fangshi* and the local doctors if they could afford them in desperate times. In the contemporary Western world, we are so divorced from the natural world and are reliant on the medical community, it seems hard to imagine that historically people, families, and villages had to deal with health issues themselves on the basis of their understanding of the body and their extensive knowledge of the healing properties of the things in their environment. The inability to turn to the elite medical community continues today for the poor and destitute who are unable to afford their services.

As the Chinese medical tradition became systematized by the end of the Tang dynasty (618–906), travelers and merchant traders had already spread these ideas to Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, where they took root, flourished, and developed according to indigenous concerns. The Japanese collected as many texts as were available to them in their *Essential Medical Methods* (*Ishinpō* 醫心

方; Tamba et al. 1986), an extensive medical tome of 30 chapters that cites 204 Chinese medical and longevity texts that were collected by the court physician Tamba no Yasuyori 丹波 康賴 (912–995) and presented to Japan’s emperor in 984 (Kohn 2012: 34–35). The collection includes many Chinese texts that were lost in China, yet were influential in Japanese medicine.

There were some differences in the practices of medicine related to well-being in these countries, but, for the most part, they adopted Chinese theories and practices about *qi* (Japan: *ki*, Korea: *gi*, *ki*) and its manipulation. Korean adoption of Chinese medicine focuses more on prescribing herbal medicines to support the manual *qi*-manipulation of acupuncture treatments to produce a permanent state of healthy *qi*-flow. Medicine in imperial China and Japan, however, sees acupuncturists and herbalists as two completely separate medical disciplines, and Japanese medicine (Kanpo 漢方; lit., Methods of the Han) emphasizes the use of herbal formulas.

### 3.5.4 Peace of Mind and Joy

The other major piece of the health-related happiness of this section is having peace of mind. This well-being concept, which involves contentment, serenity, stillness, and quietude, has been an important feature of Chinese thinking for most of China’s history. Achieving peace began as an individual endeavor but also relates to social and cosmic peace and harmony. By the late Warring States period (third to second centuries BCE), Chinese thinkers began to formulate a range of ideas based on their belief that the heavens and the earth originally existed in a state of natural harmonious balance and that people’s greed, war, corruption, and overall *yang* excesses in life and emotion led to this harmony being disturbed. As a result they began to search for ways to regain this loss and recommended that people live in calmer, simpler, less greedy, *yin*-like ways.

Yang Zhu 楊朱 (440–360 BCE) was a Chinese philosopher during the Warring States period who seemed to take a novel approach to contentment and peace of mind. Appearing in the fourth

century BCE proto-Daoist texts the *Liezi* 列子 (Graham 1960/1990) and the *Zhuangzi* 莊子 (Ziporyn 2009), as well as in the Confucian *Mencius* and a few other texts soon after his time, Yang and his small group of followers taught a form of ethical egoism and hedonism. Yang strived for pleasure, beauty, and great happiness in this life because he espoused in the *Liezi* that, even though we could live a 100 years, very few people do so, and even if people could, half of their time is spent in infancy and old age, half of the rest is spent resting and sleeping, and the remaining half is wasted in pain, illness, and sorrow. This calculation leaves some 10 or so years for life. He questions who could live one moment of it without worry and concern for the many social prohibitions and fears of punishments. In other words, Yang understood individual well-being as the main purpose of life; he thought that anything that contradicted this view should be avoided, yet any power or privilege must be exercised responsibly and ethically so as to avoid harming others. Eventually Yang's voice faltered, and the Confucian tradition ascended with new issues.

We find Confucian concern for cosmic peace and calm in the "Record of Music" (*Yueji* 樂記, in the *Book of Rites*; 3rd c. BCE, rewritten in 1st c. BCE, then lost) and in Xunzi's *Discourse on Music* (*Yuelun* 樂論; c. 3rd c. BCE; Watson 1963/1996), where the authors argue that proper music and entertainment can bring about cosmic peace. For example, the "Record of Music" states, and Xunzi reiterates: "When [proper] music is in place, then one's will is clear, the ears and eyes are perceptive and clear, blood and *qi* attain harmony and equilibrium, cultural environments and customs change, and all under heaven is tranquil" (see Brindley 2006: 1, 32). The "Record of Music" seems to argue that proper music can elicit the ideal emotional states of tranquility and peace of mind in people as well as facilitate cosmic peacefulness. Brindley calls music's ability to create a long-lasting, peaceful state in the cosmos and in the person a "psychology of cosmic attunement" and a "psychology of influence" (Brindley 2006: 7).

Why music? Interestingly, the Chinese term for music (*yue* 樂) is written with the same character as the word for joy or happiness (*le* 樂). Here, music refers to more general audio-visual performances with music, dance, theater props, and entertainers—all of which is meant to elicit joy and happiness (Brindley 2006: 2n3). Proper music should bring about a pleased mood, which is characterized by joy, delight, and peace of mind, and should negate any negative feelings of anger, fear, worry, and hatred. This view could be one reason why music was thought to elicit cosmic peace: If music could rid people of disharmony and anxiety, then cosmic peace would spread throughout the social realm, and, through correlative thinking, the heavens should have a similar reaction. Might this be one reason for the popularity of calming classical, devotional, and New Age music in the West?

We also see ideal forms of this experience of peaceful well-being in the proto-Daoist texts the *Classic of the Way and Virtue* (*Daode jing* 道德經; aka, the *Laozi* 老子; Pine 2009) and *Zhuangzi* 莊子 (Ziporyn 2009) from the Warring States period (c. 350 BCE), in which they advocate for a separation from the complexities and temptations of society and instead adopt a serene lifestyle with few desires and fewer stressors. Both of these texts emphasize naturalness, ease of life, joyfulness, balance, and nonforceful actions arising from one's direct experiential realization of the Dao's patterned manifestations (Higgins and Zheng 2002: 227; Huang 2010: 1050, 1054; see Brindley 2006: 16).

Other examples of peace of mind include its function in the Chinese medical tradition as a goal for the solution of psychological and emotional instability, which was described using a bio-psycho-social model based on a Five Phases worldview and treated as any physiological illness (see Higgins and Zheng 2002: 227). In other words, psychological well-being, positive emotional states, and avoiding excessive emotions are linked to healthy function of the organ systems. Peace of mind is not only necessary for our body's health, but it is also crucial for the larger social realm—especially during historical peri-

ods of unrest, civil war, and increased natural disasters —because the theory of resonance, or mutual influence, implies that a large enough group of like-minded individuals (with peace of mind) could affect a smaller group of people (who are corrupt or causing unrest) and even could affect the natural realm since natural disasters were thought to stem from human corruption, greed, and fighting (Arthur 2013: 70; Kohn 2005: 76–77).

For example, the Great Peace (*Taiping*) movement of the Late Han dynasty developed during a time of significant social upheaval, widespread epidemics, and alternating floods and droughts, which were interpreted as an imbalance between the heavens, the earth, and the human realm that desperately needed corrective measures. Terms such as *long happiness* and *endless pleasure* were fashionable during the Han dynasty as evidenced by the many mirrors and tiles that included inscriptions to this effect. The Great Peace movement was founded on the principle that people should seek out and create peace of mind for themselves and for society by acting morally and in tune with the patterns of the Dao. Social harmony and peacefulness are fundamental to the Chinese as Li argues: “The question of what is the ‘good life’ had been asked and answered in a philosophical sphere in China over the centuries. For the Confucian thinkers, the ‘good life’ was to be found in a harmonious society wherein individuals fulfilled the duties and obligations inherent in their status” (Li 2006: 217).

One additional area where peace of mind is significant to the Chinese is in Buddhism, where the main goal is to calm the mind in order to see reality for what it really is. The meditations and activities that Buddhists advocate tend to focus on self-reflection and learning to be “at ease with oneself” (Lu 2001: 416). The serenity and quietude offered in Buddhist settings are matched by the philosophical teachings about learning to deal with the suffering and dissatisfaction that we encounter in our lives (see Zhang and Veenhoven 2008). For Buddhism, well-being is grounded in peace of mind and tranquility of heart.

## 3.6 Longevity

### 3.6.1 Daoist Self-Cultivation, Longevity, and Immortality

Health, well-being, and living a long life are China’s oldest culturally focused aspirations. As Lu and Shih argue, “in Chinese society, longevity has always been regarded as a *fuqi* [福氣; blessings or fortunate *qi*], almost as a virtue. Health as a source of happiness reflects this traditional value” (1997: 185–186). According to prayers found on bronze inscriptions from the Western Zhou period (1112–771 BCE) and themes in the *Book of Odes* (Waley 1937/1996), the most ancient desires of the Chinese people were for longevity (*shou* 壽), prolonged life (*changsheng* 長生), and a natural death. During the Spring and Autumn Period (722–481 BCE), prayers for longevity evolved to include escape from old age, nourishment of life (*yangsheng* 養生), preservation of the body, and “no death.” It was the emergence of this last term, “no death,” that marked the appearance of Chinese beliefs about physical immortality (*xian* 仙; also translated as transcendence).

By the fourth century BCE, beliefs about physical immortality began to gain popularity, especially in the north-eastern coastal areas where immortality was thought to be attainable from drugs found in nature or received from the immortals (*xian* 仙 or *xianren* 仙人) who lived on mythical islands in the eastern ocean. Additionally, practical longevity-oriented texts began to emerge. For example, the previously discussed *Inward Training* is an early text that provides meditation instructions for refining one’s *qi* by advocating moderation of lifestyle and diet, withdrawal from sensory overload, seated meditation in an upright position, deep and regular breathing, engaging in tranquility and clarity of mind, and a focus on harmonious and balanced *qi*-flow throughout the body, which should lead to a state of profound peace, improved health, and cosmic awareness (Kohn 2012: 14–15; Roth 1999: 112–113). This classic ideal of perfection claimed that “the only life worth

enjoying was the purified and tranquil sojourn on earth in as much alignment and contact [as possible] with the Dao, the spirits, and the potency of Heaven and Earth” (Kohn 2012: 31).

By 133 BCE, a protochemical “transformation” of cinnabar into gold was discovered and thought to be an effective immortality drug. At this time in Emperor Wudi’s (r. 141–87 BCE) Han dynasty court, the search for immortality reached the peak of its popularity among the elites in China. It was believed that performing the appropriate rituals and eating from utensils made from alchemically created gold could bestow immortality. In his attempts to concoct an immortality elixir—an edible form of natural or artificial gold that could be ingested in the hopes of bringing about transcendence—Emperor Wudi employed many *fangshi* 方士 (Masters of Esoterica or Recipe Masters), who were well-known for disseminating longevity and self-cultivation recipes and techniques as they wandered across China as doctors and magic workers selling their skills to aristocrats, merchants, and farmers, and anyone else who could afford the services. The *fangshi* advocated a wide array of practices including medicinal arts, life extension techniques, herbal and mineral elixirs, *qi*-cultivation, breathing practices, ascetic dietary regimens, astrology, divination, magic rituals, sexual practices, and physical exercises all in the name of refining the body and its internal energies (Arthur 2013: 4).

During the Qin and Han periods (221 BCE–220 CE), two major methods of attaining immortality were prevalent: the earlier method of finding an immortal who would provide an elixir and a new method of using alchemical procedures to manufacture an elixir. The latter approach required would-be alchemists to renounce all ties to the social world, remove themselves to a private and quiet place in the mountains, perform ritual purifications, invoke spirits for support, obtain the raw materials needed to form the elixir (which was often difficult), vigilantly maintain moral excellence, and do complex meditative and protochemical activities based on cosmological correlative theory for up to a year—a practice that combined Confucian

morals, Daoist rituals, and Chinese medical practices.

Not only did the methods for gaining immortality evolve; the idea of what it meant to be an immortal developed as well. Pre-Han theories of immortality were worldly in orientation: Their primary aim was to increase the length of the physical body’s life indefinitely. During the Early Han period, immortality developed an other-worldly aspect: The primary goal became one of developing a spirit body that could transcend the mortal world to reside and work among other immortals and gods in the celestial bureaucracy (Penny 2000: 110; Roth 1991: 641). This fundamental transformation of the body was accomplished through ingestion of elixirs, internal refining of one’s *qi* into spirit energy through visualization and breath techniques, and virtuous action. Although virtue is humanistic and worldly in character, according to Daoist tradition, the development of the spirit body is not attainable without a virtuous mind. Additionally, following cosmic principles in alchemical practices includes emulating the virtuous nature of cosmic processes. In fact, the significance of being virtuous for attaining immortality becomes central to later texts such as the *Scripture of Great Peace* (*Taiping jing* 太平經; Hendrischke 2006) and *The Master Who Embraces Simplicity* (*Baopuzi* 保朴子; Ware 1966), which distribute knowledge about the reality of immortality by quoting concrete examples (Penny 2000: 109).

With the growing popularity of thoughts of immortality came further development of complex medical and religious ideologies. By the second century CE, the Daoist religion emerged as a relatively organized institution, and its adherents actively began to synthesize a wide array of existing ideas and practices relevant to the pursuit of immortality. This integration involved ideas about cosmological correlation, medical theories, alchemical symbolism, and a wide range of self-cultivation practices such as moderation in action and emotion, meditation, gymnastic exercises, and breathing techniques to nourish the *qi*, prevent illness, and prolong life. In addition, people began to practice techniques for self-massage, swallowing cosmic *qi* from their saliva or soaking



it up from the sun's light, ascetic dietary practices such as grain avoidance and supplemented fasting,<sup>6</sup> sexual practices to unite and preserve the *yin* and *yang* energies within the body, and pharmaceutical practices that use the plant and mineral elixirs deemed most effective for transforming and purifying the body's *qi* (Arthur 2013).

Longevity and immortality are, of course, ultimate goals of well-being; however, few people were able to fully realize these objectives because proper self-cultivation requires a great deal of effort and commitment. Rather, as Kohn argues, "most people become victims of the senses, get involved in social strife and competition, engage in excessive food and sex, give rise to the six destructive emotions—anger, hatred, worry, fear, sadness, and euphoria—and thus in various ways diminish their energy and squander their essence," which leads to stress, emotional upheaval, fatigue, moral shortcomings, unnecessary illness, and an early death (2012: 164).

The earliest of the organized and institutionalized Daoist religious groups, the Celestial Masters, was founded by Zhang Daoling 張道陵 (34–156 CE) around 142 CE. The Celestial Masters community in the southwestern region of China rapidly gained popularity, partly because of their promise of health and longevity, bestowed by the newly deified Laozi and revelations about a new pantheon of hierarchically arranged deities and partly because they integrated medical and

longevity-oriented theories and techniques into their religious practices. The Celestial Masters seem to have had two ultimate goals for practitioners: to gain influence and authority over spirit beings associated with the celestial bureaucracy and to cultivate spirit energy in order to become fully aware of the Dao. Both goals used similar practices: complex visualizations of the internal processes of the body, the avoidance of non-virtuous actions, prayers to Lord Lao and the celestial bureaucracy, the creation of talismans for protection and health, the performance of specialized rituals, control of the mind and emotions, and the practice of longevity techniques (Engelhardt 2000: 76, 86).

This variety of techniques remained important for Daoist groups for a few centuries. When we examine Daoism in the third to sixth centuries, we see further reflection on and expansion of these self-cultivation practices that were meant to lead adherents to a state of perfected well-being defined as having a refined and harmonious body and mind; experiencing perfected health and longevity; being attuned to the rhythms and patterns of the cosmos as manifestations of the Dao; being in communication with the gods; and facilitating balance between the heavenly, earthly, and human realms. One means by which many ascetic self-cultivation regimens, such as dietary practices, claim efficacy is through asserting that following them will cause an advanced practitioner, either male or female, to regain their youthfulness and beauty: White hair will revert to black, lost teeth will regrow, wrinkled and blemished skin will become smooth and clear, eyesight and hearing will improve, better-quality strength and balance will return, mental capacities will be enhanced, and the signs of aging will stop (Arthur 2013: 61–91).

These beliefs not only indicate how these Daoists thought about well-being and how they presented this ideal—as a metaphor for holiness—to the people in their communities, but they also indicate the serious nature of their concerns with mortality salience (Arthur 2013: 12, 62, 190). Additionally, the emphasis on idealized beauty and youthfulness simultaneously can indicate health, psychological well-being,

<sup>6</sup>Grains are replaced by pine bark, pine resin, sesame seeds, roots of orchids, asparagus root, mushrooms, fungus, water, and various other wild-picked ingredients (see Arthur 2013). *Zhuangzi* writes that ideally, an immortal eventually is able to subsist only on the *qi* from wind and morning dew. Some reasons for eliminating grains include the facts that grains, although part of a typical diet, are associated with bodily decay, immersion in an oppressive social structure, and the prevalence of intestinal parasites. Supplemented fasting refers to radically decreased normal food intake—typically necessitated by individuals leaving society and living in the wilderness alone or in small groups because of significant civil unrest or engagement in religious-oriented practices—which works to avoid many of the well-known negative side effects of starvation by including enough carbohydrates, proteins, vitamins, and minerals that the practitioner is able to live in relative comfort and health for long periods of time with little actual food intake (Arthur 2013: 173–174).

potency, vigor, ability, wealth, status, and legitimacy, which function not merely as physiological conditions but also as socioeconomic indicators upon which people rely when looking for authoritative figures and reliable informants. Clearly, many Daoist self-cultivation regimens are oriented toward elderly, rather than young, adepts who were interested in regaining lost aspects of their lives, such as their appearance and health, and who had sufficient funds to afford and leisure time to devote themselves to the requisite practices. Most of the well-known Daoist self-cultivation groups, such as the Numinous Treasure School, were organizations run by wealthy aristocrats and retired elite members of society, not by poor laypersons (Arthur 2013: 73).

Eventually, the complex visualizations related to the internal processes of the body, their correlation to cosmological phenomena, and the focus on manipulation and refinement of the energetic aspects of the body overshadowed the creation of chemical elixirs and became the central emphasis for Daoist cultivation. This new iteration, called internal alchemy, had its foundation in earlier practices, but became a viable alternative to laboratory-created elixirs due to a series of revelations by members of the fourth century Highest Clarity School of Daoism, which admonished followers to emphasize meditation and visualization processes rather than chemical ones. By the Tang dynasty (618–906 CE), people began to realize that alchemical elixirs could be hazardous to one's health and well-being and thus began to shy away from elixir creation in favor of a focus on inner realities. A famous Tang Dynasty physician Sun Simiao 孫思邈 (581–682 CE) wrote many important medical and longevity texts that led to him being venerated today across China as the Medicine King (Yaowang 藥王). His collections of medical information are still used by Chinese physicians today, but he is also remembered for texts about achieving happiness and preserving long life in which he discusses enhancing one's lot in life, avoiding negative karma (a Buddhist idea), being moderate in action and lifestyle, and maintaining a virtuous attitude because he argues that health is, in large part, a function of happiness and good fortune

(Kohn 2012: 138–139, 141). Then, in 1167, internal alchemy became the central feature of Wang Chongyang's 王重陽 newly founded Complete Perfection School of Daoism, which also synthesized earlier forms of Daoism with basic Confucian moral and Buddhist meditation teachings. The Complete Perfection School, which emphasizes self-cultivation through internal alchemy in order to perfect oneself and become a spirit immortal after death, remains the major tradition of Daoism in China and Taiwan today.

### 3.6.2 Buddhist Self-Cultivation

Other forms of Chinese self-cultivation practice include the aforementioned Confucian practices of being benevolent, learning, and exercising self-restraint, as well as Buddhist meditation techniques for learning to control one's mind, thoughts, and perceptions of reality. Whatever the actual practices, the ultimate goal of Buddhism is for people to improve their own well-being. This goal stems from the Four Noble Truths espoused by Buddhists: (1) people experience suffering and dissatisfaction throughout their lives, and (2) their suffering is derived directly from the various craving, desires, and attachments that people have. It stands to reason, then, that the other two Noble Truths claim that (3) suffering could be eliminated from people's lives (4) if they would just stop their incessant cravings and thirsts using the Eight-fold Path to guide them to develop morality, wisdom about reality, and an ability to calm the mind and to keep it attentive through meditation.

As Buddhism entered China and began to spread by the first century CE, its teachings became widespread and attractive to many commoners and elite alike, in part because the tradition claimed to be able to eliminate the suffering in people's lives and to bring them long-lasting contentment and happiness. Rather than focusing one's self-cultivation efforts and prayers toward craving a longer life, Buddhists advocated a detailed examination of reality through paying close attention to the inner workings of the mind as illuminated by meditation practices. What one

ideally finds is a realization that everything is “empty” (*shunyata*) of a permanent, unchanging essence upon which our minds want to cling. Everything changes, and watching one’s mind, one can see how thoughts come into being, influence one’s assumptions, and fade away when no attention is paid to them. As one learns to let go of ingrained ways of thinking and to achieve an emotional balance, then one finds a way to gradually decrease one’s suffering until one reaches a point of no suffering and a more complete understanding of reality, a state known as *nirvana* (lit. to extinguish—as to blow out a flame) or *bodhi* (lit., awakening—to the Buddhist concept of reality). Buddhists claim that the resulting transformation of consciousness due to perceiving the world “as it really is,” without our typical mental projections, can lead to enduring happiness (*sukha*) and a lasting state of perfected well-being (Ekman et al. 2005: 60; Poceski 2009; Zhang and Veenhoven 2008: 431–432). *Sukha* is one of over 20 Buddhist Sanskrit terms roughly meaning happiness, comfort, well-being, and bliss, and early Chinese translators used the aforementioned terms *anle* 安樂 and *kangle* 康樂 to make sense of the Buddhist texts.

Learning and practicing this sophisticated set of meditative concepts and the logic behind them were traditionally the purview of monks and nuns who had renounced the world in search of inner peace and tranquility. Yet, as Buddhism entered China, it also opened up its temple doors to the laity, who were encouraged to engage with the teachings and practices on whatever level they were able. As a result, many original teachings evolved to address the needs of the laity who were ill-equipped to contend with sophisticated philosophical arguments about the “emptiness of essences” and, instead, wished to focus on this-worldly needs related to their immediate well-being, the alleviation of their suffering, and their hopes for a better future.

Two major doctrinal and ideological changes occurred to address these needs. First, a new figure emerged: the *bodhisattva* (lit., awakening being), which referred to a person on the path toward realization of Buddhist truths (see Poceski 2009). New schools taught that there was no rush

to achieve nirvana—it could be gained over many lifetimes. For those bodhisattvas who were thought to have done an exemplary job, however, the tradition treated these claims as did folk religious practices: They made them into semi-divine savior beings, or cosmic bodhisattvas, who had generated such good merit while alive that after their physical death, they were reborn in the heavens where they could continue to help people in need. Following this development, the second change was an additional supernatural element, the idea of a Pure Land, a place free of suffering into which people with strong faith could be reborn (see Poceski 2009). The most well-known Pure Land is associated with the “Buddha of Light and Life”—Amitabha (Chi: Amitufo; Jap: Amida; Kor: Amita), who, according to legend, was originally a monk named Dharmakara who made a series of vows to create a paradise where earnest seekers could be reborn in order to learn the Buddha’s teaching without the interference of everyday suffering. The laity could thus pray to the bodhisattvas and the Buddha in search of assistance with life’s problems and to improve their well-being, while the monastics focus on their ascetic practices—a pattern that continues today.

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### 3.7 Fulfilling Destiny and Following the Will of Heaven

#### 3.7.1 Good Family Life (Harmonious Familial Relationships and Having Supportive Children)

We can see many traditional concepts of happiness and well-being in the family when we listen to folk concepts and sayings about this issue. One of the most central of these is the Confucian ideal of five cardinal relationships: between oneself and the ruler, one’s father, one’s spouse, one’s siblings, and one’s friends. One’s family is of utmost importance because each individual throughout East Asian history recognized and was reminded regularly that they were merely a

continuation of their ancestors. Some well-known, Confucian-based, folk sayings about the family include admonitions about “the inheritance of the family line,” “raising sons for one’s old age,” “having three generations living together under one roof,” “happiness for the elderly is from their children pleasing them by living with them,” and “harmony in the family is the basis for success in any undertaking” (Davey et al. 2009: 246–247; Li 2006: 226; Lu 2001: 410, 420). Part of fulfilling one’s destiny, *ming* 命, is finding ways to live up to society’s expectations and standards, which include being filial to one’s ancestors, having filial children (which means that the parents trained them properly), being prosperous for one’s position in life, avoiding disasters, maintaining one’s health and that of one’s family, being at peace, being relatively happy, and avoiding upsetting any supernatural entities such as one’s ancestors, the Kitchen God, or the local gods.

Similarly, the emperor’s obligations included looking after the well-being of his so-called ‘children’ (i.e., the people), ensuring an honest government, and performing the proper rituals to the gods. When the ancient kings and dynastic emperors attended to their duties, historical documents report that the country lived in relative harmony and prosperity because the ruler had earned the abstract Mandate of Heaven (*tianming* 天命) from the heavens. If the ruler allowed for corruption or became a greedy despot, he is said to have lost the Mandate of Heaven, which subsequently resulted in a loss of social harmony as well as a rise in natural disasters such as floods, draughts, forest fires, and earthquakes that disrupted agricultural production thus causing further disharmony among the populace.

### 3.7.2 Safety—In Society, Travel, Wilderness, and from Invasions, War, and Illness

As far in the past as the thirteenth century BCE, oracle bone divination evidence indicates that rulers were concerned about out-

breaks of pestilence and infectious diseases. Bronze vessels from the same period through the fifth century BCE were inscribed with prayers to avoid illness and death. Illness was a serious issue in the lives of the Chinese throughout history, and a mark of well-being was protection from disease and safeguarding against parasitic infections.

As the population grew and expanded west and south, the Chinese developed new farming techniques for the new lands they acquired, to meet their agricultural needs, and to become proficient growing a wider selection of crops, including rice. Subsequently, irrigation farming in paddies exposed many people to new types of parasites and viruses that caused widespread illness and death. Evidence indicates that millions of people died in over 30 major epidemics across central and southern China from 208 to 565 CE (Arthur 2013: 185–187).

Additionally, there were many rebellions, civil wars, invasions, and other natural disasters throughout China’s history, and the textual records express people’s concerns about their safety and security in many ways, including social, political, religious, and martial. Deng’s calculations show how the population fluctuated from 56.4 million in 157 CE to 18.5 million in 280 CE, then up to 46 million before falling to only 11.5 million at the end of the sixth century due to epidemics, wars, invasions, and natural disasters (Deng 2004: 56–57). As a result, a wide range of social and religious practices emerged that sought to control the tumultuous circumstances in which people found themselves, including political ideas about the Mandate of Heaven. Additionally, Daoist religious thinkers developed recipes and self-cultivation practices oriented toward ridding the body of parasites and intestinal worms; a talismanic tradition that sought to magically protect people who sought refuge from social upheaval in dangerous wilderness areas; and recipes that taught adepts how to survive in the wilderness without a social support network. Because life can be chaotic, developing techniques for averting chaos to ensure well-being became important hallmarks of Chinese culture and religion.

### 3.7.3 Auspiciousness and Good Luck

From ancient times, we see in China a desire for good luck, or fortune (*xing* 幸), and for blessings (*fu* 福), often bestowed by the gods for being a virtuous person and taking care of one's ancestors properly. Interacting with auspiciousness and obtaining good luck come from a range of practices including worshiping the gods, divination, use of talismans, and other types of religious involvement (Poo 1998: 7). Recent research provides empirical evidence that religious adherence and involvement can function to facilitate well-being by acting as a coping resource during life's difficulties, protecting mental health, and providing meaning for people (Huang et al. 2012: 3).

Religious life in late imperial China was active and rich for many people, especially those in urban areas that maintained temples to the City God and to the God of Walls and Moats. These officially sponsored temples hosted festivals and celebrations that were attended by many people, who also could turn to these deities for practical assistance with community issues and personal requests (Zito 1987: 333–334). Rural areas also had local temples and ancestor shrines for large families that hosted a range of community events and provided a means by which people could interact with the gods to receive their blessings.

People across East Asia not only go to sacred places—such as the local earth god shrine, the urban city god temple, the Buddhist temple, or the Shinto shrine in Japan—to light incense and to pray to the gods, but they also perform simple religious ceremonies in their homes (Poo 1998: 71). Rather than having complex altars and large statues, it has been common for at least the past 500 years for people to have paper images of gods, goddesses, immortals, or protective spirits. Images of deities with children, gold, and fruit invoke sympathetic magic to bring these riches to the household that displays these pictures on doors and above small altars. This might remind one of Deng Xiaoping's (鄧小平; the leader of China from 1978 to 1992) famous adage about cats: “It doesn't matter whether the cat is black or

white, as long as it catches mice” (Tyler 1997; Murphy 2013).

One particularly auspicious time is the lunar New Year, during which each household prepares offerings for their Kitchen God, or God of the Hearth, so that he will report good (and ignore the bad) things about the family members to the celestial bureaucracy and will provide health and tranquility to the household. Each New Year the god receives a new image in which to reside above the stove, and the family also hangs new portraits of protector gods on the outside doors of their compound to ensure their safety in the coming year.

By the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), an image of a triad of gods emerged from prevalent art and literature to “satisfy demands for auspicious images of economic fortune and personal well-being” (Fong 1983: 159). Widely popular throughout all levels of society, the gods Fu 福 (good fortune), Lu 錄 (prosperity), and Shou 壽 (longevity) developed out of the Chinese preoccupation with achieving these characteristics of well-being in their lives (Fig. 3.4). Found in early texts such as the Confucian classic, the *Book of Odes*, *fu* refers to the good luck of getting an official position, *lu* refers to a government salary, and together the term *fulu* refers to a bestowed gift. From at least the Late Zhou period (722–221 BCE), *shou* referred to longevity, one of the five sources of happiness. These concepts grew in importance throughout China's history as people began to believe that these blessings could be bestowed on anyone seen as worthy of their receipt, hence their popularity among all strata of society (Fong 1983: 181).

Woodcuts, paintings, statues, and other images of these three deities were common after the Ming dynasty, when their stylized forms were codified with additional symbolism. In addition to the gods' names being sought-after ideals, as a way of further symbolizing the traits attributed to this triad, artists added to the God of Good Fortune's image a bat, pronounced *fu* as a homonym for blessings, and a peony flower symbolizing abundance; to the God of Prosperity's image, a deer, pronounced *lu* as a homonym for prosperity and symbolizing long life in the Daoist



**Fig. 3.4** Auspicious activities in the temple. This woman in the Daoist Black Ram temple in Chengdu, Sichuan, China is participating in a common auspicious temple activity: She closes her eyes, turns around in place a few times to lose her bearings, and then walks the length of the courtyard with her eyes closed hoping to touch one of the three auspicious characters *lù* 祿 (prosperity), *shòu* 壽 (longevity), or *fú* 福 (blessings). Folk traditions say that she will get her wish and the subject of the character if she is able to touch it without peeking (Credit: Shawn Arthur, China, 2008)



tradition, and a scepter symbolizing attaining desired wishes; and to the God of Longevity's image, a crane, a Daoist symbol of immortality, and a gourd that holds the elixir of immortality (Fong 1983: 182–194).

### 3.8 Conclusion

Throughout East Asian history there has been a distinction between the various official religions of Daoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Shinto, and folk or popular religion, which may or may not have loose ties with official traditions, depending on the particular context. Official religions across East Asia can also be divided into two strands of thought and practice: officially trained clergy and the laity, who had little training and had different concerns than the literati who could write and read texts.

Additionally, by the Song dynasty (960–1279), new developments in Chinese Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism led to great syncretism and borrowing between the main traditions that continued through the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). During this later imperial period, aka traditional China, we can see the various levels of concern for well-being at work: Daoism emphasized community-centered rituals, Confucianism

emphasized family-centered thinking, and Buddhism was more concerned with individual self-cultivation (Table 3.1).<sup>7</sup>

Simultaneously, folk traditional and popular religion dealt with all of the in-between areas for common people that were not addressed by the grand traditions. Within popular idioms, happiness and well-being were often expressed in terms of helping others, of awareness of having just enough, and of sharing with friends and family. For example, folk sayings such as “helping others is the root of happiness,” “the more sons you have, the happier you can be,” and “knowing you already have enough is a constant source of happiness” were folk sources of happiness and well-being that were rooted in Confucianism that show how some contemporary ideas about these issues are based on ancient ideals (Ip 2013: 700).

<sup>7</sup>The functioning of these three major religions divided in this way provides insight into the social reality of religion(s) in East Asia and some of their major differences from Western religions. For example, Chinese religions each address certain aspects of life, but in an overlapping, inclusivist way rather than in a manner that stresses exclusivism and adherence to only one perspective and set of beliefs. As Christianity and Islam moved into China, the regions and ethnic groups that adopted these also have seen a rise in social and political unrest due in large part to a loss of much social and religious inclusivity.

**Table 3.1** Comparison of major Chinese religious groups and their well-being teachings (Arthur and Mair 2015)

	Major teachings	Path to well-being	Extending happiness to others
China generally and folk traditions	Combining aspects from all traditions	Combining aspects from all traditions	Combining aspects from all traditions
	Teaching folk customs and traditions	Being healed with Chinese medicine	Being virtuous
	Listening to one’s parents and elders	Participating in annual celebrations	Interacting well with one’s family, village, and community
Confucianism	Benevolence and propriety are keys to achieving social harmony.	Following the law	Establishing strong interactions and relationships with others
	All virtues and morals are social by nature.	Acting with virtue	
		Reciprocal relationships are important.	Living with awareness and attitude of concern for others before oneself
		Emulating good examples taught and set by others	Respecting and honoring others
Daoism	Gaining influence over celestial bureaucracy	Attuning to the Dao	Performing blessing and healing rituals
	Cultivating spirit energy	Perfecting health by refining the body and its energies	Performing rituals to help others
	Balancing life’s states	Living a moral life	Respecting and honoring others
	Practicing longevity techniques	Praying to the gods and visualizing their protective presence	Providing sacred space and opportunities for auspicious activities
	Exhibiting moral integrity		
	Acting without conflict		
Buddhism	Ending suffering due to understanding reality	Realizing the reality of suffering and how to stop it	Practicing wisdom, compassion, equanimity, and the bodhisattva ideal
	Practicing moral integrity	Upholding the precepts	Respecting and honoring others
		Practicing meditation	
		Stopping attachment	Applying these techniques to life
	Behaving in moderation		
	Examining the mind		

There can be no doubt that Christianity, Marxism, capitalism, Western educational systems, Islam, and other influences from abroad have had an enormous impact on East Asian societies, yet traditional values and practices persist. Rather than simply replacing old concepts and practices, the new social and cultural strands have fused with what came before to form an interesting combination of East and West. Happiness, good fortune, and longevity are still chief desires, but how they are achieved and what constitutes them are not identical to what they were centuries ago.

The Chinese case study is interesting and informative because for the past 2500 years or

more, the cultural, religious, medical, political, social, and intellectual systems were consciously integrated in various ways with common theoretical foundations through which each part shared concepts while contributing unique ideas. Most importantly, we can clearly see that well-being happens on a range of levels and in a variety of areas of life, so educators and policy makers need to focus their energies on developing more well-rounded and comprehensive approaches to their perspectives on well-being. A common, detrimental issue is myopic theory and policy that sees only one issue and argues that one solution is all that is necessary. It should be clear from this chapter that well-being is a com-

plicated issue that needs to be addressed from multiple perspectives before it could have even marginal success. Addressing only one aspect without accounting for the many other aspects of peoples' lives—and the people in many different places in the social scheme of well-being—can be problematic, often necessitating a series of stopgap measures to remedy weaknesses in the initial approach. Were policy makers to consult regularly with a range of nonpolitician and nonbusiness experts, by which we mean the sociologists, psychologists, religious studies scholars, anthropologists, and other scholars who study the issues at hand professionally and who are recognized experts in their fields (as exemplified in this handbook), they would place themselves in significantly better positions to make well-informed decisions and have comprehensive visions about the issues that they currently rely on their aides to summarize for them.

This example of China provides a second clear area of thought for policy makers regarding issues of disparity and diversity. For example, Chinese medicine diagnoses patients on an individual basis because each pattern of internal energy leading to illness or health is unique to the individual. Similarly, when Chinese politicians write health laws, they try to remain aware of the multiple layers of society that the law must address equally: from wealthy urbanites to poor urbanites, from moderately wealthy village dwellers to their poorer neighbors, and from the whole range of 55 legally recognized ethnic minorities across the country who are mostly poverty-stricken to the extremely poor rural population who also deserve some kind of health protection under the law.<sup>8</sup>

In other words, well-being policy needs to address the reality of *disparity*—health, economic, prosperity (or lack of), social, religious

difference, (dis-)ability, (un-)employment, education level, family education background—and *diversity*—which does not only mean color, race, and country of origin but also includes all of the categories of disparity *and more*—among the people that the policy makers are trying to assist. People living in poverty versus economic stability and prosperity or people with healthy bodies versus people with disabled bodies that are constantly in pain are living worlds apart and are in need of radically different solutions. The real limitations of poverty and the other differences between the haves and the have-nots need to be addressed honestly, thoroughly, and comprehensively for the real benefit of the people in need.

Now, in the twenty-first century, with the economic prosperity of a rapidly growing elite class and its conspicuous consumption and obsession with luxury goods, questions about well-being remain important for the majority of East Asia's populace, most of whom remain estranged from this economic growth. These men and women rely on the same types of well-being issues and practices discussed throughout this chapter. Certain aspects of East Asia are modernizing, yet the core of what it means to be and act Chinese, Japanese, and/or Korean remains rooted in a multi-millennia-old history.

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<sup>8</sup>Many of the ethnic minorities in China, such as the Uyghurs and the Tibetans, as well as those found in Japan and Korea, have their own religious and cultural traditions of well-being. Although the Chinese government currently officially recognizes minority groups and provides certain protections under the law, historically, the situation for minority groups across East Asia was often quite different.

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# Well-Being in India: A Historical and Anthropological Report

# 4

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*Any place is a palace if your heart decides so. (Tamil Proverb)*

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## 4.1 Introduction: Nature, Culture, and Well-Being in South Asia and India

All people, including those in all parts of South Asia, have consistently sought health, prosperity, longevity, community, and a state of comfort with their natural surroundings; they have, in other words, consistently sought well-being. Nevertheless, both culture and nature generate inequalities that challenge their vision of well-being and force adaptations that may be no less agreeable. This is to say that the very concept of well-being, including standards of opportunity and prosperity embedded within it as expressed in the areas of health, education, income, and subjective well-being, shift from culture to culture. India, including both its classical and modern periods, is a land of discrete and disparate cultures. These cultures have often collided but remain united in a cultural conservatism that renders it both possible and desirable to address well-being as a recognizable continuum rather than through major upheavals and disjunctions,

including the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 and their emergence as independent countries, freed from the bonds of British colonialism. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this chapter, we cover pre-independence South Asia separately from post-independence India, because the nature of the different sources dictates this. We find, however, that they augment each other, and taken together, they enable us to provide a vignette of continuity and well-being in South Asia from deep historical periods to the present day.

The Indian and other South Asian quests for health, prosperity, community, safety, education, and other factors generally associated with well-being cannot be assumed to be constructed or realized as they are in the West or as they are measured and quantified by Western economists and philanthropic bodies (Drèze and Sen 2013). Cultural and religious markers of well-being, including those that inhere in the unique histories of Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and in Indian political and socioeconomic formations, require that we examine well-being in South Asia, perhaps India in particular, through a separate prism, which is what we propose to do here.

The main questions around which the following discussions are based are (1) What is in Indian religious doctrine (primarily Buddhist, Hindu, and, later, Islam) that helps shape conceptions of well-being that are applied throughout Indian culture? (2) Can we identify

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literary or other sources that help us confirm that these conceptions are more than artifacts of literary production? (3) How do the unique (and pervasive) Indian social system of caste and the ideas of status that inhere in it shape local conceptions of well-being? (4) How has state formation contributed to well-being, particularly under the Mughals (1526–early eighteenth century), the British, and modern neoliberal industrializing India? (5) How does public religious performance continue to shape well-being in modern India? The answers to these questions will enable us to better theorize and understand the shape of well-being in India historically, on the ground today, and, ideally, in the future. We are a historian/linguist and a cultural anthropologist and cannot claim expertise in quantitative analysis or data gathering beyond our respective social science disciplines. Our contributions, then, reside more confidently in an assessment of subjective well-being. However, before we turn to further descriptions of method, then enter into the body of the essay, it is necessary to say a few words about the term South Asia and its historical and present overlap with India and other countries in the region.

The term *South Asia* is a distinctly modern term used to identify a geopolitical region that includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan,<sup>1</sup> and Sri Lanka. It was coined in the 1950s to demarcate it from West Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia. In this arti-

cle, the term *South Asia* refers to the area that includes these countries, even if parts of Afghanistan and Burma are both geographically and culturally related to South Asia. From the beginning of British dominion in South Asia in the late eighteenth century, the name India endured as the geopolitical marker for the area that comprised present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. After August 15, 1947, however, the situation changed. India assumed its present borders while the western and eastern parts of it became Pakistan and (in 1971) Bangladesh. Sri Lanka (previously called Ceylon), which since 1798 had been a British Crown Colony, achieved independence shortly thereafter, in February 1948. Nepal and Bhutan were never British colonies and, like Sri Lanka, were never considered a part of India. The entire area, however, has long shared a great deal culturally, despite the presence of more than 25 major languages and innumerable minor ones. South Asian culture, then, with its many shared traits, extends beyond the boundaries of classical India or the three central countries that today constitute the bulk of the area. We retain both designations here, speaking of South Asia in reference to pre-independence India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as a single cultural or geographic area, as well as the same area in the post-independence period when speaking of it as a cultural area. We use the word India when referring to ancient or classical India (as it is commonly used), but only to the modern post-independence country, distinguishing it from Pakistan and the rest of South Asia, in addressing matters of specific concern to that country. This slight confusion is better understood when we realize that the word Pakistan was not coined until the late 1930s and only indicated the country itself after August 14, 1947. The authors are India specialists, in both the pre-independence and post-independence sense, which means, practically, that the discussions of modernity are largely limited to India rather than Pakistan Bangladesh (or Nepal). Nevertheless, the term *South Asia* has proven to be of great help, and, as the reader will see, we use it frequently and unambiguously.

<sup>1</sup>It is worth mentioning that in 2005 Bhutan introduced a policy initiative called “Gross National Happiness” (GNH). In 2010 an extensive GNH survey was conducted: <http://www.slideshare.net/CentreforBhutanStudies/wan-10000689>. For the GNH Commission, see: <http://www.gnhc.gov.bt/>. The present authors are unable to comment further on this initiative, except to suggest that it should be interesting in a decade or so for independent researchers to validate, verify, or counter the claims of the Bhutan government. Statistical measurement of well-being is a decidedly western academic exercise, based on presuppositions of western culture and religion. Only after a decade or so will we be in a position to know the extent to which well-being according to these standards coheres with well-being shaped by a culture that is 75 % Buddhist and 22 % Hindu, generally high altitude, and comparatively rural, agrarian, educated, and sparsely populated.

## 4.2 Sources of Well-Being in Classical and Modern South Asia

A close examination of well-being in classical, premodern, and modern South Asia yields differences from one location, decade, or century to another, but on the whole acknowledges a continuum of recognition despite economic, political, and social disruptions. Thus, in treating the long history of South Asia, the abundance of sources on well-being argues for both shifting standards and a coherent depiction that take into account both temporal and environmental shifts and cultural expectations, including variables of income distribution, literacy, health standards, and gender roles, all of which are more easily measured now than they were fifty or a thousand years ago. How, we might ask, does well-being take shape in a society in which a majority of the people have historically been nonliterate despite class or caste status, but in which a high-profile culture of literacy influences the body of well-being, analogous to the body politic? A corollary question would be: How does well-being take shape in a society which is characterized by multiple standards of expectation, living, and conceptions of well-being?

We divide the chapter into two sections, the first addressing historical periods (Sects. 4.2 and 4.3) and the second addressing modern South Asia (Sects. 4.4 and 4.5) with particular reference to India. The former sets the tone for well-being in modern India; indeed, recognition of the past is particularly important for understanding modern India, even if much of this past remains contested. Thus, it is important to consider well-being as recorded in classical literature, as well as in cultural and material formations that emerge from texts and historical documents. The texts include an extensive medical, legal, social, and religious literature that guided much of life in ancient and classical South Asia. Other poetic, literary, and historical sources are critical because they reveal cultural formations and social arrangements that loom large in establishing the vision of well-being that has endured for several millennia in South Asia. In addition to this mate-

rial, other important sources for well-being include royal and religious inscriptions (often they are the same ones), which are found in the thousands in South Asia, and the accounts of travelers in the subcontinent, which date from the first millennium before the Common Era (BCE) until the arrival of the British in what was to become the British Raj (late eighteenth century until 1947). Clearly, we cannot draw from all of these sources in this article, but they deserve at least a brief mention.

In the second section, we reflect on well-being from the perspective of anthropological studies in modern South Asia. This material is inevitably unlike the textual material and sheds a different quality of light on the nature of well-being because it focuses more sharply on direct description of caste and class and on their more specific and diverse conceptions of health, social relations, gender, and religious beliefs. Although both discussions are discursive, the first is necessarily so due to the absence of reliable data collection in most such studies. Thus, we rely to a great extent in the second section on social indicator data, even if the emphasis is on subjective well-being. This approach falls within our areas of expertise and, along with more explicitly quantitative studies elsewhere in this volume, contributes to a better understanding of the dimensions of well-being in South Asia, a region with a long, variable, and complex history and a present that is equally diverse and bewildering.

The chapter, then, examines the roots of well-being as understood in South Asia from historical and anthropological perspectives. It recapitulates what ancient and classical texts and historical studies report about well-being and connects this approach with well-being as understood in the current ethnographic literature on South Asia. Thus, the methods are text-critical, historical, and (ethnographically) descriptive. We cover the following topics, generally chronologically, although because of the vast timescape, concepts occasionally override chronology. We review (1) classical concepts, often deriving from the concepts of well-being found in indigenous South Asian religions, primarily Buddhism and Hinduism; (2) Islamic concepts of well-being

**Table 4.1** Brief timeline of Indian philosophical development

Time period	Cultural and philosophical developments
3000–1750 BCE	Indus Valley Civilization—earliest record of cultural activity, along Indus River ( <a href="http://www.harappa.com">www.harappa.com</a> , <a href="http://www.crystalinks.com/indusmap.gif">www.crystalinks.com/indusmap.gif</a> )
1500–1000 BCE	<i>Rig Veda</i> and early Vedic ritual—earliest record of religious hymns and sacrificial ritual ( <a href="http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~witzel/vedica.pdf">http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~witzel/vedica.pdf</a> )
700–300 BCE	Upaniṣads—early philosophical speculations (Brereton 1990)
400–350 BCE	The Buddha and the birth of Buddhism (Gethin 1998)
200 BCE–200 CE	Sanskrit epics: <i>Mahābhārata</i> and <i>Rāmāyaṇa</i> (Brockington 1998)
50–125 CE	Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra—codification of rules of statecraft, governance, and kingship (Olivelle 2013)
First to fifth centuries CE	Early canonical medical (Ayurvedic) texts: <i>Caraka-Saṃhitā</i> , <i>Suśruta-Saṃhitā</i> , <i>Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya-Saṃhitā</i> (Wujastyk 1998)
Second century CE	<i>Laws of Manu</i> —injunctions of sociocultural law, women’s rights, caste rules (Olivelle 2005)
Third to fifth centuries CE	Gupta Dynasty—the flourishing of Hindu literature, culture, and art (Thapar 2004)
Third to eleventh centuries CE	Development of Indian analytic philosophy and religious culture (Gupta 2011)
Eighth to twelfth centuries	Flourishing of Hinduism in Kashmir and early historical writing (Zutshi 2014)
Eighth to thirteenth centuries	Introduction of Islam to India and early Muslim kingdoms (Eaton 2006)
Sixteenth to eighteenth centuries	Mughal Dynasty in North India, flourishing of Perso-Islamic culture, art, architecture, and literature (Schimmel 2004)
1757–1947	British ascendancy and Rāj (Judd 2004)
1947–present	Independent India (Guha 2008)

that became prominent in India in the first half of the second millennium of the Common Era (CE); (3) material on European colonialism and partition; (4) anthropological sources on India after independence; (5) discourses of well-being emerging from modernity, new government policies, and nongovernmental organizations. We divide the chapter into two main sections: well-being in classical and premodern South Asia and the anthropology of well-being in South Asia. Finally, we offer a few modest conclusions.

#### 4.2.1 Timeline of South Asian and Indian History

We begin this section with a fully referenced timeline introducing Indian and South Asian cultural history so that the remainder of the chapter makes sense to the reader (Table 4.1). We then discuss conceptions of well-being that developed in South Asia during these periods.

#### 4.2.2 Early Sanskrit Terms for Well-Being

Among the terms in classical Sanskrit that approximate the modern concept of well-being are “good-space” (*sukha*), indicating satisfaction, happiness, ease, agreeability, and comfort; a sound, beneficial, or healthy state (*hita*) often intended as the collective result of gift-giving or religious practice; suitability, competence, and cleverness (*kuśala*); appropriateness (*aucitya*); the oldest literary equivalent to “well-being” in Indian literature (*svasti*), which most often bears the sense of auspiciousness; and “established in oneself” (*svasthya*), used in medical texts to indicate a state of good health and general robustness (see below). These words encompass fairly well the semantic horizons of “well-being” in ancient and classical India, parameters that continue two to three millennia later. It is also important to note, for the Mughal period and the partial Islamicization of South Asia in the second mil-

lennium CE, that the word *islām* itself “evokes well-being, intactness, peace, safety, and security” (Antes 1989: 177). That said, it is misleading and inaccurate confidently to record conceptions of well-being in South Asia for historical or pre-independence India without regularly referencing what we can detect of “actual” well-being from their historical contexts. Similarly, we are in no better position to distinguish between “evaluative well-being” and “experienced well-being” (Kahneman 2011) historically, because of the prominence in the historical record of prescriptive well-being, the result of the relative paucity of narrative social history in South Asia. At least one recent article has identified soteriological conceptions within early Sanskrit religious texts as tantamount to conceptions of well-being (Joshnloo 2014). Regardless of the influence of such conceptions on indigenous philosophical and modern academic discourse, they had little effect on well-being as it was lived on the ground. In a highly stratified society in which “Hinduism” was paramount but localized into hundreds of distinct traditions of practice (and, secondarily, belief), many with little connection to others that might even be geographically nearby, these conceptions left few traces outside the literature of a tiny elite. Thus, strongly wrought ethical systems, such as Buddhism, could arguably be associated with well-being, whereas notions such as the identity of the individual self (*ātman*) with the abstract absolute (*brahman*), in early Hindu thought, are more problematic. The latter, certainly, disappeared when compared to notions of dharma, which were widespread and which we discuss below.


### 4.2.3 Buddhist Conceptions of Well-Being

The following depiction of two couples in classical India is from Karla, a mid-first millennium CE series of Buddhist rock-cut caves in the present-day state of Maharashtra, about halfway between Mumbai and Pune. The couples are full-bodied, healthy, well-groomed, agile, well-placed

with attendants situated on either side of a healthy seated Buddha, the paradigmatic figure of compassion and wisdom, and themselves surrounded by an equally well-attired celestial entourage. The depiction is idealized, to be sure, but the ideal it expresses is of health, beauty, love, responsiveness, and dexterity that may be readily recognized as components of well-being in what was then a comparatively sparsely populated India, which, at the time, had one of the highest standards of living in the world. Like this depiction of the symbiotic relationship between monastic religion and life in the world, the murals at the Buddhist Ajanta caves not too far away “portray a prosperous and multicultural environment filled with people wearing golden jewels and...enjoying imported goods” (Brancaccio 2011: 80). Indeed, the first or second century CE *Arthaśāstra*, the foundational Sanskrit text on statecraft and governance in classical India (Olivelle 2013), along with the texts that framed it from two to three centuries earlier, speak of trade for coral and other luxury goods that must have come from the Persian Gulf and even Egypt. We know, then, that well-being in terms of the presence and acquisition of luxury goods was well-attested in South Asia, beginning at a very early date.

The Buddhist sense of well-being is, as we can see here, at least in part based on bodily well-being and worldly satisfaction. But it also emerges from the fundamental doctrines of Buddhism redacted a few generations after the Buddha but surely transmitted orally from him in his early teachings between 450 and 400 BCE. These include, especially, the four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path. In Fig. 4.1 from the Karla caves, the Buddha is depicted as central, solitary, and exceptional, surrounded by earthly and celestial figures, but displaying hand gestures with the coded meanings of asceticism and correct teaching. This figure undergirds the depiction of well-being, shadowing it with the Buddhist elements of ephemerality and austerity. The Eightfold Path includes (1) right view, (2) right intention, (3) right speech, (4) right action, (5) right livelihood, (6) right effort, (7) right mindfulness, and (8) right concentration. If we





**Fig. 4.1** Relief at Karla caves (Photo © 2014 by Nachiket Chanchani; used with permission)

look at this relief with these virtues in mind, we can see well-being as portrayed in just these terms. The agility, strength, sexual fullness, and healthfulness are depicted in balance with the Buddha and Buddhist virtues. We know that the artist understood fundamental Buddhist doctrines and was able to bring them into this sculptural depiction.

All of this feeds into the central Buddhist goal of attaining *nirvāṇa*, literally meaning “blown out.” This term refers to a state, inclusive of psychological well-being, in which the individual realizes that the entire world and all conditions within it are temporary and that the blowing out of the illusion of permanence leads to an understanding that every idea, thought, life condition, or object, is dependent on prior causes that are extended indefinitely and infinitely. This state is the satisfaction afforded by realizing *nirvāṇa*. The Buddha is the one who initially realized, then transmitted, this knowledge, which is why he is at the center of the Karla relief. The Eightfold Path and the attainment of *nirvāṇa*, the instrumental and intrinsic “goals” of Buddhism, are predicated on recognition of the first of the

Four Noble Truths—that life is suffering. Subsequently, well-being is grounded in the construction of a system of ethics that considers what is in the best interest of the individual and of all sentient beings, in developing a psychological state that favors pleasure over pain but at the same time emphasizes the reality of change and cultivates specific virtues, including generosity, friendliness, compassion, joyfulness, and even-mindedness. This concept consistently trumped notions of hedonism or other forms of pure human desire as foundations of well-being (Harris 2014). Indeed, notions of well-being in classical India, regardless of the designated religious culture or peculiarities of social structure, were, with few exceptions, grounded in a practicable ethics, prioritization of pleasure, a sense of final reward, respect for authority, and, as part of this (as we see below), maintenance of status and place in the social and intellectual order. All of these concepts are depicted in the relief from Karla.

It is also important to understand that by the end of the first millennium BCE Buddhism had split into two distinct schools: Theravāda (“the

doctrine of the elders”), which remained in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, and Mahāyāna (“the great path”), which gained currency in Tibet, China, and the remainder of East Asia. The primary point relevant to well-being is that in Theravāda Buddhism, enlightenment or the realization of *nirvāṇa* as the highest goal was achievable only by monks (not even nuns) and was an individual attainment brought about through Buddhist practice over many (usually countless) lifetimes of suffering and hard work. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the advanced Buddhist practitioner possessed the option, which he was supposed to accept, to reject the heavenly rewards that came along with the achievement of *nirvāṇa* in order to become a *bodhisattva*, an “enlightenment being” motivated by compassion for all living beings. The *bodhisattva* foreswears entrance into higher realms in order to return to this world in lifetime after lifetime to help every living being achieve enlightenment, which in Buddhism amounts to a highly quiescent state of well-being.

What this situation amounted to was a symbiosis between the large and powerful monastic institutions and the laity. The monks, at least during the first millennium or so of Buddhism (fourth century BCE until the latter centuries of the first millennium CE) served as religious guides and priests for the laity whereas the latter supported the monastic institutions with gifts, labor, and other forms of remuneration. During the last few centuries of the first millennium CE and the first few centuries of the second millennium, Buddhism disappeared from the subcontinent, except in a few areas in Nepal (and Bhutan) contiguous with Tibet, and in Sri Lanka. It is not necessary here to discuss the causes for this disappearance; it is only important to note that it was supplanted by various Hindu denominations in most of subcontinental India, and by Islam in the far northwest of South Asia, from Afghanistan and Pakistan into the mountainous parts of northernmost India. Regardless of the methods used to supplant Buddhism (e.g., shifting patronage systems, the rise of Hindu devotionism, forced conversion), religiously based cultural formations offered alternative forms of well-being that were regarded as no less attractive than what came before them.

#### 4.2.4 Brahmanical, Hindu, and Other Early Indian Cultural Conceptions of Well-Being

The vast literature of ancient and classical India spans both the north and the south, from the early Vedas in the far northwest, in what is now Afghanistan and Pakistan, to early first millennium Cankam poetry in the far south, to pan-Indian drama and epic poetry that covers the entire first millennium CE. All of this literature includes the themes of love between a man and a woman, beauty, humor, health, the subtleties of friendship and enmity, verbal erudition, and complexity of expression. All of these themes readily convey conceptions of cultural, social, and individual well-being that are as resonant to us in a dislocated far future as they were to people a millennium and more in the past. Indeed, because of an Indo-European heritage in which cultures across a broad area from northwestern Europe to India shared essentially the same social divisions and many of the same linguistic structures, much of what we recognize today as characteristic of well-being in India is accessible to us.

This image of well-being can be explored and summarized from classical sources as well as from observations regarding the social system that evolved over several millennia, resulting in an almost completely closed “system” of caste identification, which roughly, if never exclusively, coincided with class. Although the earliest text in India, the *Rig Veda*, naturalized the four occupational divisions of priest, warrior, merchant, and laborer as a part of its creation myth and foundational cosmology as early as the tenth century BCE, early literature, inscriptions, and court documents indicate that this classification was not limited to birth status until nearly the end of the first millennium CE. It is likely that the upper castes, at least, regarded these divisions, and consequent social separations, as productive in securing their well-being; caste as a dependable system worked to preserve cultural and religious practices and traditions that were passed on within their own clans. Eventually, well-being became dependent on class, caste, and occupa-

tional status because these promoted the conditions necessary to preserve individual and community identity, even if the features of love, beauty, and the others mentioned above still served as culturally recognizable indicators of well-being beyond local identities.

A few notable literary figures whose works betray a high level of well-being in first millennium India include the first century CE Prakrit poet Hāla, who wrote of the shyness and pain of arranged marriage; the fourth century Sanskrit poet Kālidāsa, who wrote of love and longing and of the beauty of landscaped gardens; the early seventh century dramatist Mahendrarman, whose wisecracks and facetiousness were aimed at Buddhist monks and others in positions of religious authority; and the ninth century Sanskrit and Prakrit literary critic, poet, and dramatist Rājasekhara, who, with great ingenuity and humor, skewered the religious establishment, including the sacred Vedas themselves.

#### 4.2.5 Well-Being as Dharma: The Bhagavad-Gītā, the Laws of Manu, the Mahābhārata

Religiously, well-being, at least among the three upper social divisions around whom the notions of a discreet country of interlocking political and social arrangements congealed in the mid- to late first millennium BCE, was viewed in terms of punishment and reward in the afterlife and of what would lead to that. Those who lived a good, productive, and socially adherent life were rewarded with an abode in the world of the ancestors or were believed to take rebirth in exalted states. This trajectory was guided by adherence to *dharma*, sociocultural practice and law that was generally explicitly enjoined, even if the copious texts of dharma also discussed how to evaluate behavior that was beyond the active control of injunction.

The best known and arguably the most characteristic religious text of classical India is the *Bhagavad Gītā*, a tiny fragment of the *Mahābhārata*, the great Indian national epic dating from perhaps the first century BCE to the first

century CE. This text has much to say about both dharma and well-being. It is clear from the *Gītā* that dharma is intimately connected with well-being and that these two were conceived of as both individual and collective. The *Gītā* states explicitly that individual happiness, hence well-being, is dependent on each person acting in accordance with his or her specified dharma. The *Gītā* concludes with an exhortation to perform one's own self-ordained duty (dharma), even imperfectly, rather than another's dharma perfectly (18.47). Thus, one's ideal state of well-being was viewed as dependent on a naturalized order: A warrior must be a warrior, a merchant a merchant, a priest a priest, a laborer a laborer. This naturalized and sanctified order was certainly a reflection of the dominant social order in northern India at the time. But the notion of collective well-being revealed here undoubtedly helped perpetuate power structures inherent in this social order, which in turn reinforced notions of well-being as dependent on the purity of caste. The *Gītā* (1.40) states that the mixing of caste brought about through the "defilement" of women by members of other castes is a one-way ticket to hell for the entire clan. That said, and despite the continued aggregation of occupation- and lineage-based castes in India that theoretically assisted well-being, social and occupational mobility were never completely halted in South Asia. The security offered by caste was, however, an attractive feature in the overall construction of well-being in South Asia, which is why caste was embraced by other religious communities that came later, including Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians.

The paradigmatic text dedicated to dharma, *The Laws of Manu* (ca. second century BCE—first century CE), reflects a society of relative amplitude, guided by virtues conducive to well-being such as moderation, monogamy, truthfulness, freedom from anger, personal purity, and adherence to the Vedas. Manu 7.211 states that the qualities worthy of a noble man include compassion, valor, and constant generosity. With respect to hospitality, Manu 3.105–106 states, without any apparent bias against the caste or class of the visitor, "A householder must never

turn away a guest led there by the sun in the evening; and whether he arrives there at the proper time or not, he should not let him remain in his house without food. Nor should he eat anything that he does not serve his guest. Honoring a guest leads to wealth, fame, long life, and heaven” (Olivelle 2005: 113). This apparent egalitarianism, however, must be weighed against countless references in the same text to caste exclusivism and commensality. Similarly, Manu and many other first millennium texts, including Buddhist ones, identify groups such as Persians and Draviḍas who were once warriors (*kṣatriya*) but sank to the level of *śūdra* and even lower, into untouchability. Thus, even at this date, the extreme sensitivity to caste was readily found; there can be no doubt that well-being throughout most of South Asian history was more often than not determined by the enforced harmony created by the cultural acceptance (although often grudging) of the caste system.

Other texts, including India’s great epic, the *Mahābhārata*, of approximately the same period as Manu, illustrate sexual life (Meyer 1930) more or less in keeping with what many cultures have recognized historically: monogamy (often arranged) as a general rule, punishment for sexual offences, and preference for virginity in a wife. A well-known story in the *Mahābhārata* describes the repeated restoration of virginity, a gift from the gods, as a strategy for rescuing both the damsel in distress and her relatively powerless but sincere protector. Punishment was regularly meted out for theft, perjury, murder (albeit, in the earlier periods not capital punishment), and so on. These are but a few examples of the rules of *dharma* that were generally observed by members of the upper classes, even if they were prescribed, by default, for all members of society, including the large numbers who undoubtedly were exempt because they had never heard of them and had no contact with the upper and literate classes. This reality, in fact, is recognized by the *dharma* texts, which understand the regulations, conventions, and governance of any community to be as valid and applicable as those of any of the three upper castes that they address more specifically, that communities could and

did operate in independent juridical and injunctive realms (e.g., Buddhists, Jains, and others outside the orthodox Brahmanical fold). This freedom allowed communities to adjust their received definitions of well-being, but never so far that they would detach themselves from their moorings. As William James (1907) wrote in his *Defence of Pragmatism*, “The most violent revolutions in an individual’s beliefs leave most of his old order standing” (p. 357). This observation was certainly as true culturally in first-millennium South Asia among communities as it was for individuals a millennium and a half later.

#### 4.2.6 Stages of Life (*āśramas*)

The most important formal indicator of well-being was the division of life into four stages (*āśrama*), each with different criteria for well-being (Olivelle 1993). The first is studentship, which lasts approximately twelve years, during which the young man studies the ancient scriptures, philosophical texts, literature, science, and formal Sanskrit grammar. This approach is prescribed for boys. There are frequent references to women’s education and literacy, but it appears that the selective way in which the genders were sequestered contributed to a certain amount of well-being for both. Women had their own religious and practical educations that were also regulated by texts, although in practice surely more loosely than in the prescriptive literature (Leslie 1989). The second stage of life is that of the householder, demarcated by an elaborate marriage ceremony and raising of a family. Well-being during this stage of life was consistent with the expectations of family and societal amity discussed in the prescriptive *dharma* literature. The third stage of life is that of the retiree. The children are out of the house, and the parents retire to a forest dwelling for a period of contemplation. Finally, the fourth stage of life for the couple commences after an undetermined amount of time as forest dwellers. At this time the couple embarks on a final period as wandering religious mendicants, as world renouncers. The *dharma* texts even prescribe how religious begging should



be conducted; this stage is also bound in a battery of rules. Renunciation was an accepted aspect of Indian culture; Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, and later Muslim renunciation was accepted as an honorable, if always peculiar and disappointing, escape mechanism. It was necessary for the well-being of substantial numbers of individuals and was embraced more readily when it was institutionalized, as it almost always was in Buddhism and Jainism, if less so in Hinduism, until the second millennium. Passing through the four stages of life was of course normative and was rarely achieved for a number of reasons, including the limitations of lifespan and the tendency for the retired and the elderly to remain with their families. The point is that Indian society, or as much of it as could be enveloped in the network of Sanskrit culture, was, at least in name, highly regulated. Equally, however, it indicates that well-being, both individual and community, operated within sociocultural goals that were envisioned as realizable. It is important to mention that well-being within families was secured by inheritance, a particularly knotty topic that dharma texts addressed at length for two millennia.

#### 4.2.7 Well-Being Through Ritual and Patronage

Upper caste communities, Brahmins and sometimes Kṣatriyas (warriors and ruling class personnel), were charged with the duties of performing religious ritual, including sacrifices and the recitation of sacred Vedic texts, which were thought to promote the well-being not only of the clan itself but of the entire cosmos. Besides these, innumerable rituals and other priestly services were performed for the well-being of the client. Included here would be baby-naming ceremonies, tantamount to baptism, that brought the newborn under the protective authority of the Vedic establishment; astrological consultations, which became increasingly popular toward the close of the first millennium CE; house consecrations; and progressively complicated (and expensive) rites for the dead, designed to assure

residence in the heavenly world and a happy rebirth for the deceased and safety for the living from the bothersome spirits of their near and dear who might not have undergone proper funeral rites.

Religious renunciates, who represented a sanctioned (if somewhat disordered) escape from the restrictive social hierarchy, were given the freedom to focus on their own spiritual goals of liberation from the cycle of rebirth as well as attending to the religious and spiritual well-being of the community that supported them. This was true for renunciates from the Brahmanical, Buddhist, and Jain religious communities, in which a symbiosis between laity and monastic orders enhanced the well-being of both. Royalty patronized religious activities such as the construction of temples and guild activities, principally manufacturing, in order to support the well-being of these substantial and vigorous communities. The noted historian Romila Thapar writes, “A temple built through royal patronage was seen as symbolizing the power and well-being of the kingdom” (Thapar 2004: 479).

This state power was reciprocated by the religious and mercantile communities: The latter paid taxes and the former, exempt from taxes, were believed to control unseen forces through the power of ritual and esoteric Sanskrit recitation to confer power, authority, heavenly rewards, and earthly well-being upon the king. All of this contributed to the realization of one of the designated aims of Indian, particularly Hindu, culture, *artha*, or economic well-being. Through all of this a common morality emerged that generally supported culturally normativized relations of love and marriage, community relations, including notions of purity and pollution that established boundaries between surrounding communities, and religious objectives, including the attainment of higher states in a succession of rebirths. This classical ideal has carried over to the modern period, in which doing the right thing according to the ideas of dharma is generally the individual foundation of well-being. The rewards inhere in the dharma itself, which provides satisfaction and recognition, two of the key components of well-being in India.



### 4.2.8 Medicine and Healing as Indicators of Well-Being

The indigenous Indian medical system, Ayurveda (“knowledge of longevity”), actively addressed the two sides of healing, medical and spiritual or religious, both of which it saw (and continues to see) as necessary for the continued well-being of both the individual and the community. The Sanskrit word *svasthya*, a fairly exact equivalent to “well-being,” was articulated as the standard of health in the canonical texts of Ayurveda as far back as the first two centuries CE. The opposite of this, “dis-ease,” was defined as imbalance (*vaiśamya*). In this way the polarity of health was measured in terms of well-being and imbalance. Well-being was defined as balance because the medical system was dedicated to balancing the three “humors” (wind, bile, and phlegm), an early borrowing from Greek medicine, through lifestyle augmentation and medicinal treatment for physical and emotional debilities. Ayurveda’s approach draws the same distinctions between “illness” and “disease” that Arthur Kleinman has in the late twentieth century, seeing illness as “experience that is always culturally shaped” (Kleinman 1988: 5) and “inseparable from life history” (1988: 8), whereas “disease recasts illness in terms of theories of disorder” (1988: 5), the latter, in the case of Ayurveda, determined by humoral imbalance. Thus, in Ayurveda, well-being was applied to the individual and the local culture in different registers. Even as Indian medicine expanded through the centuries, and disease identification and treatment became much more specific, the standard of health, namely well-being, was consistently retained. It went beyond what we would regard as factors that are strictly biological or pathological to include notions of balance in the internal and external environments as well as in the social order. In the long history of premodern India, newer forms of diagnosis and treatment were developed internally or borrowed from outside and absorbed into Ayurveda (e.g., pulse diagnosis, almost certainly from China, in the sixteenth century, and mineral-based Tantric medicine, developed internally in approximately the tenth century). But none of these premodern developments altered the funda-

mental Ayurvedic orientation of well-being versus imbalance.

In addition to these definitions of health that consciously reflected and imprinted concepts of well-being, Ayurveda was an integral part of an ancient and constantly updated cultural system that reinforced allied conceptions of well-being. These included notions of dharma, which occupied important sections of medical texts and education; notions of destiny and the afterlife that were well-attested markers of well-being in South Asia; and ethics, which occupied a prominent position in the training of physicians (Dagmar Wujastyk 2012) and were important in the overall determination of well-being in South Asia.

### 4.2.9 Women as Bearers of Well-Being

Because of the normal ways in which literature, both technical and poetic, operates, we must assume at least some disjunction between the visions of normativity expressed in texts and the social realities within which they were composed. The former reflects or prescribes social norms authorized by a small privileged group with particular literary or cultural agendas, including a nostalgia recalling times that were, by the time of authorship, mythic. As such, this classical literature exposes areas in which the authors have had little active interest or intellectual engagement. Among the most prominent of these are religion and the education of women, notable for the fact that nearly the entire corpus of religious and prescriptive literature was written by men for men, with women discussed secondarily, nostalgically, or peripherally. From this literature, however, as well as from historical sources, we know that most aspects of culture and religion, including values that served as the foundation for subjective well-being, have been transmitted from one generation to the next, for centuries or millennia, by women, which is to say by mothers, aunts, and other female relatives in nuclear families. Men were responsible for the composition of texts and for handing them down in select lineages to (mostly) male students, reli-

gious figures, and legislators and for transmitting values such as courage and bravery, but women were the promethean figures who served as the glue that passed the building-blocks of well-being, namely religious narrative, cultural memory, behavioral skills, psychological material of daily life, and the humane qualities of dealing with everyday suffering, from one generation to the next.

There is little solid evidence that women were educated on the same level as men, at least education presented in Sanskrit. Anecdotal reports of educated women, as well as periodic if strong evidence of women writers and poets, do not make up for the absence of evidence for equal educations. Women were often teachers of other women but did not receive the same rites of passage that were accorded men (Scharfe 2002: 199–213). Yet their preeminent role in the family, household, and many aspects of temple ritual is unquestioned. All of the law books recognize eight different kinds of marriage, from the formal gifting of a bride by a virtuous person and a bride given away during a sacrifice to a love match to forced abduction and rape. The latter two are subject to severe punishment. Although the classical law books do not all specify the punishments for rape, they are often recorded as severe. They include castration followed by forcing the convicted rapist to serve as a door guard at women's quarters to forcing them to sit on scaldingly hot iron tables, or even being crushed under an elephant's foot. The medical literature devotes considerable space to women's health, including acute descriptions of pregnancy, delivery, nursing, menstruation, and menopause. Specific diagnoses and treatment for women's illnesses are also commonly found. In short, both the legal and medical literature is actively concerned with women's issues and well-being.

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### 4.3 Mid and Late Second Millennium Developments

As science, technology, medicine, architecture, and the organization of princely states evolved in the second millennium, local languages began to

replace the classical lingua franca, Sanskrit, Pali (of the Buddhists), and Ardhamagadhi (of the Jains) as the literary languages of choice among the educated. These languages were supplemented by Persian in the period of Mughal rule and beyond (1526 to the early twentieth century); by English, with the ascendancy of the British (late eighteenth century to the present); and by Urdu (an amalgam of Hindi and Persian), widely understood by Indian and Pakistani Muslims, but mutually intelligible with Hindi. As Indian science, medicine, literature and language evolved, new socioreligious formations, including, principally, Islam, Sikhism, and Christianity, took root. But the factors that determined well-being for the previous millennium or two, namely an identifiable social organization based on caste, notions of purity, and the virtues mentioned above, persisted through these changes. Caste was adopted by Muslims, Jains, Sikhs, and Christians, demonstrating that it was not a specifically Hindu phenomenon but part of a cultural system that, taken as a whole, was a widely adopted indicator of well-being. Under the Mughals, non-Muslims were subjected to additional taxation; Hindu temples were occasionally dismantled and replaced with mosques; and increasingly in northern and western India (especially in Rajasthan and Gujarat) women covered their heads in public.

#### 4.3.1 Islam and Well-Being Under the Mughals

Despite periods of relative calm and amity under the reign of the Mughal emperors Akbar (r. 1556–1605) and Jehangir (r. 1605–1627) and the first two decades of Shah Jahan's rulership (r. 1627–1658), during which literature and art flourished as rarely before in South Asia, scientific progress was rapid and religious communities lived peaceably (despite greater taxation imposed on non-Muslims). Islam has consistently understood the demands of human nature and reason, and the fulfillment of individual and social well-being, to be satisfied by adherence to their religion, to the Qur'an, and to Islamic law (*Sharia*; see Chap. 5); all other indicators pale in

comparison (Hakim 1953). Yet the frequent artistic depictions of the opulence of court life, sexual love, idyllic landscapes, and busy towns and marketplaces indicate that well-being in the Indo-Islamic universe included other recognizable indicators.

Education, historically recognized in all periods in India as an indicator of well-being, also improved under the Mughals (Bano 2013). The emperor Akbar believed that education served not just the individual in relation to one's own subjectivity but must also mediate with the surrounding world. The educational process, he believed, should support this. Thus, he supported traditional educational instruction, which was almost always rote memorization and doctrinal intervention. But he placed it in second position relative to the individual's self-discovery. He stated, "Care is to be taken that he learns to understand everything himself, but the teacher may assist him a little" (Fazl 1872: 289).

Madrassas, which were responsible for both religious and secular education, became more prominent in India under the Mughals, providing both moral guidance to the community and officials to run the affairs of the state, including jurisprudence and administration. Because well-being in Islam is so closely tied in with the propriety of both belief and practice, the *'ulama* (Islamic scholars) were important arbiters of well-being, regardless of class, caste, or occupation of the members of the congregation. During the Mughal and pre-Mughal periods, madrasa education did not just emphasize theology but also taught a broad curriculum that included logic, philosophy, medicine, mathematics and astronomy, rhetoric, etymology and syntax, and jurisprudence. This broad education persisted as long as education was a state enterprise, but as it fell increasingly into private hands, the curriculum thinned out and was gradually displaced by the colonial system of education in the nineteenth century.

### 4.3.2 Rise of Devotional Religion

One internal religious development in the first six centuries of the second millennium that altered

the general tenor of subjective well-being was the rise of devotional religion (*bhakti*, also see below). This change transcended religious boundaries and included many sects of Krishna devotion in both northern and southern India, as well as Sufi Islam, and was instrumental in the founding and development of Sikhism from the late fifteenth until the early eighteenth century. During this period, Sufism shared a unique otherworldly perspective with much of North Indian Hindu devotionalism, in which religiously guided well-being was contingent on generating states of ecstasy and rapture through sacred music (see Sects. 4.4.5 and 4.4.6) and modeling one's life on the saints of their traditions. The most important religious figures who contributed to this movement were Rāmānuja (1017–1137 [apocryphal]) and Madhva (1237–1317) in South India and Vallabha (1479–1531[?]) and Caitanya (1486–1534) in North India. Among the founders of Sufi orders were Abu al-Najib Suhrawardi (1097–1168), Moinuddin Chishti (1142–1236) and one of his successors, Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya (1238–1325), and various lineage holders in the Naqshbandi order that reaches back to the first few generations after Muhammad. The latter were all from Afghanistan or further west but greatly influenced the course of devotional religion and the culture of subjective well-being throughout South Asia.

### 4.3.3 British Colonialism and the Deindustrialization of India

By the time the British established their sovereignty in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, India was fast becoming impoverished. "While India produced about 25 percent of world industrial output in 1750, this figure had fallen to only 2 percent by 1900" (Clingsmith and Williamson 2008). This deindustrialization was due to British colonialism, because they supplanted Indian textile manufacturing and the production of other goods. The British introduced a formal census in the 1840s, from which it is possible to glean a few concrete results or at least

safe inferences. For example, it is possible to correlate known epidemics and a massive famine with the decline of the population in the state of Bengal in the 1870s. These events, one may safely assume, point toward a generally reduced well-being in Bengal and elsewhere in eastern India and confirm Lambek's observation that standards of well-being do not remain constant (Lambek 2008). Well-being was, in classical periods, more closely determined by stages of life; the independence of local ecology (jungle or savannah, interior or coastal, mountain or plain; Zimmermann 1987); the ability to fulfill caste and religious duties and to flow seamlessly through a highly stratified society; and the capacity of both individuals and a culture to recover from the specter of early death, even if it may be argued from the medical literature that many of the debilitating diseases that later afflicted the world were not widespread in India. Despite the deterioration of well-being in some aspects of life under the Mughals and the British, India experienced the rise of certain others as a result of the spread of Western medicine in the nineteenth century.

#### **4.3.4 The Rise of Western Conceptions of Well-Being in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries**

The last few centuries of the second millennium, from the displacement of the Mughals to Indian independence, was marked by great changes in the conceptions of well-being in South Asia. Among the main contributors to this were Christian mission primary health care centers, which were nondiscriminatory in providing medical services and functioned as models on which Hindu and other religious and secular philanthropic health providers operated. Christianity and a local Buddhist revival of the 1950s also offered ways out of deep discrimination within the mainstream system of caste. This complex issue cannot be discussed further here, and in any case, these services were only marginally successful in elevating well-being and status (they are related, as we shall see in the next section)

within the underclasses, even if they bore a certain amount of enhanced well-being that may be traced to the empowerment of religious choice.

## **4.4 The Anthropology of Well-Being in India**

### **4.4.1 Caste and Well-Being**

Apart from the study of what were variously termed "scheduled tribes," "aborigines," or "backward Hindus," anthropologists did not pay much attention to Indian society prior to independence. It was not, in fact, until the 1950s that the discipline adapted its field techniques and theories to the study of a "civilization" such as India. The "culture area" concept allowed for the reduction of the subcontinent into smaller territorial and often homogeneous social units, but it was the Indian village that, in the end, became the center of anthropological analysis for at least a generation.

What strikes the reader of the many anthropological monographs of the 1950s and 1960s is the overwhelming preoccupation with clarifying the way intercaste and intracaste relationships functioned in the Indian village. The prevailing definition of castes then was that they were localized, endogamous, and hereditary groups that were associated with a trade and ritual duties from which their members could depart only within limits. More critically, castes were thought to occupy distinctive positions in a hierarchy that was determined by concepts of pollution and purity (Dumont 1980). The "untouchables," as the Dalits were then called, ranked low, in fact the lowest, because they were inherently impure. The Brahmins ranked high because they were the purest of all castes. A hierarchical mind set pervaded the entire society, and relations between castes were regulated by strict rules of endogamy and commensality.

The early anthropological literature on caste contains many descriptions of the nonreciprocal services provided by low-caste day laborers to high-caste landowning patrons in return for shares of grain harvest or cooked meals. Workers toiled long hours in the fields for very little raw or

cooked food. Whenever landlords leased plots for sharecropping, they extracted a major portion of what was grown. Anthropologists also documented the abject conditions under which untouchables lived. Not only were these outcastes dependent for their livelihoods on the landowning castes that exploited their labor, but they also did not have the right to leave the village to which they were attached and for which they had to carry out unclean tasks, such as skinning (and removing) animal carcasses, tanning leather and making shoes, sweeping, drumming, grave digging, and cremating the dead. Moreover, they were forbidden to enter village temples and tea shops, draw water from the local tank, drink, attend the local school, and so on. The ethnographers who specialized in the analysis and solution of practical problems were not particularly optimistic that these social conditions would change. Large landowners effectively blocked equitable distribution of the fruits of government-run development programs, and, although the landless and smallholders benefited from new grains and technology, they made little gain. Powerful castes remained above the law and could not be forced to relinquish large landholdings as stipulated by the government land reforms of the 1960s.

In short, the general impression conveyed by the early literature was that only the higher castes, or so-called “dominant” castes, had the resources, in the form of land, crops (rice, especially) and water and the elementary freedoms to accede to human well-being. The lower castes (approximately 35 % of the population) and especially the most impure (approximately an additional 24 % of the population) were condemned to a life of exploitation, deprivation, discrimination, and injustice, including violence, which is to say a life in which there was little or no well-being.

#### 4.4.2 Well-Being, Family, and Marriage

In the 1970s and 1980s, anthropologists (female anthropologists, in particular) who turned to the study of South Asian kinship (marital practices,

organization of the family, domestic life, marriage payments, residential rules, laws of inheritance, and so on) found that women were disadvantaged in every case. Within families in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, there was a clear order of social precedence and influence based on gender, age, and, in the case of a woman, the number of her male children. The senior man of the household—whether father, grandfather, or uncle—typically was the recognized family head, and his wife was the person who regulated the tasks assigned to female family members. Men enjoyed higher status than women; boys were often pampered whereas girls were relatively neglected, and women were expected to treat their husbands as if they were gods. Moreover, women did not own property in their own names nor did they inherit parental property.

Anthropologists also noted that when an Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, or Nepalese son married, he usually stayed with his parents, brothers, and unmarried sisters in an arrangement that came to be known as “the joint family.” Although the courtyard was eventually subdivided into separate hearths to accommodate inevitable splits between brothers, a man remained at home, so to speak, forever. His life was usually one of stability and rootedness in his birthplace. Were he to live elsewhere, his ancestral house was still “his” both legally (as inheritance) and emotionally. By contrast, upon marriage, a South Asian daughter had to leave the home she was born into and to move in with strangers in a distant village. In her new home she was expected to work hard, be subservient to her mother-in-law, and give birth to sons. Although at first she visited her family often, over time she did so as little as once a year, sometimes less. If she became a widow, she remained with her in-laws, and in some caste groups, she was not allowed to remarry even if she was bereaved at a young age.

The grief that such marital residential rules caused women and their kin was further compounded by the spread of the Sanskritic conception of marriage as the “gift of a virgin” (*kanyā-dānam*), a gift that comes with material



presents and jewels to express her father's inferiority to the family that accepts the bride as wife and daughter (Gough 1956). Even in South India, where women abide by different preferential marriage rules, often wedding close kin who grant them more freedom, this conception came to replace the old system of the bride price. In the 1970s and 1980s, at the time of marriage, Muslim and Hindu families in rural Tamil Nadu stopped making gifts to the parents of the bride and the bride herself; instead they demanded that large payments in cash and gold be paid to the groom and his parents. Much as in North India, the financial stress caused by these new practices became reflected in significantly different rates of mortality and morbidity between the sexes, allegedly (though reliable statistics are lacking) in occasional female infanticide and increasingly in the abortion of female fetuses following prenatal gender testing. In addition, scholars linked the new dowry payments to the rise of domestic violence against the women who could not bring enough money to the marriage.

#### 4.4.3 Beginnings of the Anthropology of Well-Being

It is fair to say, then, that the classical anthropological literature on South Asia focused largely on the plight of the low castes, untouchables, and women rather than scrutinizing understandings of well-being. This observation is in keeping with the overall trajectory of the discipline. Until recently, and for reasons unnecessary to explain here, anthropologists "have been almost entirely silent" on the subject of well-being (Mathews and Izquierdo 2009:8). In fact, we can say that in general, and perhaps more so lately, social scientists tend to specialize in the documentation of suffering, injustice, and social inequalities (Thin 2005).

Yet encoded in the old ethnographies of South Asian society here and there are discussions of what we may call "positive" concepts of well-being, including references to bodily regimens (diet, exercise, self-discipline, yoga, metaphysi-

cal health), prophylactic or purifying practices, and procedures for averting the "evil eye" (Alter 2004; Dean 2013; Zimmermann 2004). These discussions inevitably suggest that in India well-being is "context-sensitive" rather than "context-free," to use the famous distinction of the well-known scholar of Indian literature, A.K. Ramanujan (1989). That is, the state and quality of one's body and mind depend on the time and place of one's birth, place of habitation, occupation, life stage, karma, dharma, and so on (Daniel 1984), so that what is appropriate for one is not so for another. In addition, this literature underscores, if only indirectly, that in South Asia, and India in particular, concepts of well-being cannot be extricated from the experience of people whose worldview includes a particular view of the person and his or her place in the cosmos.

#### 4.4.4 Well-Being and the Problem of the Individual in India

The French anthropologist Louis Dumont (1970) initiated the discussion of just what constitutes this view when he contrasted the social and moral significance of "the individual" in Western societies with the presumed absence of such a concept in a "traditional" society such as India. To him the "individual as a cultural value" was lacking in India (1970). Indians derived their sense of identity only through "relations," including village, caste, and family, to which their sense of individuality was subservient (1970: 42). Their allegiance resided in such collectivities. The only institution in which Dumont saw something akin to the Western concept of individualism was in the figure of the Hindu renouncer, who "leaves the world behind in order to devote himself to his own liberation ... [and] essentially depends upon no one but himself, he is alone" (1970: 45). As mentioned in Sect. 4.2.6, renunciation was a sanctioned means of escaping the bonds of hierarchical existence.

Dumont's argument that Indians thought of themselves, first and foremost, as members of corporate groups was countered by McKim Marriott's concept of "dividual" personhood. For

this American anthropologist, it was not so much that the South Asian was less autonomous, less independent, and less equal than the Westerner, but that he or she was a different person altogether. Far from being integrated in a relatively bounded, unique and self-determining whole—in short, of having individuality in “our” sense of the word—this person was thought to be a composite of transferable particles. It was because this “dividual” or “fluid being” broke down and significantly changed when exposed to incompatible “substances” that South Asians married within the same social group and restricted their commensal exchanges (Marriott and Inden 1977).

These two views of the South Asian person correlate with reports of what gives happiness and satisfaction to people on the subcontinent. First, ethnographic accounts make it clear that, in a society that prioritizes a relational sense of self, the quality of life is a function of having kin. To have relatives in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where Clark-Decès has conducted ethnographic research since the early 1990s, is to be wealthy (Kapadia 1995), experience “love” (Trawick 1990), and have fundamental rights (Clark-Decès 2014). By contrast, to be without family is to be poor and deprived. To have relatives, however, also comes with the obligation to subordinate oneself to the will of parents and elders, to identify with the family as a whole, and behave in ways that are compatible with family interests (Seymour 1999). That the key values here are dependence and trust in one’s families is demonstrated in a rare study of well-being in India in which the anthropologist Steve Derne (2009) reported how the young middle class Indian men he interviewed would rather have their brides chosen for them than make such choices on their own, apart from family guidance. For these youth, Derne suggested, “well-being ... was rooted in being nourished by group support” (2009: 127).

Leaving to elders (and group opinion) to decide what is appropriate for one’s self goes along with a concern with getting approval for one’s actions, not only at home but also in the public sphere. Anthropologists have documented

that social respect is a source of considerable gratification for both men and women in South Asia. The importance of protecting one’s reputation and identifying with one’s family honor (*izzat* in Hindi-Urdu) explains why people at times can remain trapped in difficult relationships. Women, for example, may not use mental health services because they are afraid of losing *izzat*. They would rather suffer than bring shame to themselves and their family. *Izzat* is part of a larger system of reciprocity, which if violated requires revenge, but acknowledgment brings prestige. It is not only individual well-being, but the notions of community well-being that it reflects, that is prominent throughout the subcontinent, in which redress for offended *izzat* was used to justify the assassination of Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards in 1984 after the Indian government put down a Sikh separatist movement just before this (Lynch 1990).

Marriott’s conception of the vulnerable South Asian person finds support in the many ethnographic descriptions of ritual procedures aimed at removing pollution and inauspiciousness. Across India, for instance, protective media—from polka-dotted pumpkins and impaled lemons to garish demon masks—are prominently deployed on everything from homes to vehicles to deflect the envious and therefore “evil eye” of one’s peers and neighbors (Dean 2013). Severe mental affliction is deflected or shared in local mental health care treatment centers. For example, at the last resort healing center associated with the great Balaji, or child Hanuman, temple in the small town of Mehendipur, in Rajasthan, local spirit healers (*ojhā*, *bhagat*) invariably use family therapy to demonstrate that an affliction seemingly the property of one family member, diagnosed there as invasive spirits, is shared within the entire family. No specific individual in the family is guilty of his or her “own” dysfunctionality; rather, the affliction, healing, and consequent well-being are the property of all members of the family in equal measure (Pakaslahti 1998; Smith 2006: 109–114). In this way, the person in South Asia has many ways to manage his or her susceptibility to absorb and mix with defiling and harmful substances and to restore, if need be,

equilibrium to his or her bodily substance. This equilibrated state with the body is perhaps the closest approximation to what people of the West may call “a state of well-being.”

#### 4.4.5 Well-Being, Popular Religion, and a Muslim Shrine in Delhi

Finally, the old ethnographies of South Asian society indicated that Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, Christians, Jains, and Sikhs turned to religion for securing the things required for the long-term welfare of their society (ample rain, for example) and their personal well-being: good crops, health, birth of a son, cure of a sick child, location of a lost valuable, victory in a local conflict, success in business, salvation in the next world, and so forth. By religion, we mean worship in the household shrine or the temple, vows, sacrifices, pilgrimages, optional devotions, all of which are performed with the wish to obtain well-being from the gods (and the dead forefathers and ancestors who are often seen on a level with the gods). The lively popular attempts to enlist supernatural aid for worldly purposes may seem, from the outside, to be at odds with the well-known “fatalistic” Indian doctrine of karma. But to Hindu and Buddhist worshippers, there is no contradiction at all. Each soul has its karma, and each person can do something for himself and his family within the broad limits set by his fate—whose limits cannot be precisely known anyway.

Throughout South Asia, it was also noted that Muslims have recourse to the spirits of venerated men whose tombs have become locally renowned shrines (*dargah*). These deceased saints of the past are believed to be alive in the present, their power radiating from the sites into the surrounding landscape. In this way, Muslim shrines are sacred spaces whose appeal is turned toward a local population, which for generations has established routinized relationships to them, similar to other sacred spaces in the local geography. Previously there was (and still is) a good deal of mutual use of these spaces by both villagers and city dwellers who follow different religious sys-

tems. A Hindu villager who never joins in daily prayers (*namāz*) at a mosque may readily make an offering at the tomb of a local Muslim saint and ask the spirit to cure his child. A good example of this multireligious participation is the *dargah* of the famous Sufi saint of the Chishti order, Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya (1238–1325), whose love of God has served as an inspiration across religious boundaries for centuries. The imposing marble *dargah* was built in Delhi in 1562 at his grave site, during the reign of the Emperor Akbar, and is currently one of the most visited places of worship in Delhi. On Thursday nights, different groups sing *qawwali*, a fusion of devotional poetry and Hindustani music, until the early hours in the morning, while throngs of thousands listen intently, many entering into trance states, wafted by the music and the rose petal- and incense-laden scent of the night air. These powerful performances are attended not only by Muslims, but also by Hindus, Sikhs, and many others. It is a good example of the convergence of religious cultures in India and the well-being that emanates from this unique phenomenon. The *dargah* is tantamount to a self-sufficient community, with dozens of food stalls, shops of all kinds, and even an office in which exorcisms are held.

#### 4.4.6 Well-Being, Festivals, and Devotion

Village festivals have been well studied, and the general impression was that they represented opportunities for people to don new clothes, feast, get together with kin, and rejoice. The South Indian festival called Pongal, a word which means “overflowing” and connotes abundance and prosperity, together with the North Indian Holi festival, discussed below, perhaps best epitomizes these celebrations of joy. This four-day festival takes place from January 13 to January 16 in the Gregorian calendar and marks the end of the harvest season. Tamilians decorate their homes with banana and mango leaves and embellish the floor with decorative patterns (*kollam*) drawn using rice flour. The festival itself begins at sunrise with a symbolic ritual of boiling



**Fig. 4.2** A street in Puducherry, India, decorated for Pongal (Photo: Alex Graves; <http://flickr.com/photos/87244355@N00>; Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.0 Generic license)

fresh milk in a new clay pot. When the milk boils over and bubbles out of the vessel, people happily shout “Pongalo Pongal” to convey the appreciation and thankfulness to the sun as it acts as the primary energy behind agriculture and a good harvest (Fig. 4.2).

One of the most evocative anthropological descriptions of a village festival brings out a peculiar aspect of Indian festivals. From the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, Marriott (1966) observed that at the celebrations for Holi, the spring festival of love, the entire community joined together to play, chase, and color each other with dyes, mud, and even cow dung, regardless of gender or caste. In this area, the Braj district, the festivities remain alive and well half a century after Marriott’s report. Two of the many villages in that region feature a ritual of role reversal, in which gender powers and privileges (or relative lack thereof) are reversed. For one day of the four-day festival, men behave passively, and women of any caste are permitted to curse at any man (including their husbands), play pranks on them, and chase them through the village with sticks and cudgels, often beating them black and blue. All the victims of the festival temporarily adopt a role of inferiority in a spirit

of playfulness and good nature. Reportedly, there has never been a case of retribution after this festival is concluded. According to Marriott, the usual compartmentalization and indifference that separated castes and families in day-to-day life were replaced by the festival mood of “boundless” and “reciprocal love” (1966: 212). In Fig. 4.3, taken during Holi, women in Braj are wrapping thread around a sacred pipal tree as votive offerings, one of the most common petitionary rites in India, thoroughly organized around the principle of enhanced well-being.

The last aspect of the relation of religion and well-being in India relates to the Hindu, Jain, and Sikh conception of devotion (*bhakti*). In this conception, the deity is not merely anthropomorphic but deeply personal and emotionally connected; he or she is both the source and the focus of love. Devotion is undertaken for its own sake; devotees do not attempt to change the world. Instead they long to be in the presence of their deities, have sight (*darśana*) of them, and offer them flowers, fruits, sweets, and music during worship (*pūjā*) or selfless service (*sevā*), as many call it. The deity then “enjoys” or tastes the offering, and the devotee receives remains of the now-divinely invested substance (*prasāda*) to ingest, wear, or place in the house as a memento. The enjoyment derived from the *bhakti* ideal of selfless caring, loving tenderness, and emotional absorption in their deities is perhaps the highest form of well-being for all Hindu, Sikh, and Jain devotees.

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## 4.5 Well-Being, Modernity, and Globalization

As noted previously, in the early anthropological literature, caste was seen as a social organization that had little chance to evolve. Although riots and violence had just led to the partition of the greater part of the subcontinent into the two sovereign states of India and Pakistan, and ethnic and religious minorities (particularly Punjabi Sikhs and, later, Kashmiri Muslims) actively resisted the political, linguistic, and secular integration enforced by the new Indian state, South



**Fig. 4.3** Holi in Vrindavan  
(Photo © by Robyn Beeche,  
2010; used with permission)



Asians were thought to be incapable of developing social relations outside of this all-pervading institution. India itself was constructed, at least by some, as a world devoid of social change and economic development. However, because the economic reforms India enacted in the early 1990s and the economic growth they spurred have pushed more than 100 million Indians above the poverty line, anthropologists are now thinking about South Asia less in static terms of village, caste, and gender than in relation to the processes currently integrating its societies into an international political economy and a locus of transnational traffic of ideas, languages, and cultures. This new focus on globalization is requiring anthropologists to adopt ideas of identity and territory that go well beyond those used by the old “regional” or “culture area” studies of the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. In recent years, we have seen works that theorize India’s cultural transformations, in particular, in terms of shifting patterns of production, movement, and accumulation of capital, emerging patterns of middle-class consumption, the growth of information technology, and diasporic communities (Donner 2011; Jeffrey and Doron 2013; Leonard 2007). The trend is definitively to map the growth of globalization on the subcontinent and locate the practices and energies that aim to affirm, and especially transcend, South Asia’s virtual borders with the First World.

For the most part, studies of India’s modernity are tempered by reports of the upper castes’ continuing political and economic advantages, the illusory successes of India’s globalizing economy, and the different experiences of modernity that are formed within it: the disappointment, despair, and rage of those (lower caste unemployed youth, disenfranchised Muslim minorities, indentured farmers, ghettoized migrants from poor villages and rural areas in the large slums of Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata, and other big cities) who feel not only left behind but also victimized by corporate-driven economic policies, endemic corruption, urban-oriented economic growth, and prejudice (Jeffrey et al. 2008). It has also been shown how India, indeed South Asia as a whole, is faced with an intense combination of tensions (communalist factions and insurgent and separatist groups that interact with the expansion of both the liberal state and the capitalist economy) that, in certain spheres (electoral politics and religion in particular) is breaking into outright violence, threatening both the viability of the Indian state and its democratizing institutions (Jaffrelot 2011). Many anthropologists now understand that the relations of power and domination created and/or exacerbated by neoliberal policies have often resulted in sustained experiences of injustice and major disparities in wealth. India, for example, has more than 100 billionaires whose combined personal reve-



nues represent more than 10 % of India's total earnings. Furthermore, India has nearly a hundred million citizens with standards of living comparable to those of affluent people in countries like the United States and Germany. At the other end of the spectrum, some 455 million Indian citizens still live on less than USD 1.25 a day (75 rupees). India is home to more poor people than any other country in the world (Todhunter 2012).

Yet it is important to note that six decades of democratic statehood and three decades of neoliberal economic growth have rendered many of the social facts recorded by anthropologists in the 1960s and 1970s and even the 1980s obsolete. In the contemporary period, the old, professional divisions that were once locked firmly into place by birth have become less visible on India's social landscape. Today, there is no formal hierarchical system that determines everyone's position, and contemporary changes have only further diluted the rigid structure of social rules that limited interaction between and within castes. Discrimination based on caste has been illegal in India for more than six decades. In today's urban India, it seems reactionary even to speak of caste. Special education and job quotas have brought the lowest castes into universities and the political mainstream, and, thanks to the landmark passing of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education (RTE) Act in 2009, the children of historically oppressed groups (43 % of India's children), indeed, children of all castes and economic backgrounds, are guaranteed their right to elementary education by the state. Although government schools are often unregulated and lack trained teachers and proper infrastructure, neighborhood "low-budget" private schools serving low-income families have mushroomed so that education is allowing some low castes to rise above the circumstances of their birth and background. Throughout modernizing India, one can even find sons and daughters of Dalits earning their engineering and business degrees and lifting their families into the middle classes. This situation certainly is not the case everywhere, but it is enough to speak of "social progress" (Ramakrishnan 2014).

#### 4.5.1 The Enhancement of the Position of Women

Another central component of change that has affected Indian society since the 1960s is the gradual improvement of women's lives, especially in the southern Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu. Whereas statistics on sex ratio at birth continued showing a high level of preference for a son, daughters throughout South Asia are increasingly sent to school. According to India's Education for All Mid-Decade Assessment, in the 5 years between 2000 and 2005, India increased primary school enrollment overall by 13.7 % and by 19.8 % for girls, reaching close to universal enrollment in grade 1. The most recent figures for primary school enrollment stand at an impressive 98 %. The gradual increase in female education, including higher education, is closely associated with higher female age at marriage, with the average age at first marriage among Indian women, standing at 13 years in the 1930s, when the government implemented the Child Marriage Restraint Act (Sarda Act), and reaching 18 years today. It has also resulted in positive changes in women's empowerment, reproductive health, and general well-being as well as in reductions in fertility, preference for a son, and infant and child mortality.

#### 4.5.2 Neoliberalism, Dharma, and Well-Being

It is also important to note that concepts of well-being derived from neoliberal and development models are increasingly operational and normative in modern India. This change is due to the presence, throughout South Asia, of myriad welfare organizations, charity trusts, civil societies, educational development centers, and rural outreach schemes that work to "uplift" low castes, urban poor, and women. Even when state agencies, nongovernment organizations, and civil societies fail to live up to the expectations that development agencies have conferred on them, or are as likely to maintain the status quo as they are

to change it, they create a discourse of aspirations for development and poverty reduction and hope for entrepreneurial possibilities. Katherine Boo reports in her chronicle of life in Annawadi, a slum at the edge of Mumbai's international airport, that many slum dwellers, "now spoke of better lives casually, as if fortune were a cousin arriving on Sunday, as if the future would look nothing like the past" (Boo 2012:16). Another consequence of the activities of charitable and philanthropic organizations in South Asia has been the development of the individual's clear-cut notion of him or herself, of an autonomous self more in line with the notion of the individual and the person in Western society than was historically the case in South Asia. When values of agency, responsibility, and enterprise are promoted for the empowerment of disadvantaged social groups, one can expect that a process of individualization and self-interest will take place. People feel responsible for their own well-being and their fates as individuals.

We have pointed out, however, that the question of well-being in South Asia, and India in particular, has not been (and is still not) posed entirely within neoliberal frames of reference, nor are the resources for its idioms limited to the Western notions (e.g., right, agency, freedom, capital, happiness) that go into the construction of these frames. We have also shown that ideas and structures from the distant past continue to inform the discourse and dialogue of well-being and that they are likely to do so for the foreseeable future. The idea of dharma still matters; most people in India continue to comprehend their well-being in terms of doing what is right according to the standards that have been transmitted to them from their families and communities. Maintaining family honor is often still perceived as more important than having money. In addition, young people still, on the whole, want their elders to arrange their marriage. Religiously, devotion as it has been developed since the late first millennium is still the preferred way of acting and thinking in religious contexts, which are much more pervasive in India than perhaps anywhere else in the world. In other words, the majority of Hindus, the dominant religious

community in India, still take pleasure in being in the presence of their loving gods. No matter what the level of education or Westernization, most still enjoy a dip in the Ganges or other local sacred rivers; travel to the religious fair and pilgrimage called Kumbha Mela that upward of a hundred million people attended when it was last held, in Allahabad on the Ganges River, from January to March 2013; perform apotropaic rituals to ward off bad luck and the evil eye; and consult astrologers to know the most beneficial time to perform auspicious ceremonies, embark on new ventures, and answer such critical questions as when and whom to marry, where and when to build one's house, where to go to seek medical treatment, and so on (Fig. 4.4).

To be sure, all of these activities have acquired new meanings. At present, dharma means attending school and making money; respect is about wealth and class rather than personal or caste purity. It is not particularly important that the rivers are too dirty to bathe in (<http://scroll.in/article/814645/indias-holiest-river-is-only-getting-dirtier-and-our-colonial-legacy-may-be-partly-to-blame>) and that, like in the West, yoga is fast losing its former spiritual meaning and becoming physical exercises. Families invest dowry money not in gold but in business. Rituals for removing the evil eye are intended to draw (rather than deflect) attention to one's acquisitions. Pilgrimages are conducted in the pursuit of new productivity and potency. For the Indian middle classes, including civil servants, businessmen, and computer analysts, consulting astrologers when life-changing decisions must be made in order to anticipate potential problems and calibrate appropriate responses represents an automatic response to the opportunities and predicaments posed by economic liberalization in India.

Despite these encroachments of modernity, well-being in India continues to make sense only in relation to the historically situated structures of persons and their relations in the Indian world. These structures may be changing. Because perceptions and experiences of well-being and quality of life on the subcontinent are not immutable, they may have been compromised by modernity and globalization, but they remain distinctive.



**Fig. 4.4** Millions of pilgrims take a holy bath at Sangam, Kumbh Mela 2013, Allahabad (Photo by Lokankara; Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported

license; [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a0/Kumbh\\_Mela\\_2013\\_Sangam,\\_Allahabd.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a0/Kumbh_Mela_2013_Sangam,_Allahabd.jpg))

## 4.6 Conclusions

Although we have emphasized the *subjective* meanings of well-being in India, we recognize that the diverse and changing attitudes to ideas about what it means to live a good life in modern India (and South Asia in general) are threatened by several *objective* facts: (1) pressure of the dizzying population growth; (2) ghettoization of an unending flow of migrants from poor villages and rural areas into large cities such as Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata; (3) the decimation of forest land due to negligence in government planning, poor agricultural practices, and overgrazing; (4) the increase in occupations that have little to do with the lives of the workers themselves, such as working at call centers; and (5) the growing scarcity of natural resources, including water, which, to provide one example of the volatility that this could hold for the future, is now supplied only by daily water tankers mak-

ing the rounds of neighborhoods in upscale cities such as Bangalore. We are optimistic about India's future, about its future well-being, in no small measure because we are confident that the ingenuity visible on every street corner and in every rice paddy in India will enable the people to create unique and practicable solutions by combining the facets of their heritage that have resolutely endured for thousands of years with the very different tools and viewpoints of the present age.

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*Know that the key to happiness is to follow the Sunna and to imitate the Messenger of God in all his coming and going, his movements and rest, in his way of eating, his attitude, his sleep and his talk.*

Al-Ghazali (Ruthven 2012)

## 5.1 Introduction

Islam is the youngest and fastest growing of the three major Abrahamic monotheistic religions (i.e., the other two being Judaism and Christianity). All three believe in a single God and share many principal beliefs. Islam's holy book, the Qur'an, is considered by Muslims to be the literal word of Allah revealed to Muhammad through the angel Gabriel. Islam is considered to be a comprehensive ideology and a style of life that make possible well-being of individuals and societies in this world and the hereafter. Islam has precise rules on each and every aspect of life, and these rules are followed by devout believers as God's commands. Muslims consider Muhammad as the last messenger of God, who brought God's last and most complete guidelines for a proper life. Hence, an overwhelming majority of Muslims throughout history have believed that the most complete version of well-being can only be attained in a life lived on the basis of the teachings of Islam (Fig. 5.1).

Islam currently has more than 1.6 billion adherents, making up about 23 %, or one in four, of the world's population (Pew Research Center

2011). Islam is one of the most widespread and fastest-growing religions in the world. Muslims represent the majority population in 49 nations. They also constitute significant minorities in other nations including the successor states in Central Asia of the former Soviet Union, China, Europe, and the Americas. The highest concentrations of Muslims are found in South, Southeast, and West Asia as well as in North Africa. Countries with the largest Muslim populations include Indonesia (N = 204,847,000), Pakistan (N = 178,097,000), India (N = 177,286,000), and Bangladesh (N = 148,607,000) (Pew Research Center 2011). Although Islam first appeared in the Arabian Peninsula in 622 of the Common Era (CE), and the Qur'an is in Arabic, most Muslims today are not Arabs. In fact, Arabs in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Egypt make up less than 20 % of the global Muslim population. Examples of non-Arab Muslim nations include Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Arab and non-Arab Muslim populations practice Islam as their religion but have maintained key elements of their indigenous cultures and languages.

Shortly after the advent of Islam, the religion started spreading rapidly to a vast number of regions, including parts of southern Europe and Central Asia. The contemporary Muslim population comprises a large number of groups in various geographical regions, embodying a wide range of races, languages, and cultures. This

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


**Fig. 5.1** Interior of a mosque in Turkey (Photo courtesy of j0j0; downloaded from [http://all-free-download.com/free-photos/download/turkey\\_izmir\\_mosque\\_233578.html](http://all-free-download.com/free-photos/download/turkey_izmir_mosque_233578.html))

cultural and geographical diversity engenders some variation in religious practice among Muslims. Muslims vary in particular on individual levels of religious commitment, openness to alternative interpretations of Islamic faith, and in their endorsement of various Islamic sects and movements (Pew Research Center 2012). In particular, there is variation among Muslim communities concerning the interpretation of certain events in the history of Islam (e.g., surrounding [succession to Muhammad](#)), religious authority, and the institution of leadership and political power. However, there are also widely accepted beliefs and practices that are considered to be the core of Muslimhood. Central beliefs that unite Muslims include a belief in the oneness of Allah, in the prophethood of Muhammad, and in the Qur'an as the sacred revelation. Key religious practices that bind Muslims together include *salat* (daily prayer), *zakat* (annual charity), *sawm*

(month-long fasting) during Ramadan, and the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca). Therefore, despite disparities in beliefs and practice in the Islamic world, basic tenets and practices of Islam are the integrative force behind all Islamic groups and schools of thought (Dodge 2003) (Fig. 5.2).

The present chapter examines Islamic conceptions of well-being and their development since the earliest days of Islam to the modern era. A brief discussion of the major historical periods of Islam from its establishment to the present is followed by a shift to the Qur'anic conceptualization of well-being and to an investigation of the concepts of well-being in Islamic philosophy and Sufism, two channels through which Qur'anic ideas have been developed. Finally, I examine the concepts of well-being in the contemporary Muslim world. Throughout this chapter, the following questions are examined:



**Fig. 5.2** Muslims performing hajj in Mecca (Photo courtesy of GLady; downloaded from [http://all-free-download.com/free-photos/download/mecca\\_hajj\\_people\\_219873.html](http://all-free-download.com/free-photos/download/mecca_hajj_people_219873.html))

1. How does Islam as a religion and system of thinking conceptualize well-being?
2. How has the Islamic concept of well-being changed over time in various Islamic trends of thought?
3. Considering the dominance of secular concepts of life, human nature, and well-being in the modern era, are Muslims still committed to original Islamic notions of well-being?

A comprehensive review of a topic as broad as well-being in a religion as heterogeneous as Islam is a challenging task. It requires a large number of generalizations and summarizations that leave out many important nuances, exceptions, and details. Thus, the present chapter is necessarily a humble attempt to provide preliminary answers to these questions. It is also noteworthy that, whereas the word happiness has recently been used in the social sciences to refer to subjective, hedonic, and affective aspects of well-being (Diener 2000), throughout this chap-

ter, happiness is used as an equivalent to well-being.

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## 5.2 A Brief History of Islam

Pre-Islamic Arabs are described as people who led a nomadic lifestyle, spending most of their time fighting against each other. Some of the Bedouins came to settle in city-states where trade relationships with neighboring tribes and towns were established. One of these towns was Mecca, an important center of worship and pilgrimage for Arabs. Bedouin idols were kept in a shrine called the *Kabah*, attracting lots of pilgrims, upon whom the town's commercial activities were dependent. Because they controlled the flow of goods in and out of the town, the Meccan religious and commercial leaders dominated Meccan society by managing the pilgrimages. The religious beliefs of pre-Islamic Arabs were based largely on idolatry and fetishism (Emerick 2002;



Grunebaum 1970). For these reasons, Muslims call the period before the rise of Islam in Arabia the era of “ignorance,” when Arabs valued pride, arrogance, and insolence and took pride in refusing to bow before any human or divine authority (Izutsu 1964). Pre-Islamic Arabs are described as people who took pleasure in the joys of present life and were concerned with wealth and power. They were passionate about drinking, gambling, seductive dance performances, and poetry (which was a recreation of various aspects of Arab Bedouinity and nomadic life, such as fighting and tribal loyalty) (Grunebaum 1970). From the scanty evidence available, we can speculate that, for these people, well-being involved a lifelong display of unswerving loyalty to family and tribe and conforming to the Bedouin codes of honor and chivalry as well as securing good luck through idol worship, possession of wealth and power, and having pleasurable experiences.

Despite the existence of small-scale alliances among pre-Islamic Arabs, they never managed to become a united political force or to form a central government. The nature of nomadic life (e.g., lack of discipline and inability to make long-term collaborative plans) limited cultural and political development in pre-Islamic Arabia (Grunebaum 1970). The situation started to change about 1,400 years ago with the advent of Arabia’s most influential spiritual leader of all times, a man from Mecca called Muhammad (570–632 CE). Muhammad’s message targeted the very core of Arab ideology and style of life. He acknowledged Allah as the only Lord of the entire world, dismissing all other human or nonhuman lords (Izutsu 1964). Revolutionizing the concept of deity necessarily created radical changes in the conceptions of the relationship between God and humans and in styles of life. Because Allah came to be the absolute Lord, absolute submission and humility were the only possible attitudes for man to take toward Him (Izutsu 1964). This revolutionized understanding of relation to the deity was translated into a lifestyle in which religiosity and piety were cardinal values, whereas materialism, hedonism, and all aspects of the “ignorance” of the pre-Islamic period were denounced. This change also had a major impact on the under-

standing of well-being among converts to Islam. Well-being came to be reformulated with the centrality of Allah as the absolute Lord, and Muslims refocused their attention from the well-being of this world to a superior version of well-being to be found in the afterlife.

But the leaders of Mecca were not pleased with Muhammad’s proselytizing and promotion of the new religion. Muhammad denounced the tribal idols that were the financial backbone of the town, encouraged the rich to free slaves, and invigorated people to reject traditionally held beliefs and practices. These practices were enough to provoke implacable hostility toward Muhammad and his few followers in Mecca. Meccans turned against him and his followers, using threats, insults, social sanctions, and physical violence. The increasing rage of Meccan tribes resulted in severe hardship, poverty, and hunger for Muslims in Mecca, which prompted Muhammad to decide to secretly leave Mecca with his followers in 622 CE, after 12 years of preaching his mission in Mecca. The year in which this migration to Madinah (referred to as the *Hijrah*) took place is designated the first year of the Islamic calendar. Migrant Muslims and new followers in the new city formed a Muslim community governed by Islamic rules (Dodge 2003; Emerick 2002; Gordon 2008).

The Muslim community in Madinah (present-day Medina) gained increasing power and new followers. In 630 CE, Muhammad led an army of 10,000 into Mecca, occupying the city without any resistance. With Meccans converting to Islam, Islam became the dominant religious and secular force in Arabia, led spiritually and materially by Muhammad. During Muhammad’s lifetime, Islam spread to all corners of the Arabian Peninsula. Under the new religion, Muhammad unified Arabian tribes into a single religious polity. The “essential significance of the appearance of Muhammad is the crystallization of a new experience of the divine, which welded all those who shared it into a new kind of community” (Grunebaum 1970: 27). His message contained new precepts of God, humanity, and life that were different from those in the traditional Bedouin belief system, yet still accessible to his Arab con-

temporaries. The new religion portrayed well-being as encompassing an absolute submission to the Creator of the world, which serves as a unifying principle to govern all human actions and intentions. Islam recognizes itself as a comprehensive lifestyle organized around the principle of Allah's absolute sovereignty. Well-being is to live one's entire life in accordance with this comprehensive manual.

After the death of Muhammad in 632 CE, Muslims chose a number of *caliphs* (successors) to politically and spiritually lead the Islamic community. The first four caliphs were Abu Bakr, Omar, Uthman, and Ali, who were among Muhammad's close companions. Muslims call them the four "rightly guided caliphs," because they stayed loyal to basic Islamic values of religiosity and piety. By the time Ali (the last rightly guided caliph) was murdered in 661 CE, the borders of the Islamic state had already expanded to large parts of the Persian and Byzantine empires in modern day Iran and Turkey. Many years of conflict between the two empires had weakened them and rendered them unprepared to face threats from the new rising power. Hand in hand with external expansion, internal division and political tension were building in the Islamic state. For example, selection of Muhammad's successors was not without critics. The split between Sunni and Shi'a began in the first century after Muhammad's death. The Shi'a believed that leadership of the Muslim community should stay in Muhammad's family, whereas the Sunni believed that the Muslim community should select the most qualified leader from among the community seniors (Dodge 2003).

After the death of Ali, deep divisions surfaced within the Islamic community. From among the opposing forces, relying on their strong army, the Umayyad dynasty (661–750 CE) gained power. The Umayyad dynasty lasted for about a century, during which the Islamic Empire grew dramatically. The Umayyad dynasty extended the borders of the empire west to the Atlantic coast, conquering lands in present-day Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco. The Muslim forces conquered Spain and moved into southern France, where they were ultimately halted in 732

CE. Islamic forces moved on toward eastern lands. They completed the conquest of the eastern parts of Persia (e.g., Afghanistan) and moved on to conquer Sindh and Punjab, in modern-day Pakistan. The Umayyad rulers earned huge benefits from the taxes they imposed on their subjects and lived lavish lives. Despite considerable institutional and material developments in the Umayyad era, pious Muslims were concerned about the yearning of the Umayyad rulers for material gains and worldly concerns at the expense of genuine Islamic values of piety and religiosity. They criticized the failure of the Umayyads to fully implement the laws of Islam. There were also complaints about unfair distribution of wealth and privileges by the Umayyad rulers. Moreover, opposition forces (such as the Shi'a) were active, occasionally organizing large, bloody rebellions (Dodge 2003; Emerick 2002; Gordon 2008).

The above-mentioned factors led to the demise of the Umayyad dynasty. The dynasty was finally overthrown by the Abbasid dynasty, which ruled from 750 to 1258. The Abbasids expanded the Islamic empire from Morocco to India, accumulating astonishing power and wealth (Gordon 2008). In this period, Muslims ruled politically and spiritually over the Middle East, North Africa, Spain, and Central Asia. The Abbasids continued the efforts to develop a large bureaucratic government (including court, banking, and postal systems), established a powerful army, and formulated the Islamic legal system based on the Qur'an and the teachings of Muhammad, which came to be known as the *Sharia* (i.e., Islamic laws and moral codes). The *Sharia* covers all aspects of life, and it is obligatory for Muslims to follow it completely, because the *Sharia* is perceived to consist of Allah's commands. As described later in this chapter, the *Sharia* came to be a comprehensive manual of well-being for Muslims from birth to death.

Great economic progress and prosperity pouring into Islamic territories, largely from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, facilitated great scientific and cultural flourishing within the borders of the Islamic empire (Fig. 5.3). Given the massive intellectual achievements in science, theology,





**Fig. 5.3** Whirling Sufis (Turkey) (Photo courtesy of Günter Ruopp; downloaded from <http://pixabay.com/en/dance-dervishes-turkey-konya-410468/>)


literature, Sufism, philosophy, art, finance, and banking during this period, many refer to it as the *Islamic Golden Age* (Emerick 2002). In this era, more orthodox trends of thought in Islam (e.g., jurisprudence and theology) emphasized an absolute devotion to Allah, fear of Allah's punishment, and adherence to the detailed laws of the Sharia as the key to well-being. However, with the burgeoning of diverse streams of thought in the Islamic world, competing conceptions of well-being started to emerge. Branches of Islamic thought such as Islamic philosophy and Sufism showed great interest in formulating their unique conceptions of well-being, which were based on Qur'anic teachings, yet had novel elements. The conceptions of well-being in Islamic philosophy and Sufism are discussed in the following sections.

The power and authority of the Abbasid dynasty gradually declined in its final centuries. The Muslim empire started facing the challenges of internal conflict and external invasion that would eventually lead to its annihilation. These challenges included countless rebellions inside the borders of the empire and the exhausting

invasions of Christian Crusaders (lasting from 1095 to 1270) from Western Europe. The Abbasid dynasty was eventually overturned by the ruthless Mongolian invasion in 1258 CE. Mongols conquered half the Muslim world, razed many cities, burned many libraries, and killed many intellectuals. By the fifteenth century, the Islamic world recovered from the invasions and saw the rise of three new empires ruling over the majority of the Islamic territories. The Mughal Empire gained power in the Indian subcontinent. In Iran, the Safavid Empire established a powerful Shi'a state. And the Ottoman Empire arose in Anatolia (Gordon 2008). The Ottoman dynasty expanded its rule to much of North Africa and the Middle East as well as to much of southeastern Europe. By mid-twentieth century, these Islamic states finally collapsed due to inefficiency in dealing with internal turmoil and external threats.

In the era of colonization in the eighteenth century, many European colonizers started moving into Muslim lands. An example is Napoleon's conquest of Egypt in 1798. Muslims were too weak to fend them off due to their technological, military, and political backwardness in compari-

**Fig. 5.4** The Qur'an  
(Photo courtesy of Nahidh  
Salman. Downloaded from  
[http://www.rgbstock.com/  
photo/nQz76Lu/Quran2](http://www.rgbstock.com/photo/nQz76Lu/Quran2))



son to the rising powers of the West (Etheredge 2010). Muslims reacted variably to the colonization (Etheredge 2010). It can be argued that the colonization and the contemporary powerful trend of Westernization have produced reactions largely centered on a mixture of fundamentalism and political activism as well as religious reform and modernization. The anti-Western reactive attempts started with *jihad* (holy combat) against colonial powers (e.g., in Southeast Asia, Libya, and Sudan) and culminated in the establishment of entirely Islamic (yet fairly modern) governments in some Muslim countries (e.g., Iran) or the formation of militant extremist groups (e.g., Al-Qaeda). The modernization attempts, on the other hand, started with experimentation with Western military technology (e.g., in the Ottoman Empire) and culminated in some contemporary Islamic trends that embrace a majority of secular styles of life and government, arguing for a complete separation of religion and state (Etheredge 2010; Saeed 2006). These developments necessarily had some impact on how Muslims perceived well-being. These modern trends and their influence on the conceptions of well-being are discussed in detail in subsequent sections. However, to understand the meaning of well-being in Islam, one needs to start with the holiest and most undisputed Islamic source: the Qur'an.

### 5.3 The Qur'anic Accounts of Well-Being

The Qur'an is believed by all Muslims to contain all of the major Islamic teachings about human life and well-being, in this world and in the hereafter. This section begins with an examination of the Qur'anic conceptualizations of God, humanity, and life in order to lay the groundwork for an analysis of the concepts of well-being in the Qur'an (Fig. 5.4).

#### 5.3.1 The Qur'anic Accounts of God, Humanity, and Life

The word Islam literally means "submission" or "surrender." It indicates the believer's absolute submission to the will of Allah. Faith in Allah must be beyond the least shadow of doubt, with absolute certainty. It must be deep and enter one's heart (Q 49:14<sup>1</sup>). In Islam, Allah is of overriding functional importance in world and human affairs. He is the creator and sustainer of the world and the teacher, observer, and evaluator of the human being. Allah is described in the Qur'an as being omnipresent in every corner of life (Q

<sup>1</sup>Translations of all Qur'anic verses were obtained from <http://Quran.al-islam.org/>.

57:4), having a close relationship with the world, and being closer to human beings than their jugular veins (Q 50:16). He knows individuals' private feelings and thoughts. Everything in the universe is regarded as a sign of Allah's presence (Leaman and Ali 2008).

The most important thing about Allah is that He is one. The principle of the unity of Allah is the single most important concept in Islam, with far-reaching effects in a Muslim's life. This principle means that one is to believe that Allah is the only God, the absolutely unique God, with no one sharing His divinity. In practice, this principle translates into a lifestyle where one must avoid following any authority other than Allah, avoid seeking to please other human beings if it requires disobeying Allah, avoid preferring the will of other human beings over the will of Allah, and avoid fearing someone other than Allah. To Muslims, Allah is sufficient in all affairs of life, and one's life must be arranged around this unifying principle.

The Qur'an strongly urges Muslims to fear Allah and His judgment: "Those only are believers whose hearts become full of fear when Allah is mentioned ..." (Q 8:2), "...And fear Allah; for Allah is strict in punishment" (Q 59:7). Although Muslims are also discouraged in the Qur'an from despair and abandoning hope in the "merciful, compassionate" Allah (e.g., Q 12:92; 16:119), fear of Allah is used as an important motivating force, which intensifies one's devotion to Allah. The Quran constantly reminds Muslims of Allah's power to inflict punishment both in this world and in the hereafter and of the horrifying nature of these punishments. There are plenty of punishment narratives in the Qur'an in order to rectify the ignorance of humans and keep the fear of Allah alive (Akhtar 2008).

The Islamic philosophy of life and faith in Allah translates into strict religious practice. That is, faith should be reinforced by a program of life-changing action, including daily rituals and practices (Emerick 2002). Mere belief without practice is considered fruitless. Islam "is a law-centered religion rooted in correct practice rather than solely in right belief" (Akhtar 2008: 291). Muslims believe that religion cannot be separated

from any little aspect of life. The Sharia (i.e., Islamic laws and moral codes), which was first systematically formulated in the Abbasid period (750–1517 CE), provides strict rules and laws to govern all aspects of life including personal, social, economic, and political matters, be it walking, talking, eating, sleeping, dressing, laughing, or toileting.

From the Islamic perspective, before great Allah, human beings are no more than slaves and servants. In relation to the rest of the creation, however, humankind enjoys a high position. The Qur'an says

And surely We have honored the children of Adam, and We carry them in the land and the sea, and We have given them of the good things, and We have made them to excel by an appropriate excellence over most of those whom We have created. (Q 17:70)

Humankind is titled as Allah's "vicegerent" on earth (Q 2:30). Qur'anic verses confirm the existence of a decent nature for humankind (e.g., "We have indeed created man in the best of moulds," Q 95:4, "by nature upright," Q 30:30), which basically indicates a large and unparalleled potential for spiritual achievement in humanity, as well as the absence of any leftover guilt from one's ancestors at the time of birth. In other words, the Christian doctrine of original sin is not recognized in Islam. Christianity holds that the sin of Adam and Eve is transmitted by heredity to all human beings, such that any human being is born with a defective, sinful nature. However, according to the Qur'anic narrative of creation, Adam and Eve disobeyed God's commandment and were expelled from paradise. Nevertheless, they repented their error, which was accepted by God. This repentance purged the blemish of the sin and left no bearing on future generations. Islam holds that humans are born innocent, suggesting that the Qur'anic view of humanity is more positive than that of classical Christianity.

The Qur'an states that humankind's unique potential for spiritual growth justifies its creation (Q 2:30–33) and gives it superiority over the rest of the creation. What is this positive side to humanity that the Quran finds highly admirable? In the Qur'anic narrative of creation, we read that

Allah breathed into the human being His own spirit (Q 32:9) and created human beings with an innate inclination for good that is called the *fitra*. The *fitra* is depicted as creating an important motivational force in the human personality, prompting humans to devote themselves to the will of Allah and to follow the Sharia. Thus, according to Islam, the human being is born with an inclination to surrender to Islam and live a proper life (Joshano 2013). Prophets delivering God's revelation are considered external forces, reinforcing the internal guidance. Humans have free will to choose to surrender to Allah and follow the Sharia, and, if they do so, they will attain the greatness that is praised in the Qur'an and is rewarded by the bounties of heaven.

But Islam also acknowledges a dark side to humanity. It is recognized in Qur'anic passages that the human being also possesses destructive dispositions stemming from the carnal/devilish side of its personality. Based on the Qur'an, this devilish side makes humans prone to all sorts of sinful behavior. Humans are described in the Qur'an as having natural dispositions to commit murder, cruelty, selfishness, disobedience, ignorance, and forgetfulness (Akhtar 2008). For example, the human being is described in the Qur'an as "a tyrant and a fool" (Q 33:72). Islam recognizes external forces that join these wicked internal dispositions, including environmental pressure and Satan. Satan is described as a powerful omnipresent entity constantly trying to interfere with the divine guidance and to seduce human beings to disobey Allah. Although the Qur'an emphasizes the benevolent God-given, excellence-seeking aspect of humans and does not recognize original sin, it emphasizes that humans are naturally prone to sinful behavior. In light of the innate negative potential, reinforced by external evil influence, humanity is described in the Qur'an as having the potential for becoming the lowest of the low (Joshano 2013). Thus, the Qur'an describes humanity as having a dual nature, consisting of two opposing forces that are in a persistent battle with each other. Given the importance of this inherent internal conflict in determining the well-being of a Muslim, this issue is treated in some detail in the following sections.

After reviewing the fundamentals of the Qur'anic plan for the human being, we are now in position to respond to this question: What is the nature of genuine well-being, the only well-being worth having, which is the final cause or goal for human beings?

### 5.3.2 The Nature of Well-Being in the Qur'an

Islam posits that the whole world, including human beings, is created by an all-knowing, wise creator, and thus, there is a reason behind the creation of humankind. Humans are created to fulfill a function. The Qur'an makes it clear that the ultimate human function is worshipping and serving Allah: "And I have not created the jinn and the men except that they should serve Me" (Q 51:56). Hence, worshipping is the *raison d'être* of humankind, its telos, its final end. Islam establishes what the human good is on the basis of humanity's ultimate function. It is fulfilling this function that constitutes well-being. Thus, well-being is essentially being a good worshipper and organizing one's whole life around fulfilling this basic function. In other words, well-being is living a life in which all of one's actions and intentions are directed at the ultimate end, which is worshipping Allah.

The need for worshipping Allah is thought in Islam to be firmly rooted in human nature. It results from the inborn and ever-present *fitra*<sup>2</sup>: a disposition bestowed by a wise and gracious God to His servants to assist them in achieving the best within them. This inbuilt inclination and the prophetic guidance are conducive to the ultimate function of humanity. Following the devilish side of one's nature and satanic temptations, on the other hand, frustrates this function. One needs constantly to resist the temptations of the carnal self and to act in accordance with the will of

<sup>2</sup>Whereas the existence of a fixed and definable human nature with a telos that guides human actions and defines well-being has been largely questioned in secular psychology and philosophy, Islam (like many other traditional religions) posits a fixed human telos and conceptualizes well-being based on it (Joshano 2013).



Allah. Believing does not suffice; one needs to continually act and live one's life on the basis of practical guidelines.

A question that arises is what determines the nature of Islamic activity? The answer is certainly not human reason and intellect. An emphasis on reason and intellect independent of religious tradition has never been evident in the history of Islam (Joshanloo 2013). The function of intellect in Islam is mainly to contemplate the religious message and to submit to it. Abu-Raiya's (2012) in-depth analysis of Qur'anic verses and Islamic theology indicates that the main function of human intellect in Islam is to contemplate Allah and to discipline the human's devilish nature. Thus, according to Islam, virtuous activity is not determined by means of human intellect. Islam holds that well-being is not achievable through rationality.

If human reason is not the determinant of virtuous activity, what constitutes virtuous activity in Islam? All of the guidelines on how to live one's life moment to moment are provided in the Sharia. The Sharia is "the detailed code of conduct or the canons comprising ways and modes of worship, standards of morals and life and laws that allow and proscribe, that judge between right and wrong" (Mawdudi 2013: 101). For Muslims, the Sharia is perceived as a God-given prescription for the right life, "the concrete embodiment of the Will of God, how God wants them to act in this life to gain happiness in this world and felicity in the hereafter" (Nasr 2003: 75). The ultimate good is only achievable through an enduring pattern of activity in accordance with the Sharia.

In Islam, only an objectively well-lived life with unrelenting religious activity counts as a good life. Well-being is not defined on the basis of certain subjective feelings and experiences, such as the intensity and frequency of certain experienced emotions and sensations. Rather, it involves a life-long devotion to organizing one's internal and external life around worshipping and serving Allah. Worshipping is not limited to practicing obligatory Islamic rituals; rather it is to organize every aspect of one's life on the basis of the Sharia. If one actually fulfills one's ulti-

mate function well, one is considered to have a high level of well-being, no matter how healthy and wealthy one is or how often one experiences positive emotions and sensations. Although subjective states of mind are not central in conceptualizing well-being in Islam, the Qur'an does recognize a number of subjective states associated with worshipping Allah, which are discussed in the following section.

### 5.3.3 Subjective Aspects of Well-Being

Desirable subjective states of mind are depicted in Islam as the by-product or concomitant of an objectively well-lived life. According to Joshanloo (2013), the ideal subjective state of mind in Islam is a tranquil, content state that is bestowed by God to a Muslim on the basis of strong religious faith and relentless virtuous activity. Where does this tranquil state of mind come from? What are the mechanisms that maintain this tranquil state of mind?

To respond to these questions, one needs to look not only at the nature of well-being itself but also at the nature of the human personality. As already mentioned, there are rival forces in the human personality: a wicked force that strongly urges us to do evil and a godly force constantly urging us to seek Allah. The devilish self is called the evil-commanding self (*Al-Nafs Al-Ammarah*) in the Qur'an (Q12:53). Obviously, this component of the personality is described in a negative light, as an unhealthy inclination that is in conflict with personal and societal well-being. The Qur'an recognizes another part in the personality, which is closely connected to the fitra: The blaming, reproachful, or self-accusing self (*Al-Nafs Al-Lawwama*). This self is the Qur'anic equivalent of conscience that stands against and counteracts the evil self's destructive power (Akhtar 2008). The clash between the evil-commanding and the self-accusing components engenders internal imbalance, anxiety, and guilt. In comparison to following the evil-commanding self without a sense of remorse, this internal state of



anxiety and remorse is considered spiritually superior because it can be ultimately conducive to victory over the evil-commanding self. Accordingly, the self-accusing component of the self is shown in a positive light in Islamic teachings.

To achieve well-being, one needs to harness the devilish self. The resulting inaction of the devilish self comes with the inaction of the self-accusing self, resulting in an absence of internal clash and turmoil. When a Muslim reaches this state of balance, through absolute devotion to Allah, he or she experiences a highly desirable state of mind that is called the peaceful, serene, or tranquil self (*Al-Nafs Al-Mutmainna*) in the Qur'an. This state is described as a state of internal assurance resulting from the awareness of having Allah's approval of the life one is living and one's complete reliance on Allah. This subjective state consists of a complete harmony within an individual in every realm of functioning, which is regarded to be the highest stage of psychospiritual development in Islam (Abu-Raiya 2012; Joshanloo 2013). Only a perfected personality gains this sense of subjective well-being. The subjective state of peacefulness and balance involves contentment with whatever God wishes (i.e., whatever happens in life). Worries over worldly difficulties and hassles are said to largely perish in this state.

In summary, resolving the conflict between the godly and devilish aspects of human psyche results in a rather permanent state of mind in the believer, involving feelings of contentment, assurance, and security, as well as low levels of worldly concerns. This mindset is described as the ideal subjective state of mind in Islam. Not every Muslim can resolve the internal conflict and achieve this ideal mental state. It requires living a pious and ascetic life devoted to worshipping Allah and permanent activity in accordance with the will of Allah. This subjective state is not achievable and maintainable without living an objectively good life. The following sections discuss the nature of an objectively well-lived life in Islam.

### 5.3.4 The Material World and Its Pleasures

Following the Sharia constitutes the path to well-being, and sinning constitutes the path to ill-being. The internal devilish forces keep disturbing the pursuit of genuine well-being. They constantly motivate the human to commit sin. This existential contradiction necessitates permanent struggle to subjugate the devilish forces. In Islam, this constant struggle is called "the major jihad," the major combat, one not with external enemies but with oneself. Muslims are urged to engage constantly in this internal battle, with the aim of placing all devilish powers, desires, and instincts under the dictates of God's command (Islami 2003).

Legitimate pleasures accompanying a genuinely well-lived life are acceptable, whereas pleasures that occur outside the context of a well-lived life are strongly condemned in Islam. Islam associates sinning with pleasure and attachment to the material world. All sins are pleasurable and inherently attractive and alluring to humans. All sins, on the other hand, indicate a failure to recognize the significance of the afterlife over the material life. If one is not seeking worldly pleasures as an end and is not attached to the material world, there remains no incentive for one to commit sin.

The Qur'an also makes it clear that there is no guarantee that, through living a life in accordance with the Sharia, one would enjoy a materially prosperous and pleasant life in this world, replete with pleasure and bounty. In fact, there is no relationship between well-being and pleasure, because Allah may choose to test one through pleasant life conditions or He may choose to test one through adversity and hardship. Therefore, living one's life in accordance with Islam does not guarantee worldly comfort and material blessings. So, what is the point in enduring the pain of leading an Islamic life, with all the prohibitions and restraints that this pursuit imposes on one? The response is, of course, that living such a life will be rewarded with complete well-being,

both subjective and objective, both physical and spiritual, in the hereafter. And living a sinful life leads to absolute suffering and unhappiness in the hereafter.

Qur'anic passages teach that the pleasures of the afterlife are better in quality and duration than worldly pleasures, and thus a prudent Muslim must prefer them:

Fair in the eyes of men is the love of things they covet: Women and sons; heaped-up hoards of gold and silver; horses branded (for blood and excellence); and (wealth of) cattle and well-tilled land. Such are the possessions of this world's life; but in nearness to Allah is the best of the goals (To return to). Say: Shall I give you glad tidings of things Far better than those? For the righteous are Gardens in nearness to their Lord, with rivers flowing beneath; therein is their eternal home; with companions pure (and holy); and the good pleasure of Allah." (Q 3:14–15)

Fear of Allah and His punishment in the afterlife and piety are factors that assist Muslims in transcending illegitimate, short, and sometimes harmful pleasures of the material world for the sake of higher pleasures, which are permanent and more intense (Fig. 5.5).

The Qur'an introduces humans' worldly life as an appealing yet temporary "play and amusement" (Q 6:32). The material world is problematic on the way toward well-being, because it can divert humans from the remembrance of Allah

and may cost the genuine, permanent, and intense pleasures of the hereafter (Q 63:9; 87:17). On top of that, life in the material world is plagued by inevitable suffering and hardship, resulting from the inherent limitations of the matter. Thus, even if a person chooses to be genuinely and completely happy in a worldly sense, that is not possible.

It is worth mentioning that, although the otherworldly well-being overshadows worldly well-being, Islam recognizes the possibility of gaining some levels of well-being in this world. It describes the ideal well-being of this world as entailing an absolute devotion to Allah, acting in accordance with the Sharia, enjoying a good personal relationship with Allah, and securing one's well-being in the afterlife, which may come with a subjective state of tranquility. The otherworldly well-being, the genuine and unlimited well-being of the hereafter, on the other hand, is characterized by the presence of intense and relentless spiritual and material pleasures of all sorts in heaven. The highest pleasure of the hereafter is gaining God's approval and nearness to Him. Therefore, from a Muslim perspective, one's life in the material world can be good and worthy, but the genuine version of well-being is not attainable in this world. Qur'anic teachings emphasize that the very reason humans are sent to this world is to gain the well-being of the afterlife. Muslims'

**Fig. 5.5** Muslim women in burqas (Afghanistan) (Photo courtesy of Amber Clay; downloaded from [http://all-free-download.com/free-photos/download/afghanistan\\_girl\\_burqa\\_220092.html](http://all-free-download.com/free-photos/download/afghanistan_girl_burqa_220092.html))



faith is constantly being tested by Allah in this world via both blessing and hardship, so that one's capacity for enjoying the genuine happiness of the afterlife can be measured: "He Who created Death and Life, that He may try which of you is best in deed..." (Q 67:2).

In summary, the Qur'an underlines the fact that human life in the material world and all material pursuits are more often than not barriers on the journey to achieving the well-being of the hereafter. Yet, humans can build strength and actualize their great potential through exposure to divine trials in their material life. They are taught not to let the worldly pursuits distract them from fulfilling their ultimate function of worshipping Allah. The rather negative descriptions of the material world provided by Islam may imply that Islam encourages celibacy, seclusion from society, and monasticism. However, Islam does take the sociopolitical aspect of well-being into account and disapproves of seclusion from society. In the following section, the sociopolitical aspects of well-being in Islam, which are important components of an objectively well-lived life, are considered.

### 5.3.5 Sociopolitical Aspects of Well-Being

Islam puts great emphasis on the social responsibility of each individual Muslim. According to Islamic teachings, the purification of the carnal self must occur in the context of society, not outside it. Piety in Islam is not supposed to lead to seclusion from society:

God's Messenger, upon him be peace and blessings, declared: "There is no monasticism in Islam." He also declared: "Monasticism for my Community is striving in God's way." Islam does not approve of holding aloof from people and life in order to attain self-perfection. Rather, it calls its followers to be among people and to work for their welfare, and to consider self-perfection along with the perfection of others. (Ünal 2007: 1043)

Islam regards social seclusion as turning away from social responsibility and failure to accept the reality of life. To be a Muslim is not only

restricted to having personal faith and performing individual acts of worship. Being a Muslim also consists of acceptance of one's social responsibility and having an active presence in society (Islami 2003). For Islam, the public aspect of religion is to complement the private one:

Religion is not only a matter of private conscience, although it certainly includes this dimension; it is also concerned with the public domain, with the social, economic, and even political lives of human beings. There is no division between the Kingdom of God and the kingdom of Caesar in the Islamic perspective. Rather, all belongs to God and must therefore be regulated by Divine Law and moral injunctions that come from Him and are religious in nature. (Nasr 2003: 32–32)

Islam is concerned with every aspect of human life on earth, including familial, social, economic, military, and political. It is clear from the earliest phase of Muhammad's teaching in Madinah and the Islamic society that he established there, that his purpose was to construct a new nation to be governed by an Islamic constitution. Islam preaches an "all-embracing law, and universal political control to be achieved, if necessary, by military power" (Black 2011: 10). It is a responsibility for Muslims to commit to a structure of law and governance based on the teachings of the Qur'an and the example of Muhammad (Al-Jibouri 2009). Using modern terminology, the sociopolitical theory of Islam (as reflected in the Qur'an and Muhammad's way of ruling) seems to emphasize social justice and social capital in addition to enactment of Islamic laws in society as indicators of societal well-being. An emphasis is also placed on economic prosperity. Yet, wealth and properties are the first to sacrifice in a Muslim's life or in an Islamic society for the sake of higher values: "You should believe in Allah and His messenger, and should strive for the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives. That is better for you..." (Q 61:11).

### 5.3.6 Summary of the Qur'anic Concept of Well-Being

The Qur'an posits that humanity certainly needs religion to achieve well-being, because the pru-

dent and gracious Allah, having created humanity to worship him, has implanted the need for worshipping in the human soul. Allah has bestowed humanity with a God-seeking fitra that constantly seeks to find Him and to surrender to Him. The God-seeking component of human nature creates a strong psychological need to worship a higher power, which should be prioritized over other human needs (Joshanloo 2013). Failure to satisfy this strong need hinders attainment of genuine well-being:

Enjoyments derived from the physical, material, and natural means of life are not sufficient for man's happiness and felicity. A series of spiritual needs are inbuilt in the human nature, without whose satisfaction the enjoyment provided by material means of life is not enough to make man truly happy." (Al-Jibouri 2009)

This natural inclination alone does not assure attainment of the ideal end, because this tendency may be suppressed by sinning. Muslims are taught to maintain or rediscover their fitra and to follow its guidance. Walking on the path of fitra is only possible though strengthening one's faith in Allah and following the Sharia. In fact, prophets and revelation are perceived in Islam as God's extra aid to help humans reattach to their God-seeking nature. In other words, these external sources are meant to help channel this in-built disposition toward its rightful target.

In view of the dynamic nature of the human personality, which entails two rival forces in a constant battle with each other and competing external forces at work, Islam posits that the God-given, God-seeking nature should be constantly nurtured or it will be lost. One must always be in combat with the carnal dimensions of one's personality. Hence, the achievement of well-being is not a status but a never-ending work in progress. One must constantly keep one's devilish inclinations in check, or they take over the control of one's personality, rendering one the lowest of the low. The human being is in constant need of internal combat, self-edification, and self-development, which should occur in the context of society, not in seclusion from it.

Living one's life moment to moment in accordance with the Sharia leads to genuine well-being

that consists of intense and permanent material and spiritual pleasures in the hereafter. The largest pleasure of the hereafter is proximity to Allah in heaven and having His approval. Although genuine well-being is only achievable after death, Islam recognizes the possibility of gaining some levels of well-being in the material world. The well-being of this world consists of fulfilling one's ultimate function of worshipping Allah and following His commandments, which may be accompanied by a tranquil state of mind. We are sent to this world to secure the well-being of the hereafter. On this basis, the well-being of this world consists of being on track to achieve the well-being of the afterlife. This Qur'anic formulation of well-being served as the grand blueprint for all later formulations of well-being in the Islamic world, some of which are introduced in the rest of this chapter.

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## 5.4 Islamic Philosophy and Sufism

This section summarizes briefly the notions of well-being in classic Islamic philosophy and Sufism. Islamic philosophy refers to the tradition of philosophical thought in the Islamic lands, which was partly derived from the Hellenic philosophical tradition. Muslim philosophers admired human reason and intellectual faculties and sought to harmonize rationality and religious faith. Sufism (Islamic mysticism), on the other hand, deemphasizes rationality and intellectual efforts, and instead makes use of intuitive and spiritual faculties to achieve a union with God (Saeed 2006). These two branches of Islamic thought are considered among the main channels through which Qur'anic teachings have been discussed and developed. These accounts of well-being are compared and contrasted with each other and with that of the Qur'an.

### 5.4.1 Islamic Philosophy

Muslims' conquest of various lands after the death of Muhammad put them in contact with a

range of civilizations with established educational systems, such as Syria, Egypt, and Persia. Scholars in some of these lands (e.g., Syria) were familiar with Greek philological teachings. Since the eighth century CE, a number of Greek philosophical and scientific works were translated from Greek and other languages into Arabic, with support from the Abbasid rulers. Early Muslim philosophers emerged in the ninth century CE, during the Abbasid period. They moved beyond translation and transformed Islamic philosophy into a distinct Islamic discipline, which came to inspire later developments in philosophical thought in other areas of the world, including Europe (Saeed 2006). The first prominent Muslim philosopher is widely believed to be al-Kindi (801–873 CE). Other renowned Islamic philosophers include Al-Farabi (950–951), Avicenna (980–1037), and Averroes (1126–1198).

Muslim philosophers sought to integrate Greek thought into their Qur’anic framework and were interested in harmonizing rationality and religion. Although their work was influenced by ancient Greek, Persian, and Indian traditions, the outcomes of Islamic philosophical work were hardly different from the Qur’anic teachings in their generalities. They also criticized Aristotelian philosophy for neglecting God, afterlife, and the spiritual side of existence (Leaman and Ali 2008). What distinguished Islamic philosophy from other Islamic schools was that Islamic philosophers promoted the use of rational means to analyze Qur’anic messages.

Muslim philosophers showed considerable interest in conceptualizing human happiness. Human happiness is basically conceived in Islamic philosophy as the actuality and perfection of the human rational soul, which is understood to involve the ascent of the rational soul toward a contact with the divine presence. In this state, the perfected soul is in a sense divinized, becoming fully spiritual like angels with no bodily needs (Mattila 2011). Technically speaking, happiness for Muslim philosophers means contact or union with the *active intellect* (Fakhry 1997; Leaman and Ali 2008). In Islamic philosophy, the active intellect is an immaterial intellect of the higher world. It is one of the emanations of

God, a semidivine link between the human and the divine. The state of union with the active intellect is described as an epistemological ascent from perception of sensibles to comprehending nonmaterial intelligibles. Put otherwise, it involves gaining knowledge of ultimate truths (Mattila 2011; Walker 2005). The ultimate happiness can be fully actualized in the afterlife, where the rational soul is dissociated from the body. Given that Islamic philosophers regarded the theoretical intellect as the soul’s highest and noblest faculty, they deemed the nature of happiness to be intellectual, assuming also that intellectual pleasure is the highest kind of pleasure attainable by the human being.

Bodily desires can hinder the attainment of true intellectual happiness and thus should be cast off. Toward this end, virtuous activity and piety are thought to be necessary. Thus, Muslim philosophers thought that the ultimate happiness is gained through seeking rational knowledge as well as through virtuous activity. However, practical morality is regarded as subservient to the higher theoretical perfection. That is, the practical aspect of gaining happiness is more of a means toward achieving theoretical perfection (Fakhry 1997; Mattila 2011).

What is the nature of philosophical virtuous activity? Moral virtue for Muslim philosophers largely entails subjugating bodily desires to religious principles, which requires varying degrees of ascetic practice as formulated in the Sharia: “It is primarily religious law that provides the concrete means for moral purification” (Mattila 2011: 132). Furthermore, Islamic philosophy posits that happiness cannot be obtained in isolation from society. Besides individual moral action, happiness should be pursued at the level of the larger political community to facilitate acquisition of happiness for all (Fakhry 1997). Toward this end, the larger society as a whole must also be organized around the principles of the Sharia.

In summary, for Muslim philosophers, the ultimate well-being is a state where one gains semidivine intellectual powers, the ability to comprehend nonmaterial intelligibles, and knowledge of the ultimate truths. This eternal



and highly pleasurable state occurs when the human intellect is fully actualized through contact with the active intellect, which is an emanation of God. The ultimate happiness can only happen after death when the soul is separated from the body. In a sense, for Islamic philosophers, the pleasure resulting from knowing the ultimate truths is considered to be the highest pleasure of heaven. But, in this world, one must constantly try to put his soul in contact with the active intellect through perfecting one's rational abilities and trying to understand "the principle behind the logical organization of everything in our world" (Leaman 2004: 20). Islamic philosophers admit that using rational abilities to discover the divine truths is only reserved for a limited number of philosophers and is not available to lay people. But these truths are already available for lay people in the revelation and the Sharia. Islamic philosophers instruct both philosophers and lay people to despise material pursuits and pleasures and to follow the Sharia. Ultimately, the way to well-being in this world comprises unrelenting activity in accordance with the Sharia.

Muslim philosophers were generally pious individuals and committed to Islamic religiosity. The philosophical account of human perfection and happiness described above is closely related to Qur'anic teachings. Similarities include the assertions that true happiness is not achievable in this world, that the way to achieve happiness is harnessing bodily desires, and that a lifestyle based on the Sharia is required to achieve happiness. However, they used philosophical method and terminology, which were not tolerated by traditionalists. Traditional theologians interpreted philosophers' attempts as producing conflict between faith and reason and giving credence to human intellect as an autonomous tool for answering questions that are already answered in religion. This approach resulted in major attacks from traditionalists, leading to the premature death of Islamic philosophy (Saeed 2006). The classical Islamic philosophy lasted until the twelfth century CE, ending with the death of [Averroes](#), who is widely recognized as the last eminent Muslim philosopher. Akhtar (2008) rec-

ognizes that, whereas the Islamic "fertile soil watered by the Qur'an and Muhammad's example ... has up to this day yielded a religiously rich harvest," philosophy "never took root firmly in the soil of Islam even in the intellectual heyday of Muslim civilization" (p. 88). The main reason for this decline was, as mentioned before, the intrinsic conflict between philosophical thought and religious faith.

#### 5.4.2 Sufism

One way of understanding and approaching God in Islam is Sufism, which is the mystical component of Islam. Contrary to Islamic philosophy, Sufism tries to explain the world, human nature, and God by relying on intuitive knowledge and direct experience rather than reasoning and logic (Joshanloo and Rastegar 2012). Islamic Sufism is believed to originate from early Islamic asceticism during the first two decades of Islam. Early Islamic asceticism was based on fear of God's punishment, deep and permanent awareness of sin and human weakness, and complete submission to the will of Allah. Ascetics encouraged piety, self-discipline, constant vigilance, and austerity. However, by the end of the second Islamic century, the ascetic movement was gradually combined with mystical tendencies, developing the earliest forms of Islamic Sufism (Renard 2005; Saeed 2006). Ascetics gradually turned into mystics and started speaking of a mutual love between the human being and God. Scholars refer to these first three Islamic centuries up to about 950 CE as the "formative" period in the history of Sufism, when sensitivity to the various manifestations of interior spiritual experience and individual relationship with God was emerging (Renard 2005). Beginning around the tenth century, Sufis started to systematize and theorize their approach, and Sufism was consolidated as an important practical and theoretical discipline. Sufism initially met serious objections from orthodox canonists and theologians. However, by the eleventh century, moderate trends in Sufism came to be recognized as legitimate.

Sufism has continued to grow in various dimensions of institutionalization and intellectualization (Renard 2005). Some of the renowned Sufis include Mansur al-Hallaj (858–922), Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (1077–1166), Attar of Nishapur (1145–1221), and Ibn Al-Arabi (1165–1240). Today, Sufism remains well represented in various forms and in various regions. Sufis are present almost everywhere Muslims live. Beside the strong presence of institutional Sufism, Sufism has become fully integrated into the popular religiosity of many Muslims (especially, Iranian, Indian, and Turkish Muslims). The Sufis' non-elitist tendencies as well as their authentic and simple way of life enabled them to convince and attract many kindred spirits. The use of poetry by Sufis as a vehicle for their teaching can be considered as one of the facilitators of the popularity of Sufism in the Islamic world (Joshano and Rastegar 2012). This popularity distinguishes Sufism from elitist Muslim philosophy.

Whereas ancient Persian and Indian traditions had a crucial influence on the emergence of Islamic mysticism, for the most part, Sufi teachings originate from, and are intertwined with, Qur'anic teachings. Sufis regard prophets as the chief models on the "Sufi path." They define happiness as union with God. This ultimate goal is only attainable by faithfully following the Sufi path, which is believed to enable the "soul to be purified, to acquire certain qualities and to rise higher until, with the help of divine grace, it would find its home in God" (Saeed 2006: 76). Sufis believe that it is human heart, not intellect or body, that can get in direct contact with God, and thus the Sufi path is basically a number of stages to prepare the heart to meet God. Divine love plays a central part on the path to divine union. Divine love is described as a pure, wholehearted, and affectionate love for God (Joshano and Rastegar 2012). Contrary to Islamic philosophy, in Sufism, reason is considered to be limited and limiting in many ways and thus is not considered helpful on the path. In particular, when reason denies intuitive knowledge and "blinds the eye of the heart," it becomes the target of strong criticism from Sufism (Joshano 2014).

Sufis also attach importance to asceticism and piety, both as a prerequisite for and a manifestation of divine love. Asceticism is considered as the key method of purification of the soul. Sufism regards the carnal/devilish self as a component that consistently leads the Sufi off the spiritual path and commands him or her to do evil. The devilish self can impede the actualization of the spiritual potential of the heart if not controlled by the divine aspects of the personality. Accordingly, this self should be actively fought against throughout life (Joshano 2014). As a result of pure love and an ascetic lifestyle, pursuing the Sufi path is believed to lead to the absolute annihilation of the individual self (e.g., Fakhry 1997), which is needed in order to become one with the Divine Being. This union is "a condition of oneness with the object of love, implying a mystical relationship of ecstasy and annihilation in God, the ultimate Beloved" (Renard 2005: 244). In this state of mystical union or melding of the lover with the Beloved, some Sufis say, the soul is so completely absorbed by the presence of God that it no longer has any individuality (Joshano 2014; Joshano and Rastegar 2012). This state results in the experience of spiritual drunkenness in the lover, which is an important component of both otherworldly and worldly well-beings for Sufis.

Speaking of central tenets, the Sufi concept of well-being resembles the Qur'anic teachings in important aspects. These similarities include the monotheistic emphasis of Sufis on pure love and absolute devotion to God, the importance of subjugating the devilish parts of the personality, and the necessity of following an ascetic lifestyle. The Sufi understanding also resembles the Islamic philosophical understanding along the same dimensions. The Sufi concept of union with the divine is highly reminiscent of the philosophical concept of conjunction with the active intellect. Yet, the Sufi version of happiness is slightly different from the other Islamic notions of happiness in some aspects. Some Sufis speak of the possibility of becoming one with Allah, whereas this approach is considered blasphemous by orthodox Islam. Islamic philosophy also does not speak of union with Allah. The active intellect is

only semidivine and certainly not identifiable with Allah. Moreover, in Islamic philosophy, the soul is believed to retain its individuality even after its conjunction with the active intellect. Hence, the contact or union with the active intellect as described in Islamic philosophy is different from the notion of oneness with God as described in Sufism.

Another noticeable difference is that, although Sufis normally do not promote isolation from society, the sociopolitical aspects of religiosity are less emphasized in Sufism than in the Qur'anic and philological approaches. Less emphasis on the social responsibilities of individuals in Sufism was one of the reasons why Sufism gained considerable popularity in some Islamic territories in the period of the Mongol invasion, when Muslims lost their sociopolitical sovereignty over their lands. Finally, although the Qur'an and Islamic philosophy allow for milder forms of spiritual happiness to be attainable in this world, Sufis believe in the possibility of more complete forms of spiritual happiness on earth. In the Sufi system of thought, traveling along the Sufi path may lead to intense internal experiences resulting from union with God that are described as immense and richly pleasant. Sufis believe that one does not need to wait until death to meet The Divine. It can happen in this life.

In summary, the philosophical and Sufi conceptualizations of well-being have a lot in common with the Qur'anic concept of well-being. The central theme that underlies all these notions is a yearning for getting in touch with the Creator. In all the approaches, human physical existence can be a barrier on the road to well-being, and thus due weight is given to piety and asceticism to subjugate this side of the human being. In all three, the most perfect and genuine type of well-being can be experienced in the hereafter. It is obvious that the Qur'anic master plan for achieving well-being has laid the ground for all later conceptualizations of well-being in the Islamic world since the advent of Islam up to the modern era. An important question that arises is to what extent are the Qur'anic notions surrounding the concept of well-being still endorsed in the contemporary Muslim world? Have Muslims decided

to abandon the classic notions of well-being in the modern era in response to rapid modernization, globalization, technological progress, and the new economic and political order of the world? The following sections attempt to respond to these questions, after a brief sketch of the streams of thought that are dominant in the contemporary Islamic world.

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## 5.5 Contemporary Islamic Accounts of Well-Being

Modern Islamic history cannot be understood independently of the influence of the West. Since the eighteenth century, which brought European colonial control over a host of Islamic lands, Muslims have shown various reactions to counter the humiliating dominance of the West. Some (such as the Ottoman Empire) started experimentation with European technology and manners, and some resorted to Islamic activism (e.g., jihad against Europeans). Since the colonization period, modernization/Westernization and reconstruction/revivalism have been alive and competing in Islamic territories (Etheredge 2010). Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1839–1897), and Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) are widely recognized as the first prominent reconstructionists and pioneers of Islamic modernism. They all called for reform and reappraisal of Islamic traditions to meet the challenges posed by modernity. Yet, they warned against blindly pursuing Western culture at the expense of Islamic values and spirituality. They held that cultivating the Islamic cultural and spiritual heritage is the only way for Muslims to regain their strength and glory. To these reformists, the only way out of misery and weakness involves going back to basic teachings of the Qur'an and the pristine Islam of the earliest Muslims (Etheredge 2010; Saeed 2006).

Ever since the colonization period, Muslim scholars almost unanimously have shown resistance to Westernization in the realm of values and morality. However, there has been more diversity in response to the critical question of whether or not Islam should be the foundation of the politi-

cal system. Some groups have emphasized enforcement of Islamic laws in social and political life. Among the most influential figures in this group are Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi (1903–1979) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), who advocated active sociopolitical involvement of Islam in Muslim societies. This ideology has led to successful establishment of Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia under Ibn Saud (in 1932) and the Islamic republic of Iran under Ruhollah Khomeini (1979), injecting hope to many Islamic movements aspiring to establish Islamic states. Beginning in the 1970s, partly as a result of recurrent failures of Islamic nations to free the Arab land occupied by Israel, radical versions of this ideology have also engendered a new generation of militant activism with utopian tendencies such as al-Qaeda under Osama Bin Laden (1957–2011). In contrast, some Islamic groups have emphasized that Islam should not be the basis of the political system and should be limited to the individual and private sphere. An example is the Egyptian scholar Ali Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966), who advocated separation of Islam from the state. On the basis of such notions, Muslims have been able to establish largely secular states, such as the Republic of Turkey in 1923, under Atatürk (1881–1938).

As this brief history of thought in recent Islamic countries indicates, the modern world has seen the emergence of great diversity in Muslim thought and sociopolitical life. Differences among contemporary Islamic trends of thought largely exist along a continuum from secularization to politicization of Islam. At the secularization end, Muslim individuals or groups relegate Islam to the private realm and leave governance to secular states. At the politicization end, Muslim individuals or groups hold that individual faith is not enough and that Islamic laws should be enforced by an Islamic state. Despite great diversity along this continuum among Muslims, Joshanloo (2013) argues that contemporary Muslim understandings of life, humankind, God, and well-being are still strongly influenced by the original Qur’anic ideology and the teachings and normative example of Muhammad. Muslims, no matter where on this

continuum they are, accept the Qur’an as the heart of Islam. Islamic spirituality, which involves a private connection between a Muslim and Allah, constitutes the core of Muslimhood, whether that Muslim is an Islamic activist engaged in holy war to establish an Islamic state in Iraq or a secular Muslim citizen of Belgium.

### 5.5.1 The Concept of Well-Being in the Contemporary Muslim World

Contemporary Muslim scholars strongly take issue with the secularization and hedonism dominant in the contemporary world. They warn against leakage of these materialistic trends into Muslim societies, which, in their view, can lead to the loss of Islamic traditional values and morality and to an entire breakdown of societal order. They seriously warn about the devastating psychological effects of lack of religious faith and following hedonic pursuits, arguing that a person who lacks religious faith cannot lead a good life. For example, Yahya (2001) argues that the lives of people who do not have religious faith are undoubtedly afflicted by purposelessness and that these people indisputably lack the essential factors that give life meaning. This lack of faith also makes individuals selfish and insensitive to other people’s needs. He describes an individual who does not have religious faith and who does not fear Allah as one who is likely “to commit any evil and ignore all kinds of immorality when he feels his interests are at stake. Someone, who readily kills a human being, for instance, for no apparent reason or for a worldly interest, does this because he does not fear Allah” (p. 23).

Many contemporary Muslim scholars express similar views: that morality, justice, conscience, and societal order are unimaginable without religious faith. They regard materialistic striving and neglecting one’s spiritual side as the cause of all the vices and disorders they recognize in the modern world. They blame Western civilization for spreading these “toxic” values among people of the world as well as Muslims themselves for their weakness of faith. Accordingly, they dis-

miss any materialistic solutions to the present state of affairs, which they perceive as utterly disastrous.

Muslim writers generally hold that to obtain well-being, one needs to know all aspects of humankind, i.e., all its abilities, deficiencies, and needs, and that such a complete understanding is beyond human capacity. They assert that modern science and secular worldviews have failed to bring well-being to humans' lives due to a lack of a complete understanding of humankind and its spiritual needs (e.g., Musawi Lari 1997). Only God can show humans the way to well-being, because He has created them and knows all about them. Accordingly, they argue that humans should try to find the answers to all their questions in the revealed law and religious scriptures. Hence, the core message of modern Islamic scholarship is to solve the existing problems through reviving Islamic values and returning to the Qur'an and the teachings of Muhammad.

They prescribe that it is religious faith rather than hedonic and materialistic motives that must dominate the human personality. Absolute submission to God and living in accordance with the Sharia feature as key virtues in contemporary Islamic scholarship (e.g., Motahhari 1992; Musawi Lari 1997; Yahya 2001). They state that faith helps individuals resist the pressures of carnal desires and inclinations, which are regarded as conducive to ill-being and unhappiness. At the same time, as with traditional Islam, extreme celibacy and asceticism are not prescribed by contemporary Muslim scholars. They encourage believers to stay connected to this world and to others, and to play their proper role in society (Motahhari 1992; Musawi Lari 1997). They posit that individual well-being is tied to collective well-being and that a person cannot seek happiness independent of others. Finally, in full conformity with the Qur'anic teachings, contemporary Muslim scholars think that genuine well-being can only be experienced in the afterlife, which is generally interpreted as proximity to God in heaven.

The subjective turn in the conceptualization of well-being after the enlightenment has prompted contemporary Muslims to pay special attention to

subjective and psychological aspects in their accounts of well-being. Contemporary Muslim scholars contend that without a strong religious faith, a human being cannot achieve psychological and social well-being. They reason that religious faith has major benefits for personal and social well-being. Religion gives meaning to the world and human life and provides us with stronger and more permanent pleasurable experiences, compared to which sensual pleasures are of little value. Examples of these religious pleasures are those derived from worshipping Allah and voluntary service to society. They recognize that life has lots of worries, hardships, and failures and that humans cannot overcome all of these on their own. The only thing that can bring peace and happiness to life is religious faith. This benefit of religion comes from religion's success in persuading humans that all these hardships and worries are divine trials that will be compensated in the afterlife. Hence, a believer can find meaning and tranquility even in hardship (Joshanloo 2013).

Some Muslim scholars dismiss Western and modern scientific theories of human nature as being alien to Islamic ideology and are suspicious of secular scientific methodologies. This position is advocated by Huq (2009) in the following excerpt:

Muslims, who believe that humanity has been created by Allah (SWT) and has been sent by Him to this world as His vicegerent endowed with divine "spirit" with inherent divine potentials, cannot exclusively trust and depend on such scientific tools which are unable to sense and unfold the spiritual basis of human existence, and which consequently fail to provide any knowledge and direction for promotion and development of the real human self. (p. 161)

On the basis of these assumptions, Huq (like many Muslim scholars) identifies the dominant views of human nature in modern social science as "soulless, lopsided, and truncated" (2009: 161). However, surprisingly, this disagreement on the fundamentals does not lead to an entire dismissal of all modern indicators of well-being recognized in the modern social sciences. Some Muslim scholars and Muslim governments tend to regard many psychosocial indicators of well-



being emphasized in modern scientific literature as consistent with the teachings of Islam (Joshanloo 2013). In addition to morality, faith, and following the Sharia, they stress some personal indicators of well-being, such as self-esteem, individual subjective well-being, positive interpersonal relationships, personal growth, and purpose in life. They also advocate many social indicators of well-being, such as social contribution, social capital, social justice, access to education, economic progress, national subjective well-being, and lack of governmental corruption. Personal freedom, social and religious tolerance, ecosystem sustainability, and uncontrolled access to information are sometimes considered as ingredients of individual and societal well-being by Muslims.

Muslim scholars argue that the Islamic lifestyle leads to all of these positive outcomes, whereas secular lifestyles will most probably fail due to their distorted understandings of human nature. Yet, for Muslim scholars, these indicators are not helpful if basic Islamic ideals are missing. If the ultimate function of humans (i.e., worshipping Allah in the broad sense) is not fulfilled, these indicators will not mean anything. They are only superficial indicators of well-being, which should be backed up by firm faith and persistent religious practice. For example, these scholars believe that life satisfaction is not a legitimate indicator of well-being when a person's life is not lived in accordance with the Sharia (Joshanloo 2013). It is also noteworthy that the modern values and indicators are often understood somewhat differently by Muslim scholars. For example, self-esteem is perceived partly as an awareness and acknowledgement of one's admirable godly self rather than a simple appreciation of personal worth.

In summary, mainstream Muslims scholars' views on well-being can be considered as a contemporary repackaging of the Qur'anic notions of well-being, adjusted to the demands of life in the modern era. Contemporary Muslim scholars define well-being as consisting of an absolute devotion to Allah and living in accordance with the Sharia. However, with the aim of giving enough weight to subjective experiences (which

are emphasized in the contemporary world), they have paid special attention to the subjective and psychological aspects of well-being, introducing religious faith as a (or the ultimate) psychological remedy for a myriad of mental disturbances prevalent in the contemporary world. The emphasis on the subjective aspects of well-being, however, does not mean that contemporary Islamic scholars have deemphasized the objective aspects of well-being. Instead, to them, all of the subjective and psychological benefits of religious faith result from activity in accordance with the Sharia, and religious faith without activity is futile. Muslim scholars also have imported many indicators of well-being from modern social science and situated them in their religious ideologies.

### 5.5.2 Views of Political Islamism on Well-Being

As mentioned before, some contemporary Islamic scholars and groups do not consider individual faith as sufficient for genuine well-being of Muslims. Rather they believe that Muslim populations should be ruled by Islamic governments that enact the laws of Islam, even if this requires revolution or military violence against secular rulers or alien suppressors. Under this category, there are two major streams of thought: political Islamists and militant extremists (Saeed 2006). Political Islamists advocate the view that a state should derive its authority from Allah and that secular governments are not qualified to rule Muslim states. Examples include Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903–1979) and Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989), who emphasized the sociopolitical aspects of Islam and the importance of establishing Islamic states. They believed people must not submit to any ruler (e.g., kings or sultans) other than a ruler who obtains his authority from Allah. From this perspective, all the guidance that humankind needs is provided in the Qur'an and Sharia, and political power is essential to put the divinely ordained Sharia into effect.

Militant extremists are more radical in their views. They believe that the contemporary world is characterized by a deep systematic injustice

against Muslims and intents to keep them weak. They have developed passionate anti-Western sentiments and try to revive Islamic power through forming states that are entirely ruled by the traditional Islamic laws. Toward this end, they are ready to fight and use terror when necessary. Martyrdom for Islam is perceived by militant extremists to guarantee attainment of the genuine well-being of the afterlife. The most exemplary militant extremist of Islam that the history has seen is Osama Bin Laden (1957–2011), who founded and led al-Qaeda.

It is noteworthy that both political Islamists and militant extremists agree with other Islamic groups (including secular and progressive movements) on the central ingredients of Islamic well-being. That is, they see the solution in recovering Islamic values as originated in the Qur'an and formulated in the Sharia. However, what distinguishes militants from the rest of Islamic groups is their overemphasis on jihad against secular powers. Moreover, they are characterized by imposing extremely strict punishments on their Muslim subjects who fail to follow the Sharia as dictated by them. Militant extremists are considered to be the least compatible among the Islamic groups with modern cultural ethos and practices, which are being widely spread and reinforced by globalization. They largely reside and function in poverty-stricken areas in Islamic territories.

## 5.6 Concluding Remarks

This chapter provided a review of the Qur'anic account of well-being and discussed how this concept has played out throughout Islamic history. In summary, the Qur'an distinguishes itself from secular, hedonistic, and merely subjectivist schools in formulating the concept of well-being. According to the Qur'an, there is no well-being independent of religious faith. This faith should be deep and intense and should "enter the heart." Moreover, it must translate into permanent activity in accordance with the Sharia and in carrying out one's social responsibilities toward society and other Muslims. To achieve these goals, it is important to harness the carnal aspects of one's

personality with a pious and ascetic lifestyle. Hence, Islam largely sets objective criteria for well-being. However, it also recognizes the subjective aspects of well-being. The ideal subjective aspect of well-being in Islam is a tranquil and peaceful state of mind bestowed on a Muslim by Allah as a reward for a strong faith and living one's life in full accordance with the Sharia. The fullest form of happiness is not achievable in the material world and is thought to only occur in the afterlife. Human life in this world is considered as a trial of Muslims' faith to qualify for the ultimate happiness.

This chapter showed that although Muslims have been responsive to various historical and cultural developments inside and outside their territories, the overwhelming dominance of the Qur'anic notion of well-being as the prototype of the life well-lived is evident in all Islamic eras and in all Islamic schools of thought. Given the absolute and unquestionable authority of the Qur'an among all Islamic sects and schools and the fact that the Qur'an is particularly clear on how a Muslim should live a good, proper, worthy, and admirable life, a rather timeless Qur'anic account underlies all Islamic formulations throughout Islamic history.

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
## Part II

# Domains of Well-Being

*Caution in handling generally accepted opinions that claim to explain whole trends of history is especially important for the historian of modern times, because the last century has produced an abundance of ideologies that pretend to be keys to history but are actually nothing but desperate efforts to escape responsibility. (Hannah Arendt – Arendt, H. (1968). *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt.)*

*There is a view in which all the love of our neighbour, the impulses towards action, help, and beneficence, the desire for removing human error, clearing human confusion, and diminishing human misery, the noble aspiration to leave the world better and happier than we found it, – motives eminently such as are called social, – come as part of the grounds of culture, and the main and pre-eminent part. (Mathew Arnold – Arnold, M. (1932). *Culture and Anarchy* (p. 44). J. Dover Wilson (Ed.), Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press.)*

*The question, then, is whether we can arrive at a set of normative rules which seek to protect liberty, reward achievement, and enhance the social good, all within the constraints of economics. (Daniel Bell – Bell, D. (1996). *The Cultural Contradictions of Capital* (p. 26). [20th Anniversary Edition]. New York: Basic Books.)*



*Ik'* – Second day of the Maya calendar. Mixed media on paper—22" × 30". © 2015 Lylia Forero Carr. Used with permission.



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# How We Measure Well-Being: The Data Behind the History of Well-Being

# 6

M. Joseph Sirgy, Richard J. Estes,  
and Audrey N. Selian

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## 6.1 Introduction

The study of well-being comprises substantial bodies of empirical work done by scientists working across many disciplines—from the natural and social sciences to the arts, humanities, the nature and social sciences, as well as the performing arts.<sup>1</sup> The field of study covers important social advances achieved for people in general but also for special groups who have been discriminated against on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and social class, among others.

The goal of this volume is to present the historical and contemporary patterns of human progress, grounded in a combination of data and

of documented historical narrative that underlies true human experience. The empirical writings of well-being scholars tend to promote a fuller understanding of the social, political, and economic dynamics that contribute to well-being. In addition, through attention to the public policy implications of their research, well-being scholars seek to advance well-being in individuals, families, communities, entire countries, geopolitical regions, and the world as a whole (Hagerty et al. 2002).

Although the study of well-being is multidisciplinary, research practitioners are clustered primarily in the fields of sociology, political science, economics, and psychology. All draw for their inspiration from the fundamental knowledge of quality of life and well-being from the major philosophical, religious, and humanist tradition of Western, Eastern, and Middle Eastern religions and philosophical systems. The conceptual base of this book lies primarily in the broad-based social, economic, political, ideological, military, and other conflicts that have characterized much of humanity throughout history. The most prominent thinkers about these topics have emerged over the past 40 years and include scholars influenced by the human atrocities perpetrated during and the subsequent developments associated with the First (1914–1918) and Second World Wars (1939–1945), the Great Depression, the protracted wars in Vietnam and Indo-China (1955–1975), and the recurrent conflicts

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<sup>1</sup>The international and interdisciplinary nature of this field of social science theory and research is captured by Alex Michalos in his 12-volume *Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research* (2014).

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occurring in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2014). The recent “Arab Spring” and subsequent crises in the Middle East have also contributed to advances in well-being research.

Starting with the broad perspective of well-being on our planet and gradually narrowing our focus, a few simple “grand themes” appear. The increased threats associated with the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, for example, are all too clear. The threat of nuclear wars has significantly mobilized global concern and action focused on improving the social conditions that exist in the world’s most populous countries (China, India, Pakistan). The United Nations Millennium Development Campaign (MDC), launched in 2005, is just one example of worldwide efforts directed at improving the living standards of people in deeply impoverished countries. In addition to many of the world’s largest countries, members of the “Nuclear Club” now include smaller, poorer countries in developing Africa, Asia, and the Middle East where the potential for their use in settling local, regional, and international conflicts is high (e.g., North Korea) (Nuclear Threat Initiative 2014). It is possible that increasing the levels of development for people everywhere may help abate the threatened or actual use by rogue individuals or nations of nuclear weapons in settling cross-border and regional conflicts. Hopefully they will not become weapons of choice in dealing with global conflicts. It is a core presumption of the editors of this volume that peace and development are essential preconditions for advancing individual and collective well-being.

The other elements of interest that become evident as one moves beyond global security are health, education, and income, all core indicators of the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) *Human Development Index* (HDI). These three measures which have essentially over time evolved to depict a general wave of improvement across the planet on all fronts, as well as people’s self-assessment of their own states of well-being, form the basis of the organization and description of the histories of well-being presented here.

## 6.2 Indicators of Well-Being

When studying the history of well-being in the various world regions, we first ask “How do well-being scholars capture the quality of life of a country or world region?” To build a complete narrative of the quality of life and well-being of a specific country or world region, researchers use a variety of indicators that are complementary to one another. These indicators can best be viewed in terms of *inputs* (*investments*) and *outputs* (*results*). The *outputs* are specific conditions that can be expressed as both subjective and objective indicators. *Subjective outcome indicators* reflect the personal voice of those in the direct line of experience, with all the inherent personal biases and associated methodological inconsistencies in generalizing such perspectives to the population as a whole. *Objective outcome indicators* are more impartial, such as changes in average years of life expectancy, in infant and child death rates, and in rates of criminal activities. Many of these data are collected and disseminated by official government agencies and bodies. *Input* indicators describe broad-based forces operating in the microenvironments that impact the well-being of people individually and collectively. For example, if a country that was funding prenatal care for pregnant women wanted to measure the overall effectiveness of its efforts on the well-being of women, it could compare the dollar amount of the financial investment (input indicator) to both a subjective output indicator—how well pregnant women felt they were treated by the prenatal care team (subjective output indicator)—and an objective output indicator—the number of live births. Such indicators include public and private investments in achieving particular outcomes; the creation of policies that encourage people and organizations to act in a particular way; and the varieties of physical, social, and technological infrastructures that promote societal investments in particular areas or processes.

In addition to input and output indicators, we discuss *equity* and *technology* indicators. *Equity* indicators capture society’s degree of equality or inequality with respect to the distribution of various resources available to entire populations but especially to those that address historical inequities

that have persisted for historically disadvantaged groups such as women, children, the elderly, the disabled, and minorities. *Technology* indicators, as the term implies, are designed to capture the extent to which technological innovations, especially in information technology, have contributed to societal progress and well-being at large.

### 6.2.1 Output Indicators: Objective

A great many of the quality-of-life indicators needed to assess well-being must focus on the objective state of well-being at both the individual and collective levels. *Objective outcome indicators* are based essentially on objective information—usually data collected by government ministries and nongovernmental organizations—and *the focus is on capturing the state of well-being of individuals in the context of their communities*. An example of an overall health outcome indicator is life expectancy, which many argue is a good indicator of overall health status, especially in terms of access to prenatal health services, the actual birth assisted by skilled health care professionals, and postdelivery supportive services.


Within the physical health dimension (as opposed to mental health), one may consider at least three subdimensions: *ailments and disease*, *physical fitness*, and *lifestyle*. Ailments and diseases can be captured using health measurements related to specific disease incidents such as coronary heart disease and diabetes. Physical fitness can be captured using health indicators such as physical fitness tests and newborns with low birth weight. The preponderance of healthy lifestyles can be captured using indicators such as tobacco use, sexual activity with protection, and time spent outdoors. These are all excellent examples of the types of data that are commonly treated as objective in the sense that they are collected by experts focused on particular health outcomes for individuals. Indicators like these are often used in the assessment of well-being outcomes related to health, education, finance, work, leisure, sports, and recreation. There are many other examples of objective outcome indicators from well-established well-being indicator systems.

#### 6.2.1.1 The United Nations Human Development Index

The common points of departure for all analyses in this volume are the component parts of the HDI. The HDI, one of the most popular measurement systems, is used throughout this book in the analysis of various world regions. The UNDP introduced the HDI in 1990 as part of its now annual series of *Human Development Report(s)*. The HDI builds on the conceptual legacy of both the *Physical Quality of Life Index* of Morris David Morris (1979) and the *Level of Living Index* of Jan Drewnowski and Wolf Scott (1966).

The HDI uses three core indicators to assess national and international progress in human development: (1) *longevity* (as measured by life expectancy at birth); (2) *educational attainment* (as measured by adult literacy rates in combination with primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollment levels); and (3) *standard of living* (as measured by per capita real *gross domestic product* or *purchasing power parity*). National performances on each of these indicators are transformed into standardized scores. Then, using a moderately complicated system of statistical weights, the standardized scores are combined to produce a single composite HDI score. The chapters in Part IV focus on central dimensions of well-being that align with the HDI: health, education, and economic well-being. Each geographical analysis is further enriched with data that reflect subjective well-being. The first three dimensions (health, education, and economic well-being) plus the subjective voice from vast swaths of aggregated populations comprise what we consider the most important aggregate measures in the assessment of well-being. This approach is consistent with the efforts of the UNDP to capture quality of life at the country level (longevity, educational attainment, and standard of living). We consider these HDI dimensions and the ancillary subjective well-being component to be fundamental to capturing the quality of life of any country. Of course, measuring these well-being indicators does not comprise the totality of quality of life. For example, the authors of Chap. 7 discuss the quality of life in Latin America in terms of social well-being, an angle that is an important element of the totality of quality of life in that region.

**Fig. 6.1** Distribution of global income and wealth by population quintile (*Human development report 1992: Global dimensions of human development*, p. 35, 1992, United Nations Development Programme, [© Copyright ©1992 by the United Nations Development Programme], by permission of Oxford University Press USA UNDP 1992)



Like many of its predecessor indexes, the HDI attempts to focus international attention on *both* the economic and noneconomic aspects of development—the persistence of global poverty, gender inequality, the relationship between social and economic development, and the need of people everywhere to participate more fully in framing both the goals and means of development. In 1995, the UNDP released two additional indexes that focused on the changing status of women: the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment Measurement.


### 6.2.1.2 United Nations Millennium Development Campaign

One of the most important accomplishments of the UNDP occurred in 2005 with the launching of the United Nations MDC. The purposes of the MDC were to (1) focus the attention of all of the specialized agencies of the United Nations on a shared development agenda; (2) focus this agenda on meeting the needs of the world's least socially developed countries; (3) elicit support of other development organizations, agencies, and private philanthropists to join with the United Nations in implementing the agenda; and (4) achieve to the

fullest extent possible the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).<sup>2</sup> The MDC received formal support of 189 member states of the United Nations; the time for the campaign was set for 2000–2015 (United Nations 2005).

Figure 6.1 summarizes the global inequality in income and wealth as represented by wealth distribution by population quintile distributed in the total area of a champagne glass (UNDP 1992). This is a remarkable graphical representation of the maldistribution in income, wealth, and natu-

<sup>2</sup>The eight Millennium Development Goals are to (1) eliminate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other infectious diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development. Each goal has a set of operational goals and subgoals, a predetermined strategy, and, where possible, an assigned budget or mechanism for generating support toward its financing. Progress reports on the MDC and its eight goals are issued annually at the national, regional, and global levels (UNDP 2014). These progress reports have proven to be of great value in helping to keep the campaign on track and, as necessary, in generating new resources needed to ensure each goal's optimal attainment.



**Fig. 6.2** Percentage change in rates of extreme poverty for selected developing regions, 2000 and 2012 (Data from UNDP 2014)

ral resources that exists for much of the world's population. The discrepancy is especially pronounced among the world's poorest, or lowest, quintile which has little, if any, chance of reversing the "bottom of the pyramid" position in which they are located. In effect, the top 20 % of all income earners earn approximately 83 % of the world's total global output, whereas the bottom 80 % earn less than 17 % of the total global output!

And this pattern of wealth maldistribution does not differ appreciably over the decades with the exception that the lowest 20 % have diminishing access to the world's total economic output. The structural nature of this income disparity provides further evidence of the need for a global rather than a local, national, or even regional approach to the alleviation of poverty. These observations were discussed more fully at the recent World Economic Forum 2015 held in Davos, Switzerland, whereby a study by Oxfam (Gates 2013) confirmed that the statistics related to income and wealth inequality are of steadily increasing concern, especially in the global effort to lift the extreme poor out of structural poverty. The world's richest 1 % will soon amass wealth that represents more than the entirety of that


owned by the rest of the people on our planet. This dramatic inequality in wealth continues today and, indeed, has been even more serious than that reported by the United Nations in 1992.

Figure 6.2 shows the extent of UNDP progress in achieving major aspects of Millennium Development Goal #1: the elimination of extreme poverty and hunger. Between 2000 and 2012, the rate of global extreme poverty dropped significantly in all of the world's regions, but especially in those where it was particularly prevalent (South and East Asia). Today, 700 million fewer people live under conditions of extreme poverty than in 2000 (United Nations 2014).

## 6.2.2 Output Indicators: Subjective

Objective indicators of well-being provide only a partial picture of the full extent of life satisfaction and happiness experienced by people individually and collectively. A more complete picture of well-being is ascertained through a combination of both *subjective* and *objective* approaches to well-being assessment. Since the Second World War, well-being scholars have used both approaches to arrive at a more complete under-





**Fig. 6.3** Countries whose people smile most frequently (Gates 2013)

standing of the nature, dynamics, and extent of well-being. This section identifies examples of popular approaches to subjective well-being assessment that are in use today.

A curious method, the frequency of public smiling in a nation, is sometimes used as an indirect proxy measure of the level of subjective happiness or well-being experienced by people. Researchers who use this method acknowledge the fact that cultural factors play an important role in shaping public expressions of happiness (e.g., Western societies encourage public smiling whereas many Asian societies actually discourage it). An international team of investigators studied the relationship between the frequency of smiling in public settings and the resulting sense of well-being expressed by those who smiled frequently versus those who smiled less often (Huffington Post 2012) (Fig. 6.3).

Figure 6.3 identifies the countries studied in which people smiled the least and most frequently per day. Unlike the happiness lists of countries identified by the renowned sociologist, Ruut Veenhoven, and his interdisciplinary team of “happiness” researchers at Erasmus University in the Netherlands (Veenhoven 2014), Latin American and Caribbean countries (N = 9) domi-

nate the list of the 20 countries whose people smile most frequently: Brazil, Nicaragua, Honduras, Colombo, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Mexico. The second cluster of countries whose people smile most frequently spans the entirety of Africa (N = 10): South Africa, Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Tunisia, Nigeria, Morocco, Kenya, Tanzania, and Mauritius. The only Asian country to make the top 20 list of most-smiling countries was the Philippines. Somewhat surprisingly, and unlike the happiness patterns reported in the *World Database of Happiness* studies, no European or North American country is identified as a leading country in terms of public smiling.

A significant amount of data suggests a negative relationship between happiness and levels of financial wealth beyond a certain point of actual need, especially when wealth takes the form of money, securities, property, and other material goods. In contrast, *social wealth* (i.e., *human relationships, social cohesion, and social capital*) is plentiful in economically less-developed countries. The psycho-emotional relationships embodied in these concepts likely account for the unexpectedly high degree of “happy” behavior for less economically advantaged peoples in

developing countries. One can argue from the data that it is the pursuit of happiness rather than of economic wealth that is the driving force underlying the high degree of positive “happy” behavior seen in developing countries.


The method most frequently used for assessing the degree of life satisfaction, happiness, and psychological well-being is the public opinion poll. Opinion polls can reach large numbers of people within a relatively brief period at a relatively low cost. After making some cultural adjustments, opinion pollsters also can ask respondents to reflect on the same question or set of questions regarding a broad range of psychosocial-economic experiences. Demographic data collected along with these polls permit researchers to control for additional factors of special interest to them. These factors help to associate an individual’s sense of well-being with a wide range of other factors occurring in his or her life (e.g., work, family, leisure, community, politics, the environment) Gallup, Inc. is an American-based research organization and private consulting company that became famous for its public opinion polls that began in the in the early 1930s. Gallup’s major areas of focus today, in addition to their widely known public opinion polls, include assessing employee engagement, customer engagement, talent management, and well being. One of the more popular Gallup surveys is the *Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index*. This survey tracks daily the percentage of Americans who, reflecting on the day before they were surveyed, say they experienced a lot of happiness and enjoyment without a lot of stress and worry versus the percentage who say they experienced daily worry and stress without a lot of happiness and enjoyment. Daily results are based on telephone interviews with approximately 500 national adults; margin of error is  $\pm 5$  percentage points.

In addition to covering a wide range of other topics of interest to policy makers, the Gallup polls include questions related to individual happiness and life satisfaction. Table 6.1 and Fig. 6.4 show interesting time-series subjective assessments of well-being. Figure 6.4, for example, identifies by name five of the happiest countries of the world and five of the unhappiest. Especially


**Table 6.1** Examples of content categories and findings from Gallup Sample surveys (Brown 2014)

Content categories	Findings
Using mobile technology for work linked to more stress	Nearly half of workers who “frequently” use e-mail for work outside of normal working hours report experiencing stress “a lot of the day yesterday” versus only 1:3 of persons who “never” check work e-mail outside of working hours. However, workers who e-mail outside of normal working hours and those who work remotely outside of their homes, assess their lives to be more enriched than their counterparts who do not
Obesity linked to lower social well-being	Obese Americans are the least likely of all weight groups to be thriving, whereas underweight individuals are the most likely to be suffering. This pattern underscores the risk of emotional stress for persons at either extreme of the weight spectrum
Depression rates higher for long-term unemployed	About one in five Americans who have been unemployed for a year or more say they currently have or are being treated for depression. The long-term unemployed also spend less time with family and friends than other Americans

noteworthy in this poll is the fact that all five of the world’s happiest countries are located in Latin America. These countries include those with a high level of per capita income and those with some of the world’s lowest per capita incomes. In all cases, though, considerable gaps exist in the income levels of the rich and poor groups. Also, the respondents report their wealth not in terms of money but in terms of family size and ties, especially their relationships with extended members of the family. Active community participation adds substantially to the psychological wealth that people in these countries experience as does their overall social capital from relationships with a wide range of friends, acquaintances, and others. The significance of these trends is discussed more fully elsewhere in the volume. The data represented in this volume are generated from the responses of many thousands of people and are critical to establish-



**Fig. 6.4** World’s most happy and least happy countries (Data from poll conducted by Gallup Organization 2014b)



**Fig. 6.5** Gallup poll results: “Personal satisfaction with life,” United States, 1980–2013 (Gallup Organization 2014b)

ing the *homeostatic theory of well-being* developed by Robert Cummins and his large network of colleagues using the same basic set of tools in different regions of the world (Cummins et al. 2014). The relative stability of this trend line is remarkable, especially given the serious wars, economic hardships, and social fractures that have characterized rich and poor countries alike across the world as a result of these wars. Thus, the Gallup poll data add considerable empirical evidence to a general theory of well-being that could not have been amassed through any other

means. Gallup’s contribution to the theoretical and empirical development of well-being is unparalleled. Data of this magnitude and timeliness are unusual in social science research and certainly in research focused on well-being.

Figure 6.5 reports life satisfaction trends for the United States. Data were obtained from daily telephone interviews of approximately 2100 Americans from 1981 to 2014 (Gallup Organization 2014b). These interviews varied in length and depth but, in every case, the interviewers collected data on a wide range of

topics of interest to well-being scholars. Especially remarkable about the results from the 33 separate surveys summarized in Fig. 6.5 are the overwhelmingly positive attitudes and the stability of these attitudes that Americans maintained about their quality of life during periods of political instability, economic hardships, widespread joblessness, the spread of serious infectious diseases, and even family losses. The 2000 people sampled on a daily basis believed that, in time, all of these hardships would pass and that their problems with income stability, housing fluctuations, and ill health would be restored to an acceptable level. Thus, Americans remained generally optimistic about both their current and future situations even during periods of personal and collective hardship. This result reflects a remarkable characteristic of American culture that is transferred from one generation to the next. This observation indicates not that Americans fail to assess the seriousness of their problems properly but rather that American culture contains within it a generally optimistic attitude or spirit reflecting the belief that most collective problems can be solved with effort. The same belief appears to carry over into a sense of personal well-being and happiness.

In addition to the *Gallup Poll* (Gallup Organization 2014a), the World Values Survey (2014) is equally popular and widely used by well-being scholars. Data from both of these polls are presented in nearly all of the chapters in Part III. Most of these polls also control for important factors known to influence happiness levels between various population groups, e.g., between men and women, the young and the old, those working and those not, residents of rural vs. urban communities, and persons of different income and age levels.

One can also find many other large-scale national and international surveys directly related to subjective well-being or life satisfaction (Sirgy 2012).<sup>3</sup> Common throughout these large-scale surveys and indices are indicators that seek to capture the subjective experience of the totality

of life at the individual level (i.e., satisfaction with life overall) and satisfaction with life domains (satisfaction with material life, family life, social life, community life, cultural life, work life). Hundreds of studies have been conducted using these primary indicators of the human quality of life.

Quality-of-life researchers refer to the theoretical underpinning of this research as “bottom-up theory” (e.g., Diener 1984; Sirgy 2012), in that satisfaction from various life domains (namely, domain satisfaction) spills over to influence overall life satisfaction. Specifically, the theory argues that, in the minds of people, satisfaction experiences are organized in memory in a hierarchy varying from the abstract to the concrete. At the most abstract level, there is overall life satisfaction—a judgment that a person makes about his or her life overall varying from “very unhappy with my life” to “very happy with my life.” Below the most abstract level is the domain satisfaction, which captures one’s feelings about well-being in specific domains such as work life, social life, family life, spiritual life, financial life, community life, marital life, or love life. Bottom-up theory asserts that domain satisfaction influences life satisfaction moderated by domain salience. That is, if a person feels that work life is most important relative to other domains (e.g., social life, leisure life, and community life), then increases (or decreases) in work life satisfaction are likely to induce increases (or decreases) in overall life satisfaction. Those life domains that are less important are not likely to have much influence on overall life satisfaction. At the most concrete level of the satisfaction hierarchy are satisfaction memories involving concrete events (i.e., specific objects, people, and issues). Satisfaction at the most concrete level influences domain satisfaction. For example, a reprimand from the boss at work is likely to generate negative affect that can adversely influence one’s overall sense of work well-being. The influential well-being research conducted using bottom-up theory includes the large-scale surveys of quality of life in the United States by Andrews and Withey (1976) and Campbell et al. (1975).

<sup>3</sup>See Appendix B for a partial listing of national and regional on-going public opinion surveys that are cited extensively in quality of life and well-being research.

A major advantage of these subjective indicators is the fact that they can be aggregated. Life satisfaction and domain satisfaction scores can be aggregated to represent the views of specific demographic groups (e.g., children, women, the disabled, the elderly, and the poor) and of people in specific geographic areas (e.g., communities, state/provinces, and countries). Arguably, it is the scores of the aggregated data representing the preferences and perceptions of particular segments of society that would guide government policy in individual (democratic) countries where the will of the populace is counted as a concrete and tangible input into a political system.

### 6.2.3 Input Indicators

Some well-being indicators focus on factors that concurrently affect the objective *and* subjective states of the totality of life at the individual level. Such indicators, also called input indicators, are one step removed from the individual. They are essentially factors in *the social, cultural, political, technological, and physical environments* that impact the quality of life of individuals who comprise a specific demographic segment (e.g., children, adolescents, young adults, mature adults, elderly) or a geographic segment (e.g., a specific neighborhood, community, state/province, or country). For example, let us consider health indicators as input indicators. Health outcomes (as captured by physical and mental health indicators) are affected by factors such as institutional and medical care activities and programs in a given city or town. Input health indicators related to institutional dynamics may include the number of primary care physicians per capita, the cost of health care, financial access to health care, and access to mental health services. These kinds of data related to medical care may include information about immunization rates, early prenatal care, health education, and prevention and early treatment.


The sample data cited above are all input data in the sense that they reflect factors that are removed from the objective and subjective realities of lives of individual people. To help the

reader better understand input indicators, we review Estes' weighted *Index of Social Progress* (WISP) (Estes 1998).<sup>4</sup> It was initially conceptualized in 1976 by Richard Estes, the senior editor of this volume. In its present form, the WISP consists of 41 social indicators divided among 10 sectors of development or well-being: education (N = 4); health status (N = 7); women status (N = 5); defense effort (N = 1); economic (N = 5); demographic (N = 3); environmental (N = 3); social chaos (N = 5); cultural diversity (N = 3); and welfare effort (N = 5). Statistically weighted versions of the index are used periodically to assess the changing capacity of nations, world regions, and the world in providing for the basic social and material needs of their growing populations (Estes 2012, 2015).<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup>This indicator system contains several sets of tertiary indicators such as the economic subindex (gross domestic product [GDP] per capita; percentage real growth in GDP, average annual rate of inflation, external public debt as percentage of gross national product); the education subindex (public expenditure on education); the defense effort subindex (military expenditures as percentage of gross national product); the welfare subindex (first national law—old age, invalidity, death; age first national law—sickness and maternity; age first national law—work injury; age first national law—unemployment; age first national law—family allowances); and the health subindex (population with access to safe water).


<sup>5</sup>The similarly named *Social Progress Index* is another interesting way of looking at the success of countries; it studies 132 nations, evaluating 54 social and environmental indicators in each (<http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/data/spi>). The index is premised on the notion that GDP per capita is insufficient to explain the complex picture that comprises a portrait of human happiness, if one existed. It is not unreasonable to posit that looking at countries only in terms of their wealth results in a missed opportunity to comprehend that which fulfills and inspires the human spirit. For this reason, this index (like some others) offers a framework for measuring multiple dimensions of social progress, benchmarking success, with a series of rich visual views that include geo-maps as well as rankings. The Index consists of three dimensions: basic human needs, foundations of well-being, and opportunity. Each dimension is made up of four equally weighted individual components scored on an objective scale from 0 to 100. This scale is determined by identifying the best and worst global performance on each indicator by any country in the last 10 years and using these results to set the maximum (100) and minimum (0) bounds. As of 2014, this information does not appear to be available on an historical basis or viewable over time.





**Fig. 6.6** Weighted index of social progress by continent and year (Estes 2015)

**Percent Change in Average WISP Scores by Continent (N=160), 1970-2010**



**Fig. 6.7** Weighted index of social progress scores by continent and percentage change (Estes 2015)

The data summarized in Figs. 6.6 and 6.7 represent the results of worldwide trends in objective well-being for the 40-year period 1970–2010 (Estes 2015). Of particular note in the last wave of data (2000–2010) are the dramatic advances in objective well-being that occurred in sub-Saharan Africa between 2000 and 2010 (Estes 2015). These social advances are all the more dramatic

given the net social declines, almost at the same level, that occurred in patterns of well-being in Australia-New Zealand, Europe, and North America for the same period. After several decades of social declines, substantial progress is beginning to occur in the poorest countries of Africa. These countries are steadily becoming midlevel performers in well-being relative to the

well-being performance of the rest of the world. The declines in well-being for the more socially advanced regions of the world are associated with the enormity of the financial crisis that began in the United States in 2007 and subsequently undermined the financial stability of other economically advanced countries and regions.

Figures 6.6 and 6.7 also show the percentage changes that have occurred in levels of worldwide well-being over the 40-year period from 1970 to 2011. These changes are reported using countries grouped by continents. A number of important shifts forward in well-being are captured by these data: (1) social development, like well-being, is asynchronous and uneven; (2) changes in the rate of improvement of well-being are slowest in the regions of the world that already are the most developed (North America, Europe, and Oceania); (3) changes in well-being can be, and often are, erratic in the socially least developed countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America; (4) advances in objective well-being have been the slowest (occasional reversals have occurred) for the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, though the aggregate trajectories have remained uniformly upward-trending; (5) until 2000, virtually no positive changes were recorded for the 50 nations of Africa; (6) between 2000 and 2011, however, dramatic changes occurred in the development and well-being levels of much of the African region; (7) the recent accelerated improvements in well-being occurring in Africa are directly associated with significant progress in realization of the selected components of the eight goals of the United Nations' MDC; and, finally, (8) the dramatic social losses in well-being reported for the economically advanced countries of North America and Europe are directly related to the dramatic banking and other financial crises that were centralized in these regions.

All of these trends are remarkable, especially those that reflect significant movement forward for regions that, prior to 1970, either did not move at all or experienced net social losses from one decade to another (Fig. 6.8). These trends have changed, however. Today, nearly all of the

world's regions are moving forward with respect to their overall levels of development, despite the existence of variation in the different sectors that are included in the models used to measure this progress.

In addition to measuring changes in well-being at the national level, the WISP also monitors changes in well-being at the regional level. Regions are defined as countries that are close to one another geographically and, in most cases, share a common set of social and economic characteristics. Figure 6.8 identifies the world's 19 geopolitical regions, ranked on the right side of the figure from the most to the least developed regarding overall well-being. Economically advanced countries are closest to the top of the list; those regions closest to the bottom are the poorest and most socially chaotic. The dates shown in Fig. 6.8 are 2010 and 2011 but comparable data are available for the same regions as far back as 1970.

The jagged line on the left side of Fig. 6.8 shows changes in overall rank position that took place in the well-being status of all 19 regions for the period 2000–2011. Those regions with the longest time line changes are the ones that made the most significant social progress between 2000 and 2011. The changes are dramatic for many regions, especially for the poorer ones, as they begin or continue their progress toward a more positive sociopolitical-economic status or, in many cases, continue to move downward. Many factors account for these changes, and most have been analyzed and reported on by Richard Estes in a series of regional papers.

Countries that experienced the most significant progress between 2000 and 2011 also are identified in Fig. 6.9. The figure shows WISP scores for each country and the number of shifts in WISP rank position for the same period. These data offer the keenest insights into the extent to which governments and nongovernmental development assistance agencies succeeded in removing the major obstacles that prevented advancements in well-being. Of special note concerning these data is the large number of very poor African countries that are moving forward in helping their citizens achieve a higher standard




Fig. 6.8 How world regions fared on the weighted index of social progress, 2000–2010 (Estes 2015)





Fig. 6.9 Countries scoring the highest improvements on the weighted index of social progress, 2000–2010 (Estes 2015)



[Sig\_ % Losses\_10-Tab 45a(2)]

**Fig. 6.10** Countries scoring the most significant social losses on the weighted index of social progress, 2000–2010 (Estes 2015)


of living and well-being. Most of these countries are making significant positive gains, though some are moving forward more moderately than others.

Figure 6.10 identifies the 15 countries that experienced the most significant losses during an 11-year period beginning in 2000. The right side of the figure shows country WISP scores for 2010; the left side shows the number of losses in WISP rank positions relative to all 162 countries included in the study.

The countries with major social losses are primarily African and Asian—countries characterized by considerable internal volatility and conflict, war, deep poverty, poor industry, and little participation in the global market place. Those countries that experienced the most significant social losses on the Weighted Index of Social Progress between 2000 and 2010 are identified in Fig. 6.10. The social situations of these countries deteriorated below levels that existed at the outset

of the study. These countries most likely cannot accomplish appreciable changes in their social status on their own. Initiatives such as the United Nations Millennium Development Campaign (MDC), in tandem with sustained and generous private philanthropy and social investment, are likely to be the only means whereby these countries can extricate themselves from poverty and even deeper social deterioration. The well-being of most of the people living in these “failing” countries is likely to remain unchanged until the high levels of poverty and the internal conflicts that confront these countries have decreased.

Figure 6.11 is a geo-mapped graphical analysis of the distribution of well-being across the planet for the period 2009–2010. Countries represented in lighter colors have attained higher levels of well-being than have countries and regions resented by darker colors. Comparable geographic charts are available going back as early as 1970.



**Fig. 6.11** Distribution of weighted index of social progress scores by country and development zone (*Social Indicators Research*, The world social situation:

Development challenges at the outset of a new century, 98, 2010, pp. 363–402, Estes, R.J., [© September 2010], with permission of Springer)

### 6.3 Equity Indicators

Some well-being indicators and data focus on equity issues in relation to disadvantaged populations (e.g., children, the elderly, women, and the poor, persons with serious physical or emotional disabilities). Such equity indicators help build a fuller, more robust well-being narrative within a specific country and world region, and allow for a more meticulous and targeted type of analysis that highlights what we may perhaps refer to as the idiosyncrasies or “special circumstances” that characterize life in particular regions of the world.

One of the most prominent measures of equity in society is the UNDP GDI. The GDI involves a set of national, regional, and other estimates in which all of the figures for women are expressed in relation to the corresponding figures for men, which are indexed to equal 100. Another way to measure equity is the women status subindex of Estes’ *WISP*. This subindex contains indicators such as life expectancy of women as a percentage

of that of men; female adult literacy rate as a percentage of that of men; contraceptive prevalence among married women; maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births; primary school enrollment of girls as percentage of that of boys; and female secondary school enrollment as percentage of that of young men.

The term “historically disadvantaged population groups” is used by the United Nations to identify groups within the general populations of all nations that have been neglected, underrepresented, or disadvantaged in some way compared with the more favored groups in the population. These groups and their status as determined by the data are a useful proxy by which to “take the temperature” of the well-being of a wider populace in a given region. Chances are that in a society in which gender discrimination and ageism are largely absent, one will find a more liberal political culture and thereby a higher collective perception of well-being. The analysis of data in this volume uncovers and explores precisely these types of correlative presumptions. Typically,



historically disadvantaged population groups include the following:

- Preschool-age children and the elderly
- Women
- The poor
- Persons with serious physical or emotional disabilities
- Populations of “first” or “indigenous” peoples<sup>6</sup>
- Religious and sexual minorities
- Other population groups that have been socially excluded on the basis of race,
- Ethnicity, cultural, linguistic, or other characteristics over which they can exercise little or no control.

All societies include such groups of disadvantaged people. In fact, when historically disadvantaged persons (i.e., those who do not participate fully in the social, political, or economic main-streams of the societies of which they are a part) are counted as a single group, their numbers often constitute a majority of a given society’s population. Thus, a complete narrative of well-being and quality of life in a specific country or world region should incorporate an assessment of changes in well-being that have/have not occurred worldwide with respect to these often marginalized population groups. Accordingly, each author addresses the special situation that applies to the marginalized groups that exist in his or her region(s) of interest and analysis.

Furthermore, the authors discuss the significant public policy, legislative, or similar types of formal actions that have been taken within their respective world regions (and countries) to

advance the well-being of these traditionally marginalized populations. Such actions are symbolic of deliberate and *proactive* movement and dialogue; we would be hard pressed to see any advancement of well-being in these segments of society “by accident” or without purposeful, engaged, and enlightened leadership. The importance of collective mentality and mindset as shaped by the dominant belief systems of leaders cannot be overstated, despite the difficulty in quantitatively capturing such dynamics.

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## 6.4 Technology Indicators

Beginning in the 1960s, think tanks, networks, and institutions, such as the Club of Rome (CoR) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), were formed. One of their goals was to create platforms capable of capturing longitudinal data, identifying trends, and convening the results in a dialogue that would yield a plan for collective action in response to the dominant challenges to well-being of the time. Technology was a key area being tracked by these and other more specialized agencies (like the International Telecommunication Union).

Technology is a domain of study that is characterized by an unparalleled pace of change and is broad in scope not only in its definitions but also in its applications. The way technology has evolved actually affects the very act of observation of the trajectory of well-being over time. In this volume, the authors emphasize the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs), although the broad topic is essentially technological automation as a whole. From the first communication revolution that began in the nineteenth century with the telegraph, to the emergence of radio and satellite technology, to the third revolution encompassing the Internet and networking, technology has been a crucial interface between the key actors in any society. It is a domain that today, through the use of social media like Skype, Twitter, and Facebook, is transforming the way humans interact and impacting both the physical and the subjective

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<sup>6</sup>According to the United Nations, there are approximately 400 million Indigenous people [first peoples] worldwide, making up *more than 5000 distinct tribes*. Together [Indigenous peoples] are one of the largest minority groups in the world, spanning more than 90 countries. While Indigenous Peoples total only about 6 % of the world’s population, [they] represent 90 % of the cultural diversity. Indigenous Peoples hold 20 % of the Earth’s land mass. That land harbors 80 % of the world’s remaining biodiversity (First Peoples Worldwide n.d.).

quality of human life. It must, therefore, be appreciated as a domain that colors the analytical lens by virtue of its connective and transformational properties. That said, *everything* from the rudimentary technologies that support our capture of images, to the semiconductors that enable information processing and storage, to the telecommunications that allow mass dissemination of information, constitutes a quantum leap forward in our ability to recognize, synthesize, understand, and tell the story of well-being.


It is worth noting that, amid the extensive literature on the subject of technology, including topics such as the “digital divide” and “information society,” *technology often represents a mere proxy by which to express whether a society “has” or “has not” the critical infrastructure necessary to serve its greatest numbers well.* For hard-core technological determinists, the lack of technology (and synonymously the capital to develop or pay for it) is in itself a commentary on its developmental status, social structure, and cultural values. For others, like Orlikowski (1992), who espouse a softer view of determinism, technology is more of a recursive entity, created and changed by human action while being used by human actors to interact with the structures they create to govern. At his most idealistic, Robert Dahl (1996) believed that the liberal vision of a future hinges on the premise that increased technological communication spreads liberal principles and supports democratic change. Rosenau and Singh (2002) saw the emergence of technology as a means of allowing diffused forms of authority to emerge if the right conditions are present. Given the approach of this volume, it is likely that a more constructivist and reflexive view of technology as a domain will be useful. Thus, the view of technology as a synonym for Western liberal values and a “first world development paradigm” should be discarded outright.

The study of technology generates interesting results in terms of output indicators, both objective and subjective, input indicators, and equity indicators. The most straightforward and

commonly referenced data points in this domain are those referring to *equity* (e.g., gender ICT statistics; the World Economic Forum’s Networked Readiness Index; the International Telecommunication Union ICT Opportunity Index; the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ICT Diffusion Index). The *Networked Readiness Index*, measured on a scale from 1 (worst) to 7 (best), of the performance of 148 economies in leveraging information and communications technologies to boost competitiveness and well-being, represents one such snapshot (Fig. 6.12).

The theoretical underpinnings of these indicators represent a balance between whether one sees the increasing density of communication networks as a means of arriving at Deutsch’s (1963) notion of a “single community of humanity” or McLuhan’s (1964) “global village,” or whether technology as a whole, as in Jane Fountain’s (2002) characterization of it as the “nervous system of government,” may actually reinforce an inequitable status quo. Most of these indicators reflect the idea that “equity” and “inequity” derive from the teleological premise that less technological inequity is better or that equality is objectively desirable. It is useful to bear in mind Alleyne’s (1995) sharp distinction between the power of technology versus the power of the information and content that flows through the technology.

With respect to output indicators that are inherently subjective, increasing attention is paid to levels of individual human satisfaction with the new technologies that pervade our lives. For many who work in advanced Western capitalist nations, technology has infiltrated our lives to the point where our experiences with cognition, human expression, and everyday interactions are fully shaped by the tools we use to connect to one another. It would be fair to say that cognitive assessments of satisfaction in this life domain should and could play a significant role in life satisfaction or overall happiness. A number of studies present empirically based linkages that demonstrate the association between satisfaction



**Fig. 6.12** Networked readiness (Bilbao-Osorio et al. 2014) (Figure reprinted with kind permission of World Economic Forum, Switzerland)

with information technology in general and satisfaction with life.<sup>7</sup>

The debate around these sets of data is heated, with numerous counter-determinist arguments supported by data such as the following: Japan's economy between 1960 and the ensuing two decades was completely turned around as the nation moved toward becoming one of the most technologically sophisticated on the planet. The GDP quintupled, and unprecedented increases in per capita income occurred. Yet, "by the late 1980s, the Japanese said they were no happier

than they had been in 1960" (Surowiecki 2005). It is worth noting that research leaves as an open question the debate as to whether more (or better) technology makes people happier. This observation is consistent with parallel debates related to the correlations between income and human happiness. The fabric of human social capital is certainly *different* today than it was in the past, because society as a whole systematically digests great innovations and passes them off as old hat within a year or 2. Thus, the research described in this volume is timely and unique in that a technological domain must be viewed as one embedded in and intertwined with the historical narrative of each region of the world. In some ways, subjective views on technology are not a dramatic departure from the findings of Easterlin (2001), who first showed in the 1970s that increases in income over time are not correlated with increases in happiness. His observation is referred to as the "Easterlin paradox."

Indicators that refer to inhabitants or households can be considered *objective outputs*, the underlying assumption being that these are objec-

<sup>7</sup>Examples include:

- Globally focused sources like Brookings Global Economy and Development (<http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/global>), which themselves draw from multiple survey exercises.
- Studies like the VMware New Way Of Life (2013); a review of information technology sector trends and challenges by the BCS Chartered Institute for IT (2013) as well as standard polls and survey sources, including Gallup and the International Technology and Engineering Educators Association (2001, 2004), that routinely assess levels of satisfaction with technology in the United States.

tive representations in data that parallel levels of satisfaction with technology. Such indicators<sup>8</sup> tend to be generated by development or standards-setting organizations like the International Telecommunication Union or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Other indicators that are more macro in nature (e.g., total Internet subscriptions in a country, availability of digital subscriber lines, cable TV subscriptions in total, percentage of businesses with ten or more employees using the Internet) may be treated as *input indicators*—*data that tell the story of the landscape*. These indicators and data<sup>9</sup> capture quality of life at a level of society beyond that of the individual or household and in themselves tell a story of the impact of cables, fiber optics, pipes, and grids (and related policies and incentives for propagation) on the collective human consciousness.

Each chapter in this volume takes a deeper look into the dynamics of the sociopolitical, economic, and cultural histories of various parts of the world. Each of the core areas stemming from the Human Development Index method—including health, education, and income per capita—are areas that have been and continue to be deeply impacted by technology, just as in many ways the

exponential growth or scalability of service delivery is closely tied to some kind of technologically based innovation. From re-inventing channels for political participation, to providing information and transparency, to delivering financial access—regardless of whether assessments thereof are subjective or objective, nearly *every dimension of well-being today is affected by technology*. The ubiquity of mobile handsets is an example of how technology can affect well-being through a powerful multiplier effect unlike anything we have ever witnessed.

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## 6.5 The Balancing Act for Indicators and Data

The well-being data presented in this volume are *complementary in that some capture dimensions of quality of life that we would like to increase (enhancement of positive states), whereas others capture dimensions that we would like to decrease (reduction of negative states)*. That is, an effective well-being narrative about a specific country and world region uses indicators and data that capture both positive and negative states of quality of life. For example, domains concerning functional status or human suffering reflect negative states that should naturally be reduced. When these indicators are used in a quality-of-life index, they tend to be counterbalanced with indicators that capture positive states. This issue is important because well-being measures are designed to capture the comprehensive totality of life experiences, both positive and negative.

For example, Argyle (1996) argued that subjective well-being is determined by three factors: (1) happiness, (2) life satisfaction, and (3) absence of ill-being. He argued that subjective well-being cannot be experienced when people experience ill-being in the form of depression or anxiety. As in all analyses whose practical and theoretical foundations lie in a paradigm of “forward movement” over time, the implicit change that we as human beings are hardwired to desire is “progress” or some tangible manifestation of the inevitable and desired *positive* change that occurs with the passage of time.

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<sup>8</sup>Examples include:

- Access lines and access paths in total/per 100 inhabitants
- Mobile subscriptions in total/per 100 inhabitants
- Internet subscriptions
- Broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
- Households with access to a home computer
- Households with access to the Internet.

<sup>9</sup>Examples include:

- Number of ICT-related occupations in the total economy
- Share of ICT-related occupations in the total economy
- Telecommunication services revenue in total
- Mobile telecommunication services revenue
- Telecommunication infrastructure investment in total
- Share of ICT value added in specific business sectors
- ICT business research and development expenditures by selected ICT industries
- Share of ICT employment in business sector employment
- ICT-related patents as a percentage of national total
- Contributions of ICT investment to GDP growth.

One of the editors (Sirgy 2011) elaborated on the distinction between positive and negative states by equating this distinction with basic versus growth needs. That is, indicators reflecting positive states tend to focus on growth needs, whereas indicators focusing on negative states tend to reflect basic needs (Maslow 1954). Human development needs comprise a hierarchy of basic and growth needs. Health, safety, and economic needs are essentially basic needs (i.e., needs related to human survival). Social, esteem, actualization, knowledge, and aesthetics needs are growth needs (i.e., needs related to human flourishing). Basic needs are more pre-potent and salient than growth needs.

Hence, well-being indicators should capture the full spectrum of human development, both as a snapshot and as a process. For the less-developed countries, capturing well-being in terms of basic needs (i.e., indicators capturing the negative states) is more important than focusing on growth needs (i.e., indicators capturing the positive states). It is difficult to achieve growth needs without first attending to basic needs. Many well-being scholars have argued this point. For example, Veenhoven (1988, 1991) made the distinction between basic needs satisfaction and subjective well-being. People with higher income levels can easily satisfy their basic needs (food, housing, health) and therefore are more likely to focus on experiences that lead to higher levels of subjective well-being. The UNDP (2005) work on poverty equates poverty with disease; high rate of infant mortality; low average life expectancy; malnutrition; hunger; and lack of access to water, education, knowledge, public and private resources, housing, clothes, and security. Similarly, the HDI is the average of three human development dimensions: living standard (measured through GDP per capita), health (measured in terms of life expectancy at birth), and education (calculated through adult literacy for one-third and the average years of school enrollment of adults above 25 years for the remaining two-thirds). These indicators reflect negative states in the sense that they focus on basic needs.

To achieve a high level of quality of life, people have to satisfy the full spectrum of their

developmental needs—both basic and growth needs. Indicators capturing the full spectrum of needs satisfaction would allow for the assessment and monitoring of progress toward that end. Thus, well-being indicators should capture both basic and growth needs satisfaction. Indicators related to basic needs (negative states) may include (a) environmental pollution, (b) disease incidence, (c) crime, (d) housing, (e) unemployment, (f) poverty and homelessness, (g) cost of living, (h) community infrastructure, and (i) illiteracy and lack of job skills. In contrast, indicators related to growth needs (positive states) include (a) work productivity and income, (b) consumption of no basic goods and services, (c) leisure and recreational activities, (d) educational attainment, (e) community landscape, (f) population density and crowdedness, (g) arts and cultural activities, (h) intellectual activities, and (i) religious activities.

Many indicators projects are developed with a special focus on growth needs. For example, Lloyd and Auld (2002) and Michalos and Zumbo (2003) conducted an indicators project focused on leisure and its relationship to quality of life. Michalos (2005) conducted a data project focused exclusively on the arts and its relationship to quality of life (cf. Michalos and Kahlke 2008).

The discussions in the subsequent chapters attempt to capture the kinds of indicators discussed above—output indicators in the form of both subjective and objective data, input indicators, equity indicators, and technology indicators—in their world regional narrative *over time*. Well-being narratives are developed around these sets of indicators and are enriched with layers of culturally specific anecdotes that capture the unique ethos and spirit emanating from each history.

The subsequent chapters begin with an introduction describing the history and geography of each region. Each chapter attempts to capture the people's sense of personal happiness and life satisfaction over time. The data related to the personal happiness of the focal region are compared with data from other world regions and within the region. The authors link the *subjective reality* of well-being with the *objective reality* and note



consistencies and discrepancies between subjective and objective data. They also tackle the way societal institutions such as government, business, religious organizations, and nongovernment organizations have tried to promote the integration of both spheres of well-being assessment. The resulting narratives are guided by the macro-level indicators, the input indicators. Lastly, the authors describe contemporary efforts (and outcomes where possible) in advancing well-being within their regions of interest. Each chapter includes a summary of all the above (i.e., past and contemporary models and indicators systems used to describe and assess individual and collective well-being over time).

The selection of the particular output (both subjective and objective), input, equity, and technology indicators and data used to illustrate the changes in well-being within a specific world region is guided by a specific conceptualization of well-being that is appropriate to the authors' analyses and points of view. The resulting variations are to be expected given the historical differences (past and present) that characterize the social, cultural, philosophical, and religious foundations of well-being in each world region. In each case, the authors use a unified conceptual framework in their selection of output (both subjective and objective), input, equity, and technology indicators for their analyses. Such frameworks are rooted in the histories of their regions as well as in the regions' contemporary aspirations for advancing individual and collective well-being. Needless to say, the picture of well-being is highly fluid and temporal, changing form and substance as one takes a virtual flight from continent to continent.

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## 6.6 Conclusions

We have attempted to introduce the basic concepts commonly used to analyze and measure well-being. We discuss how societal-level data capturing well-being are traditionally constructed, with indicators reflecting the desired states of the human condition as reflected in both subjective and objective output indicators. In

contrast to subjective and objective data of the final desired states, input indicators and data reflect institutional efforts designed to influence both subjective and objective terminal states (i.e., output of the human condition). These include health care (e.g., number of physicians per 1000 households), infrastructure (e.g., government expenditures on roads, bridges, telecommunications, water and sanitary systems, electric power), law enforcement and security (e.g., number of police per 1000 households), and so on. The end of each chapter in this volume will include a series of graphs and tables that graphically depict a consistent assessment of comparable HDI-based datasets across all regions and continents.

We also discussed equity indicators, which focus on the well-being of historically disadvantaged groups. The analysis of societal progress cannot be complete without an assessment of progress in such groups. For example, what is the quality of life of women in a particular country? Has their quality of life improved over time? How does the quality of life of women in that country compare to that of women in other countries? The chapters that deal with different regions of the world highlight such progress. We also have a chapter devoted to women and well-being (Chap. 16). Addressing societal inequities and disparities is extremely important, given the fact that much civil strife is directly related to how society treats its historically disadvantaged groups. The importance of equity and the need to measure equity in society are of paramount importance in eradicating inequity and disparities.

A complete assessment of well-being in a given country must include how that country uses technology to enhance the quality of life of its citizenry. In this context, we described how quality-of-life researchers traditionally measure societal progress in the use of technology in terms of subjective indicators (i.e., satisfaction with mobile communications, satisfaction with the use of the Internet), objective indicators (e.g., number of mobile phones per 1000 household, degree of access to the Internet), and landscape indicators (e.g., number of Internet service providers per 100,000 households, country level percentage coverage of mobile communications).

Well-being in 2015 is about more than simply alleviating stress and reducing pain in aggregate human terms. The measurement of societal well-being should capture those aspects of life that make life worth living—the positive aspects that emanate from fulfillment, social capital and human community in the context of a world capable of supporting basic human needs for the greatest number possible. Hence, a comprehensive picture of well-being of a country or a world region has to include those aspects of society related to the reduction of ill-being and those aspects related to enhancement of well-being.

Whereas rigorous analytic method will champion the importance of granularity in data that reports on relativistic measures focused mostly on the capture of disparities, this volume strives also to achieve a narrative that is equally capable of capturing “the bigger picture.” A lens capable of and committed to appreciating the absolute, aggregate improvements in the state of humanity over time, particularly in the post-World War II era, is a part of the mission of this research. In some ways, this lens draws from the thought leadership of theoretical pioneers like David Cooperrider, whose innovations in the school of “appreciative inquiry” have helped transform the way questions are asked and analysis is undertaken. This approach requires a conscious, intentional move in formulating research questions about well-being that focus beyond “problems” and “problem solving” (which is often the take of development literature) and into the wholesale embrace of *the best of what is*, in each part of the world. This approach will hopefully transcend any critiques of perceived “blind optimism” through the counterbalance of the sheer qualitative and quantitative expertise convened in the author pool of this volume, while honoring still the positive intentions of those who have initiated and sponsored the origins of this research.

We hope that the reader now has a better appreciation of how quality-of-life and well-being researchers measure societal progress and well-being and is now in a position to make full use of the information presented in the chapters that follow.

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## Part III

# Regional Analyses of the History and Contemporary State of Well-Being Since World War II

*A good man is one who rejoices in the well-being of others. (Arab Proverb)*

*My interest is not data, it's the world. And part of world development you can see in numbers. Others, like human rights, empowerment of women, it's very difficult to measure in numbers. (Hans Rosling – Provost, C. (2013, May 17). Hans Rosling: the man who's making data cool. [Interview and video]. Theguardian. [Web site]. <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/may/17/hans-rosling-data-population-fertility>. Accessed 6 February 2016.)*

*Our modern lifestyle is not a political creation. Before 1700, everybody was poor as hell. Life was short and brutish. It wasn't because we didn't have good politicians; we had some really good politicians. But then we started inventing – electricity, steam engines, microprocessors, understanding genetics and medicine and things like that. Yes, stability and education are important – I'm not taking anything away from that – but innovation is the real driver of progress. (Bill Gates – Goodell, J. (2014, March 13). Bill Gates: The Rolling Stone Interview: The richest man in the world explains how to save the planet. <http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/bill-gates-the-rolling-stone-interview-20140313>. Accessed 6 February 2016.)*



**Ak'b'al** – *Third day of the Maya calendar*. Mixed media on paper—22" × 30". © 2015 Lylia Forero Carr. Used with permission.



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# New Beginnings in an Ancient Region: Well-Being in Sub-Saharan Africa

# 7

Valerie Møller and Benjamin Roberts

*“Happiness is not perfected until it is shared”*

*(African Proverb)*

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## 7.1 Introduction

Sub-Saharan Africa is unique in that it is the cradle of humankind and we all have ancestors from the continent. In prehistory, it was the central continent from which Asia and the Americas split off. Some 100,000 years ago, the first anatomically modern humans left the continent; their descendants returned as strangers in the 1500s (Oppenheimer 2003). Meanwhile, the people who remained in sub-Saharan Africa experienced a turbulent history. They survived times of feast and famine, slavery, colonialism, and exploitation, all of which will have shaped myths of origin, self-esteem, and values and aspirations that influence evaluations of present-day well-being (Fig. 7.1).

Today, sub-Saharan Africa is home to some 926 million people living in 49 countries (see Map 7.1). Given the length of time that humans have lived on the continent, it has the world’s greatest language and genetic diversity. An estimated 3,000 languages—300 in Nigeria alone—are spoken. Many Africans speak several languages, an indigenous local language as well as a common one, which is

often a colonial-era language adopted as their country’s official language after independence.

The region is bounded by the Sahara Desert in the north and by the Atlantic and Indian Oceans and the Red Sea on three sides. Many states are landlocked. This isolation meant that many earlier technologies developed in other parts of the world did not reach Africa until later.

The region also features a wide range of climatic conditions. The tropical belt in Central Africa gives way to more temperate savannah grasslands and desert landscapes on either side. Habitable regions are limited and rainfall is erratic. There is a high burden of disease, mainly in the tropical belt.

Sub-Saharan Africa is rich in minerals. It boasts great plant and animal biodiversity and even a unique plant kingdom on the southern tip of the continent.

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## 7.2 Tracing Well-Being in Sub-Saharan Africa

There is a dearth of reliable written evidence on African well-being in ancient times. The archaeological record is the main source of information on the early history of the continent. In sub-Saharan Africa, genealogy and history have been transmitted orally from generation to generation. The first written records on sub-Saharan well-being saw Africa through the lens of out-

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AFRICA



Map 7.1 Regional map of Africa (CIA 2015; public domain)

siders, mainly traders, explorers, and adventurers, who produced assessments of the continent’s material and developmental successes and failures from their points of view. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ethnologists

and also missionaries conducted more scholarly studies of African customs and life styles and collected oral histories from Africans. It is only with the advent of the social indicators movement in the 1960s (see Chap. 6), that African



**Fig. 7.1** Mambila protective statue, artist unknown, c. nineteenth to twentieth century, Donga Valley, Nigeria/Cameroon. Musée du quai Branly, Paris. Inventory no.: 73-1986-1-88 (Photo by Siren-Com; [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Statuette\\_Mambia\\_Nig%C3%A9ria.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Statuette_Mambia_Nig%C3%A9ria.jpg); Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported)

well-being has been measured systematically and captured in a range of both subjective and objective indicators and indices. Subjective indicators rely on an individual's own judgement whereas objective measures are factual information. We draw on both objective and subjective indicators to trace trends in well-being to give a rounded picture of quality of life. To date, the collection of social indicators in Africa has been carried out mainly under the auspices of international organizations, and there have been problems with data quality and unequal coverage of all countries in the region. More recently, home-grown monitoring initiatives have gained momentum. The Afrobarometer launched its first survey in 1999 and now covers some 31 sub-Saharan countries. The barometer's main focus is on material well-being and the deepening of democracy; its proxy

measure of "lived poverty" serves as its measure of well-being (Mattes 2008).

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### 7.3 Chapter Outline

We first present a time line of different historical periods in sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>1</sup> Then we describe reference standards that relate to African well-being during these historical periods. We examine trends in well-being and concentrate on progress made in achieving greater prosperity since the time of independence. We focus on three domains of life considered to be universal drivers of well-being: health, education, and income. Good health may be considered a basic condition for human life; education and instruction is a means of adapting to and securing a livelihood in a given environment; and income and access to resources create opportunities to cover basic needs and gain power and prestige. We also examine further sociopolitical challenges for sub-Saharan Africa. Lastly, we review trends in subjective well-being: how people evaluate their own lives. In conclusion, we review main findings and discuss what might enhance future quality of life in the region.

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### 7.4 Looking Back in Time

Historians often distinguish between periods that afforded the people living in Africa different life chances that impacted on well-being: ancient times, the age of discovery, the Atlantic slave trade, the colonial period, and independence. We consider population growth as an indicator of well-being in each period. Throughout history, Africa's population growth has been subjected to the interrelated constraints of food production, availability of labor, fertility, and disease.

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<sup>1</sup>Reader (1997) is one of the main sources used in this section.



### 7.4.1 “The World Until Yesterday”<sup>2</sup>

Initially, all humans were nomadic hunter-gatherers who obtained most of their food from wild plants and animals. Foragers survived longer in sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere, and their subsistence mode of life was one of humanity’s most successful adaptations. Technical advances, such as the weighted digging stick that aided foraging and arrow tips and spear heads that allowed people to hunt rather than scavenge for meat, were likely prompted by threats to food security during times of scarcity (Reader 1997: 153). In time, some of these groups became herders and agriculturalists. The predominantly agriculturalist Bantu (meaning “people”) slowly moved from their cradleland in West Africa across the continent and down the eastern coast of sub-Saharan Africa. They brought iron-smelting technology with them that revolutionized agricultural production. By 200–300 Common Era (CE), Bantu-speaking farmers had reached the southern tip of the continent in the area around present-day Cape Town where they gradually displaced San (Bushmen) hunter-gatherers and the Khoi pastoralists (Wilson 2009). As a consequence, the Bantu language group, one of five main language groups in Africa, became dominant in large areas of sub-Saharan Africa.

### 7.4.2 Ancient Sub-Saharan Africa: 2000 Before the Common Era to 500 CE

Early African history is mainly recorded in the archaeological evidence. Ancient sub-Saharan Africa was essentially an unknown territory, often referred to as “darkest” Africa. However, the archaeological records tell of early civilizations that date back to 2000 Before the Common Era (BCE). In East Africa, the Nubian Kushite are believed to be the first people to have made practical use of iron. In West Africa, the agricultural civilization of Nok that emerged in present-



**Fig. 7.2** Character with chin resting on his knee, artist unknown, c. 500 BCE. Nok sculpture, Nigeria (Photo by Marie-Lan Nguyen; public domain; [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e2/Nok\\_sculpture\\_Louvre\\_70-1998-11-1.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e2/Nok_sculpture_Louvre_70-1998-11-1.jpg))

day northern Nigeria, produced terracotta sculpture (500 BCE–200 CE) of high quality (Fig. 7.2). The Niger River was one of the most fertile areas that gave rise to civilizations located in present-day Mali as early as 250 BCE. Its inhabitants produced food surpluses of dried fish, grains, and oil that could be exchanged for essential goods, such as salt, through the trans-Saharan trade route (History of Sub-Saharan Africa 2015).

### 7.4.3 Ancient Sub-Saharan Africa: 500–1500 CE

Recent archaeological excavations have produced evidence of complex societies in West, East, and Southern Africa that prospered for several centuries.

In West Africa, a succession of powerful kingdoms emerged in the fertile areas between the Senegal and Niger rivers and later in the tropical

<sup>2</sup>The title of Jared Diamond’s (2012) work on traditional societies.

coastal forest regions. One example is the ancient settlement of Jenne-jeno, situated on the fertile inland delta of the Niger River southwest of Timbuktu<sup>3</sup> in present-day Mali. Jenne-jeno's inhabitants, farmers, pastoralists, and fishermen, made use of the annual flood regime to live in a loose symbiotic society. The farmers cultivated indigenous rice varieties that are still grown in the region today. At its height in CE 800, the Niger inland delta may have supported a population of some 27,000.

In East Africa, the ancient Kingdom of Kush was situated on the island of Meroë where the Blue Nile and the White Nile meet in present-day Sudan. In the eighth century BCE, the Kushite kings had ruled as the pharaohs of the 25th Ethiopian Dynasty. A later Ethiopian civilization, Aksum, took advantage of high altitude and a nearby port to become a socially stratified settlement that prospered for several centuries. At its zenith in 500 CE, it had some 20,000 inhabitants. The Kushite rulers devised a script based on Egyptian symbols and constructed the Sudan Meroë pyramids, which have been declared a UNESCO heritage site. Aksum was also a literate society of its day that erected monumental stele.

In southern Africa, the pastoralists of Mapungubwe (ca. 900–1250 CE) and Great Zimbabwe (ca. 1275–1550 CE) took advantage of fertile grasslands to grow large settlements that were socially stratified and had far-flung trade relations.

The sub-Saharan civilizations and kingdoms can be classified as Christian, Islamic, and traditional African religions. Aksum was the first civilization to convert to Christianity after 300 CE, about the same time as Rome. Muslim influence came along the trade routes that crossed the Sahara Desert to commercial centers such as Timbuktu in present-day Mali and went down the east coast of Africa where Arab traders founded city states, including Mombasa, Zanzibar, and Kilwa. The civilizations and dispersed settlements of southern Africa are traditional in the

sense of traditional indigenous religions (History of Sub-Saharan Africa 2015).

The glory of Africa's ancient past is still reflected in the names chosen by the modern states of Ghana, Mali, and Zimbabwe. Where the circumstances were opportune, population numbers in ancient sub-Saharan Africa grew and people flourished. However, the majority of the population still lived in dispersed settlements as agriculturalists and pastoralists.

#### 7.4.4 Age of Explorers: Fifteenth Century

When Europeans set out to explore Africa in the fifteenth century, they had no idea they would be returning to the land of their forebears. It was only 500 years later that genetic evidence authenticated the African Eve, who was featured on the covers of *Newsweek* and *Time* magazines in January 1987.

The Portuguese began their exploration of the Atlantic west coast in the mid-fifteenth century. Their aim was to find a trade route to Asia that circumvented the Mediterranean route controlled by Venetian and Saracen traders. A lucrative trade was established on the west coast. In time, trade items included gold, ivory, diamonds, animal hides, bananas, palm oil, and the cola that was to become the main ingredient in the soft drink that conquered the world to spread "shared happiness." Slaves were one of the most sought-after trade items. The names given to the coastline on ancient maps identify what West Africa had to offer: the *Grain Coast* in today's Liberia (referring to an African species of pepper known as grains of paradise), the *Ivory Coast*, the *Gold Coast* (today's Ghana), and the *Slave Coast* (Benin and Nigeria). Trading was mainly limited to the coastal area. Each Portuguese expedition moved further along the coast of Africa. The Portuguese erected stone crosses wherever they landed, strung along the coast of the continent "like charms on a necklace" (Reader 1997: 383), but they did not venture into the interior. Africa's unnavigable rivers, vividly portrayed in Joseph Conrad's (Conrad 1985) novel, *Heart of*

<sup>3</sup>Timbuktu was to become famous for its ancient manuscripts written in Arabic in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.



*Darkness*, presented a formidable deterrent. The mission of discovering a trade route to Asia was accomplished when Vasco da Gama finally circumnavigated the Cape of Good Hope and sailed up the east coast of Africa and on to India in 1499. His expedition discovered that Arab merchants had already established a trading presence on the east coast of Africa; reportedly their dhows in the Zambezi delta were laden with gold dust.

In later centuries, the Portuguese introduced new crops to some parts of Africa, such as maize, that was easier to grow than traditional sorghum and millet, which increased food security in sub-Saharan Africa. They also traded firearms, although one of the earlier popes forbade placing weapons in the hands of heathens.

#### **7.4.5 The Atlantic and East Coast Slave Trade: Sixteenth to Nineteenth Centuries**

The Atlantic slave trade, which lasted from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, fed the European appetite for sugar. The majority of slaves brought to the New World were used to produce this labor-intensive crop. Initially, the Portuguese were given the near monopoly of the slave trade; later they were joined by other European traders, mainly the British, French, and Dutch (The Transatlantic Slave Trade 2008). Slaves were obtained from along the west coast of Africa with the full and active cooperation of African kings and merchants (Boddy-Evans 2014). In Africa, as elsewhere on the globe, slavery was a common practice at that time. Historians note that slavery in African cultures was more like indentured servitude, and slave-status was not always permanent. Unlike the slaves shipped to the Americas, an individual enslaved in Africa could be emancipated or might escape or be traded back to his own people (The Transatlantic Slave Trade 2008).

It is estimated that up to 12 million African slaves were transported from the west coast of Africa, stretching from Senegal to Angola, to the New World. The most notorious slave route was known as the middle passage. The conditions of

transport were appalling, and large numbers died en route. Slaves were tightly packed into the holds of ships just like any other type of cargo (The Transatlantic Slave Trade 2008).

The British abolished the slave trade in 1807 but not slavery itself until 1833 (Griffiths 1994: 46). By that time, the slave economy was so well established in West Africa that it could not grind to a halt immediately, and slaves continued to be used to work plantations. Ships still involved in the slave trade who attempted to break the British blockade were seized, and Africans on board the ships were freed (The Transatlantic Slave Trade 2008). The relief expressed by a rescued slave testifies to the damage done to body and soul by the Atlantic slave trade. He recalled, “They took off all the fetters from our feet, and threw them into the water, and they gave us clothes so that we might cover our nakedness, they opened the water casks, that we might drink water to the full, and we also ate food, till we had enough.” (Iliffe 1995: 148).

The Arab slave trade on the east coast of Africa focused on Zanzibar, an ancient intersection for trade and cultural exchange between Africa and the East that predated the arrival of the Portuguese. Unlike their European counterparts, Arab slave traders penetrated deeply into the hinterland (Griffiths 1994: 46). Some historians refer to the East Coast slave trade as *Maafa*, which means “holocaust” or “great disaster” in Swahili (The Transatlantic Slave Trade 2008). In time, sub-Saharan Africa was caught in a pincer of slave raids from the east and west into the interior that displaced whole villages. Many of the ethnic groups known today probably originated in flights from the slaving wars of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In summary, the Atlantic slave trade caused distress and dispersions in sub-Saharan Africa. The impact on individual well-being varied: A minority of African kings and traders profited while the lives of millions of slaves were made miserable. Possibly its most negative effect for the region as a whole was that it exported from Africa the many hands needed there to provide food security. During the period of slavery, the populations of Europe and the Americas grew

exponentially while the population of Africa remained stagnant.

#### 7.4.6 Scramble for Africa: 1800s

*Whatever happens, we have got  
The Maxim Gun, and they have not.* (Belloc 1907)

In 1876, King Leopold II of Belgium (1825–1909) hosted the Geographical Conference of Brussels to present his vision of bringing civilization to a part of the globe that had not yet been penetrated. A few years later in 1884–1885, the European powers met in Berlin to construct the rules for spheres of influence in Africa. King Leopold held the trump cards for dividing the spoils and claimed the Congo for himself while Portugal, Britain, France, Italy, and Germany divided the rest of Africa among themselves. Thus, Leopold became the Sovereign of the Congo Free State without informing the Congolese people. African leaders had not been invited to attend the Berlin Conference in 1884–1885, nor were they consulted (Reader 1997: 581).

By the time the scramble for Africa was over, Meredith (2011: 2) notes that “some 10,000 African polities had been amalgamated into 40 European colonies and protectorates.” The only two regions to avoid conquest were Ethiopia, whose absolute independence and the sovereignty of its emperor were recognised in a treaty of 1896, and Liberia, which was founded by the American Colonization Society as a home for freed slaves (Moss 2011). Medical and technological advances gave Europeans the upper hand. The discovery of quinine as a prophylactic for malaria in the 1850s made military operations possible even in badly malaria-infested areas. The Maxim machine gun, patented in 1884, gave superior fire power to the signatories of the Brussels Convention of 1890, who had agreed not to sell weapons to Africans.

African leaders who resisted were killed or captured and deported. Rural families, the majority of the African population, had little choice in the matter. Reader (1997, p. 616) noted that where circumstances were oppressive, such as in

areas where slavery persisted, people may even have welcomed the prospect of a brighter future under European domination. Elsewhere on the continent, resistance to colonial rule was crushed by force or attrition.

Famine and pestilence may have weakened resistance to conquest. Between 1870 and 1895, most of sub-Saharan Africa experienced exceptional rainfalls and abundant harvests. The time of plenty was followed by a period of drought and famine of biblical proportions; outbreaks of cholera and typhus; and a smallpox epidemic. Sand fleas introduced to Angola from Brazil spread across the continent and locusts destroyed crops. The rinderpest, brought to sub-Saharan Africa by Italian forces, killed over 90 % of all cattle in Africa between 1889 and the early 1900s. It is described as one of the greatest natural calamities to befall the African continent. The epidemic swept away the wealth of tropical Africa and ruined the pastoralist aristocrats. The loss of cattle, a form of wealth that signified both power and prestige, dealt a blow to pride and dignity. A captain assigned to establish a British colonial presence in East Africa noted in his diary that without “this awful visitation, the advent of the white man had not else been so peaceful” (Davies 1979: 17). Later insubordination to colonial rule in other areas was brutally crushed and introduced man-made famine and the destruction of herds and way of life, as in the case of the Herero and Nama rebellions in German South-West Africa (1904–1905) and Maji-Maji rebellions in German East Africa (1905–1906) (Pakenham 1992: 602–628).

#### 7.4.7 Bringing “Civilization” to Sub-Saharan Africa

*The missionary says that we are the children of  
God like our white brothers ... but just look at us.  
Dogs, slaves, worse than baboons on the rocks ...  
that is how you treat us.* A Herero to a German settler (Pakenham 1992: 602)

The colonialists’ civilizing project was essentially a commercial venture. A whole generation of Africans bore the brunt of the colonial incur-

sions. Under colonial rule, the African population was obliged to give up land, accede to European demands for labor, accept the initiatives of a cash economy, pay taxes, and submit to foreign law. One of the worst known cases of exploitation during the colonial period took place on the rubber concessions in King Leopold's Belgian Congo. Instead of paying state taxes, villagers in concession areas collected rubber to be used in the production of Michelin tires. The wild rubber supplies were soon exhausted so that villagers struggled to fulfill their quotas. Those who could not were flogged, imprisoned, or even shot. Soldiers cut off the hands of those they shot to prove they had not wasted cartridges. Entire regions of the Congo were depopulated as a result of this practice. Technical and agricultural advances were instrumental in halting the carnage: The Kodak roll-film camera produced photographic evidence of the atrocities that raised public outrage in Europe, and cultivated latex produced in other parts of the world made harvesting of wild rubber uneconomical (Pakenham 1992: 585–601; Reader 1997: 574–580).

#### 7.4.8 Colonial Rule in the Twentieth Century

Initially, the colonies had to be supported by grants; they only became economically self-sufficient by around 1914. There are mixed reports on the influence of colonial rule on the well-being of sub-Saharan Africa people during the later period. Exploitation of labor continued in the gold and diamond mines of southern Africa, where the migrant labor system disrupted family life. But in other areas, colonial administration became more competent and efficient over time and produced benefits of improved infrastructure; hygiene; and agricultural, health, and educational services for select groupings of peoples. The law and order introduced by Europeans brought peace to some areas formerly plagued by strife between neighbors (Diamond 2012).

However, the most harmful lasting legacy of the colonial period in Africa is undisputed. All of the boundaries of present-day sub-Saharan states

are artificial. Africa was carved up without regard to geography, ethnicity, and cultural distinctions. Nearly half of the new boundaries were “geometric lines, lines of latitude and longitude or other straight lines” (Meredith 2011: 491). Present-day states in sub-Saharan Africa have inherited problems of access to ports, security, and economic stability. The roads and railways that stop at the colonial borders have accelerated fragmentation rather than establishing communication networks in Africa.

Despite the so-called civilizing efforts under colonial rule and the introduction of more productive crops and labor-saving technology, Africa had not reached its full growth potential during this period. By 1900 the population of Africa was about 129 million, an increase from 49 million in 1500. During the same 400 years, the world population, excluding Africa, had increased fourfold, from just under 500 million to almost 2,000 million.

#### 7.4.9 “Wind of Change”<sup>4</sup>: 1960s

By the end of the Second World War, the ideological basis for colonialism had been fundamentally weakened, and the socioeconomic power of European powers had deteriorated. The small but influential African elite that had been educated abroad was agitating for African self-government and independence. The time had come for the European powers, beginning with Sudan in 1956 and Ghana in 1957, to decolonize their possessions in sub-Saharan Africa. Decolonization in the 1960s was achieved with varying degrees of violence. Resistance to local political emancipation was greatest in colonies where there was a large settler population as in Kenya and in the so-called settler states in the south: South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia. These conflicts proved highly destructive to the economic and social bases of the countries involved.

<sup>4</sup>Referring to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's milestone “wind of change” address to the South African parliament in 1960.

### 7.4.10 Independence: 1970s to 1990s

In the first two decades following independence, most states in sub-Saharan Africa adopted a single-party system and discouraged democratic opposition. Ostensibly this approach was defended on the basis of creating national unity and political harmony among disparate groups (Meredith 2011). However, the single-party state failed to deliver on political stability. In the five decades of independence, there were more than 106 military coups, averaging more than 20 a decade in the 1970s and 1980s (see Griffiths 1994: 80–83). Foreign powers often played a prominent role—particularly France, who launched 46 military operations in its former colonies between 1960 and 2005. Political instability often led to violent conflict on the continent. During the period 1950–2002, 45 military conflicts occurred in the region.

In January 1989, urban crowds, composed primarily of students and unpaid civil servants, marched in protest on the streets of Benin’s cities. The Benin protestors, who eventually overthrew their authoritarian ruler Mathieu Kérékou, signalled a new phase in African history. Between 1989 and 1994, 38 sub-Saharan African states held competitive elections (Ilfie 1995: 299); 33 of the region’s 42 undemocratic states saw an increase in civil liberties in the period 1988–1992 (Ndulu and O’Connell 1999: 49). Military coups became less common on the continent—numbering fewer than 10 during the 2000s—and elections became more familiar. Racial oppression by the White south ended, and political rights were finally obtained by the black Africans in Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990), and South Africa (1994).<sup>5</sup>

Since the overthrow of Mathieu Kérékou, the subcontinent has been part of significant political transition away from authoritarianism. The region is part of what Samuel Huntington called the third wave of democratization, a period beginning in the late 1980s when many authoritarian

regimes underwent a democratic transition (Diamond 2002).

To summarize, the transition to democracy in many states of sub-Saharan Africa in the last half of the twentieth century opened up new opportunities for prosperity in the region. The later colonial period had laid some of the foundations that the post-independent states could build on to improve health, education, income, and self-governance in Africa south of the Sahara in the second half of the century.

### 7.4.11 Africa Rising: Twenty-First Century

In May 2000, *The Economist* presented Africa as “The Hopeless Continent” on its cover. In a complete about-turn, the December 2011 cover of *The Economist* featured “Africa Rising,” which has since become the latest catchword for Africa’s prospects of earning a place in the global economy. The narrative speaks of economic growth, investment opportunities, regional markets, and an emergent middle class. New trends were thought to drive change in Africa: a more youthful and affluent population, rapid urbanization, technological changes and innovation, and agricultural potential. For the first time in history, sub-Saharan Africa was poised to realize its full economic potential, which could translate into prospective gains in well-being.

## 7.5 The Sub-Saharan Quest for Well-Being

*The heroism of African history is to be found not in the deeds of kings but in the struggles of ordinary people against the forces of nature and the cruelty of men.* (Ilfie 1987: 1)

Many African values and virtues that nurture well-being have their roots in the early history of the continent. The people living on the subcontinent have frequently had to fight against the natural elements and foreign conquest to survive. As a consequence, the African concept of well-being is based on kinship solidarity, collective prosperity,

<sup>5</sup>For a brief description of this process, see Ilfie (1995: 283–287) and Meredith (2011: 265–283).

and an egalitarian ethic that precludes internecine strife.

### 7.5.1 Community Cohesiveness

Kinship has been the dominant social structure in sub-Saharan Africa as illustrated by the opening proverb that states that happiness must be shared (Fig. 7.3). For most of early history, sub-Saharan Africans lived in smaller groups of nomadic foragers, pastoralists, and agriculturalists. Foragers need to travel light, so being limited to few material possessions was critical for nomadic well-being. Mobility was an important strategy to make optimal use of poor soils, seasonal changes in rainfall, and annual disease patterns as well as to avoid competition for scarce food and other resources. Marriage and exchange relations between kinship groups provided an additional degree of food security. Chieftains with larger followings emerged only when sub-Saharan Africans became agriculturalists and pastoralists; the power of chiefs grew under colonial rule only where they assisted as junior



**Fig. 7.3** *Family*, J. Ndandarika, 1975, Harare, Zimbabwe. Private collection, Møller

administrators and with the British policy of divide and rule.

### 7.5.2 An Egalitarian Ethic

Citadels and large monuments, the hallmarks of great civilizations according to Mumford (1961), are conspicuous mainly by their absence in many of Africa's early civilizations. Larger civilizations, such as the Kush in Sudan and the Aksum in Ethiopia, were the exception rather than the rule. The lack of coercive social hierarchies in early African civilizations, best exemplified by the West African inland-delta settlement of Jenne-jeno on the Niger (see Sects. 7.4.2 and 7.4.3), might be regarded as an adaptation to African conditions of extreme uncertainty where all hands were needed to survive. One explanation offered for the decline of Aksum refers to excessive consumption by its elite, evidence of which is seen in archaeological artefacts.

### 7.5.3 African Ubuntu

The African philosophy of *ubuntu* or humanness (Metz 2014) may be considered a legacy from earlier times when survival depended on kinship (Fig. 7.4). The communitarian ethic aims to promote community welfare and congenial shared living. All individuals born into a community are implicated in a web of moral obligations, commitments, and duties to be fulfilled in pursuit of general welfare. Molema (Gyekye 2011) noted that “the greatest happiness and good of the tribe was the end and aim of each member of the tribe.” Similarly, the anthropologist Monica Wilson (Gyekye 2011) observed that “the basis of morality is fulfilment of obligation to kinsmen and neighbours, and living in amity with them.” To this day, the domains of life related to family and community relationships are important for the well-being of people living in sub-Saharan Africa.



**Fig. 7.4** Ubuntu—“Wisdom circle.”  
Artist: Jackson Hlungwane, Mbokota,  
South Africa. Illustration of the Photo  
Archive BPA.60, Erika Sutter, Basler  
Afrika Bibliographien (Used with  
permission)



### 7.5.4 Religion and Resilience

Religious beliefs and practice are an integral part of life in Africa that have played an important role in nurturing resilience and coping skills in times of adversity. Traditional religious beliefs in the ancestors, who guard over the welfare of their descendants, are still important to many people in sub-Saharan Africa. In the 1960s, expectations that traditional African beliefs and rituals would cease to be observed when rural Shona people migrated to the cities in contemporary Zimbabwe proved to be unfounded (see Gelfand 1968). Although Christianity is dominant in large areas of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in urban areas, the number of Africa’s professed Christians, who also observe their traditional beliefs and customs, may be underreported in official statistics. The church currently plays an important role in many domains of life. For example, the African Independent Churches that split off from South Africa’s mainline Christian churches in the nineteenth century have assisted rural people to adapt to urban life in the twentieth century. Many of these churches go by the name of Ethiopian with reference to Africa’s first Christians, who never came under colonial rule. More recently, Africa’s emergent middle class has turned to the Pentecostal and Evangelical churches for fellowship, mutual support, and prosperity.

Muslim beliefs and practices, introduced by Arab traders in Islamic states in ancient times,

continue to play a central role in the well-being of people in the northern-most areas of sub-Saharan and on the east coast of Africa. Pious Sufis, the mystical element of Islam (see Chap. 15), were mainly responsible for convincing Africans to convert to Islam—apparently without resorting to the sword. However, the religious divide between Christians and Muslims within the state boundaries inherited from the colonial era has caused serious socioeconomic and socio-political conflicts, as in the case of Nigeria, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. In particular, religious tensions between Muslim fundamentalists and Muslims belonging to the predominant, more tolerant form of Islam practised in Africa have caused political instability.

### 7.5.5 Conservatism and Self-Reliance

Africa’s isolation and climatic conditions have favored conservatism but also self-reliance. Innovations travel faster along degrees of latitude where they can take root because conditions tend to be more similar than those at different degrees of longitude (Diamond 1998). Many innovations bypassed the subcontinent; others proved to be unsuitable or detrimental to prosperity. For example, trade with Africa that would have brought innovations up the Nile was largely one-sided in favor of ancient Egypt. In

the west, the Saharan salt trade brought high-quality salt to the Sahel region of West Africa but it may also have supported indigenous slavery; porters on the last stretch of the trade route were often enslaved. As for unsuitable innovations, there was little incentive for animal husbandry in earlier times given the abundance of wild animals for protein and the few animals that could be domesticated. For example, the horses brought by Portuguese traders to West Africa did not live long. Domestic animals imported to Africa were susceptible to disease, and providing fodder for them was not cost-efficient. Similarly, the wheel was not suitable for Africa's rough terrain.

### 7.5.6 Peaceful Coexistence Alongside Violence

The Garden of Eden myth of Africa implies that sub-Saharan Africa was peaceful until it came into contact with external influences. Conflict-avoidance between groups occupying the same space seems to have been commonplace. For example, Bantu agriculturalists and pastoralists lived as neighbors with hunter-gatherers on the East African highlands. Archaeological evidence suggests that iron was used for food-production technology rather than for weaponry; food was of paramount importance for survival at the time. The wealth of the great civilizations of Aksum in Ethiopia, the Niger inland-delta, and southern Africa's Mapungubwe and Great Zimbabwe was derived from trade rather than conquest. Initially, a papal edict prohibited weapons being traded for goods by the first Portuguese explorers, but firearms later became a medium of exchange for slaves in West Africa. The subsequent introduction of guns that were easier to load and whose ignition did not light up at night increased the terror of slave raids (see Reader 1997: 143 ff.).

Although it may be expedient to blame outsiders for introducing violence to sub-Saharan Africa, there can be no doubt that violence and warfare were commonplace in early African history. Slavery was a common practice in

sub-Saharan Africa as was the case in other parts of the world at the time. Local chiefs and merchants collaborated with the Atlantic and the Arab slave traders. On the other hand, oral accounts, for example among the !Kung of the Kalahari, suggest that intergroup warfare may actually have been suppressed under colonial rule and did not reoccur thereafter (Diamond 2012). In the 1950s and 1960s, the response to colonial oppression during the transition to independence was often violent. The Mau Mau insurrection in Kenya is just one example. Currently, one of the main challenges for the new independent governments of sub-Saharan Africa has been to guarantee the safety and security of citizens after decades of colonial rule and suppression of civil rights.

## 7.6 Indicators of Well-Being

The wind of change that swept through the continent in the 1960s raised expectations for the material benefits of freedom. In this section we review whether hopes for a better life have been fulfilled in sub-Saharan Africa over the past decades. We begin with an examination of social indicators relating to health, education, and income, which are considered key to human development. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set benchmarks for achieving better health and education outcomes and eradicating poverty in Africa by 2015. These important domains of life have been affected by many factors over time including climate and ecology, economic boom and bust periods, revolutionary technological innovations, and historical events. As we see, significant progress has been made in improving quality of life in these domains since independence.

### 7.6.1 Health: Health Is Happiness

*The word mutakalo in Venda means either happiness or health. So I am happy and I have good health.* – Rural focus group participant, Vhembe district, Limpopo, South Africa (Roberts et al. 2014)

### 7.6.1.1 Food Equals Happiness

In the Venda language spoken by people living near the border between Zimbabwe and South Africa, health *is* happiness. There is no other word for it. A full belly has been important for both health and happiness in Africa since early times. The introduction of the plough during the Iron Age revolutionized agricultural production in Africa, as did the introduction of maize from the Americas by the Portuguese in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Recent research has found evidence that African pastoralists developed lactose tolerance to take advantage of the milk produced by their herds. Agriculturalists and pastoralists in Africa depend on rainfall. Aptly, Botswana's currency is named *pula*, "rain" in Setswana, which is precious in a country that is home to the Kalarhari desert. Nutritional limitations kept population numbers at minimal levels in sub-Saharan Africa for most of early history. There were cycles of boom and bust depending on whether climatic conditions were favorable or unfavorable. Populations that boomed when conditions were favorable often became surplus when conditions changed. Until the twenty-first century, sub-Saharan Africa's potential for population growth was never fulfilled.

### 7.6.1.2 Africa's Burden of Disease

The many vicious and perfidious diseases and parasites that have preyed on both animals and on humans have always presented threats to life in sub-Saharan Africa. Diseases such as malaria, sleeping sickness, which is caused by a parasite spread by the tsetse fly, and bilharzia sapped energy to grow food and caused widespread infant mortality. One of the main reasons for low population growth in Africa relative to the rest of the world was precisely because the people who moved out of Africa some 100,000 years ago were not exposed to such deadly and crippling diseases (Reader 1997). Some groups that remained in Africa managed to develop immunity or found niches in the ecology where they escaped the clutches of disease. For example, sub-Saharan pastoralists migrated to highlands not infested with the tsetse fly.

In the twentieth century, the improved hygiene introduced during the late colonial era and the discovery of penicillin saved lives. Practical preventive health care measures such as the provision to people living in malaria areas of insecticide-treated sleeping nets have increased life expectancy in the last decades. New threats to health are the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that causes AIDS and multi- and extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis. In the new millennium, antiretroviral therapy (ART) has allowed thousands of people with HIV/AIDS to lead normal, productive, fulfilling lives. The drugs currently used to treat Africans infected with tuberculosis (TB) were developed some 40 years ago. Meanwhile, cases of multidrug and extremely drug-resistant TB have emerged. A new combination drug may soon become available that will shorten and simplify treatment regimens for regular TB and be more effective in treating multidrug-resistant TB.

### 7.6.1.3 "Always Something New Out of Africa"<sup>6</sup>: Ebola

The outbreak of Ebola in West Africa in December 2013 is the latest life-threatening plague to affect Africa. The epidemic swept through Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia; all of these countries have porous borders (Fig. 7.5). The epidemic is the largest since the discovery of the virus in 1976.<sup>7</sup> It is also distinctly different from earlier ones in that it rapidly got out of control and spread to densely populated metropolitan areas, the capitals of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. The few cases of Ebola in Lagos, the sprawling metropolitan area of Nigeria, were swiftly contained (Ogunsola 2015).

<sup>6</sup>Attributed to Plinius the Elder, the connotation has shifted over time. The saying is thought to have referred to the novel and exotic in earlier times but has also been associated with the unexpected, harmful, or deadly.

<sup>7</sup>Ebola was identified by Belgium scientist Peter Piot in 1976. The virus was first detected in a Belgian mission hospital in the Congo, where expectant mothers had been injected with vitamins using the same needle. The research team gave the virus the name of the river Ebola to avoid attaching stigma to the hospital and the region it served (Was zum Teufel ist das? Der Spiegel 2014).

**Fig. 7.5** Ebola map of Africa for the geographically challenged. Anthony England (@EbolaPhone)/Twitter (Used with permission)



A toxic mix of factors overwhelmed the health services of the West African countries battling to halt the spread of Ebola. For example, Liberia's infrastructure and health services were recovering from a 14-year civil war that ended in 2003; only 52 doctors were left to serve a population of close to four million. The World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva had cut its budget for infectious disease control during the global economic downturn, and its regional African offices were staffed by political appointees rather than competent partners. As was the case with HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, fear, traditional health beliefs, stigma, and conspiracy theories hindered the first attempts to contain the spread of the disease.

According to the WHO, by the time Liberia, the hardest hit state, was declared Ebola free in May 2015, more than 11,000 people had died, and new cases were still being detected in neighboring Guinea and Sierra Leone (WHO 2015). Only approximately 30 % of patients survived the West African Ebola outbreak. However, survival rates in the event of new outbreaks of Ebola

may be greater in future; trials with vaccines and genetic sequencing of Ebola are now underway.

#### 7.6.1.4 Life Expectancy in Africa

Despite the AIDS pandemic of the 1980s and the recent outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, the prospects of living a longer and healthier life have never been as good in Africa's history. Life expectancy has improved dramatically in the last decades, which have witnessed a population explosion and the so-called demographic dividend in sub-Saharan Africa.

Increasing life expectancy is a worldwide trend in recent decades, and, for the first time in history, it includes Africa. In 2012, a child born anywhere in the world could expect to live 70 years, a gain of 6 years compared to a child born in 1990. If that child was born in Africa, the gain in life expectancy over the same period would be an additional 2 years. Significantly, the 8-year gain in life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2012 occurred despite the effects of the HIV pandemic that continues to beleaguer many countries in the region.


Figure 7.6 shows the dramatic changes in life expectancy in four of sub-Saharan Africa’s most populous countries: Nigeria in West Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo in Central Africa, Tanzania in East Africa, and South Africa, which is located on the southern tip of the continent. A child born in any of these countries in 1940 might expect to live only 30 years, whereas generations born in 2012 could expect to live 50–60 years. The changing pattern in years of life expectancy between 1990 and 2012, characterised by stagnation or decline in the 1990s followed by general improvement in the new millennium, highlights the impact of the HIV pandemic and the significant gains in life expectancy subsequently achieved after the introduction of ART, one of Africa’s major success stories.

Global and regional averages tend to conceal substantial cross-national inequalities, and life expectancy is no exception. In 2012, life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa ranged from a low of 46 years on average in Sierra Leone to a high of 74 years in the island states of Mauritius, Seychelles, and Cabo Verde. Despite this disturbingly large difference in longevity within the region, there has been a slight narrowing in inequality in life expectancy since the early

1990s, with the range of country values falling from a difference of 32 to 28 years.

It is instructive to look a little closer at the experience of the country at the bottom of the ranking in both periods of evaluation, namely Sierra Leone. In 1990, the country was at the tail end of a decade-long civil war, and life expectancy for both newborn boys and girls was a mere 38 years. This value is similar to the longevity recorded in the United States as well as in England and Wales around 1850 or China in 1960. Jumping ahead to 2012, life expectancy in Sierra Leone has increased by 8 years for newborn children, slightly above the world average. These improvements are, however, from a low base, and the health context facing the country is still bleak. The country has some of the world’s highest infant and maternal mortality rates; is prone to diseases such as yellow fever, cholera, meningitis, and Lassa fever; and has a relatively small share of the population with access to adequate medical care. The outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa in late 2013 resulted in a rapid progression of the disease through Sierra Leone and brought into sharp relief the limitations of the health infrastructure in the country.

Table 7.1 shows that life expectancy exceeds 70 years among both men and women in only 3



**Fig. 7.6** Changes in life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa’s more populous countries, 1940–2012 (Data from Clifton *et al.* 2013; WHO 2014c)



of the 49 sub-Saharan nations, all of which are small-island developing nations (Mauritius, Seychelles, and Cabo Verde). At the lower end of the distribution, we find countries where life expectancy is estimated at less than 55 years. Most of these countries have been affected by conflict and civil war, and Lesotho and Swaziland are among the countries most badly affected by the AIDS pandemic. The table also ranks countries in the region on the basis of the change in life expectancy from 1990 to 2012. A number of low-income countries within sub-Saharan Africa have produced remarkable improvements. Liberia experienced the world's greatest observed increase in life expectancy, from 42 years in 1990 to 62 years in 2012, an increase of 20 years. Progress was equally impressive in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Niger, and Eritrea, all of which are ranked in the top countries in terms of change in

life expectancy. An important part of the explanation for such impressive strides in human development is success in reducing child mortality rates (WHO 2014a). Improvements in areas such as water and sanitation, child immunization, public health infrastructure, and maternal and child nutrition have all played a part.

Conversely, the shadow of AIDS features prominently among those countries in the region showing the greatest reversals in life expectancy in recent decades. Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Botswana are the only countries in the world, with the exception of Syria, to have experienced aggregate declines in life expectancy in the post-1990 period. Yet, despite such losses, the scaling up of access to ART has begun to yield a significant reduction in AIDS-related deaths in Africa over the last decade, which is a positive development that

**Table 7.1** Life expectancy in Africa, 1990 and 2012 (WHO 2014c)

<b>Top 10 countries in 2012: life expectancy (years)</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>Change 1990–2012</b>	<b>Top 10 countries: years gained</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>Change 1990–2012</b>
Mauritius	70	74	4	Liberia	42	62	20
Seychelles	69	74	5	Ethiopia	45	64	19
Cabo Verde	66	74	8	Rwanda	48	65	17
Sao Tome and Principe	61	67	6	Niger	43	59	16
Namibia	63	67	4	Eritrea	48	63	15
Rwanda	48	65	17	Malawi	45	59	14
Ethiopia	45	64	19	Zambia	43	57	14
Madagascar	51	64	13	Madagascar	51	64	13
Senegal	57	64	7	South Sudan	42	55	13
Eritrea	48	63	15	Guinea	47	58	11
<b>Bottom 10 countries: life expectancy in years (2012 rank)</b>				<b>Bottom 10 countries: years gained (1990–2012)</b>			
Swaziland	61	54	–7	Togo	55	58	3
Mozambique	43	53	10	Cameroon	54	56	2
Somalia	47	53	6	Côte d'Ivoire	51	53	2
Côte d'Ivoire	51	53	2	Gabon	61	63	2
D.R. Congo	49	52	3	Kenya	60	61	1
Angola	43	51	8	Botswana	65	62	–3
Chad	45	51	6	South Africa	62	59	–3
Central African Rep.	48	51	3	Zimbabwe	62	58	–4
Lesotho	61	50	–11	Swaziland	61	54	–7
Sierra Leone	38	46	8	Lesotho	61	50	–11

should translate into further gains in life expectancy across the region in coming years.

### 7.6.1.5 Maternal and Child Health

Improving maternal health has become an important global priority, as reflected in the fact that it has been adopted as one of the core MDGs. A range of initiatives have been pursued in recent years to bring about sizable and sustainable improvements, especially in relation to maternal deaths. The most recently available trend data cover a period of approximately a quarter century, from 1990 to 2013 (WHO 2014a). There have been commendable strides in addressing maternal mortality, with the maternal mortality ratio falling 45 % worldwide and 48 % in sub-Saharan Africa (Fig. 7.7). The MDG target of reducing maternal deaths by three quarters between 1990 and 2015 has been achieved in Equatorial Guinea, Cabo Verde, Eritrea, and Rwanda, and countries such as Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique are close to attaining this milestone. Yet, despite such gains, in 2013 the maternal mortality ratio for the region was still nearly two-and-a-half times the world average (510 compared to 210), and 62 % of the women who died that year from complications during pregnancy or childbirth (179,000 of 289,000) came from sub-Saharan Africa (WHO 2014a).

One of the reasons for the positive achievements in life expectancy relates to the improvement in child survival that is evident in the region, particularly since 2000 (WHO 2014c). Between 1990 and 2000, the under-five mortality rate in the African region fell from 173 to 154 deaths per 100,000 live births, a decline of approximately 11 % or an average of barely 1 % per year. By contrast, between 2000 and 2012, the child mortality rate dropped 38 % to 95 deaths per 100,000 live births. Countries such as Malawi, Liberia, Tanzania, and Ethiopia had by 2012 already achieved the MDG target of reducing the under-five mortality rate by two thirds between 1990 and 2015, whereas an additional seven countries in the region are on track to meet the target. In 40 of the 49 countries in the region, there was at least a 25 % reduction in child mortality since 1990. Only in Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana did child survival worsen over the period, due primarily to AIDS-related deaths. However, in these contexts, the causes of child mortality have rapidly begun to alter. In 2000, AIDS accounted on average for 40 % of all child deaths across the four countries, but this number had fallen to 12 % by 2012. These are laudable developments, but it is sobering to remember that in 2012 alone, 3.2 million children died in




Fig. 7.7 Regional trends in maternal mortality, 1990–2013 (WHO 2014a)

sub-Saharan Africa, equivalent to half of the total number of child deaths worldwide.

Internationally, the last two decades have seen a transition in the primary causes of premature death and disability among children away from communicable diseases toward noncommunicable lifestyle diseases affecting the adult population. Sub-Saharan Africa is somewhat exceptional in this regard, with infectious and parasitic diseases (especially HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria) together with maternal, newborn, and nutritional conditions still accounting for about 70 % of premature deaths in 2012 (WHO 2014b). Though these conditions are still among the top-ranked conditions in the region's burden of disease, there are again positive signs of change. Although the AIDS pandemic has had devastating consequences for many sub-Saharan African countries over the last 30 years,<sup>8</sup> in many instances the pandemic peaked in the mid-2000s. The result of this peak, coupled with the rapid scaling up of access to ART, has meant that the number of years lost declined by slightly more than a fifth (22 %) between 2005 and 2010. In 2012, 90 % of all malaria-related deaths (554,000 out of 618,000) occurred in sub-Saharan Africa, and the disease was responsible for a fifth of all childhood deaths. Nevertheless, commendable strides have been made in expanding malaria control programs involving interventions such as insecticide-treated bed nets, indoor spraying, preventive treatment during pregnancy, and antimalarial drugs. Such efforts translated into a 49 % reduction in malaria mortality rates in Africa between 2002 and 2012 and a 31 % decline in malaria incidence rates (WHO 2014b). Vaccinating children against measles has also been successful. In 1990, immunization rates for measles across the continent stood at 58 %, a figure that fell to 53 % in 2000. The drive to improve vaccination rates in Africa since 2000 has seen coverage increase to 73 % by 2012 and an 88 % drop in measles-related deaths from 417,000 in 2000 to 48,000 in 2012. Continued efforts to achieve and maintain

high rates of vaccination, especially in countries such as Nigeria, Somalia, and the Central African Republic, will hopefully bring further gains in reducing preventable childhood deaths.

Although communicable diseases still predominate as causes of illness and death in the region, the relative contribution of noncommunicable lifestyle diseases has grown. For instance, the number of deaths from cardiovascular diseases such as strokes and heart disease increased by a third between 2000 and 2012; the number of cases of diabetes and depression is also rising, especially in middle income countries in the region. This emerging threat is imposing an added burden on health systems that are already strained under the demands imposed by communicable diseases. Road injuries and interpersonal violence also display an increasing trend.

Although efforts to fight high-profile diseases such as HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria have received the greatest attention in recent years, diseases that have been neglected continue to take lives. Polio, which has been eradicated in most of the world, has recently reappeared in West Africa because some parents refuse to inoculate their children on religious grounds.

In summary, although considerable health challenges remain in sub-Saharan Africa, the fairly impressive gains that have been achieved in recent decades are producing important quality-of-life gains through longer and healthier lives.

### 7.6.2 Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Class Act?

*Worldwide, countries are far more concerned about improving the quality of life of their citizens than they were a hundred years ago. The most corrupt and inefficient of countries in Africa are still providing services of a quality and extent far in advance of any country in the world prior to the Industrial Revolution. (Kenny 2012)*

From a historical perspective, formal schooling was a late innovation in most regions of sub-Saharan Africa. Africa's oral tradition had served as the sole means of communication and transmission of knowledge in most of sub-Saha-

<sup>8</sup>Evident in the more than threefold increase in the number of years lost to premature death and disability between 1990 and 2010.

ran Africa until the nineteenth century. The task of carrying out the civilizing project that had justified the scramble for Africa was delegated to missionaries who proceeded to build schools, churches, and hospitals and transcribed many local African languages. The few missionary-educated Africans who had studied abroad became the leaders of Africa's independence movements in the 1950s and 1960s and the first heads of states. In the 1930s, just four institutions offered those among sub-Saharan Africa's 165 million inhabitants who were eligible an education that met university-entrance standards (Reader 1997: 666). Education, considered a prerequisite for democracy, has represented an important MDG for sub-Saharan Africa. Since the 1960s, illiterate African parents have made great sacrifices to send their children to school so that levels of education have risen rapidly from one generation to the next. Furthermore, urbanization has increased access to schooling.

As with health, if one adopts a longer historical perspective when looking at patterns and trends, it is evident that sub-Saharan Africa has experienced notable growth in certain core educational indicators and has begun to narrow the gap relative to leading countries. Although it is again important to recognize the multiple challenges that remain in bringing about greater parity with other world regions, this fact should not overshadow the appreciable progress that has been forged.

### 7.6.2.1 School Enrollment

With regard to basic education, the region as a whole is not on track to reach the ambitious Education for All goal of universal primary education by 2015, with a net enrollment ratio of 77 % in 2012. This number represents an increase of approximately 25 percentage points relative to 1990 (52 %). By pushing further backward and comparing recent educational statistics to those covering the period prior to World War II (see Table 7.2), one is left with a clearer sense of the convergence that has occurred in relation to basic access to education in the region relative to other

key high income countries.<sup>9</sup> Over the half century between 1870 and 1930, during the time of colonial education in Africa, levels of primary school across the region ranged from three to six times below that of countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. In the decades following independence, sub-Saharan African nations pursued major educational reforms and major initiatives to promote education, which yielded remarkable results. Some concern has, however, been expressed about the fact that primary enrollment has remained relatively unchanged since 2007. This finding is partly attributable to population growth, which has seen the numbers of primary and lower secondary school age children increase by around a third between 2000 and 2012 and the out-of-school population in the region remain constant at around 30 million children.

Although the share of primary school-age children out of school fell from 40 % to 22 % between 2000 and 2012, corresponding to a reduction from 42 to 30 million children, the slowdown in momentum in getting such children to school is worrisome because estimates suggest that half of these children will never receive any formal education. Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, and Niger each have more than a million out-of-school children.

The abolition of school fees in accordance with the Dakar Framework has been instrumental in bolstering enrollment in certain contexts. For instance, when Burundi abolished school fees in 2005, the effect was an increase in net primary enrollment from 54 % in 2004 to 74 % in 2006; by 2010, the figure had risen to an impressive 94 % (UNESCO 2014).

A fifth of sub-Saharan African countries that had enrollment ratios below 80 % in 1999 are expected still to be in the same position in 2015, placing them among the countries furthest from achieving universal primary enrollment. The

<sup>9</sup>Some caution needs to be taken in directly comparing enrollment patterns in the 1870–1930 period to those in the 1990–2012 interval, especially because of the different types of enrollment measures used. If gross rather than net enrollment ratios are used for recent trends, the impression of convergence is even more apparent.

**Table 7.2** Signs of convergence in primary school enrollment (Benavot and Riddle 1988; World Bank 2014)

	Unadjusted primary school enrollment rates (%)			Net primary enrollment rates (%)		
	1870	1900	1930	1990	2000	2012
Sub-Saharan Africa	17	15	15	52	60	77
United States	72	95	93	97	96	92
United Kingdom	49	74	82	99	100	100
Germany	67	73	73	...	99	98
Ratio of enrollment in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to other countries						
SSA: United States	0.23	0.16	0.16	0.54	0.63	0.84
SSA: United Kingdom	0.34	0.20	0.18	0.53	0.60	0.77
SSA: Germany	0.25	0.20	0.21	...	0.60	0.78

SSA Sub-Saharan Africa

countries are Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, the Gambia, Lesotho, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. However, other countries in the subcontinent exhibit encouraging signs of progress. Rwanda and Zambia also had enrollment below the 80 % threshold in 1999 but have already reached their MDG target, whereas Mozambique is expected to come close to the target. Mauritania and Senegal have also shown improvements and managed to achieve enrollment figures of more than 80 %.


### 7.6.2.2 Literacy Rates

Literacy is deemed a fundamental human right and the basis for addressing deprivation and for promoting societal participation. The extension of access to primary education to sizable shares of the population in African countries since independence has brought about advances in the ability to read and write. Between 1870 and 1910, less than a tenth of African citizens were literate, a figure that rose to a mere 15 % by 1950. This figure doubled to 29 % over the next 20 years and doubled again to 60 % by 2000. Although literacy in sub-Saharan Africa still lags behind that of other regions, we again see that disparities in literacy have narrowed significantly (Fig. 7.8). The literacy rate in Africa was 19 times lower than that of Europe and its offshoots in 1870, around six times lower in 1950, and only one-and-a-half times lower by the turn of the century.

Despite overall improvement in the adult literacy rate in sub-Saharan Africa since 1990, this period has also been characterized by growth in the absolute number of illiterate persons aged 15 years and older, rising 37 % between 1990 and 2011 (from 133.2 to 181.9 million) due primarily to continuing population growth. In 2011, close to one in four (23.5 %) of the world's illiterate adults were found in the region. Close to half of the region's illiterate are concentrated in three countries—Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Furthermore, low literacy rates (below 50 %) are still found in nine countries, most of which are in West Africa (Table 7.3).

Female illiteracy in sub-Saharan Africa is a particular challenge, and around three fifths of illiterate persons in the region are women. In 18 of the 44 countries (41 %) in the region with available data, the female literacy rate falls below the 50 % threshold (Fig. 7.9). The situation in Guinea, Niger, Benin, and Burkina Faso is more alarming: The female literacy rate does not even exceed 25 %, and the literacy rate among men is more than double that of women in the first three countries. The prospects of a rapid change in this scenario are unlikely, given that the same patterns are reflected among young women aged 15–24 years. Young women in the 18 countries exhibit literacy levels below 50 %, with less than a quarter able to read and write in the four lowest ranked countries. A new





**Fig. 7.8** Average adult literacy rates, 1870–2010 (%) (Data from Morrison and Murtin 2005; World Bank 2014)

**Table 7.3** Categorized adult literacy rate (15 years and older) in sub-Saharan Africa, 2005–2011 (UNESCO 2014)

Below 50 % (n = 9)	50–59 % (n = 8)	60–69 % (n = 8)	70–79 % (n = 9)	Above 80 % (n = 10)
Guinea (nd; 25)	Senegal (27; 50)	Togo (nd; 60)	Angola (nd; 70)	Zimbabwe (84; 84)
Benin (27; 29)	Gambia, The (nd; 51)	Dem. Rep. Congo (nd; 61)	Sao Tome and Principe (73; 70)	Botswana (69; 85)
Burkina Faso (14; 29)	Mozambique (nd; 51)	Malawi (49; 61)	Cameroon (nd; 71)	Cape Verde (63; 85)
Niger (nd; 29)	Nigeria (55; 51)	Zambia (65; 61)	Ghana (nd; 71)	Burundi (37; 87)
Mali (nd; 33)	Guinea-Bissau (nd; 55)	Madagascar (nd; 64)	Kenya (nd; 72)	Swaziland (67; 88)
Chad (11; 35)	Central Afr. Rep. (34; 57)	Rwanda (58; 66)	Uganda (56; 73)	Gabon (72; 89)
Ethiopia (27; 39)	Cote d’Ivoire (34; 57)	Tanzania (59; 68)	Comoros (nd; 76)	Mauritius (80; 89)
Liberia (43; 43)	Mauritania (nd; 59)	Eritrea (nd; 69)	Lesotho (nd; 76)	Seychelles (88; 92)
Sierra Leone (nd; 43)			Namibia (76; 76)	South Africa (nd; 93)
				Eq. Guinea (nd; 94)

Figures in parentheses represent the adult literacy values from 1985–2004 to 2005–2011, respectively. In both periods of assessment, no data were available for five countries: the Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan  
 nd no data


threat to female literacy gains in northeast Nigeria is the militant Islamist movement of Boko Haram (*Western education is forbidden*) that abducted women and kidnapped 276 schoolgirls in 2014. In some of the northern states of Nigeria, less than 5 % of women can read and write.

Therefore, efforts to further bolster literacy and bring greater gender parity in literacy levels will take at least another generation to materialize in subregions such as West Africa that are presently lagging behind.

### 7.6.2.3 Poverty Eats My Blanket: Income and Standard of Living

*Poverty eats my blanket. A poor man—they say in Lesotho—cannot afford a new blanket to wear when his old one begins to fray at the edges. So he continues to wear a blanket which wears away thread by thread as his poverty nibbles at it, until he is left with only a few tatters around his neck.* (Marres and Van der Wiel 1975)

From a historical perspective, standards of living have been uniformly low for most of sub-Saharan Africa’s people until recently.



**Fig. 7.9** Male and female literacy rates in sub-Saharan Africa, 2005–2011 (%) (Data from UNESCO 2014)

Subsistence agriculture and herding limited the accumulation of wealth and thus inhibited economic inequality. Lineages of families who were the first to settle in any area may have risen to more prominent positions of prestige and power. However, the power of African chiefs and elites was usually limited in precolonial days. The age-set social stratification system gave equal status to members of an age group and tended to distribute decision making and income and assets among all members of the community. It was mainly traders who became the first group of sub-Saharan Africans to prosper and who were able to invest in goods and services including cattle wealth and slaves.

In early history, trade goods were often bartered or exchanged for other goods that were in short supply. Few rural inhabitants had ever participated in the urban cash economy until the hut tax was introduced during the colonial period to ensure a regular supply of labor for the gold and

diamond mines of southern Africa and for farms in the highlands of East Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The hut tax, which had to be paid in cash, forced men to leave their homes to seek work in the mines or on plantations for little pay. In southern Africa, the migrant labor system, which divided families for most of the year but provided a source of cash income, became a way of life for a large sector of the population. Former herders and agriculturalists turned migrant workers sent remittances to their families in the rural areas and invested any savings in cattle. In recent decades, the situation in most of sub-Saharan Africa has changed dramatically. Participation in the wage economy has increased rapidly since independence. In parallel, living standards have risen as more people have moved to urban centers to find work in industry, manufacturing, and services. However, expectations of improved living standards have also increased for citizens in Africa’s fledgling

democracies. Large pockets of poverty still exist where people live below the subsistence minimum in informal urban settlements and rural areas.

#### **7.6.2.4 Social Welfare in the Twenty-First Century: “My Family Eat This Money Too”**

Large numbers of sub-Saharan people were left behind in the new scramble for wealth during the 1980s and 1990s that enriched ruling elites and their cronies (Meredith 2014). Rapid urbanization has put enormous pressure on traditional ways of coping with adversity. The kinship system of mutual aid and support is overstretched, particularly when falling back on subsistence agriculture as a lifeline is no longer an option. It has been an embarrassment for independent Africa to have to rely regularly on external aid to feed its starving people in times of famine or civil war. In the new millennium, sub-Saharan countries are attempting to look after their poor and vulnerable themselves. Historically, South Africa took the lead in providing social protection for the new white poor who were displaced after the brutal South Africa War (1899–1902). South Africa’s social pension, an unconditional cash transfer to impoverished whites first introduced in 1928, was gradually extended to black pensioners and disabled people. The amounts paid out to beneficiaries were equalized in 1993, on the eve of the country’s transition to democracy. A new child support grant was introduced during Nelson Mandela’s first years as president of the new democracy (1994–1999). Social pensions and cash grants currently reach approximately one third of the South African population. Namibia introduced its social pension in 1949 and Mauritius followed suit in 1958. By 2010, nine sub-Saharan states were paying old-age and disability pensions and 20 were providing some form of social assistance to the poor and vulnerable (Barrientos and Nino-Zarazua 2010). Assistance comes in different forms, such as cash grants to poor and child-headed AIDS households, pensions for the aged and disabled, and work guarantees or public works programs for the unemployed. In some cases, cash transfers are


tied to the conditions that infants be vaccinated and school-age children be enrolled in school, resulting in improved child nutrition and survival rates as well as the alleviation of poverty. In line with Africa’s traditional mutual support system, pension-sharing is widespread, and cash grants often support whole families.

#### **7.6.2.5 Poles Apart: Income Divergence and Quality of Life**


In 1997, Harvard economist Lant Pritchett published an influential study entitled “Divergence, big time,” which outlined how advanced capitalist nations experienced rapid long-run growth in per capita income between 1870 and 1990 while poorer, developing countries exhibited stagnating economic performance over this period (Pritchett 1997). The effect of these patterns of change was a mounting divergence prior to the end of World War II and limited signs of convergence in recent decades, despite the rise of China and India (Fig. 7.10). Going back to the beginning of the second millennium (1000 CE), the level of estimated gross domestic product per capita (in 1990 international \$) in both Africa and Western Europe was indistinguishable at around \$400 per person. By the eve of the African era of independence in 1950, Western Europe was five times richer than Africa. Jumping ahead another half-century, we find that the gap has widened immeasurably, with average income in Western Europe 13 times that of Africa. Recent growth in Africa closed the relative gap to a 10-fold difference by 2010, but the overarching pattern remains.

Africa did exhibit modest growth in per capita incomes between 1820 and 1980, increasing threefold over this period but stagnating over the next two decades, before slowly improving after the turn of the millennium. However, even if one compares African income growth with that of other developing countries such as Brazil, China, and India, it is apparent that the region has tended to lag behind (Bolt and Van Zanden 2013).

Within and between countries in the region, economic inequality and impoverishment remain salient development challenges. Figure 7.11a presents the range of Gini coefficients for 40 sub-Saharan African countries with available data



**Fig. 7.10** Real gross domestic product per person in select countries and continents (in 1990 dollars), 1950–2010 (Data from Bolt and Van Zanden 2013)



**Fig. 7.11 (a)** Gini coefficients for the distribution of household consumption per capita in sub-Saharan Africa, 2010. Countries sorted by their Gini coefficients (Data from the World Bank 2013, 2014). **(b)** Poverty headcount

ratio in sub-Saharan African countries, 2010. Poverty computed over the distribution of consumption/income per capita with the purchasing power parity-adjusted \$1.25-a-day line (Data from the World Bank 2013)

around year 2010. The inequality measures have been ranked from the least unequal (Niger, 31.2) to the most unequal economy (South Africa, 65.0). None of the countries have coefficients below 30; 5 have values exceeding 55, whereas 11 of the 40 countries fall below the developing country mean of 39.8. The graph also highlights the region’s most populated nations, showing that South Africa has exceptionally high inequality levels (the highest globally); Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo lie in more intermediate positions; and Tanzania and Ethiopia

exhibit relatively low levels on inequality. The spread of Gini coefficient values across the region is considerable, the largest dispersion of any of the world’s regions, although almost all highly unequal societies with Gini coefficients above 50 are located on the continent (Alvaredo and Gasparini 2015). Although constrained by the availability of data, the evidence does seem to suggest that economic inequality in the region has remained virtually unchanged during the 1990s and 2000s (results not shown). Figure 7.11b shows that similar country-to-country vari-

ation in income per capita exists across the region. The heterogeneity is stark, with less than 1 % of the population in countries such as the island nations of Seychelles and Mauritius living on less than \$1.25 a day compared to more than 80 % in the cases of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Liberia, and Burundi. The world's top 10 most materially deprived countries remain in Africa. Although remarkable gains have been made in Asia over the past 30 years, the region's poverty reduction performance was weak until the 2000s, when discernible, broad-based improvements became apparent. Even though this news is indeed encouraging, bringing notable gains in the quality of life of many, efforts to reduce inequality and consolidate poverty reduction efforts remain key priorities.

#### 7.6.2.6 The Long Walk to Freedom: Political Challenges

*If ... African countries are to achieve sustainable development, democracy cannot stand still, and freedom alone will not be enough. Democratic institutions will have to work better to control corruption and constrain the exercise of power, so that the chief business of government becomes the delivery of public goods, not private ones.* (Diamond 2008: 262).

Since the mid-1970s, more than 60 countries around the world made transitions to democracy in what has been termed a “third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991), a process of change that reached and indelibly influenced sub-Saharan Africa from the early 1990s onward. Longstanding authoritarian rule, characterized by military and one-party states as well as by dominant leaders, was challenged, and multiparty electoral competition was established in countries such as South Africa, Benin, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Zambia. The influence of these changes also spread to other regimes spanning the continent, from Niger and Togo in West Africa, through the Congo in Central Africa, and even to the island nations of Madagascar, São Tomé, and Cape Verde. At the beginning of the 1990s, only 3 countries were classified as democracies; by the close of the decade only 2 of 48 countries in the region had *not* held national competitive, multiparty elections (Diamond and Plattner 2010). The rise of


democracy on the continent has therefore seen the often violent overthrowing of leaders that typified the 1960s through 1980s increasingly being replaced with peaceful exits, the imposition of limits on terms of office, and the gradual demise of one-party states.

To provide a sense of the changing nature of freedom in the region over recent decades, we make use of the cumulative findings of the Freedom House series *Freedom in the World* (Freedom House 2015). This annual report series assesses the state of freedom across the countries of the world by rating each in terms of the state of political rights as well as of civil liberties. In each instance, a 1–7 ratings scale is used, where 1 represents the most free and 7, the least free. These two scores are, in turn, premised on 25 detailed indicators. The average of the political rights and civil liberties scores is finally used to classify a country or territory as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free.<sup>10</sup> The pattern of freedom in sub-Saharan Africa over the last 40 years clearly reflects the processes of democratization that have occurred as well as the advance of civil and political rights in public opinion and legal practice (Fig. 7.12). In 1973, less than a tenth of countries in the region were deemed as Free by Freedom House, whereas 23 % percent were designated as Partly Free and the remaining majority were Not Free (Freedom House 2015). Distinct progress is evident between 1973 and 2003, with the share of countries in sub-Saharan Africa that are Not Free halving and the corresponding shares that are Free or Partly Free exhibiting improving trends.

Despite such accomplishments, the Freedom House measures for the decade between 2003 and 2013 provided early warning signs that democratic recession may be occurring in the region. This period was generally one of heightened volatility, with declines precipitated by coups, insurgencies, political instability, and reversals in terms of freedom of expression and association in certain cases occurring alongside gains in countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar, and

<sup>10</sup>More information on the Freedom House methodology can be found at [freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology](http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology).





**Fig. 7.12** Trends in freedom in sub-Saharan Africa, 1973–2013 (% of countries) (Data based on calculations from Freedom House 2014)


Mali, due mainly to recovery after coups and conflict (Freedom House 2014). For the first time in four decades, the share of countries categorized as Not Free demonstrated an upward tendency, whereas the share that was Free of Partly Free declined modestly.

Apart from the spread as well as the ebbs and flows of democracy in the region, another important aspect of developmental progress that has a bearing on individual and collective well-being in sub-Saharan Africa is the quality of governance. The Brookings Institute economist Daniel Kaufmann and his World Bank colleagues have identified six core dimensions with which to evaluate the nature of governance in any given country, the first of which is voice and accountability, which links closely with the Freedom House focus on basic civil liberties as well as the ability to participate in the selection of government. The other aspects are political stability and absence of violence or terrorism; government effectiveness (in providing public service, public administration, and policy formulation and implementation); regulatory quality (in terms of enabling and promoting private sector development); the rule of law; and, lastly, the control of corruption. The latter four dimensions could be thought of collectively as an indication of “state quality” (Diamond 2008). Available indicators that have been compiled to inform this multidimensional definition of quality governance, and

covering 1996–2013, tend to portray sub-Saharan Africa in a fairly unfavorable light (Kaufmann et al. 2010).

In 2013, the region ranked at the low end of the 30th percentile on governance measures (Fig. 7.13a), faring marginally better on indicators of political stability and accountability than on the other four components of state quality. Yet, the region fell behind other world regions on the basis of these indices. These averages also mask considerable variation between different countries within the region. If one concentrates on sub-Saharan Africa’s five largest countries, which account for close to half of the region’s population, it is immediately apparent how appreciably the quality of governance varies across nations (Fig. 7.13b). Whereas the percentile rankings for South Africa approximated those of Eastern Europe, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Nigeria had worse governance scores than the region as a whole; Ethiopia also had voice and accountability and political stability scores below the sub-Saharan average. Tanzania fared moderately better than the region on the different dimensions of governance. The control of corruption in particular is of concern.

Although politics across the continent has become less violent and more institutionalized in character over the last two decades, at the same time many democracies remain fragile and beleaguered by quality concerns, affected in particular



**Fig. 7.13** (a) World Governance Indicators rankings by world region, 2013 (Data from Kaufmann et al. 2010). (b) World Governance Indicators rankings among the five largest sub-Saharan African countries, 2013 (Data from Kaufmann et al. 2010)


by corrupt practices, clientelism, and authoritarian leadership (Diamond and Plattner 2010). Alongside the complex patterns of progress and reversal that have occurred following the democratic experiments in Africa since the 1990s, it is interesting to observe the resolute public appetite for democracy. According to our analysis of Round 5 of Afrobarometer (2011/2012), 76 % of people across the continent believe that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, and more than three quarters disapprove of one-party rule, military rule, and big man politics. There is similar support for constitutional limits to terms of office. These beliefs convey a deeply rooted demand for democracy and an appreciation of the benefits it brings to citizens and represent a trend that has remained relatively resilient over the last 15 years of the survey series. Public evaluations of the supply of democracy are more critical in nature, with 52 % of Africans expressing satisfaction with the functioning of democracy in practice in 2011/2012. There is again a considerable gradient of difference across countries (Fig. 7.14), ranging from 75 % voicing satisfaction with democracy in Tanzania to less than a third satisfied in

Madagascar, Togo, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe, Mali, and Nigeria. There have also been some notable reversals over the last decade, especially in Kenya, Mozambique, and Mali.

The obvious gap between the demand for and evaluations of the supply of democracy suggests that important democratic deficits exist in sub-Saharan Africa. These deficits reflect disillusionment with the manner in which democracy is delivering upon the expectations of the mass public. By extension, as the example of the Arab Spring has taught us, these statistics also serve as a signal to the elected of their responsibility to the voting public and the potential consequences of failing to live up to this mandate.

**7.6.2.7 Social Progress in Review**

Since the wave of independence in Africa more than half a century ago, interest has been growing in monitoring societal progress to determine how well countries are faring relative to the vision for reform and long-term development that was articulated. Indicators and data abound with which to provide an overarching sense of the state of social progress in sub-Saharan Africa toward ensuring well-being and quality of life for



**Fig. 7.14** Satisfaction with democracy, 2002/2003 and 2011/2012 (percentage who are fairly/very satisfied) (Data from Afrobarometer 2015; Afrobarometer Network 2004)

its diverse population. One of the most comprehensive review measures of objective well-being is the Index of Social Progress—or the WISP as its statistically weighted version is known—developed by Richard Estes (see Chap. 6, Sect. 6.2.3). The index consists of 10 subindexes encompassing 41 individual social indicators. The aim of such a composite measure is to encompass all major aspects of societal economic development including educational status, health, gender equality, social welfare nets, and cultural diversity. The use of such an index, which has been collected since 1970, allows the researcher to measure the capacity of nations to provide for the basic social and material needs for their citizens.

In 2009, a majority of sub-Saharan African countries had WISP scores well below the world average of 49 (Table 7.4). If sub-Saharan Africa is analyzed regionally, significant differences are noted, with Southern Africa (40) having much higher average WISP scores than East Africa (18), West Africa (14), and Central Africa (8). These values represent a significant improvement over the last 10 years. Sub-Saharan Africa has had consistently unfavorable WISP scores for the period 1970–2000. Social progress for much of the continent in fact declined between 1970 and 1980 and only began to rebound after 2000. This recovery has been profound enough for Estes (2012a: 439) to remark that “Africa’s recent

social gains [in the last 10 years] nonetheless are impressive.”

Recent conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly civil conflict, made it impossible for millions of Africans to pursue happiness and improve the quality of their lives. A recent study of failing states (Estes 2012b: 577) found that social development “requires peace, or at least minimum levels of positive social, political, and economic stability.” Indeed, Estes further argued that a failing state will have a negative impact on the quality of life in neighboring states. As the results show, those states that have become entrenched in civil conflict in the recent past tended to have low social development.

Civil strife was particularly common to West Africa during the 1990s and 2000s. A majority of West African countries experienced a decline in their WISP scores between 1970 and 2000, and the average for the subregion fell from 16 in 1970 to 10 in 2000, although some progress was made between 2000 and 2009 when the WISP score increased to 14. Those Western African countries (Chad, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire) directly involved in civil war experienced extreme deteriorations in social progress during this period. Much of central Africa is also recovering from civil wars that occurred in the 1990s and 2000s, and the subregion had a low WISP average of 8, with the Democratic Republic of the

**Table 7.4** Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP) in sub-Saharan Africa, 2000–2009 (Estes 2010)

		1970	1980	1990	2000	2009
1	Sudan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Western Africa</b>						
2	Benin	14	17	8	19	19
3	Burkina Faso	3	11	8	3	23
4	Cape Verde	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	40	51
5	Côte d'Ivoire	24	24	16	12	6
6	Gambia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	13	16
7	Ghana	22	18	16	26	29
8	Guinea	14	5	−1	5	9
9	Guinea-Bissau	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	−4	−3
10	Liberia	24	20	12	−6	−11
11	Mali	13	8	4	13	16
12	Mauritania	23	10	13	12	20
13	Niger	6	8	3	−4	9
14	Nigeria	6	26	11	14	4
15	Senegal	27	18	24	19	22
16	Sierra Leone	25	12	2	−10	0
17	Togo	9	13	17	14	11
<b>Eastern Africa</b>						
18	Burundi	5	8	18	3	10
19	Comoros	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
20	Djibouti	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	12	14
21	Eritrea	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	−15	−7
22	Ethiopia	4	−10	−10	−12	15
23	Kenya	27	26	24	12	24
24	Madagascar	30	31	23	19	24
25	Malawi	11	4	13	9	27
26	Mauritius	n.a.	56	67	61	60
27	Mozambique	n.a.	2	−4	4	11
28	Rwanda	17	18	21	19	24
29	Seychelles	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
30	Somalia	19	10	1	1	−4
31	South Sudan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
32	Tanzania	12	20	15	20	22
33	Uganda	14	14	12	7	12
34	Zambia	27	25	28	22	21
35	Zimbabwe	32	29	37	24	23
<b>Central Africa</b>						
36	Angola	n.a.	5	−3	−10	−4
37	Cameroon	23	22	21	15	14
38	Central African Rep.	10	12	9	2	3
39	Chad	3	−4	−2	−4	−7
40	Congo	n.a.	22	27	22	17
41	Congo, Dem. Rep.	15	21	14	−2	2
42	Equatorial Guinea	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

(continued)

**Table 7.4** (continued)

		1970	1980	1990	2000	2009
43	Gabon	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	28	30
44	São Tomé and Príncipe	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
<b>Southern Africa</b>						
45	Botswana	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	44	50
46	Lesotho	n.a.	36	36	36	46
47	Namibia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	36	46
48	South Africa	51	43	44	52	51
49	Swaziland	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	37	33

*n.a.* not available

Congo, the Central African Republic, and Angola scoring below this subregional average.

Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa that achieved greater political stability also experienced increased social development. Ethiopia, for instance, made significant improvements in social development, albeit from a low base. The country's WISP score increased from -12 in 2000 to 15 in 2009. This increase was caused primarily by the end of the prolonged civil disorder of the authoritarian Mengistu era in 1994 and the constitutional and agricultural reforms of the democratic Meles era. However, not all transitions to democracy coincided with increases in social progress. Nigeria, plagued by disputed elections since the transition from military rule in 1999, experienced a reversal of social development, declining from 26 in 1980 to 4 in 2009.

The case of Nigeria demonstrates that even when civil war is avoided, other factors can reverse social development. Estes (2010) suggested that other contributing factors are the rapid spread of infectious and communicable diseases (such as HIV/AIDS), the underinvestment and, in some cases, declining investment in health, education, and social welfare by some countries as well as an inability to overcome serious infrastructure limitations, particularly within the region's landlocked states. Zimbabwe, for example, suffered considerable economic (and subsequent social) decline following a poorly managed land reform program that destroyed the country's leading export-producing agricultural sector. As

a result, Zimbabwe was the only country in southern Africa to suffer a substantial decline in its WISP score (falling from a high of 37 in 1990 to 23 in 2009).

### 7.6.3 Subjective Well-Being

With the exception of South Africa, and to a lesser degree Nigeria, research into subjective well-being in sub-Saharan Africa has tended to trail more objective analysis of quality of life during the post-independence period. Following influential cross-national undertakings of the 1960s and 1970s, progress in surveying subjective well-being in Africa proceeded at a rather slow pace until the late 1990s and early 2000s. The World Value Survey series, established in 1981, has measured subjective well-being on a bi-decennial basis using a single-item overall life satisfaction question based on a 10-point scale. Only Nigeria and South Africa were included in the survey during the first three waves of the survey, though this increased to nine countries in Wave 5 (2005–2007). The latest round of interviewing (Wave 6, 2010–2012) focused on dramatically increasing sub-Saharan African participation. Other global survey series that have gained prominence since the end of the twentieth century, such as the Gallup World Poll and the Pew Global Attitudes Surveys, are characterized by a greater representation of African countries, but relatively small sample sizes, sampling prob-



**Table 7.5** Ranked average life satisfaction in sub-Saharan African countries from highest to lowest, 2000–2009 (mean on a 0–10 scale) (Veenhoven *n.d.*)

<i>Highest values</i>	
Malawi (6.2)	South Africa (5.8)
Nigeria (5.7)	Djibouti (5.7)
Chad (5.4)	Namibia (5.2)
Ghana (5.2)	Zambia (5.0)
Sudan (5.0)	Mauritania (4.9)
Uganda (4.8)	Mali (4.7)
Botswana (4.7)	Central African Rep. (4.6)
Senegal (4.5)	Guinea (4.5)
Côte d'Ivoire (4.4)	Congo, Dem. Rep. (4.4)
Burkina Faso (4.4)	Rwanda (4.3)
Liberia (4.3)	Angola (4.3)
Ethiopia (4.2)	Cameroon (3.9)
Niger (3.8)	Mozambique (3.8)
Madagascar (3.7)	Kenya (3.7)
Congo, Rep. (3.7)	Sierra Leone (3.5)
Zimbabwe (3.0)	Benin (3.0)
Burundi (2.9)	Tanzania (2.8)
Togo (2.6)	
<i>Lowest values</i>	

lems, and inconsistent country participation are some of the limitations experienced to date. Similarly, at the regional level, the Afrobarometer survey series, which was established in the late 1990s, comprised 12 countries as part of its first wave (1999–2001) and managed to expand to at least 22 nations by its fifth round (2011–2013).<sup>11</sup> The series, however, does not contain a direct measure of subjective well-being, though analysts have attempted to overcome this by examining proxy measures such as lived poverty or optimism (Mattes 2008). Although these developments have resulted in significant advances in our understanding of social attitudes in Africa and the extent to which this approximates or diverges from other countries and regions, there remains much room for building on this initial engagement.

<sup>11</sup>The expectation is that the survey will increase to 35 countries by the completion of the survey round.


### 7.6.3.1 Overall Life Satisfaction

Data on overall life satisfaction for sub-Saharan Africa are generally less readily available than other forms of happiness measures, though the World Database of Happiness has compiled available empirical evidence for 35 sub-Saharan African nations, with a coverage that focuses predominantly on the period 2000–2009. We find an appreciable spread in national averages, with the highest rating of 6.2 in Malawi nearly two-and-a-half times higher than the lowest rating of 2.6 in Togo (Table 7.5).

Globally, Togo was the lowest ranked of 149 nations in the database, whereas Costa Rica had the highest score (8.5). Another finding of note is the relatively few countries in the sub-Saharan region that have mean scores above the scale midpoint (5.0). In this instance, only Malawi, South Africa, Nigeria, Djibouti, Chad, and Namibia fall into this category. The overall average level of satisfaction for the set of sub-Saharan African countries with available data is 4.4, which is below that of North Africa (5.6) and the world average (5.9).

### 7.6.3.2 Contentment with Life

The most commonly used measure of happiness in the region asks respondents to rate their life on an 11-step Cantril ladder scale that ranges from what they perceive to be the worst possible life (0) to the best possible life imaginable (10). In Fig. 7.15, we present ranked averages for 35 sub-Saharan African countries based on recent data from the Gallup World Poll (Roberts et al. 2015). In terms of the pattern of responses within the region, we again found a considerable degree of variation in contentment, ranging from a low of 2.9 in Togo to a high of 5.6 in Angola. Only Angola, Mauritius, and Nigeria had a mean score exceeding the midpoint of the scale, whereas 11 countries had an average score that was below four on the 0–10 scale. A simple mean score was calculated for all the countries as well as for each of the four subregions. The lowest score was found in western Africa (4.08), followed by central and eastern Africa (4.30 and 4.41 respec-



**Fig. 7.15** Average contentment for select sub-Saharan African countries, ranked by current life ratings. Life today, Life 5 years ago, and Life in 5 years are measured using the Cantril ladder questions with respondents asked to choose a rung on the 0–10 ladder. All countries use data from the Gallup 2011 World Poll except for Ethiopia and

Namibia (2007), Cote d’Ivoire (2009), and Liberia (2010). All data are weighted so that the results are representative of the adult population in each country (Roberts et al. 2015, © Springer Science + Business Media Dordrecht, with permission of Springer)


tively), with a moderately higher average in southern Africa (4.92).

The Gallup data also include retrospective and prospective evaluations, with the national averages displayed in Fig. 7.15. It is immediately apparent that considerable optimism exists among sub-Saharan African countries concerning life improvements in the medium term. Contentment in the region, based on simple all-country averages, is expected to rise from the present 4.4 to 6.7 over the 5-year interval, an increase of more than 50 %. On the basis of these future evaluations, only two nations have an average score below the midpoint of the ladder, with 14 countries reporting a value of 7 or above. It is interesting to note that the largest anticipated gains are found among countries characterized by low present scores and perceived reversals in recent years. This observation is especially true of the western African states of Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Senegal, as well as Rwanda in

eastern Africa. The Togolese example is perhaps most telling. As with overall life satisfaction, 2012 Gallup data indicate that the country possesses the lowest level of contentment worldwide. Although citizens generally felt marginally more contented in the past (3.2 compared to 2.9), there is an expectation of a substantive reversal, with the mean country rating jumping to more than double its current level (6.0) by the end of a 5-year period. It is this “happiness in hardship” (Veenhoven 2005) that strikes one in the comparative examination of happiness in the subcontinent: the remarkable resilience that is encountered in the face of considerable personal and societal adversity.

### 7.6.3.3 Positive Experiences Outweigh the Negative

The Gallup World Poll has also fielded a series of questions concerning the positive and negative feelings experienced by respondents on the day




**Fig. 7.16** Positive and negative experiences in sub-Saharan Africa in 2011/2012, ranked by the size of the gap between the two indices. Gallup World Poll 2011 data for Positive Experience Index used for the following countries: Lesotho, Central African Republic, Burundi, Djibouti, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo. All other data represented use

Gallup World Poll 2012. Gallup World Poll 2011 data were used for the Negative Experience Index (*The Global Handbook of Wellbeing and Quality of Life*, Shadow of the sun: The distribution of wellbeing in sub-Saharan Africa, 2015, pp. 531–568, Roberts, B. J., Gordon, S. L., Struwig, J., & Møller, V., © Springer Science + Business Media Dordrecht, with permission of Springer)

prior to interviewing. From the results, a positive experience index is constructed on the basis of the respondents’ reported well-being yesterday with regard to feeling well-rested, being treated with respect all day, smiling or laughing a lot, learning or doing something interesting, experiencing enjoyment or love, feeling proud about something that they did, and expressing a general desire for more days like yesterday. Gallup also constructs a negative experience index on the basis of the reported experience of physical pain, worry, sadness, stress, anger, and depression. Examining such experiences rather than other types of evaluations of life, such as happiness, we find that the share reporting positive emotions exceeds the share with negative feelings for all 34 sub-Saharan African countries with available data. As such, all affect balance scores for these nations are positive, with a regional mean of 42.1, ranging from 16 in Togo to 59 in Lesotho (Fig. 7.16).

From a comparative perspective, the region has an average affect level that exceeds that

found in South Asia (31.9), the Middle East and North Africa (33.6), and Europe and central Asia (35.1). The highest affect balance scores are found in East Asia and the Pacific (50.5) and in Latin America and the Caribbean (49.3). Sub-Saharan Africa therefore has a higher average affect balance score than one might expect given the multiple social challenges that continue to beleaguer the subcontinent. This score, as in Latin America, is buoyed partly by a fairly high level of positive feelings reported among the region’s population. Nearly two fifths of the sub-Saharan African countries (13 out of 34) had a positive experience score exceeding 70, with the highest scores evident in Nigeria (78), Lesotho (77), and Malawi (76), whereas only two African countries (Togo and Madagascar) were in the bottom ten countries in terms of positive emotions worldwide. In addition, those regions of the world with the lowest rankings include countries that face lower than average positive affect coupled with a high degree of negative emotion. This situation exists in nations such as Iraq



**Fig. 7.17** Growth of Islam and Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa since 1900 (Pew Forum on Religion & Political Life 2010; used with permission)

(-9)<sup>12</sup>; Palestine (16) and Egypt (19) among the Arab states; Pakistan (22), Iran (23), and Afghanistan (29) in South Asia; and Armenia (12), Serbia (16), and Turkey (19) in Europe and central Asia. Individuals living in Togo, Angola, and Sierra Leone are similarly predisposed toward experiencing a high level of negative emotion on a daily basis, and all three countries are in the top quartile of the negative emotion distribution. The resilience of sub-Saharan Africans to social and economic hardship is evident from the Positive and Negative Experience Index data.

#### 7.6.3.4 The Spirit Level: Religion and Well-Being

A majority of people living in sub-Saharan Africa express a robust commitment to the beliefs and practices associated with Christianity or Islam. A 2010 report by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that at least 90 % of all respondents across 19 countries surveyed<sup>13</sup>

in the region indicated they belonged to one of these two religions, with slightly more than a tenth (13 %) affiliated with a traditional African religion and only a nominal share religiously unaffiliated (Fig. 7.17). This picture has altered markedly over the last century, with Muslims and Christians accounting for barely more than a fifth of the population in 1900, whereas two thirds followed a traditional African religion. The rising dominance of Christianity and Islam does not, however, mean that traditional beliefs and practices have fallen away. In fact, a quarter of all respondents (including 20 % of Christians, 26 % of Muslims) exhibited high levels of traditional beliefs.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, in contemporary societies in the region, the commitment to Islam or Christianity tends to coexist with involvement in traditional African religions. The distribution of religions exhibits a distinct geographic pattern: Northern Africa is predominantly

<sup>12</sup>Iraq has the lowest affect balance score of 148 countries in the 2011 Gallup World Poll and is the only country with a negative overall score. This result is attributable to an exceptionally high level of negative affect (59) in contrast with a relatively low experience of positive emotion (50).

<sup>13</sup>More than 25,000 face-to-face interviews were conducted across Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Collectively, these countries account for about three quarters of the region's population.

<sup>14</sup>These scores were obtained by means of an index created from 11 indicators: These indicators included belief in (i) the protective power of certain spiritual people; (ii) the power of juju and other sacred objects; (iii) the evil eye; (iv) witchcraft; (v) evil spirits; (vi) the protective power of sacrificial offerings to ancestors; and (vii) reincarnation. Traditional religious practices were captured by four items asking about (viii) visiting traditional healers; (ix) owning sacred objects; (x) participating in ceremonies to honor ancestors; and (xi) participating in traditional puberty rituals. Those saying they believed or did six of these things were classified by Pew as having high levels of traditional beliefs and practices.

Muslim, southern Africa is heavily Christian, and a more even affiliation is evident in countries between these poles, stretching in a horizontal band across the continent from Senegal to Somalia.

A further examination of the Pew data reveals that sub-Saharan Africa unquestionably remains one of the most religious regions of the world. In most of the countries surveyed, around 90 % of people stated that religion is an important part of their lives. Even in middle income countries such as Botswana and Namibia, where the importance attached to religion is slightly lower (69 % and 74 %, respectively), more people reported that religion was an important part of their lives than in the industrialized countries such as the United States (57 %). Despite prevailing stereotypes, a clear majority of citizens across the region expressed the view that people of other faiths have widespread freedom to practice their religion (ranging from a low of 65 % in Djibouti to a high of 93 % in Senegal) and considered this view as a positive attribute of their country. These findings, however, do not imply that the region is uniformly a place of religious harmony. On average, 28 % of those interviewed reported that conflict between religious groups is a significant problem in their countries, with more than half the population voicing such concern in Nigeria, Rwanda, and Djibouti. People across the region also displayed a fair amount of uneasiness about religious extremism, with at least half of respondents in 11 of the 19 countries saying they were very or somewhat worried about this phenomenon. A sizable majority, however, expressed the view that the perpetration of violence against civilians in order to defend one's religion is rarely or never justifiable. Notable minorities do regard such violence as justified, ranging from 20 % on average to a high of more than 50 % in countries such as Guinea-Bissau and Djibouti.

## 7.6.4 The Millennial Challenge: Rapid Social Change

### 7.6.4.1 Population Growth and Urbanization

One of the most populous sub-Saharan African countries, Nigeria, experienced a fourfold increase in population since independence in 1960, and its population is expected to increase to 500 million by 2050 and to more than 900 million by 2100 (Mills 2014: 108).


At the time of independence, sub-Saharan Africa was populated mainly by rural subsistence agriculturalists. Only approximately 15 % of the population were city dwellers. Since the 1960s, urbanization has increased rapidly in line with world trends, and twice as many people lived in cities by 2012—some 37 % of the population (Fig. 7.18). However, urbanization rates vary widely over the region. From 50 % to 62 % of the population is urbanized in South Africa, Botswana, Angola, Ghana, and Nigeria. In contrast, Ethiopia's rate of urbanization increased only from 6 % in 1960 to 18 % in 2012.

People have moved to cities in search of economic opportunities, access to services, and a better quality of life. The question is whether greater concentrations of people in cities will improve access to economic opportunities and delivery of infrastructure and services. In Kenya, for example, over 60 % of the urban population live in slums and are deprived of central and local government services owing to antiquated town planning laws. The majority of slum dwellers are underemployed in the informal sector (see Mills 2014: 38ff).


### 7.6.4.2 The Mobile Phone Revolution

The legacy of sub-Saharan Africa's oral tradition may have spurred enthusiasm for cellular phone connectivity. Telecommunications may be one of the most readily adopted innovations in twenty-first century Africa, which has leapfrogged earlier stages of technological advances (Fig. 7.19).





**Fig. 7.18** Urbanization in sub-Saharan African and the world, 1960–2012 (Data from the World Bank 2014)



**Fig. 7.19** Mobile cellular phone subscriptions, 1995–2012 (per 100,000 people) (Data from the World Bank)

Most households in sub-Saharan Africa may never have had access to a landline telephone (only 1.2 % of people in the region had a telephone line in 2013) (World Bank 2014)<sup>15</sup>, but the first mobile phone has become a rite of passage for many teenagers. Mobile phone technol-

ogy has been used in innovative ways to improve quality of life in many domains, including health, finance, education, and family and social relations. In Kenya, for example, mobile phones are used for cash transfers. By 2011, some 40 % of the population or approximately 17 million people were subscribers to M-Pesa, a digital banking system. In South Africa, people living with HIV are reminded to take their ART by text messaging.

<sup>15</sup>Only three countries had figures exceeding 10 %, namely Mauritius (29 %), Seychelles (23 %), and Cabo Verde (13 %).

### 7.6.5 Well-Being Among Minorities in Sub-Saharan Africa

Until recently, the majority of people living in sub-Saharan Africa might be regarded as disadvantaged minorities despite their being majorities in terms of their numbers. Although many sub-Saharan Africans have seen positive changes in their life chances since the 1960s, a number of groups in society fare worse than others.

#### 7.6.5.1 Urban Slum Dwellers

The depressed quality of life of the growing proportion of slum dwellers among the urban poor was discussed previously. Slum dwellers are overrepresented among the informally and marginally employed if they can find a source of income. They have become the new second-class citizens in their own countries with less access to services and to a political voice.

#### 7.6.5.2 Women

There is a saying in Africa: “You strike a woman, you strike a rock,” alluding to African women as the backbone of society. The World Happiness Report 2013 (Helliwell et al. 2013) reported that well-being among the women of sub-Saharan Africa is lower than that of men. Customary tribal law codified during the colonial period and still recognized today has, in some instances, halted the emancipation of women in many regions of sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, women in most societies have enjoyed equal access to education since independence, and a number of countries have introduced quotas for women to serve in public office, where they can exert influence on creating better opportunities and protection for women’s rights. Land rights for women are regarded as vital for food production to feed Africa’s growing population.

#### 7.6.5.3 Indigenous People

The descendants of Africa’s first people, the hunter-gathers, who prefer to be known as the San or Bushmen, were gradually dispersed by the Bantu who migrated to southern Africa and

later by white settlers. Bushmen could be shot like vermin until 1937 in Namibia and until 1926 in South Africa (Grant-Marshall 2013). Hunters could apply for a licence to shoot a number of bucks and a wildebeest along with a male and a female Bushman. More recently, the extraordinary skills of San trackers have been appreciated but also exploited by regional defense forces and commercial organizations. Today, a dwindling number of Bushmen continue to preserve their way of life in the areas reserved for them in Botswana and Namibia; others have chosen to integrate into modern society where they mainly occupy the lowest social stratum. Similarly, the well-being and survival of other indigenous people, including the pygmy peoples of central Africa, the Hadza of East Africa, and the Cimba (also Tjimba) of southern Africa, are at stake in the twenty-first century.

#### 7.6.5.4 Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex People

Although South Africa’s Constitution guarantees the rights of people regardless of gender, race, and religious and sexual persuasion and recognizes marriage between same-sex partners, homosexuals are threatened with imprisonment or even death in some countries to the north.

#### 7.6.5.5 Refugees and Displaced People

Lastly, four of the world’s top refugee-producing countries (Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Eritrea) are in Africa. Of the estimated 16.7 million refugees worldwide, 2.3 million or close to 14 % are in Africa. Of the 33.3 million internally displaced persons in the world, half or 16.8 million are displaced in African countries. Although various United Nations conventions provide for the rights of refugees, refugees are placed in conflict with members of host societies and may become targets of xenophobia. Similarly, the well-being of displaced persons is depressed economically and socially.

## 7.7 Conclusions: Imagining Future Sub-Saharan Well-Being

### 7.7.1 Sub-Saharan Africa's Glass Is Half Full

Social indicators for sub-Saharan Africa tell a promising story. On balance, the gains in life expectancy, literacy, and standards of living suggest that people in the region are better off since independence. A number of countries met their MDGs by the target date of 2015; others will reset their aims to achieve the new Sustainable Development Goals. According to the WISP, a majority of sub-Saharan countries have experienced progress. Levels of happiness increased between 2005 and 2012; twice as many sub-Saharan countries experienced rising rather than falling levels of happiness according to the 2013 World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al. 2013). But levels of happiness in the sub-Saharan countries are lower than those in all other regions of the world and there is room for improvement. People expect better performances from their governments, which need to address issues ranging from corruption to fixing infrastructure that has suffered from years of “maintenance-free abuse,” to cite Mills (2014: 267). Sub-Saharan wealth has benefited mainly a small elite. In past decades, the elite have enriched themselves with oil wealth at the expense of the poor in a number of sub-Saharan countries. The emergence of a middle class has not contributed to levelling of economic differences in society, and rapid urbanization has created slums of despair rather than hope. Therefore, an urgent task in the twenty-first century will be to grasp the opportunities in the African Rising narrative and to take a long view on how best to increase the life chances and happiness of a greater number of people in the region. The prospects are promising.

#### 7.7.1.1 From “Basket Case” to the World’s Food Basket

For millennia Africa has struggled to produce enough food to feed its people. Consequently, it only reached its full population growth potential in the middle of the twentieth century. In the twenty-first century, sub-Saharan Africa has the highest fertility rates in the world, and it is estimated that the sub-Saharan population will double to two billion by the end of the century. One of the new challenges for Africa’s decision makers will be to provide food security for a rapidly growing population. Meeting this goal will require good governance and prudent resource management. The green revolution that accompanied rapid population growth in Asia in the twentieth century bypassed Africa, and climate change may pose a greater threat to Africa’s food production than elsewhere. Many sub-Saharan countries currently import food. However, agricultural experts are of the opinion that Africa could become the world’s food basket if it realizes its potential for combining subsistence agriculture with agribusiness (Bourne 2014).

Whereas earlier explorers, colonial powers, and post-independence investors were interested in exploiting Africa’s gold, mineral, and oil and gas reserves, it is now agricultural land that is up for grabs. Between 2006 and 2009, an estimated 15–20 million hectares of land—roughly the combined area of Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Macedonia—were the subject of negotiation for foreign investment by African governments (Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen 2010). As has been the case with oil and gas reserves in sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural reserves could become a burden rather than a blessing for the people of the region. The land grab has already displaced thousands of subsistence farmers who can no longer feed their families and have effectively joined the refugee population of sub-Saharan Africa. It will therefore be important that the

neocolonial scramble for Africa's agricultural land not jeopardize food security but enhance quality of life in the region. There are promising signs that African leaders are becoming more careful when managing agricultural and wildlife resources and more circumspect when partnering with international investors to ensure that returns stay in the country and benefit their people.

### **7.7.1.2 Turning the Youth Bulge into a Youth Dividend**

Africa's presidents for life, the "Big Men" who cling to power, may be out of touch with the aspirations of the youth in their countries. Only four African leaders voluntarily left power between 1960 and 1990, and in 2014, 15 heads of state in sub-Saharan Africa have ruled for over 20 years. The youth uprising in Burkina Faso, which forced President Blaise Compaoré to resign after 27 years in power in November 2014, could set the stage for a new era of inclusive government. A telling fact is that 46 % of Burkina Faso's population is under 15 years of age. Burkina Faso's regime change may be taken as a warning that the Arab Spring could ignite a Harmattan Spring south of the Sahara—the Harmattan is a wind that travels from the Saharan desert to West Africa every November. African leaders are fast becoming aware that if sub-Saharan youth lack avenues for social mobility and a political voice, they may resort to staging protests at home or seek to fulfill their dreams beyond African shores. An additional concern is that disillusioned, frustrated youth may become easy recruits for extremist groups intent on

destabilizing society. Sub-Saharan leaders are increasingly taking such threats seriously.

Africa is a youthful continent; its youth represent a development potential. However, this potential can only be tapped if sub-Saharan youth are afforded opportunities to access quality education and acquire the types of skills that will enable them to contribute to a modern economy. To date, most African economies have not been able to absorb new entrants to the labor market. An encouraging development is that Africa is starting to experiment with training young people to become self-employed as entrepreneurs and is making attempts to include the youth in shaping their economic opportunities.

### **7.7.2 Summary**

Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced dramatic changes in the past 60 years. Substantial improvements that have occurred in living standards and human development are reflected in rising levels of well-being. Nonetheless, the people of the region are still among the least happy in the world, which belies the patronizing impression of cheerful, smiling Africans who love to sing and dance at every occasion. It is this positive outlook on life that has kept Africa going for centuries; the history of well-being in Africa south of the Sahara is one of resilience combined with faith in a better life. It is possible that the dream of a happy "African Century" may yet become a reality for the generations to come.

## Supplemental Tables

### Supplemental Table 7.1 Demography

#### SOCIAL INDICATORS: Demography

#### REGION: Africa (N = 44)

	Country Source	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
East Africa	Burundi	2.8	4.8	9.2	10.5	1.9	3.2	3.4	3.1	2.1	5.2	10.6	11.8
East Africa	Comoros	0.2	0.4	0.7	0.8	1.7	2.7	2.5	2.4	12.6	25.5	27.9	28.2
East Africa	Djibouti	0.1	0.4	0.8	0.9	4.9	4.6	1.5	1.5	50.3	74.9	77.0	77.3
East Africa	Eritrea	1.4	2.8	5.7	6.5	2.3	3.2	3.2	3.2	9.8	15.2	20.6	22.2
East Africa	Ethiopia	22.2	40.8	87.1	96.5	2.2	3.2	2.6	2.5	6.4	11.5	17.3	19.0
East Africa	Kenya	8.1	19.7	40.9	45.5	3.1	3.7	2.7	2.7	7.4	16.1	23.6	25.2
East Africa	Madagascar	5.1	10.0	21.1	23.6	2.4	2.7	2.8	2.8	10.6	20.9	31.9	34.5
East Africa	Malawi	3.5	7.3	15.0	16.8	2.2	4.3	3.0	2.8	4.4	10.2	15.5	16.1
East Africa	Mauritius	0.7	1.0	1.3	1.3	2.9	0.8	0.2	0.2	33.2	42.3	40.6	39.8
East Africa	Mozambique	7.6	13.3	24.0	26.5	1.9	1.0	2.6	2.4	4.8	18.3	31.0	31.9
East Africa	Rwanda	2.9	6.1	10.8	12.1	2.5	4.0	2.9	2.7	2.6	5.1	24.0	27.8
East Africa	Somalia	2.8	6.1	9.6	10.8	2.1	-0.7	2.7	2.9	17.3	28.1	37.3	39.1
East Africa	Tanzania	10.1	21.8	45.0	50.8	2.9	3.1	3.0	3.0	5.2	16.8	28.1	30.9
East Africa	Uganda	6.8	14.7	34.0	38.8	3.0	3.3	3.4	3.3	4.4	9.2	14.5	15.8
East Africa	Zambia	3.1	6.8	13.2	15.0	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.3	18.1	39.7	38.7	40.5
Middle Africa	Angola	5.0	9.1	19.5	22.1	1.8	3.1	3.2	3.1	10.4	22.5	40.1	43.3
Middle Africa	Cameroon	5.4	10.4	20.6	22.8	2.0	3.0	2.6	2.5	13.9	36.2	51.5	53.8
Middle Africa	Central African Rep	1.5	2.6	4.3	4.7	1.6	2.6	1.9	2.0	20.1	35.5	38.8	39.8
Middle Africa	Chad	3.0	5.1	11.7	13.2	1.9	2.7	3.0	3.0	6.7	19.8	22.0	22.3
Middle Africa	Congo, Rep	1.0	2.1	4.1	4.6	2.5	2.9	2.9	2.5	31.6	52.2	63.2	65.0
Middle Africa	Congo, Dem Rep	15.2	30.0	62.2	69.4	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.7	22.3	28.5	39.9	42.0
Middle Africa	Gabon	0.5	0.8	1.6	1.7	0.9	2.7	2.4	2.3	17.4	62.4	85.7	86.9
Southern Africa	Botswana	0.5	1.2	2.0	2.0	2.3	3.3	0.9	0.9	3.1	26.7	56.2	57.2



Southern Africa	Lesotho	0.9	1.5	2.0	2.1	1.7	2.0	1.0	1.1	3.5	11.8	24.8	26.8
Southern Africa	Namibia	0.6	1.1	2.2	2.3	2.4	3.3	1.6	1.9	17.9	26.4	41.6	45.7
Southern Africa	South Africa	17.4	31.3	50.8	54.0	2.5	2.6	1.5	1.6	46.6	49.4	62.2	64.3
Southern Africa	Swaziland	0.3	0.7	1.2	1.3	2.4	3.6	1.6	1.4	3.9	21.8	21.5	21.3
Southern Africa	Zimbabwe	3.8	8.9	13.1	14.6	3.2	3.8	1.4	3.1	12.6	25.4	33.2	32.5
West Africa	Benin	2.4	4.3	9.5	10.6	1.3	2.9	2.9	2.6	9.3	30.8	41.9	43.5
West Africa	Burkina-Faso	4.8	7.7	15.5	17.4	1.4	2.6	2.9	2.8	4.7	12.3	25.7	29.0
West Africa	Cape Verde	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	2.0	1.9	0.4	0.9	16.7	31.5	61.8	64.8
West Africa	Cote d'Ivoire	3.5	10.2	19.0	20.8	3.4	3.9	2.0	2.4	17.7	37.9	50.6	53.5
West Africa	Gambia	0.4	0.7	1.7	1.9	3.0	4.3	3.2	3.2	12.1	33.0	56.3	59.0
West Africa	Ghana	6.7	12.7	24.3	26.4	3.2	3.2	2.4	2.1	23.3	32.9	50.7	53.4
West Africa	Guinea-Bissau	0.6	0.9	1.6	1.7	1.1	2.3	2.3	2.4	13.6	22.4	45.2	48.6
West Africa	Guinea	3.6	5.1	10.9	12.0	1.6	2.8	2.6	2.5	10.5	26.6	34.9	36.7
West Africa	Liberia	1.1	2.2	4.0	4.4	2.2	1.5	3.5	2.4	18.6	42.4	47.8	49.3
West Africa	Mali	5.1	7.4	14.0	15.8	1.0	1.7	3.1	3.0	11.1	21.0	36.0	39.1
West Africa	Mauritania	0.9	1.8	3.6	4.0	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.4	6.9	35.0	56.7	59.3
West Africa	Nigeria	45.2	83.9	159.7	178.5	2.0	2.6	2.7	2.8	15.4	25.6	43.5	46.9
West Africa	Niger	3.3	6.7	15.9	18.5	2.7	2.8	3.8	3.9	5.8	14.5	17.6	18.5
West Africa	Senegal	3.2	6.4	13.0	14.5	2.7	3.0	2.8	2.9	23.0	37.5	42.2	43.4
West Africa	Sierra Leone	2.2	3.6	5.8	6.2	1.3	2.6	1.9	1.8	17.4	32.0	38.2	39.6
West Africa	Togo	1.6	3.3	6.3	7.0	1.3	3.5	2.6	2.6	10.1	26.6	37.5	39.5
	East Africa (N = 15)	5.2	10.4	21.2	23.8	2.6	2.8	2.6	2.6	12.6	22.6	29.2	30.7
	Middle Africa (N = 7)	4.5	8.6	17.7	19.8	1.9	2.8	2.7	2.6	17.5	36.7	48.8	50.4

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 7.1** (continued)

	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban				
	Country	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
	Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
Southern Africa (N = 6)	3.9	7.4	11.9	12.7	2.4	3.1	1.3	1.7	14.6	26.9	39.9	41.3	
West Africa (N = 16)	5.3	9.8	19.1	21.3	2.1	2.8	2.6	2.5	13.5	28.9	42.9	45.3	
Regional average	4.9	9.5	18.6	20.7	2.3	2.8	2.5	2.4	14.0	27.7	38.8	40.6	

Population: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship – except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates

% Population growth rate: Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage

% Urban: Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

i World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

j World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

k World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

l World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

**Supplemental Table 7.2** Education  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Education**  
**REGION: Africa (N= 44)**

	Country	% Secondary school enrollment			% Adult literacy			% Tertiary education		
		1985	2010	2013–2014	1985	2010	2013–2014	1985	2010	2013–2014
	Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
East Africa	Burundi	3.6	23.1	33.1	33.8	86.9	86.9	0.6	3.2	4.5
East Africa	Comoros	37.4	...	63.9	...	...	75.9	...	6.3	10
East Africa	Djibouti	10.0	33.3	47.7	...	...	...	0.0	3.4	4.9
East Africa	Eritrea	...	...	...	...	...	70.5	...	2.0	2.0
East Africa	Ethiopia	12.5	29.0	...	24.3	39.0	...	0.5	2.8	...
East Africa	Kenya	39.6	60.1	67.0	...	72.2	...	1.3	4.0	...
East Africa	Madagascar	34.1	30.4	38.4	...	64.5	...	4.1	3.6	4.2
East Africa	Malawi	17.1	32.7	36.6	48.5	61.3	...	0.5	0.7	0.8
East Africa	Mauritius	44.5	93.2	95.9	...	89.2	...	1.1	34.2	41.2
East Africa	Mozambique	7.1	25.3	26.0	...	50.6	...	0.1	4.6	5.2
East Africa	Rwanda	16.3	30.1	32.6	...	65.9	...	0.4	5.8	7.9
East Africa	Somalia	11.6	7.4	...	...	...	...	2.8	...	...
East Africa	Tanzania	3.4	31.6	33.0	59.1	67.8	...	0.3	2.1	3.7
East Africa	Uganda	9.1	26.4	26.9	...	73.2	...	0.8	3.9	4.4
East Africa	Zambia	18.4	...	20.1	...	61.4	...	1.5	2.0	...
Middle Africa	Angola	11.7	31.3	...	41.0	...	70.6	0.6	7.5	7.5
Middle Africa	Cameroon	21.6	39.6	52.2	...	71.3	...	2.1	11	11.9
Middle Africa	Central African Rep	15.3	14.0	17.8	33.6	36.8	...	1.1	2.6	2.8
Middle Africa	Chad	6.2	22.9	22.8	...	...	37.3	0.4	2.1	2.3
Middle Africa	Congo, Rep	64.1	...	53.7	59.6	79.3	...	5.8	6.5	9.6
Middle Africa	Congo, Dem Rep	24.0	40.9	43.4	...	61.2	...	1.4	6.8	6.9
Middle Africa	Gabon	35.3	37.5	...	...	...	82.3	5.5	5.5	...
Southern Africa	Botswana	28.0	81.7	...	...	...	86.7	1.8	17.0	24.8
Southern Africa	Lesotho	21.6	50.4	53.3	...	75.8	...	1.3	10.8	10.2
Southern Africa	Namibia	36.1	64.8	...	...	76.5	...	...	9.3	...
Southern Africa	South Africa	...	95.4	110.8	...	92.9	93.7	...	...	19.7
Southern Africa	Swaziland	37.6	58.0	60.7	67.2	83.1	...	4.4	6.0	5.3
Southern Africa	Zimbabwe	41.5	...	47.2	77.8	83.6	...	1.8	6.2	5.8
West Africa	Benin	18.7	47.7	54.2	...	28.7	...	2.0	13.3	12.4
West Africa	Burkina-Faso	3.8	21.9	28.4	...	28.7	...	0.6	3.6	4.8
West Africa	Cape Verde	11.1	87.8	95.7	...	...	85.3	...	18	22.8
West Africa	Cote d'Ivoire	18.9	...	39.1	34.1	...	41.0	2.4	8.4	9.1
West Africa	Gambia	18.3	57.5	...	...	...	52.0	...	...	...
West Africa	Ghana	37.5	58.3	67.1	...	71.5	...	1.6	8.8	14.3
West Africa	Guinea-Bissau	12.3	34.5	...	...	...	56.7	...	2.6	...
West Africa	Guinea	17.0	38.1	38.1	...	25.3	...	2.5	10.3	10.4
West Africa	Liberia	...	45.2	37.9	32.1	42.9	...	2.6	9.3	11.6
West Africa	Mali	7.2	42.4	44.9	18.8	31.1	33.6	1.2	6.5	7.5
West Africa	Mauritania	14.4	20.3	29.5	35.1	45.5	...	1.7	4.4	5.4
West Africa	Nigeria	29.2	43.8	...	...	51.1	...	3.4	10.4	...
West Africa	Niger	4.9	13.8	18.3	10.9	...	15.5	0.6	1.5	1.8

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 7.2** (continued)

	Country	% Secondary school enrollment			% Adult literacy			% Tertiary education		
		1985	2010	2013–2014	1985	2010	2013–2014	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i
West Africa	Senegal	12.6	36.4	41.0	26.9	49.7	52.1	2.4	7.6	...
West Africa	Sierra Leone	19.5	45.7	44.7	...	...	44.5	0.7	1.5	...
West Africa	Togo	18.6	54.9	...	...	57.1	60.4	1.6	9.1	10.0
	East Africa (N = 15)	18.9	38.1	39.8	41.4	67.6	67.6	1.1	6.2	6.7
	Middle Africa (N = 7)	25.5	33.7	37.0	44.7	62.7	62.7	2.4	6.1	6.6
	Southern Africa (N = 6)	33.0	66.3	69.8	72.5	83.1	83.2	2.3	11.5	12.5
	West Africa (N = 16)	16.3	43.5	45.6	26.3	46.5	45.9	1.8	7.9	8.8
	Regional average	20.8	43.9	45.7	40.2	61.3	60.7	1.7	7.6	8.2

% Secondary school enrollment: Gross enrollment ratio. Secondary. All programs. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percent-age of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100 % due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition. For the 1985 category, the actual year of value ranges between 1984 and 1986. For the 2010 category, the actual year of values ranges between 2007 and 2013. Lastly, for the 2013–2014 category, the actual year of values ranges between 2006 and 2014

% Adult literacy: Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, 'literacy' also encompasses 'numeracy', the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100. For the 1985 category, the actual year of values ranges between 1982 and 1988. For the 2010 category, the actual year of values ranges between 2007 and 2012. Lastly, for the 2013–2014 category, the actual year of values ranges between 2006 and 2014

% Tertiary education: Gross enrollment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percent-age of the total population of the 5-year age group following on from secondary school leaving

a

b World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

c World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

d World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

e UNESCO (2002) – Estimated Illiteracy Rate and Illiterate Population Aged 15 Years and Older by Country, 1970–2015, Paris

f World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

g World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

h World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

i

j World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

k World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

l World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

**Supplemental Table 7.3** Health  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Health**  
**REGION: Africa (N= 44)**

Country	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1k live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate		TB incidence per 100k		
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	2010	2013–2014	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
East Africa																	
Burundi	41.2	48.6	52.6	54.1	147.4	106.8	60.9	54.8	249.3	177.2	93.6	82.9	820.0	740.0	48.5	195.0	128.0
Comoros	43.4	54.0	60.2	60.9		101.8	62.8	57.9		147.2	85.5	77.9	380.0	350.0	58.4	36.0	34.0
Djibouti	44.0	55.5	60.3	61.8		103.0	62.1	57.4		134.2	76.1	69.6	250.0	230.0	533.2	620.0	619.0
Eritrea	37.4	45.0	61.2	62.8		105.6	39.4	36.1		175.1	55.6	49.9	450.0	380.0		121.0	92.0
Ethiopia	38.4	44.6	61.5	63.6		131.8	50.7	44.4		223.0	75.6	64.4	500.0	420.0	175.9	341.0	224.0
Kenya	46.4	59.5	59.5	61.7	118.5	62.4	52.0	47.5	199.0	96.3	79.5	70.7	460.0	400.0	53.2	361.0	268.0
Madagascar	40.0	49.7	63.3	64.7		110.1	43.6	39.6		183.4	63.0	56.0	480.0	440.0	32.3	262.0	233.0
Malawi	37.8	46.1	53.5	55.2		148.7	52.5	44.2	375.1	251.7	82.7	67.9	540.0	510.0	73.4	353.0	156.0
Mauritius	58.7	68.4	73.0	74.5	67.7	23.7	13.3	12.5	102.0	28.4	15.2	14.3	72.0	73.0	10.9	23.0	21.0
Mozambique	35.0	42.9	49.1	50.2	186.1	167.7	71.8	61.5	279.9	251.6	102.5	87.2	540.0	480.0	39.0	523.0	552.0
Rwanda	42.2	49.3	62.2	64.0	128.0	96.8	43.6	37.1	216.1	158.4	63.6	52.0	390.0	320.0	21.7	101.0	69.0
Somalia	37.0	46.2	54.0	55.0		111.8	97.1	89.8		186.5	159.0	145.6	930.0	850.0	44.9	285.0	285.0
Tanzania	43.7	51.2	59.2	61.5	144.1	106.6	41.4	36.4	243.8	176.7	61.4	51.8	460.0	410.0	62.7	215.0	164.0
Uganda	44.0	49.2	57.3	59.2	133.5	113.0	51.3	43.8	225.9	188.4	78.4	66.1	410.0	360.0	9.5	304.0	166.0
Zambia	45.1	48.3	54.5	58.1	123.1	105.6	63.5	55.8	207.2	174.6	101.4	87.4	320.0	280.0	120.6	564.0	410.0
Middle Africa																	
Angola	33.0	40.8	50.7	51.9		134.5	109.6	101.6		227.6	182.4	167.4	530.0	460.0	95.5	275.0	320.0
Cameroon	41.5	52.8	53.7	55.0	166.0	92.1	66.0	60.8	280.1	149.7	104.4	94.5	640.0	590.0	32.7	311.0	235.0
Central African Rep	36.5	48.4	48.1	50.1	157.6	116.4	102.7	96.1	266.5	179.4	152.6	139.2	960.0	880.0	19.8	687.0	359.0
Chad	38.0	45.9	49.8	51.2		121.7	93.7	88.5		228.5	160.4	147.5	1100.0	980.0	29.2	151.0	151.0
Congo, Rep	48.6	56.7	57.2	58.8	108.8	63.6	42.0	35.6	181.0	98.4	60.1	49.1	450.0	410.0	127.4	426.0	382.0
Congo, Dem Rep	41.0	46.9	49.0	49.9		119.2	92.4	86.1		185.2	130.7	118.5	810.0	730.0	86.8	327.0	326.0
Gabon	39.6	59.0	62.3	63.4		64.5	43.2	39.1		100.0	63.5	56.1	260.0	240.0	103.5	592.0	423.0

(continued)



**Supplemental Table 7.3** (continued)

Country	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1k live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate		TB incidence per 100k		
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	2010	2013–2014	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q
<b>Southern Africa</b>																	
Botswana	50.5	63.0	46.4	47.4	116.0	44.1	39.9	36.3	170.4	56.7	52.4	46.6	210.0	170.0	228.4	728.0	414.0
Lesotho	46.5	56.3	47.5	49.3	141.8	76.9	76.9	73.0	189.8	96.6	108.6	98.0	540.0	490.0	199.4	1279.0	916.0
Namibia	46.9	59.8	62.5	64.3		56.9	37.5	35.2		86.5	55.7	49.8	160.0	130.0	421.1	1518.0	651.0
South Africa	49.0	59.9	54.4	56.7		54.9	35.2	32.8		73.2	53.2	43.9	140.0	140.0	189.6	932.0	860.0
Swaziland	44.2	57.4	48.3	48.9	140.2	64.2	62.5	55.9	209.2	87.8	94.0	80.0	350.0	310.0	155.6	1157.0	1382.0
Zimbabwe	51.5	61.4	53.6	59.8	92.5	53.2	58.7	55.0	150.5	79.8	96.0	88.5	610.0	470.0	53.7	801.0	552.0
<b>West Africa</b>																	
Benin	37.3	49.9	58.7	59.3	191.8	118.7	62.1	56.2	321.9	199.2	95.7	85.3	370.0	340.0	47.6	73.0	70.0
Burkina-Faso	34.5	49.3	55.0	56.3	162.8	108.9	70.0	64.1	351.0	218.9	114.4	97.6	440.0	400.0	58.8	64.0	54.0
Cape Verde	49.0	63.6	73.9	74.9		57.9	23.3	21.9		78.0	27.8	26.0	58.0	53.0	78.3	153.0	143.0
Cote d'Ivoire	36.9	52.6	49.7	50.8	208.8	105.8	76.9	71.3	311.6	153.7	109.3	100.0	750.0	720.0	56.4	267.0	170.0
Gambia	32.0	50.0	58.1	58.8	148.5	91.0	51.8	49.4	362.8	203.1	81.7	73.8	460.0	430.0		191.0	173.0
Ghana	45.8	54.1	60.6	61.1	124.7	95.1	55.0	52.3	210.3	155.3	83.2	78.4	410.0	380.0	25.4	119.0	66.0
Guinea-Bissau	42.1	47.3	53.6	54.3		142.6	84.5	77.9	286.5	241.3	135.9	123.9	600.0	560.0	58.2	361.0	387.0
Guinea	34.9	45.5	55.3	56.1	211.1	155.3	71.4	64.9	352.2	262.5	112.2	100.7	690.0	650.0	26.0	210.0	177.0
Liberia	34.8	47.3	59.4	60.5	222.1	156.3	60.4	53.6	330.6	234.4	81.9	71.1	680.0	640.0	19.3	267.0	308.0
Mali	28.2	43.5	53.8	55.0	243.3	143.5	83.1	77.6	497.9	284.5	137.1	122.7	600.0	550.0	21.9	69.0	60.0
Mauritania	43.5	56.9	61.0	61.5	134.5	85.9	70.2	67.1	254.8	138.4	98.2	90.1	360.0	320.0	249.3	181.0	115.0
Nigeria	37.2	46.3	51.3	52.5	186.4	125.3	81.9	74.3	313.3	211.3	131.1	117.4	610.0	560.0	17.8	343.0	338.0
Niger	35.5	41.7	57.0	58.4		139.4	66.1	59.9		331.6	123.5	104.2	690.0	630.0	10.4	143.0	102.0
Senegal	38.2	53.9	62.8	63.4	126.0	81.0	47.2	43.9	302.4	173.3	66.3	55.3	360.0	320.0	16.5	141.0	136.0
Sierra Leone	30.3	40.3	44.8	45.6	222.9	163.3	114.4	107.2	394.8	279.1	175.3	160.6	1200.0	1100.0	24.1	316.0	313.0
Togo	40.3	54.6	55.5	56.5	162.7	97.0	60.5	55.8	274.7	158.7	92.9	84.7	480.0	450.0	22.9	76.0	73.0
East Africa (N = 15)	42.3	50.6	58.8	60.9	131.1	106.4	53.7	47.9	233.1	170.2	79.5	69.6	466.8	416.2	91.7	286.9	228.1

Middle Africa (N = 7)	39.7	50.1	53.0	54.3	144.1	101.7	78.5	72.5	242.5	167.0	122.0	110.3	678.6	612.9	70.7	395.6	313.7
Southern Africa (N = 6)	48.1	59.6	52.1	54.4	122.6	58.4	51.8	48.0	180.0	80.1	76.7	67.8	335.0	285.0	208.0	1069.2	795.8
West Africa (N = 16)	37.5	49.8	56.9	57.8	180.4	116.7	67.4	62.3	326.1	207.7	104.2	93.2	547.4	506.4	48.9	185.9	167.8
Regional average	40.9	51.4	56.3	57.8	154.2	102.8	62.4	57.1	270.4	171.0	94.9	84.4	511.8	462.4	89.5	374.1	297.2

Avg. years life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same through-out its life

Infant <1/1k live born: Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching 1 year of age, per 1000 live births in a given year

Child mortality <5/1K: Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year

Maternal mortality rate: Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births. The data are estimated with a regression model using information on the proportion of maternal deaths among non-AIDS deaths in women ages 15–49, fertility, birth attendants, and GDP. No maternal mortality ratio values are included for 1960 and 1985 due to a lack of available statistics. The only exceptions were Mauritius, with a MMR of 154.4 in 1960 and 98 in 1985, and Zimbabwe with a MMR of 78.1 in 1985

TB incidence per 100k: Incidence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of new pulmonary, smear positive, and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis cases. Incidence includes patients with HIV. No TB incidence values are included for the region in 1960 due to a lack of available statistics

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

i World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

j World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

k World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

l World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

m World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

n World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

o <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>; Note: these values do not account for population coverage, so they will be lower than the actual value

p World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

q World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

**Supplemental Table 7.4** Africa – Income  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Income**  
**REGION: Africa (N = 44)**

Country	GDP (Billions of constant 2005 USD)				PCGDP (constant 2005 USD)				% Growth in GDP				GINI or other measure of wealth disparity	
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n
<b>East Africa</b>														
Burundi	0.4	1.0	1.4	1.7	147.0	213.6	150.7	157.5	–13.7	11.8	3.8	4.7		
Comoros		0.3	0.4	0.5		708.6	602.7	616.4		2.3	2.2	3.0	55.5	53.5
Djibouti			0.9	1.1			1085.9	1228.7			4.5	5.5		
Eritrea			1.1	1.3			184.0	193.8			2.2	1.7		
Ethiopia		5.4	20.8	30.5		132.1	238.6	316.0		–11.1	12.6	9.9	33.6	33.6
Kenya	2.6	9.9	23.9	29.6	322.1	503.5	584.9	648.8	–7.8	4.3	8.4	5.3		
Madagascar	2.4	3.3	5.8	6.4	475.5	331.8	275.0	271.1	2.0	1.2	0.3	3.0	40.6	40.6
Malawi	0.5	1.6	3.9	4.6	141.8	219.4	258.1	272.2	7.6	4.6	6.5	5.7	46.2	46.2
Mauritius		2.3	7.8	9.0		2205.3	6260.9	7116.6		7.0	4.1	3.6	35.9	35.9
Mozambique		1.9	9.0	11.9		145.7	376.2	451.4		1.0	6.8	7.4	45.7	45.7
Rwanda	0.6	1.6	3.8	5.1	221.0	264.3	355.0	417.7	–4.3	4.4	7.3	7.0	50.8	50.8
Somalia									–3.3	8.2	–1.5	...		
Tanzania			22.7	29.6			520.7	600.7			6.4	7.0	37.8	37.8
Uganda		2.7	13.3	16.4		184.7	390.6	422.4		–3.3	5.2	4.5	44.3	44.6
Zambia	2.9	4.8	12.6	16.2	929.9	707.1	956.9	1081.0	1.4	1.6	10.3	6.0	57.5	57.5
<b>Middle Africa</b>														
Angola		13.6	50.4	61.1		1504.6	2576.6	2759.2		2.8	3.4	3.9	42.7	42.7
Cameroon	3.8	13.6	19.1	23.3	704.8	1309.3	928.4	1021.6	1.2	8.1	3.3	5.9	40.7	40.7
Central African Rep	0.7	1.1	1.6	1.1	479.7	419.0	360.0	231.0	5.0	3.9	3.0	1.0	56.3	56.3
Chad	1.7	2.2	8.4	10.4	550.2	440.1	718.8	788.2	1.4	21.8	13.6	7.3	43.3	43.3
Congo, Rep	1.0	4.4	7.9	9.3	957.0	2116.5	1909.8	2038.1	8.4	–1.2	8.8	6.5	40.2	40.2

Congo, Dem Rep	11.5	17.7	15.7	21.2	754.9	589.9	251.9	306.0	-10.9	0.5	7.1	9.0		
Gabon	1.5	7.0	10.0	12.3	3046.5	8416.2	6420.5	7195.7	14.8	-2.3	7.4	4.3		
Southern Africa														
Botswana	0.2	3.0	12.4	15.8	379.7	2497.3	6302.6	7726.9	6.3	7.1	8.6	4.4	60.5	60.5
Lesotho	0.2	0.6	1.8	2.1	197.4	435.5	877.4	979.3	1.9	2.6	7.9	2.0	54.2	54.2
Namibia		3.5	9.0	11.0		3047.5	4149.9	4677.9		0.5	6.0	4.5	61.3	61.3
South Africa	61.6	164.3	300.2	328.7	3543.5	5246.4	5910.7	6086.4	3.8	-1.2	3.0	1.5	63.1	65.0
Swaziland		0.9	2.9	3.2		1316.5	2440.6	2522.3		3.8	1.7	2.5	51.5	51.5
Zimbabwe	1.8	5.7	5.2	6.9	491.2	640.9	397.8	475.3	6.3	6.9	11.4	3.2		
West Africa														
Benin	1.0	2.1	5.2	6.3	392.9	484.9	550.3	598.2	3.1	7.5	2.6	5.4	43.5	43.5
Burkina-Faso	0.9	2.1	7.3	9.2	189.9	267.4	472.8	530.8	4.0	8.5	8.4	4.0	39.8	39.8
Cape Verde		0.2	1.3	1.4		623.6	2648.7	2797.7		8.6	1.5	2.7	43.8	43.8
Cote d'Ivoire	3.3	12.8	19.1	24.0	945.8	1264.4	1004.6	1154.7	9.9	4.5	2.0	9.0	43.2	43.2
Gambia		0.3	0.8	0.8		435.2	466.6	435.2		-0.8	6.5	-0.2		
Ghana	3.2	4.4	14.7	20.5	481.6	342.6	606.4	775.5	3.4	5.1	7.9	4.2		36.0
Guinea-Bissau		0.4	0.7	0.8		462.3	434.8	433.4		4.2	4.4	2.5		
Guinea		1.4	3.3	3.6		277.1	300.4	298.9		3.3	1.9	-0.3	33.7	33.7
Liberia	0.6	1.1	1.0	1.4	552.1	494.9	242.6	329.2	2.4	-0.8	10.9	9.3	38.2	38.2
Mali		2.2	7.0	7.8		295.2	498.5	495.4		-11.4	5.8	7.2	33.0	33.0
Mauritania	0.4	1.2	2.8	3.5	509.5	668.2	775.2	873.6	15.5	3.0	4.8	6.4	40.5	40.5
Nigeria	25.3	53.7	159.0	194.9	559.2	639.5	995.7	1091.6	0.2	8.3	7.8	6.3	43.0	43.0
Niger	1.6	2.1	4.4	5.6	476.4	308.9	275.7	302.3	4.5	7.7	8.4	6.9	31.2	31.2
Senegal	2.8	4.6	10.4	11.8	872.0	707.8	800.4	809.2	3.0	3.3	4.3	3.9	40.3	40.3
Sierra Leone	3.3	10.2	33.3	44.1	329.9	393.1	369.7	537.7	1.8	-5.3	5.3	7.0	35.4	35.4
Togo	0.4	1.4	2.5	3.1	272.5	438.4	392.9	437.3	12.2	5.6	4.0	5.7	46.0	46.0
East Africa (N = 15)	1.6	3.2	9.1	12.5	372.9	510.6	874.3	985.3	-2.6	2.6	5.7	4.8	44.8	44.6

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 7.4** (continued)

Country	GDP (Billions of constant 2005 USD)				PCGDP (constant 2005 USD)				% Growth in GDP				GINI or other measure of wealth disparity	
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n
Middle Africa (N = 7)	3.4	8.5	16.1	19.8	1082.2	2113.7	1880.9	2048.5	3.3	4.8	6.6	5.4	44.6	44.6
Southern Africa (N = 6)	16.0	29.7	55.3	61.3	1152.9	2197.3	3346.5	3744.7	4.6	3.3	6.4	3.0	58.1	58.5
West Africa (N = 16)	3.9	6.3	17.0	21.2	507.4	506.5	677.2	743.8	5.5	3.2	5.4	5.0	39.3	39.1
Regional average	5.0	9.3	19.6	24.0	700.9	1042.5	1309.8	1453.5	2.9	3.3	5.9	4.7	44.6	44.4

**GDP (constant 2005 USD):** GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2005 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used

**PCGDP (constant 2005 USD):** GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars

**% Growth in GDP:** Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources

**GINI or other measure of wealth disparity:** Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. No inequality values are included for 1960 and 1985 due to a lack of available statistics. In 1985, only six countries had available values, as follows: Botswana (54.2), Lesotho (56.0), Cote d'Ivoire (45.6), Ghana (35.4), Mauritania (43.9) and Nigeria (38.7)

a World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

b World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

c World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

d World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>



e World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>  
f World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>  
g World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>  
h World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>  
i World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>  
j World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>  
k World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>  
l World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.world-bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>  
m World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>  
n World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

**Supplemental Table 7.5** Subjective well-being  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Subjective well-being**  
**REGION: Africa (N= 44)**

		WVS 1	WVS 2	WVS 3	WVS 4	WVS 5	WVS 6
	Country	1981–1984	1990–1994	1995–1998	1999–2004	2005–2009	2010–2014
	Source	a	b	c	d	e	f
East Africa	Burundi						
East Africa	Comoros						
East Africa	Djibouti						
East Africa	Eritrea						
East Africa	Ethiopia					5.0	
East Africa	Kenya						
East Africa	Madagascar						
East Africa	Malawi						
East Africa	Mauritius						
East Africa	Mozambique						
East Africa	Rwanda					5.0	6.5
East Africa	Somalia						
East Africa	Tanzania				3.9		
East Africa	Uganda				5.6		
East Africa	Zambia					6.1	
Middle Africa	Angola						
Middle Africa	Cameroon						
Middle Africa	Central African Rep						
Middle Africa	Chad						
Middle Africa	Congo, Rep						
Middle Africa	Congo, Dem Rep						
Middle Africa	Gabon						
Southern Africa	Botswana						
Southern Africa	Lesotho						
Southern Africa	Namibia						
Southern Africa	South Africa	6.8	6.2	6.1	5.8	7.0	6.6
Southern Africa	Swaziland						
Southern Africa	Zimbabwe						
West Africa	Benin						
West Africa	Burkina-Faso					5.6	
West Africa	Cape Verde						
West Africa	Cote d'Ivoire						
West Africa	Gambia						
West Africa	Ghana					6.1	6.1
West Africa	Guinea-Bissau						
West Africa	Guinea						
West Africa	Liberia						
West Africa	Mali					6.1	

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 7.5** (continued)

		WVS 1	WVS 2	WVS 3	WVS 4	WVS 5	WVS 6
	Country	1981–1984	1990–1994	1995–1998	1999–2004	2005–2009	2010–2014
	Source	a	b	c	d	e	f
West Africa	Mauritania						
West Africa	Nigeria		6.6	6.6	6.9		6.3
West Africa	Niger						
West Africa	Senegal						
West Africa	Sierra Leone						
West Africa	Togo						
	East Africa (N = 15)				4.7	5.3	6.5
	Middle Africa (N = 7)						
	Southern Africa (N = 6)	6.8	6.2	6.1	4.9	7.0	6.2
	West Africa (N = 16)		6.6	6.6	6.9	5.9	6.2
	Regional average	6.8	6.4	6.3	5.2	5.8	6.3

Mean life satisfaction: Averaged value of responses to the following survey question: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means you are “completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?

a WVS 1 1981–1984: V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
b WVS 2 1990–2004: V96.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
c WVS 3 1995–1998: V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
d WVS 4 1999–2004: V81.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
e WVS 5 2005–2009: V22.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
f WVS 6 2010–2014: V23.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

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Mariano Rojas and José de Jesús García Vega

*Tres cosas hay en la vida: Salud, dinero y amor. El que tenga esas tres cosas Que le dé gracias a Dios.*

*There are three things in life: Health, money, and love. Whoever has those three things should give thanks to God.*

(tango lyrics; Sciammarella 1939)

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## 8.1 Introduction

Latin American comprises many countries, many languages, about 600 million people, a vast territory, and the idea of a single identity (Maps 8.1, 8.2, 9.1). The term may result from the desire of dividing the American continent between those who speak romance languages (Latin Americans) and those who speak an Anglo-Saxon language (Anglo Americans). However, the Latin American identity is not defined by language alone; this identity is based on sharing central values of well-being.

Latin Americans may experience well-being in ways similar to those of people in other cultures: They experience pleasure and pain, enjoyment and suffering, and achievement and failure; however, the fundamental factors explaining their sense of well-being may be different because of their cultural and historical background. For example, Latin Americans are well-

known for their warm human-relation orientation, centrality of the family, and relative disregard for materialistic values. These cultural characteristics may play a significant role in explaining the sense of well-being of Latin Americans.

This chapter informs the reader about the well-being situation of Latin Americans as determined from indicators associated mainly, but not exclusively, with health, education, material wealth, and satisfaction with life. The chapter also provides an understanding of the current well-being situation in the region by taking into account the historical background that defines the Latin American identity.

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## 8.2 Latin American History

### 8.2.1 The Rise of a Nation

Those who visit the National Palace in Mexico City are usually amazed by its murals; they were painted by Diego Rivera, the famous Mexican muralist. The murals portray the history of Mexico from the time of the Aztecs to the Mexican revolution. One particular mural (Fig. 8.1) shows the arrival of the Spaniards. In this mural, Rivera shows, among other figures, an indigenous woman carrying a small child. There isn't anything special about an indigenous mother carrying her baby with the traditional *rebozo* (a

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**Map 8.1** Regional map of Central America and the Caribbean (CIA 2015; public domain)

muffler or wrap), except for the fact that this child has green eyes. It is difficult to identify the artist’s motive for including an indigenous child with green eyes in this mural. Some art critics believe that this child represents the first Mexican; they see the child is a symbol of the union of two important civilizations: the European and the Aztec. However, the child is neither European nor Aztec. The child represents the birth of a new nation: the Latin American nation. Although the child may be the outcome of a couple’s love affair, he is also the product of a crashing of two civilizations. The child is a symbol of battles and impositions, of conquerors and conquered being forced to live in the same land and to share a common destiny.

The Latin American nation is to some extent a melting pot but it is also highly segmented. In fact, it is a mix of several civilizations: the result

of a European civilization mixing with the large pre-Columbian indigenous civilizations. The Europeans were the conquerors, but the emergent society reflects an integration of both the conquerors and the conquered.

Three main civilizations dominated the Latin American region by the end of the fifteenth century when the Europeans (mostly Spaniards and Portuguese) arrived in the so-called new world: the Aztecs, the Mayans, and the Incas. Archeological evidence shows that the Aztec empire had a population of about five million people, and its capital, Tenochtitlan, had about 200,000 people when the Spaniards arrived, a population more or less similar to that of Paris, the largest European city at the time. In addition to the Aztecs, the Mayans, and the Incas, many other groups populated the region, such as the Guarani and Mapuche in South America.



Map 8.2 Regional map of South America (CIA 2015; public domain)



**Fig. 8.1** The arrival of Hernan Cortés by Diego Rivera, Palacio Nacional de Mexico, 1951; photo by Kgv88 ([https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/31/](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/31/Arrival_of_Hernan_Cortez_in_Veracruz_Detail.JPG)

[Arrival\\_of\\_Hernan\\_Cortez\\_in\\_Veracruz\\_Detail.JPG](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/31/Arrival_of_Hernan_Cortez_in_Veracruz_Detail.JPG); Creative Commons Attribution-Share alike 3.0 Unported)

### 8.2.2 Colonial Times and the Emergence of a Social System

The Europeans found it convenient to develop an economic system based on exploiting the abundant supply of indigenous labor. For this reason, they did not exterminate indigenous groups. Many Indians died as a consequence of the new illnesses brought by Europeans, and many others died as a consequence of extenuating working conditions. It was not in the interest of the conquerors to exterminate the local populations. As a matter of fact, today there are large indigenous populations in countries like Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Furthermore, a majority of the Latin American population is considered to be “mestizo” (racially mixed ancestry between American Indian and European, usually Spanish or Portuguese, ancestry). For example, in Guatemala, about 50 % of the population speaks an indigenous language, whereas another 40 % are considered mestizo. The culture, values, and aspirations of indigenous

people still play an important role in the culture and values of Latin Americans at large.

The Spaniards developed an institutional system based on the exploitation of natural resources by using the relatively abundant supply of indigenous labor. Institutions such as the *encomienda* (colonial grant of land and inhabitants), in which indigenous people were entrusted to Spaniards, allowed for exploitation of the large, cheap supply of indigenous labor. Similarly, land and natural resources were distributed among the conquerors. Consequently, the large estate (the plantation and the ranch) and mining became the rule of the land in Latin America. In those regions where a large supply of indigenous labor did not exist, such as in the Portuguese territories (today Brazil), slaves were brought from Africa. Hence, during the colonial times, a new socioeconomic system emerged based on a highly polarized society that amassed wealth in the hands of a small group—mostly Europeans and European descendants—with a vast segment of the population being treated as cheap labor with limited civil



rights. The system did not encourage social mobility, and exclusion extended beyond the economic domain; hence, the political system also reflected socioeconomic divisions in society. The political and judicial institutions were weak, giving great discretionary power to those who controlled both the economy and the political machine. Consequently, the emerging society was characterized by social exclusion, political elitism, lack of social mobility, wealth concentration, income inequality, and massive poverty.

### 8.2.3 Independence and Integration to the World Economy

The wars of independence took place during the first decades of the nineteenth century. Military conflict in Europe, the global decline of the Spanish Empire, and the weakening of the Portuguese paved the way for the emergence of new independent states. At birth, these independent states inherited weak political and judicial institutions, high concentrations of land and wealth, economic inequality and poverty, and social exclusion. In a world that was becoming economically integrated, most Latin American countries exploited their cheap and uneducated labor force to become exporters of raw materials and agricultural commodities. Foreign investments and foreign control of Latin American natural resources became the norm in this increasingly integrated global economy. As such, foreign interests continued to play an important role in the Latin American political arena. The region had gained its independence from Spain and Portugal, but, due to weak political institutions, the interests of the local elite and foreign firms and the State prevailed over those of the commoners, particularly the indigenous people. The local elites as well as the foreign interests controlled not only the economy but also the government. Invasions by foreign armies as well as filibusters (supported by local elites) were not uncommon in Latin America. The increasing interests of the United States in the region reflected by the Monroe Doctrine led to growing

interference in Latin American politics, with the support of the local elites.

Figures from the Montevideo-Oxford Latin American Economic History Data Base (Figs. 8.2 and 8.3)<sup>1</sup> show that around the year 1900 the estimated mean life expectancy at birth—highly dependent on child mortality—ranged from 49 years in Uruguay to about 24 years in some Central American countries such as Guatemala and Nicaragua. Life expectancy was 29 years in Brazil and 25 years in Mexico, the two most populated countries in the region. The illiteracy rate ranged from about 92 % in Haiti and 88 % in Guatemala to 42 % in Uruguay. In Brazil, the illiteracy rate was 65 % and in Mexico it was 76 %.<sup>2</sup> It was clearly a region where access to health services and education was a luxury not available to the majority of the population. It is noteworthy to state the obvious: Mean indicators do not portray a positive picture of well-being. Only the elite had good access to health and education services both locally and abroad, whereas the majority of the population did not have access (Figs. 8.2 and 8.3).


### 8.2.4 The First Half of the Twentieth Century: Nationalism and Dictatorships

The beginning of the twentieth century found a region characterized by weak political and judicial institutions; an economic system highly linked to the international economy through the exploitation of cheap labor and natural resources and direct foreign investments; a very unequal society with rampant marginalization of the vast majority of the population; and wealth and political power concentrated among a few local and


<sup>1</sup>Information is presented for the four most populous countries in the region (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina), which represent about 60–70 % of the total population in the region.

<sup>2</sup>This information comes from the Montevideo-Oxford Latin American Economic History Data Base, <http://mox-lad.fcs.edu.uy/>. Figures for the beginning of the twentieth century are supplied by Shane and Barbara Hunt (Thorp 1998).





**Fig. 8.2** Changes in life expectancy in selected Latin American countries, 1900–2000 (Data from Montevideo Oxford Latin American Database 2015)



**Fig. 8.3** Illiteracy rates in Latin America’s four most populous countries, 1900–2000 (Data from Montevideo Oxford Latin American Database 2015)

foreign elites. Democracy was weak or nonexistent in most Latin American countries. Foreign interference, coups, and dictatorships prevailed.

The twentieth century saw the rise of many nationalistic movements that emerged primarily from four social trends (Coatsworth and Williamson 2002): First, the Latin American countries developed an incipient industrialization process as a consequence of the global powers being involved in wars and the economic recession that ensued. The new industrial entrepreneurs found room to cultivate their own interests through involvement in the political arena dominated by landowners and foreign companies. Second, new social groups linked to industrialization and urbanization emerged. The interests of this new bourgeoisie focused on the manufacturing and service sectors, not mining and agriculture. This new bourgeoisie involving urban workers and small-business entrepreneurs demanded better education and health services. Third, resentment toward the foreign interference and military maneuverings in the region arose. The common perception was that the interests of the Latin American countries were not the same as those of the United States, and foreign companies were not contributors to social and economic development but part of a system of exploitation of the cheap labor force and natural resources in the region. Fourth, new socialist ideas were spreading globally. In Latin America, these ideas took hold in poor urban and rural areas. These ideas resonated in a region afflicted by exclusion, poverty, and concentration of wealth among a few local elites and foreign entities (Thorp 1998). The Mexican revolution, which started in 1910, is considered the first socialist revolution in the world: Urban groups demanded greater political participation and better access to public services, whereas rural groups demanded agrarian reform.

These political movements emerged within a context of weak institutions; thus, they ended up fostering new *caudillos* (highly personal and quasi-military political regimes) instead of fully democratic systems that promoted social inclusion. As such, various political movements in the region faced enormous structural obstacles inherited from colonial times. The same period saw

greater foreign interference aimed at protecting foreign economic and strategic interests in the region. As such, foreigners did not hesitate using military means to suit their economic purposes. For example, the foreign military intervention in Nicaragua (1912–1933) was followed by the installation of a dictatorship fully supported by foreign powers.

By 1940 the situation had improved somewhat (Figs. 8.2 and 8.3): Life expectancy ranged from 58 years in Uruguay to 29 in Guatemala. The two most populous countries experienced an increase in life expectancy—37 years in Brazil and 39 years in Mexico. The illiteracy rate declined during the first decades of the twentieth century; Uruguay and Argentina now had illiteracy rates beneath 20 %, whereas this rate was above 70 % in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Haiti. The illiteracy rate in Brazil was 56 % and in Mexico, 54 % (Fig. 8.3).

A quick look at Figs. 8.2 and 8.3 show that life expectancy increased significantly during the first half of the twentieth century in Latin America, and the illiteracy rate declined importantly in all countries with the exception of Haiti. It is a period characterized by political turbulence, local caudillos, and foreign interference. It is also a period in which the basic human conditions of health and education did improve.

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## 8.3 Contemporary Period (Post-WWII)

### 8.3.1 The Search for Economic Development

#### 8.3.1.1 Greater Role for the State and Protectionism Policies

The first half of the twentieth century gave rise to a conscious process of addressing the structural problems of the region (Bresser-Pereira 2009; Thorp 1992). During the 1940s, the balance inclined in favor of greater state intervention in the economy. There was a general agreement that the mere insertion of the region in the global economy was insufficient to solve structural problems threatening the well-being of Latin


Americans and that governments had to play a greater role in steering the economy (Puchet Anyul et al. 2012a; Rojas 2012a).

A protectionist strategy emerged in the 1940s as a result of several factors: (1) the stronger influence of urban groups demanding better access to education and health services; (2) the political pressure of industrial entrepreneurs and workers to further expand the manufacturing sector; (3) the increasing frustration with an international order where the region played an economic role of supplier of raw materials and agricultural commodities; (4) new theories questioning the advantages of free trade and arguing that there was little hope for building a strong middle class within a free-trade context; (5) political resentment toward the “United States’ backyard” role in the region; (6) Keynesian theories pushing for a greater role of the state; and (7) greater confidence in the benevolent motives of nationalistic governments.

The interests of the emerging nontraditional urban groups prevailed over those of the traditional landowners and foreign companies. The traditional landowners and foreign companies

favored free trade, paying few taxes and low wages, and maintaining control of their plantations and mining operations. In contrast, the emerging urban groups favored greater government intervention to protect local industry from foreign competition, developing urban infrastructure, and providing health and education services to people of low income. Thus, in the postwar years, most Latin American countries ended up implementing a development strategy that protected local industry, expanded the size and scope of government activity, and promoted income and wealth redistribution through state intervention.

The new strategy was fully implemented from the postwar years until the early 1980s, and it was successful in generating acceptable economic growth and in enhancing well-being. On average, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita grew at an annual rate of 4.8 % in Brazil (quadrupling its value in 30 years) and 3.5 % in Mexico (tripling its value in 30 years) between 1950 and 1980 (Fig. 8.4). The simple country-mean annual rate of growth for the whole Latin American



**Fig. 8.4** Evolution of per capita gross domestic product for four large Latin American Countries, 1900–2000 (Data from Heston et al. 2011)

region was 2.3 % during these decades. By 1980 most Latin American countries were classified as middle income according to the standards of the time. Even in Nicaragua, the GDP per capita (a little above USD 3,000 per year) was enough to allow most people, on average, to live above the poverty line. Productivity in Latin America was not high, but it was adequate enough to allow most people to meet their basic needs in the context of a more egalitarian system involving redistribution of wealth; however, inequality persisted because it was a significant structural problem inherited from colonial times.

The strategy paid off in well-being gains: The illiteracy rate in Brazil declined from 51 % in 1950 to 25 % in 1980. For the same period these figures were 40–18 % in Mexico, 38–16 % in Colombia, and 12–6 % in Argentina. By 1980, the illiteracy rate was as low as 5 % in Uruguay and as high as 69 % in Haiti and 47 % in Guatemala. Similarly, life expectancy increased during the period from 43 to 63 years in Brazil, 48–67 years in Mexico, 49–66 years in Colombia, and 61–70 years in Argentina. Countries like Cuba and Costa Rica had life expectancies above 70 years by 1980 whereas Haiti and Bolivia only reached 52 years.

The substantial enhancement in these well-being drivers can be explained by three factors. One factor involved a worldwide systemic effect associated with the development of new technologies, the reduction in production costs, and important innovations in the health sector (e.g., vaccines and public sanitation). The second factor involved the greater role played by the state in providing easy access to public services such as education and health. The active participation of the state helped break up the structural vicious cycle of marginalization, exclusion, and polarization. Children of the illiterate and the poor could now attend public schools; they also could access public hospitals and clinics. The third factor was the fact that urbanization fostered economies of scale in the provision of public services such as education and health. In other words, it became cheaper for government to provide health and education services on a large scale for people living in the cities.

This period was also characterized by the emergence of a large middle class. Even in a period of population explosion, there was a sense of inclusion, social mobility, and declining inequality in the region. The switch from the external to the local market (and from the outward-oriented agricultural and mining sectors to the inward-oriented manufacturing and service sectors) provided conditions that helped to alleviate the structural problems of exclusion and inequality inherited from colonial times.

However, this inward-looking strategy had its weaknesses, which were manifested in the 1980s. During this period, Latin American cities grew at exponential rates and megacities emerged (e.g., Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Buenos Aires). The manufacturing sector failed to absorb the influx of rural migrants. It was not only a problem of supply exceeding demand; it was also a problem of mismatch between the labor requirements of the manufacturing sector and the skills of the rural migrants. As a result, cities saw the swelling of peripheral slums and many rural migrants finding refuge in the informal urban sector.

Furthermore, the ever increasing scope of government participation facilitated the expansion of corruption in these countries that have weak judicial systems. In addition, the local manufacturing sector failed to become competitive by international standards. Local entrepreneurs became very skillful in lobbying the government to protect their business from encroaching foreign competition. Hence, instead of trying to become more competitive, they opted to lobby government officials to erect trade barriers.

New tensions arose when politicians pushed for an expansion in the scope of government intervention in the economy. The new agenda was not accepted by the manufacturing entrepreneurs who had benefited from the protectionist policies.

### **8.3.1.2 Crisis and Change of Strategy: More Market and Less State Intervention**

The decade of the 1980s is associated with a generalized economic crisis. Many Latin Americans agreed that the benefits from the inward-looking

strategy were significantly diminishing and that it was necessary to modify the development strategy. The region moved toward an outward-looking strategy based on promoting exports and inserting itself in the global economy. Free-trade agreements and promarket reforms proliferated during the following years in many Latin American countries (Dean 1995). The conservative views that prevailed in the 1980s in the Western world had great influence in the region. The so-called Washington Consensus called for privatizing many state-owned enterprises to attract foreign investments, deregulating the industrial sector, relaxing labor laws, and, in general, reducing state intervention in the economy (Edwards 2009; Williamson 1990). Also, people in the region became more aligned with the Consensus, calling for a greater role of free markets in allocating resources, in setting prices, and in determining the distribution of income.

The promarket orientation of the new strategy required a different approach to addressing social problems such as poverty and marginalization. The focus now moved toward focalized social programs and away from universal social policies. The new strategy decoupled the social arena from the economic one. Government was restrained from intervening in economic affairs, and it was forced to deal with social problems using policies and programs that create few distortions in the market place (Kuczynski 2003). Focalized social programs, such as conditional cash transfers, were the popular solution to dealing with the social problems. However, fighting poverty through focalized social programs was not as effective as expected; these policies were based on promoting human capital by providing conditional cash transfers. Even though these policies created incentives for low-income children to attend school and to access better health services, the historical and surrounding socioeconomic conditions hampered well-being in many ways.

### 8.3.1.3 Greater Discontent and the Search for New Paths

By the beginning of the new millennium, there was a growing discontent with the promarket reforms. Several large countries in Latin America

experienced significant economic crises: the Tequila crisis (Mexico, 1994–1995), the Samba crisis (Brazil, 1999–2000), and the Tango crisis (Argentina, 2001–2002). With few exceptions, the rates of economic growth were moderate and well below expected levels (based on what the strategy promoters had promised) (Easterly et al. 1997). Furthermore, income inequality increased during the 1990s, and local magnates with unconceivable fortunes appeared on the scene (Lustig and López-Calva 2010). It was also recognized that the strategy did not address the persistent structural problems associated with the concentration of wealth; that the universal social benefits provided by the state were at risk (e.g., equal access to health and education services); that deregulation allowed local entrepreneurs to engage in monopolistic and oligopolistic practices; and that large segments of the population were being left behind in a strategy that gave more opportunities to those who were already better prepared to take advantage of them (Ffrench-Davis 2007; Ffrench-Davis and Machinea 2007). The strategy did not directly address the historical conditions of marginalization and social exclusion in the region; it assumed that these structural problems would be solved as a consequence of rapid economic growth; however, greater inequality grew in the region.

The beginning of the new millennium found a region still looking for the best options to address the structural problems of inequality and exclusion (Ocampo 2005; Ffrench-Davis 2005). Should more state intervention be implemented? Should promarket reforms be abandoned? How could they ensure government transparency and solve weaknesses in the political and judicial institutions? How could they build an inclusive society? What is the role of democracy and what is the role of strong personalities in the political arena? Should social change come about through revolution or evolution? People's frustration with the system may explain the rise of new nontraditional political parties as well as the political rise of indigenous movements (e.g., in Bolivia).

At the beginning of the new millennium, Latin America could be characterized as mostly a middle-income region with relatively good edu-



cation and health indicators. The historical information regarding the long-run trend in illiteracy rate and life expectancy at birth shows that these indicators have substantially improved during the past century. As expected, their rate of improvement declines as they approach their bounds (lower bound of 0 in the case of illiteracy rate, and an upper bound to life expectancy marked by human condition). Life expectancy also increased significantly for the majority of Latin Americans during the last century. The majority of Latin Americans have a life expectancy at birth of more than 70 years; countries like Haiti, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras lag behind. Again, mean values do not really reflect the situation inside countries, but it is clear that the general trend is positive. In a similar way, illiteracy rates have also declined during the last century; however, with the exception of countries like Costa Rica, Chile, Argentina, Cuba and Uruguay, there is still a great opportunity to improve the situation.

Information regarding the evolution of the GDP per capita also shows a general positive trend (Fig. 8.4). The long-run assessment shows rapid growth until the 1980s, a generalized economic crisis in the 1980s, and moderate but positive growth afterward. On average, GDP per capita grew 120 % during the past six decades in Argentina, 370 % in Brazil, 240 % in Colombia, and 240 % in Mexico. The situation for the other Latin American countries shows significant dispersion, from stagnation in Nicaragua and Bolivia—with growth rates for the whole period of less than 20 %—to rapid growth in Panama and the Dominican Republic, where GDP per capita grew about 450 % during the period. It is important to state that these growth rates are computed for GDP per capita figures in Latin American countries; however, due to high income inequality and exclusion, it would not be accurate to say that this situation applies equally to almost everyone in the country. There is not only high dispersion within countries but also across countries. For example, the GDP per capita of countries such as Panama, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Mexico, Argentina, and Chile is about five times higher than that in Nicaragua.

## 8.3.2 The Social Situation


### 8.3.2.1 A Very Unequal Region

Historical and structural conditions led to a region characterized by high income inequality. Together with sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America is considered one of the most unequal regions in the world (Lopez and Perry 2008).


Figure 8.5a presents the Gini coefficients for all Latin American countries except Cuba. The Gini coefficient is an indicator of the distribution of income in a country; it ranges from 0 % to 100 %. The lower its value, the more egalitarian is the distribution of income in the country. Extreme values are 0 and 100, the latter associated with perfect inequality (one family holds the whole country's income) and the former, with perfect equity (income is distributed in an egalitarian way across all families). Gini coefficients in Latin America are among the highest around the world, indicating a relatively unequal distribution of income. The first series of data correspond to the years 2000–2001, and it is observed that Bolivia, Colombia, and Guatemala have Gini coefficients above 55 and that Haiti has one of almost 60. The simple country average for Latin America (not including Cuba) is 53.4 and the population-weighted mean is 54.39. These figures can be compared to those from countries with relatively egalitarian income distributions, such as Finland and Australia, that have Gini coefficients of 26.9 and 30.5, respectively.

The second series of data show a slight reduction in inequality in Latin America, although the numbers are still very high. Most countries showed a reduction on this index, bringing down the simple mean to 50.1, whereas the population-weighted mean dropped even more to a Gini coefficient of 49.2 (Figs. 8.5b, c).

Another indicator of inequality is the ratio of the average income of the richest 10 % of the population to the poorest 10 %. Countries like Finland and Australia have a ratio of 5.6 and 12.5, respectively, whereas the average in Latin America is 38.4. In other words, the richest 10 % of the population in Latin America has an income that is almost 40 times that of the poorest 10 %.



**Fig. 8.5** (a) Changes in Gini coefficients for selected Latin American countries: 2000–2001 and 2008–2010; (b, c) graphical representation of level of income inequality in Latin American countries, 2000–2001 and 2008–2010 (Data from The World Bank 2013)



**Fig. 8.6** Poverty rates in Latin America at USD 2.50 vs. USD 4.00 per day. \* = 2011; \*\*= 2009 (Data from Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 2015)

This figure reaches such extreme values as 94 in Bolivia and about 20 in Uruguay and Venezuela.

**8.3.2.2 Mid-income Countries with High Absolute and Relative Poverty**

Poverty has been a problem in Latin America, in part due to the structural problem of great wealth and income inequality in the region. Even with average mid-income levels, great inequality implies that large segments of the population in Latin American countries end up being classified as poor according to the standard measures. Furthermore, great inequality makes it more difficult to fight poverty through economic growth. In addition, it is widely recognized that a vicious cycle develops when a society provides few mobility options for the youth of poor families. It is not only a problem of absolute poverty (people making a living with an income below the poverty line); it is also a problem of relative income (people making a living with an income that is far below that of the top deciles). During the last decade or so, two main social instruments were

used to reduce poverty. The first instrument was economic growth, with the limitations already mentioned regarding the moderate rates of growth and the small impact it may have in raising income in the lower deciles. The second instrument was conditional-cash transfer programs, which are focused on breaking up the vicious cycle of poverty by conditioning transfers to parents sending their children to schools as well as providing access to health care services. Absolute-poverty rates decreased during the last decade, in part as a consequence of these two factors, as well as of the recent downturn in inequality trends. According to data from the World Bank, substantial declines have taken place in Peru, Uruguay, Brazil, and Ecuador during the last decade.<sup>3</sup>

No single criterion is used to assess poverty rates in a country; a poverty line based on setting threshold levels for household per capita income is usually followed. Figure 8.6 shows poverty

<sup>3</sup>See <http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/region/LAC>

head counts for two different criteria: USD 2.5 and USD 4 of household per capita income per day. Poverty rates range from above 60 % in Guatemala to just 8 % in Uruguay. Figure 8.6 shows that large segments of the population make their living with just enough income to buy basic food.


**8.3.2.3 Widespread Corruption, Crime, and Violence**

The beginning of the new millennium found the region facing drug-related violence and organized crime. Organized crime takes advantage of weak political institutions, and a vicious cycle emerges where corruption breeds organized crime and organized crime promotes corruption. The closeness of Latin America to the largest drug market in the world (the US market) exacerbates this social malaise. Obviously, lack of security and victimization reduce the well-being of Latin Americans. Furthermore, inequality, poverty, and the rise of materialistic values have caused an increase in illegal migration (mostly to

the United States and Europe). Illegal migration is associated with the rise in broken families and the deterioration of the family as a central institution (important to well-being in Latin America).

To reiterate, corruption and lack of security represent two major nemeses of well-being. Corruption increases the costs of doing business. Corruption affects the business environment, political life, and, overall, the culture and values of society. That is, corruption undermines the efficient and equitable allocation of resources, people’s respect for the rule of law, and the overall integrity of a society.

Latin America is a region where corruption has been the norm for many years. In the Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 Rankings provided by Transparency International, if Latin America were a country, it would be 100th out of 177 countries. This index is computed using surveys of public perceptions in different countries. A score of 100 means the country is perceived as “very clean,” whereas a score of 0 represent the perception of a “very corrupt” country. Figure 8.7



**Fig. 8.7** Corruption perceptions index for Latin America, 2003 and 2013 (Data from Transparency International 2013)


show the scores of Latin American countries on this index.

The best-ranked country from Latin America in 2013 was Uruguay (ranked 19) with a score of 73; the most corrupt country was Haiti, with a score of 19 (ranked 163). The best ranked country in this index in 2013 was Denmark, with a score of 91.

Looking at trends, we can see that, from 2003 to 2013, Uruguay and Chile performed much better, whereas the performances of Cuba, Paraguay, and Venezuela decreased on this index. Finland, with a score of 97, was the best ranked country in 2003.

Besides corruption, lack of security brings fear—fear to venture outside the home, to shop, to travel, and to enjoy life. To socialize with friends and family outside the home is cherished by Latin Americans. This observation is particularly true for Latin Americans because they consider family and personal relationships an important element in their well-being.

Figure 8.8 shows data for the homicide rate per 100,000 people in Latin America for different periods, given the availability of the data. For instance, the comparison period for Peru goes from 1985 to 2010, whereas that for Cuba goes from 2000 to 2010. The simple average for Latin America is 23.3 homicides per 100,000 people for the year of 2010. The population-weighted average is not too different, but it appears slightly lower than the simple average. Compared to countries like Australia and Finland, where the rate is one and two homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively, the rate for Latin America is extremely high. Countries like Honduras (91) and El Salvador (69) have a very high rate and show a substantial increase on this rate. Venezuela is a special case: The homicide rate increased from 8 in 1986 to 45 in 2010—an increase of more than 460 %. Colombia is another special case: In the early 1990s, the rate reached a high of almost 80 homicides per 100,000 people.



**Fig. 8.8** Homicide rate per 100,000 people for selected Latin American countries, 1990–1996 and 2010 per 100,000 population (Data from the World Bank 2015a)



The decline in the size and scope of the state (as a result of promarket reforms in the 1980s) also contributed to decreases in social solidarity (i.e., decreases in retirement benefits and access to health services and education). Megacities (as a consequence of rural-urban migration) created new threats to well-being, emerging mostly from living in depersonalized neighborhoods, without a social/family network, and with higher commuting costs. A not-so-new phenomenon of segmented neighborhoods (a new version of the ancient enclave-kind of neighborhood) is also threatening social cohesion by creating economically integrated but socially separated communities.

### 8.3.3 Political Aspects

During the second part of the twentieth century, the region faced the complexities of a world divided between Eastern and Western blocs. There was internal disagreement about what path should be followed. Some groups pointed toward the structural conditions of exclusion and inequality in the region and advocated more reforms. However, other groups thought that reforms were not enough and that a complete transformation of the socioeconomic system was needed: They called for a socialist revolution in Latin America. Others groups in society who were strongly linked to the United States both economically and ideologically wanted to foster a capitalist system and fight socialism in the region. The big powers also played a large role in making political decisions in the region. Thus, the 1950s to the 1970s were characterized by the rise of guerrilla movements and military coups that brought strong, cruel dictators to power. In countries such as Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, and Brazil, military coups were supported by local right-leaning groups as well as by direct participation of foreign interests who wanted stop the tide of the socialist agenda. In some countries such as Cuba and Nicaragua, leftist revolutionary movements took control of the government. In many other Latin American countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, and Colombia, an undeclared

civil war existed, involving the guerrilla movements and the army. Although some indicators of well-being showed marked growth, other indicators (e.g., loss of civil rights, violence associated with both guerrilla attacks and military countervailing actions, and the uncertainty about the direction the country) marked a serious threat to the well-being of Latin Americans. Entire populations were displaced by guerrilla movements, and large segments of the population migrated as a consequence of the violence.

Defining a common political system in Latin America can be a real challenge (Puchet Anyul et al. 2012b). Most Latin American countries claim to have a democratic system and hold periodic elections. However, due to weak political institutions, large segments of the population are marginalized from the political process. Business people and entrepreneurs have to deal with political risks related to government corruption and expropriation. Even though some countries, like Costa Rica, have had a long-standing tradition with democracy, other countries like Mexico and most Central American countries have transitioned to democracy only recently. Mexico has lived more than 70 years under a pseudodemocratic regime controlled by a strong party. The breakthrough came in 2000. The country was given a chance to be governed by another party. Chile had the first democratic election after the Pinochet dictatorship in 1990, and many other countries, such as Bolivia, had never had transparent elections up to the early 1980s.

Political regimes may affect people's well-being by limiting their liberties and by restraining their opportunities. Most dictatorships and pseudodemocratic regimes tend to reflect the interests of the economic, political, and military elites, marginalizing the interests and aspirations of most people in society. By definition, democratic regimes, together with strong, transparent judicial institutions, are designed to develop and implement public policies that can enhance the well-being of the majority of citizens.

Weak political institutions adversely affect citizens' rights in many ways. Some indicators from the CIRI Human Rights Database (<http://www.humanrightsdata.com/p/data->

[documentation.html](#)) illustrate this situation. The Physical Integrity Rights Index includes indicators of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. The scores range from 0 to 8, where 0 is “no governmental respect for these rights” and 8 is “full governmental respect for these rights.” Figure 8.9 shows results for this indicator. Latin American countries had a score of 3.30 in 1981 and 4.30 in 2011. For comparison, Finland had scores of 8 both years and Australia, of 8 and 7 for 1981 and 2011, respectively. Colombia had the lowest score, 1, in both years, whereas Panama and Uruguay had a score of 7 in 2011. In general, the trend shows improvements in some countries like Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay, whereas other countries like Venezuela and Dominican Republic have suffered setbacks. Two other indicators worth analyzing are “freedom of speech” and “workers’ rights,” also found in the CIRI Human Rights Database. The first indicator refers to the extent to which freedoms of speech and press are

affected by government censorship. A score of 0 indicates that the censorship is complete; a score of 1 indicates government censorship; and a score of 2 indicates no government censorship in that year. The simple mean for Latin America for 1981 was 1.10; for 2011, the score was 1.05, which shows a small decrease from 30 years earlier. Cuba had the lowest score on this indicator, with a score of 0 for both years.

The workers’ rights indicator refers to the freedom workers have to unionize at their workplace and bargain collectively with their employers. A score of 0 indicates that workers’ rights are severely restricted; a score of 1 indicates that workers’ rights are somewhat restricted; and a score of 2 indicates that workers’ rights are fully protected during the year in question. The average score for Latin America for the years 1981 and 2011 were 0.85 and 0.60, again showing a decline. Cuba again had a score of 0 in both years. Countries like Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Venezuela went from a score of 2 to a score of 0.




Fig. 8.9 Physical integrity rights index, Latin American, 1981–2011 (Data from Cingranelli et al. 2014)

## 8.4 Well-Being in Latin America


Education, health, income, and subjective well-being are commonly associated with the assessment of people’s well-being. This section focuses on the Latin American situation in relation to these four aspects.

### 8.4.1 Health Well-Being: Relatively Favorable

Enjoying good health is, in most cases, a necessary condition for experiencing a high level of well-being. It is difficult to imagine situations where people experience high levels of well-being if they do not have enough energy or physical resources to perform daily activities and engage in life’s functions. Of course, it is not so difficult to imagine the reverse situation, i.e., people having enough energy or physical resources but not enjoying life. Health is an important factor in people’s well-being. There

may be many indicators to assess the health conditions in a country; there is also some agreement that life expectancy at birth provides a good approximation of the general health situation in a country. This indicator not only provides us with information about the years a person is expected to live; it also relates to the condition of the person’s health during his or her life and to this person’s access to basic health services (e.g., vaccinations, public sanitation). Figure 8.10 shows data capturing the current situation in Latin America.

Simple average life expectancy at birth for the Latin American countries included in this study was 74.2 years in 2012. This number compares favorably with the numbers from most regions, except Europe and Central Asia. However, serious disparities appear when we compare countries within this group. In 2012, Haiti had an average life expectancy at birth of 62.7 years, whereas Chile, Cuba, and Costa Rica each had an average life expectancy at birth of almost 80 years. On the upside, the trend is positive, because



**Fig. 8.10** Life expectancy at birth for selected Latin American countries, 1960 and 2012 (Data from the World Bank 2015b)

the average life expectancy at birth of the Latin American countries increased from 54.8 to 74.2 (35.4 %) years from 1960 to 2012.

Another indicator of health is the infant mortality rate per thousand births. Figure 8.11 shows that the average rate for Latin America is 8 infant deaths per thousand births whereas that for the world as a whole is 35. With this rate, Latin American countries are close to the rate of 13 for those countries classified by the United Nations Development Program as high human development countries. In comparison, Haiti, with a rate of 57, is far behind. Bolivia is second to last, with a rate of 33 deaths per thousand births. At the top are Cuba, Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, all of which have a rate of fewer than 10 deaths per thousand births. Again, we observe a positive trend. Considering the simple mean, infant mortality in 2012 was about 30 % of that in 1980. Taking into account the population proportion, this indicator represents less than 25 % of the index we had in 1980.

Certainly, several countries have experienced improvements in health, and the current situation is not bad in comparison with that of other regions. However, it is not clear what role local policies and technology have played in improving health and health care.

### 8.4.2 Economic Well-Being: On Average There Is Enough

Even though it may be difficult to define “basic needs,” there is agreement that not having enough material resources to meet basic needs constitutes an important threat to people’s well-being. In addition, it is not only a matter of income level but also of income stability, because not having adequate material resources becomes a major source of stress and anxiety. The economic performance of Latin American countries has been extremely unpredictable in recent decades: Some periods have experienced economic growth whereas others have been plagued by economic crises. Economic crises sometimes originate from local decisions and local problems, but in other cases the economic situation in Latin American countries may be related to the global economic situation. Nevertheless, on average, Latin American countries have a decent per capita income in comparison to other regions of the world.

Average gross national income per capita (GNI), expressed in terms of purchasing power parity, in Latin American countries is 8,414.7 for 2012, as reported by the United Nations Development Program. The differences among





Fig. 8.11 Infant mortality rate, Latin America, 1980 and 2012 (Data from The World Bank 2015b; You et al. 2013)



**Fig. 8.12** Per capita income level: the world and Latin America, 2012 (Data from United Nations Development Programme 2014)

countries are huge: Haiti has a per capita GNI of 1,070, whereas that of Argentina is 15,347. Five countries do not reach 5,000, and seven countries have a per capita GNI over 10,000. The world average for this indicator is 10,184.

Figure 8.12 shows the information regarding GNI per capita. One can see huge disparities across Latin American countries. It is also important to note the huge disparities within countries. On the basis of the data, it is possible to state that, with the exception of Haiti and, perhaps, Nicaragua, there is on average enough income for each Latin American to meet his or her basic needs.

Economic crises have taken a toll in different ways in every country in Latin America. For instance, in recent years, Chile, Dominican Republic, and Panama did not experience economic crises, *period*. Their per capita GNI increased by 175 %, 133 %, and 131 %, respectively, from 1980 to 2012. Cuba also experienced high growth during the same period, with an almost 100 % increase in its per capita GNI. On the other hand, countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua dropped their per capita GNI by more than 1 %. Haiti was again the worst case: Its per capita GNI dropped more than 40 %, even though


by 1980 it was already very low (1,828). In comparison, the world GNI per capita in terms of purchasing power parity increased by more than 70 % in the same period (1980–2012), whereas the weighted average of the countries of Latin America increased only 41 %.

### 8.4.3 Education Well-Being: Not Only Quantity but Also Quality

Latin America’s quest for development is deterred by education. Even though there has been some progress and more coverage, the performance of students is lacking in relation to that of students from advanced economies. Education might be the door to new opportunities of development—to better paying jobs, better citizenry and more political participation, social mobility, and even greater satisfaction with life. However, lack of investment in education, paired with poor quality, has played a key role here.

The average-years-of-schooling indicator is commonly used to evaluate the situation of the education in a country; however, it is important to recognize that this indicator describes quantity





**Fig. 8.13** Mean years of schooling in selected Latin American countries, 1980 and 2012 (Data from United Nations Development Programme 2014)

rather than quality of education. Whereas the world average in 2012 was 7.5 years, Latin American countries had an average of 7.8 years of schooling. Guatemala with 4.1 and Haiti with 4.9 years of schooling had the lowest scores in the region, whereas Chile and Cuba had the highest, with 9.7 and 10.2 years of schooling, respectively. As a region, Latin America increased education well-being by 95 % in the last 30 years (from 4 to 7.8 years of schooling). Figure 8.13 shows the average years of schooling for Latin American countries.


Support for education has not been adequate in Latin America. The unequal distribution of income makes private education unaffordable for the majority of people; hence, governments are expected to fill the huge gap. However, governments are constrained by their limited ability to raise taxes. Low-income families are not a significant source for tax revenues. The elite control political power and are not enthusiastic about paying higher taxes, and a large portion of economic activity takes place in the informal sector. Thus, the relatively low resources governments can allocate to education, plus the not-so-small leaks of expenditure due to corruption, may explain the difficulty governments face in enhancing the quantity and quality of education in Latin America. These limitations also show up in the resources available for research and development,

which are a mere 0.2 % in 2009 in Latin America, in contrast to 1.8 % for the world’s average. Also, in Latin America, the number of researchers per million people was 487 in 2010; this indicator for the world average was 1,180 in the same year.

### 8.4.4 Subjective Well-Being: A Happy Region

*“Ten of the 11 ‘most positive’ countries in the world are in Latin America.”* So begins a Gallup report about the subjective well-being situation in the world (Clifton 2012). The report refers to the experience of positive affect, which is where Latin Americans clearly outperform most people in the rest of the world. As a matter of fact, the subjective well-being situation in the region is not only very good, it is also outstandingly good given the region’s not-so-good socioeconomic situation (Rojas 2012b).

It is widely recognized that positive and negative affect reflects an important but not unique substrate of subjective assessment of one’s quality of life. Life satisfaction is considered even a better indicator of a subjective assessment of one’s quality of life; besides positive and negative affect, life satisfaction also incorporates contentment (evaluative assessment of achievement in life) (Rojas and Veenhoven 2013).




**Fig. 8.14** Life satisfaction in selected countries, World Values Survey, 2014 (Data from World Values Survey 2014, 2015)

Figure 8.14 shows the life-satisfaction situation in selected countries from the last wave (Wave 6) of the World Value Survey (WVS). The data are clear: Latin Americans have life satisfaction levels that, in general, are at least as high as those of the European and Anglo-Saxon worlds. The WVS does not provide information for all Latin American countries, and it is known from other surveys that other countries in the region have even higher life-satisfaction levels. However, the information from the WVS is important because it shows that average life-satisfaction levels in the four more populous countries in the region (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina) are higher than those in countries such as the United States, Germany, Australia, and Spain.

Figure 8.15 shows information on life satisfaction for all Latin American countries. This information is available from the Latinobarometer, which uses a categorical scale ranging from 1 (not at all satisfied) to 4 (very satisfied). Two observations are noteworthy. First, Latin Americans are highly satisfied with their life, with exceptionally high levels in countries like

Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, Mexico, and Guatemala. Second, the trend during the last decade is mostly positive. With only a few exceptions (El Salvador, Venezuela, Honduras, and Chile), most countries show an increase in people's satisfaction with life from 2001 to 2011.

The information in Figs. 8.14 and 8.15 also indicates that social and GDP per capita indicators are limited in capturing all relevant factors in a person's life. Why do Latin Americans report such high levels of life satisfaction? Their affective state is, in general, outstanding, and their contentment state is good. In contrast to some people in African countries, Latin Americans have higher contentment levels, reflecting their not-so-bad access to health, education, and other material benefits. Of course, neither the income nor the quality of the services is comparable to those in the so-called developed countries. This fact may explain why contentment levels are moderate in the region. On the other hand, and in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon world, Latin Americans are not driven by materialistic values—they have not yet succumbed to the status



**Fig. 8.15** Life satisfaction among Latin American countries, 2001–2011 (Data from Latinobarómetro 2015)

race. Thus, in general, they have a more relaxed life; people are valued not for what they have but for what they are. Latin Americans value human relations, and they can count on family and friendship networks to live a fulfilling life. Warm, genuine, noninterested, and close human relations, as well as a relaxed life not based on accumulating possessions but on experiences with others, are important sources of happiness in Latin America, which may help to explain the apparent paradox of high happiness in a context of mid income levels and nonoutstanding economic achievement (Rojas 2012c; Rojas and Elizondo-Lara 2012). As an illustration, Fig. 8.16 shows the average satisfaction with family life in selected countries. A few Latin American countries in the survey rank at the top, with an average for Argentina and Mexico of about six (corresponding to “very satisfied”).

### 8.4.5 Disadvantaged Population Groups


It has been stated that due to high inequality, average figures are not good proxies in Latin America. Inequality usually makes reference to huge differences in one variable (e.g., income) across the whole population; however, it is also possible to think about huge differences across social groups. Age and gender groups normally

receive substantial attention when talking about disadvantaged groups. In Latin America, the indigenous population—which overlaps in some countries with the rural population—is also of particular importance.

Latin America is a region of young people; at present there is a demographic bonus that contributes to the well-being of Latin Americans. The median age is 26 years (reported in 2012), compared to Australia at 37 and Finland at 42. With the exception of some countries like Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Costa Rica, the threats to the well-being of older adults are not a major consideration in most Latin American countries. The dependency rate is low, and most older adults find emotional and economic support within their families. However, the trend in the dependency ratio is expected to rise in the future as life expectancy increases and birth rates decline.

Child labor is a problem in Latin America. As Fig. 8.17 shows, 7.8 % of Latin American children are engaged in economic activities or household chores.<sup>4</sup> The region has one of the highest child labor rates in the world; only the sub-

<sup>4</sup>Under UNICEF’s definition, a child is considered to be involved in child labor under the following conditions: (a) children 5–11 years old who, during the reference week, engaged in at least 1 h of economic activity or at least 28 h of household chores or (b) children 12–14 years old who, during the reference week, engaged in at least 14 h of economic activity or at least 28 h of household chores.




**Fig. 8.16** Satisfaction with family life, 2012 (Data from International Social Survey Program 2012)

Saharan region and the group of least developed countries have higher rates. Peru (34 %) and Bolivia (26 %) are among the highest in the world; Guatemala and Haiti also have a significant percentage of children (21 %) engaged in labor.

Perhaps the population group that has attracted considerable attention as disadvantaged are women. The data show that women are a disadvantaged group in the region; it also shows that the region has made progress in reducing the gender gap during the last few decades. The CIRI Human Rights Database shows that the score for women's economic rights in Latin America (which include, among others, equal pay for equal work, free choice of employment, and equality in hiring and promotion practices) was 1.25 (in 1981) and 1.40 (in 2011); the score for women's political rights (including the right to vote, run for political office, and hold elected positions, among others) was 1.45 (in 1981) and 2.30 (in 2011). The scores range from 0 (meaning "no women's political rights") and 3 (meaning "women's political rights are guaranteed in both law and practice").

On the other hand, indigenous people in Latin America continue to suffer discrimination, marginalization, extreme poverty, and conflict. The United Nations' report, *State of the World's Indigenous Peoples* (United Nations 2009), suggests that poverty among indigenous people is pervasive and severe in Latin America. Poverty is so common among indigenous people that being indigenous is almost equivalent to being in poverty. Differences between indigenous and nonindigenous peoples are striking in some countries: In Paraguay, poverty rates are 7.9 times higher among indigenous people compared to the rest of the population; in Panama, this figure is 5.9, and in Mexico, 3.3 times. The poverty rate for indigenous people reaches 90 % in Mexico, whereas in Guatemala and Ecuador it is 80 %.

This situation has not improved much over the years. Even if indigenous people now have greater access to secondary or higher education, they face difficulty in converting education to higher incomes. The rise of transparent electoral processes in Latin America has fostered political participation of indigenous groups (e.g., in



**Fig. 8.17** Child labor ages, 5–14, Latin America 2012 (Data from United Nations Development Programme 2015)

Bolivia). New policies aim to safeguard lands and rights of indigenous people. However, the same policies put the indigenous people in conflict with oil, mining, and lumber companies. Greater political participation has also generated a movement that calls for the respect of indigenous cultures, their aspirations, and values. This indigenous movement also aspires to define well-being in their own terms on the basis of their own values. Doing so challenges the common practice of measuring people's well-being in terms of income and access to particular services.

## 8.5 Public Policy Considerations

The Latin American region has seen significant improvements in indicators such as life expectancy and literacy rates. Furthermore, Latin Americans are, in general, highly satisfied with their lives.

Within the dominant paradigm of economic development, the countries of the region have implemented different strategies to increase economic productivity and income; these strategies produced modest gains in economic well-being.

Per capita income has increased, but the gap between the Latin American countries and those with the highest income levels remains wide. Absolute improvements in per capita income do not necessarily translate into relative improvements in well-being. The major players in Latin America still associate development with rapid economic growth, which seems paradoxical, given the fact that the data demonstrate that well-being in Latin America depends on a host of factors in addition to income.

The emergence of a well-being paradigm calls for a reconsideration of the development strategy as well as for a new framework to guide public policy and social action in the region (Rojas 2014). First, it is important for the region to play a more active role in identifying and setting well-being goals. The conception of development and progress has been mostly determined by non-Latin Americans. Latin Americans should identify their own well-being aspirations. Unfortunately, the region has imported a view of development as economic growth and mass consumption that does not necessarily reflect the values of Latin Americans and that does not ensure well-being. It is crucial for the region to generate



an internal process aiming to define the concept of societal progress that best fits the values and culture of the region.

Second, well-being is a personal experience: It involves people, not society. People experience well-being; society does not. It is important to recognize that this personal experience is greatly influenced by the social context people in which people live. In other words, well-being should not be understood as the result of the actions taken by an out-of-context individual but by a person who is socially imbedded and whose identity implies the existence of a social context. As a result, social action aimed at increasing people's well-being must recognize the importance of the social context. Well-being should not be promoted with an individualistic viewpoint but with a social view. Social diversity and social exclusion have long besieged Latin America; thus, social action should develop well-being strategies based on the recognition of a shared destiny rather than on a common destiny. The idea of a common destiny assumes that people in Latin America have common values and interests, whereas the idea of a shared destiny recognizes heterogeneity in values and interests. A shared destiny perspective also recognizes interdependence and the important role of the social context in influencing the well-being experience. Thus, social action and public policy in Latin America must be based on pursuing a win-win well-being strategy rather than on imposing the interests and values of some groups over others. This win-win strategy favors compromise and inclusion.

Third, the region must develop political institutions that can enhance social inclusion. We stated earlier in the chapter that political and judicial institutions in Latin America are weak. Latin American history is riddled with conflict—military coups and dictatorships are the rule rather than the exception; economic elites and foreign companies control the electoral and judicial systems; and pyramid structures of power are common in both the agricultural and public sectors. Weak political institutions are better fitted for top-down rather than bottom-up decision making. It is not surprising that recent democratic experiences quickly moved toward soft dictatorships characterized by continuous reelections and the reemergence of caudillo practices. The region should

develop institutions that facilitate social negotiations to reach agreements among conflicting parties to avoid the high well-being costs of social conflict and exclusion. There is no doubt that the region should closely examine the role and functioning of political parties, political representatives, parliaments, and citizenry. Doing so should change the political system from the predominant top-down to a bottom-up political process. The result should pave the way for greater inclusion of groups that have been traditionally excluded.

Fourth, for decades, the region has focused on GDP as its main social goal. The well-being paradigm recognizes the importance of higher income, but as an instrumental goal, not a final one. Guided by the new paradigm, the region should go beyond promoting economic growth. In other words, the goal is not to raise income for its own sake but to use it to enhance people's well-being. This approach implies the need to address new questions such as (1) are there well-being costs in strategies used to foster economic growth? (2) How ought economic resources to be used? The literature suggests that some strategies that promote economic growth come at the expense of substantial well-being costs (i.e., due to their adverse impact on human relations, on the availability of free time, on decreasing job security, and on conflict with fundamental values). The literature also suggests that higher income may not necessarily translate into greater well-being in societies where materialistic values are promoted and the provision of public goods is lacking. Public policy should take into account the existence of well-being costs in the promotion of economic growth. Public policy should uncover strategies for transforming economic growth into well-being. The fallacy of the benefits of perpetual economic growth becomes evident once these hidden costs are revealed. Thus, rather than thinking about economic growth as a never-ending process, it may become necessary to think of economic growth as an instrument to attain well-being.

Fifth, the improvement of social indicators such as literacy rate and life expectancy also presents new challenges for public policy. Current literacy and life-expectancy indicators are practically bounded, which means that it becomes very difficult—and also very expensive—to fur-

ther improve these indicators. With literacy rates reaching 100 %, it becomes more important to think about the quality of education rather than the quantity of educated people. Within the paradigm of development as economic growth, the role of education is to provide the knowledge and skills for people to become productive workers; however, within the new paradigm of development as well-being, it is important for the education system to provide knowledge and skills for people to lead satisfactory lives. Consequently, being highly productive is only one of many goals. Public policy should address the following question: What knowledge and skills are needed in a globalized world when the objective is not to become a productive worker but a highly satisfied person (e.g., a person who is satisfied with his or her life overall)? In a similar way, it is necessary for public policy to move from a quantitative to a qualitative focus regarding life expectancy. It may be important to add more years to life, but it is also crucial to add more quality of life to those years. Life-expectancy indicators focus on the number of years but not on their quality. Also, the change in age demographics (which is expected to occur in Latin America in the next few decades) raises new public-policy concerns: how to make the pension system in many Latin American countries sustainable and how to provide care facilities for the growing ailing older adult population?

Sixth, it is crucial for public policy to develop new indicators in those areas that are important for well-being and that are not currently incorporated in the national accounting system. Public policy and social action experts need better knowledge about what the relevant factors for people's well-being are and to develop theories that help us better gauge the impact of policy and action on well-being. The development of new indicators should permit complete assessment of all of the well-being costs and benefits associated with different policies and actions. It is important to develop new indicators regarding important well-being aspects such as family situation, the state of human relations in society, the quality of urban life, the availability of leisure time, and satisfaction with life.

Seventh, during the last century, most Latin American countries have fought a war against

poverty with some degree of success. However, the war-on-poverty perspective has a major shortcoming because it focuses on deficiencies. A broader perspective recognizes that it is not only important to get people out of poverty but also to be concerned about where these people are going. For example, the literature shows that there is not much increase in well-being when people get out of poverty but become financially indebted and adopt nongratifying consumption habits. Furthermore, higher income is not a good substitute for deterioration of family relations or of the amount of leisure time. Public policy in Latin America must not only address the question of how to get people out of poverty but, more importantly, how to place them in situations that foster their well-being.

Eighth, the region needs to go beyond the blaming game—to stop blaming either the state or the market system for society's problems. Creative thinking is needed to go beyond trade-offs between state intervention and the free market. It seems clear that the state has a role to play in the region, given the huge disparities in economic opportunities and in access to resources. Lack of state intervention under these conditions would condemn vast numbers of people, especially the youth, to a life of exclusion and marginalization. The cost of well-being is high not only to these groups but also to society at large. Society should benefit from the inclusion of these groups if it provides them with better employment, health, and educational opportunities. The state must intervene so that the socioeconomic conditions at birth do not constitute a burden children must carry for the rest of their lives. State intervention should promote and foster the potential contribution every member of society can make not only to his or her own well-being but also to the well-being of others. For the state to adequately perform this task, Latin America must address such ills as corruption, distorted incentives, and limited capacity. In addition, Latin America should recognize that the market system can play an important role in creating adequate incentives and rewards as well as in transmitting proper information about the relative scarcity of resources. Alexander Dumas once said that money "is a good servant but a bad mas-

ter.” It is important for Latin America to find ways to make the market system a good servant rather than a bad master.

## 8.6 Final Considerations

“Origin is destiny.” This expression is popular in Latin America; it refers to the importance that a person’s socioeconomic status at birth plays on his or her whole life trajectory. The origin-is-destiny concept is also an important argument made in this chapter. Problems and opportunities of Latin America are directly associated with its origins. As we argued, many social ills are structural in the sense that they were inherited from colonial times (e.g., exclusion, wealth concentration, a production process based on the exploitation of cheap labor, dependence on foreign investment, and weak political institutions).

Advancing well-being within the Latin American inherited structural condition is not an easy task. This chapter shows that some practices and strategies have been successful in advancing well-being in the region but that many errors have been made and many obstacles and problems still remain. Progress has been made in health, education, and income indicators, which are highly correlated and which are also highly intertwined regarding causality. Strategies looking for greater productivity and income have contributed to life expectancy and to schooling, and vice versa. Constant wars and guerrillas have been an obstacle to economic progress in many countries, but they have also emerged as a consequence of poor well-being conditions that economic progress alone cannot solve. Discrimination against indigenous groups and women constitutes a threat to well-being that sometimes is hidden by the widespread use of “average” indicators. Democracy is more than holding periodical elections: It is incorporating the interests and perspectives of people in the definition and purpose of social and political decisions.

This chapter shows that economic growth is not enough to generate the conditions appropriate for the emergence of high well-being. It also shows that economic growth is not sufficient to assess the well-being of people in a region. The

way Latin Americans experience well-being may not differ from the way people in other cultures experience it, but the sources of this well-being may differ substantially. The drivers of people’s well-being are not universal; their importance may change across regions depending on people’s values and culture. Over the centuries, a Latin American identity has emerged. This Latin American identity values human relations more than material possessions. The Latin American identity places an enormous importance on the family and social life. Latin Americans are not fully immersed in a consumer society in which people are valued for what they have rather than for how they treat others. They are not into a status race based on consumption, which allows them to have a more relaxed life oriented toward enjoyment rather than accumulation. Latin Americans have managed to enjoy life within their socioeconomic constraints, which shows that income is important but that high income is not really necessary; it seems that there is more to life than income.

The existence of some degree of dissonance between the so-called objective top-down indicators of income, health, and education and the subjective bottom-up indicators of well-being in Latin America shows that more work is needed in the study of well-being conceptualizations and measurement. It is necessary to recognize that the drivers of well-being are not universal and that it is possible to experience high well-being even when some conditions are deficient; this situation may happen because the importance of these conditions is not as great in some regions as in others (e.g., consumption is more important in consumer societies that gauge status by what people possess) or because there are other factors that have not been contemplated and that partially or completely offset some deficiencies (e.g., the affective benefits from strong family ties compensate for lack of income) (Rojas 2015). Thus, traditional indicators of progress, centered in productivity and economic growth, are not well-suited for Latin America. Perhaps this fact explains why there is a movement in Latin America that focuses on the importance of measuring and promoting *bienestar* (well-being) and *buen vivir* (well-living) (Rojas 2012d).

## Supplemental Tables

### Supplemental Table 8.1 Demography

#### SOCIAL INDICATORS: Demography

#### REGION: Latin America (N= 26)

	Country Source	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
Caribbean	Bahamas	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.4	4.8	2.0	1.7	1.4	59.7	76.7	82.5	82.8
Caribbean	Belize	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.3	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.3	54.0	48.4	45.0	44.1
Caribbean	Cuba	7.1	10.1	11.3	11.3	1.9	0.7	–0.1	–0.1	58.4	70.9	76.6	77.0
Caribbean	Dominican Republic	3.3	6.5	10.0	10.5	3.4	2.2	1.3	1.2	30.2	53.9	73.8	78.1
Caribbean	Haiti	3.9	6.4	9.9	10.5	2.0	2.3	1.3	1.4	15.6	23.3	52.0	57.4
Caribbean	Jamaica	1.6	2.3	2.7	2.7	1.2	1.4	0.4	0.2	33.8	48.4	53.7	54.6
Caribbean	Trinidad & Tobago	0.8	1.2	1.3	1.3	2.3	1.3	0.4	0.2	17.3	9.6	9.1	8.6
Central America	Costa Rica	1.3	2.7	4.7	4.9	3.4	2.7	1.5	1.3	34.3	45.4	71.7	75.9
Central America	El Salvador	2.8	5.0	6.2	6.4	2.9	1.3	0.6	0.7	38.3	46.6	64.3	66.3
Central America	Guatemala	4.1	7.9	14.3	15.9	2.7	2.4	2.5	2.5	31.1	39.2	49.3	51.1
Central America	Honduras	2.0	4.2	7.6	8.3	3.2	3.0	2.0	2.0	22.7	37.7	51.7	54.1
Central America	Mexico	38.7	77.9	117.9	123.8	3.2	2.0	1.2	1.2	50.8	69.0	77.8	79.0
Central America	Nicaragua	1.8	3.7	5.8	6.2	3.2	2.4	1.4	1.4	39.6	51.1	57.3	58.5
Central America	Panama	1.1	2.2	3.7	3.9	3.0	2.2	1.7	1.6	41.2	52.1	65.1	66.3
South America	Argentina	20.6	30.3	40.4	41.8	1.6	1.5	0.9	0.9	73.6	85.0	91.0	91.6
South America	Bolivia	3.4	6.0	10.2	10.8	2.2	2.4	1.6	1.6	36.8	50.5	66.4	68.1
South America	Brazil	72.8	136.2	195.2	202.0	3.0	2.1	0.9	0.8	46.1	69.9	84.3	85.4

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 8.1** (continued)

	Country	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
	Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
South America	Chile	7.6	12.1	17.2	17.8	2.5	1.7	0.9	0.9	67.8	82.6	88.6	89.4
South America	Colombia	16.0	30.1	46.4	48.9	3.0	2.1	1.4	1.3	45.0	65.6	75.0	76.2
South America	Ecuador	4.5	9.0	15.0	16.0	2.8	2.5	1.6	1.5	33.9	51.2	62.7	63.5
South America	Guyana	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	2.8	−0.9	0.6	0.5	29.0	30.0	28.2	28.5
South America	Paraguay	1.9	3.7	6.5	6.9	2.6	2.9	1.8	1.7	35.6	45.0	58.5	59.4
South America	Peru	9.9	19.5	29.3	30.8	2.8	2.3	1.1	1.3	46.8	66.9	76.9	78.3
South America	Suriname	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.5	2.9	1.0	0.9	0.9	47.3	65.3	66.3	66.1
South America	Uruguay	2.5	3.0	3.4	3.4	1.3	0.6	0.3	0.3	80.2	87.2	94.4	95.2
South America	Venezuela	7.6	17.3	29.0	30.9	3.8	2.7	1.6	1.5	61.6	81.9	88.8	88.9
	Caribbean (N=7)	2.4	3.8	5.1	5.3	2.6	1.8	1.1	1.0	38.4	47.3	56.1	57.5
	Central America (N=7)	7.4	14.8	22.9	24.2	3.1	2.3	1.5	1.5	36.9	48.7	62.5	64.4
	South America (N=12)	12.3	22.4	32.8	34.2	2.6	1.7	1.1	1.1	50.3	65.1	73.4	74.2
	Regional Average	8.3	15.3	22.7	23.7	2.7	1.9	1.2	1.2	43.5	55.9	65.8	67.1

Population: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates

% Population growth rate: Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage

% Urban: Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

i World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

j World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

k World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

l World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>



**Supplemental Table 8.2** Education  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Education**  
**REGION: Latin America (N= 26)**

	Country Source	% Secondary school enrollment			% Adult literacy				% Tertiary education		
		1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j
Caribbean	Bahamas	86.2	92.9	92.9					15.0		20.9
Caribbean	Belize	57.8	80.5	86.0						22.6	25.9
Caribbean	Cuba	82.0	89.2	92.1	79.0	94.0	99.8	99.8	18.0	95.0	47.8
Caribbean	Dominican Republic	53.9	75.5	75.9	64.0	77.0	89.5	90.9	18.5	46.4	46.4
Caribbean	Haiti	17.1		17.5	16.0	34.7		48.7	1.1		1.0
Caribbean	Jamaica	61.6	91.0	77.8			87.5	87.5	4.9	28.9	28.7
Caribbean	Trinidad & Tobago	81.5		83.2			98.8	98.8	4.5		6.6
Central America	Costa Rica	40.3	99.4	108.9	83.0	92.6	97.4	97.4	21.4	44.5	47.6
Central America	El Salvador	34.3	64.7	70.2	48.0	69.0	84.5	85.5	15.4	23.4	25.9
Central America	Guatemala	19.2	64.6	65.0	35.0	57.0	78.3	78.3	6.9	17.9	18.7
Central America	Honduras	36.9	73.2	71.0	44.0	65.0	84.8	85.4	8.7	20.6	21.1
Central America	Mexico	54.8	83.7	87.6	65.0	85.0	93.1	94.2	15.0	26.7	29.9
Central America	Nicaragua	29.7	68.9	68.9	47.0	63.0		78.0	8.2		7.3
Central America	Panama	59.1	70.3	73.7	73.0	87.0	94.1	94.1	24.2	43.9	43.5
South America	Argentina	70.2	90.2	107.3	91.0	95.0	97.9	97.9	35.7	74.8	80.3
South America	Bolivia		77.5	80.0	44.0	74.0	91.2	94.5		37.7	37.7
South America	Brazil				60.0	78.0	90.4	91.3			
South America	Chile	75.3	89.1	99.0	84.0	91.1	95.1	95.1	15.3	65.9	78.7
South America	Colombia	46.1	96.0	93.0	70.0	87.0	93.4	93.6	11.5	39.0	48.3
South America	Ecuador	58.7	85.2	103.2	65.0	83.6	91.9	93.3	32.2	38.9	40.5
South America	Guyana	73.8	99.4	101.0			85.0	85.0	2.7	11.5	12.9
South America	Paraguay	30.6	67.8	75.3	73.0	78.5	93.9	93.9	9.1	34.5	34.5
South America	Peru	62.8	91.7	94.0	60.0	83.0	93.8	93.8	22.4	40.6	40.6
South America	Suriname	55.7	74.9	76.0			94.7	94.7	6.8		9.6
South America	Uruguay	71.9	90.3	90.3	89.0	95.4	98.1	98.4	24.1	63.2	63.2

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 8.2** (continued)

	Country	% Secondary school enrollment			% Adult literacy				% Tertiary education		
		1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1985	2010	2013–2014
	Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j
South America	Venezuela	56.1	82.3	93.0	62.0	87.0	95.5	95.5	21.5	77.9	77.9
	Caribbean (N=7)	62.9	85.8	75.1	53.0	68.6	93.9	85.1	10.3	48.2	25.3
	Central America (N=7)	39.2	75.0	77.9	56.4	74.1	88.7	87.5	14.3	29.5	27.7
	South America (N=12)	60.1	85.9	92.0	69.8	85.3	93.4	93.9	18.1	48.4	47.7
	Regional Average	54.8	82.5	83.3	62.6	78.8	92.2	90.2	14.9	42.7	35.8

% Secondary school enrollment: Gross enrollment ratio. Secondary. All programs. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition

% Adult literacy: Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, 'literacy' also encompasses 'numeracy', the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100

% Tertiary education: Gross enrollment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving

a World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

b World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

c World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

d <http://moxlad-staging.herokuapp.com/home/en#tabs-graficar>

e World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>; <http://moxlad-staging.herokuapp.com/home/en#tabs-graficar>

f World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

g World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

h World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

i World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

j World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

**Supplemental Table 8.3** Health  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Health**  
**REGION: Latin America (N= 26)**

	Country Source	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1k live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate				TB incidence per 100k			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013-14	1960	1985	2010	2013-14	1960	1985	2010	2013-14	1960	1985	2010	2013-14
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t
Caribbean	Bahamas	62.7	69.6	74.6	75.1		23.3	11.2	10.4		27.8	13.9	12.9			38.0	37.0		26.8	17.0	9.8
Caribbean	Belize	60.0	71.1	73.3	73.9		41.6	15.7	14.3		53.0	18.3	16.7	0.0	62.9	60.0	45.0		15.2	38.0	37.0
Caribbean	Cuba	63.9	74.5	78.7	79.2	41.9	15.0	5.4	5.0	47.3	18.4	6.8	6.2	97.3	48.3	80.0	80.0		6.7	9.2	9.3
Caribbean	Dominican Republic	51.8	65.3	72.8	73.5	105.5	54.4	25.6	23.6	153.2	72.3	30.7	28.1		50.5	130.0	100.0		0.1	82.0	60.0
Caribbean	Haiti	42.2	52.5	61.9	63.1	202.0	113.6	72.7	54.7	301.9	166.4	174.4	72.8		24.6	420.0	380.0		77.6	272.0	206.0
Caribbean	Jamaica	64.2	71.1	72.8	73.5	62.2	28.2	15.7	14.3	84.7	34.2	18.3	16.6	203.6	43.2	82.0	80.0		5.6	6.6	6.5
Caribbean	Trinidad & Tobago	62.7	67.6	69.6	69.9	56.5	29.8	20.8	19.0	68.3	34.0	23.4	21.3			82.0	84.0		9.6	16.0	21.0
Central America	Costa Rica	61.6	74.6	79.3	79.9		18.2	8.7	8.4		21.6	10.0	9.6	124.5	37.1	33.0	38.0		13.9	16.0	11.0
Central America	El Salvador	51.3	59.8	71.6	72.3	126.3	59.4	15.2	13.5	187.1	80.2	17.7	15.7	64.6	58.7	71.0	69.0		29.2	31.0	39.0
Central America	Guatemala	45.5	59.6	71.0	72.0	148.1	72.8	28.4	25.8	221.8	101.3	34.5	31.0		105.2	140.0	140.0		83.0	65.0	60.0
Central America	Honduras	46.3	63.6	72.9	73.8	141.2	56.0	21.0	18.9	210.9	75.0	24.9	22.2		45.6	120.0	120.0		79.7	73.0	54.0
Central America	Mexico	57.1	68.8	76.7	77.4	101.5	45.4	14.4	12.5	146.7	58.7	16.8	14.5	176.2	70.9	47.0	49.0		19.3	21.0	21.0
Central America	Nicaragua	47.0	60.7	73.8	74.8	134.4	60.6	22.0	20.0	200.0	82.2	26.1	23.5	176.3	40.3	110.0	100.0		70.2	44.0	55.0
Central America	Panama	60.9	71.8	76.9	77.6	66.8	30.1	16.8	15.4	91.8	36.8	19.7	17.9	180.5	52.1	82.0	85.0		27.5	61.0	48.0
South America	Argentina	65.2	70.6	75.7	76.2		29.0	13.0	11.9		33.1	14.6	13.3		56.4	76.0	69.0		52.7	33.0	24.0
South America	Bolivia	42.7	55.7	66.3	67.2	179.1	98.8	34.7	31.2	298.3	147.3	44.0	39.1			230.0	200.0		127.1	158.0	123.0
South America	Brazil	54.7	64.5	73.1	73.9	130.0	61.9	14.6	12.3	172.9	75.8	16.3	13.7		48.2	68.0	69.0		61.9	51.0	46.0
South America	Chile	57.0	71.8	79.1	79.8	127.7	18.9	7.5	7.1	157.6	22.4	8.7	8.2	286.2	47.4	24.0	22.0		54.8	17.0	16.0
South America	Colombia	56.7	67.6	73.4	74.0	88.9	34.2	15.9	14.5	126.7	42.5	18.6	16.9	216.1	81.8	85.0	83.0		40.0	38.0	32.0
South America	Ecuador	53.1	66.1	75.6	76.5	120.6	54.7	20.9	19.1	178.1	72.8	24.7	22.5	284.7	136.6	90.0	87.0		53.5	83.0	56.0
South America	Guyana	58.2	61.3	65.7	66.2	67.8	51.0	32.3	29.9	93.4	67.0	39.8	36.6		66.5	230.0	250.0		28.6	115.0	109.0
South America	Paraguay	63.8	67.3	72.0	72.3	63.3	42.9	20.5	18.7	86.3	54.9	24.2	21.9	121.4	109.1	110.0	110.0		52.1	49.0	44.0
South America	Peru	47.7	63.0	73.9	74.8	136.9	70.9	15.2	12.9	229.5	104.4	19.6	16.7		48.3	100.0	89.0		125.2	150.0	124.0
South America	Suriname	59.7	67.0	70.3	71.0		45.8	22.3	20.3		54.1	25.1	22.8			150.0	130.0		13.3	62.0	39.0

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 8.3** (continued)

	Country	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1k live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate				TB incidence per 100k			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013-14	1960	1985	2010	2013-14	1960	1985	2010	2013-14	1960	1985	2010	2013-14
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t
South America	Uruguay	67.9	71.6	76.6	77.1	57.6	25.3	10.6	9.5	63.9	28.6	12.3	11.1	126.7	42.1	23.0	14.0		39.9	21.0	30.0
South America	Venezuela	59.5	69.7	74.2	74.6	59.9	29.4	13.7	12.9	81.0	35.8	16.0	14.9	100.2	53.7	110.0	110.0		27.8	34.0	33.0
	Caribbean (N=7)	58.2	67.4	72.0	72.6	93.6	43.7	23.9	20.2	131.1	58.0	40.8	24.9	100.3	45.9	127.4	115.1		20.2	63.0	49.9
	Central America (N=7)	52.8	65.6	74.6	75.4	119.7	48.9	18.1	16.4	176.4	65.1	21.4	19.2	144.4	58.6	86.1	85.9		46.1	44.4	41.1
	South America (N=12)	57.2	66.3	73.0	73.6	103.2	46.9	18.4	16.7	148.8	61.6	22.0	19.8	189.2	69.0	108.0	102.8		56.4	67.6	56.3
	Regional average	56.3	66.4	73.1	73.8	105.6	46.6	19.8	17.5	152.4	61.6	26.9	21.0	154.2	60.4	107.3	101.5		43.9	60.1	50.5

Avg. years life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life

Infant <1/1k live born: Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year

Child mortality <5/1K: Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year

Maternal mortality rate: Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births. The data are estimated with a regression model using information on the proportion of maternal deaths among non-AIDS deaths in women ages 15–49, fertility, birth attendants, and GDP

TB Incidence per 100k: Incidence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of new pulmonary, smear positive, and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis cases. Incidence includes patients with HIV

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

i World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

j World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

k World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

l World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

m [http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality\\_data/en/](http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/); <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN>. estimate made from pregnancy related deaths, birth rate, and population

n [http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality\\_data/en/](http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/); <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN>

o World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

p World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

q <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>

r <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>

s World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

t World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

**Supplemental Table 8.4** Income  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Income**  
**REGION: Latin America (N= 26)**

	Country Source	GDP (Billions of constant 2005 USD)				PCGDP (constant 2005 USD)				% Growth in GDP				GINI or other measure of wealth disparity		
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1985	2010	2013–14
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o
Caribbean	Bahamas	1.5	5.1	7.6	7.9	13380.9	21708.1	21128.5	20689.6	10.7	4.8	1.5	1.0			
Caribbean	Belize	0.1	0.3	1.3	1.4	971.4	1846.5	4101.1	4103.9	4.9	1.1	3.3	1.5			
Caribbean	Cuba		38.9	55.4	60.3		3855.8	4913.9	5351.3		1.6	2.4	2.7			
Caribbean	Dominican Republic	3.5	13.6	45.3	53.7	1068.0	2080.2	4517.6	5100.8	-2.3	-2.1	8.3	7.3	47.8	47.2	45.7
Caribbean	Haiti			4.5	5.2			452.1	497.4			-5.5	2.7			
Caribbean	Jamaica										-2.9	-1.5	1.3	43.2		43.2
Caribbean	Trinidad & Tobago	3.8	8.9	18.9	19.1	4423.2	7623.0	14203.5	14275.4	14.0	-4.1	0.2	1.6	42.6		42.6
Central America	Costa Rica	2.5	7.7	25.0	29.4	1842.4	2838.4	5357.5	5962.4	-1.0	1.0	5.0	3.5	34.4	48.1	48.6
Central America	El Salvador		8.8	18.3	19.8		1750.7	2949.6	3103.0		0.6	1.4	2.0		44.5	41.8
Central America	Guatemala	4.8	13.6	32.6	37.7	1170.7	1712.8	2270.1	2380.0	4.3	-0.6	2.9	4.2	58.3	52.4	52.4
Central America	Honduras	1.6	4.8	11.5	12.4	813.4	1127.9	1515.0	1495.1	1.9	4.2	3.7	3.5	55.1	53.4	57.4
Central America	Mexico	127.6	516.9	953.1	1067.9	3299.0	6639.5	8084.6	8626.2	5.0	2.6	5.1	2.1		47.2	48.1
Central America	Nicaragua	2.2	4.6	7.2	8.7	1256.1	1237.0	1228.8	1417.2	7.4	-4.1	3.2	4.7		45.7	45.7
Central America	Panama	2.1	7.9	22.6	31.8	1830.9	3539.2	6145.3	8087.5	10.8	4.9	5.9	6.2		51.9	51.9
South America	Argentina	77.0	132.6	294.5	332.6	3732.4	4369.6	7293.7	7955.6	5.4	-7.6	9.5	0.5	42.8	44.5	43.6
South America	Bolivia	2.9	5.1	12.0	14.9	874.3	840.6	1177.0	1371.9	2.1	-1.7	4.1	5.4		49.7	46.6
South America	Brazil	124.2	535.4	1108.5	1206.1	1706.1	3930.4	5678.3	5969.7	10.3	7.9	7.6	0.1	55.6	53.9	52.7
South America	Chile	19.0	39.3	147.7	175.0	2479.2	3242.8	8609.3	9847.9	4.0	7.1	5.8	1.9	56.2	52.0	50.8
South America	Colombia	23.2	74.2	183.0	222.6	1452.5	2465.4	3939.1	4549.4	5.3	3.1	4.0	4.6	53.1	55.5	53.5
South America	Ecuador	7.2	23.4	49.0	60.5	1593.2	2613.6	3268.8	3782.4	1.5	3.9	3.5	3.8	50.5	49.3	46.6
South America	Guyana	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.1	769.6	740.5	1168.9	1380.5	4.7	2.4	4.4	3.8			
South America	Paraguay	1.1	4.7	11.1	13.7	569.5	1270.1	1725.8	1979.5	6.9	4.5	13.1	4.4		51.8	48.0
South America	Peru	18.6	45.7	104.6	127.7	1876.0	2342.9	3574.7	4151.1	7.4	2.1	8.5	2.4	45.7	44.9	45.3
South America	Suriname		1.3	2.2	2.5		3393.8	4207.6	4569.2		-1.9	5.2	2.9			
South America	Uruguay	8.0	10.2	23.2	27.4	3151.8	3381.1	6878.3	8018.6	2.5	1.5	7.8	3.5		45.3	41.3
South America	Venezuela	45.0	91.8	174.6	186.9	5939.8	5298.8	6010.0	6057.0	3.2	0.2	-1.5	-4.0	53.5		53.5

(continued)



**Supplemental Table 8.4** (continued)

	GDP (Billions of constant 2005 USD)				PCGDP (constant 2005 USD)				% Growth in GDP				GINI or other measure of wealth disparity			
	Country	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1985	2010	2013–14
	Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o
Caribbean (N=7)	2.2	13.4	22.2	24.6	4960.9	7422.7	8219.4	8336.4	6.8	-0.3	1.3	2.6	44.5	47.2	43.8	
Central America (N=7)	23.5	80.6	152.9	172.5	1702.1	2692.2	3935.8	4438.8	4.7	1.2	3.9	3.7	49.3	49.0	49.4	
South America (N=12)	29.7	80.4	175.9	197.6	2194.9	2824.1	4460.9	4969.4	4.8	1.8	6.0	2.4	51.1	49.7	48.2	
Regional Average	22.7	66.5	132.6	149.0	2581.0	3743.7	5216.0	5628.9	5.2	1.1	4.1	2.8	49.1	49.2	48.0	

GDP (constant 2005 USD): GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2005 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used

PCGDP (constant 2005 USD): GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars

% Growth in GDP: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources

GINI or other measure of wealth disparity: Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line.

Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality

a World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

b World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

c World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

d World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

e World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

f World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

g World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

h World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

i World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

j World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

k World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

l World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

m World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

n World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

o World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

**Supplemental Table 8.5** Subjective well-being  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Subjective Well-Being**  
**REGION: Latin America (N= 26)**

	Country	World Values Survey (WVS), 1981–2014					
		WVS 1 1981–1984	WVS 2 1990–1994	WVS 3 1995–1998	WVS 4 1999–2004	WVS 5 2005–2009	WVS 6 2010–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f
Caribbean	Bahamas						
Caribbean	Belize						
Caribbean	Cuba						
Caribbean	Dominican Republic			7.1			
Caribbean	Haiti						
Caribbean	Jamaica						
Caribbean	Trinidad & Tobago					7.3	7.5
Central America	Costa Rica						
Central America	El Salvador			7.5			
Central America	Guatemala					7.9	
Central America	Honduras						
Central America	Mexico	8.0	7.4	7.5	8.1	8.2	8.5
Central America	Nicaragua						
Central America	Panama						
South America	Argentina	6.8	7.3	6.9	7.3	7.8	7.5
South America	Bolivia						
South America	Brazil		7.4			7.7	7.8
South America	Chile		7.6	6.9	7.1	7.2	7.3
South America	Colombia			8.3		8.3	8.4
South America	Ecuador						7.9
South America	Guyana						
South America	Paraguay						
South America	Peru			6.4	6.4	7.0	7.1
South America	Suriname						
South America	Uruguay			7.1		5.6	7.6
South America	Venezuela			6.7	7.5		
	Caribbean (N=7)			7.1		7.3	7.5
	Central America (N=7)	8.0	7.4	7.5	8.1	8.1	8.5
	South America (N=12)	6.8	7.4	7.1	7.1	7.3	7.7
	Regional Average	7.4	7.4	7.2	7.3	7.4	7.7

Mean life satisfaction: Averaged value of responses to the following survey question: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely satisfied” and 10 means you are “completely dissatisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?

a WVS 1 1981–84: V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

b WVS 2 1990–04: V96.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

c WVS 3 1995–98: V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

d WVS 4 1999–04: V81.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

e WVS 5 2005–09: V22.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

f WVS 6 2010–14: V23.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

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# Well-Being in Canada and the United States

# 9

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*This country will not be a good place for any of us to live in  
unless we make it a good place for all of us to live in.*(Theodore Roosevelt, *United States  
President, 1901–1909*)

(Roosevelt n.d.)

*Two races share today the soil of Canada. These people had not always been friends.  
But I hasten to say it. There is no longer any family here but the human family.  
It matters not the language people speak, or the altars at which they kneel.*(Wilfrid  
Laurier, *Former Canadian Prime Minister*)

(Laurier n.d.)

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## 9.1 Introduction

The three countries of North America—Canada, Mexico, and the United States—make up one of the world’s largest geographic regions—com-

prising more than 9.54 million miles<sup>2</sup> of landmass with a combined population in excess of 464 million people and a regional economy larger than 18.6 thousand million USD (trillion) in 2013 (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] 2014). By comparison, the Russian Federation, the world’s largest country geographically, has a landmass of 17.1 million km<sup>2</sup> and, in 2015, a countrywide population of 146.2 million people.

The borders of the North American region are defined by thousands of miles of mostly unguarded coastlines, including those along the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Gulf of Mexico, and, in the case of Canada, the Arctic Ocean (Map 9.1). Canada also includes the 1.2-million-square-mile Hudson Bay, the largest body of inland salt water in North America. The United States and Canada share the five Great Lakes, or inland seas (Lakes Superior, Michigan, Huron [or Michigan–Huron], Erie, and Ontario). Together, the Great Lakes hold more than 94,000 miles<sup>2</sup> of fresh water and serve as major transportation networks that terminate in Canada and, through their river systems, the southern tip of northern Central America. The Great Lakes also feed the region’s extensive Missouri (east to

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west) and Mississippi (north to south) Rivers, which unite most geographic regions of the United States. The United States shares land and water borders with Mexico and Central America as well, the latter being joined by the Gulf of Mexico, which is rich in fish, petroleum, and other natural resources that work to the benefit of all of the countries that share access to the Gulf's rich salt waters.

Thus, both Canada and the United States are Atlantic and Pacific powers. The United States is a major influence in Mexico and Central America as well because of the shared ties through the Gulf of Mexico. Since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the three-nation region has been unified by an extensive railway network that connects all three countries to their respective major industrial and urban centers. Air transportation in the region is remarkably sophisticated and connects all of the region's major cities to one another and to the rest of the world. Formally, the North American region includes Mexico, which, for reasons related to Mexico's long history, unique culture, and Spanish language, is discussed in the chapter on Latin American and the Caribbean (Chap. 8).

### 9.1.1 The Region in Global Perspective

The peoples of Canada and the United States share extensive social histories: their experience as former European colonies; the size and richness of their economies and natural resource base; the depth of their human resources; and the variety of their social, political, cultural, religious, racial, and ethnic makeup (Camarota 2012; Powell 2005). The residents of both countries easily cross borders into one another's country.

North America, given the vastness of her size, also has a great abundance of flora and animal life—including many species not found elsewhere in the world. The high level of trust that exists between the populations of the two countries is reflected in the fact that only a small percentage of the 5525 miles of borders that separate

Canada and the United States is guarded. This reality contrasts sharply with the high levels of border tension that exist between Mexico and the United States. Today, America's southern border is punctuated with hundreds of miles of razor fences, high walls, deep ditches, and continuous surveillance by armed military and civilian patrols (CIA 2015). The current approach to keep Mexicans from entering the United States illegally, however, has not been successful and, as of today, more than 11–12 million illegal immigrants have crossed these boundaries in search of either improved economic opportunities or to rejoin other members of their family who crossed the border in past years.

Canada's population, despite the large amount of land available to it, is affected by especially challenging and difficult winters, and its population is therefore substantially smaller than that of the United States. Canadians number approximately 35.9 million people, a population that, though smaller than that of the United States, ranks 37th worldwide (Statistics Canada 2015).

### 9.1.2 Centers of Global Legal and Illegal Immigration

Canada, like the United States, is home to many illegal immigrants who, like those in the United States, easily become “lost” in the country's crowded urban centers and in the vastness of its Northern Territories (García 2006). Owing to the extremes of Canada's winters, a disproportionate share of the country's population, including its illegal immigrants, live along its relatively warmer southern border with the United States. The population concentrations of both countries are clearly visible in the regional map (Map 9.1).

### 9.1.3 Economic, Cultural, and Education Exchanges

In addition to their many formal and informal programs of educational and cultural exchange, Canada and the United States are each other's largest economic partners, with a combined trad-

**NORTH AMERICA**



**Map 9.1** Regional map of North America (CIA 2015; public domain)

ing level exceeding 25.9 % of the world’s total economic output of USD 74,555 billion in 2015

(World Bank 2014d). Economic trade between the two countries continues to increase each year,

especially in response to the identification of new oil and other petrochemical energy reserves in Canada. Tourism between the two countries has increased appreciably in recent decades.

#### 9.1.4 Political Structures and Characteristics

Politically, the United States is a federal republic with 50 distinct *state* governments, 1 federal government, and 1 special administrative government unit that governs the affairs of the District of Columbia, the territory in which the country's central government is located. The United States also has literally tens of thousands of incorporated villages, boroughs, towns, cities, and counties, each of which has its own local government and, sometimes, conflicting legal or regulatory systems (National League of Cities 2015). The large number of state and local governments, plus the federal government, effectively brings government close to America's citizens; at the same time, though, they slow the pace of social and political change. This pattern of multiple layers of government is exactly what the country's founding fathers intended in order to ensure the existence of a comparatively *weak* central government with political power located as close to local citizens as possible (Hamilton et al. 2003). This pattern continued until the country was forced into a shattering Civil War (1861–1865) over slavery that threatened the country's integrity as a nation. The creation of a central tax system to finance the war in 1862 was one of a series of direct outgrowths of the war that in turn laid the foundation for a strong federal government that, in time, assumed many of the responsibilities of the local governments and individual states.

Like the United States, Canada also has a federal system of government. Unlike the United States, the country is a constitutional monarchy with a Westminster-style parliament containing a bicameral legislature consisting of a Senate whose members are appointed by the Prime Minister and a House of Commons whose members are elected by the people. There are ten

provinces and three territories whose legislative authority is somewhat structured by the federal constitutional acts of 1867 and 1982. The country's aboriginal population also exerts considerable authority in Canadian federal affairs. The size, composition, and responsibilities of each country's geopolitical levels differ appreciably from one another but all exert important influence at the federal level (CIA 2015; Statistics Canada 2014).

#### 9.1.5 International Political Reach

Both Canada and the United States are full and active members of nearly all major intergovernmental bodies including those of the United Nations and its dozens of specialized agencies. Both countries also cooperate extensively with European political institutions and, in turn, are major partners in intergovernmental bodies that promote cooperation between Pacific and Atlantic nations as well as those of Latin America and the Caribbean. Because of Canada's history of promoting peaceful development, it is frequently called upon to help settle disputes in other countries and world regions. The military resources of the United States, on the other hand, often are called upon to aid in the settlement of open conflicts between warring states. Both countries also are recognized for their high levels of international development assistance to developing countries, i.e., 0.27 % of Canada's gross domestic product (GDP) (USD 4.85 billion) and 0.19 % of the America's GDP (USD 31.55 billion) in 2013 (OECD 2014b). The amount of foreign aid given by the United States to developing countries is a continuing source of debate within the country, with many groups preferring that these resources be redirected to rebuilding America's failing infrastructure or inadequately financed social programs (Lancaster 2006). As a percentage of GDP, however, the level of development aid and technical assistance provided by both countries to poorer countries is much smaller than that provided by other affluent developed market economies of Europe, Oceania, and Asia (OECD 2014b).

### 9.1.6 Selected Regional Characteristics of Well-Being

Canada and the United States are defined by a variety of cultural, political, and social characteristics. For example, the American middle class has experienced spectacular gains in wealth even in the presence of recurrent poverty in the country ranging from 11 to 14 %, including one in five children under the age of 16 (United States Census Bureau 2010, 2014a). Recurrent, seemingly intractable, poverty has resulted in high levels of economic inequality in both countries, especially among the Native American and aboriginal peoples, children and the aged, persons unable to speak official languages, those with low levels of education, unskilled workers, and others who, for a variety of social reasons, are unable to participate fully in the highly competitive economic systems of both countries. Further, recurring economic “boom and bust” cycles impact different population subgroups and contribute to uneven well-being in education and health, especially for disadvantaged population groups (OECD 2014b; Sullivan et al. 2001).

Figure 9.1 shows poverty levels in the United States for the 52-year period 1959–2011 (United States Census Bureau 2014a). The figure also shows the numbers of persons officially classified as poor and provides evidence concerning the seemingly intractable nature of poverty in

American life, despite a robust system of public transfer programs (food, childcare, and health care subsidies as well as subvention to publicly financed housing). The fact that one in five of the nation’s children lives in poverty is especially tragic given the stability of the number over the past 150 years. Poverty in Canada is less pronounced than that which exists in the United States. For its part, Canada has decided that poverty is too expensive a social problem to afford, given the long-term contributions of poverty to heightened levels of crime, drug and substance abuse, family and community violence, and rapidly deteriorating social infrastructure. These issues are especially pronounced among Canada’s aboriginal youth, for whom rates of social and emotional breakdown are high (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2013).

Today, however, the social situation in both Canada and the United States is such that government-supported educational opportunities are available to all without cost. Increasingly, primary health care continues to reach large numbers of people in both countries, but the United States remains a relative *social laggard* among rich countries in this critical sector of well-being (Bresica and Super 2008; OECD 2014b). Even so, North America’s progress on the health front continues, with the result that residents of both Canada and the United States have access to what are regarded as two of the world’s highest levels of health care.




Fig. 9.1 Number in poverty and poverty rate: 1959–2011. (DeNavas-Walt et al. 2012)



### 9.1.7 Major Well-Being Themes

The nations of North America, though old relative to many newly independent nations of Africa and Asia (and even those restructured countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the Baltic States), are still two of the youngest (and most successful) on the planet. From their formation until today, the following themes have guided increases in the region's pursuit of well-being (Turner and Turner 2008; Zakaria 2007):

- An emphasis on participatory forms of self-governance reaching from the local community to the county and state levels and, ultimately, to the federal levels, including a mostly self-regulated form of taxation to support publicly financed services;
- Isolation initially from problematic world affairs but today, full immersion in all aspects of international affairs—often at the expense of investments in their respective domestic social programs and physical infrastructures;
- A general attitude of openness and welcome to the stranger, especially to new arrivals in both countries, though with some reservations;
- An emphasis on personal achievement through work as the basis for advancing within the countries' multilayered economic and social systems;
- An emphasis on the containment of diversity-related social conflict, albeit America's early history with slavery, even among the country's founding fathers, undermined many of its most fundamental principles;
- An unparalleled emphasis on education, research, and a spirit of inventive inquiry that led the region's nations to emerge as premier world centers for higher education and for scientific and technological innovation;
- A long-standing and continuing emphasis on individualism even in the midst of group and other collective activities;
- Sustained public and private investments in science, technology, and the arts.

These themes are dealt with throughout the remainder of the chapter, but the primary focus is

well-being in both Canada and the United States since the end of the Second World War.

## 9.2 Settlement of North America

This chapter provides an overview of well-being in the predominately English-speaking countries of the region—Canada (Anglo-French) and the United States (Anglo-Spanish). In addition to a discussion of the well-being of the Canadian and American “middle mass,” this chapter also discusses the considerable changes in the well-being status of the rapidly increasing racial, religious, and cultural minority populations of both countries. First, however, we provide a brief social and political history of Canada and the United States from the perspective of the major themes characteristic of each country since the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The chapter's primary focus, however, is on regional changes in well-being since the end of World War II, for which Canada and the United States rank 8th and 5th, respectively, on the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2013).

### 9.2.1 Early Habitation

Evidence exists that human habitation of North America began at least 4000 years ago (Griggs 2014); most likely, though, human settlements in North America date back as long ago as 40,000 Before the Common Era (Goebel et al. 2008). Present-day North Americans of European origin arrived in large numbers on the continent during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries but were preceded by smaller groups of Viking explorers who crossed into what would become the Canadian Atlantic Provinces via Greenland in the tenth century (Gear and Gear 2015).

### 9.2.2 Slavery and Indentured Servants

“Americans,” though, especially those of the seventeenth century, did not arrive on the continent



alone. They brought with them large numbers of Black African slaves who were openly sold as chattel in America's slave markets. Indeed, much of economic development and early expansionism that occurred in the American South occurred through slave labor. This single fact of American social history has had a lasting impact on well-being in the United States: Disproportionate numbers of the country's poor and jobless are the blood descendants of the country's early slaves (Kolchin 2003; United States Census Bureau 2014a).

Many people also arrived in the United States as indentured servants, i.e., persons whose sea passage was paid for by another in exchange for labor lasting a mutually agreed upon time period (Salinger 2000). Most were adolescent boys and girls who were needed for farm work or assistance with running large family homes or estates. Indentured servants did, though, acquire marketable skills during the period of their servitude, skills that would serve them well in adulthood as self-sufficient farmers, blacksmiths, carpenters, and the like.

### 9.2.3 The Migration of Free People to North America

Canada and the United States also have been centers of global migration of "free people" from the earliest beginnings of both countries. Most of the earliest settlers originated from Europe but, in time, large numbers flocked to the shores of both nations from Africa, Asia, Central and South America, and, in recent years, from the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union. In all, between 1820 and 2014, the two countries welcomed tens of millions of immigrants as permanent residents, eventually citizens, of their countries. Legal, and even illegal, immigration to Canada also was high during this period and, during some decades, the percentages of immigrants admitted to both countries frequently equaled or exceeded natural population growth rates (Statistics Canada 2014; United States Census Bureau 2014a, b). Thus, population growth via immigration has been, and is likely to remain,

one of the most dominant features of population increases in North America (Powell 2005; Statistics Canada 2014).

One of the most important defining features of both countries, indeed that of the region as a whole, is the emphasis on immigration as a way to provide refuge for persons experiencing conflict in their societies of origin. At the same time, the steady flow of immigrants into both countries made possible geographic expansion into the largely unchartered territories of both countries and served as a steady source of large numbers of agricultural, factory, and both highly skilled and unskilled laborers. Both countries are widely recognized for their superior primary, secondary, and tertiary educational systems and for their groundbreaking contributions to literature, the arts, science, and technology. Interstellar exploration and, perhaps, eventual interstellar travel are now part of the scientific agenda of the United States.

### 9.2.4 North America's Newest Arrivals

Well-being for the middle mass of the North America population of approximately 353.2 million people is high by global standards, and both the region's population and social accomplishments continue to increase each year. Using the United Nations HDI to assess social progress, average life expectancy in the region increased from an average of 65.7 years in 1945 to a record average for the region of 78.8 years in 2014—a net increase of 20 % in just a little less than 70 years! School enrollment at the primary level is virtually universal (99 %) as are rates of adult literacy, albeit literacy includes languages other than English and French—the two most frequently spoken languages in Canada (98 %) versus English and Spanish in the United States.

Today, the work forces in both countries consist primarily of "white- rather than "blue-collar" or unskilled workers, and the percentage of the work force of each country engaged in agriculture and fishing is on the decline to well below 5 %. Some interesting facts about the composition

of the agricultural workforce in the United States are as follows: (1) 75 % of the workers were born in Mexico; (2) 53 % of all respondents to a national survey of agricultural workers were not authorized to work in the United States; and (3) foreign-born newcomers comprised 16 % of the hired crop labor force (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014). All of these trends are likely to increase as the percentage of the agricultural workforce continues to shrink relative to increases in the country's white-collar workforce (Holzer and Demetra 2007; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014).

Because of the high levels of immigration, both Canada and the United States enjoy the continuous infusion of new workers representing diverse racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and religious backgrounds. "Diversity in the midst of unity," or *e pluribus unum* (from many one), expresses the aspiration of the peoples of the new world to build nations unified through their differences to an extent found elsewhere only in Australia and New Zealand—the two other Eurocentric societies that consist primarily of immigrants.

In addition to promoting rapid assimilation of large numbers of people into their societies and doing so with a minimum of diversity-related social conflict, the two nations also sought, at least initially, to maintain comparatively passive positions vis-à-vis conflicts occurring in the larger world community. Neither country, at least from their earliest beginnings, wanted to involve themselves in what appeared to be a seemingly ceaseless series of wars and conflicts that occurred in Europe and in the other world regions from which they fled. Canada has been more successful in attaining this goal than has the United States, which today maintains the world's largest and most expensive military force in the history of the world (Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute [SIPRI] 2014). Figure 9.2 shows U.S. expenditures for military and defense purposes relative to social spending. The struggle in the United States today is to reduce even further the country's current expenditures for mandated social programs, some measure of which is achieved by categorizing military expenditures designated for military-related education, train-

ing, and health services as domestic social spending in these categories. Similarly, expenditures for postmilitary re-education for veterans returning to civilian life are grouped with "educational" expenditures rather than being classified as military defense spending; in effect, approximately 22 and 25 % of the country's central budget is allocated to military and military-related purposes, respectively, rather than the estimate of 19 % suggested by Fig. 9.2.


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### 9.3 In Pursuit of Freedom

The still young colonies of North America represented pathways to improved levels of well-being for millions of immigrants who left the old world behind and embraced the many opportunities that were available to them in a new world of their own creation, i.e., a world with open participatory political systems, favorable economic opportunities for those willing to work, a comparatively nonhierarchical social order, and a legal system based on laws rather than on men, within which all felt their basic right to justice to be protected.

The United States differs from Canada in its now nearly two-centuries-long problem of institutional racism (Horton and Horton 2006). The country's history of slavery continues to be reflected in the disproportionate numbers of disenfranchised Black Americans who live in splintered families, possess lower than average levels of education (often well below high school level) (Layton 2015), experience high levels of joblessness and interpersonal violence, and, as previously noted, high levels of poverty (Bowser 2006).

Both the wealthy and the poor of the "old world" arrived legally and illegally in Canada and the United States over many decades and in large numbers. Most began their work lives in the new world as farmers or as low-skilled urban laborers who spoke little or no English and who, for the most part, did not share a common culture or set of beliefs either with other migrants or with the longer term residents of the still young countries. Then, as now, persons trained in professions such as medicine, nursing, education, and the law



**Fig. 9.2** President’s proposed budget by category of spending for FY 2016. (Data from National Priorities Project 2015)


had to abandon those professions inasmuch as their credentials were not recognized as valid in either Canada or the United States. For many, un- and semiskilled labor became their new occupation while they prepared to meet the registration and licensing requirements of their new country (Statistics Canada 2014; U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2014a, b).

Among the immigrants, however, were many wealthy people including persons and families in possession of large numbers of slaves. Slavery and the slave trade were always problematic for the United States, which, in its founding documents, granted freedom to all but, for reasons of economic and social solidarity, permitted persons already in possession of slaves to keep them and to exploit slave labor on large farming plantations that made up a disproportionate share of the total wealth generated by the early colonies (Yglesias 2013). But the approval of slavery then and now always was a source of dissension in the United States and divided families and even regions of the country from one another. Steven Mintz

(2013) estimated that the United States had more than 10.5–11.5 million slaves before Abraham Lincoln, using his presidential authority, issued an executive order in 1863 known as the Emancipation Proclamation that ended slavery in the United States.

In the United States, all men, in time all women as well, were born equal to one another but some, mostly White landowners, were born more equal than others. This pattern is clearly visible in Fig. 9.3, which illustrates voting patterns for the years 1788 through 2010. The dramatic shift in voting patterns reported for all population groups reflected in this table is impressive and reflects the evolution of suffrage in America over more than two centuries, i.e., 1788 through 2012.

The American Constitution, a highly contentious document in its earliest years, made no provisions for the suffrage of women, Black people, Native Americans, and others, to take part in the political life of the country. Indeed, the Constitution’s silence on these matters ensured




**Fig. 9.3** United States popular vote as a percentage of total population, 1788–2012. (Data from Gans and Mullig 2011)

that none of these groups could participate either in the selection of their political representatives or in the making of the laws by which they were to be governed. Voting, at least during the United States’ first century, was restricted in the main to educated or land-holding White men. In Canada, Section 41 of the British North American Act 1867 allowed that “every male British subject, aged 21 years and upwards, being a householder, shall have a vote.”

Related to the substance of Fig. 9.3 are the equally impressive changes in access to state-financed public education that took place in the United States during the same time. These trends in educational opportunity are summarized for the United States in Fig. 9.4 for the 70-year period 1940–2009. Today, virtually all university students 18 years old or more, with the exception of foreign nationals, are eligible to vote in local, state, and federal elections and do so in large numbers. The parallels that exist in the United States between legal suffrage and education are important and suggest that many of the nation’s best educated people are actively engaged in the nation’s political life. The relationship between education, suffrage, and political activity in Canada parallels that which exists in the United States.

### 9.3.1 Freedom, Business, and Commerce

It is often said that the “business of America *is* business,” and its establishment certainly attests to that, with early efforts in private companies enticing settlers to join efforts to build agricultural ventures and cottage industries. Later, the industrial revolution ignited industry at levels unprecedented in the history of well-being. The United States became an industrial powerhouse early in the Industrial Revolution that began between 1820 and 1840 in Great Britain and quickly spread to Western Europe and North America within a few decades. In the process, the United States became the world’s leading economy by the late 1800s as the empires of Britain and the then great European powers waned (United States Department of State 2015). This orientation toward business and the interests of the private sector resulted in extraordinarily positive outcomes of well-being for the citizens and residents of the United States. Wealth of incalculable magnitude was generated along with the emergence of a new and rapidly increasing “middle class” that ushered in a new age of prosperity for tens of millions of people in both of the region’s countries. This profound social revolution sustained itself until the onset of the Great



**Fig. 9.4** Percentage of the population 25 years and over who have completed high school or college: selected years 1940–2009. (Data from United States Census Bureau 2015)

Depression that began in the late 1920s and reached its apex in the 1930s. Given the sense of positivist sentiment that existed in both countries during this period, there was little reason to question the idea that economic growth, combined with pioneering advances in agriculture and technology, would continue unabated. North Americans envisioned nearly unlimited levels of economic growth far into the future—certainly until at least the beginning of the twentieth century (World Bank 1955).

Vast numbers of the population began to migrate from the countryside to cities, where industries of all types proved eager to provide them with at least middle level employment and salaries for a single wage earner that were sufficient to support entire families. Technological innovations were subsequently introduced more rapidly and required decreasing numbers of people to produce the same or even higher levels of economic output. The population of North America increased rapidly from 3.9 million in 1790, to 63.0 million in 1890, to 248.7 million in 1990 and, today, to 321.1 million (United States Census Bureau 2015). Suburbanization occurred at the same time as rapid increases in the population due, in large measure, to the introduction of

the automobile, which made transportation between home and work relatively easy, efficient, and cost effective (Phillips and Pittman 2015). The structure and nature of the relationships between the land and the city fundamentally changed along with the implications of land use in promoting well-being, especially for those succeeding in the new economic order. Today the percentage of urban dwellers in Canada and the United States exceeds 85 %, a factor that is positively associated with advances in national and personal well-being (stemming from ease of access to health care, education, community services, financial services, and the like).

The impact of large numbers of Europeans on Native Americans and other early peoples of North America was devastating. Most of the latter found themselves displaced from their traditional lands, and still others were plunged into poverty, alcoholism, and other social ills. The sudden, often fatal, spread of infectious diseases from immigrants (tuberculosis, typhus, polio, sexually transmitted diseases) and natives (influenza) to one another was also devastating. In time, far more than half of all Native Americans would perish as a result of these illnesses; however, those who survived went on to live produc-



tive lives, albeit many are still subject to racial discrimination.

### 9.3.2 Freedom, Religion, and Political Persecution

Despite all of the obstacles they initially faced in the new world, the idea of freedom from religious and political persecution, coupled with the need to expand the resource base for supporting the European population, served as a powerful incentive for immigrants. The contradiction of founding a country (the United States) in the late 1770s on the basis of freedom for all is that constitutionally guaranteed freedoms were available only to White men. Slaves, women, Native Americans, and other designated minority groups were excluded from universal suffrage. Ninety years would pass before slavery was abolished in the United States. Britain abolished the slave trade in 1778, which applied to British colonies in Canada (Government of Canada 2014). It would be nearly 60 years after the abolition of slavery in the United States (1865) before women gained the right to vote in the United States; Canada was slightly ahead, with voting rights phased in from 1916 to 1919 (Brescia and Super 2008; Government of Canada 2014).

### 9.3.3 Freedom and Health

Immigrants to the new world brought with them new infectious and communicable diseases against which indigenous populations had little or no protection (Forghani 2014). These diseases limited people's sense of freedom inasmuch as they experienced a sense of assault both from within and without, and many lost their lives in the process, especially from tuberculosis, typhus, and influenza. The effects of many of these diseases were exacerbated because of the small, congested, and highly contaminated living spaces in which people of the time lived. These epidemics resulted in the deaths of large numbers of both immigrant and indigenous populations who had no immunity to these diseases and little or no

understanding of their modes of transmission. However, natural immunities to the most common communicable diseases developed gradually over time such that their impact on the populations of both countries diminished rapidly by the early part of the twentieth century.

The capacity of the dwindling numbers of Native Americans to maintain their economic status in an increasingly competitive (and hostile) market-driven environment was also limited by the fact that the livestock around which much of tribal and community life was organized were hunted to near extinction. In the 1800s, for example, an estimated 65 million bison roamed the Great Plains, which stretch across the middle of the United States into Canada, supporting indigenous populations sustainably (Malakoff and Birnbaum 1998). Within just a few years, the entire population of bison was driven almost to extinction by White hunters killing for sport rather than for food. These behaviors had destructive outcomes on the quality of life for indigenous populations reliant on this ecosystem for their existence.

Not surprisingly, years of average life expectancy dropped precipitously during the most serious periods of communal infection and, at the same time, rates of infant, child, and maternal mortality rose dramatically (Silva 2011). But these, too, gradually came under control for the immigrant population. However, their devastating impact on the indigenous population of North America continued until only a comparatively small percentage of their numbers remained to repopulate (Statistics Canada 2014; United States Census Bureau 2014a). In addition, Native Americans lost forever ownership and control over their lands even as their basic cultural teachings came under attack by the new immigrants who occupied their land. Alcoholism, drug use, and psychological depression appear to have been widespread throughout the more than 150-year period during which patterns of social exclusion and typically fatal infectious diseases persisted among Native Americans. Further, and in both countries, native peoples were relegated to agriculturally unproductive tribal zones, known as "reservations" in the United States and

“reserves” in Canada, from which they could not leave without permission of local authorities. Nearly all of these zones were located considerable distances from the original homelands of most of the native peoples and were, and often continue to be, centers of material, social, health, and educational deprivation.

These factors significantly affected the person’s sense of personal security and imposed limitations on when and where a person traveled as well as those with whom he or she chose to associate. During these years, many private, not-for-profit charitable organizations began to emerge. Officially affiliated with religious denominations, many of these people- and sector-specific nongovernmental organizations eventually recast themselves to serve broader populations and a wider range of social sectors, e.g., the Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, the Allied Jewish Appeal, and the United Way (Worldwide Nongovernmental Organizations 2015).

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## 9.4 Well-Being of Canada and the United States

Economic, health, intellectual/educational, and subjective well-being are explored in the following sections. We discuss similarities as well as differences between the two countries. These sectors of human well-being are what people most often consider to be the most important aspects of well-being and, as elsewhere in the world, dominate individual and collective well-being.

### 9.4.1 Economic Well-Being: Average Income Levels and Trends Over Time

The U.S. GDP is the largest in the world. In 2013–2014, it was \$14.7 trillion, moving up from \$2.8 trillion in 1960—a high level of economic growth (Fig. 9.5). In contrast, Canada registered \$232 billion in GDP in 1960, increasing to \$1.360 billion in 2013–2014 (Fig. 9.5). As shown in the


figure, the rate of economic growth of the United States is significantly higher than that of Canada.

The GDP per capita figures are equally impressive. The United States had a GDP per capita of \$46,405 in 2013–2014 compared to \$38,293 in Canada. The rate of growth in GDP per capita has increased significantly and continuously since 1960 (Fig. 9.6). However, the actual rate of growth in both countries shows a slightly different picture (Fig. 9.7). The percent growth in GDP for the United States was 2.6 % in 1960, climbing to 4.2 % in 1985, and declining to 3.0 % in 2010 and 2.4 % in 2013–2014. A similar pattern of economic growth is shown in Fig. 9.7. Canada’s rate of economic growth was 3.2 % in 1960, climbing to 4.7 in 1985, and declining to 3.4 in 2010 and 2.5 in 2013–2014.

Canada seems to have done much better than the United States with respect to economic equality. As Fig. 9.8 shows, Canada’s Gini index (an inequality measure: the higher the number, the greater the level of inequality) was 35.5 % in 1960, decreasing to 31.6 in 1985, but climbing slightly in 2010 and 2013–2014 to 33.7 %. In contrast, economic inequality in the United States has steadily increased since 1960 (Fig. 9.8). The United States registered 36.4 % in 1960 (comparable to Canada’s Gini index at that time), but economic equality climbed steadily since—registering 38.9 % in 1985, 44 % in 2010, and 44.8 % in 2013–2014. In sum, the North America region has performed well in relation to economic well-being, except for the fact that economic inequality seems to be on the rise in the United States.


### 9.4.2 Health Well-Being

The health well-being of the people of both the United States and Canada has consistently gained ground since 1960. Health well-being outcomes tend to be judged using key health indicators such as life expectancy; infant, child, and maternal mortality rates; and incidence of a common disease such as tuberculosis. Life expectancy has increased steadily in both coun-



**Fig. 9.5** Growth of gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States and Canada since 1960. GDP in billions at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and deg-

radation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 USD. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2005 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. (Data from World Bank 2014a)




**Fig. 9.6** Growth of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the United States and Canada since 1960. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes

and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 USD. (Data from World Bank 2014a)

tries since 1960. In 1960, life expectancy was 69.8 years in the United States and 71.1 years in Canada; in 1985, 74.6 years in the United States and 76.3 years in Canada; in 2010, 78.5 years in the United States and 80.9 in Canada; and in


2013–2014, 79 years in the United States and 81.8 in Canada (Fig. 9.9).

Public health data show that the infant mortality rate decreased significantly in both the United States and Canada since 1960 (Fig. 9.9). In the



**Fig. 9.7** Rate of growth in gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States and Canada since 1960. GDP growth is equal to the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 USD. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus

any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. (Data from World Bank 2014b)




**Fig. 9.8** The Gini index of the United States and Canada since 1960. (Data from Galbraith 2014; United States Census Bureau 2014b; World Bank 2015a)


United States, the infant mortality rate (number of deaths of infants under 1 year old per 1000 live births) decreased from 25.4 in 1960, to 18.4 in 1985, to 5.4 in 2010, and to 5.2 in 2013–2014. Similarly, in Canada, the infant mortality rate decreased from 26.6 in 1960, to 16.8 in 1985, to 5.2 in 2010, to 4.8 in 2013–2014. Figures 9.10, 9.11 and 9.12 also show similar positive patterns for child and maternal mortality rates (except for

the increase in maternal mortality 1985 in the United States, which may be viewed as an anomaly; Fig. 9.11), and the incidence of tuberculosis (Fig. 9.12). In sum, health statistics paint a positive picture of health well-being in United States and Canada.

How can we explain these results? Good health is a prerequisite for good outcomes in well-being. It is a major focus of the concept of



**Fig. 9.9** Life expectancy and infant mortality in the United States and Canada since 1960. (Data from List of countries by infant mortality rate 2015; Statistics Canada 1990; United States Census Bureau 1990; World 2015c)




**Fig. 9.10** Child mortality in the United States and Canada since 1960. (Data from UNICEF 2016)

well-being. Without access to quality health care and healthy environments, people will not thrive over the long term. As health declines in a country, overall well-being also declines. Differences in health care have existed for some time between the two countries. Canada long ago instituted universal health care coverage, based on need rather than on ability to pay. Although there are issues


within the system, Canada spends about 10 % of its GDP on health care, whereas the United States spends nearly 18 % (World Bank 2015b). The United States finally addressed the pressing issue of large segments of the population remaining uninsured with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. In a short time, the percentage of uninsured dropped from nearly a quarter





**Fig. 9.11** Maternal mortality in the United States and Canada since 1960. The maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births. The data are estimated with a regression model using information on the proportion of

maternal deaths among non-AIDS deaths in women ages 15–49, fertility, birth attendants, and gross domestic product. (Data from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (n.d., 2003); Public Health Agency of Canada 2008; Statistics Canada 2014; World Health Organization 2013)



**Fig. 9.12** Tuberculosis incidence in the United States and Canada since 1960. (Data from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2014; Davies 1967; World Health Organization 2015)

of the population to 11 %, with ten million Americans signing up for health care. Disadvantaged populations are still struggling with affordability, and many people do not have adequate access to health care facilities in the United States.

### 9.4.3 Intellectual/Educational Well-Being

The quality of education and the extent to which education contributes to societal quality of life are typically judged using indicators such as


gross enrollment in secondary schools, adult literacy, and gross enrollment in tertiary schools. The statistics pertaining to these indicators paint a positive picture for the United States and Canada. With respect to gross secondary enrollment, Canada's performance increased substantially over the last 50 years. In 1960, Canada's secondary enrollment rate was 66.4 %, increasing to more than 100 % in 2013–2014. The increase in secondary enrollment in the United States was less pronounced—87.1 % in 1960, climbing to 94 % in 2013–2014 (Fig. 9.13). The data suggest an adult literacy rate of approximately 96 % for both Canada and the United States (Federal Reserve Archival System for Economic Research 1975; United States Census Bureau 2012). The progress in tertiary education for both the United States and Canada is truly remarkable. In Canada, tertiary school enrollment increased from 9.7 % in 1960 to 84.8 % in 2013–2014 (Fig. 9.14). Similarly, in the United States, tertiary education increased from 25.5 %

in 1960 to 89.1 % in 2013–2014. These increases represent a great achievement for both countries.

In summary, both Canada and the United States had relatively high scores on educational well-being indicators in comparison to the universe of the 186 countries with data in the *Human Development Report 2013* (United Nations Development Programme 2013). Compared to the 34 relatively highly developed countries of the Office of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), however, the performances of Canada and the United States were below average.


### 9.4.4 Subjective Well-Being

Just how satisfied and happy are Canadians and Americans? Numerous studies have compared well-being with rankings of life satisfaction or happiness for countries, states and provinces, cities, and towns. These studies indicate how we are



**Fig. 9.13** Gross secondary school enrollment in the United States and Canada since 1960. Percentage secondary school enrollment = gross enrollment ratio, secondary, all programs. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. The

gross enrollment ratio can exceed 100 % due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition. (Data from National Center for Education Statistics 2013; Statistics Canada n.d., 1960; World Bank 2014c)



**Fig. 9.14** Gross tertiary school enrollment in the United States and Canada since 1960. Percentage tertiary school enrollment = gross enrollment ratio. Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the popula-

tion of the 5-year-old age group that continues their education after leaving secondary school. (Data from National Center for Education Statistics 2013; Statistics Canada 1960; World Bank 2014c)

far, both within our area and in relation to others. Numerous rankings and data are available for looking at well-being at the country level. One that has gained considerable attention is the *World Happiness Report 2012 and 2013* (Helliwell et al. 2013). This report ranked Canada #6 in the world, whereas the United States was #17. Just looking at these rankings implies that “money cannot buy happiness,” given that both are among the wealthiest countries on earth. There are many other reasons why happiness in the United States is not at the highest level among countries of the world (and less so in Canada), some related to health, others related to relationships.

Since 1972, the General Social Survey (GSS), which is conducted periodically in the United States by the National Opinion Research Center, has included the following question: “Taken altogether, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?” Firebaugh and Tach (2012) analyzed trends over time in the GSS data on responses to this question and the rela-

tionship thereof to trends in family income, finding that the average happiness of Americans, measured on a three-point scale corresponding to the three possible responses to the GSS happiness question (not too happy = 1, pretty happy = 2, and very happy = 3) has oscillated from about 2.1 to 2.26—in other words, just above pretty happy but not very happy. They also studied the relationship between trends in median household income and the GSS average happiness levels, finding that short-term increases (decreases) in median household income associated with periods of economic expansion (contraction) were reflected in short-term increases (decreases) in average happiness (Firebaugh and Tach 2012). Although these analyses pertain to the United States, similar relationships hold for Canada, with the proviso that, as noted in Helliwell et al. (2013), the average happiness levels in population surveys in Canada were higher than those in the United States.

We also examined the survey data from the World Values Survey (World Values Survey Association 2015). People in both the United

States and Canada have responded to large-scale surveys (e.g., the World Values Survey) over the last 30 years or so. The life satisfaction survey item is as follows: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means you are “completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?”

On the average, the mean life satisfaction scores for people in Canada seem to hover around 7.8, whereas the average score in the United States is slightly lower (around 7.5). These scores indicate that both countries seem to have a strong sense of well-being. In other words, the vast majority of people residing in both countries seem to be happy with life overall. The average scores in both countries seem to be remarkably stable—that is, the averages do not fluctuate from one year to the next. The stability of life satisfaction scores at the national level has been widely documented across many countries. For example, a visit to the OECD Web site related to the OECD Better Life Index (OECD 2014a) to examine the life satisfaction scores across countries over time shows a remarkable stability over time. This phenomenon has also been examined and widely debated, and the consensus seems to be that, unless a country goes through periods of intense civil strife and conflict, life satisfaction scores remain fairly stable over time (see Easterlin and Angelescu 2011 and Cummins et al. 2011 for a discussion of this phenomenon).

As one might expect, researchers are much better at collecting data on *how* people feel about their lives than they are at explaining *why*. Using demographic indicators such as age, gender, ethnicity, race, marital status, employment status, educational attainment, and income, researchers are usually able to explain about 25 % or less of the variation in people’s reported happiness or life satisfaction (Helliwell et al. 2013). That leaves a whopping 75 % or more typically unexplained. Hundreds of studies show that people’s evaluations of their lives or of specific aspects of their lives (e.g., job satisfaction, marital satisfaction) are determined more by perceived discrepancies between what they have and what they

want, what relevant others have, or what they think they deserve or need or expected to have than they are by standard sets of demographic statistics (Michalos 1985). In large international studies like that of Helliwell et al. (2013), such determinants are simply not considered. Although we are fortunate that more research is being done on well-being than ever before, unfortunately, some of the most powerful drivers of self-reported well-being are being neglected.

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## 9.5 Well-Being in Canada

Canada was founded in 1867 as a parliamentary democracy, a federation, and a constitutional monarchy and as a self-governing dominion with strong ties to Great Britain, from which most of the country’s earliest settlers originated (García 2006). The country’s name is derived from the St. Lawrence Iroquoian word “kanata” meaning village or settlement. Canada is officially, though less functionally, bilingual (English and French) and is headed by Queen Elizabeth of the United Kingdom. The queen is represented in the daily administration of the country’s affairs by a Governor General, a cabinet, and an elected parliament. The country’s formal constitution is relatively modern in origin, with the governance of the country based primarily on unwritten and written acts, customs, judicial decisions, and traditions dating from 1763. The written part of the constitution consists of the *Constitution Act of 29 March 1867*, which created a federation of four provinces, and the *Constitution Act of 17 April 1982*. Several amendments to the 1982 Constitution Act have been made, with the most recent one introduced in 2011.

### 9.5.1 Sociocultural Characteristics of Canada

The cultural mix of Canada is highly diverse (CIA 2015; Day 2000). Based on estimates constructed in 2011 (CIA 2014), the country’s predominant ethnic groups include Canadian (of multigenerational origin), 32.2 %; English,

19.8 %; French, 15.5 %; Scottish, 14.4 %; Irish, 13.8 %; and others (4.3 %). Canada's most commonly spoken *languages* are English (official), 58.7 %; French (official), 22.0 %; and "others" that are mostly spoken at home (19.3 %) (CIA 2015). The country's dominant religions are Catholicism, 40.6 % (includes Roman Catholicism, 38.8 %; Orthodox Catholicism, 1.6 %; other Catholicism, 0.2 %); Protestant, 20.3 % (includes United Church of Christ, 6.1 %; Anglican, 5.0 %; Baptist, 1.9 %; Lutheran, 1.5 %; Pentecostal, 1.5 %; Presbyterian, 1.4 %; "other" Protestant, 2.9 %); "other" Christian, 6.3 %; and others (32.8 %).

### 9.5.2 Social and Technical Accomplishments in Canada

Canada, like the United States, is widely recognized for welcoming new immigrants. The promotion of social harmony among its diverse population also is a major characteristic. Of importance, too, is the fact that Canada is recognized globally for its high levels of scientific and technological innovation especially in physics, chemistry, and medicine. Canadians, for example, have received a dozen Nobel prizes since 1901 for pioneering work in each of these fields: Sidney Altman, *Chemistry* 1989, for catalytic RNA; Sir Frederick Banting, *Medicine* 1923, for discovering insulin; Willard Boyle, *Physics* 2009, for discovering the charge-coupled device; Bertram Brockhouse, *Physics* 1994, for condensed matter; Gerhard Herzberg, *Chemistry* 1971, for molecular spectroscopy; David Hubel, *Medicine* 1981, for mapping the visual cortex; Rudolph Marcus, *Chemistry* 1992, for electron transfer reactions (e.g., rust); John Polanyi, *Chemistry* 1986, for chemiluminescence; Michael Smith, *Chemistry* 1993, for site-based mutagenesis; Jack Szostak, *Medicine* 2009, for discovery of how telomeres work; Henry Taube, *Chemistry* 1983, for electron transfer reactions; and Richard Taylor, *Physics* 1990, for verifying the quark theory.

Canada also has its own systems of awards and prizes that are given at regular intervals to

prominent Canadians and, sometimes, to others. Not surprisingly, Canadian universities are ranked among the top-tier institutions of higher learning worldwide and each year attract growing numbers of graduate students from countries as diverse as India, China, Pakistan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden, and Australia.

### 9.5.3 Status of Women in Canada

It is generally considered that women in Canada fare reasonably well, with education, health, and other indicators comparing favorably across the world as well as to the United States. Although numerous issues remain, including the large wage gap between women and men, Canada has a rich history of addressing women's rights and issues, beginning with the establishment of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in 1967. Their 1970 *Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada* focused on recommendations to update the country's legislative system and to tackle issues related to family law and representation for women. This commission later led to a department of the federal government, Status of Women Canada.

The current focus of Status of Women Canada is to "achieve the full participation of women in the economic, social, and democratic life of Canada. Funding is provided to eligible organizations in support of projects at the local, regional and national levels that address the following three priority areas:

- Ending violence against women and girls
- Improving women's and girls' economic security and prosperity
- Encouraging women and girls in leadership and decision-making roles" (Status of Women Canada 2014).

Twenty-five years after the 1970 report, Status of Women Canada released the 1995 *Beijing Platform for Action for the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women*. Fourteen indicators were used in both reports, allowing us to



make direct comparisons at two points in time. All things considered, those indicators provided more evidence of improvement than of deterioration toward gender equality from 1970 to 1995. Notable examples of improvements included the number of men and women attending school, women as a percentage of full-time university enrollees, and the ratios of poverty rates of women to men. Examples of areas of deterioration included gender equality indexes for job training, total sexual assault rates, and ratio of supply to demand for childcare spaces.

#### 9.5.4 Canadian Aboriginal Peoples

In 2011, 81 % of Canadians lived in urban areas, and 19 % resided in rural areas. In general, it is not uncommon for people living in rural areas to have more health problems, fewer governmental services, higher mortality rates, lower incomes, and lower levels of education; these issues may be more pronounced for aboriginal peoples. However, the 2011 National Household Survey showed a shift from rural to urban areas, with 56 % of aboriginal people living in Canada's urban areas. Aboriginal peoples living in urban areas face a number of issues, including poverty and income rates lower than those for the overall population. In both small and large metropolitan areas, aboriginal people experienced rates of unemployment greater than nonaboriginal people and the percentage of children living in low-income households was more than twice that of children of other urban dwellers (Government of Canada 2010).<sup>1</sup> Also, suicide rates are especially

high among young people in these communities and far exceed those reported for other age groups, particularly among girls (Weeks 2015).

In the 2006 census, 1,172,790 (about 4 % of the total population of Canada) "identified themselves as an aboriginal person": 60 % were First Nations people; 33 %, Métis; and 4 %, Inuit. About 3 % had other aboriginal identities. On average, the aboriginal population was and still is younger than the nonaboriginal population. Forty-three percent of First Nations people lived on reserves (Statistics Canada 2013a: 4).

From the Canadian Community Health Surveys (Statistics Canada 2013a) samples of surveys of aboriginal people 12 years of age and older, not living on reserves, we learned that, from 2007 to 2010, all three groups self-reported poorer health than the nonaboriginal population, with 50 % of the First Nations people, 54 % of the Métis, and 55 % of the Inuit (55 %) claiming "very good" or "excellent health" compared to 63 % of the nonaboriginal population. Fifty-six percent of First Nations people and 48 % of the nonaboriginal population "reported being diagnosed with one or more chronic conditions." "All three groups had higher rates of asthma," 13–14 % compared to 9 % of the nonaboriginal population. All three groups had "higher rates of daily smoking," with First Nations people, 32 %; Métis, 30 %; and Inuit, 39 %, compared to 15 % for the nonaboriginal population. All three groups had higher rates of heavy drinking, with First Nations people, 26 %; Métis, 27 %; and Inuit, 26 %, compared to 19 % of the nonaboriginal population. All three groups had higher obesity rates: First Nations people, 25 %; Métis, 22 %; and Inuit, 26 %, compared to 16 % for the nonaboriginal population. For First Nations people 45 years and older, 19 % had diabetes compared to 11 % of the nonaboriginal population. Notwithstanding their relatively much poorer health, 92 % of Inuit, 89 % of First Nations people, and 90 % of Métis reported that they were satisfied with life as a whole compared to 93 % of the nonaboriginal population.

From the Aboriginal Peoples Survey 2012, we can create a rough profile of the educational and employment experiences of sampled aboriginal people for each of the three groups. We limited our

<sup>1</sup>The first national *Aboriginal Peoples Survey*, conducted by Statistics Canada in 1991, was so useful to researchers for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996) that they requested further studies. A second survey was undertaken in 2001, and a third, after the 2006 census, after which the survey was conducted every 5 years. We review the fourth survey, undertaken in 2012. The aim of all these surveys is to provide "key statistics to inform policy and programming activities aimed at improving the well-being of Aboriginal Peoples." In particular, the purpose "is to identify the needs of Aboriginal people and focus on issues such as education, employment, health, language, income, housing and mobility" (Statistics Canada 2012a: 1).

review to a selection of indicators for First Nations people living off reserve. Seventy-two percent of First Nations people living off reserve, 42 % of Inuit, and 77 % of Métis, ages 18–44 years, had “a high school diploma or equivalent (completers)” compared to 89 % of the nonaboriginal population. Twenty-eight percent of First Nations people, 58 % of Inuit, and 23 % of Métis in this age group “were not attending high school and had not met the requirements for a high school diploma (leavers)” compared to 11 % of the nonaboriginal population. Forty-three percent of First Nations people in this age group, 26 % of Inuit, and 47 % of Métis had “a post-secondary qualification; that is, a certificate, diploma or degree above the high school level” compared to 64 % of the nonaboriginal population (Statistics Canada 2013b: 6).

Cooke et al. (2004) claimed that “there has not been a systematic attempt to describe the changes in the relative well-being of Aboriginal people and other Canadians in a single, easily understood set of indicators.” Following up an earlier study by Beavon and Cooke (2003), they calculated a modified version of the United Nations HDI (UNDP 1996) to address this problem for the five census years 1981–2001. They compared the Registered Indian population according to the Canadian Indian Act of 1976 with all Canadians who were not registered. The division is rough because many First Nations peoples, Inuit, and Métis are not registered and therefore are included in the general population. The results of these authors’ analyses revealed that, whereas Registered Indians and other Canadians improved their conditions in the period 1981–2001, gains were greater for the former population. However, registered Indians made greater gains in life expectancy and education than in average income. Within the class of Registered Indians, the overall HDI scores for women increased more than the scores for men, driven mainly by the stronger educational performance of women. The gender gap in earnings for men and women was reduced, though the men still had higher incomes than the women throughout the period. Comparing the development of on- and off-

reserve Registered Indians, they found that the latter had better scores than the former throughout the period 1981–2001, although the gap between the two groups decreased from the beginning to the end of the period.

Cooke et al. (2007) again applied a modified version of the HDI in an altered form to aboriginal peoples in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States for the period 1990–2000. To nobody’s surprise, they immediately found that in all four countries “minority Indigenous populations” had “much poorer health and social conditions than their non-Indigenous compatriots.” Comparisons of the overall HDI scores showed that over the decade, the gap decreased the most for United States nonaboriginal peoples versus American Indians and Alaska Natives. Australia had the worst performance, with the gap between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander scores versus Australia non-Aboriginal scores increasing. The gaps for Canadian nonaboriginal versus Canadian aboriginal and for New Zealand nonaboriginal and Māori decreased approximately the same amount.

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## 9.6 Well-Being in the United States

The United States was established in 1776 when 13 colonies of Great Britain declared their independence. Independence did not come easily to the country. Wars followed, and many of the residents who self-identified as “British” chose to leave the newly independent territories (or states), as they were eventually called. Over time, however, the original 13 former colonies became stabilized, and more immigrants flowed into their territories. In 1789, the country ratified what was then a highly contentious Constitution (1789) and accompanying Bill of Rights that severely limited the role of government in the lives of individual people. The opening paragraph of the Constitution emphasized the foundational commitment of the country to the promotion of well-being of all her residents and citizens.

*We the People* of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Though flawed in many important respects, especially concerning the status of women and slaves (Goldstone 2005), the *Constitution* proved to be an effective instrument of unification with the result that, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an additional 37 states joined the union. Those new members of the union, however, joined the country either through a series of protracted internal or intraregional wars (War of 1812, Mexican-American War, Spanish-American War) and land purchases made by the central government (e.g., the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, for which the United States paid France a mere \$11.3 million dollars and, peacefully, doubled the size of the country). The American Civil War (1861–1865) severely threatened the country's unity and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans at the hands of their fellow countrymen. Slavery was at the heart of this conflict—a source of dissension that is still manifest in America's continuing patterns of personal and institutional racism. Using his authority as president, and through an Executive Order,<sup>2</sup> Abraham Lincoln signed the *Emancipation Proclamation* in 1863, thereby forever ending slavery and the slave trade in the United States. Nonetheless, and with the sole exception of lingering divisions by race, the United States has largely succeeded in integrating immigrants from throughout the world into a commonwealth designed to advance the well-being of nearly all Americans.

<sup>2</sup>Presidential Executive Orders do not require the consent of the U.S. Congress to implement. However, an Executive Order can be easily rescinded by future presidents who do not agree with the intent or structure of the order. Thus, such orders must be considered tentative only and, in time, become the subject of Congressional debates and passage into laws if they are to remain permanent.

### 9.6.1 Social and Demographic Characteristics of the United States

As of 2014, the United States had a combined population of nearly 320 million people, of which more than a third were under the age of 25 years. The country's major racial and ethnic groups are Whites, 80.0 %; Blacks, 12.9 %; and others, 7.1 %. The primary languages spoken are English, 79.2 %; Spanish, 12.9 %; and others, 7.9 %, which are mostly spoken at home (2011 estimate). The primary religions practiced in the United States are varied, albeit most U.S. residents identify themselves as Christian (78.0 %): Protestant, 51.3 %; Roman Catholic, 23.9 %; and Mormon, 1.7 %. Non-Christians account for approximately 22.0 % of the total population (2007 estimates; CIA 2014).

### 9.6.2 Education and College Graduation in the United States

Approximately 85.2 % of the American high school population graduate. Additionally, 22.2 % of the American population possess at least bachelor's degrees. The numbers of persons with graduate degrees, including those with doctorates in medicine, science, technology, and the arts, are increasing rapidly, especially among women. American music, art, dance, and culture in general are widely exported, and variations can be found in most countries. This remarkable pattern of higher education, as well as groundbreaking innovations in science and technology, are attributed to a vigorous spirit of inquisitiveness, political freedoms, and financial support for higher education that pervades the society.

### 9.6.3 Innovations in Science and Technology in the United States

The advance of science and technology is one of the organizing principles on which the United

States was established. The country's early and most original scientist was Benjamin Franklin, who combined his interests in chemistry, physics, refractory science, and other areas of scientific inquiry with statesmanship and diplomacy. This approach was not regarded as unusual during the early colonial period, and, indeed, people made comparatively few distinctions between the many areas of human activity in which people could involve themselves as long as the work in which they were engaged was original and contributive.

Not surprisingly, and as of 2014, 340 Americans or American organizations have been awarded 342 Noble Prizes for their contributions to physiology or medicine (98), physics (88), chemistry (67), economics (54), peace (22), and literature (11). Citizens of the country also regularly receive other global prizes and, in turn, many are recognized by both public and private learned societies in the United States for their significant contributions to human knowledge and understanding.

Generous levels of public support for innovations in medicine, science, and technology also have made the many inventions and discoveries that originate in the United States possible—ranging from the telephone to the Internet to identifying the causes of major diseases to interstellar travel. Intergenerational transfers of funds plus private sources of support also are generous but do not approach in dollar amounts the level of public support that is made available.

#### **9.6.4 Military and Defense Expenditures Versus Social Spending in the United States**

Americans are involved in nearly every major world conflict. The country maintains 750 military bases outside of its borders with a combined force in excess of 200,000 uniformed military personnel and another 100,000 civilian workers (Johnson 2007). These figures exclude the even larger numbers of uniformed personnel stationed in the United States and the vast internal stores of conventional and nuclear weapons (SIPRI 2014).

The cost to the United States of maintaining these bases is extraordinary and is a source of considerable consternation among both much of the American population and those of her allies who are pursuing a less conflict-ridden world. The United States is also the world's largest purchaser and supplier of conventional and technical weapons, many of which are sold to both sides of warring groups (SIPRI 2014). Thus, despite their early histories of comparative isolation in world affairs, the United States and, reluctantly, Canada are engaged in a range of extraregional and national conflicts of which most of the world disapproves (List of ongoing armed conflicts 2015).

#### **9.6.5 Income Inequality Within the United States**

The generation of income and wealth, though highly sensitive to market forces, is increasing steadily but so too are the numbers of persons officially classified as "poor" in the United States. In the United States, this group increased from 11.3 % in 2000 to 14.5 % in 2014 (Gongloff 2014; World Bank 2014d). In Canada, the percent of people classified as "low income" after tax dropped from 13.3 % in 1992 to 8.85 % in 2011 (Statistics Canada 2013c). In the United States, this group increased from 11.3 % in 2000 to 14.5 % in 2014 (Gongloff 2014; World Bank 2014d). One in five children in the United States lives in absolute poverty, the highest rate among all economically advanced nations, which persists despite America's numerous public transfer programs, e.g., health and housing subsidies and food stamps (Ingraham 2014). In Canada, in 2012, 19.1 % of children were classified as poor, compared to 15.8 % in 1989 (Ogrodnik 2014). Further, public and private cash and service transfer programs have not been able to keep up with the rapid increase in the numbers of children and youth. The extraordinary expenditures allocated to the decade-long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (SIPRI 2014), the increase in the already high level of national debt, and the support of an extensive network of foreign military bases deprive the United States of resources needed to

finance its social services and improvements to its rapidly deteriorating physical and transportation infrastructures and its stocks of public housing (United States Office of Management and the Budget 2015). The same pattern is continuing into 2016, even as the level of the country's national debt continues to increase and the quality of its human services steadily declines for all but the most advantaged in society, e.g., more favorable tax rates, favorable access to credit, and stores of private investment.

Wealth distribution in the United States has historically been inequitable, but in 2015, it reached its highest levels of inequality since the Great Recession (average 2010 Gini coefficients = 33.7 and 41.1 for Canada and the United States, respectively). Even so, employment levels are comparatively high in both countries, well above 94 % of all working age adults, even though the percentage of long-term unemployed persons continues to increase, i.e., 20.3 % and 1.9 % for Canada and the United States, respectively (Grant 2014; World Bank 2015b). This latter phenomenon is attributed primarily to the aging of the region's workforce, the high salaries older workers expect relative to younger workers, and the introduction of advanced commercial technologies for which many long-term unemployed workers have had little or no training. In both Canada and the United States, the need for poorly educated, unskilled, and non-English speaking workers is rapidly declining and, as predicted as early as 1984, will likely continue to drop as a result of the increasing mechanization and computerization of most forms of production (Tofler 1984).

### 9.6.6 The Well-Being of Disadvantaged Population Groups in the United States

Ethnic and racial minorities, women, and children in the United States tend to fare less well than men. For example, income inequality and educational gaps have long existed between the genders and continue to the present (DeSilver 2013). Over the last 50 years, much progress has

been made, although inequality is still pervasive. Both women and minorities are more likely to live in poverty than the majority of men, with female-headed families having the lowest earnings among all family types. For example, African American women earn 64 cents for every dollar that White men earn (American Association of University Women 2015).

Given their long history of inequality and relative isolation, Native Americans have not fared well in comparison to the overall population or in comparison to other racial and minority groups. The 2010 U.S. Bureau of the Census reported that 5.2 million people identified as Native American or Alaska Native, either alone or in combination with other races. Native Americans in the United States, including Alaska Natives, encounter substantial difficulties in well-being across economic, social, health, and environmental indicators. Compared with the experiences of the total population of the United States, they experience poorer health, lower earnings, and higher poverty rates (Smith-Kaprosy et al. 2012). The American Community Survey, conducted annually, shows that in 2013, median household income for Native Americans and Alaska Natives was 70 % of the national average. In the past, Native Americans predominately resided on reservations, most typically in isolated rural areas. Over the last 30 years, many in this population group have moved to urban areas, so that as of 2010, seven out of ten Native Americans resided in metropolitan areas (United States Census Bureau 2010). This trend is a significant change from the past: In 1940, 8 % of this population group lived in urban areas; by 1970, this percentage had increased to 45 %. A large proportion of urban Native Americans "live in or near poverty and thus faces multiple barriers to obtaining care; half of all non-elderly American Indians and Alaska Natives are poor or near-poor, with family incomes below 200 % of the federal poverty level" (Urban Indian Health Commission 2007: 1).

As historical data such as the Current Population Survey show, women have made progress in the labor force over the last five decades. These data, gathered by the U.S. Census



Bureau, include indicators such as income disparity and absolute income. However, there are many other dimensions to consider in well-being. Although research on wage inequality and family income distribution has been plentiful—the focus of much research over this time period—less attention has been paid to the implications of these trends for the well-being of women (Blau 1998). More comprehensive indicators are needed to more fully gauge well-being. The first attempt by the U.S. government to gauge well-being using a range of indicators took place in 2011 with the release of *Women in America, Indicators of Social and Economic Well-Being*. This effort, prompted by the White House Council on Women and Girls, gauged 40 factors across the categories of (1) people, families, and income; (2) education; (3) employment; (4) health; and (5) crime (White House Council on Women and Girls 2011).<sup>3</sup>

A useful analysis involves Chu and Posner’s (2013) work on the examination of differences in the indicators among states, where the data reveal wide variations, having important implications for well-being assessments. Examples include wide variation in income, with women in California earning close to 85 cents for every dollar a man makes, whereas women in Wyoming earn far less at only 64 cents. Although the White

House report did include overall poverty rates, examining these rates by racial minority by state is more illuminating. In the Deep South, poverty rates for African American and Hispanic women are nearly double the overall national rates for women in poverty. The situation on leadership varies widely as well, with 15 states having no female elected leaders in the U.S. House of Representatives or Senate (Chu and Posner 2013: 22). The report grades each state, on a scale of A to F, on all 36 indicators. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 provide a look at the top five states versus the bottom five.

The American Human Development Index (AHDI) provides a range of national and regional comparisons presented by Measure of America, a nonpartisan project of the Social Science Research Council. Their focus is to provide accessible data with sound methodology for promoting discussion of well-being in the United States. The index builds on the HDI. It filters data through the lenses of place, race, and gender. Indicators are calibrated on the topics of physical safety, political participation, sustainable environment, respect of others, digital access, self-expression, religious freedom, equality before

**Table 9.1** Legal immigration to the United States, 1820–2014. (United States Department of Homeland Security 2014a)

Modal year	Number	Population (%)
1820	8385	8.7
1840	84,066	4.9
1860	153,640	4.9
1880	457,257	9.1
1900	448,572	6.0
1920	430,001	4.1
1940	70,756	0.1
1960	265,398	1.5
1980	524,295	2.3
2000	841,002	3.0
2010	1,042,626	3.4
2014	990,583	3.1

The figures summarized in this table exclude the more than 11–12 million illegal immigrants that entered the United States after 2000 (United States Department of Homeland Security 2014a). Though substantially fewer in number, illegal immigration to Canada also is high and may outnumber those admitted legally. (Statistics Canada 2014)

<sup>3</sup>The mission of the council, created in 2009 by President Obama, is to foster a “coordinated Federal response to the challenges confronted by women and girls and to ensure that all Cabinet and Cabinet-level agencies consider how their policies and programs impact women and families” (White House Council on Women and Girls 2011: iii). This report, for the first time in U.S. government history, compiled information across federal statistical agencies to establish baseline information on women. Some of the factors gauged status over 40 years, others used more recent time frames. Using a set of 36 indicators in the areas of economic security, leadership, and health, the Center for American Progress (a nonpartisan nonprofit organization founded in 2003) produced a report by Chu and Posner in 2013. This report, *The State of Women in America: A 50-State Analysis of How Women Are Faring Across the Nation*, presented far more in-depth data about “well-being” than the typical indicators expected from the White House report. This document includes data gathered from federal sources, just as with the other report, yet goes beyond it to look at indicators such as access to contraceptives, paid family leave, and minority women in public office.

**Table 9.2** Comparison of women’s status in the United States by top and bottom five states. (Center for American Progress Action Fund 2015)

<i>Top five<sup>a</sup></i>
1. Maryland
2. Hawaii
3. Vermont
4. California
5. Delaware
<i>Bottom five<sup>a</sup></i>
46. Mississippi
47. Alabama
48. Oklahoma
49. Utah
50. Louisiana

<sup>a</sup>Analysis based on 34 factors: wage gap (overall wage gap, African American wage gap, and Hispanic wage gap); minimum wage (minimum wage impact); women in poverty (poverty rate, African American poverty rate, Hispanic poverty rate, Asian American poverty rate, and Native American poverty rate); paid family and medical leave policies (paid family leave, temporary disability insurance, and paid sick leave); early childhood education (access to and spending on early childhood education); women’s leadership in public office (Congress, executive statewide offices, state legislature, and minority women officeholders); women’s leadership at work (management gap, African American management gap, Hispanic management gap, Asian American management gap, and Native American management gap); Implementation of Affordable Care Act protections (overall uninsured, African American uninsured, Hispanic uninsured, and Medicaid expansion); access to reproductive health services; ensuring healthy pregnancy and delivery

the law, voice and autonomy, and family and community. Various elements within the AHDI that focus on underrepresented populations provide a deeper understanding of conditions impacting well-being. Findings by Lewis and Burds-Sharps (2014), the authors of the 2013–2014 report of the AHDI, include the following:

1. The top-scoring racial/ethnic group on the AHDI is Asian Americans (7.21), followed by Whites (5.43), Latinos (4.05), African Americans (3.81), and Native Americans (3.55).
2. Latinos outlive Whites by an average of 4 years, with the second longest life span.
3. African Americans have the shortest life span; their educational outcomes and earnings are higher than those of Latinos and Native Americans (Lewis and Burds-Sharps 2014: 4).

**Table 9.3** American human development index: examination of changes in life expectancy and earnings from 2000 to 2010 between racial and ethnic groups. (Data from Lewis and Burds-Sharps 2014)


Change in life expectancy	Race/ethnic group	Changes in earnings
+1.9 years	United States	−\$2185
No change	Native Americans	−\$1613
+1.4 years	Whites	−\$2281
+2.1 years	Asian Americans	+\$1149
+2.4 years	Latinos	−\$1411
+2.9 years	African Americans	−\$1871

Table 9.3 reports changes from 2000 to 2010 in the life expectancy and income statistics of the AHDI for the total United States population and five race/ethnic subpopulations. The report provides analyses of minority groups on health, education, and income. The researchers reported the following:

- Asian Americans are better off than other race/ethnic groups in terms of health, education, and income.
- Latinos score high on life expectancy; they have the second longest life span, outliving Whites, on average, by nearly 4 years.
- African Americans, although not as healthy, have higher educational outcomes and earnings than Latinos and Native Americans.
- Progress in health was fastest among African Americans over the last decade—an increase of nearly 3 years in life expectancy.
- Native Americans were the only group whose life expectancy did not increase over the last decade.

Another population group deserves attention for measuring well-being: children. In many ways, because they cannot be advocates for themselves, children are the most vulnerable group.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>In the United States, several indicator sets are used for assessing well-being. These include *Kids Count*, by the Annie Casey Foundation, which provides comprehensive data at the state, regional, and local levels. The data center maintains statistics and other information on the educational, social, economic, and physical well-being of children across hundreds of indicators, including those



**Fig. 9.15** Child well-being index, 1975–2013


These national and state-level data sets, together with other related data series, have formed the basis for research on the composite United States Child and Youth Well-Being Index (CWI) developed by Land (1983, 2012, 2014) and Land and associates (Land et al. 2012).<sup>5</sup>

examining the impacts of poverty and race on child outcomes (Annie E. Casey Foundation 2014). The *Kids Count Data Book*, released each year, ranks states on 16 indicators or measures of child well-being and discusses trends. The U.S. government conducts research on conditions impacting children. The Federal Interagency Forum on Child and Family Statistics (2014) produces an annual report, *America’s Children: Key National Indicators of Well-Being*. Children, ages 0–17, account for about one quarter of the United States population, with 22 % living in poverty. Seven domains are tracked to characterize the well-being of children: family and social environment; economic circumstances; health care; physical environment and safety; behavior; education; and health. Much of the data tabulated in the indicators include race and ethnicity. Indicators range from standard types, such as the number of children living in single-parent households, to more specific types such as adolescent birth rates and the location of children in counties experiencing air quality issues.

<sup>5</sup>The basic national CWI is an index composed from 28 key indicators of child and youth well-being in the United States grouped into seven domains of well-being that have been identified in prior research on subjective well-being: family economic well-being, safe/risky behavior, health, social relationships, community engagement, and emo-

Figure 9.15 shows historical changes in the national CWI for the years 1975–2013. As the figure shows, this measure of trends in U.S. child and youth well-being went into a long recession from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s; this recession was largely associated with changes in the structures of American families (toward more single parenting and increased participation of women in the labor force). From 2000 to 2003, it recovered to, or slightly above, 1975 levels. This recovery was largely associated with cohort changes in parenting (toward more “helicopter parenting” styles in reaction to the recession of the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s and the adaptation of childcare institutions to the noted changes in family structures, e.g., after-school daycare programs for working parents). The recession was followed by twenty-first century fluctuations associated with economic cycles—a short recession in 2002–2003, a recovery in 2004–2007, a decline associated with the Great Recession of 2008–2009, and a slow recovery in 2010–2012.

tional well-being. The objective of the national CWI is to measure annual changes (improvements or deterioration) in well-being for America’s children ages 0 to 18 relative to the values of its key indicators in a base year such as 1975 (Land 2014).



**Fig. 9.16** U.S. state-level Child and Youth Well-Being Index, 2007, by quartiles. (O'Hare et al. (2013)). © Springer Science+Business Media 2012, with permission of Springer)

Originally formulated at the national level, the CWI, in cooperation with the Kids Count project cited above, has recently been calculated at the state level for each of the 50 states (O'Hare et al. 2013) and for metropolitan areas/regions within the states (Lee et al. 2009). Figure 9.16 contains a map of the state-level CWIs grouped by quartiles from the highest to the lowest. Statistical analyses by O'Hare et al. (2013) found that several factors are associated with state differences in child well-being, including state economic characteristics, demographic composition, human capital, and state policy measures. The human capital factors most highly correlated with child well-being are characteristics of adults including levels of education and health insurance coverage as well as levels of disability—all indicative of activities and investments that increase resources in people. The economic factors most highly correlated with overall child well-being include employment, income, and wealth. The policy measures that are most highly correlated with child well-being are the state and local tax rates. States that have higher tax rates are also more generous in providing edu-

cation and support services, and these states have higher levels of child well-being on average. A key finding of the study, which is consistent with findings from many other studies, shows that when children are situated in environments with more resources they do better. Resources may be private, such as family income, wealth, and parental education, or public, such as welfare benefits, health insurance, or school expenditures.

## 9.7 Cross-Country Comparisons of Well-Being of Disadvantaged Groups in Canada and the United States

The United Nation's HDI is the most comprehensive set of indicators and data regarding overall well-being at the country level. These reports provide rankings of countries by overall as well as by some disaggregated data. Of the latter, it is particularly useful to consider the inequality-adjusted HDI as well as the gender inequality

index. The United States ranks third in the overall HDI category (with a score of 93 %), and Canada ranks #11 with a score of 91 % (UNDP 2014). When adjusted for inequality, the overall scores drop—for the United States it falls from 94 % to 82 %, a significant 12 percentage point decrease. For Canada, the score drops 9 percentage points, from 91 % to 83 %. The calculations for the gender inequality index are different, with higher percentages indicating more loss in achievement for women and girls. Canada fares better on this count, with a global rank of 18 and a loss of 11 percentage points versus the United States' fall to 42nd place with a loss of 25 percentage points. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) issues the *Innocenti Report Card* periodically. As described, the need for nations to commit to child well-being is "compelling both in principle and in practice [and to] fulfill that commitment, measuring progress in protecting and promoting the well-being of children is essential to policy-making, to advocacy, to the cost-effective allocation of limited resources, and to the processes of transparency and accountability" (UNICEF Office of Research 2014: 11).

Five dimensions of well-being of children were considered: material well-being, health and safety, housing and environment, behaviors and risks, and education. A total of 26 indicators were included. These indicators were combined to rank the 29 countries with an overall well-being index as well as to rank the countries in each of the five dimensions. The top five positions are held by the Scandinavian countries on all measures, and the bottom five are held by Greece, the United States, Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania. Canada ranks 17 overall. This international comparison is consistent with that of the analysis by Land et al. (2011) of the average ranks of five Anglophone countries on 19 indicators of child and youth well-being, in which Canada was ranked first followed by Australia, the United States, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

Overall, the gender inequality index adjustments of the HDI and the international comparisons of child well-being indicators show that

Canada is performing better than the United States with respect to the well-being of women and children.

Of special note is the fact that the social challenges confronting the United States in particular have proven to be formidable in that only a comparatively small number of racial minorities have advanced to the country's dwindling middle class (Sullivan et al. 2001). Fewer still are in positions of national and international leadership as heads of major corporations, albeit that pattern is changing in response to the civil rights movements of the 1960s, 1970s, and, more recently, the 1980s and 1990s (Black Profiles 2015). Less pernicious forms of economic inequality characterize Canada, but it, too, continues to struggle with a wide range of social issues affecting its racial minorities, women, and its aboriginal population (Reynolds 2015).

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## 9.8 Contemporary Well-Being Themes in North America: Post World War II

The history of immigration, innovation, and technological advances, combined with the shattering inequities of slavery in the United States (and continuing long after slavery was abolished) and of the domination of indigenous populations, provides insight into how people perceive well-being. Immigration alone has had a major impact on how both societies approach an understanding of well-being. The migrants who settled in Canada and the United States in the wake of the chaos following the two great wars that originated in Europe have likewise had a major impact on how societies perceive well-being and on the preference for policies to support it. Many children of the Great Depression never fully recovered from that experience (an experience that permanently shaped the criteria they used to assess their own well-being and helped shape the criteria of subsequent generations). Even more notable is the fact that the legacy of slavery is a permanent feature of United States cultural life.



Issues of inequity alongside that of opportunity continue to be of major concern. The fact that the income gap between the richest and poorest is widening has multifaceted implications for well-being.

Since World War II, the pace of growth accelerated and the population increased rapidly, which fed the need for new housing and broad-based social development. Policies were initiated to create a commercial mortgage market, and the resulting housing boom did not abate until the global financial crisis originated in the United States in 2007 (United States Department of State 2015). Well-being became more focused on surviving rather than on thriving as unemployment rates soared and houses were foreclosed upon at astounding rates. At the time of this writing, the United States is still the largest economy in the world, although forecasters say that China will surpass it at some point in the future. Economics have dominated life in the United States, whereas Canada has strived for a more egalitarian society.

Themes around the decline of the middle class, income inequities, and lack of opportunity and access to health care and other necessary amenities of life have become more prominent. At the same time, advances in technology continue to accelerate, and gains have been made on a number of fronts. Concepts of well-being in Canada and the United States are rooted in the histories that continue to permeate our collective lives.

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## 9.9 Conclusion

In summary, both Canada and the United States are, among the countries of the world, at the highest end of human development and quality of life/well-being. With respect to the relative rankings of these two countries, the outcome depends on the specific indicators and indices that are used. In general, however, Canada tends to rank ahead of the United States on a number of well-being dimensions and indices, as indicated in the foregoing. The economic well-being of the peo-

ple in both countries is considered to be very high compared to the world at large. The United States continues to be the world's leading economy in terms of both GDP overall and GDP per capita.

The health well-being of the people of North America continues to be highly favorable compared to the vast majority of countries worldwide. Average life expectancy is high and continues to rise. The same can be said about other health indicators such as infant and child mortality rates. The recent changes in the health-care system in the United States are likely to further improve the health well-being of Americans.

Both countries are doing well with respect to intellectual/educational well-being. Both countries are education magnets for many of the world's citizens who seek high quality education, both at secondary schools and educational institutions of higher learning.

North Americans self-assess their sense of subjective well-being at a very high level, as evident in results from the majority of World Values Surveys since 1981 and in the more recently conducted Gallup Organization's Happiness polls. Canadians and Americans tend to be happy in general, with Canadians reporting a slightly higher level of life satisfaction than residents of the United States. Other indicators of intellectual well-being show that both Americans and Canadians, along with their counterparts in other economically advanced countries, are highly literate and well-educated compared to people from other developed countries. It is likely that further innovations in educational systems in both countries will further elevate the quality of education, producing minds that will make Americans and Canadians highly competitive in the ever-evolving world economy.

Although considerable progress has been achieved over recent decades in attaining social, political, and economic parity for women and other minority groups, much more is needed to decrease disparity in economic, health, and educational well-being. We remain highly optimistic that the pace of social progress for these once disadvantaged populations will continue to rise in both countries.

## Supplemental Tables

### Supplemental Table 9.1 Demography

SOCIAL INDICATORS: Demography

REGION: North America (N = 2)

Country	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban			
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
Canada	17.9	25.9	34.0	35.5	2.3	0.9	1.1	1.1	69.1	76.0	81.0	82.0
United States	180.7	237.9	309.3	318.9	1.7	0.9	0.8	0.7	70.0	74.0	81.0	81.0
Regional average	99.3	131.9	171.7	177.2	2.0	0.9	1.0	0.9	69.5	75.0	81.0	81.5

Population: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates

% Population growth rate: Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of the midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage

% Urban: Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects

a Statistics Canada, 1990; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 1990. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-debut-eng.html>; [http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical\\_abstract.html](http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html)

b Statistics Canada, 1990; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 1990. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-debut-eng.html>; [http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical\\_abstract.html](http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html)

c Statistics Canada, 2015; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 2015. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-debut-eng.html>; [http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical\\_abstract.html](http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html)

d Statistics Canada, 2015; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 2015. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-debut-eng.html>; [http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical\\_abstract.html](http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html)

e Statistics Canada, 1990; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 1990. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

f Statistics Canada, 1990; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 1990. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

g Statistics Canada, 2015; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 2015. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

h Statistics Canada, 2015; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 2015. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

i United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

j United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

k United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

l United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

**Supplemental Table 9.2** Education

SOCIAL INDICATORS: Education

REGION: North America (N = 2)

Country	% Secondary school enrollment				% Adult literacy				% Tertiary education			
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
Canada	66.4	98.7	102.3	111.2		NA	96.2	96.2	9.7	70.3	81.9	84.8
United States	87.1	94.2	93.2	94.0	97.8	NA	95.7	95.7	25.5	58.2	93.3	89.1
Regional Average	76.8	96.4	97.8	102.6	97.8	NA	96.0	96.0	17.6	64.2	87.6	86.9

% Secondary school enrollment: Gross enrollment ratio. Secondary. All programs. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100 % due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition

% Adult literacy: Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, “literacy” also encompasses “numeracy,” the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100

% Tertiary education: Gross enrollment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group that continues their education after leaving secondary school.

NA = not available a Historical Statistics of Canada: Section W: Education; National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Educational Statistics 2013. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/sectionw/4147445-eng.htm>; [https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/current\\_tables.asp](https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/current_tables.asp). Note: US value is for 1961

b UNESCO Institute for Statistics

c UNESCO Institute for Statistics

d UNESCO Institute for Statistics

e U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970. [http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past\\_years.html](http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/past_years.html); <https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/?id=237#15809>

Note: US adult literacy calculated from illiteracy; values are for ages 14+ instead of 15+; also value is from 1959

f NA

g Skills in Canada: First Results from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-555-x/89-555-x2013001-eng.htm>. Note: US and CA values are for 2012

h Skills in Canada: First Results from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC). <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/89-555-x/89-555-x2013001-eng.htm>. Note: used percent of people at or above level 1 as literacy rate (not sure if this is the correct interpretation -- the data uses a newer model than older adult literacy conceptions)

i Historical Statistics of Canada: Section W: Education; National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Educational Statistics 2013. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/sectionw/4147445-eng.htm>; [https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/current\\_tables.asp](https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/current_tables.asp). Note: CA value is for 1967; definition used here may not be compatible (uses 18–24 instead of 18–22); same is true for the US data point (age range, that is)

j UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. Note: CA value from 1986

k CANSIM Table 477–0019: Postsecondary enrollments, by registration status, Pan-Canadian Standard Classification of Education (PCSCE), Classification of Instructional Programs, Primary Grouping (CIP\_PG), sex and immigration status; CANSIM Table 051–0001: Estimates of population, by age group and sex for July 1, Canada, provinces and territories; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=4770019>; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. Note: CA values computed by dividing postsecondary enrollment by 18–22 year old population

l CANSIM Table 477–0019: Postsecondary enrollments, by registration status, Pan-Canadian Standard Classification of Education (PCSCE), Classification of Instructional Programs, Primary Grouping (CIP\_PG), sex and immigration status; CANSIM Table 051–0001: Estimates of population, by age group and sex for July 1, Canada, provinces and territories; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=4770019>; <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>

**Supplemental Table 9.3** Health  
SOCIAL INDICATORS: Health  
REGION: North America (N = 2)

Country	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1K live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate				TB incidence per 100k			
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–14	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t
Canada	71.1	76.3	80.9	81.8	26.6	16.8	5.2	4.8	33.2	9.0	5.7	5.5	40.0	3.4	13.0	11.0	30.2	8.3	5.0	5.0
United States	69.8	74.6	78.5	79.0	25.4	18.4	5.4	5.2	30.6	9.0	7.6	7.6	37.1	7.8	27.0	28.0	30.7	9.3	4.1	3.3
Regional Average	70.5	75.5	79.7	80.4	26.0	17.6	5.3	5.0	31.9	9.0	6.7	6.6	38.6	5.6	20.0	19.5	30.5	8.8	4.6	4.2

Avg. years life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life

Infant <1/1K live born: Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1000 live births in a given year

Child Mortality <5/1K: Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age 5, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year

Maternal mortality rate: Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births. The data are estimated with a regression model using information on the proportion of maternal deaths among non-AIDS deaths in women ages 15–49, fertility, birth attendants, and GDP

TB incidence per 100K: Incidence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of new pulmonary, smear-positive, and extrapulmonary tuberculosis cases. Incidence includes patients with HIV

a Statistics Canada, 1990; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 1990. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-debut-eng.html>; [http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical\\_abstract.html](http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html)

b Statistics Canada, 1990; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 1990. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-debut-eng.html>; [http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical\\_abstract.html](http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html)

c Statistics Canada, 2015; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 2015. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-debut-eng.html>; [http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical\\_abstract.html](http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html)

d Statistics Canada, 2015; U.S. Statistical Abstracts 2015. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-debut-eng.html>; [http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical\\_abstract.html](http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical_abstract.html)

e CIA World Factbook via Wikipedia, 2015. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_infant\\_mortality\\_rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_infant_mortality_rate)

f CIA World Factbook via Wikipedia, 2015. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_infant\\_mortality\\_rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_infant_mortality_rate)

g CIA World Factbook via Wikipedia, 2015. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_infant\\_mortality\\_rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_infant_mortality_rate)

h CIA World Factbook via Wikipedia, 2015. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_infant\\_mortality\\_rate](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_infant_mortality_rate)

i UNICEF. 2016. Child Survival, 2015. <http://www.data.unicef.org/child-survival/under-five>

j UNICEF. 2016 Child Survival, 2015. <http://www.data.unicef.org/child-survival/under-five>

k UNICEF. 2016. Child Survival, 2015. <http://www.data.unicef.org/child-survival/under-five>

l UNICEF. 2016. Child Survival, 2015. <http://www.data.unicef.org/child-survival/under-five>

m Historical Statistics of Canada: Section B: Vital Statistics; Vital Statistics of the United States, 1960. <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/11-516-x/sectionb/4147437-eng.htm>; [http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/vsus/vsus\\_1939\\_1964.htm](http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/vsus/vsus_1939_1964.htm)

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 9.3** (continued)

n Canadian Perinatal Health Report, 2008; Vital Statistics of the United States, 1985. <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/2008/cphr-rspsc/index-eng.php>; [http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/vsus/vsus\\_1980\\_2003.htm](http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/vsus/vsus_1980_2003.htm)

o World Health Organization, Maternal mortality ratio. <http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.1390?lang=en>. Note: not sure if this is cited correctly. I could not find a suggested citation on the page with the data.

p World Health Organization, Maternal mortality ratio. <http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.1390?lang=en>

q Davies, J. W. (1967). Epidemics of Tuberculosis in Canada in the Sixties. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 96(16), 1156–1160; CDC. Reported Tuberculosis in the United States, 2013. Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, September 2014. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1922842/#reference-sec>; <http://www.cdc.gov/tb/statistics/reports/2013/default.htm>. Note: 1963 value is used for CA

r World Health Organization, Global Tuberculosis Report; CDC. Reported Tuberculosis in the United States, 2013. Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, September 2014. <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>; <http://www.cdc.gov/tb/statistics/reports/2013/default.htm>. Note: for 1985 CA had to take new incidences and divide by 1985 population; case detection rate is not available for years earlier than 1990 so the value may be lower than the real value

s World Health Organization, Global Tuberculosis Report

t World Health Organization, Global Tuberculosis Report



**Supplemental Table 9.4** Income  
SOCIAL INDICATORS: Income  
REGION: North America (N = 2)

Country	GDP (Billions of constant 2005 USD)				PCGDP (Constant 2005 USD)				% Growth in GDP				Gini or other measure of wealth disparity			
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p
Canada	231.6	678.5	1240.0	1361.0	12931.0	26154.2	36465.7	38293.3	3.2	4.7	3.4	2.5	35.5	31.6	33.7	33.7
United States	2853.1	6985.4	13599.3	14796.6	15791.9	29359.7	43961.2	46405.3	2.6	4.2	2.5	2.4	36.4	38.9	44.0	44.8
Regional Average	1542.4	3831.9	7419.6	8078.8	14361.4	27756.9	40213.4	42349.3	2.9	4.5	3.0	2.5	35.9	35.3	38.8	39.3

GDP (constant 2005 USD): GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 USD. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2005 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used

PCGDP (constant 2005 USD): Per capita GDP (PCGDP) is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars

% Growth in GDP: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources

GINI or other measure of wealth disparity: Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality

a World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

b World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

c World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

d World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

e World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

f World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

g World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

h World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

i World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 9.4** (continued)

j World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

k World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

l World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

m Inequality Project: Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set (EHII); US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/data.html>; <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/>. Note: CA taken from 1963

n World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>; <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/>. Note: CA taken from 1987

o World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>; <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/>

p World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>; <https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/data/historical/inequality/>. Note: most recent CA from 2010

**Supplemental Table 9.5** Subjective Well-Being  
 SOCIAL INDICATORS: Subjective Well-Being  
 REGION: North America (N = 2)

	WVS 1 1981–1984	WVS 2 1990–1994	WVS 3 1995–1998	WVS 4 1999–2004	WVS 5 2005–2009	WVS 6 2010–2014
Country						
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f
Canada		NA		7.8	7.8	
United States	7.7	NA	7.7	7.7	7.3	7.4
Regional Average	7.7	NA	7.7	7.7	7.5	7.4

Mean life satisfaction: Averaged value of responses to the following survey question: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means you are “completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?

NA = not available

a World Values Survey Wave 1, 1981–1984. <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>

b World Values Survey Wave 2, 1990–1994. <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>

c World Values Survey Wave 3, 1995–1998. <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>

d World Values Survey Wave 4, 1999–2004. <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>

e World Values Survey Wave 5, 2005–2009. <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>

f World Values Survey Wave 6, 2010–2014. <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp>

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# The History of Well-Being in East Asia: From Global Conflict to Global Leadership

# 10

Takashi Inoguchi and Richard J. Estes

*There is no way to happiness*

Happiness is the way. (Hanh n.d.)

*The mind is the source of happiness and unhappiness.*

(Buddha n.d.)

*Vulnerability is the only authentic state.*

*Being vulnerable means being open,  
for wounding, but also for pleasure.*

*Being open to the wounds of life means  
also being open to the bounty and beauty.*

*Don't mask or deny your vulnerability:  
it is your greatest asset.*

*Be vulnerable: quake and shake in your boots with it.*

*The new goodness that is coming to you,  
in the form of people, situations, and things can only come to you  
when you are vulnerable, i.e. open.*

(Russell 1999)

## 10.1 Introduction

East Asia is among the largest, most culturally diverse, and economically robust regions of the world. The region comprises China, Hong Kong SAR,<sup>1</sup>

Macau SAR, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan (Map 10.1). Together, these eight societies and territories have a combined population of 1600 million people or about 22 % of the world's total in 2015. The region occupies approximately 28 % of the Asian continent, the world's largest, and somewhat more than 8 % of the world's total land mass. The East Asian region is 15 % larger than Europe but has a population density that ranges from a low of two people per square mile for Mongolia to a high of 6390 people per square mile for Hong Kong with a region-wide average of 340 people per square mile (versus 188 and 59 persons per square mile for Europe and North America, respectively). The majority of the region's capital cities are among the world's leading metropolises—Beijing, Seoul, Taipei, and Tokyo—and, taken together, exert considerable influence on the world's economies, politics, and even its

<sup>1</sup>Hong Kong and Macau are not, of course, independent nation-states. Rather they are Special Administrative Regions (SARs) within the People's Republic of China and, as such, experience considerable freedom of choice in all sectors except the selection of their chief executive and the ability to conduct international affairs. Both SARs, however, differ appreciably from other provinces of China and are therefore sometimes included in the chapter's more detailed analyses (Estes et al. 2002).

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Map 10.1 Regional map of Asia (CIA 2015a; public domain)



broad-based social development outcomes. The region's two largest societies, China and Japan, but especially China, have historically wielded a major influence on all aspects of the region's social, cultural, and religious life, including through their ancient religions and philosophies, e.g., Buddhism, Confucianism (and Neo-Confucianism), Shamanism in Korea, Shintoism in Japan, Daoism and, in recent years, Christianity in South Korea (de Mente 2009; Nadeau 2014).

Well-being in East Asia is remarkably high when measured by a variety of objective and subjective indicators. Japan, for example, leads the world in years of average life expectancy (average = 84.6) as does South Korea (average = 81.0) and Taiwan (average = 80.6 years) versus average years of life expectancy for the United States of just 79.8 (Inoguchi 2012).

Achievements in average years of life expectancy are remarkable and mirror the region's 20-year successes in reducing infant and child mortality rates and increasing levels of both per capita gross domestic product (PCGNP) and per capita gross national income (Perkins 2013). The region's highly favorable position on these key components of the United Nation's *Human Development Index* is especially impressive in that East Asia contains one of the world's two population "super giants"—China—whose population makes up 92 % of the region's total. Since the introduction of the country's "Four Modernizations" program by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has succeeded in lifting literally hundreds of millions of its rural poor from absolute poverty to economically sustainable and even higher levels of living. The privatization of most smaller and communal farms, the increase in the levels of at least local political participation, and the aggressive adoption of an open market economic system, albeit one with "Chinese characteristics," has accelerated China's remarkable rate of social and economic development and, thereby, has hastened the rate of improvements in well-being throughout the entire East Asian region (Perkins 2013).

### 10.1.1 Framework

This chapter explores the changing nature, state, and achievements in advancing well-being among the nations of East Asia. More particularly, the chapter attempts to answer the following questions that will help us better understand the underlying well-being dynamics of the region:

- What is the current state of well-being in East Asia and within the region's member countries?
- To what extent does East Asia's current state of well-being differ from that of its past but particularly with levels of well-being that existed following the end of the Second World War (Japan), the wars of liberation fought in China and the Koreas, and the devastating wars that occurred in Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam), large elements of which spilled over into the East Asian region as well?
- What are the underlying sociocultural-religious factors that account for the differences in the attainment of well-being for the region's nations?
- What have been East Asia's most significant well-being accomplishments and challenges since at least 1990?
- To what extent do all areas of the region share the same or at least similar patterns of well-being gains and losses?
- What impact does the continuing negative social, political, and economic trends occurring in North Korea have on East Asia's well-being more generally?
- In what ways, and to what extent, has well-being in East Asia been impacted by the region's dramatic political and military events:
  - The creation of the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949
  - The Korean War, which ended with the country's division into a communist North and a democratic South in 1953
  - The granting of full autonomy and international recognition to Mongolia (often referred to as "outer Mongolia") in 1961



- The return of Hong Kong SAR from Great Britain in 1997 and Macau SAR from Portugal in 1999 to the PRC
- The continuing political, sometimes military, tensions between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the PRC?

### 10.1.2 Study Countries and Societies

Though the eight societies (a term that is used to include both sovereign nations and two of China's SARs [Hong Kong SAR and Macau SAR]) that make up the East Asian region share many geopolitical, social, and cultural characteristics with one another, there are important differences between them as well. We have, therefore, chosen to focus on only a subset of the region's societies, i.e., China (PRC), Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan (Republic of China). These five societies account for almost 95 % of the region's total population (United Nations Population Division 2012). Well-being patterns for Hong Kong SAR<sup>2</sup> and Macau SAR are not treated separately in this chapter inasmuch as these regions are semiautonomous territories of the PRC, and their well-being data are presented as part of the data reported for the PRC. We also have excluded North Korea from major aspects of our analysis because most of the data needed for North Korea are either unavailable, incomplete, or unreliable. Where possible, though, we include selected data for North Korea in the figures when we think the data are reasonably reliable. Where possible, we also include data for Mongolia but much of the data needed for Mongolia are either missing or incomplete. In any case, we have attempted to optimize use of the social indicator data that are available.

<sup>2</sup>These recently reacquired territories of the PRC enjoy considerable autonomy in managing their social, economic, and internal affairs. All matters relating to internal security, defense, international agreements and treaties, and the like are under the direct control of the central government of the PRC in Beijing. In time, all internal and external matters relating to the functioning of these territories will be transferred to China's central government.

For purposes of comparison, we occasionally report similar data for the United States, which is also a Pacific Rim country in that it shares the Pacific Ocean with East Asia, Singapore (a predominantly Chinese society geographically grouped with the Southeast Asian group of nations), and selected countries of Indo-China that have predominately ethnic Chinese populations and strong ties to East Asia, especially Vietnam. In including selected non-East Asian countries in the analyses, the authors make no claims concerning the political relationships that may or may not exist between the countries of the region and countries that clearly fall outside the region, e.g., the United States, which has made major contributions to promoting East Asia's political and economic development.<sup>3</sup>

## 10.2 Well-Being

A complete picture of well-being in East Asia can only be ascertained from an analysis of both objective and subjective forces that are at work in the region. The objective indicators measure the visible outcomes that are attained through social investments whereas subjective indicators reflect the cognitions and feelings that people experience and, therefore, are the invisible outcomes of well-being investments. Often though, objective and subjective assessments can be polar opposites, especially in cultures that place less emphasis on consumption of goods and services and more emphasis on improved levels of personal, interpersonal, familial, and community relationships. For such cultures, social investments, i.e., accumulating social capital, are valued more significantly than the accumulation of the material,

<sup>3</sup>America's major contributions to the region have taken a variety of forms: (1) military occupation of Japan following the end of World War II; (2) military alliance with South Korea, where it fought to help bring to an end a protracted war (1950–1953) between the communist North and democratic South and where it continues to provide a significant military presence; and (3) defense treaty with Taiwan, for whom the United States continues to extend its defense umbrella to prevent invasion of this small, but densely populated, island nation by the PRC (Hickey 2005; Winkler 2012).

always transitory, consumer goods and services. This view of well-being is consistent with the teachings of the region's much admired religions and philosophies and is reflected in the values, norms, and traditions around which East Asian societies are organized.

Our discussion of well-being in the East Asia region focuses on the three components that are used to form the United Nations *Human Development Index* as well as self-assessment made by the region's people of their own state of social, psychological, and emotional well-being, life satisfaction, and quality of life. Thus, this chapter follows more or less the same model of analysis used by the authors of the other regional chapters: the extent of social improvements in health as measured by advances in years of average life expectancy and reductions in infant and child death rates; improvements in education as reflected in the access of children to primary and secondary schools and of young adults and others to university and technical schools; and, finally, the region's generation of wealth and income and the extent of its distribution to the region's population. We also examine regional changes in self-assessed (subjective) well-being, especially self-assessments made by the region's different population groups, i.e., men vs. women, children vs. adults, the young vs. the old, recognized ethnic and sexual minorities, and people who live on the periphery of society.

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### 10.3 Brief History

The history of East Asia spans at least 40,000 years, likely longer. Much information about the region's earliest history, however, has been lost due to the destruction of ancient settlements, archeological sites, sculptures, and written documents. Much historical information was also lost during the "cultural revolution" (1966–1976) in the PRC due to the destruction of ancient structures and the massive amounts of textual material contained within them. Fortunately, many important artifacts and critical written records were transported from pre-PRC to Taiwan from the seventeenth century until the island's formal

break from the PRC in 1949. In Japan, temples and monasteries have served as centuries-long repositories of that country's social, political, economic, cultural, and religious history as well (Oxtoby and Amore 2010).

Critically important textual and nontextual materials do exist, however, that document much of the region's history from as early as 600 Before the Common Era (BCE) to the present. The underlying teachings and values promulgated through oral traditions and narratives taught by the region's various religions also provide us with important insights into the organizing principles around which much of the region has been organized, i.e., those promulgated through Buddhism (since about 563 BCE forward) and Daoism (since about 550 BCE forward) (Fig. 10.1). These principles are deeply embedded in the region's history and continue to be relevant in the contemporary Asian world (Fig. 10.2):

- an emphasis on collective "needs" rather than personal "wants" in the pursuit of well-being;
- the pursuit of personal and interpersonal peace, balance, and social harmony in all aspects of private and social life;
- deferential attitudes toward persons and institutions occupying positions of authority;
- personal adherence to a code of social conduct that informs individual and collective roles and responsibilities at each level of social organization;
- filial piety toward the elderly and others; and,
- a concern for individual and collective prosperity within the values and norms of each society (de Bary 2000).

Although what may be called the Chinese centrality of East Asia is not questioned, it must be noted that Zhonghua, a small area located at the midstream basin of the Yellow River, was the origin of the ancient Chinese state and that only through interactions between ancient Chinese and surrounding non-Chinese including Persians, Uighurs, Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, Thais, Burmese, Vietnamese, Koreans, and Japanese, has China become what it is today. By interactions we mean the invasion and occupation by



**Fig. 10.1** The symbol of opposites in Chinese philosophy—yin and yang



**Fig. 10.2** Teaching Buddha (563 BCE–480 BCE), Gupta period (Archaeological Museum, Sarnath, India; photo by Tevaprapas Makklay; Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license)

non-Chinese and the assimilation of non-Chinese into what is now broadly called the Chinese state. Alternately, these Chinese states were ruled by non-Chinese: most notably, Tang (618–906 Common Era [CE]) by Persians and Turks; Yuan

(1279–1368 CE) by Mongols; and Qing (1644–1912) by Manchus, Mongols, and Uighurs. The Chinese civilization has been a key factor in assimilating those and other invaders and occupiers. It consists of rice agriculture, Chinese ideographs, and weapons technology. In the current PRC, Manchus, Thais, Burmese, and Vietnamese are well assimilated; Tibetans and Uighurs are often defiant dissidents whereas Mongols and Koreans are to a lesser degree.

### 10.3.1 From Chaos to Order and the Foundations of the Modern Nation-States

As already suggested, the history of East Asia is long, rich, and multilayered. However, much of the region's history is linked to the history of China, which comprises more than 90 % of the region's combined population. Although each of the region's countries has its own rich history, many of the countries, such as Japan, have influenced religious thought, philosophy, and politics worldwide.

The unification of all ethnically related Chinese people into a geographically distinct and shared space has been a central dynamic (Callahan 2015) of China's history. It has been China's goal for more than a thousand years. Today it is almost a reality following the return of Hong Kong and Macau from colonial powers (Estes 2005a, b). The challenges confronting premodern China, however, were not unlike those confronting the region's younger nations today: (1) the absence of a shared sense of identity among the various Chinese clans that resided in a vast, largely unmapped, territory; (2) competing linguistic dialects with no unifying common dialect or language; (3) recurrent intra- and interregional conflict; (4) the absence of public symbols that promote a sense of unity among the country's peoples (including a common language or at least dialect, a country-wide integrated military, shared financial and monetary systems, and the like). Each of East Asia's societies underwent more or less the same process of unification but did so at different times

with different sets of organizational priorities (Ryu 2007).

The most important dynasties that shaped early China and, in turn, the entirety of East Asia were the short-lived, but highly influential, Qin Dynasty of 221 BCE to 206 BCE and the four-centuries long Han Dynasty of 206 BCE to 220 CE. The former dynasty brought about the long sought after unification of China under the authority of a single emperor and formally demarcated China's borders from those of Korea and Mongolia. The division of the region into the Chinese "mainland" and, in time, into Mongolia and Korea was to prove long-lasting and contributed to a flourishing of unique cultural identities for all three countries. The Qin dynasty also helped to formalize the political separation of present-day Japan and Taiwan from the Chinese mainland, although many conflicts, and even occupations, have ensued over subsequent centuries concerning China's role in each of these nations. Another of the significant political achievements of the Qin dynasty was the confinement of the warring and land-ambitious Mongols who, in fact, ruled China and much of East Asia for centuries (including, of course, Genghis Khan [1162 CE–1227 CE; Fig. 10.3] and his successors). Today, Mongolia is a divided society, with "Inner" Mongolia and its capital, Hothot (Huhehaote), located in the PRC and "Outer" Mongolia and its capital, Ulaanbaatar, existing as an independent nation. Mongolia has had its own discrete territory since at least 1206 CE, albeit the country underwent many wars with and occupation by neighboring states.

Among the many factors that made possible East Asia's innovations in science, technology, and the humanities, including the printing technique and gun powder, is the fact that they occurred through trial and error observations as well as through the application of scientific method that would be recognized as valid even today. Further, all of the region's seminal contributions to its own and to greater Asia's well-being brought unprecedented prosperity to a large percentage of Asia's total population. In turn, the centuries of relative peace and prosperity that followed China's unification contributed



**Fig. 10.3** Genghis Khan (1162–1227) (From *Dschingis Khan und seine Erben* [exhibition catalogue], München 2005, p. 304; public domain)

to a great flourishing of the arts and sciences throughout the East Asia region, especially in painting, sculpture, poetry, dance, and even in daily dress. All of these innovations were supported by the communal values derived from East Asia's ancient religions, i.e., Daoism, Shintoism in Japan (1000 BCE forward), Buddhism, and Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism. Common to these religions and to their contributions to well-being were their essentially nontheistic nature combined with well-articulated practices for achieving high levels of individual and collective well-being. Most of these religions and philosophical traditions taught the importance of moderation and following the "middle way" as the ideal path for achieving spiritual, psychological, and material well-being. At the same time, it must be pointed out that their emphasis may not be compatible with the values of contemporary society. Some examples include the emphasis on humility (Confucianism), forbearance and tolerance (Buddhism), and harmony (Daoism). Extremes along either end of any continuum were to be avoided no matter how attractive they



may appear on the surface, i.e., to be self-denying, self-punishing, or living in abject poverty versus achieving great wealth and influence. Also, emphasis was placed on the attainment of these preconditions for well-being within a communal, collectivist process rather than one that each individual would initiate and complete on his own (Iwai and Ueda 2011; Nadeau 2014).

Among its many other accomplishments, the Han Dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) brought to China a well-organized, efficient bureaucracy that served as a direct interface between the emperor, his surrogates, and people at all levels of social organization. The emergence of a highly effective and efficient civil servant class permitted the development of systems for transmitting and enforcing the emperor's will at a fast pace. Not since the civil servant class of the former pharaohs of Egypt did the world witness such a narrowing of the time gap between imperial commands and actions throughout all regions of a vast, multilingual empire. East Asian civilization, given the basic tenets of its religions, rituals, and philosophies, found the hierarchical nature of a civil service class highly compatible with its search for progressively higher levels of societally promoted well-being (de Bary 2000; Inoguchi 2013; Oxtoby and Amore 2010).

The comparative peace and security brought to the region by the Han Dynasty also contributed to heightened levels of well-being that, in time, found expression in the arts, the humanities, the physical and social sciences, and mathematics and astronomy. These developments also resulted in the formalization of relations with modern-day Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan including complex, and expensive, systems of tributes between these countries and China in exchange for independence, peace, normalization of at least regional sea and land trade, and the promotion of religious, educational, and cultural exchanges. Today, the vast majority of China's population is of the Han lineage (more than 91 %) and, through them, the ideals and social organization promoted through the dynasty's four centuries of rule in the distant past continue to be advanced. Thus, political, social, cultural, and religious continuities are

among the major elements that distinguish East Asia from other world regions and, in turn, suggest many of the approaches used to advance individual and collective well-being (Inoguchi and Fujii 2011; Kivimäki 2011).

The material contributions of ancient China, and of East Asia more generally, to well-being were many and varied. They included:

- the invention of paper (made from many fibrous products including wood, bamboo, and cloth);
- large-scale shipbuilding (still a major industry in China, Japan, and Korea);
- the compass (necessary to sea travel, house-building, and the like);
- the cultivation of silk and the development of a silk trade (both China and Japan excelled in its making). The process of making silk did not spread to Byzantium, Arabia, and the West until many centuries after the formation of the "Silk Road" through China and Central Asia;
- the invention of porcelain (a major source of trade between East Asia and Europe. The complex processes required to make porcelain were replicated in Europe until late in the eighteenth century);
- the invention of innovative approaches to printing;
- the invention of gun powder initially used for fireworks but quickly adapted to military use;
- significant innovations in medicine, but especially through the introduction of acupuncture, acupressure, understanding of the "Qi" (ch'i; organic, material energy), as well as innovations in surgery and herbal medicine; and
- important intellectual innovations in philosophy, mathematics, engineering, geology, and weaponry.

In the social arenas, the nations of East Asia traditionally have emphasized orderliness and harmony in both their public and private lives. Thus, the following norms have been more dominant throughout this region than in other regions that have been discussed in the book:



- deference to men in all matters pertaining to public and public affairs;
- for men, the centrality of work and the workplace as their central life interest;
- for both men and women a strong preference for boys as their firstborn child;
- for women, a deferential role toward men and, in the absence of a husband, toward their eldest male child;
- for children, filial piety and deference toward parents, other older family members, the elderly in general, and toward public officials and other representatives of the government; and
- for men, women, and children alike, compliance with the collective norms, traditions, and related social expectations of their local communities and the larger society of which all are a part (de Mente 2009; Iwai and Ueda 2011).

These expectations carried over to the subtleties of all aspects of family life. Rarely, for example, would non-blood-related persons be considered suitable for adoption and, in the rare occasions in which nonsanguine adoptions do (or did) occur, they were primarily of boys (Estes 2001). Girls were almost never adopted outside of their extended families of origin, which forced many girls into pauperism, commercial or sexual exploitation, work as housemaids or servants, and, not infrequently, early death from exposure. The underlying premise of these practices was that, in time, women married, left home, and became members of someone else's family or clan. On the other hand, boys remained forever active members of their families of origin and, not infrequently, assumed the financial and social responsibilities of their father upon his death. Wives traditionally assisted their husbands in carrying out these familial obligations (Iwai and Ueda 2011; Iwai and Yasuda 2011).

Charity and benevolence toward strangers, to the extent that they existed at all, were organized through monasteries and temples that received financial and in-kind support from their members and the general community in support of the monks and nuns themselves, childless war veter-

ans, never-married women, and others who were judged to be worthy of the charity of others. Much of this charity was provided anonymously and rarely, if ever, did benefactors and beneficiaries meet one another. Aid, in general, was not given to unknown persons apart from that provided by monasteries and temples to designated groups of people (Dubs 1951).

Increases in the level of well-being that resulted from the gradual unification of East Asia's nation-states are reflected in dramatic increases in overall years of life expectancy (from about 35 years in early nineteenth century to an average of more than 80 years today); lower rates of infant and child mortality (which were well below 15 per 1000 live births in 2012); higher levels of both formal and informal education (which touched nearly every child in the region); and, of course, significant improvements in each region's financial and monetary systems. These changes occurred rapidly and steadily over a comparatively brief period and, ultimately, forever altered East Asia's socio-political-economic-cultural and even religious profile. The changes also had a profound impact on the extent to which foreigners from other Asian regions and the world at large would be welcomed into the region's newly established countries. Long gone are the days when items stamped "made in Japan" or "made in China" were only cheap, mass-produced goods (Hanley and Yamamura 1977; Lee 2000; Perkins 2013; Vogel 1979).

### 10.3.2 East Asia's Modern History: Social Chaos, Hegemony, Defeat, and the Emergence of "Modern" Nation-States

As discussed previously, despite East Asia's present-day prosperity, even in the modern era, the region's nations have been the focal point of many national, regional, and global conflicts. These conflicts have their roots in the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and up through the middle of the twentieth centuries. All were large scale and all resulted in death and destruction not



**Fig. 10.4** Mao Zedong (1893–1976) (Photo by Georg Denda; [http://www.panoramio.com/user/128586?with\\_photo-id=701721](http://www.panoramio.com/user/128586?with_photo-id=701721); Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license)

previously experienced by the region's societies. The conflicts took place primarily within the region but many of the most recent ones were global in nature: (1) the Pacific front of the Second World War in 1945; (2) the popular revolution in China led by Mao Zedong (Fig. 10.4) that resulted in the imposition of communist rule on the country in 1949; (3) the forced separation of the two Koreas; (4) the reunification of Hong Kong (1997) and Macau (1999) with the Chinese mainland; and (5) recurring, often serious, confrontations between the region's two Chinas, i.e., the PRC and Taiwan. Mongolia transitioned more peacefully as a satellite state of the former Soviet Union to a sovereign nation-state in its own right (1991). Currently, only the Republic of China (Taiwan) remains a disputed territory, a situation that has been exacerbated by the exclusion of Taiwan as a member state of the United Nations in 1971 (Estes 2005a).

Elsewhere in the greater East Asian region, wars in Indo-China (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) also influenced East Asian and global political development. These conflicts have had a profound impact on the region's development and have shaped the attitudes of many East Asian nations toward France and the United States in particular, the two leading Western powers against which regional wars were fought. The independence of predominately Chinese-populated Singapore (74 %) from Malaysia in 1965 also impacted the region's democratic and open market economic orientation (Barr and Skrbis 2008; Inoguchi 1991).

Social, political, economic, and cultural developments in Japan also have exerted a profound influence on the region's overall successes in well-being. Japan's unique, innovative approach to socioeconomic and political-cultural development is tied to a number of major political philosophers and statespersons. One example is Kinjiro Ninomiya (1787–1856), a prominent agricultural and business leader, moralist, economist, and beloved statesperson who was born of humble origins and who succeeded in introducing agricultural reforms that virtually ended famines throughout Japan and hunger in much of the larger East Asian region. Figure 10.5 shows a typical sculpture of Ninomiya and depicts him as an older boy or young man carrying firewood on his back while reading, representing two of the core values of East Asia—hard work and scholarship. Such sculptures once were commonplace in all Japanese educational institutions but are rarely seen today. Ninomiya himself rarely appears even in modern day textbooks despite the enormity of the contribution he made to Japanese society and greater East Asia (Iwai 2010; Johnson 1982).

Table 10.1 summarizes the major historical challenges and achievements that have confronted the East Asian regions since the nineteenth century. The table focuses on major social, political, military, economic, and cultural events that occurred at the same point for the world, the region, and for three of East Asia's most culturally distinctive countries: China, Japan, and South Korea.



**Fig. 10.5** Kinjiro Ninomiya (1787–1856) statue (Museum of History of Folklore of Kawaba; photo by Qurren; Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported Generic license)

## 10.4 Social Progress and Challenges Since 1990

This section focuses on those domains of well-being that are central to the discussions contained in this volume: regional progress over time in health, education, income, and wealth and subjective well-being. The following discussion parallels that of the book's other regional chapters and provides comparative analyses of well-being trends occurring in East Asia and in other world regions. We focus on well-being accomplishments and challenges experienced by the region from 1990 to 2015. In some cases, and where information is available, we include data for other Asian nations as well (Estes 1990, 1991, 1996b, 2007; Maddison 2007).

### 10.4.1 Population and Fertility

Population issues are always of particular interest to well-being specialists. In most parts of the world, population size is steadily increasing, and,

as it increases, greater demands are placed on both the public and private sectors of society to provide a more comprehensive range of programs and services to an increasing number of people, especially for the new arrivals, e.g., children, and those who are living longer. In most societies, population growth also occurs through the migration from other, usually poorer, countries and regions of the world of people desiring increased economic opportunities. Thus, changes in gross population size are a function of births plus migrants, less deaths that occur on an annual basis.

Figure 10.6 summarizes population growth trends for each of the East Asian countries included in this analysis as well as for the region as a whole. The data reported cover 60 years and reflect the remarkable changes in population that have occurred in East Asia since 1950.

Figure 10.7 shows the magnitude of the net population increases with which all of the region's countries are struggling, though the nature of the struggle differs for each country. China's population increase has slowed somewhat since the introduction of the one-child policy in 1979. After three decades, its consequence is a dramatic decrease in the number of births. A more serious issue now is the reality that the age dependent population of children under 15 and adults aged 65 and older are increasing more rapidly than the economically active members of the population (16–64 years). The situation is exacerbated by the comparatively weak social nets that characterize the majority of the region's countries. In the intermediate term of 10–15 years, China's net reproductive rate is estimated to further decline below 1.2, the same as that of South Korea, the lowest in East Asia. At that rate, China's population decline would be accelerated.

Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan struggle with their rapidly growing numbers of older people whose average years of life expectancy are well above those of the world as a whole. Many years of peace, stability, and prosperity have contributed to this remarkable longevity. Japan's population has tripled since 1945; both longevity and government expenditure on the social safety net

**Table 10.1** East Asian Timeline, 1823 to the Present (AsiaBarometer 2006)

Year	World	China	Japan	North and South Korea
1823	United States proclaims Monroe Doctrine, making Latin America part of U.S. sphere			
1839		First Opium War		
1842		Treaty of Nanjing opens Chinese ports and provides preferential treatment for Western nationals		
1854			Perry's military threats result in Convention of Kanagawa, ending Japan's isolation policy. Other treaties follow, providing preferential treatment for Western nationals	
1856		Second Opium War		
1858		Treaties of Tianjin open more ports and open interior to Westerners. Later treaties signed in Shanghai condone opium trade		
1861–1865	U.S. Civil War			
1868			Meiji Restoration	
1869	Suez Canal opens			
1870		Backlash against Western presence results in "Tianjin massacre"		
1876			Japan opens Korean ports under Treaty of Ganghwa	
1882		U.S. enacts China Exclusion Act restricting immigration by Asians		
1884		Sino-French war		
1889			Japan adopts formal constitution as part of bid to renegotiate treaties on a more equal basis	
1894–1895		First Sino-Japanese war (ends with Japan victorious) China cedes Taiwan to Japan and grants Japan free hand in Korea		
1895		China recognizes Korean independence under Treaty of Shimonoseki		

(continued)

**Table 10.1** (continued)

Year	World	China	Japan	North and South Korea
1898–1901		Boxer Rebellion against Western domination		
1904–1905			Russo-Japanese war (ends with Japan victorious)	
1903	Wright brothers' flight			
1905			Korea becomes Japanese protectorate	
1906	San Francisco earthquake			
1910			Japan annexes Korea	
1911		Xinhai Revolution overthrows Qing dynasty		
1912		Kuomintang (KMT) party established		
1912			Great Kanto earthquake destroys Tokyo/Yokohama	
1912		Republic of China (Taiwan) established		
1914	Outbreak of World War I			
1914	Panama Canal opens			
1915		Japan issues 21 demands		
1917	Russian revolution			
1918	End of World War I			
1919	Treaty of Versailles imposes stiff reparation requirements on Germany			
1921		Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded		
1922	USSR established			
1923	Washington Naval Treaty seeks to limit sizes of French, Italian, Japanese, UK, and US navies		Washington Naval Treaty denounced within Japan as discriminatory and unduly restrictive	
1924		U.S. Immigration Act prohibits immigration by East Asians		
c. 1927		Chinese civil war (CCP vs KMT) starts		
1928	Kellogg-Briand Pact signed renouncing war as an instrument of national policy		Kellogg-Briand Pact signed	

(continued)



**Table 10.1** (continued)

Year	World	China	Japan	North and South Korea
1929	Start of Great Depression			
1931		Mukden incident provides pretext for Japanese invasion of Manchuria and start of second Sino-Japanese war		
1933			Japan quits League of Nations	
1934		CCP embarks on Long March		
1937		Nanjing massacre		
1937		Marco Polo Bridge incident extends Japanese invasion to China proper		
1938	Munich agreement gives Czechoslovakia to Germany			
1941			Japan bombs Pearl Harbor, bringing the United States formally into the war	
1945	Bombing of Dresden		Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki	Korea gains independence but is divided into north and south administrations
	End of World War II in Europe		Japan surrenders	
	End of World War II in Asia			
1946			Postwar constitution promulgated	
1948				North and South Korea established as separate states
1949	North Atlantic Treaty Organization created	CCP forces defeat the KMT, which flees to Taiwan; CCP establishes the People's Republic of China		
1950				Outbreak of Korean war
1951		China annexes Tibet		
1951			San Francisco peace treaty restores Japanese sovereignty	
1952			Occupation of Japan ends. Japan signs Joint Security Treaty with the United States	
1953				Korean war cease-fire signed, dividing peninsula at 38th parallel

(continued)


**Table 10.1** (continued)

Year	World	China	Japan	North and South Korea
1956		Hundred Flowers campaign starts		
1958		Great Leap Forward starts		
1959	Hawaii becomes U.S. state			
1961	Berlin Wall goes up	Great Leap Forward ends		
1962	Cuban missile crisis			
1964			Tokyo Olympics	
1965			Japan normalizes relations with (South) Korea	
1965	Communists purged in Indonesia			
1966		Cultural Revolution starts		
1971		Mainland China replaces Taiwan in the United Nations		
1972			Okinawa reverts to Japan, yet U.S. bases remain	
1972		Japan and (mainland) China normalize diplomatic relations		
1973	Oil crisis develops as supplies are curtailed and prices soar			
1975	End of Vietnam War			
1976		Cultural Revolution ends		
1979	Iranian Revolution	One-child policy begun		
1980		Four modernizations begun		Gwangju massacre
1988				Olympics/para-Olympics held in Seoul
1989		Tiananmen Square cleared		
1989	Berlin Wall falls			
1990		Two-digit economic growth in 1990s		South establishes diplomatic relations with Russia
1991			Deceleration of high growth and deflation begin	North and South Korea join the United Nations


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**Table 10.1** (continued)

Year	World	China	Japan	North and South Korea
1992		Establishes diplomatic relations with (South) Korea		South establishes diplomatic relations with China
1992	Maastricht Treaty creates European Union			
1994				Kim Il-Sung dies and son, Kim Jong-Il, takes reins in North Korea
1995			Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in Tokyo	
1995			Hanshin earthquake devastates Kobe	
1997		Hong Kong reverts to China (from UK)		
2001	New York World Trade Center destroyed			
2002			Japan-Korea jointly host the World Cup of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association	
2003	United States attacks Iraq			
2005	Kyoto Protocol goes into effect	Conflict between China and Japan begins		
2007	Collapse of subprime loans triggers global recession			
2008		Olympics/ Paralympics held in Beijing		
2010	Arab Spring starts			
2011				Kim Jong-Il dies and son, Kim Jong-Un, takes reins in North Korea
2011			Fukushima nuclear accident	



**Fig. 10.6** East Asian population in millions for selected countries, 2015 (Data from United Nations Population Division 2012)



**Fig. 10.7** East Asian population growth rate, 1950–2010 (Data from United Nations Population Division 2012)

have grown alarmingly large whereas the productive population (15–60 years old) is rapidly shrinking. The Japanese government expenditure on social policy has surpassed that of the United Kingdom and is on a par with that of the Netherlands. The net reproductive rate has been below 2.0 for years in all three of these societies (cf. South Korea, 1.20; Japan, 1.46; and Taiwan 2.42).

Thus, the region's countries and societies, even with lower than average fertility levels, can be expected to continue to struggle with all of the social welfare issues surrounding population growth much as they have in the recent past (Fig. 10.8).


#### 10.4.2 Life Expectancy and Infant Mortality

Along with this East Asian prosperity has been a general improvement in health care, as reflected in both longevity and decreased infant mortality rates (Figs. 10.9, 10.10, and 10.11). East Asians are generally living longer, which is attributed to

better and more balanced diets, better health care, and modernization, e.g., home, farm, factory, and office equipment that makes work less strenuous (Estes 1996a). At the same time, the region's extended longevity statistics and improved natal care initiatives have been accompanied by declining fertility rates, although the data on fertility are skewed somewhat by China's imposition in 1979 of a one-child per family policy. This policy has been partially modified because it has brought dramatic increases in the number of China's rapidly aging population and still shrinking population of young people.


#### 10.4.3 Leading Causes of Death

The 12-item short form (SF-12) health survey developed by the New England Medical Center attempts to measure quality of life in eight dimensions: total health, physical functioning, everyday physical limitations, everyday emotional limitations, bodily pain, mental health, vitality, and social functioning. The results allow not only cross-societal comparisons but also age and




**Fig. 10.8** Fertility rates in selected Asian countries, 2000–2004 and 2010–2014 (Data from World Bank 2014)






**Fig. 10.9** Average years of life expectancy in selected East Asian countries, 1960–2011 (Data from UNPOP 2015)



**Fig. 10.10** Percentage increase in average life expectancy from 1960 to 2011 (Data from AsiaBarometer 2006)



**Fig. 10.11** Infant mortality in East Asian countries: 1950, 1980, 2013 (Data from United Nations Development Programme 2014; World Health Organization 2014b)


**Table 10.2** Top ten causes of death in selected Asian countries, 2013 (Data from World Health Organization 2014b)

	World	China	Japan	Korea, North	Korea, South	Taiwan	United States
Coronary heart disease	1	3	3	1	2	2	1
Stroke	2	1	1	3	1	3	3
Influenza and pneumonia	3		2	2		4	
Lung disease	4	2		7		6	5
Diarrheal diseases	5						
HIV/AIDS	6						
Lung cancers	7	4	4	6	3		
Tuberculosis	8			5			
Diabetes mellitus	9			8	4	7	7
Road traffic accidents	10	7			8		8
Hypertension		10		4		9	10
Other injuries		9				5	
Liver disease					10	8	
Suicide			8		7	10	
Kidney disease			9	9			
Stomach cancer		6	5		5		
Liver cancer		5	7		6		
Colorectal cancers			6		9		9
Violence				10			
Esophageal cancer		8					
Pancreatic cancer			10				
Lung cancer							2
Alzheimer's disease/ dementia							4
Breast cancer							6
Malignant neoplasms						1	

gender comparisons within a society (Table 10.2). For example, they show Japanese age/gender differences as relatively slight and South Korean age/gender differences as the most pronounced among the East Asian societies, China being somewhere in the middle on most measures. What do the narrower Japanese age/gender gaps or, conversely the wider Korean gaps, mean? Iwai and Hanibuchi (2013) explained that (1) since Japanese scores decline with age, they should not be interpreted as meaning that Japanese live long and healthy lives irrespective of age or gender and (2) they may indicate that the inevitable deterioration of health among older cohorts does not prevent them from being active in their work and other roles.

#### 10.4.4 Suicide: The Ultimate Despair on the Part of Individuals and Societies

Suicide may be seen to correlate inversely with psychological well-being in that it is thought to be the ultimate expression of the individual's inability to deal with his/her perceived problems—what the unknown author quoted on the title page might call an escape from the unhappiness of being unable to cope (Fig. 10.12). As the 2013 *OECD Factbook* notes, “The intentional killing of oneself can be evidence not only of personal breakdown, but also of a deterioration of the social context in which an individual lives.... Because of this, suicide is often used as a proxy



**Fig. 10.12** East Asian suicide rates for selected countries by age, 2012 (Data from World Health Organization 2014a)

indicator of the mental health status of a population.” As such, it follows that “a comprehensive multisectoral suicide prevention strategy is needed” and “Communities ... can provide social support to vulnerable individuals and engage in follow-up care, fight stigma and support those bereaved by suicide” (World Health Organization WHO 2014a).

## 10.5 East Asian Family and Social Life

Family, not only the nuclear family but, by extension, the extended family, is generally thought to provide identity stability and support in coping with problems. Dysfunctional families are the obvious counterexample, but the fact that “dysfunctional” is defined as not offering such personal support and even impeding the ability to cope highlights the importance of family to well-being. If one accepts the importance of family and the fact that the difficulties created by space and other constraints caused by urbanization

make it more difficult to sustain the extended or even nuclear family in the city than in the countryside, the question arises as to what East Asian family values are and how they impact well-being.

When asked which is more important, individual happiness or family happiness, Taiwanese and South Koreans responded in favor of family happiness whereas Chinese and Japanese respondents said that family happiness was less of a priority. However, people in all four East Asian societies in their 20s gave individual happiness a high priority.

What does the division of labor within the family look like in East Asia? The prevailing pattern in China is for both husband and wife to hold full-time jobs. That said, fully one third of Chinese couples who work full time work together at family businesses. This same pattern of both spouses working full time, with wives often working for the family business, is also common in South Korea and Taiwan. In Japan, the prevailing pattern is for both husband and wife to work but with the husband working full

time at one firm while the wife works part-time elsewhere. The distribution of labor for household chores perhaps parallels this. Even though the prevailing pattern is for East Asian husbands to do far less than their wives even when both work full time, Chinese husbands are more involved at home, fixing dinner and cleaning the house several times a week, whereas Japanese husbands are the least involved.

These are, however, the patterns for couples who do not yet have children. Once they have children, Japanese and South Korean wives typically quit working full time late in the pregnancy and remain at home to raise their children; Chinese and Taiwanese wives keep working full time even when their children are young, presumably because the extended family is more intact and they have family nearby to help them.

When these East Asian wives were asked if they were happy with their marriages, about half of the Japanese and South Korean wives said they were happily married and only about 10 % said they were unhappily married. Yet even the 10 % of “unhappy” wives was higher than the number of unhappy Chinese and Taiwanese wives. There is, however, a generational aspect to these data in that Japanese and South Korean wives are significantly more likely to express unhappiness in their 40s and beyond—a phenomenon not seen among Chinese and Taiwanese wives. This difference might be attributable to the difference between the Japanese and South Korean nuclear family pattern and the fact that Chinese and Taiwanese extended-families have many members living, if not together, at least close to one another.

Looking at the sources of care and support for the aged, there is much more emotional support from China and Taiwan than from South Korea and Japan. The same relationship holds for operational support and for emotional support from friends, colleagues, and neighbors. China also leads in narrow and extended-family financial support. Of the four countries, China provides the most and Japan, the least, financial support from friends, colleagues, and neighbors. The same holds true for operational support from friends,

colleagues, and neighbors. Financial support from financial institutions and public sources is minimal in all four societies, as is operational support from care service providers. It is not coincidental that the highest suicide figures for older people are in the countries where traditional family support networks are most frayed.

Although it originated in China, Confucianism informs all of the East Asian societies. Having been adopted by the ruling class, this system of social rituals and consideration designed to promote harmony is often invoked to prioritize obedience/deference (to parents, elders, and other authority figures) over independence and initiative. As such, it finds its echo in, for example, the characterization of the Japanese in the 1890 *Japanese Imperial Rescript on Education* as “ever united in loyalty and filial piety” and its injunction that they “be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; . . . advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws” (Government of Japan 1890) It has been a major philosophical mainstay of family and community solidarity and support.

Indeed, this *Confucian tradition* is one reason that East Asian societies are generally regarded as collectivist societies. When Iwai and Ueda (2011) asked representative samples in the four countries whether they agree with the proposition that, in a collectivist society, silence is golden even when you are dissatisfied, South Korean, Chinese, and Taiwanese respondents voiced strong agreement with this proposition and Japanese, weak agreement. Corroborating this finding, Hofstede et al. (2010) individuality rankings put Japan 35th, China 58th, South Korea 65th, and Taiwan 66th among the 75 societies they examined. In a similar vein, respondents were asked if they thought they should follow their boss’s instructions even if they disagreed with them. Chinese and Taiwanese respondents agreed more strongly than Japanese and South Koreans did, suggesting that the Confucian influence is stronger in China and Taiwan than in Japan and South Korea.

## 10.6 Education

A number of nonmaterial measures contribute to enhanced well-being, among them educational opportunity. Education becomes increasingly important and educational level becomes an indicator of well-being as the society becomes more advanced technologically and comes to rely more on written than verbal communication. Modern prosperity has (1) demanded higher skill levels for gainful employment and (2) enabled both society at large and individual citizens and families to better afford the costs of higher education (including the opportunity cost of deferred earnings). In addition, governments have promoted continued education both to enhance international competitiveness and as an instrument of social integration. It is thus encouraging that most of the East Asian countries and societies have stipulated at least 9 years of education as compulsory and that the people often opt for more. Similarly, East Asia boasts a number of world-class universities and research facilities. The main value of education comes not from higher earnings but from enabling people to deal successfully with the problems they face and to enhance their own and their societies' well-being.

Chen (2012) reported that survey data from the four East Asian countries show a common pattern in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Although both monetary and nonmonetary factors play a role in explaining the relationship between education and higher reports of happiness in these countries, the monetary factor is relatively unimportant, and nonmonetary factors such as interpersonal networks and greater cosmopolitanism account for a significant part of the correlation between education and happiness. China deviates from this pattern because of the higher relative importance of personal income to happiness.


That said, there are times and places where educational achievement is a mere rite-of-passage formality that people go through to obtain the necessary certification and not because they are interested in or even plan to use the content being taught. Done right, education is empowering;

done wrong, it is a deadening ritual undertaken in preparation for further deadening. In such situations, education is a ticket to social class (e.g., white-collar vs. blue-collar vs. unemployed) membership rather than an indication of psychological well-being, although there is some correlation in that higher social class is often accompanied by financial rewards that lead at least to material well-being.

As part of the *AsiaBarometer* project (AsiaBarometer 2006), Inoguchi and his team asked parents to select the two most important items from a list of qualities that children might be encouraged to learn (Inoguchi 2011). These values are learned at an early age, with values and norms most visibly inculcated by parents. As shown in Fig. 10.13, *independence*, *diligence*, and *honesty* were the clear leaders in China, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Singapore, with Japan an obvious outlier in prioritizing consideration for others and putting independence a distant third. Given that Confucius advocated both the virtue of independence (“Do not be concerned that no one recognizes our merits. Be concerned that you may not recognize others.”) and the virtue of consideration for others (“Consideration for others is the basis of a good life and a good society.”), it would clearly be misleading to call China Confucian and Japan non-Confucian. Both are Confucian with different emphases.

*Independence* is a top-three quality emphasized everywhere in East Asia except Japan. Why the difference? The other East Asian societies are all continental and have suffered frequent conquests, revolutions, wars, and other civil disturbances. Japan has been largely spared these kinds of events. A student of Mongol history, Okada (1999), argued that societies that fell under the Mongol empire's sway tended to be politically authoritarian whereas societies outside the reach of the Mongolian empire (e.g., Japan) were more able to develop free market-oriented societies. In addition, the continental societies are all more or less recent-settler societies. China, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam are full of migrants, both internal and external.





**Fig. 10.13** Ranking of values children should learn in selected Asian countries, 2006. Percentages reflect percentage of people within each of the value categories so

the total percentage for each country per line exceeds 100%. D.K. = don't know (Data from AsiaBarometer 2006)

*Diligence* used to be a key virtue stressed in Japanese compulsory education textbooks. Kinjiro Ninomiya (1787–1856), discussed previously, was held up as an exemplary figure for the way he first worked his way out of poverty and then served as a moral administrator in developing local economies, and statues of him (typically reading a book as he carried a heavy load of firewood) were common sights in Japanese schoolyards. Yet he has disappeared from twenty-first-century Japanese primary and junior high school textbooks. In the other countries studied, individual competition is highly valued as a means to survive and thrive, as epitomized by the fact that the entrance examinations for prestigious universities are more competitive than they are in Japan.

*Honesty* is another virtue stressed in the Confucian doctrine. Recent-settler societies are societies of strangers living in close proximity, and honesty is an essential virtue in such a society. Likewise, sincerity is also stressed in the Confucian doctrine, yet it is stressed more in the

Chinese periphery (e.g., Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam) than in China itself, which stresses the result of sincerity rather than sincerity itself.

*Consideration for others* scores highest only in Japan, perhaps because the other societies are more mobile, have shorter-lasting relationships, and hence have lower expectations that such consideration will be repaid. Humility is ranked relatively high in Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan but not in China, Japan, Singapore, or Vietnam.

*Patience* is seen as anachronistic everywhere in East Asia except Japan. Even in Japan, the favorite make-good storyline has shifted from Oshin, a girl patiently persevering in the face of hardship and separation from her parents, to Hanzawa Naoki, a hard-driving and somewhat impulsive businessman wreaking revenge for decades-old slights.

*Respect for the elderly* is definitely a Confucian virtue, and it is highly regarded in culturally Chinese societies such as Vietnam, China, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in that order—i.e., in negative correlation to per capita

income. Although people profess respect for the elderly, it is unclear how much of this is sincere and how much is pro forma. The suicide data deserve another look. Perhaps “Confucian capitalism” would be an oxymoron?

### 10.7 Religions and Religious Traditions

*Overt religiosity* does not dominate in East Asian societies the way it does in some Judeo-Christian and Islamic societies. Official China, for example, has long been wary of organized religions as potential countervailing forces; yet the Chinese and Japanese cultures are so multitheistic that ordinary people may well have a Christian wedding and a Buddhist funeral with occasional visits to local folk religion shrines and temples in between in search of ways to improve their everyday well-being. East Asia is perhaps the most secular region in Asia; South Asia is the most religious, be it Christian, Islam, or Hindu; and Central and Southeast Asia fall in the middle. Religion seems to be making a modest comeback

in many countries as people seek solace and belonging, but it is not clear to what extent this desecularization will reverse the twentieth-century trend toward scientific secularism. Studies of “religion” in East Asia can be misleading because, as discussed in Chap. 3, East Asian languages had no term corresponding to the English word “religion.” Therefore, as researchers in the following studies of “religious affiliation” ask East Asian people if they have a religious tradition with which they affiliate themselves, most people answer negatively unless they have made a personal commitment to follow a particular set of religious ideas. Overall, most people throughout East Asia do not do this, but they do visit Buddhist, Daoist, Confucian, and folk religious temples and even sometimes Christian churches, “to worship” (lit: “to bow to a deity and to light incense”) when they need help in their lives, when they want extra good luck, or during important festival dates. These patterns are reflected in the data pertaining to religious affiliation summarized in Fig. 10.14.

For decades, East Asia has been one of the world’s most rapidly developing regions. Indeed,




Fig. 10.14 Percent religious affiliation by East Asian country, 2010 (Data from Central Intelligence Agency 2015b)


the region's annual rate of economic expansion ranged from 6 % to as much as 12–13 % and even higher for the PRC (World Bank 2014). The result of these rapid rates of economic growth, in combination with low to modest levels of growth in Europe and North America, is that China now ranks as the second largest economy (USD 9; 181.2 million; 12.6 %) in the world, and Japan is third (USD 4; 898.5 million; 6.7 %)—even allowing for the sluggish pace of economic growth that has characterized the Japanese economy since the early 1990s. Thus, China and Japan, along with first-ranked United States (USD 16; 768.1 million; 23.0 %), now account for more than USD 30,844.3 million, or approximately 42.3 % of the planet's total economic output.

Despite the region's long history of warfare between bordering states, the East Asian region has been at peace with itself for much of the past three decades. Peace, in combination with new affluence, has resulted in impressive gains in the region and in the well-being of the member countries. The gains are represented in all areas of social development and are reflected in all four of


the volume's four sectors of well-being, i.e., health, education, income, and subjective well-being. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion of the gains and continuing challenges faced by the region in each sector of well-being (Estes 2007; Estes and Van Roy 1992).

### 10.7.1 Financial Well-Being


Economic prosperity is widely accepted as a prerequisite for economic well-being. Thus, it is instructive to look at different levels of economic prosperity that exist in each society and, in turn, to draw comparisons between these countries and others with very different income and wealth profiles. Among the many measures available to assess economic well-being are GDP and, taking the size of each country's population into consideration, PCGDP. As reported in Figs. 10.15, 10.16, and 10.17, all East Asian countries and societies—with the exception of North Korea—have GDP and PCGDP levels that compare favor-



**Fig. 10.15** Gross domestic product (GDP) in USD in selected East Asian countries, 1960–2010 (Data from World Bank 2014)



**Fig. 10.16** Per capita gross domestic product (in USD) in selected East Asian countries, 1960–2010 (Data from World Bank 2014)



**Fig. 10.17** Relative sizes of gross domestic products (Data from World Bank 2014)

ably with those of other economically leading nations of the world. The improvement in PCGDP that occurred between 1980 and 2015, however, did not occur in a straight line; indeed, there were many periods in which net economic losses were more typical. This pattern is comparable to global

trends in GDP and PCGDP and, therefore, is not unique to the East Asian region, which struggles with the same economic investments and financial flows as do other economically advanced countries (World Bank 2014). The overall direction of these changes is, however, decidedly posi-


tive and, today, the majority of the region's countries are among the most significant wealth-producing nations worldwide.

### 10.7.2 Gini Coefficients and Subjective and Objective Assessments of Well-Being

Gini coefficients are an economic tool used to assess the extent to which income and wealth are distributed more or less equally in a society (Fig. 10.18). Ranging from “0” to “100,” scores closer to 0 indicate less inequality in access to and the distribution of income and wealth; conversely, scores closer to “100” indicate high levels of income and wealth inequality within and between a nation's various population groups. At the global level, the most favorable Gini scores are reported for the Scandinavian countries: Denmark 26.9, Finland, 27.8, Norway, 26.8; conversely the societies with the highest levels of financial inequality are in Latin America, i.e.,

Panama, 51.9., Colombia, 53.5, Costa Rica, 48.2, and Paraguay, 48.0.

On average, the countries of East Asia have Gini scores that reflect high levels of income inequality both within and between the region's countries, i.e., China (47.0), Japan (38.1), South Korea (35.1), and Taiwan (35.1). These high levels of financial inequality parallel those found in the United States (41.1) and the Russian Federation (41.7). In all respects, these Gini scores reflect values that are more consistent with economically developing nations than those reported for countries with fully developed economies (World Bank 2014) (Fig. 10.18). These severe disparities in income inequality are manifesting themselves in growing levels of economic discontent throughout the East Asia region—a phenomenon that the region has not experienced for many decades. Thus, objective economic performances profoundly impact subjective assessment of well-being, with the result that the two core domains of well-being cannot really be separated from one another (Wan 2007).



**Fig. 10.18** Trending direction of most recent Gini coefficients for the largest East Asian countries, 1992–2008 (Data from United Nations Development Programme 2014; World Bank 2014)



## 10.8 Technical Infrastructure Quality

It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of public utility infrastructure to everyday well-being (Fig. 10.19). As shown, East Asian societies generally have good access to core public utilities. Although taken from official government sources and needing to be understood as such, the available data show that electricity is nearly 100 % available in all of the societies; safe drinking water is 92 % available in China and 95–100 % available elsewhere. Similarly, liquefied propane gas/city gas is 73.5 % available in China and 93–99 % elsewhere. This situation, while much better than before, is still not as good as it should be, and both inadequate hygiene and sanitation facilities and pollution pose long-term threats to the people's well-being (Inoguchi 2006).

Telephone service is another oft-cited measure of development and prosperity (Fig. 10.20). Communications connectivity is important not just in terms of giving more people better access to information that they can use in their daily

lives (e.g., weather forecasts for agricultural communities) but also in terms of integrating them into the society and keeping them connected with family and friends even when these people do not live nearby. Many of the later-developing East Asian societies are bypassing fixed-line networks and going directly to mobile/cellular service. In China, for example, many are even bypassing subscribing to mobile services and are instead going online with prepaid access.

Many observers see automobile ownership as a measure of prosperity and well-being, despite the serious pollution and other problems that accompany automobile ownership and use. This paper cites two sets of data: paved road length (which is linked to automobile ownership but is also indicative of the distribution system and mobility in general) and rail track (a measure of both mobility efficiency and social infrastructure development). The four leading East Asian countries have made obvious progress here as well. Figure 10.21 shows the land area and transport infrastructure for each of the region's countries.




Fig. 10.19 Access to core public utilities in selected East Asian countries, 2012 (Data from World Bank 2014)




Fig. 10.20 Comparison of landline and mobile subscribers in 2000 and 2012 (Data from World Bank 2014)




Fig. 10.21 Paved roadway (km) vs. railway and per land area of country (km<sup>2</sup>) (Data from 18dao 2015; NationMaster 2015)

## 10.9 Psychological or Subjective Well-Being


In large part, deriving from but nonetheless transcending public performance on the objective measures just described, are self-assessed, or subjective, feelings of well-being. These two dimensions of well-being differ significantly from one another. Fortunately, we have sophisticated methods for assessing the extent to which people are happy with their lives as they are currently living them. Questions to be asked of people in obtaining these self-assessments include, but are not limited to, “Do you think life is good?” or “Do you feel trapped in a ‘no-exit’ maze of personal nonrewards and despair?” The answers that result from these questions are intriguing and reinforce the individual’s sense of personal and collective achievements in both the objective and subjective arenas of well-being.

Thus, although the overall levels of economic and social prosperity noted above are encouraging from a well-being perspective, concern has been expressed that the distribution of wealth within and between the region’s societies is increasingly unequal, and this inequality may be a factor that correlates with subjective dissatisfaction and a subjective social disconnect as people become more aware of the discrepancy. That is to suggest that a profound sense of relative deprivation slowly, but profoundly, creeps into a population as major income groups recognize the imbalances that exist between actual and relative attained levels of objective and subjective achievement. The larger the gap in the imbalance, the greater is the likelihood that subjective assessments of well-being will decline (Gornick and Jantti 2014; Inoguchi and Fujii 2011).

The period following the end of the Second World War in Japan offers valuable insights into how this mix of objective and subjective assessments of well-being interact with one another. Following the war, for example, only a minority of Japanese lived under circumstances in which their daily needs, housing needs, the ability to return to university, and the like could be met.

Only a handful of the population had the access necessary to bring about what, then, was regarded as a high level of social and economic inclusion. The typical picture was one of deprivation, denial, and having to suspend a concern for the future in order to focus on meeting the basic day-to-day needs that confronted the majority of the population. People’s attitudes toward having to live under such harsh conditions were not confrontational in nature. Over time, however, the living conditions of many population groups began to change for the better, e.g., access to better food on a predictable and sustainable basis, governmental approval to build more secure living units, and regular employment even in low paying jobs; at the same time, the majority of the population did not share in these benefits. Thus, the material and subjective well-being of the few improved dramatically within a short time whereas the self-assessments of well-being of the many declined precipitously in an environment within which a minority were able to rebuild their lives to at least a prewar level. These disparities resulted in many internal conflicts between the relatively advantaged and the relatively disadvantaged population groups, a process that undermined the already fledgling political, economic, and social welfare systems that clearly were designed to meet all of the victims of war—at least in principle. The end result of these disparities, of course, was that personal and communal hardships became less acceptable when some people were living luxuriously and their neighbors were unable to escape poverty no matter how hard they worked (Graham 2011; Walker and Smith 2011).

As mentioned briefly above, longevity and infant mortality are significant social data but do not necessarily reflect how the individual feels about his or her own health. Although inherently subjective, self-assessment of health is an important component of personal well-being. Of the four East Asian societies, China and South Korea register high health self-assessments and Japan and Taiwan register cautiously good self-assessments. In large part, chronic diseases such



**Fig. 10.22** Self-assessment of personal happiness in selected East Asia (Data from Inoguchi and Fujii 2011)

as high blood pressure, diabetes, cardiovascular difficulties, and respiratory problems increase with age and become increasingly important as the East Asian societies age. Figure 10.22 summarizes the major findings with respect to how selected groups of East Asian citizens and residents view their satisfaction with life and with happiness.

## 10.10 Discussion and Conclusions

We began this chapter with a series of questions that guided our exploration of a complex body of objective and subjective well-being data with respect to changes in development that occurred in East Asia. Among others, our major findings include the following:

- East Asia has been and continues to be one of the world's most rapidly developing regions and experiences high levels of self-assessed well-being.
- The region's contemporary development patterns are linked to one another and to the

region's rich historic past, which has had major socio-political-cultural-religious impacts not only on the region but on the rest of the world as well.

- Through the region's ancient religions and philosophical systems, East Asia teaches compassion toward others, including toward strangers. In fact, however, the region has spun a comparatively weak social safety net to care for its elderly, disabled poor, and others who cannot participate fully in East Asia's "economic miracle."

Japan may perhaps be an outlier in East Asia in two senses. First, Japan registered a government social policy expenditure higher than that of the United Kingdom and on a par with that of the Netherlands. Second, given alarmingly increasing government debts and the need to reduce government expenditure on social issues, those with lower income may feel the crunch similar to those in the rest of East Asia.

Instead, the region's cultures and, in turn, their governments emphasize individual savings and family social care responsibility to meet the

majority of these needs. Government involvement in this sector is limited to small pensions for previous members of its civil service, to widows, to childless single persons, and to the poor who are found in every community. But the levels of financial security provided through the publicly administered systems of social welfare tend to be minimal. Local temples and monasteries pick up the void left by the absence of help from the public sector.

- Nonconsanguine adoptions are a rarity in East Asia and, to the extent they do occur, the preference is for the adoption of boys rather than girls, for whom other forms of social support must be found.
- Economic development has been one of the region's most significant social accomplishment.
  - East Asia, for example, contains two of the world's three largest economies and, in general, levels of PCGDP and per capita gross national income are well above world averages.
  - Similarly, cell phone ownership, paved roads, railways, and other transportation and communications infrastructures are among the world's most developed, even when compared with those of the United States.
  - Long gone are the days when products with the notation "made in Japan" or "made in China" were considered cheaply produced, mass market items. As was the case for nearly a thousand years, selected products of Japan and China, especially in the electronics sector, are considered to be among the best available in the global market place.
- Self-assessed levels of well-being are exceptionally high in the majority of East Asian countries. Positive ratings on self-assessment tools are closely related to the levels of educational and income attainment, the presence of a strong sense of social mobility, engagement in productive work in which individuals take considerable pride, and the presence of children, but especially boys.
- On the negative side, the countries and societies of East Asia are confronted by a wide range of recurrent natural and man-made disasters. In recent years these have included:
  - The near meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [UNESCAP] 2015)
  - The devastating destruction brought about by an earthquake of large expanses of Kobe in Japan (UNESCAP 2015)
  - Less frequent, and certainly more contained, flooding associated with China's extensive rivers and other waterways (UNESCAP 2015)
  - Devastating and recurring earthquakes in both China and Japan (UNESCAP 2015)
  - Frequent tsunamis among the coastal cities of virtually all of East Asia's major territories (UNESCAP 2015)
  - Air pollution of nearly unbreathable levels related to the burning of fossil fuels (coal) in China, Taiwan, and, often, South Korea (UNESCAP 2015)
  - The accumulation of large amounts of nuclear waste in all of the region's countries dependent on nuclear power as a major energy source (UNESCAP 2015)
  - The rapid spread of frequent public health pandemics from China to other areas of East Asia and, owing to airplane travel, quickly to other world regions, e.g., avian flu epidemics, severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, among others (WHO 2014b)
- Also problematic for a majority of East Asian countries are continuing problems with overpopulation, albeit the nature of the dilemmas differs enormously from one country to another, e.g., on-going rapid population growth in China, which ranks 2nd behind India in the size of the total population, and, owing to declining fertility and increases in overall years of life expectation, rapid population aging in Japan, Taiwan, and even China



(United Nations Population Division 2012). The complex social care needs of the region's elderly are placing extraordinarily high levels of demands on East Asia capacity to provide adequately for their needs (UNESCAP 2014).

### 10.11 Looking Ahead

The East Asian countries, with the notable exception of North Korea, have achieved remarkable progress in well-being and their people have benefitted enormously. Some of these accomplishments have been government-directed, yet government policy obviously had to be backed up and supplemented by private initiative as people saw the benefits to development.

Modernization and industrialization have raised standards of living throughout the region and enhanced physical well-being in general (Estes and Van Roy 1992). Yet, these forces have also had their downside, as epitomized by pollution at public-disaster levels (e.g., the mercury poisoning of Minamata in Japan; the current levels of air, water, and soil pollution in China; and the near meltdown of the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan). Conducive to enhanced well-being, modernization and industrialization have not had unmitigated results. Including greenhouse gas emissions and climate change, it is clear the East Asian economies must do more to develop and adopt nonpolluting (or, at a minimum, less-polluting) manufacturing processes and lifestyles.

There are clearly lessons here that other countries can learn, with the understanding that not all East Asian economies offer the same lessons and that not all lessons apply equally to all situations. Some of the lessons from East Asia are *dos* and others are *don'ts*. Allowing room for innovation is an obvious *do*; rampant pollution that, in effect,

poisons the wells for future generations is an obvious *don't*. In many areas, the East Asian economies have learned how to curb much of their pollution, both industrial and personal. Desulphurization scrubbers on smoke stacks, emission regulations for automobiles, and sewage treatment plants are just a few examples.

Having come this far and possessing advanced design and technology skills, it is incumbent upon the East Asian economies to move to the next stage and develop solutions to some of the urgent pollution issues facing the global community. Climate change and sea-level increases associated with global warming represent just two of the many issues needing to be addressed worldwide. Other imperatives are the need to check and reverse desertification, to ensure adequate fresh water supplies in tandem with robust water conservation programs, to wean our economies from fossil fuels, and to vigorously promote and protect species diversity. These are all essential if our current well-being is to be more than just a one-off blip on the radar of history.

Moreover, all of these changes have to be done against the backdrop of declining and aging populations. As fertility rates have fallen well below the developed-country 2-to-1 replacement rate (with less developed countries needing higher fertility rates to offset their higher infant mortality rates) and as improved health and living conditions have extended lifespans, many societies are finding their social security structures stressed by having fewer working-age people to support more retired people and by having fewer young people to maintain infrastructure, production, and distribution systems. Nevertheless, it is hoped that this demographic issue, which is by no means restricted to East Asia, can spur these societies to devise innovative solutions applicable to enhanced well-being worldwide.

## Supplemental Tables

**Supplemental Table 10.1** Demography  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Demography**  
**REGION: Asia (N= 24)**

	Country Source	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
East Asia	China	667.1	1051.0	1337.7	1364.3	1.8	1.4	0.5	0.5	16.2	22.9	49.2	54.4
East Asia	Hong Kong SAR	3.1	5.5	7.0	7.2	4.5	1.1	0.7	0.8	85.2	92.9	100.0	100.0
East Asia	Japan	92.5	120.8	128.1	127.1	0.9	0.6	0.0	-0.2	63.3	76.7	90.5	93.0
East Asia	Korea, North	11.4	18.8	24.5	25.0	2.5	1.6	0.5	0.5	40.2	57.6	60.2	60.7
East Asia	Korea, South	25.0	40.8	49.4	50.4	2.9	1.0	0.5	0.4	27.7	64.9	81.9	82.4
East Asia	Mongolia	1.0	1.9	2.7	2.9	2.5	2.7	1.5	1.5	35.7	55.0	67.6	71.2
East Asia	Taiwan	10.6	19.3	23.2	23.4	3.7	1.3	0.2	0.3				
South Central Asia	Afghanistan	8.8	11.5	28.4	31.3	2.0	-2.8	2.5	2.4	8.2	17.0	24.7	26.3
South Central Asia	Bangladesh	49.5	94.3	151.1	158.5	2.8	2.7	1.1	1.2	5.1	17.5	30.5	33.5
South Central Asia	Bhutan	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.8	2.3	2.8	1.7	1.5	3.6	12.9	34.8	37.9
South Central Asia	India	449.6	781.7	1205.6	1267.4	2.0	2.2	1.3	1.2	17.9	24.3	30.9	32.4
South Central Asia	Iran	22.0	47.5	74.5	78.5	2.6	4.0	1.2	1.3	33.7	53.4	70.6	72.9
South Central Asia	Nepal	9.5	16.1	26.8	28.1	1.7	2.3	1.1	1.2	3.5	7.4	16.8	18.2
South Central Asia	Pakistan	45.5	94.8	173.1	185.1	2.4	3.4	1.8	1.6	22.1	29.3	36.6	38.3
South Central Asia	Sri Lanka	9.9	15.8	20.7	20.6	2.8	1.5	1.0	0.8	16.4	18.6	18.3	18.3
South East Asia	Cambodia	5.7	7.8	14.4	15.4	2.5	3.6	1.5	1.8	10.3	13.9	19.8	20.5
South East Asia	Indonesia	88.7	162.5	240.7	252.8	2.4	2.1	1.3	1.2	14.6	26.1	49.9	53.0
South East Asia	Lao, PDR	2.1	3.7	6.4	6.9	2.3	2.8	2.0	1.8	7.9	13.8	33.1	37.6
South East Asia	Malaysia	8.2	15.8	28.3	30.2	3.2	2.8	1.7	1.6	26.6	45.9	70.9	74.0
South East Asia	Myanmar	21.5	38.5	51.9	53.7	2.2	2.1	0.8	0.9	19.2	24.1	31.4	33.6
South East Asia	Philippines	26.3	54.3	93.4	100.1	3.3	2.7	1.7	1.7	30.3	43.0	45.3	44.5
South East Asia	Singapore	1.6	2.7	5.1	5.5	6.4	0.1	1.8	1.3	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
South East Asia	Thailand	27.4	52.0	66.4	67.2	3.0	1.8	0.2	0.3	19.7	28.1	44.1	49.2

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 10.1** (continued)

	Country	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
South East Asia	Viet Nam	34.7	58.9	86.9	90.7	1.6	2.0	1.0	1.1	14.7	19.6	30.4	33.0
	East Asia (N=7)	115.8	179.7	224.7	228.6	2.7	1.4	0.6	0.5	44.7	61.7	74.9	77.0
	South Central Asia (N=8)	74.4	132.8	210.1	221.3	2.3	2.0	1.5	1.4	13.8	22.6	32.9	34.7
	South East Asia (N=9)	24.0	44.0	65.9	69.2	3.0	2.2	1.3	1.3	27.0	34.9	47.2	49.5
	Regional average	67.6	113.2	160.3	166.4	2.7	1.9	1.2	1.1	27.1	37.6	49.5	51.5

Population: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates

% Population Growth Rate: Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage

% Urban: Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>. Taiwan: <http://www.populstat.info/Asia/taiwanc.htm>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>. Taiwan: <http://www.indexmundi.com/taiwan/population.html>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>. Taiwan: <http://www.indexmundi.com/taiwan/population.html>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>. Taiwan: <http://www.indexmundi.com/taiwan/population.html>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>. Taiwan: <http://www.populstat.info/Asia/taiwanc.htm>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>. Taiwan: <http://www.indexmundi.com/taiwan/population.html>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>. Taiwan: <http://www.indexmundi.com/taiwan/population.html>

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>. Taiwan: <http://www.indexmundi.com/taiwan/population.html>

i World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

j World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

k World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

l World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

**Supplemental Table 10.2** Education  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Education**  
**REGION: Asia (N= 24)**

	Country Source	% Secondary school enrollment				% Adult literacy				% Tertiary education			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
East Asia	China		32.2	83.1	92.4		65.5	95.1	95.1		2.5	23.3	29.7
East Asia	Hong Kong SAR		72.4	87.2	99.3						12.2	57.8	66.8
East Asia	Japan		94.9	101.6	101.8						29.0	58.1	61.5
East Asia	Korea, North						97.0	100.0	100.0				
East Asia	Korea, South		90.6	97.1	99.0						31.6	101.0	96.6
East Asia	Mongolia		87.5	91.6	91.6			98.3	98.3		23.8	53.8	62.3
East Asia	Taiwan												
South Central Asia	Afghanistan		13.3	50.2	54.3			31.7	31.7		2.2	3.9	3.7
South Central Asia	Bangladesh		20.1	49.9	53.6			58.8	58.8		5.0	10.5	13.2
South Central Asia	Bhutan		11.9	66.3	77.7				52.8		0.7	7.0	10.9
South Central Asia	India		34.9	65.1	71.5				62.8		5.8	18.2	24.7
South Central Asia	Iran		44.1	81.1	86.3		52.3	85.0	84.3			43.1	57.9
South Central Asia	Nepal		27.5	60.4	67.0	8.8		57.4	57.4		3.5	14.4	17.2
South Central Asia	Pakistan		19.1	34.1	38.3			55.4	54.7		2.9	6.6	9.8
South Central Asia	Sri Lanka		61.1	97.2	99.2			91.2	91.2		3.7	16.0	18.8
South East Asia	Cambodia			45.0	45.0			73.9	73.9		0.3	14.1	15.8
South East Asia	Indonesia		34.8	78.4	83.1			92.6	92.8		6.2	24.9	31.5
South East Asia	Lao, PDR		21.4	44.8	50.5				72.7		1.5	16.1	17.7
South East Asia	Malaysia		53.7	66.9	70.8			93.1	93.1		5.6	37.1	37.2
South East Asia	Myanmar		23.1	50.2	50.2		78.6	92.6	92.6		4.8	13.8	13.4
South East Asia	Philippines		67.1	84.6	85.4			95.4	95.4		27.7	29.4	33.8
South East Asia	Singapore							95.9	96.4				
South East Asia	Thailand		30.7	83.5	85.9			96.4	96.4		20.6	50.0	51.2
South East Asia	Viet Nam				43.0			93.5	93.5		1.9	22.4	24.6
	East Asia (N=7)		75.5	92.1	96.8		81.3	97.8	97.8		19.8	58.8	63.4

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 10.2** (continued)

	Country	% Secondary school enrollment				% Adult literacy				% Tertiary education			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
	South Central Asia (N=8)		29.0	63.0	68.5	8.8	52.3	63.2	61.7		3.4	15.0	19.5
	South East Asia (N=9)		38.5	64.8	64.2		78.6	91.7	89.7		8.6	26.0	28.2
	Regional average		44.2	70.9	73.6	8.8	73.3	82.7	79.7		9.6	29.6	33.3

% Secondary school enrollment: Gross enrollment ratio. Secondary. All programs. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition

% Adult literacy: Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, 'literacy' also encompasses 'numeracy', the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100

% Tertiary education: Gross enrollment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving

Note: can also find data directly from UNESCO (World Bank has same values since data comes from UNESCO)

a

b World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

c World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

d World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

e UNESCO (1970) – Literacy 1967–1969 Progress Achieved in Literacy Throughout the World. Paris (1970)

f World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

g World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

h World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

i

j World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

k World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

l World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>



**Supplemental Table 10.3** Health  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Health**  
**REGION: Asia (N= 24)**

	Country Source	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1k live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate			TB incidence per 100k				
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t
East Asia	China	43.5	68.3	74.9	75.4		42.1	13.6	10.9		53.8	15.8	12.7			36.0	32.0		21.6	92.0	70.0
East Asia	Hong Kong SAR	67.0	76.4	83.0	83.8									49.8	5.2				138.3	94.0	76.0
East Asia	Japan	67.7	77.7	82.8	83.3	30.4	5.5	2.4	2.1	39.7	7.5	3.2	2.9	131.0	14.0	6.0	6.0		48.5	24.0	18.0
East Asia	Korea, North	51.1	67.4	68.9	69.8		27.7	24.8	21.7		35.1	31.3	27.4			98.0	87.0		383.0	429.0	
East Asia	Korea, South	53.0	68.5	80.6	81.5	80.6	8.5	3.5	3.2	113.6	9.9	4.1	3.7		17.4	21.0	27.0		213.6	97.0	97.0
East Asia	Mongolia	48.4	58.4	66.9	67.5		94.3	29.3	26.4		135.2	35.7	31.8			74.0	68.0		155.8	227.0	181.0
East Asia	Taiwan																				
South Central Asia	Afghanistan	31.6	44.4	59.6	60.9	234.9	146.7	75.3	70.2	359.5	219.6	105.2	97.3			500.0	400.0		93.2	189.0	189.0
South Central Asia	Bangladesh	47.0	57.4	69.5	70.7	176.0	117.8	38.9	33.2	263.8	173.3	49.1	41.1			200.0	170.0		44.3	225.0	224.0
South Central Asia	Bhutan	32.4	48.6	67.0	68.3		113.0	34.2	29.7		165.4	42.5	36.2			140.0	120.0		228.7	287.0	169.0
South Central Asia	India	41.4	57.1	65.7	66.5	164.9	100.6	46.4	41.4	247.4	145.2	60.2	52.7			220.0	190.0		149.5	209.0	171.0
South Central Asia	Iran	44.9	55.7	73.1	74.1		56.1	16.4	14.4		75.1	19.2	16.8			25.0	23.0		18.4	20.0	21.0
South Central Asia	Nepal	38.5	51.2	67.1	68.4	221.6	120.5	36.2	32.2	330.0	177.8	45.3	39.7			220.0	190.0		0.3	163.0	156.0

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 10.3** (continued)

	Country	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1k live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate			TB incidence per 100k				
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t
South Central Asia	Pakistan	46.4	59.6	66.1	66.6	186.4	114.6	73.4	69.0	253.9	150.8	91.8	85.5			190.0	170.0		117.6	276.0	275.0
South Central Asia	Sri Lanka	59.7	69.3	73.8	74.2	70.7	25.2	9.2	8.2	98.0	30.2	10.7	9.6	302.5	50.6	32.0	29.0		37.2	66.0	66.0
South East Asia	Cambodia	41.2	52.9	70.6	71.7		87.4	37.3	32.5		120.9	43.8	37.9			200.0	170.0		130.4	511.0	400.0
South East Asia	Indonesia	44.8	61.2	70.2	70.8	149.9	73.7	27.4	24.5	224.7	102.7	33.2	29.3			210.0	190.0		10.9	199.0	183.0
South East Asia	Lao, PDR	43.2	50.9	66.9	68.2		122.9	59.0	53.8		181.7	79.6	71.4			270.0	220.0		115.8	270.0	197.0
South East Asia	Malaysia	59.5	69.5	74.5	75.0	67.3	18.6	7.2	7.2	92.7	21.8	8.5	8.5	242.3	37.1	31.0	29.0		67.0	75.0	99.0
South East Asia	Myanmar	42.7	56.9	64.6	65.1		86.5	43.7	39.8		122.9	56.1	50.5			220.0	200.0		27.3	403.0	373.0
South East Asia	Philippines	57.8	63.8	68.2	68.7	66.8	50.2	25.0	23.5	104.1	74.8	32.1	29.9	153.2		120.0	120.0		278.0	337.0	292.0
South East Asia	Singapore	65.7	73.9	81.5	82.3	35.5	8.8	2.2	2.2	47.8	10.9	2.8	2.8	44.2	4.4	4.0	6.0		71.3	35.0	47.0
South East Asia	Thailand	55.2	67.9	73.8	74.4	102.1	38.3	12.5	11.3	147.6	48.2	14.5	13.1	329.6	35.5	28.0	26.0		149.2	157.0	119.0
South East Asia	Viet Nam	59.1	68.9	75.3	75.8	76.1	41.7	20.6	19.0	120.6	59.7	25.9	23.8			51.0	49.0		79.7	176.0	144.0
	East Asia (N=7)	55.1	69.5	76.2	76.9	55.5	35.6	14.7	12.9	76.7	48.3	18.0	15.7	90.4	12.2	47.0	44.0		115.6	152.8	145.2
	South Central Asia (N=8)	42.7	55.4	67.7	68.7	175.8	99.3	41.3	37.3	258.8	142.2	53.0	47.4	302.5	50.6	190.9	161.5		86.1	179.4	158.9

	South East Asia (N=9)	52.1	62.9	71.7	72.5	83.0	58.7	26.1	23.8	122.9	82.6	32.9	29.7	192.3	25.7	126.0	112.2		103.3	240.3	206.0
	Regional Average	49.6	62.0	71.5	72.3	118.8	68.2	29.0	26.2	174.5	96.5	36.8	32.9	178.9	23.5	131.6	114.6		99.8	196.3	173.7

Avg. years life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life

Infant <1/1k live born: Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1000 live births in a given year

Child mortality <5/1K: Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year

Maternal mortality rate: Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births. The data are estimated with a regression model using information on the proportion of maternal deaths among non-AIDS deaths in women ages 15–49, fertility, birth attendants, and GDP

TB incidence per 100k: Incidence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of new pulmonary, smear positive, and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis cases. Incidence includes patients with HIV

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

i World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

j World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

k World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

l World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

m [http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality\\_data/en/](http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/); <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN>. Note: some estimates made from pregnancy related deaths, birth rate, and population

n [http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality\\_data/en/](http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/); <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN>

o World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

p World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

q <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>

r <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>

s World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

t World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

**Supplemental Table 10.4** Income  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Income**  
**REGION: Asia (N= 24)**

	Country	GDP (Billions of constant 2005 USD)				PCGDP (Constant 2005 USD)				% Growth in GDP				GINI or other measure of wealth disparity			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p
East Asia	China	80.8	359.7	3867.4	5274.1	121.2	342.2	2891.1	3865.9	–27.3	13.6	10.6	7.4		29.9	42.1	37.0
East Asia	Hong Kong SAR		69.0	220.1	247.8		12655.3	31328.4	34222.3		0.8	6.8	2.5				
East Asia	Japan	654.9	3018.2	4648.5	4779.5	7079.4	24994.7	36296.3	37595.2	12.0	6.3	4.7	–0.1			32.1	32.1
East Asia	Korea, North																
East Asia	Korea, South	27.7	230.6	1098.7	1238.7	1106.8	5650.2	22236.1	24565.6	4.9	7.5	6.5	3.3				
East Asia	Mongolia		1.5	3.5	5.5		801.6	1273.2	1901.0		5.7	6.4	7.8			36.5	36.5
East Asia	Taiwan																
South Central Asia	Afghanistan			10.2	12.9			360.7	413.4			8.4	2.0			27.8	27.8
South Central Asia	Bangladesh	14.4	28.5	93.2	119.0	291.6	302.6	616.9	750.4	6.1	3.3	5.6	6.1		26.9	32.1	32.1
South Central Asia	Bhutan		0.2	1.3	1.6		408.3	1796.8	2068.4		4.2	11.7	6.3			38.7	38.7
South Central Asia	India	102.7	262.3	1243.7	1600.3	228.3	335.5	1031.6	1262.6	3.7	5.3	10.3	7.4		31.9	33.9	33.6
South Central Asia	Iran		100.2	239.5	231.4		2108.6	3215.7	2949.3		2.1	6.6	1.5		47.4		

South Central Asia	Nepal	1.7	3.4	10.1	12.0	177.8	209.5	376.3	426.5	1.9	6.1	4.8	5.5			32.8	32.8
South Central Asia	Pakistan	10.0	44.0	129.5	151.6	219.4	464.2	748.0	818.9	6.0	7.6	1.6	5.4		33.4	29.6	29.6
South Central Asia	Sri Lanka	3.3	10.2	33.3	44.1	336.7	644.2	1610.1	2135.7	4.2	5.0	8.0	7.4		32.5	36.4	36.4
South East Asia	Cambodia			8.7	11.5			605.2	744.9			6.0	7.0			33.6	31.8
South East Asia	Indonesia	25.4	106.4	377.9	471.7	286.0	654.7	1570.2	1865.9	6.1	3.5	6.2	5.0		29.3	35.6	38.1
South East Asia	Lao, PDR		0.9	4.0	5.5		244.5	628.8	793.9		5.1	8.5	7.5			36.2	36.2
South East Asia	Malaysia	8.1	41.1	178.7	220.5	986.5	2609.3	6319.0	7304.1	7.6	-1.1	7.4	6.0		47.0	46.2	46.2
South East Asia	Myanmar									0.5	2.9	8.2	8.5				
South East Asia	Philippines	18.3	49.3	131.1	165.1	696.1	907.1	1403.4	1649.4	5.6	-7.3	7.6	6.1		41.0	43.0	43.0
South East Asia	Singapore	4.2	33.4	176.5	208.3	2529.9	12192.9	34758.4	38087.9	8.1	-0.7	15.2	2.9				
South East Asia	Thailand		54.5	210.1	232.0		1046.5	3163.9	3451.3		4.6	7.8	0.7		43.8	39.4	39.4
South East Asia	Viet Nam		15.7	78.3	97.8		267.5	900.5	1077.9		3.8	6.4	6.0			39.3	35.6
	East Asia (N=7)	254.5	735.8	1967.6	2309.1	2769.1	8888.8	18805.0	20430.0	-3.4	6.8	7.0	4.2		29.9	36.9	35.2
	South Central Asia (N=8)	26.4	64.1	220.1	271.6	250.8	639.0	1219.5	1353.1	4.4	4.8	7.1	5.2		34.4	33.1	33.0

(continued)



**Supplemental Table 10.4** (continued)

Country	GDP (Billions of constant 2005 USD)				PCGDP (Constant 2005 USD)				% Growth in GDP				GINI or other measure of wealth disparity			
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p
South East Asia (N=9)	14.0	43.0	145.7	176.5	1124.6	2560.4	6168.7	6871.9	5.6	1.3	8.2	5.5		40.3	39.0	38.6
Regional Average	79.3	233.1	607.8	720.5	1171.6	3517.9	7291.9	7997.6	3.0	3.9	7.5	5.1		36.3	36.2	35.7

GDP (constant 2005 USD): GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2005 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used

PCGDP (constant 2005 USD): GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars

% Growth in GDP: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources

GINI or other measure of wealth disparity: Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality

a World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

b World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

c World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

d World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

e World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

f World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

g World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

h World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

i World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

j World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

k World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

l World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

m

n World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

o World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

p World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

**Supplemental Table 10.5** Subjective well-being  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Subjective well-being**  
**REGION: Asia (N= 24)**

	Country	World Values Survey (WVS), 1981-2014					
		WVS 1 1981–1984	WVS 2 1990–1994	WVS 3 1995–1998	WVS 4 1999–2004	WVS 5 2005–2009	WVS 6 2010–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f
East Asia	China		7.3	6.8	6.5	6.8	6.9
East Asia	Hong Kong SAR					6.4	6.9
East Asia	Japan	6.6	6.5	6.6	6.5	7.0	6.9
East Asia	Korea, North						
East Asia	Korea, South	5.3	6.7		6.2	6.4	6.5
East Asia	Mongolia						
East Asia	Taiwan			6.6		6.6	6.9
South Central Asia	Afghanistan						
South Central Asia	Bangladesh			6.4	5.8		
South Central Asia	Bhutan						
South Central Asia	India		6.7	6.5	5.1	5.8	5.1
South Central Asia	Iran				6.4	6.4	
South Central Asia	Nepal						
South Central Asia	Pakistan				4.9		7.5
South Central Asia	Sri Lanka						
South East Asia	Cambodia						
South East Asia	Indonesia				7.0	6.9	
South East Asia	Lao, PDR						
South East Asia	Malaysia					6.8	7.1
South East Asia	Myanmar						
South East Asia	Philippines			6.8	6.7		7.3

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 10.5** (continued)

		World Values Survey (WVS), 1981-2014					
	Country	WVS 1 1981–1984	WVS 2 1990–1994	WVS 3 1995–1998	WVS 4 1999–2004	WVS 5 2005–2009	WVS 6 2010–2014
	Source	a	b	c	d	e	f
South East Asia	Singapore				7.1		7.0
South East Asia	Thailand					7.2	7.6
South East Asia	Viet Nam				6.5	7.1	
	East Asia (N=7)	6.0	6.8	6.7	6.4	6.6	6.8
	South Central Asia (N=8)		6.7	6.5	5.5	6.1	6.3
	South East Asia (N=9)			6.8	6.8	7.0	7.2
	Regional Average	6.0	6.8	6.6	6.2	6.7	6.9

Mean life satisfaction: Averaged value of responses to the following survey question: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means you are “completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?  
 a WVS 1 1981–84: V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
 b WVS 2 1990–04: V96.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
 c WVS 3 1995–98: V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
 d WVS 4 1999–04: V81.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
 e WVS 5 2005–09: V22.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
 f WVS 6 2010–14: V23.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

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Vijay Kumar Shrotryia and Krishna Mazumdar

*Where the mind is without fear  
and the head is held high;  
Where knowledge is free;  
Where the World has not been broken up  
into fragments by narrow domestic walls;  
Where words come out from the depth of truth;  
Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards protection;  
Where the clear stream of reason has not lost  
its way into the desert sand of dead habit;  
Into that heaven of freedom and goodwill,  
Let my country awake.*

(Tagore 1920)

## 11.1 Introduction

South Asia is located in the southern extremity of the culturally and politically diverse Eurasian continent. The region's geographical boundaries, which include the highest mountain ranges in the world to the north and encircling seas and oceans on two sides, set the whole of the Indian subcontinent apart from the rest of the world. Nevertheless, over the centuries, the region could not escape foreign invasions and migrations, mainly from Middle Eastern and Western colonizers. The region's most recent newcomers came over the Khyber and Bolan passes on the western side. Some groups came to settle; some came to plunder and conquer. More than 3000 years ago, seafaring groups interested in trade accessed the region via the Indian Ocean, which

constitutes the southern border of South Asia, thereby opening the region to the outside world (Malhotra 2009).

According to the famous German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel (1899: 146), the region is an object of desire:

From the most ancient times downwards, all nations have directed their wishes and longings to gaining access to the treasures of this land of marvels, the most costly which the Earth presents; the treasures of Nature—pearls, diamonds, perfumes, rose-essences, elephants, lions—also treasures of wisdom. The way by which these treasures have passed to the West, has all times been a matter of World-historical importance, bound up with the fate of nations.

The original inhabitants of the region, together with the foreign invaders and foreign traders from Europe (Portuguese, Dutch, English, French) and the Middle East (Arabs and Turks), representing all regions, religions, and races, have coexisted with minimal conflict for centuries. This layering of different cultures, which can be described as a combination of Indo-Aryan, Austro-Asiatic, Dravidian, Mughal, Arab, Persian, Turkic, British, Portuguese, and Dutch, among others, has given a unique identity to

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South Asia that is unparalleled in the world. The region is characterized by immense diversity within a broad contour of unity (Bose and Jalal 2011). In sum, the region and its people present a picture of diversity in unity in almost all aspects.


South Asia is one of the world’s largest, most densely populated (Fig. 11.1), and most culturally diverse regions (Petraglia and Boivin 2014: 339). It possesses two major characteristics: (1) Geographically, culturally, economically, philosophically, and historically, the region is Indocentric, which means that Indian culture has, in one way or another, influenced all of the countries of the region; (2) the power structure is unbalanced and asymmetric (Muni 1979). The geography of India made it vulnerable to invaders from the northwest (Kaplan 2010). Hence India plays a key role as it comprises the largest area geographically and has the largest population in the region. India faces conflict with Pakistan to the west and with China to the northeast, but these conflicts are very different because, historically and religiously, the ties between India and Pakistan are much closer than the ties between India and China. Since Pakistan became independent in 1947, the relationship between the two countries has been characterized by similarities

and dissimilarities in religious practices, and concerted claims on Kashmir have affected their relationship politically.

This chapter examines well-being in all eight of the region’s countries. Some 1600 million people comprise the population of South Asia, inhabiting just 4440 km<sup>2</sup>—approximately 24 % of the planet’s total population of 6915 million in 2010, and about 5 % of the planet’s 93 million km<sup>2</sup> of habitable land (Fig. 11.1). The population density of the region is the highest and most congested in the world, ranging from a high of 1142 people per km<sup>2</sup> for Bangladesh to a low of 20 people per km<sup>2</sup> for Bhutan. The population density for all of India is 416 persons per km<sup>2</sup> in contrast to a population density of 6650 persons per km<sup>2</sup> for Hong Kong, the world’s most densely populated city.

South Asia is subject to recurring floods, mudslides, frequent earthquakes, and temperature extremes, which renders it one of the most consistently geologically vulnerable areas in the world. The casualties and deaths associated with these natural disasters are extraordinarily high, as is the level of human suffering brought on by these frequent disasters. The risks to life and property associated with these disasters is com-

**Fig. 11.1** Surface areas and population distribution by major world regions (Data from World Bank 2012a: 20–22)



pounded by the absence of viable programs of national and regional disaster mitigation even in areas in which disasters occur on a recurrent basis.

About half of Bangladesh is flooded each year (Dewan et al. 2003), which threatens its ability to survive as a sovereign nation. Various studies of Bangladesh (Agrawala et al. 2003; Dewan et al. 2003; Huq 2002; Schiermeier 2014; World Bank 2000) have looked into the challenges this country faces as a result of having to build and rebuild homes in response to frequent floods. “A destructive combination of earthquakes, floods, droughts and other hazards make South Asia the world’s most disaster-prone region” (Oxfam International 2008). Countries throughout South Asia experience many deaths, extensive property damage, and a profound sense of physical insecurity because of the realities of the extreme physical environment in which they live (see Green 2012; Oxfam International 2007; Raychaudhuri 1985). Thus far, the countries of South Asia have required sustained and high levels of foreign disaster and humanitarian assistance from countries both within the region and from the world as a whole.


The region as a whole has one of the poorest economies. However, when we look at the Human Development Index (HDI), which takes into account the broad indicators of health, education, and income, we see that the region is trying to respond to the global challenges in all spheres. When we compare nations in South Asia, we see that Sri Lanka scored highest on the HDI, followed by India and Bangladesh, for the period 1980–2010 (Fig. 11.2).

Geographical and cultural diversity makes this region rich and unique. It is surrounded by mountains, oceans, and arable land and boasts some of the best island locations. Even though the countries have been making efforts at organizational and individual levels to be together, the ethnic and religious tensions have had a negative effect on the general well-being.

## 11.2 The Search for Unity Amid Diversity

South Asia is one of the most culturally and religiously diverse regions on the planet. The people of South Asia, for example, speak at least 20 major languages, such as Hindi, Bengali, English, Telugu, Marathi, Tamil, Urdu, Gujarati, Nepali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi, Pashto, Dari, Dzongkha, and Dhivehi. If one includes the most important dialects, the number increases to more than 200. Because India is the largest country in the region, Hindi is the most frequently spoken language (422 million people); Bengali is the second most frequently spoken language (210 million people). However, English has become an important and officially accepted language in most parts (India and Pakistan) of South Asia. The number of schools offering courses in their respective vernaculars is not growing as quickly as are English medium schools or colleges. Within India, the residents of different provinces use English to communicate with each other: For example, a person from northern India finds it easier to communicate in English with a person from southern India; similarly, English is the most commonly used language in northeastern India. Young people who learn English are more employable and have access to literature not available in the vernacular. Overall, learning English has added to the well-being of the residents because it has opened larger opportunities for employment.

Urdu is also a major language, especially in Pakistan. Urdu is linguistically similar to Hindi. Hindi and Urdu together comprise Hindustani. The other languages fall into several major linguistic groups: the Dravidian languages, the Indo-Aryan languages, the Indo-Iranian languages, the Indo-European languages. Pashto and Balochi, which are widely spoken in Pakistan, are a subbranch of the Indo-Iranian languages. Peoples of the Tibeto-Burman ethnic group residing in Nepal and Bhutan speak Austro-Asiatic languages. Most of the South Asian languages



**Fig. 11.2** Human Development Index scores for selected South Asian countries, 1980–2010 (Data from UNDP 2014: 165–166)

are written using various abugida, such as the Brahmi script. Other languages of the region are written using derivatives of the Persian-Arabic script, such as Urdu, Pashto, and Sindhi. Despite the existence of so many diverse languages, South Asia has made enormous contributions to world literature from ancient to modern times (Bose and Jalal 2011: 4). As discussed by Sreekumar (2014), this region is the second richest in the world in terms of language diversity.

The residents of this region are practitioners of all of the major world religions. Hinduism, with its ancient roots, modern transformations, and many other interpretations, plays a vital part in the culture of the region. Most Hindus are residents of India. Many inhabitants of South Asia are followers of the Islamic faith. Islam was first brought to South Asia by Arab traders and further propagated by Muslim Turk and Mughal conquerors. Christianity, brought to this region by Portuguese, Dutch, French, English, and other European traders, spread widely during the colo-

nial period (large parts of South Asia were European colonies during the seventeenth to twentieth centuries). Consequently, Christianity in its all forms is practiced by a large fraction of the population. Two other great religions, Buddhism and Jainism, have their roots in this region. A small fraction of the population practices Sikhism. Hindus and Muslims constitute a huge majority of the population in the region. The religious tensions in the region seem to be more political than among individuals. Harmony among peoples of all faiths and a feeling of oneness are evident in the behavior of the people. There are many localities in India as well as Pakistan where Hindus and Muslims live together.<sup>1</sup> Interreligious marriages are common, and many younger people appear to be able to live with others irrespective of their religious background, which is expected to strengthen the unity among the masses of the region.

<sup>1</sup>For detailed examples see Williams (2007).

Most of the countries of this region were colonies of European countries prior to 1950. In 1947, British India was divided into two independent sovereign states on the basis of religion: India (primarily Hindu) and Pakistan (primarily Muslim).<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the initial conditions of well-being found in British India were similar for both India and Pakistan. Pakistan comprised two geographic entities before 1971—East Pakistan and West Pakistan (later Bangladesh). West Pakistan was politically dominant, whereas East Pakistan was comparatively isolated and had weak administrative systems. In 1971, East Pakistan fought a war of liberation with West Pakistan that resulted in the formation of a new independent nation, Bangladesh (approximately 143,998 km<sup>2</sup>).

Today, even after the demarcation of India and Pakistan, India is home to about one sixth of the world's population. According to its constitution, which was adopted in 1950, India is the largest multiparty participatory democracy in the world. Pakistan has undergone recurrent periods of political turmoil since it became independent; it took 23 years after it gained independence to hold the first general election. Bangladesh, the youngest nation of the region, has also had political problems ever since its inception.

Sri Lanka obtained its independence in 1948 after 450 years of colonial rule by the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the British (roughly 150 years each). The Sri Lankan population is mainly Buddhist. The rest of the population is Hindu, Muslim, and Christian. They speak Sinhala and Tamil, though English is also an official language. The rivalry between the Tamil and the Sinhalese has led to internal struggles (Ross and Savada 1988).

The history of each of the other South Asian countries—Afghanistan, Bhutan, Nepal, and Maldives—is different. Afghan independence was secured in 1921 after three wars with the British. Unrest in Afghanistan continued until a coup in 1973 ended the reign of King Muhammad Zahir Shah. A close relationship with the USSR followed the Saur Revolution in 1978, and the

Soviet invasion in 1979 resulted in a civil war. In 1989, the withdrawal of the Soviets left the cities under government control, whereas the countryside was under the control of Muslim fundamentalists.

Bhutan, which is located in the Himalayan region, is the youngest democracy in the world. It is predominantly a Buddhist nation and has a population of less than one million people. In 1907, the governor of Tongsa was elected the first king of Bhutan. After India received her independence, it provided both financial and operational support to help Bhutan maintain her sovereignty and peace and order along the northern border.

In 1768, the ruler of the principality of Gurkha in the west, conquered the Kathmandu valley and began a phase of expansion that ended in his defeat by the Chinese in Tibet (1792) and by the British in India (1816). From 1846 to 1950, members of the Rana family served as hereditary chief ministers of a powerless monarchy. Their isolationist policies preserved Nepal's independence at the expense of its development.

Culturally, the Maldives is the most homogeneous state in South Asia. It has a common religion (Islam) and a common language (Divehi), both of which give the country a strong national identity. It is the least populous country in South Asia (about 500,000 people) and also one of the most peaceful. Historically, it was ruled by a sultan. From 1887 to 1965, the Maldives islands were a self-governed British protectorate. In 1968, the ad-Din sultanate was abolished in favor of a republican system of government.

The religious, cultural, and linguistic diversity that characterizes this region has led to ethnic disputes and problems that divide the different groups and has resulted in clashes, internal unrest, and tensions. This diversity also has resulted in appreciable decreases in individual and collective well-being as reflected in downward trends in the domains of health, education, employment, income, wealth, and subjective well-being (SWB).

Social discrimination against population subgroups in South Asia has also reached an all-time high, despite policies and laws enacted to reduce these tensions. The problem is especially severe

<sup>2</sup>See Guha (2007), Tharoor (2007), and Wallbank (1965).

in India because of its large population, but it is equally serious in the smaller South Asian countries. These tensions persist despite the gradual separation from India of the recently autonomous nations of Bangladesh (formerly West Pakistan) and Pakistan, which were territories within historic India. The struggles between Pakistan and India in the politically divided territory of Kashmir illustrate the magnitude of the unresolved tensions that exist within South Asia on a larger scale (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015), especially those recurrent confrontations between the region's two nuclear states—India and Pakistan (Ganguly and Kapur 2012: 27). Afghanistan has faced many challenges in dealing with the Kabul Marxists and the Soviet occupation. Bhutan and Nepal have never been conquered or colonized. Because they are sandwiched between two of the most populous nations in the world, China and India, they struggle to maintain peace and security in an otherwise conflict-ridden region. Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have other internal problems that continually hinder their progress. India's friendly relations with Nepal and Bhutan have promoted the free movement of people and vehicles across borders and have helped these countries to avail goods and services and explore opportunities that contribute to improving their indicators of social well-being.

The problems and challenges within this geographically, ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse region have affected relationships among these countries. The “clash of civilizations” within South Asia threatens the unity of the region and, as a result, has affected well-being. We next discuss the emergence of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation,<sup>3</sup> which has introduced many initiatives to unite the region and to improve the well-being of its people.

### 11.3 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

In 1985, seven independent South Asian countries—Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—formed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to strengthen mutual cooperation and resource sharing in agriculture, rural development, telecommunication, meteorology, and health and population activities. The major objective of SAARC as defined in its charter was to promote the welfare of the people of the region and to help improve their quality of life (QOL) in addition to boosting economic growth and sociocultural cooperation and development. SAARC also promoted mutual collaboration and assistance in economic, social, cultural, technical, and scientific areas. As the organization grew, it kept adding more areas and activities. In 2007, Afghanistan also joined SAARC, so at present the organization has eight member countries.

In 2004, all of the member countries of SAARC signed a social charter that defined targets for eradicating poverty, stabilizing population growth, empowering women, mobilizing youth, developing human resources, protecting children, and promoting health and nutrition.<sup>4</sup> The goal was to assure the well-being of the people of the region by coordinating efforts and resources to reach these targets. We discuss below how the different countries are performing in the areas of health, education, social welfare, income and wealth, and technology. We also see the impact of these changes on the region's most vulnerable population groups that traditionally have lived on the margins of South Asian societies.

Over the last three decades, SAARC has become a vibrant organization, engaging in many activities to ensure a better QOL and improved well-being for its people. SAARC is unique among international organizations and is itself a member of other major regional and international

<sup>3</sup>SAARC's official Web site: <http://www.saarc-sec.org/>.

<sup>4</sup>For details visit: [http://saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity\\_id=7](http://saarc-sec.org/areaofcooperation/detail.php?activity_id=7)

organizations. It operates using an important instrument called the *Integrated Plan of Action* and various coordination committees involving all of the states of the region. To boost trade and commerce and to improve the gross domestic product (GDP) in the region, the member countries signed the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement, which allows the movement of more than 5000 commodities. The SAARC Food Security Reserve was initiated to meet the emergent needs of the member countries. The South Asian Development Fund was created to finance industrial development, poverty alleviation programs, and environmental protection programs and to protect against balance of payment problems. SAARC has made committed efforts to deal with gender-related issues, child welfare and development, and health- and education-related issues and has signed various agreements with other concerned agencies to improve the well-being of the people. SAARC is also a powerful contributor to promoting health, well-being, and QOL of all people in the region.

Looking at the history of this region and at the unifying institutions such as SAARC, it could be stated that SAARC has contributed to the overall development and to maintaining its identity as an effective institution to represent all of South Asia. The following discussion looks at the trends seen in well-being indicators and uses narrative experiences to offer conclusions for a better understanding of the issues under consideration.

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## 11.4 Well-Being in South Asia

The remainder of this chapter is organized around the four core domains of well-being used as the point of departure for all of the book's regional chapters: (1) health; (2) education; (3) income and wealth; and (4) SWB. The first three domains are components of the widely used United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) HDI, which has been used to monitor well-being since 1990. The *Human Development Report* was based on the premise that people are the real wealth of a nation. This approach was a key focus even in Adam Smith's thinking about economics

as a discipline when, in the eighteenth century, he stated that human effort is the greatest wealth of a nation. Health, education, and income (or physical wealth) are the domains that are indicative of one's standard of living, and, taken together, they are used to translate human effort into human efficiency, thereby assuring well-being.

SWB helps balance the discussion of the objective indicators inasmuch as the measures used for this domain reflect how people actually experience and feel about changes in well-being that have and have not occurred over time. Scholars differ on how to measure and compare SWB across sections, groups, regions, nations, and communities. Recent efforts to quantify SWB have gained in importance, and different agencies have developed their models of measurements. Before we discuss the progress of South Asia in these domains, however, some background is needed with respect to the current size, composition, and challenges that confront the modern states of South Asia. These social, political, and economic challenges are different for each country because each state has its own set of national priorities, goals, and plans of action with respect to how best to pursue the social progress of its citizens.

Though the literal meaning of the phrase "well-being" seems clear to the average lay person, research has shown that it connotes different meanings to different people (Mazumdar 2003). We treat well-being as a broad concept (with specific indicators) that indicates the level of human development of a region or of a country and that covers both monetary and nonmonetary aspects of human development such as demography, health, education, gender disparity, the economy, and the environment.

The conceptual background of well-being has already been discussed in Chap. 10, hence this section presents the contemporary status of well-being as reflected through different data sources for the broader domains of education, health, income, and SWB apart from looking at the demographic profile of the region. As observed in other parts of the world, South Asia has experienced transformative developments across nations in the last 60 years. The pace of economic



development has been remarkable; however, its progress in terms of social indicators has not been as good as that in other parts of the world, as discussed below.

We studied different variables over time from all eight countries of the region in order to identify a general trend in the progress of well-being. Improving the well-being of people has been a great challenge for the policy makers in the respective countries, and these nations have responded to this challenge by offering various welfare programs designed to develop better social infrastructures (health and education facilities), thereby ensuring good health and education. These countries have based the framework of their policies on the premise of welfare economics. The living conditions of the population in the whole of South Asia have improved considerably. Our analyses are based primarily on data published by the World Bank (for health, education, and income), as are the *Human Development Reports* from different years. To study SWB or life satisfaction, we used data from the World Database of Happiness and the World Values Survey (WVS) across select countries. Though we attempted to compare data across the decades from 1960 onward, inconsistencies and nonavailability of data, especially in the initial decades, posed a challenge.

### 11.4.1 Demographic Profile

Population size and density, birth rate, death rate, and fertility rate all have significant roles in describing the well-being of the inhabitants of a country. The larger the population and the higher the rate of population growth of a country, the greater is the need to provide more resources for education, housing, health care, and employment for that population. Population growth and unemployment have posed serious challenges for this region. The subcontinent covers about 5 million square kilometers, less than 4 % of the total surface area of the planet. About one fourth of the world's population resides in this region—resulting in about 342 persons per km<sup>2</sup> compared to an average of 53 persons per km<sup>2</sup> for the rest of the

world. There have been discussions about how to absorb young workers into the workplace, thereby boosting economic growth; at the same time, many young workers have left the region, seeking and responding to employment opportunities available elsewhere in the world.

With nearly one quarter of the world's population in 2010, the growth rate of South Asia's population of 1.6 % per annum from 2000 to 2010 was far higher than the world average of 1.2 % per annum during the same period. Data from 1960 to 2013 show that the population of South Asia increased on average 2.9 times. The total population increase in Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan, and Nepal has been greater than the average; however, it has been lower than the average in India and Sri Lanka. Further, when we look at population increases by country over the last 50 years, we note sharp increases (8.8–9.6 % and 8.1–11.1 %, respectively) in Bangladesh and Pakistan. The Muslim population has resisted attempts at family planning, birth control, and other similar initiatives. Bhutan and Nepal have experienced a marginal increase in population levels (0.04–0.05 % and 1.7–1.7 %, respectively) whereas India and Sri Lanka have seen decreases (79.7–76.4 % and 1.8–1.3 %, respectively). These changes are the result of measures taken by the state to deal with population control and of improvements in medicine and better access to health care. Though population numbers are viewed as a problem in the region, over the years Sri Lanka has shown balanced control in this area.

The population density of South Asia is the highest in the world. From 1960 to 2013, the population density in all of the countries increased. Bangladesh had the highest population density of the region. South Asia grows by one million people every month (World Bank 2012b: 48). The population growth rate, crude birth rate, crude death rate, and fertility rate of South Asia were higher than those of other regions of the world. However, these demographic indicators declined in all of the sample countries.

In their efforts to convince people of the harmful effects of imbalances between population size and resources, policy makers must deal with the

challenges of illiteracy, child labor, early marriages, prevalence of superstitious beliefs, and traditional, conservative thinking. The respective states have undertaken many initiatives to introduce family planning measures and to create awareness among the masses about the problems of overpopulation. The smallest of the eight countries of the region, Maldives, does not have any official birth control policy, though some international agencies like the World Health Organization have initiated programs to help improve health standards. However, the government of this country has not initiated any action to develop a policy related to setting a standard of family size. In India in the 1970s and 1980s, policies to control population growth were initiated and encouraged. Though the size of the population increased, the population growth rate decreased.


South Asia as a whole faces a number of demographic challenges: (1) reducing fertility rates and improving key health parameters; (2) dealing with an aging population and a health care infrastructure that has not improved over time; and (3) absorbing an increasing number of young working-age people not covered under social security. When one looks at the demographic transition of this region over the last 50 years, it is evident that the highest priorities going

forward are making improvements in the availability of job opportunities for young workers, in education, and in the health infrastructure.


### 11.4.2 Education Well-Being

Education is one of the most important factors used to gauge the well-being of a population. South Asia has the lowest literacy rate in the world (Fig. 11.3). In India, which comprises 90 % of the population in this region, only 24 % of people above the age of 15 could, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement about their everyday life, apart from knowing simple arithmetic calculations. We used this measure, the Adult Literacy Rate (ALR), to compare the general education status of the nations in South Asia.

Figure 11.3 shows that this region has a long way to go to reach the level of other regions. The Millennium Development Goal objective of education for all will take a few more decades to achieve. Though countries like the Maldives and Sri Lanka have outperformed the other countries of the region, Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh need to put more effort into eradicating illiteracy.



**Fig. 11.3** Adult literacy rate: South Asia compared with other major world regions (Data from World Bank 2012a)



**Fig. 11.4** Change in adult literacy rates for selected South Asian countries, 1960–2010 (Data from World Bank 2012a: 94–96)

In 2010, the ALR for South Asia was only 61 %, whereas that of the world was 89 %. South Asian countries showed improvements in ALR from 1960 to 2010 as depicted in Fig. 11.4. Though we do not have time series data for the Maldives, data available in bits and pieces show remarkable transitional trends in adult literacy. The time series data for Afghanistan and Bhutan are sparse, yet the World Bank data series reports that Afghanistan had an ALR of 18.2 % in 1979 that improved to 31.7 % in 2011. Education is a major challenge in Afghanistan. For Bhutan, World Bank data are available only for 2005 (ALR); in that year, 52.8 % adults were literate. The policies of the country indicate that the political leadership is concerned about education. Many programs have been launched to improve overall literacy rates, thereby improving the well-being of its residents.

One might attribute the low achievement and slow progress in education in this region to the fact that South Asian countries have spent less on education than other countries at a similar level of development (Rama et al. 2015: 20). In 2010,

the percentage of GDP spent on education in South Asia was only 2.5 %, whereas the global average was 4.5 %. The same pattern holds true for the individual countries. In India, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, the public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP and of total government expenditure decreased between 2001 and 2010. Despite having one of the lowest public expenditures for education (percentage of GDP), Sri Lanka (2.1 % in 2009) had one of the highest literacy rates because they were able to sustain relatively high rates of literacy over the last five decades.

Although Maldives is a small country, it has the highest literacy rate in the region. The ALR for men and women is the same, which indicates an unparalleled gender equality measure. In comparison, girls in Pakistan and children of low socioeconomic status or from rural regions continue to have less access to primary education (Dundar et al. 2014: 2). Overall, members of the same gender, especially women, are motivated by success stories from other women, and therefore perform better in educational settings. Beaman

and colleagues (2012) found that girl students were more highly motivated to succeed when their local administration was led by women. Pakistan and Afghanistan still lag behind the other countries in the region as far as education standards are concerned. It is disheartening to note that education and skill development are among the two most neglected areas of economic development in Pakistan (Amjad et al. 2015). Afghanistan was ranked 147 out of 148 countries in gender inequality index in 2012. There is a huge gap between the literacy rates of men and women in Afghanistan: only 5.8 % of adult women have secondary or higher education compared with 34 % of men.

The countries of South Asia have initiated many programs during the last decade to respond to the challenge of providing education for everyone. Bangladesh has provided programs for inclusive education for students with special needs (Malak 2013). To improve teacher training, equity, quality, and access, it initiated programs such as Teaching Quality Improvement in Secondary Education Project 2005; Secondary Education Quality and Access Enhancement Project, 2008; and Higher Secondary Female Stipend Project, 2009. The National Education Policy was introduced in 2010 to reform education delivery mechanisms, and the Third Primary Education Development Program was launched in 2011. The Bhutan Education Development Project, 2003 was initiated to boost enrollment of children up to the tenth standard. Different 5-year plans have focused on education. The Bhutan 2020 document clearly states that “Education must prepare young people for the world of work and instill an acceptance on the dignity of labour” (Planning Commission 1999: 19).

The government of India launched three important flagship initiatives to boost the education sector as a whole. To achieve universal elementary enrollment and retention by 2010, *Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan* (SSA) (Education for All movement) was conceived and implemented from 2002 onward. This initiative was strongly supported by the World Bank. SSA also recruited and trained teachers, provided textbooks and teaching materials, and monitored learning out-

comes. SSA interventions have annually benefited around 130 million children in government schools and another 17 million enrolled in government-aided private schools. Some 71 million girls, 27 million children from India’s disadvantaged groups, 15 million tribal children, and 2.8 million children with special needs have gained access to education. SSA outcomes have contributed to the government’s push to enact a national right to education law to guarantee free and compulsory basic education for all children (World Bank 2013a: 6).

In order to expand the number of secondary schools to ensure universal enrollment for the ninth and tenth standards by 2018, *Rashtriya Madhyamik Shiksha Abhiyan* (Universalization of Secondary Education movement) was launched in 2009. In the same year, the Indian Parliament passed the Right to Education Act, which mandated free compulsory education for all children between the ages of 6 and 14. This act provides for a minimum school infrastructure such as a building, a library, toilets, and an appropriate pupil-to-teacher ratio. This act is one of the landmark decisions to improve the enrollment rate, and it has positively affected the rate. In 2013, *Rashtriya Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan* (RUSA or National Higher Education Movement in English) was launched to fund institutions of higher education run by the state governments. It includes about 306 state universities and 8500 colleges across different states and union territories. The funding is supposed to be norm-based and outcome-oriented.

The experience of Nepal in improving educational standards is really interesting. Community schools were initially run by the communities themselves; however, the central government of Nepal took them over and initiated efforts to improve the system and its delivery. However, this initiative backfired, and in 2001 the Education Act was amended to hand the schools back to the communities (Dundar et al. 2014: 358). Nepal initiated the Basic Primary Education Project, the Community School Support Program, the Secondary Education Support Program, and the Education for All Program to improve the enrollment rate and the universalization of education at

different levels. In 2009, the School Sector Reform Program was launched to improve the quality of education for primary and middle school children. These initiatives helped the country to improve its educational parameters. Education has been an important agenda of the SAARC. Ever since its formation in 1983, the eight member states have discussed education and developed cooperative projects through different committees and regional centers located within member countries.<sup>5</sup> The SAARC Human Resource Development Centre was initiated in Pakistan for the benefit of all the member states to undertake research, provide training, and disseminate information on human resource development issues.

All of these initiatives have resulted in an improvement in last decade in the primary net enrollment percentage from 75 % in 2001 to about 88 % in 2010, which is more in line with that of other regions (Dundar et al. 2014: 63). Although South Asia is the most illiterate region in the world, literacy rates rose in all of the countries between 1960 and 2010. However, learning outcomes and the average level of skill acquisition are still low in both absolute and relative terms. Mean student achievements in mathematics, reading, and language are low throughout the region, except for Sri Lanka; a large number of children do not master basic primary-school skills even by grade 5 (Dundar et al. 2014: 86). Sri Lanka and Maldives have maintained the highest literacy rate and surpassed the global literacy average in 2010.

Participation of private entrepreneurs in the education sector is on the rise across South Asia except for Bhutan, where only a few private schools (and only in some urban pockets) are

available for middle level education. Education is considered an important business opportunity, and it is becoming part of public-private partnership ventures. This trend is, however, occurring only in the urban areas; ironically, about 70 % of the total population of South Asia still resides in villages.

The quality of teachers is an issue that plagues this region as a whole. Many South Asian teachers barely know more than their students (Dundar et al. 2014: 23). This concern has added to the slow improvement in education-related indicators and does not contribute to improving the standard of education as a whole. A Goldman Sachs report found that India scored poorly relative to BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and below the average relative to emerging economies in terms of school quality and that its growth and productivity were affected by low educational standards across the board (O'Neill and Poddar 2008). Though there are political commitments toward education for all, they have not reached the masses. The relationship between teachers and politicians has negatively influenced teacher quality and accountability in government schools in India (Beteille 2009). Militancy also hinders the cause of education in some parts of South Asia. In Nepal, the civil conflict due to Maoist insurgency has adversely affected education for girls, but overall it has not significantly reduced the number of years of education for either boys or girls (Valente 2011). Many households do not send their children to school, especially their girls in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan, many girls who wish to attend school must deal with two types of social boundaries: caste boundaries and gender boundaries. Low-caste girls may face discrimination if they attend a school dominated by high castes, and all girls are subject to *pardah*, a form of female seclusion that restricts women's mobility and social interactions. These social constraints limit educational opportunities for girls (World Bank 2015a: 52). World Bank Education Strategy 2020, which targets access, equity, quality and governance, will be a reality only when employment opportunities for students improve.

<sup>5</sup>SAARC's member states include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. The countries and political organization that have observer status in SAARC include [Australia](#), [China](#), the [European Union](#), [Iran](#), [Japan](#), [Mauritius](#), [Myanmar](#), [South Korea](#) and the [United States](#). [Myanmar](#) has expressed interest in upgrading its status from an observer to a full member of SAARC. [Russia](#) has applied for observer status membership of SAARC. [Turkey](#) applied for observer status membership of SAARC in 2012. South Africa has participated in SAARC regional meetings.

Although educational well-being in South Asia has improved over the last 60 years, it has not kept pace with gains in the rest of the world. International agencies have made contributions to improve educational outcomes in South Asia, but inherent territorial problems, religious stigmas, gender inequality, and concentration on quantity rather than quality have greatly hindered the cause of educational well-being in the region. Unlike in ancient times, when education was considered necessary for building character, gaining knowledge, creating learned societies, and spreading scholarship to the other parts of the world, today education is considered necessary only to prepare one to earn a living in the market-driven economy. The great institutions of this region, such as Takshila and Nalanda, which developed a strong culture of learning, knowledge, and wisdom, have lost their relevance in modern times. Efforts are underway to revive these institutions, but overcoming market forces and looking beyond mere educational indicators are large challenges to overcome. The region has the potential to improve educational well-being. We feel that, as time passes, educational advances will not just be reflected through indicators but will empower the residents with a rich cultural outlook.

### 11.4.3 Health Well-Being


The demographic profile of a country is closely related to its health profile. We discuss issues related to health and track the parameters of life expectancy, infant and child mortality rates, and disease prevalence over the past 50 years. Public health scholars agree that years of average life expectancy at birth is a major contributor to well-being and is both an indicator of the health of a country and of the quality of its health care systems. Overall health and years of average life expectancy are also affected by access to health services and the quality of the services provided. Life expectancy is defined as the number of years a randomly selected newborn is expected to live, provided that the prevailing patterns of mortality

at the time of its birth remain more or less the same throughout his or her life span.

Life expectancy for the people of South Asia has increased from 1960 to 2012, though it has approached but not reached world average levels (Fig. 11.5). In this context, during the post-World War II period, there were significant increases in life expectancy around the world, which is considered a notable achievement in the history of humans (Ram 1998). The increase over the last 62 years has been dramatic, especially among low income populations that, increasingly, live on average as long as 71 years. This increase is the result of efforts made to improve health facilities. Bhutan and Nepal have increased the life expectancy of their citizens by 36 and 29 years, respectively, a remarkable achievement, especially given the low levels of per capita income of the majority of the citizens. Average life expectancy in Sri Lanka increased from a low of 60 years in 1960 to more than 74 years by 2012. Again, this achievement is remarkable for a comparatively poor country. Sri Lanka and the Maldives are considered outliers in terms of health parameters. During the last 20 years, the average life expectancy trends in all South Asian countries have increased and continue to be competitive with world standards. East Asian countries such as China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea had higher gains in average life expectancy than did the majority of Southeast Asian countries—Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The countries of South Asia—India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—experienced comparable gains by 2012 (World Health Organization 2012). Afghanistan had the lowest average life expectancy in 2012. Even when one compares the 2012 rate with the 1960 rate, the rates of Bhutan, Nepal, and Maldives are better than those of Afghanistan.

In general, women live longer than men in most countries of South Asia, albeit average years for life expectations for the region's men is on the rise. As countries progress along this critical dimension of human development, the gap between the rate of survival to age 65 of both men






**Fig. 11.5** Life expectancy at birth for selected South Asian countries, 1960–2010 (Compiled from data published by the World Bank [World Development Indicators] for different years)


and women is increasing. The average years of life expectancy of women, though, is expected to continue to exceed that of men, e.g., the chances that a woman born in 1960 in Bhutan would increase to 65 years continues to be approximately 20 % higher than that attained by men. Similarly, life expectancy projections for a woman born in 1960 in Sri Lanka would reach age 65 have increased to an average of 64 % of all women in the country. Over time, these conditions have changed, and the male-female gap has grown. On average, 86.5 % of the women born in Sri Lanka in 2012 could reach age 65 whereas only 72 % of Sri Lankan men born in 2012 are expected to reach 65—still higher than during earlier decades but the male-female gap in average years of life expectancy persists. The pattern is region wide even as further advances in years of male average life expectancy continue to improve.

Infant mortality rate (IMR) data reflect the quality of nutrition and hygiene during the early stages of life, which contributes to life expectancy as well. Figure 11.6 indicates a gradual

decline in the IMR, which is a positive indicator. As reflected in educational and other health indicators, Sri Lanka has been successful in controlling the IMR, and the trend in India is similar to that of the region. Pakistan and Afghanistan have performed poorly on this indicator. Overall, the IMR for South Asia has declined, and it is expected that it will continue to decline in the future. In 2012, South Asia had an IMR of 37.81 deaths per 1000 live births compared to the world IMR of 35. In 2012, Sri Lanka and Maldives had extremely low IMRs, whereas Pakistan and Afghanistan had the highest IMRs (Fig. 11.7). Although Sri Lanka has had consistently low IMRs, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal have better IMRs than India. When we relate the IMR to the availability of physicians per 1000 people, we find that the region suffers from a shortage of physicians: In 2010, the world had 1.4 doctors (2.9 hospital beds per 1000 people) per 1000 people, whereas this region had 0.6 (0.9 hospital beds per 1000 people). The exception was Pakistan, which had more doctors per 1000



**Fig. 11.6** Infant mortality rate for selected South Asian countries, 1960–2010 (Compiled from data published by the World Bank [World Development Indicators] for different years)



**Fig. 11.7** Infant mortality rate for selected South Asian countries, 2012 (Data from World Bank 2015b)

people compared to the other IMR countries of the region but which had a high IMR.

The poor health outcomes in South Asia can be attributed to low expenditures for health care and lack of an adequate health care infrastructure, especially in the rural environments in which much of the region’s population resides. A

contributing factor to the poor life expectancy is the comparatively low level of public investment in local, regional, and national health services. In 2010, the health care expenditure of South Asia as percentage of GDP, for example, was less than 3.8 % of public expenditures, whereas the world expenditures for health for the same period aver-

aged 10.8 %. This big gap in allocation of funds for improving health has adversely affected the parameters used to measure health well-being.

South Asia rates somewhat better than sub-Saharan Africa on health parameters; otherwise, its overall level of health performance ranks far behind virtually every other subregion of the world. This ranking reflects decades of neglect on the part of central and local governments in developing health infrastructures. India's famed traditional healing systems of Ayurveda and similar types of innovative medicine, because of the focus on one case at a time, have contributed relatively little to advances in public or communal health. Higher than average levels of per capita GDI have not succeeded in reversing the region's generally downward trend with respect to health, health care, and the means used to promote high levels of health for increasingly large numbers of people. The last decade has seen a proliferation of Ayurvedic products, and the governments have promoted private sector investment in health, especially in supporting yoga and Ayurveda. In December 2014, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the importance of yoga for better well-being and hence declared June 21 as International Yoga Day.

Though the region's expenditure on health care has increased steadily during the last decades, the resulting modest gains have been sidelined by the high rates of population growth not only in India but in other South Asian countries, e.g., Pakistan, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka—all of which rank among the lowest in the world in terms of national public sector spending on health as a percentage of GDP.

Sri Lanka, an exceptional country in this region, does extremely well on health parameters despite having internal governance problems. In India, one sees disparities in health parameters by region as well as between the poor and the rich (Yazbeck and Peters 2003). Some states like Kerala are doing much better than states like Uttar Pradesh. In 2000, the global burden of diarrhea and malnutrition, attributable to climate change, was highest in India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives and is expected to remain the same until 2030 (Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change 2007). The region faces major health challenges: poor sanitation, poor maternal health, poor access to health care services, and the prevalence of many emerging chronic diseases.

SAARC has undertaken many initiatives<sup>6</sup> designed to improve public responses to health hazards, diseases, and other health-related problems. Though many research institutions<sup>7</sup> have been established in the region, many scholars (see Sadana et al. 2004; Yazbeck and Peters 2003) have observed that health research has not matured in this region and that it will take time for health to become a priority. The Global Forum for Health Research (2001) called the research gap in developing countries "the 10/90 gap," whereby a meager 10 % of health research funding is allocated to 90 % of the disease burden facing the world.

A major problem the region faces is how to implement the existing and proposed programs and how to reach out to needy people. Lapses occur in implementing the programs. Corruption at different levels creates a major hindrance in reaching the masses. In Bangladesh and Nepal, government health providers were pressured to provide free medicine to people whom they knew were not ill but who were selling it to others or who wanted it for their livestock (World Bank 2015a: 195). In some of the states in India, scams are perpetrated by people who are supposed to deliver state-proposed expenditures to the people. A former Prime Minister of India once said that in India only 10 % of the expenditure reaches

<sup>6</sup>The SAARC Tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS Centre was established in 1992 in Nepal, with the goal of treating and preventing tuberculosis. This center coordinates and implements regional activities related to TB and HIV/AIDS. The health ministers of the member countries of SAARC meet periodically to review progress and to develop strategies to improve the health well-being of the residents of the region. Steps are underway to develop the Telemedicine Network Project for resource sharing within the region.

<sup>7</sup>Bangladesh Medical Research Council, 1972; Health Research and Epidemiology Unit, Bhutan, 1995; Indian Council for Medical Research, 1911; Pakistan Medical Research Council, 1962; Nepal Health Research Council, 1991; National Health Research Council, Sri Lanka 1996.

the people for whom it was meant (Basu 2006: 216).

Although South Asia has experienced some improvements in the parameters related to health well-being, these improvements have not kept pace with improvements in other parts of the world. Whereas government expenditures for health as a percentage of GDP have not increased significantly, private expenditures have increased, which indicates that in general people are becoming aware of health issues and expenditures on health are increasing. Health outcomes for Sri Lanka and Maldives are excellent whereas those for Pakistan and Afghanistan are poor. India, which has a large percentage of the overall population, has the greater challenge. South Asia has a long way to go to improve the health well-being of its people.

#### 11.4.4 Economic Well-Being

In the contemporary world, GDP has been considered an important indicator of the progress of a nation. It is believed that economic empowerment results in broadening choices and freedoms, thereby improving well-being. Income is a prime measure of satisfaction for an individual. Similarly, production is the measure of satisfaction for a nation.


Densely populated South Asia is emerging as the world's most deprived region. The per capita purchasing power parity gross national product (GNP) in 2010 was only USD 3124. This region, which has 24 % of the world's population, produces only 6.7 % of the world's purchasing power parity dollar income. According to the classical work of Maddison (1995), India (including Bangladesh and Pakistan) and China were dominating economies until 1870; they contributed about two thirds of world GDP. "Moghul India had a bigger industry than any other country which became a European colony, and was unique in being an industrial exporter in pre-colonial times. A large part of this industry was destroyed as a consequence of British rule" (Maddison 1995: 115). In the sixteenth century, on average, Indians had relatively higher incomes and lower

taxation rates than their counterparts elsewhere in the world. Gold, diamonds, fine shawls, spices, and opium were sold in the markets during that period (Von 2007). Three centuries ago, the general economic well-being of the residents in this part of the world was much better than that of the residents of other parts of the world.


A comparison of the GDP using 1990 prices (USD) shows that, between 1600 and 1947, the GDP for India increased more than three times whereas that for the United Kingdom increased more than 50 times, corresponding to a per capita increase of 1.1 times and 6.5 times, respectively. Further, a comparison of per capita income between 1947 and 2008 shows that India had much faster growth (4.8 times) than the United Kingdom (3.7 times) (Maddison 2006). During the last 60 years, India has grown at a faster pace than other parts of the world. At the same time, social indicators and outcomes have not improved in the same proportion, as per expectations. The challenge is to sustain this growth and to translate it into improving the well-being of the people.

The GDP per capita of South Asia grew six-fold from 1960 to 2010 (Fig. 11.8); Sri Lanka has grown much faster than the other countries, followed by India. Maldives seems to be the richest country and Nepal, the poorest country of the region so far as GDP is concerned. The growth of the region during the last 22 years has been much faster than the growth during the previous 30 years, which is the result of liberalization policies of various governments. The flow of capital through these countries and beyond has been positive during the last 15 years. In India, however, the GDP did not grow at the expected rate because of problems related to governance, corruption, and political compromises. The coalition government could not make the kinds of decisions that would boost the economy. However, the present government, which won by a significant majority, seems committed to make India a manufacturing hub through a "Make in India" campaign targeted toward inviting other countries to invest in India. Policies are being put in place to strengthen the Indian economy.

Policies put in place to respond to market forces and expectations are yielding positive



**Fig. 11.8** Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for selected South Asian countries, 1960–2010 (constant 2005 USD) (Data from International Monetary Fund 2014)



**Fig. 11.9** Rate of growth in gross domestic product in selected world regions including South Asia, 2012 (Data from World Bank 2012a: 22)

results in terms of economic growth. In 2012, the GDP of Southeast Asia grew by 8.9 % and that of South Asia grew by 6.6 % (Fig. 11.9); the GDPs of all other parts of the world have grown at much lower rates. The purchasing power of the house-

holds in this region has increased. At the same time, the gap between rich and the poor is widening, which is a cause of worry.

As is evident from the preceding discussion, the region has a high level of poverty, which con-

tributes to its slow growth. In 2013, 98 % of the population in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa lived on less than \$10 a day (World Bank 2013b: 58). According to the World Bank, though the percentage of the total population living below the poverty line in South Asia declined from 1981 to 2008, the number of people living below the absolute poverty line (earning USD 1.25 per day) increased from 568 million in 1981 to 571 million in 2008. In fact, South Asia has more poor people than all other regions of the world. It has been estimated that, from 2005 to 2008, 20 % of the total population of the region was undernourished. In addition, one third of the adult women residing in this region were anemic. The developmental process in Bangladesh has been marred by internal power struggles between the political parties. As Karim (2013) put it, the country stands at the crossroads between hope and depression. Bangladesh and Nepal are classified as low income economies, whereas India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are considered lower middle income economies (World Bank 2013b).

Despite the many problems in the region, it has performed satisfactorily in terms of economic growth rate. The economic growth rate in India has improved over the last 25 years, but at a slower rate than expected because of corruption and governance deficit. However, the new government has taken effective measures to boost the economy by instituting a better system for whistle-blowing and accountability that is expected to build confidence among investors and common people. Political disturbances in Pakistan and Bangladesh have affected the momentum of growth in that region. Real GDP projections for South Asia by the International Monetary Fund (2014) for the coming years are positive.

#### 11.4.5 Subjective Well-Being Profile


In this section, we look at SWB, which is used as a proxy for both quality of life, happiness, and well-being more generally. Determination of QOL is based on the premise that once human needs are fulfilled, SWB will steadily increase

and, in turn, will be expressed as a positive attitude that can be measured using standardized subjective well-being tools (Costanza et al. 2007). SWB refers to how people experience the quality of their lives and includes to both emotional reactions and cognitive judgments. The best way to assess a person's life satisfaction is to ask the person directly. This approach reduces the possibility of manipulation; at the same time, it is limited because it represents the individual's response at a specific point in time. However, it is considered the best way to obtain firsthand opinion of a person's level of satisfaction with different variables. "Assessing the appraisal of life in a nation requires that the total of experienced well-being is estimated. This sum of experience is denoted by the concept of 'happiness.' Happiness is a person's overall evaluation of his/her life as-a-whole" (Veenhoven 1996). Different agencies and individuals have conducted surveys using suitable tools to track the status of life satisfaction (or happiness) across world regions.

SWB data for this region are not consistently available in a uniform format, making comparisons difficult. However, we were able to obtain some data for India and for some of the other countries of the region through the World Database of Happiness, the WVS, and the Gallup opinion poll.

The World Database of Happiness gauges life satisfaction using the Cantril ladder: "Suppose the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder the worst possible life, where on this ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time." As projected by Veenhoven (n.d.), the mean value for life satisfaction in 2011 for the South Asian region was 4.94. Only scattered data were available for Bangladesh (1996, 2002), India (1990, 1996), and Pakistan (2001, 2012); compiled mean values for 2000 to 2009 are shown in Fig. 11.10. Happy life years (Veenhoven 1996), which is the product of the measures of life expectancy and of life satisfaction, provides a closer look at the relationship between these objective and subjective measures. The happy life years score could be a better measure for studying health well-being because it goes beyond life expect-





**Fig. 11.10** Subjective well-being for selected South Asian countries, 2000–2009 and 2011 (Compiled from World Database of Happiness dataset, Veenhoven 2015)


tancy and takes into account subjective measures that are based on people’s own perceptions. In 2011, Sri Lanka had the highest (36.2 years) level of average happy life years. Pakistan (32.5 years) had the lowest (Fig. 11.10). There is not much variation in this measure in South Asia. In 1990, India, which was the only South Asian country included in the study of 48 nations, had 36.44 happy life years. Of the 48 nations, only six had lower happy life years scores than India, and Iceland had the highest value at 62.4 (Veenhoven 1996).

The WVS provides data on life satisfaction (or, in some waves, satisfaction with life). India was included in five of the six waves of data collected (1990–2014). The data for Bangladesh and Pakistan are available only in two waves (fourth and sixth waves and third and fourth waves, respectively). The WVS does not provide data for the other countries of this region. The respondents are asked to reply on a 10-point scale (1 being dissatisfied and 10 being satisfied) to the question, “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days.”

Data from the World Database of Happiness indicate that the people in India have a higher level of life satisfaction than those in the other

countries of South Asia. However, when one looks at the happy life years, Sri Lanka ranks first. As discussed previously, this result is attributable to the high life expectancy rate. In general, there is little variation in the expression of satisfaction among the people of this region (lowest 5, highest 5.5). When we look at WVS data over time (Fig. 11.11), we see a downward trend in Bangladesh and India and an upward trend in Pakistan. In light of the internal problems that Pakistan has experienced in the last 5 years, it is difficult to believe that the residents have experienced such a high level of life satisfaction.

Because of the small number of respondents for these surveys (e.g., Wave VI, 1591 for India and 1200 for Pakistan) and the scattered nature of the data, it is difficult to be convinced that these surveys reflect the SWB of the people of the region correctly. Also, because SWB responses are subjective and reflect the respondent’s feelings at a moment in time, it is difficult to believe that they provide an accurate picture. Between 2007 and 2011, the number of people who reported that they were “very happy” increased 2 % globally; however, for India it increased by 5 %. In this study, India was the only country from South Asia (Wright 2012).



**Fig. 11.11** Average life satisfaction values in selected 5-year intervals for selected South Asian countries, 1990–2014 (Waves 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) (Compiled from different waves of data from the World Values Survey)

The downtrend of SWB in India is understandable in view of the negative sentiments across India because of poor governance (Das 2012). However, the Indian population feels hopeful that the government that took over in 2014 will introduce public policies designed to create a more positive environment whereby India is able to regain its lost glory.

The reporting of SWB data from South Asia has been highly inconsistent both in terms of trends over time and of the countries represented. However, given the lack of reliable data, one can only use what is available. This situation provides a great opportunity to better organize the collection of data from the region to ensure better regional comparisons.

### 11.5 Bhutan's Experiments with Gross National Happiness

Bhutan is a small nation of about one million people whose government is seriously interested in the happiness and general well-being of its people. In 1972, the Bhutanese king spoke about gross national happiness (GNH) at a United

Nations gathering in Geneva. Ever since, GNH has become the foundation of socioeconomic thinking in Bhutan and has guided public policy toward the well-being of its citizens. Government planners concentrated on measures that would result in the happiness of people rather than just on economic growth. This thinking led to policies which would assure a better QOL for the people, thereby creating a happy society. As creating a happy society became a national priority in Bhutan, all ministries and departments involved in developing public policies worked with decision makers and implementing agencies to initiate and execute the policies and programs that would result in GNH. In order to further operationalize this concept and to deliberate on different aspects that involve well-being, many workshops, seminars, and conferences were organized. These events helped clarify GNH and raised issues that were crucial to its practical application. Because this planning process remained at the policy level for more than three decades (1970s–1990s), its impact on well-being has yet to be felt. Several international conferences and workshops were held during the first decade of the twenty-first century to discuss how to operationalize and measure GNH.


In 2008, the Planning Commission became the GNH Commission. It was headed by the prime minister, who was assisted by bureaucrats and policy makers. The GNH Commission assigned the task of developing practical, target-oriented indicators for GNH to the Centre for Bhutan Studies, which published a short guide to the GNH Index in 2010 and developed a nationwide index (comprehensive GNH Index) of the satisfaction level (impact of public policies on well-being of citizens) of people related to different aspects of QOL (based on nine domains, each having equal weight).

Bhutan achieved 72.5 % forest coverage (United Nations 2001) because the National Assembly (the highest legislative body) had mandated that the country should maintain at least 60 % of the land area under forest cover for all time (Planning Commission Secretariat: Royal Government of Bhutan 2002). A fact sheet published by the government in 2006 showed that a large percentage of people reported a happy status of life. Many of the parameters indicated favorable conditions: access to primary health care was greater than 90 %; access to safe drinking water in rural areas was about 65 %; more than 90 % of the children were immunized; life expectancy at birth increased to 66 years (Planning Commission Secretariat: Royal Government of Bhutan 2000). Bhutan was the first South Asian country to attain the status of Normal Iodine Nutrition Country (Royal Government of Bhutan 2005: 29) and has been identified as a Millennium Development Goals fast-track country on the basis of governance qualification (United Nations Millennium Project 2005, p. 234). It has been one of the most successful countries in South Asia in the development and delivery of social welfare (Rutland 1999) and has enjoyed a strong growth record over the last decade because of sound macroeconomic management, good governance, and rapid development of hydroelectric power resources (International Monetary Fund 2004). The philosophy of GNH is based on the basics of the QOL of the people. "The pursuit of GNH calls for a multi-dimensional approach to development that seeks to maintain harmony and balance between

economic forces, environmental preservation, cultural and spiritual values and good governance" (Planning Commission Secretariat: Royal Government of Bhutan 2000: 20). The premise of QOL is derived from the theory that, once a person's basic human needs are fulfilled, the individual experiences positive SWB. A better QOL is supposed to improve the satisfaction level of people vis-à-vis their happiness.

GNH is based on four pillars: incorporating equitable and balanced socioeconomic development; preserving and promoting cultural and spiritual heritage; conserving the environment; and maintaining good governance in every aspect of government. Bhutan has taken the initiative in prioritizing happiness over several economic indicators. Almost all of the planning documents underscore the fact that GNH is the top priority of the government of Bhutan. Spiritualism and culture are two important issues for GNH. Traditional thinking and the different components of GNH are reflected in Fig. 11.12, which contains an outline of the Bhutan 2020 document published in 1999. In 2010, the government began to focus on measuring GNH. Table 11.1 identifies 4 pillars, 9 domains, and 16 key result areas to evaluate the outcome of their public policies to improve well-being or happiness.

The focus on improving economic indicators has led policy makers to overestimate the strength of the GDP. Policy makers have assumed that a nation can develop only by concentrating on improving economic growth. For poor countries, the main concerns are always health and hygiene, education, social security, alleviation of poverty, gender-related issues, and participation by and empowerment of the people. In such situations, the priority of the state must shift from economic growth to the well-being of its citizens. Rural-urban differences in QOL of people in eastern Bhutan during 2001 and 2005 (Shrotryia 2009) indicated that the pace of providing physical infrastructure was faster in rural areas; however, the satisfaction level did not rise accordingly. Bhutan can attest to the fact that despite constraints and pressures, it can sustain its developmental process. GNH has inspired the citizens of



**Fig. 11.12** Normative architecture for future change and development (Planning Commission: Royal Government of Bhutan 1999: 15)

**Table 11.1** Gross National Happiness Framework, Bhutan

Pillar one	Pillar two	Pillar three	Pillar four
Sustainable and equitable socioeconomic development	Preservation and promotion of culture	Conservation of the environment	Good governance
Nine domains			
1. Living standards	4. Cultural diversity and resilience	8. Ecological diversity	9. Good governance
2. Education	5. Community vitality		
3. Health	6. Time use		
	7. Psychological well-being		
Sixteen key result areas			
1. Sustained economic growth	5. Strengthened Bhutanese identity, social cohesion, and harmony	7. Carbon neutral/green and climate resilient development	11. Public service delivery
2. Poverty reduced and MDG Plus achieved	6. Indigenous wisdom, arts, and crafts promoted for sustainable livelihood	8. Sustainable utilization and management of natural resources	12. Democracy and governance strengthened
3. Food secure and sustained		9. Water security	13. Gender friendly environment for women’s participation
4. Full employment		10. Improved disaster resilience and management mainstreamed	14. Corruption reduced 15. Safe society 16. Needs of vulnerable groups addressed

this kingdom to maintain peace, tranquility, and sovereignty (Shrotryia 2006).

Bhutan adopted its written constitution on 18 July 2008 and included “happiness and well-being of people for all time” in its preamble. Article 9 (2) states that “The State shall strive to promote those conditions that will enable the pursuit of GNH.” The country has concentrated its energy and resources during the last two decades on decentralization and participation, both of which are considered essential elements of GNH. The life of Bhutan citizens has been transformed during the last two decades, but especially in the last 7 years since the people elected their first democratic government in 2008. The number of private medical clinics is on the rise because some government doctors prefer to operate private clinics. These clinics are primarily in urban areas. Because these clinics provide choices for the people who can afford them, many people also feel that they contribute to a class-based society. Royal University of Bhutan came into being in 2003 through a Royal Charter. Previously, the citizens of Bhutan depended on the Indian educational system because the only college was an affiliate of the University of Delhi, India. The Charter sets out a rationale of this university to disseminate knowledge for the economic and cultural development of Bhutan and to promote well-being of its people.

The number of college graduates is increasing, which is slowly causing an unemployment problem. Bhutan is developing its own information and communications technology systems; many transactions go through the Internet, which has exposed their society to the outer world. The residents feel that, having chosen a democratic government, they are more open and have easier access to high government officials. Transparency and accountability of the bureaucracy have improved, and there is better communication between the citizens and their leaders. The media have become proactive toward issues of common concern. Capital investment in infrastructure projects has increased, which has resulted in better roads and the development of the townships. The economy still suffers from a balance-of-payment problem, and Bhutan is still dependent

on India, which translates into a huge liquidity problem.

Because it is still a young democracy, Bhutan will continue to change over time. Comparisons of QOL measures before and after the introduction of democracy will be important projects for future scholars. It is observed that the SWB of its citizens is demonstrably better than that of countries that focus on attaining high levels of income, a testimony to the effectiveness of the GNH project.

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## 11.6 Discussion and Conclusions

The focus of this chapter is the well-being since 1960 of the South Asian countries of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. As mentioned previously, South Asia is geographically, culturally, and religiously diverse. This diversity, sometimes considered a strength, has also been a source of political conflict both past and present. The region continues to struggle with military conflicts that originate both within and outside the region. These conflicts continuously threaten to disrupt the peace throughout the region and the world as a whole. Sreekumar (2014) reported an inverse relationship between the number of languages spoken in a particular region and the well-being of the people residing in that region.

The region’s accomplishments in the areas of health, education, income, wealth, and SWB are modest compared with the gains attained by other regions of the world. The slow pace of development is attributable to the region’s continuing high rates of fertility and increasing years of average life expectancy. Few of the region’s governments possess the resources needed to bring about lower fertility rates, and none of the region’s countries, understandably, wishes to reduce the years of average life expectancy. Institutions of higher learning are available and affordable, albeit the quality is highly varied.

Many of the region’s people, especially the young people, are unemployed; some migrate to other parts of the world in search of improved economic opportunities. The brain drain phe-

nomenon is visibly prevalent across South Asia. Dependency on foreign remittance is widespread throughout the region. The instability and poor conditions are a disincentive for the region's governments to provide income security for the region's historically most vulnerable populations, e.g., widows and their children; the aged; unemployed workers; persons belonging to socially disadvantaged groups, and persons with chronic illnesses or permanent disabilities that prevent them from working. The government expects families, neighbors, local communities, and religious organizations to provide the basic material needs of these persons, albeit many remain outside the care of even these informal systems of social welfare. Poverty is widespread and highly visible in most of the countries of South Asia, as are begging and the disfigurement of children to increase their value as beggars.


Except for large-scale initiatives undertaken in South Asia by the SAARC and the United Nation's Millennium Development Campaign, few global initiatives, apart from projects targeted at local villages and communities, are designed to assist the nations of the region in reducing the low levels of social development and well-being that have existed for decades. Even recent, sometimes dramatic, increases in the per capita income level have not succeeded in lifting the great population of South Asia to increasingly higher levels of social achievement. The situation is puzzling, given the tremendous wealth, highly developed land, air, and sea transportation systems, and rich human capital resources that exist in the region. Our best assessment of the lag in well-being relates to the region's continued high rates of population increase; the existence, despite its illegality, of the caste system; the inferior status conferred on women; and, more existentially, the philosophies of the region that teach acceptance of one's lot in society rather than social achievement and social mobility as the prime goal of each individual. Certainly, all of these factors contribute to the region's relative pattern of social stagnation even as progress is made in one or more critical social indicators.

Von (2007: 11) described the region as follows: "In the beginning, there were two nations. One was a vast, mighty and magnificent empire, brilliantly organized and culturally unified, which dominated a massive swath of the earth. The other was an undeveloped, semifeudal realm, riven by religious factionalism and barely able to feed its illiterate, diseased and stinking masses. The first nation was India. The second was England. The year was 1577, and the Mughal emperors were in the process of uniting India." Though these sentences describe India, they were written when India included Bangladesh and Pakistan. These sentences provide a historical perspective of the general well-being of the population of this nation. The experiences of the last 60 years tell a totally different story. When we compare the general well-being of the people of this region with that of the residents of other regions, the results are disturbing. Though these sovereign nations exhibit a strong commitment to improving the well-being of their respective populations, conditions have not improved as expected, whether we look at education, health, or income. Overall, Sri Lanka has been able to make progress as far as social indicators are concerned. This achievement becomes all the more important because the country is also trying to deal with its internal problems.

The region has Sri Lanka and Maldives, both of which have positive well-being indicators. It also has Afghanistan, which has suffered terribly during the last few decades. It is considered one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in the world. Its GDP is largely dependent on aid and remittances from Afghans abroad; about 85 % of its budget comes from abroad and nearly half of all government money is spent on security. The Kabul bank scandal that occurred from 2010 to 2013 almost bankrupted the state. The indicators reflect the poor status of the country as a whole. When one looks at the HDIs of the countries in this region (Fig. 11.13), one sees that Sri Lanka and Maldives have outperformed the other countries in the areas of education, health and income; Pakistan and Afghanistan are lowest on the scale.

Although the region is still heavily rural, in 20 years (1990–2010), 5 % of the population moved





**Fig. 11.13** Human Development Index: growth rates for selected South Asian countries, 2013 (Data from UNDP 2014)

from rural to urban areas.<sup>8</sup> Though studies show that unemployed people report lower levels of happiness and life satisfaction than their employed counterparts (Blanchflower and Oswald 2011; Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998), farmers in South Asia report even lower levels of life satisfaction than the unemployed whereas self-employed and wage earners of this region report similar levels of life satisfaction. Overall, only sub-Saharan African populations report lower levels of life satisfaction than South Asian populations (World Bank 2012b).

In recent years, South Asia has become the fastest growing region of the world, with per capita GDP growth accelerating in the last couple of decades. The indicators of social development also have shown improvement in health and education and a decline in the population growth rate. Although the QOL of the people in South Asia has improved over recent decades, it still

lags significantly behind that of other world regions. This multilingual, multireligion, multi-ethnic, multicultural region is the poorest, most illiterate, most malnourished, and least gender-sensitive region in the world. Though women have started participating in the workforce and the discussion on women empowerment is on the political and social agenda for policy and practice, the region is still recognized as one where the conditions of women have not improved compared to other regions of the world. A field study (Datta 2013) done in India (Awadh plains and Uttarakhand region) observed that women tend to have lower levels of well-being because they are less valued within the household and the community. This proud region of the 5000-year-old Indus Valley civilizations still lags in social development.

Considerable resources are channeled into military budgets rather than into human development. The region experiences repeated border hostilities, recurrent internal communal and ethnic conflicts, and outbreaks of violence in different areas. The partition of British India into two

<sup>8</sup>In 1990, 75.1 % of the South Asian population resided in rural areas; in 2000, the number dropped to 72.6 % and in 2010, to 69.9 % (Trading Economics 2015).

states, India and Pakistan, in 1947 and the secession of Bangladesh in 1971 caused two big shocks in the subcontinent. The QOL for many people deteriorated because of these two massive events. In general, all of the countries of the region have experienced internal conflict in the last two decades, and the resulting casualties have outnumbered those from interstate conflicts. Moreover, since 2001, more of the conflicts have been in the poorer regions of these countries than elsewhere (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2013: 40). The idea that all human beings, irrespective of caste, creed, color, or religion, are equal should be instilled in the minds of children. In this context, the roles and responsibilities of parents and teachers are crucial.

In South Asia, 44.4 % of the population live on \$1.25–2.50 a day. Many who recently joined the middle class could easily fall back into poverty with a sudden change in circumstances (UNDP 2014: 34). Poverty is ongoing in most of the countries of this region. Poor health is both a consequence and a cause of poverty. Increased inequality should not be the price of economic growth. The policies of a developing country should be designed to allow it to grow economically and to distribute the fruits of economic growth efficiently and effectively to deal with gender disparity. For example, in Sri Lanka, policies enacted during the colonial and postcolonial eras produced significant progress in well-being. South Asia reduced the proportion of the population living on less than \$1.25 a day (in 2005 purchasing power parity terms) from 61 % in 1981 to 36 % in 2008, yet more than half a billion people remained extremely poor (UNDP 2013: 56). Though the students are taught about the Gandhian way of living and told what Mahatma Gandhi said—“the earth has enough to satisfy everybody’s need but not anybody’s greed,” the fact that acquiring more wealth motivates most of the population in one way or another has negatively affected the sense of well-being, especially in India.

Revival of the Panchayat system in India resulted in wide-spread local participation in

government. In this system, one third of the total political seats are reserved for women. This system provides a large political platform for women, thereby impacting the lives of all women in the region by empowering them to express their views in the development of their communities.

Hsieh and Klenow (2009) reported that if resource allocation in China and India were as efficient as it is in the United States, productivity would increase by as much as 50 % in China and 60 % in India. In the last half century, resource allocation has been a considerable challenge for South Asia. Using a monetary indicator as a measure of well-being assumes that individuals or households can freely reallocate their resources among consumption, health, and education. If so, measuring the amount of resources available to individuals or households is enough to assess the maximum well-being they can attain (Rama et al. 2015: 45). Availability of choices would facilitate better living conditions of for all residents.

The region has a long way to go to improve literacy levels and learning outcomes. The various governments have made huge investments in this sector, but learning outcomes have not improved significantly, primarily because of the poor quality of the teachers. Improving the quality of teachers is perhaps the most significant way to improve learning outcomes, and its benefits are expected to translate into national economic gains (Dundar et al. 2014: 22). The conditions of higher education are not satisfactory compared to those in other parts of the world. India has close to 20 million students in higher education, nearly as many as the United States; both countries are outpaced by China, with 30 million postsecondary students (World Bank 2012b: 7). The World Bank (2011) reported that, although overall enrollment has improved, many fewer girls and members of disadvantaged groups than boys are enrolled in primary and secondary schools in many sub-Saharan countries and some parts of South Asia. In Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, religion also explains part of the inequality in access to primary education. In India, caste explains more than religion (Rama et al. 2015:

111) because caste dominates religion when it comes to inequality as far as access to primary education is concerned.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter, diversity is embedded in the basic fabric of the region. Among the eight countries of the region, India is the most diverse in terms of language, ethnicity, religion, caste, and tribes. The education, health, and economic well-being of disadvantaged groups in India has posed a great challenge for the state in terms of devising and implementing programs to improve their well-being. The constitution of India includes provisions to safeguard the interests of people belonging to educationally and socially disadvantaged groups because of their caste. They have been formally grouped in three categories: Scheduled Castes, Schedule Tribes, and Other Backward Class. Together, they comprise more than 50 % of the population. These groups have a low level of general well-being because they live under poor educational, health, and economic conditions. For this reason, successive governments have advocated and carried out a jobs reservation policy (a proxy for affirmative action) for these groups of people. It has resulted in providing better opportunities for them and in improving their well-being. The country as a whole witnessed a transformation in their well-being because today members of these groups hold key positions in government as well as in private institutions. Dirks (2001: 3) rightly stated that “when thinking of India it is hard not to think of caste. ...caste has become a central symbol for India.”

In this region, social and local identities are stronger than national identities. India is a Hindu majority secular state and, though clashes have occurred between Muslims and Hindus, a harmonious coexistence is also evident in many areas of the country. Other parts of the region also have minority-majority conflicts, for example, Tamil and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka and Shia-Sunni conflict in Pakistan, which includes the threat from the Baluch.

South Asia has the world's largest number of malnourished children. Inadequate nutrition

adversely affects the development of the brain and cognitive faculties. These children enter school with huge learning disadvantages, and the effects are compounded over time. The challenge for this region is to address this issue. The governments have introduced different programs (e.g., Indian government's Mid-Day Meal plan) to respond to this challenge. Dundar et al. (2014) stated that “since early childhood nutrition has traditionally been outside the realm of education ministry activities in the region, a multisectoral approach is central to ensuring children receive such inputs.” Surprisingly, many people feel that public spending for health is directed more toward people who are financially secure than to the poorest population groups and that it is progressive at the lower levels but regressive at secondary and especially tertiary levels (Rama et al. 2015: 97). Sub-Saharan Africa has the greatest inequality in health whereas South Asia has the greatest inequality in education (UNDP 2013: 14). In South Asia, more people have cellular phones than toilets, which illustrates the failure of governments to provide the most basic services (World Bank 2013b).

Despite initiatives in the region to decentralize, South Asia continues to encounter challenges: inadequate resources; political interventions; inconsistent practices; and a low level of stakeholder engagement. Dundar et al. (2014) commented that decentralization reforms in South Asia have been much weaker than are needed to be effective from the perspective of student learning.

Efforts to speed up economic growth and governmental reforms introduced to improve the economic well-being of people were criticized by left-leaning political groups, who charged that such moves were detrimental to the poor (Chandra et al. 1999: 369). It was a challenge for the states to respond with strong policies for alleviating poverty. Muni (1979) identified factors that obstructed the development of regionalism in South Asia: colonial legacies; problems of national integration; nation building; unequal economic development and regime stability; power

disparities in the region superimposed by an artificial balance between India and Pakistan; and the role of external powers. Ironically, the region has not yet been able to rise above these issues, which has a negative effect on the general well-being of people. Today, there are two Indias: One is a new, vibrant, globally competitive India, based on the knowledge industries—software, the Internet, information technology-enabled services, generic pharmaceuticals, and entertainment. It is professionally run. The second is the old India of the family houses, which is still floundering. This segment of India has not acquired the skills needed to succeed in the global economy (Das 2002: 135). The first India is still small compared to the second India. The World Bank (2014) projects that Bhutan will grow faster than any other country in South Asia, followed by Bangladesh and then by India. Pakistan is expected to experience the slowest growth in the coming years.

It is evident that much needs to be done to improve the well-being of the people of South Asia. Governments in the region have not been able to implement and monitor projects successfully which are designed to improve the living conditions of their citizens. The countries have to increase public spending on health and education for the long term. Improving health and education parameters, thereby empowering the population economically, will benefit everyone. The populations of the various countries will develop a sense of pride in their respective nationalities, which should improve their life satisfaction. Cooperation between the partners has been positive, and India has contributed heavily to achieving parity in living conditions and inequalities of income and opportunities. SAARC, which has articulated strategies for improving the well-being of the people of the region, has a challenging role in the years to come. The region will have to work hard to regain its past glory.

**Acknowledgement** We would like to express our thankfulness to Professor Richard Estes, Professor Joseph Sirgy and an anonymous reviewer for sharing their comments and insights for this chapter. We also acknowledge the expert assistance provided by Pamela Fried in the editing and formatting of our chapter and by David Walker in the preparation of the figures.

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Mahar Mangahas and Edilberto C. De Jesus

*One who doesn't see from where he came  
Won't arrive at where he's going —old Tagalog proverb<sup>1</sup>*

## 12.1 Well-Being in Southeast Asia: A Historical Approach

The well-being of the Southeast Asia region in the early twenty-first century is the net outcome of centuries of diverse histories. The peoples of Southeast Asia began to exercise independent self-government—which is itself an element of well-being—only in the latter half of the twentieth century. Thus this story begins with a discussion of the impact of colonization by the various Western powers. The centuries of foreign occupation that underlay the formation of the present nation-states were not a benign preparation for independence. Colonization was a force that in many ways harmed and hindered, though in some ways also promoted, the well-being of the indigenous and immigrant peoples in the region.

The second part of the story is the rapid emergence of modern Southeast Asia after World War

II (WWII), as the countries acquired their independence, in line with the global movement toward decolonization. The task of consolidating their governments, in many cases after further violent conflicts engendered by the Cold War, took a quarter century or more and for some countries is not completed.

The timing, pace, and pattern of colonization and the motives and the means used to establish control followed no simple template. In the Philippines, for example, Spain and the United States imposed the model of central, direct rule. In the Malay Peninsula, on the other hand, England exercised indirect rule, governing through indigenous political structures and their officials. In both cases, the colonial powers had to enroll indigenous staff in governance, and the degree of central control conformed to the conditions on the ground and to the competence of the colonial officials in charge. Under either model, extensive contact and collaboration with the colonial government became a source of power. But, in a region with a multiplicity of ethnolinguistic communities, indirect rule gave better chances for the indigenous officials and their dominant ethnic group—often later immigrants to the territory—to consolidate their power over the smaller communities of the First Peoples, and independence permitted this established elite to maintain their dominance (Cheong 1999).

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The authors are grateful to Iremae D. Labucay for research assistance.

<sup>1</sup>“*Ang hindi tumingin sa pinanggalingan/Ay hindi makakarating sa paroroonan.*”

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Although compressed over a shorter period, the process of decolonization, affected by colonial policies, the impact of WWII, and the complications of Cold War politics, presented newly independent nations with different sets of challenges. Colonization and decolonization gave these nations different starting points but did not determine their respective, present-day conditions of well-being. Each nation owns the result of its own governance effort.

The historical overview provides a necessary context to appreciate the well-being of Southeast Asian peoples according to available quantitative tools originally developed in advanced countries to chart their own progress along health, education, income, and other welfare dimensions, while taking for granted certain basic standards of democracy, the rule of law, public security, and accountable governance.

“Well-being” is a moving target, located by multiple indicators defined by the expectations of each society and the daily challenges of life that its people confront. Statistics help to clarify the situation and identify the problems of social development in Southeast Asia.

### 12.1.1 Present Profile of Southeast Asia

Early scholars used the term *Indochina* to designate the countries now collectively known as Southeast Asia, though the territory was not actually situated between India and China.<sup>2</sup> The term itself later became more narrowly identified with the countries of Vietnam, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), and Cambodia (constituting “French Indochina”), but the Indochina label did serve to identify the great Indic and Sinic civilizations as the competing sources of cultural, religious, economic, and political influence for the countries of both main-

land and island Southeast Asia (SarDesai 2012; Steinberg et al. 1985).

The term *Southeast Asia* itself had a relatively recent WWII origin. In August, 1943, Lord Louis Mountbatten assumed leadership over a new Southeast Asia Command (SACSEA), comprising all Allied land, sea, and air forces in Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Siam (Thailand), the Malay Peninsula, and Sumatra (as part of the Netherlands East Indies). Sri Lanka is now grouped with South Asia. Southeast Asia now includes Brunei, Indonesia as a whole, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Singapore and the Philippines, plus the old SACSEA members, Burma (now Myanmar), Malaysia and Thailand. These ten countries are all members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, which has become the more popular brand-name for the region, although for the time being it excludes Timor Leste, formerly a part of Indonesia (Map 12.1).

Present-day Southeast Asia is a region of dizzying diversity. The countries differ radically, not only in the sizes of their territories and populations but also in ethnicity, language, religion, and form of government. Each country also accommodates differences that exist internally among its citizens. All profess themselves to be democratic, but they differ in political organization, orientation, and practices.

Southeast Asia extends some 4000 km from north to south and 5000 km from east to west. The countries range from gigantic Indonesia, with 1.8 million square kilometers (km<sup>2</sup>), most of it water, to city-state Singapore, with 687 km<sup>2</sup>. Two small countries, Brunei (5.3 thousand km<sup>2</sup>) and Timor Leste (15 thousand km<sup>2</sup>), co-exist with seven countries with hundreds of thousands of square kilometers in land area apiece, ranging from Cambodia (177) to Myanmar (654). More than half of Southeast Asia’s 4.5 million km<sup>2</sup> in land and sea area lie off the Asian mainland. The great Indonesian and Philippine archipelagoes, the eastern side of Malaysia, and Brunei and Timor Leste are in the Pacific Rim’s Ring of Fire, the location of great volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and tsunamis and the path of typhoons originating in the Pacific Ocean. The interna-

<sup>2</sup>Also commonly known as part of the Far East—a Eurocentric term “othering” Asian countries as distant and different.

## SOUTHEAST ASIA



**Map 12.1** Regional map of Southeast Asia (CIA 2015; public domain)

tional seaway between the western and eastern sides of Southeast Asia brings the total area to some 10 million km<sup>2</sup>.

The populations per country range from 250 million in Indonesia to less than half a million in Brunei (World Bank 2014c). Population pressure impinges on well-being. The two countries with

high population densities are the Philippines (330 people/km<sup>2</sup>) and Vietnam (289 people/km<sup>2</sup>). The Philippines' demographic disadvantage will continue for some time, because of its relatively high 1.7 % annual population growth rate. Indonesia (density 138 people/km<sup>2</sup>) and Thailand (density 131 people/km<sup>2</sup>)—both known for aggressive

family-planning programs—have more manageable populations. Elsewhere, the population density rate is at most 90 people/km<sup>2</sup>. The extreme density of Singapore (7713 people/km<sup>2</sup>) is normal for a modern city (World Bank 2014c) (Supplemental Fig. 12.1).

Each country's present ethnic complexity is due to its colonial history, involving the progressive conquest of many tribes and nations and their forcible assembly into an overseas possession. During the period of its empire, Britain imported many Bengalis and Tamils to work in the Malay Peninsula. For centuries, Chinese from China have migrated to Southeast Asia, especially to Singapore (Tate 1979; Trocki 1999).

### 12.1.2 Impact of Colonial Rule

The modern states in Southeast Asia did not emerge from a gradual or organic process of communities voluntarily coalescing to form an increasingly larger and more complex political organization. The formation of the states was not bloodless. The eventual outcome usually featured one or a few big winners and many losers, whose well-being suffered drastic, sometimes fatal, damage. The stronger states had a greater capacity to sustain bigger, materially wealthier, and organizationally more complex communities, with higher standards of well-being.

Colonial rule, because of the timing and manner of its imposition and of its eventual dissolution, also impacted each country differently. Because foreign control was enforced by different Western powers, endured for varying lengths of time, and ended under different circumstances, the emergent independent states had educational systems, bureaucratic structures, and political practices more closely resembling those of their former colonizers than those of their neighbors. Given the cultural diversity of the region and the distinctive historical experiences of the countries that comprise it, tracing how concepts of well-being and happiness have developed and changed over time is challenging. However, in a historical context, the peoples of the region had to face the

same survival issues as early human communities elsewhere.

Within a colonial context, the connection between governance and well-being was ambiguous. The well-being of the colony and its peoples was not the principal mission of colonial officials; their mandate was to promote the well-being and the interests of the mother country and her people. To derive sustained benefit from the colony, however, the government had to address security and subsistence issues and other aspects of well-being, such as the health and education of the indigenous inhabitants, because safe, healthy, educated people contributed to the prosperity of the colony.

The Philippines offers an instructive example of the process of state formation. Spanish explorers arrived in the islands in the sixteenth century, before the indigenous communities had organized into kingdoms, as had already happened in Cambodia, Java, and Burma. It was thus easier for the Spaniards to incorporate the archipelago into the kingdom of Spain. Although the Spaniards liked to describe their colonization not as conquest but as “pacification” (Chandler et al. 2005; de la Costa 1965), it was not accomplished without violence. Pacification was often achieved at the expense of the welfare of the inhabitants, notwithstanding efforts of missionaries to moderate the abuses of soldiers and officials. Invariably, the indigenous populations suffered even more when they tried, unsuccessfully, to resist the foreign invaders. Once conquered, they had to submit to restrictions on where and how they lived their lives and to government claims on their land, labor, and loyalties. It was not surprising, therefore, that at the colony's edges, where open seaways or formidable mountains more easily offered the option of flight, people voted with their feet and chose autonomy over submission. Flight defeated the key objective of the colonial government to gather the population in settlements they could more easily manage.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>This theme is developed in Scott (2009), *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*.



Once a population had submitted to foreign rule, peace (or at least the reduction of violence) was arguably the positive outcome of colonial consolidation. Colonial governments sought to suppress the capacity of indigenous groups to threaten their own control and achieved it with a fair measure of success. In the process, they also reduced the ability of indigenous communities to war against each other and to inflict collateral damage on noncombatants.<sup>4</sup>

In areas where colonial control was effective, the subjects benefited from reduced levels of violence and from access, albeit limited, to whatever technology, infrastructure, income opportunities, and public services the government implemented or dispensed. The missionaries themselves took the initiative to provide social services by building and maintaining the first schools, hospitals, and orphanages for the indigenous communities (de la Costa 1965).

Colonial rule also brought a measure of prosperity to some sectors. Manila, as the outpost of Spanish power in Asia, became a thriving center of international trade (de la Costa 1965).<sup>5</sup> Similarly, Portuguese Malacca and Dutch Batavia (Jakarta) also flourished as trade centers (Steinberg et al. 1985; Tate 1979).

### 12.1.3 Health and Education in Colonial Southeast Asia

The initial peace dividend that a colonial government provided depended on the colonial mission and policies as well as on how these were pursued and implemented over time. By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the relations

between the rulers and the ruled in the European colonies, as well as in independent Siam, assumed a different character.

In the Americas, the European powers established *colonies of settlements* populated by significant numbers of the colonizers. In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, they established *colonies of occupation*, where they deployed a limited number of government and church functionaries. Distance, the tropical climate, and the lack of easily exploitable resources discouraged European migration to the region, and the governments could not afford the cost of sending large numbers of Europeans to staff the administration of the colonies. As long as the concerns were limited to security and the maintenance of basically unrestricted trade in a few port cities, officials did not need a large bureaucracy to deal with the indigenous peoples, and there was no need to invest in teaching them European languages (Tarling 1999; Tate 1979).<sup>6</sup>

In the second half of the eighteenth century in the Philippines and a century later in the rest of Southeast Asia (including still-independent Siam), governments became bigger in terms of the staff and resources they could command and more ambitious in the objectives they pursued. Improvements in transportation, with the development of the steamship and the railroads, and the discovery of markets for tropical products, such as coffee, tea, sugar, rubber, and hardwood, opened the potential for expanding the export trade between the region and Europe. The expansion of commercial agriculture and the cash economy also established markets in the colonies for products imported from the West (Tarling 1999; Tate 1979).

Developing this potential meant a more intensive engagement with the local population, which had to be persuaded or coerced to produce the commodities desired by the marketplace. This

<sup>4</sup>The missionaries claimed that the Spanish presence protected the people from exploitation by their indigenous superiors: "They no longer receive from one another the vexations and injuries they used to, the freemen from the chiefs, the little people from the great ..." (de la Costa 1965, p. 25).

<sup>5</sup>The galleon trade with Mexico prompted the growth of other businesses and the establishment of the *parian*, the first Chinatown of Manila, which gathered "tradesmen of all the trades and crafts that flourish in a commonwealth ..." (De la Costa 1965, p. 39).

<sup>6</sup>Spain was an exception. The conversion of the natives to Christianity was an explicit and the proclaimed rationale for the colonial enterprise. Given their small numbers and the diverse linguistic groups dispersed in small settlements across the archipelago, the missionaries had to learn the local languages to convey their religious beliefs to the natives.



situation pushed the state to intrude more deeply into village life and imposed a different role for the ruler:

In traditional Southeast Asia, the main function of the ruler was to **be**, symbolizing in his person an agreed-on social order, a cultural ideal, and a state of harmony with the cosmos. The new colonial and Siamese governments existed primarily to **do**, providing themselves with a permanently crowded agenda of specific tasks to accomplish. (Steinberg et al. 1985, p. 217)

Public health received particular attention from colonial regimes, not least because they did not want their staff, imported at great cost from the homeland, succumbing to strange and deadly diseases like beriberi, cholera, dysentery, malaria, tuberculosis, and typhus. Southeast Asia had a reputation as one of the unhealthiest places in the world (Tate 1979).<sup>7</sup>

Enlightened self-interest dictated that colonial governments also extend medical services to the indigenous population, since epidemics did not recognize racial distinctions and could easily spread from one group to another. Of more direct concern was the health of the labor force working in the mines and forests where malaria was endemic. Western medical research, sanitary regulations, health information campaigns, and mass vaccinations combined to help colonial governments contain and subsequently prevent the worst epidemics. Bubonic plague, for instance, killed 14,000 in Java in 1911, but only 50 in 1937 (Tate 1979).

In some areas, Christian missionary organizations supplemented, if not led, the government efforts. Missionaries introduced the first modern medical services in Brunei in the mid-nineteenth century. The Anglicans built the first dispensary in Sarawak in 1849 and the first hospital 10 years later. The Jesuits in Palawan and the Lutherans in Central Sumatra ran some of the first successful

colonies in the region for people with leprosy (Tate 1979).

The introduction of Western medicine and medical services brought down the death rate and led to a surge in the region's population. In the 1930s, the region had 25.6 million people. By 1940, the population had increased to 150.4 million. Immigration from China and India contributed to this growth, particularly in the Malay Peninsula. But the Great Depression ended unrestricted immigration. The British implemented in the Federated Malay States an Immigration Restriction Ordinance in 1930, by which time the Malays were no longer the majority population in the Malay Peninsula. An oversight made it apply only to male immigrants, leading to a rush of Chinese women to the region, but the British closed this loophole in 1938 (Tate 1979).

With greater reach and larger goals, bigger government required more specialists to staff public school and health systems, agricultural research stations, forestry services, and archeological departments. Even for general administrative functions, it needed literate personnel to maintain written records and submit reports in the language colonial officials could understand. The colonies could tap the services of Asian immigrants, mainly Chinese, who had more exposure to colonial systems. The British could also deploy people from their older outposts in India to Southeast Asia. The obvious recourse was to enlist the services of the indigenous population. Despite their reservations, colonial governments had to establish schools to train the needed specialists (Steinberg et al. 1985).

Policy on education for the colonial subjects was, therefore, generally utilitarian. The colonial governments were content to allow traditional educational systems in the indigenous languages to continue and even gave them some support. But education in the language of the colonial power was limited to the subject matters and to the numbers of persons the colony needed for the new tasks of government.

Such was Dutch policy in the Netherlands East Indies, where administration was conducted in Malay. In 1907, they began adopting existing native primary schools to teach the children in

<sup>7</sup>At the turn of the century, cholera took a deadly toll on the Philippine population. By 1915, deaths from cholera had dropped from 100,000 to 820 a year and the fatalities from smallpox, from 40,000 to 276 a year. Over a period of 40 years, improved nutrition for the children reportedly added 4 inches to the height of the average Filipino.

Dutch. Access to higher education for the indigenous population, as intended, remained restricted (Dahm 1968).<sup>8</sup>

In Burma, the British allowed the Buddhist monasteries to take care of educating the children but encouraged the expansion of the curriculum by providing books on subjects such as arithmetic and land measurement. Most colonial powers shared the British view of the education fit for Malaya: “The government has never desired to give the children a smattering, or even a larger quantity, of knowledge which will not help them to more useful and happy lives than they now lead. To the Malay, the principal value of school attendance is to teach him habits of order, punctuality and obedience” (Steinberg et al. 1985, p. 263).

French intervention in Vietnam resulted in the collapse of the Confucian civil service examination system introduced by the Chinese. Proud of its own cultural achievements, France manifested an inclination, not entirely absent among other colonial powers, to expand the colonial mission toward the goal of extending the benefits of French civilization to the natives by providing them French education. The French also preferred to see the administration of the colony conducted in their own language. Admission to the colonial civil service required completion of the traditional education in the village vernacular and 10 years of the French educational system (Chandler et al. 2005; Steinberg et al. 1985).

Because of historical accidents, education in the Philippines took a turn different from that taken in other colonies. Spain had the good fortune to arrive in the archipelago at a time when Catholicism reigned supreme in Europe and when the indigenous population had not yet developed a strong, unifying religious institution. It was the only colonial power in the region that succeeded in converting the colonial subjects to

its own religion. Earlier than the other colonial powers, Spain found it necessary to employ baptized “indios” and those of Chinese descent in village or barangay administration. Education was also useful for those appointed and later elected into the lower reaches of the colonial bureaucracy and for the colonial specialist services.

Nonetheless, education in Spain’s Asian colony appeared to be valued as it had been when universities first began to emerge in medieval Europe—because knowledge was intrinsically good and worth pursuing for its own sake. The class of *ilustrados*, the enlightened ones, who studied in Spanish universities and provided the intellectual leadership for political reforms and the independence campaign in the colony were not all men of wealth, but they were all men of learning. The potential of indigenous individuals given the opportunity for education to raise questions about colonial rule was precisely what other colonial governments did not want to encourage. They could not, however, dispense with the need for subordinates trained in modern technical skills.

The transfer of the Philippines to American colonial rule altered in fundamental ways the character of the educational system established by Spain. It ended the control of the Roman Catholic Church over education, established a public education system from the elementary grades to the university level, and encouraged the participation of the private sector in the delivery of education, thus expanding access to education. The widely proclaimed American goal of self-government for the Filipinos required political education to prevent “a vast mass of ignorant people easily and blindly led by the comparatively few.”<sup>9</sup> In relative terms, therefore, looking specifically at education, but even beyond that, the Philippines emerged from the Second World

<sup>8</sup>In 1920, only four schools taught in Dutch, attended by more Europeans and Chinese than Indonesians. In their first decade of operation, the schools produced seven Indonesian graduates a year. The government opened the Technical College, Bandung, in 1920 because of the “scarcity of specialists in technical fields” (Dahm 1968, pp. 28–31).

<sup>9</sup>The Secretary of War and later president, William Howard Taft, cautioned in 1908 that the “work of instruction in individual rights will require many years before the country is rid of the feudal relation of dependence which so many of the common people now feel towards their wealthy or educated leaders” (Steinberg et al. 1985, p. 278).

War in better shape than the rest of the region. The Republic, unfortunately, failed to build on what the colonial powers had established.<sup>10</sup>

#### 12.1.4 The Plural Societies of Southeast Asia

The racial distribution of enrollment in Indonesia's Dutch-language schools illustrates the phenomenon that colonial rule created and passed on to the independent states that succeeded them: *the plural society*. Although they studied in the same schools, each of the different ethnic groups that came to populate the colony had their own language and culture, generally belonged to different faith communities, and performed specific roles within the polity (Trocki 1999).

All Southeast Asian countries had their share of indigenous minority communities, most of them making their homes in the highland areas. Colonial policies added foreign immigrants to the demographic mix. All colonial powers, despite intermittent concerns, welcomed the Chinese, although they also imposed restrictions on the occupations they could perform, where they could reside, and how far they could travel. The Chinese came, despite sporadic incidents of massacres, hoping to make enough money in the colonies to take back to China. Initially, only men migrated to the colonies. Many of them married (in the Philippines after being baptized as Catholics) and started families with the local women. In the nineteenth century, the men were able to bring in Chinese brides. At this time, the British also promoted migration from their Indian territories (Chandler et al. 2005; Steinberg et al. 1985; Tate 1979).

The classic construction of the plural society took place in Burma, where different races occupied distinct occupational niches (Furnival 1948; Trocki 1999). The British controlled the top rungs of government and ruled the colony through Burmese clerks and traditional village leaders. They also dominated the top echelons of the economy with the help of Chinese and Indian subordinates. Burmese monks took care of the temples. The Chinese also handled trade. The cultivation of rice paddy fields remained with the Burmese farmers. The British imported laborers from their India colony to work on the plantations. They also brought in recruits from indigenous tribes in the uplands to serve in the military.

The process of fixing the frontiers of the Southeast Asian states complicated their demographics and reinforced pluralism. It resulted in communities that shared kinship, ethnicity, religion, and history being divided from each other by arbitrary political boundaries (Trocki 1999). Brunei, Sabah, and the Sulu Archipelago, with their Malay and Muslim populations, could have formed a single state but eventually ended up flying three different national flags. The arbitrary boundaries also resulted in enfolding communities divided along primordial lines of blood, language, and religion, within one political unit. Thus, the Muslims of the Sulu Archipelago and Central Mindanao ended up as a minority among Christians. Filipinos and Malay Muslims in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula became subjects of a Thai, Buddhist king.

It would have been ideal if the various groups could have remained with their appointed tasks. But Chinese traders also had to deal with Burmese customers, and some Indians also branched out into money-lending. With more contact among these communities came the risk of communal friction, which the colonial government had to control. Because colonies served as production units to generate resources for the home government, peace among the communities was important; communal clashes would disrupt the smooth functioning of the system and depress profitability. Preserving peace among the different ethnic

<sup>10</sup>The educational system suffered from inadequate budget support, particularly during the period of martial law (1972–1986). The Philippines will be shifting from a 10- to 12-year cycle of preuniversity education only in 2016. It will be saddled with the dubious record of having tolerated for decades a basic educational system inferior to that which it had inherited from its colonial rulers.

groups figured mainly as an operational security problem familiar to colonial governments.

At one level, decolonization involved a transfer of sovereign power from foreign to indigenous rulers. The completion of this transfer thus accomplished the objective of nationalist advocates of independence, who rejected the argument that the benefits conferred by colonial rule justified its continuation. Manuel L. Quezon, who led the campaign for Philippine independence from the United States and was elected president of the Commonwealth in 1935, simplified the issue, declaring that he would prefer to see “a government run like hell by Filipinos than one run like heaven by Americans.”

The brash statement boosted Quezon’s popularity but was actually problematic, both in the context of the Philippines and when projected as a proposition for colonial Southeast Asia. The statement appeared to concede that the colonizers could better ensure the well-being of the country, a point that many colonial subjects living on the margins would dispute and the liberals among European and American colonizers would at least qualify. It also offered the acceptability of trading off good governance for self-governance—both a debatable proposition and a false dilemma.

However badly run, whether by locals or foreigners, government is rarely hell for the small group of people close to the decision makers at the top. The privileged position of foreign colonizers offended the sense of autonomy and self-worth of the indigenous elite and depreciated their objective well-being and subjective happiness. But access to education, economic opportunities, and political influence gave them the opportunity to bargain with the colonial regime and to protect their interests. The majority of the population had little, if any, contact with officials beyond the village level. The ethnic identity of these officials would be of less concern than their immediate needs for security, sustenance, survival, and, over the long term, a more secure future for their children.

The legacy of functional specialization posed a challenge. Not every Chinese migrant who settled in Southeast Asia amassed a fortune, but having focused their time and talent on trade and business, the Chinese emerged after independence controlling significant portions of the economy in several of the countries. On the other hand, the indigenous population comprised the majority (a narrow one in the case of Malaysia) and had participated in the colonial bureaucracy. When independence came, one race held the reins of government and commanded most of the voters. Another race controlled the levers of the economy and directed the flow of money. In such a situation, consensus on how scarce resources should be deployed for the well-being of the public became difficult to achieve. In other societies, the failure to reach this consensus has led, in extreme cases, to ethnic or religious cleansing. Yet nothing like the partition in India or the genocidal bloodletting in Rwanda has happened in Southeast Asia thus far. The expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia was a more benign form of ethnic cleansing.

The peace dividends provided by colonial governments depended on the colonial mission and policies; on the way these were pursued and implemented; on the relations established during colonial rule between the government and the subject population; and on the process of decolonization initiated by WWII. Independence transferred to the indigenous leaders the responsibility for constructing a strong state, capable of maintaining order and delivering essential services. They also had to address the bigger challenge of creating a cohesive nation, even when the magnetic field in which they operated left them with constituent parts that tended to repel each other.

The process of decolonization and the task of creating secure, culturally cohesive, politically stable, and economically as well as ecologically sustainable nation-states, continue in Southeast Asia as works in progress. To **do** and to **be** remain the challenges for the sovereign states of the region.

## 12.2 The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia

### 12.2.1 Acquiring Independence

Whereas the colonization of Southeast Asia happened over the course of four centuries, the decolonization occurred rapidly, over only a few decades. Well before its surprise attacks on Pearl Harbor and Manila (December 1941), Japan had already occupied French Indochina and Portuguese Timor (1940). By 1942, Japan had occupied British New Guinea, the Philippines, Malaya, the Straits Settlements (Singapore), Sarawak, Brunei, North Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies, and “allied” itself with Thailand. The defeat of the Western colonial powers led to an end of the myth of “white supremacy” in the minds of the indigenous peoples, and, perhaps even more so in the minds of the Western colonizers (McCoy 1980). Japan encouraged independence movements in the colonies it occupied. It portrayed itself as benevolent, but without success, because it proceeded to act like a traditional colonizer in exploiting local resources. Meanwhile, various insurgencies gathered strength across the region (Chandler et al. 2005; Stockwell 1999; Tarling 1999; Turnbull 1999).

The Philippines, appropriated by Spain in the sixteenth century, was the first Southeast Asian territory governed as a Western colony. It declared its independence in 1898 but was frustrated by Spain’s cession of the islands to the United States and by the US victory in the inevitable Philippine-American War (1899–1902). The United States, due to strong anti-imperialist sentiment at home, passed legislation in 1916, pledging eventually to recognize Philippine independence, and then, in 1933, providing for a 10-year transition to independence after establishment of a Philippine Commonwealth (in 1935) (Chandler et al. 2005; SarDesai 2012; Tarling 1999; Turnbull 1999).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup>When the Philippines became the first of the region’s colonized countries to achieve independence in 1946, the leaders of its new government had not been at war with the United States; instead, they were seeking US assistance to fight fellow Filipinos who had subscribed to a nationalist/communist ideology.

On the eve of WWII, Great Britain owned Penang, Malacca, Singapore, and the island of Labuan as the Crown Colony of the [Straits Settlements](#). British residents appointed by the Crown ruled the [Federated Malay States](#) of [Pahang](#), [Selangor](#), [Perak](#), and [Negeri Sembilan](#) through their traditional Malay rulers. The remaining five Malay states in the peninsula, Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, [Perlis](#), and [Terengganu](#), referred to as the Unfederated Malay States, were British protectorates, like Brunei and the two states of Sabah and Sarawak in North Borneo (Chandler et al. 2005; SarDesai 2012; Tarling 1999; Turnbull 1999).

After WWII, a British initiative to consolidate these territories, which became the independent states of Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei, into a single Crown Colony met resistance from Malay leaders who objected to granting citizenship to ethnic Chinese. Thus the Malayan Union established in 1946 excluded Singapore, which was by then inhabited predominantly by ethnic Chinese. The Federation of Malaya, which replaced it in 1948, included the nine Malay states in the peninsula and the British Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca, but not Singapore. Malay suspicion of Singapore and the Chinese grew during the period of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), when the Malayan Communist Party, dominated by ethnic Chinese, waged its guerrilla war against the British (Chandler et al. 2005; SarDesai 2012; Tarling 1999; Turnbull 1999).

Independence for the Federation in 1957 and the defeat of the Malayan Communist Party paved the way for its expansion into the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, with the addition of the states of Sabah and Sarawak in North Borneo and Singapore, which had also become independent earlier that year. Continuing tension between Malays and Chinese, however, made policy differences difficult to reconcile. The expulsion of Singapore from the Federation in 1965 led to the birth of the Republic of Singapore and a separate state of Malaysia with a securely Malay majority. Brunei did not regain its independence until 1984 (Chandler et al. 2005; SarDesai 2012; Tarling 1999; Turnbull 1999).



British opposition to self-rule alienated Burmese nationalist leaders, many of whom joined the Burma Independence Army to fight with Japan against England from 1942 to 1944. Disaffection with the Japanese occupation of Burma, during which 170,000–250,000 civilians reportedly died, and the signs of a coming Allied victory in the war moved the Burmese to change sides in 1945. The timely switch paved the way for a peaceful transition to independence in 1948 (Chandler et al. 2005; SarDesai 2012; Tarling 1999; Turnbull 1999).

In the Indonesian archipelago, the Dutch East India Company had become the dominant economic, political, and military power by the early seventeenth century. With the Company's bankruptcy and formal dissolution in 1800, the Dutch governed Indonesia as a colony known as the Netherlands East Indies. The colony's occupation by Japan strengthened the Indonesian independence movement, which successfully resisted a recolonization effort attempted by the Dutch after the Japanese surrender in 1945. Armed resistance, supported by international pressure, won Indonesian independence from the Netherlands in 1949. Yet the Netherlands did not surrender all of the East Indies. Neither did all peoples—not the Acehnese nor the Moluccans, in particular—of the East Indies readily agree to be absorbed into an Indonesia dominated by the Javanese (Chandler et al. 2005; SarDesai 2012; Tarling 1999; Turnbull 1999).

Vietnam, which had declared independence from France in 1945, achieved it in 1954, after its victory at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. The Geneva Conference of 1954 resulted in the division of the country, at the 17th parallel, into North and South Vietnam and the withdrawal of France from all of its Indochinese colonies (Chandler et al. 2005; SarDesai 2012; Tarling 1999; Turnbull 1999).

The last chapter of decolonization in Southeast Asia involved the liberation of a Southeast Asian state from a Southeast Asian colonial power. The Portuguese colony of East Timor, or Timor Leste, declared its independence in 1975 but could not defend itself from Indonesian invasion and annexation as its 27th province in 1976. It fought

for and regained its independence under a United Nations-sponsored process of self-determination in 2002 (Chandler et al. 2005; SarDesai 2012).<sup>12</sup>

### 12.2.2 Post-independence Conflicts

The violence that accompanied and in some cases delayed the transition to independence in Southeast Asia unfortunately continued even after the transfer of sovereignty to the countries' original inhabitants. After attaining independence from the colonial rulers, the new holders of power had to guard against violent opposition. The causes of the internal and external conflicts that continue to afflict the region today trace their origins to its colonial past. Independence, instead of bridging the social, economic, and political cleavages created during the period of foreign occupation within each country and across the region, exacerbated communal animosities and provoked recourse to arms.

The Cold War and the military intervention of the United States in Vietnam complicated the path to independence for the constituent parts of French Indochina, namely Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Vietnam finally achieved independence as a unified state in 1975, when North Vietnam defeated South Vietnam, which had been supported by the United States (Chandler et al. 2005; Turnbull 1999).

France had imposed a protectorate on Cambodia in 1863 and on Laos in 1893. Both achieved formal independence in 1953, but both became entangled in the Vietnam War. The Communist Pathet Lao, Communist Vietnam's ally, waged civil war against the Lao constitutional monarchy for more than two decades until it finally assumed power following the American defeat in Vietnam in 1975 (Chandler et al. 2005; Turnbull 1999). It abolished the monarchy and renamed the country as the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

<sup>12</sup>Timor Leste has had observer status in ASEAN since 2002. It became a member of the Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Organizations (SEAMEO) in 2006.



Cambodia's constitutional monarchy succumbed to the Khmer Rouge regime in 1975, which, apparently emulating Mao's Great Leap Forward, only duplicated and exceeded the model's disastrous results. Although the Khmer Rouge and North Vietnam had been allies in the war against the United States, the Khmer Rouge pursued xenophobic policies, such as forced repatriation of Vietnamese citizens, that provoked Vietnam to invade Cambodia in 1979<sup>13</sup> and to support the People's Republic of Kampuchea against the Khmer Rouge in a civil war that dragged on until the Paris Peace Accord of 1991 (Chandler et al. 2005; Turnbull 1999). More Cambodians died at the hands of fellow Cambodians in the purge perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge of its internal enemies than at the hands of the Vietnamese.<sup>14</sup> A United Nations Mission administered Cambodia for a year until 1993, when it supervised elections that registered a 90 % turnout of registered voters.

The communist insurgencies that flared in Southeast Asia gained numbers and strength together with the nationalist struggles against colonial rule. The Philippine government has been battling a communist insurgency, the longest-lasting in the world, since the 1930s, when it was still a Commonwealth under the United States (Chandler et al. 2005; Turnbull 1999).<sup>15</sup>

<sup>13</sup>This conflagration was similar to wars between the Vietnamese and Cambodian kingdoms in precolonial times. The Vietnamese forces took less than a month to capture Phnom Penh, but the complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia only happened after 10 years, in 1989. After losing their capital, the Khmer Rouge retreated west to bases near the Thai border, where, in another reflection of tangled ideological lines, they continued to receive assistance from Communist China against Communist Vietnam.

<sup>14</sup>Various studies have estimated the death toll from executions and starvation and disease to be from a conservative 1.8 million to a high of 3.42 million people, with 2.2 million as the likely count, roughly 20–30 % of the population (Rummel 1998; SarDesai 2012; Sharp n.d.; Turnbull 1999).

<sup>15</sup>Its conflict with the Communist Party of the Philippines resulted in 20,000–27,000 deaths from 1969 to 2008 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] 2009).

General Suharto in 1965 and President Ferdinand Marcos in 1972 both used the threat of a communist takeover to justify their seizure of power in Indonesia and in the Philippines, respectively. Because the Chinese community, already widely resented for its wealth and perceived control of the economy, had been identified as supportive of the Indonesian Communist Party, the allegation became the justification for the massacre of an estimated 500,000 people and the disenfranchisement of a million of its members. Marcos did not launch a pogrom against the Chinese, but his imposition of martial law gave him the power to go after "leftist" forces and those who rejected his overthrow of the country's democratic system (Chandler et al. 2005; Turnbull 1999).<sup>16</sup>

In 1964 in Singapore, race riots between ethnic Malays and ethnic Chinese were among the causes of Singapore's split-off from Malaysia into an independent state in 1965. Singapore and Malaysia had a brief war with Indonesia in the early 1960s. Indonesian President Sukarno had identified neocolonialism as an enemy to be vanquished and regarded Malaysia as a neocolonialist creation (Chandler et al. 2005; Turnbull 1999).

Some issues hinged on territorial disputes (Chandler et al. 2005; Stockwell 1999; Tarling 1999; Turnbull 1999). Even though Cambodia and Thailand were both ASEAN members, their troops inflicted casualties on each other over the territory surrounding the Preah Vihar temple, a Cambodian UNESCO Heritage site.<sup>17</sup> Although no formal declaration of war was issued, the Philippines and Malaysia faced off in the 1970s

<sup>16</sup>In both Indonesia and the Philippines, a focal point of internal conflict was the clash between those who wanted a liberal, representative democratic system of government and those, usually the parties already holding power, who preferred a "guided democracy" of a more authoritarian, top-down governance system.

<sup>17</sup>The temple had been ruled as Cambodian in 1962 by the International Court of Justice, but Thailand still claimed the area around the temple itself. Shooting erupted across the disputed border from time to time in 2009–2011, causing several deaths and displacing thousands. In November 2013, the Court ruled the immediate area around the temple as Cambodian but said that its ruling did not include another disputed temple area 3 km away.

as Muslim secessionist groups in Mindanao drew support from relatives in Sabah.<sup>18</sup> Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines have overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea or Western Philippine Sea, although all recognize China as the bigger threat in this area.

The Government of the Philippines has been engaged in low-intensity conflict with Muslim rebels in the south since independence, but the organization of the Moro Nationalist Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) led to episodes of more intense fighting during the late 1960s, the period of martial law (1972–1986), and the late 1990s. The conflict with the MILF resulted in about 37,000 deaths between 1986 and 2008 as well as the displacement of the thousands of families who fled from the fighting (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI] 2009). Several years of negotiations between the Government of the Philippines and MILF led the two sides to accept a Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (October, 2012) and a Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (March, 2014); however, preparations in the Congress of the Philippines to pass a Bangsamoro Basic Law have been stalled by the backlash caused by a botched police operation in January 2015 against international terrorists in Mamasapano, a territory where MILF forces were stationed (Hermoso 2015).

Polarization as to political preferences developed in Thailand and Burma. Most Thai military coups were relatively bloodless because of the reverence many Thais still have for the reigning king, Bhumibol Adulyadev. But the victory of the military factions who resisted any change in the monarchical system claimed many victims, especially university students, in the 1970s.<sup>19</sup>

In Myanmar, the military used force freely both against those who opposed their coup and against other ethnic communities in the uplands. Although the military allowed the restoration of civilian government, the issue of communal strife remains, and not just with the hill tribes. The conflict of the government with the Karen National Union resulted in more than 15,400 deaths from 1948 (when the conflict began) to 2008 (SIPRI 2009). More recently, the Buddhist attacks against the minority Rohingya Muslims have again focused attention on the challenge posed by plural societies (Perlez 2014).

Thus the state of security has been tenuous in several Southeast Asian countries, despite their attainment of independent self-governance. This problem could not but affect the capacities of the governments to provide the public services necessary for the basic well-being of the people to improve over time.

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### 12.3 Well-Being in Contemporary Southeast Asia

This section examines the state of well-being in the region, in basic dimensions, using presently available quantitative tools. It uses an eclectic approach<sup>20</sup> to select indicators salient to the region's colonial and postcolonial history, with an eye for comparisons across Southeast Asian countries and between the region and the rest of the world. It examines movements over time as data are available.

The indicators are organized under the broad categories of (1) security and good governance, (2) social and economic well-being, and (3) subjective well-being. The first category covers what the peoples of Southeast Asia have struggled for

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<sup>18</sup>The Sultan of Sulu, a citizen of the Philippines, still has claims of ownership over Sabah that have not been resolved.

<sup>19</sup>The discussion of Thailand does not take into account the new military regime installed 22 May 2014 under General Prayut Chan-ocha. In July, General Prayut issued an interim constitution, granting himself sweeping powers; in August, a military-dominated national legislature elected him prime minister. General Prayut launched multiple crackdowns on dissents. Public discussion about

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democracy and criticism of his government are banned (Fuller 2014).

<sup>20</sup>The development of measures of well-being along a particular dimension tends to be led by nongovernmental institutions or networks whose specific advocacy is to enhance well-being in that specific dimension. Because the most salient dimensions tend to be politically sensitive, official statistical agencies avoid such measurements.

since colonial times: a peaceful and secure existence, under a democratic and accountable government, independent of foreign power. This category is the most important, because the aspects of well-being discussed under the other categories are essentially the dividends of peace and good governance.

The second category covers, firstly, the universal desire of all peoples to attain economic circumstances, education, and health that are decent and reasonable by societal standards, and, secondly, the status of women vis-à-vis men. The third category covers the state of satisfaction with personal life, according to the people’s own subjective standards.

### 12.3.1 Security and Good Governance


The four indicators selected for this category are the Global Peace Index (GPI); the Democracy Index; the proportion of people satisfied with the

working of democracy; and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).

#### 12.3.1.1 The Global Peace Index

The Institute for Economics and Peace has produced a cross-country GPI annually since 2008. It involves the scoring of countries, by experts, on the states of peace along the three themes of *militarization* (seven indicators), *societal safety and security* (ten indicators), and *domestic and international conflict* (five indicators). The GPI is scaled from 1 to 5, 1 being the peaceful end (Institute for Economics and Peace 2014). Figure 12.1 shows GPI scores in Southeast Asia. By world standards, scores of 1.5 or less (the average for Western Europe) are peaceful; scores from 1.6 to 2.0 are decent (North America is 1.7), and scores over 2.0 are cause for concern.

Southeast Asia, as a whole, had a borderline score of 2.0 as of 2014. It is much more peaceful than other regions of the world with a similar history of colonial occupation, like sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa



**Fig. 12.1** Global Peace Index (GPI) scores for selected Southeast Asian countries, 2008–2014. The GPI provides the “numerical measure of how at peace a country is with itself and other countries” (p. 32) based on 22 qualitative

and quantitative indicators. All scores for each indicator are normalized on a scale of 1–5. The closer the overall GPI score is to 1, the more peaceful the country is (Data from the Institute for Economics and Peace 2014)

(MENA), and South Asia. It is slightly more peaceful than Latin America, where the colonial history is characterized by settlement rather than by occupation. It is roughly as peaceful as central and Eastern Europe, but not as peaceful as Western Europe or North America.

However, there is much variation within Southeast Asia. Singapore and Malaysia are very peaceful,<sup>21</sup> and Lao PDR, Vietnam, Timor Leste, and Indonesia are relatively peaceful. On the other hand, Cambodia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand are all problematic. The borderline score of Southeast Asia reflects generally calm situations in militarization and domestic/international conflict combined with a troubled situation in society and security.


Timor Leste, Myanmar, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand have serious societal safety and security problems, but they are less

severe than those in such former colonies as India, Brazil, South Africa, and Nigeria. Thailand, the Philippines, and Myanmar have problems with domestic/international conflict but not as severe as those of India and Nigeria.

The data show that several countries of Southeast Asia continue to deal with serious problems related to the absence of peace. These problems are probably the result of discrimination against minority groups, but this idea needs confirmation by group-specific data.

### 12.3.1.2 The Democracy Index

The Economic Intelligence Unit, an independent firm within the Economist business group, has constructed a cross-country Democracy Index (Fig. 12.2). It is based on ratings for a total of 60 indicators in five categories<sup>22</sup> and has been computed six times from 2006 to 2012. The category



**Fig. 12.2** Democracy Index Scores for selected Southeast Asian countries and major world regions, 2006–2012 (Data from Economist Intelligence Unit 2012)

<sup>21</sup>Except for the state of Sabah, where security is a major issue, especially on the eastern coast where immigrant terrorists from the Philippines threaten the peace of all communities.

<sup>22</sup>Each category is rated from 0 to 10, where 10 is the democratic extreme. The overall index is the average of the five category indexes. Of the 60 indicators, 48 are rated by experts, and 12 are based on opinion surveys if available.

ries, with their respective number of indicators in parentheses, are *electoral process and pluralism* (12), *functioning of government* (14), *political participation* (9), *political culture* (8), and *civil liberties* (17).

According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2012), the quality of democracy differs widely across Southeast Asia, but none of the countries is a *full democracy* (defined as an index level of 8 and up). Instead, the region has (1) five so-called *flawed democracies* (index level 6–7.9), namely Timor Leste, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines; (2) two so-called *hybrid regimes* (defined as 4–5.9), namely Singapore and Cambodia; and (3) three *authoritarian regimes* (index level below 4), namely Vietnam, Myanmar, and Lao PDR. On this index, the quality of democracy in Southeast Asia as a whole is below the world average, superior only to sub-Saharan Africa and MENA.

Applying the Economist Intelligence Unit terminology to the components of democracy, full democracy in the electoral process prevails in Timor Leste and the Philippines. Full democracy in civil liberties prevails only in the Philippines.

In other respects, democracy is “flawed,” at best, throughout the region. Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam are entirely authoritarian, except in political culture. Cambodia and Singapore are authoritarian in political participation. The Philippines is authoritarian in political culture. Singapore and Indonesia do relatively well in governmental functioning and civil liberties. Malaysia is the best in governmental functioning but is weak in civil liberties.

### 12.3.1.3 Satisfaction with the Working of Democracy

Following the examples set by the Eurobarometer and *Latinobarometro*, public satisfaction with the working of democracy has been polled in the Philippines annually since 1991.<sup>23</sup> The Philippine

<sup>23</sup>The Philippine opinion polls are conducted by Social Weather Stations, the Philippine member of the Asian Barometer Survey, a survey network that occasionally asks the “how democracy works” question in some

time-series has wide amplitude, with remarkably sharp peaks during the popular presidential elections of 1992, 1998, and 2010, but its average is not too different from the European and Latin American averages.

The average Philippine satisfaction with democracy in over 50 surveys is markedly below the averages of Cambodia (80 %), Indonesia (58 %), Malaysia (69 %), Singapore (86 %), Thailand (83 %), and Vietnam (85 %), from much fewer surveys. It should be noted that being under an authoritarian system does not preclude a large majority of citizens from being satisfied with how democracy works in their country.

### 12.3.1.4 The Corruption Perceptions Index


Transparency International (2013) is a nongovernmental organization that monitors corporate and political corruption in international development. Its CPI is an annual score of the degree of corruption in the public sector of a country, based on surveys and assessments collected by a variety of reputable institutions.<sup>24</sup> As currently constructed, the CPI has a scale of 0–100, where 0 is completely corrupt and 100 is very clean; CPI scores are available only for 2012 and 2013.<sup>25</sup>

The CPI depicts Singapore (scoring 86 in 2013) as outstandingly noncorrupt and Malaysia

Southeast Asian countries. This question is different from the item “preference for democracy over authoritarianism.” In the Philippines, the margin of preference for democracy is wide, even in times when satisfaction with “how democracy works” is low (Social Weather Stations 2013).

<sup>24</sup>The Transparency International data are from private international research firms that periodically survey their clients in the countries scored. The data represent the perceptions mainly of executives of domestic offices of multinational companies based in developed Western countries. On the other hand, the Philippines conducted eleven surveys, in 2000–2013, of Filipino business executives on the topic of corruption (Social Weather Stations 2014); these surveys show a remarkable lessening of corruption since mid-2010, when the presidency shifted from Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (February 2001–June 2010) to Benigno S. Aquino III.

<sup>25</sup>Because the CPI scores for the years 2000–2011 were not comparable over time, the methodology was changed in 2012.



**Fig. 12.3** Corruption Perceptions Index scores for selected Southeast Asian countries, 2012–2013 (Data from Transparency International 2013)

(scoring 50 in 2013) as moderately clean (Fig. 12.3). It points to a medium level of corruption (scoring 31–36) in the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam, and a high level of corruption (scoring 20–26) in Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia. From 2012 to 2013, the scores did not change by more than two points, except for a 5- to 6-point improvement in the scores of Lao PDR and Myanmar. On the basis of the CPI, the degree of corruption in Southeast Asia is above the world average. It is similar to that of MENA and less than those of sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and central Asia.

### 12.3.2 Social and Economic Well-Being

#### 12.3.2.1 The Human Development Index

The most useful single statistic that melds several dimensions of social and economic well-being is the Human Development Index (HDI), produced by the United Nations Development Program


(UNDP).<sup>26</sup> The basic HDI combines (a) life expectancy at birth, (b) years of schooling of people presently aged 25 or more, (c) years of schooling that a child of school entrance age may expect, and (d) gross national income per capita in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars.

For each component, the UNDP scores a country relative to the best achievement in the world, which is assigned the number 1.000, and then averages its component scores.<sup>27</sup> As of 2013, within Southeast Asia, the HDI ranged from 0.901 in Singapore to 0.524 in Myanmar (Fig. 12.4). In general, human development in Southeast Asia is comparable to that in the Arab States and better than that in South Asia and sub-

<sup>26</sup>The latest Human Development Report (7/24/2014) contains statistics through reference year 2013.

<sup>27</sup>As of 2013, Norway had the highest HDI (0.944): Life expectancy was 81.5 years; adults completed 12.5 years of school; children could expect 17.6 years of school; and the GNI per capita was \$63,909 (PPP, 2011). In the world as a whole, the HDI was 0.702; life expectancy was 70.8 years; adults had 7.7 years of school; children could expect 12.2 years of school; and the GNI per capita was \$13,723.





**Fig. 12.4** Human Development Index trends, selected Southeast Asia countries, 1980–2013. \*Singapore baseline data are from 1990. \*\* Timor-Leste baseline data are

from 2000 (Data from United Nations Development Programme 2014a)

Saharan Africa. It has been steadily improving since 1980, though the growth rate for many countries peaked in the 1990s and then slowed down (UNDP 2014a, b).

Life expectancy at birth rose throughout the region but at different rates. In 1960, it was above 60 years in Singapore and Brunei but below 50 years in Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Cambodia, and Timor Leste. By 2013, it was above 82 in Singapore, above 70 in Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Cambodia, and between 65 and 69 in the Philippines, Lao PDR, Timor Leste, and Myanmar.

Education expanded tremendously from 1980 to 2012, again at different rates per country—the average years of schooling of an adult in Singapore rose from 3.7 to 10.2 years, or from fifth to first in the region (Supplemental Fig. 12.2). In 1980, adult schooling ranged between 6.1 years in Brunei and the Philippines and 1.7 years in Myanmar; by 2012 it ranged between 10.2 years in Singapore and 4.0 years in Myanmar.


The average years of schooling for an adult depend on the availability of schooling during that person's childhood years. The added number of years of schooling provided per child between

1980 and 2012 was 5.2 in Thailand, 4.2 in Cambodia, 4.0 in Indonesia, 3.9 in Lao PDR, 3.3 in Vietnam, 3.1 in Brunei, 2.7 in Singapore, 2.6 in Myanmar, 2.3 in Malaysia, and 2.0 in Timor Leste, but only 1.0 in the Philippines.

### 12.3.2.2 Poverty and the Millennium Development Goals

In 2000, the United Nations set the year 2015 as a target date for achieving a set of important social and economic objectives known as the Millennium Development Goals. The first two goals of cutting in half, from 1990 to 2015, extreme poverty (using the conventional poverty line of \$1.25/person/day used in global analysis) and undernutrition have been achieved in Southeast Asia, except for the Philippines (United Nations Statistics Division 2014). Other goals have also been achieved in most countries of the region (Asian Development Bank 2014; World Bank 2014b).

In August 2014, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) proposed an Asian regional poverty line of \$1.51/person/day as an alternative to the conventional \$1.25 line, which had been based on official poverty lines of the world's 15 poorest countries, 13 of which are African (ADB 2014).



**Fig. 12.5** Proportion of population living below the “Asian Poverty Line” of \$1.50 (purchasing power parity) per day (%), selected Southeast Asia countries, 2005 and 2010 (Data from Asian Development Bank 2014)

The ADB based its Asian poverty line of \$1.51 instead on the official lines of the nine least developed Asian countries,<sup>28</sup> of which two (Cambodia and Lao PDR) are in Southeast Asia (ADB 2014).

Poverty has declined in the region but at different rates per country. Based on the ADB poverty line, poverty has been virtually eradicated in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. In 2005, the poorest Southeast Asian country was Lao PDR (54 % of the population poor), followed by Cambodia (46 %), Vietnam (36 %), Indonesia (33 %), the Philippines (31 %), Thailand (2.5 %), and Malaysia (0.9 %).<sup>29</sup> In 2010, on the other hand, the poorest of these countries was Lao PDR (38 % poor), followed by Indonesia (28 %) and the Philippines (26 %). Thus both Vietnam and Cambodia overtook the Philippines in reducing poverty (Fig. 12.5).

<sup>28</sup>The least developed countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Nepal, Pakistan, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. The dollar amounts are in terms of PPP as of 2005. A PPP dollar is worth what one dollar can buy in the United States in the base year. The \$1.51 standard is nevertheless still extremely low for Southeast Asia, where the latest *official* poverty lines are Malaysia \$3.02, Cambodia \$1.88, Philippines \$1.84, Thailand \$1.75, Lao PDR \$1.48, Indonesia \$1.43, and Viet Nam \$1.29 (ADB 2014).

<sup>29</sup>The ADB report on Asian poverty includes only seven Southeast Asian countries. It does not include Singapore, which obviously succeeded in eradicating extreme poverty very early.

### 12.3.2.3 Education and Health Indicators

Primary education enrollment rates have risen to well over 95 % in Southeast Asia—with the notable exception of the Philippines, where it fell from 98 % in 1990 to 89 % in 2009. The ratio of girls to boys in primary education is at least 94 % (Supplemental Fig. 12.3).

Public spending on education and health varies widely. The most recent data (circa 2009/2013) for the percentage of GDP spent on public education are 7.6 % in Thailand, 6.3 % in Vietnam, 5.9 % in Malaysia,<sup>30</sup> 3.6 % in Indonesia, 3.0 % in Singapore, 2.8 % in Lao PDR, 2.7 % in the Philippines, 2.6 % in Cambodia, and 0.8 % in Myanmar. These rates all rose from earlier years, except for Myanmar, which fell by 2.1 points, and Singapore, which lost an insignificant 0.1 point. Southeast Asia’s average 3.8 % of GDP for education was below the world average 4.1 % and all other regional averages, except South Asia’s 2.1 % (Supplemental Fig. 12.4).

<sup>30</sup>There was a significant reform in tertiary education in Malaysia in 1996, when the Private Higher Educational Institutions Act finally permitted the legal establishment of private universities. This reform raised the opportunities of nonbumiputras (i.e., Malaysian Chinese and Indians) to attend college, given the obligation of government universities to give priority to bumiputras or ethnic Malays. Malaysia now has 39 private colleges and universities, exceeding the government’s 18.

The latest (2012) percentages of GDP spent on public health, on the other hand, were 3.0 % in Thailand, 2.8 % in Vietnam, 2.2 % in Malaysia, 1.7 % in Singapore, 1.7 % in the Philippines, 1.5 % in Lao PDR, 1.3 % in Cambodia, 1.2 % in Indonesia, and 0.4 % in Myanmar. These percentages all grew over time, except for a drop of 1.0 point in Lao PDR and no change in Myanmar. The Southeast Asian average of 1.8 % was an unsatisfactorily low rate of investment in health—below the world’s average of 6.1 % and the averages of all other regions except that of South Asia, which was 1.3 % (Supplemental Fig. 12.5).

Objective indicators of health have been improving in Southeast Asia, with a few exceptions. Infant mortality rates have fallen over time, though they vary widely across countries—the number of deaths per 1000 live births, as of 2013, was only 2 in Singapore compared to 7 in Malaysia, 11 in Thailand, 19 in Vietnam, 24 in the Philippines, 24 in Indonesia, 32 in Cambodia, 40 in Myanmar, and 54 in Lao PDR (World Bank 2014c).

The under-5 mortality rate has also fallen and varies widely—the number of deaths per 1000

live births was 3 in Singapore compared with 8 in Malaysia, 13 in Thailand, 23 in Vietnam, 29 in Indonesia, 30 in the Philippines, 38 in Cambodia, 51 in Myanmar, and 71 in Lao PDR. Maternal mortality rates have dropped in all of the countries, with the notable exception of the Philippines, where deaths per 100,000 live births rose from 110 in 1990 to 120 in 2013.

The percentage of married women below age 50 using contraceptives is high in Thailand (80 %) and Vietnam (78 %) and is at least 46 % elsewhere. It is increasing in all countries (except Singapore, where it fell from 65 % in 1992 to 62 % in 1997). The incidence of and the death rate from tuberculosis have fallen in all countries. The availability of safe water and sanitation has grown, and the number of slums is falling.

### 12.3.2.4 The Status of Women

According to the Global Gender Gap Reports of the World Economic Forum (Hausmann et al. 2014), the status of women vis-à-vis men varies widely across the region (Fig. 12.6). These reports use a Global Gender Gap Index scaled from 0 to 1: the closer the score is to 1, the more




Fig. 12.6 Global Gender Gap Index, selected Southeast Asian countries, 2006–2014 (Data from Hausmann et al. 2014)

equal women are to men. Among the 142 countries indexed in 2014, the top-ranked country was Iceland (0.859) and the bottom-ranked country was Yemen (0.514).

Within Southeast Asia, the Philippines, with a score of 0.781,<sup>31</sup> was ranked 9th among the 142 countries, by far the most gender-equal country in Southeast Asia. Singapore (0.705), Lao PDR (0.704), and Thailand (0.703) were 59th, 60th, and 61st, respectively, up to 11 points above the median of 0.694 (Brazil, 71st). Vietnam (0.692) is 76th. Indonesia (0.6725) and Brunei Darussalam (0.6719) are 97th and 98th. Malaysia and Cambodia, both 0.652, or 22 points below the median, were 107th and 108th.<sup>32</sup> The index levels are so widely spread that Southeast Asia as a whole—with the notable exception of the Philippines, 87 points above the median—is no more gender-equal than other regions of the world.

By moving from 0.752 in 2006 to 0.781 in 2014, the Philippine index improved by 4.0 %. This level of improvement was second to Singapore's rise from 0.650 to 0.705, an increase of 7.6 %. Other Southeast Asian countries already indexed in 2006 improved by less: Cambodia, 3.6 %; Thailand, 2.9 %; Indonesia, 2.8 % and Malaysia, 0.2 %. These changes show that the status of women vis-à-vis men is improving, at an uneven pace.

### 12.3.3 Subjective Well-Being

Subjective indicators of well-being are not on the agenda of official statistical agencies in Southeast Asia. There is no ASEAN Barometer. Only the Philippines has an institute focused on measuring subjective well-being—Social Weather Stations, which does quarterly surveys of self-reported poverty, hunger, satisfaction with governance,

<sup>31</sup>The overall country index is a simple average of subindexes—also on a scale of 0 to 1—based on the four dimensions of educational attainment; health and survival; economic participation and opportunity; and political empowerment.

<sup>32</sup>Myanmar and Timor Leste are not included in the report.

and victimization by crime and annual surveys of happiness and satisfaction with life (Mangahas and Guerrero 2008). To show data for other countries as well, this section uses data for other countries obtained from the World Values Survey and the Gallup World Poll (Figs. 12.7 and 12.8).

#### 12.3.3.1 The World Values Survey

Six Southeast Asian countries, having institutions that belong to the network of the World Values Surveys (WVS), have data on their people's subjective appraisals of their health and happiness. On the basis of recent waves of WVS in the region, the percentages of people calling their health was either Very Good or Good fall into three groups: (1) a "high-health" group of Malaysia (89) and Singapore (82); (2) a "medium-health" group of Thailand (77) and Indonesia (75); and (3) a "low-health" group of Vietnam (58) and the Philippines (55) (Figs. 12.7 and 12.8 and Supplemental Fig. 12.1).


At least 90 % of WVS respondents say they are either Very Happy or Quite Happy; these combined responses are stable over time. The percentage of people who report being "Very Happy" varies more widely—57 % in Malaysia (2012), 50 % in the Philippines<sup>33</sup> (2012), 40 % in Thailand (2007), 38 % in Singapore (2012), 26 % in Indonesia (2006), and 23 % in Vietnam (2006) (Figs. 12.7 and 12.8).

#### 12.3.3.2 Cantril Ladder of Life Scale, Gallup World Poll


The Gallup World Poll (GWP), undertaken by the Gallup Organization in over 160 countries, has been asking survey respondents annually since 2005 to evaluate their satisfaction with life on a scale of 0–10, where 0 and 10 signify, respectively, the worst-possible life and the best-possible life that they can imagine—called the Cantril Ladder of Life Scale.

The new World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al. 2013) has pooled GWP surveys from each

<sup>33</sup>Social Weather Stations, the Philippine member of WVS, has run the four-point happiness scale in 24 national surveys of adults since 1991. Its latest survey, in September 2014, had 30 % Very Happy and 50 % Quite Happy.



**Fig. 12.7** Subjective state of health (% Very good +% Good), World Values Surveys, world regions, selected Southeast Asian and selected comparison countries, 1996–2014 (Data from World Values Survey Association 2014)



**Fig. 12.8** Feeling of happiness in selected Southeast Asian and comparison countries (percent “very happy” and percent “quite happy”), World Values Surveys, 1996–2012 (Data from World Values Survey Association 2014)


country for 3 years, effectively tripling the sample size to about 3000 per country. The GWP's absolute ladder scores for 2010–2012 in Southeast Asia are Singapore 6.5, Thailand 6.4, Malaysia 5.8, Vietnam 5.5, Indonesia 5.3, Philippines 5.0, Lao PDR 4.8, Myanmar 4.4, and Cambodia 4.1. As a region, Southeast Asia is average—considerably below North America but well above South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Fig. 12.9).

Ladder-scores in a country can fluctuate up or down relatively quickly. Comparing the scores from 2010 to 2012 with those from 2005 to 2007, the World Happiness Report found that the scores rose in 60 countries, hardly changed in 29 countries, and fell in 41 countries. Within Southeast Asia in particular, there were significant increases in Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, and Vietnam; no real changes in the Philippines and Singapore; and significant decreases in Malaysia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar.

## 12.4 Tracking Southeast Asian Well-Being into the Future

Indicators of both objective and subjective well-being have inevitably improved over time in Southeast Asia. What was acceptable as a standard of living for *Homo sapiens* at the dawn of civilization does not suffice for modern man. Welfare standards have also risen over time. Advances in science and technology in the life sciences and in organizational efficiency continue to create opportunities for enhancing people's welfare. A historical review of the welfare trajectory in Southeast Asia suggests two points for further research and advocacy.

Of late, the key issue that has surfaced, not just in Southeast Asia but all over the world, is the challenge of inclusive growth. Whether in developed or underdeveloped economies, the benefits of growth are not trickling down fast enough to improve the welfare of the poorest sec-



**Fig. 12.9** “Cantril Ladder” satisfaction with life, Gallup World Poll, 2005/07 and 2010/12, selected Southeast Asian countries. The *Cantril Self-Anchoring (Ladder) Scale* was developed by pioneering social researcher Dr. Hadley Cantril and consists of the following steps: (1) Please imagine a ladder with steps numbered zero at the *bottom* to 10 at the *top*. (2) The *top* of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the *bottom* repre-

sents the worst possible life for you. (3) On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time? (4) On which step do you think you will stand about 5 years from now? The Cantril Scale, which has been used by a wide variety of researchers since its initial development, is one example of subjective well-being assessment (Data from Helliwell and Shun 2013)



tors of society. In Southeast Asia, the most disadvantaged groups tend to be the cultural minorities. In some countries of the region, they are still battling for independence, or at least, autonomy.

The second issue is that now, just as at the beginning of the colonial era, the fundamental welfare-related concern is the security of persons, of their property, and of their rights. The clearest marker of a failed state is its inability to provide security for its people.


National data on welfare indicators are necessary for tracing the trajectory of the development of the nation-state. Unfortunately, the communities whose welfare is at greatest risk are specific groups living precariously at the edges (sometimes literally) of society: minority groups, marginalized by their language, race, religion, or economic status. They include, aside from the indigenous tribes, landless peasants, informal urban settlers, migrant laborers, unemployed youth, and refugees fleeing from areas of con-

flict. All of these groups need quantitative measures of their well-being as well as institutions to undertake the measurements.


Fortunately, women in Southeast Asia no longer suffer the heavy-handed discrimination experienced by women in other countries. Women are, however, frequently victims when armed conflict arises. Even when they are located away from the fighting, when violence does erupt, the number of women involved increases. Violence also comes from criminal elements, another problem that underlines the critical importance of governance. Failed states also tend to show high levels of corruption.

Average scores of national well-being will probably rise if government and other institutions can directly address the needs of these marginalized sectors. Effective assistance requires more information about the condition of these groups. This requirement argues for greater efforts to disaggregate national data to focus directly on the communities that need the most help.


### 12.5 Supplemental Figures




**Supplemental Fig. 12.1** Population Density and Fertility Rates, selected Southeast Asian Countries, 2012–2013 (Data from World Bank 2014c)




**Supplemental Fig. 12.2** Mean Years of Schooling and Gross National Income per capita (2011 PPP \$) selected countries of Southeast Asia, 2013 (Data from United Nations Development Programme 2014a; World Bank 2014c)



**Supplemental Fig. 12.3** Total net enrollment ratio in primary education (%) and Ratio of girls to boys in primary education: Southeast Asia—Earliest and latest years (Data from United Nations Statistics Division 2014; World Bank 2014a)



**Supplemental Fig. 12.4** Public spending on education (% of GDP) and total net enrollment ratio in primary education (%) (Data from United Nations Statistics Division 2014; World Bank 2014a, c)



**Supplemental Fig. 12.5** Public spending on health (% of GDP) and Tuberculosis Rate (per 100,000 population) (Data from United Nations Statistics Division 2014; World Bank 2014a, c)

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## Wolfgang Glatzer and Jürgen Kohl

*Well-being is a fashionable topic today, appearing on advertising billboards as well as in numerous philosophical or scientific writings. This seems natural in a society that endeavours to produce complete satisfaction for all its members.*

*Thus, after a period of strong economic growth granting easy access to mass consumption, citizen's concerns shift towards the purpose which it arguably defeats: well-being.*

Alexander Viadychenko (Council of Europe 2008)

### 13.1 Introduction

We start out by discussing how well-being in Europe is perceived and monitored. We then shift to a presentation of concepts used to define and measure the well-being of the people of Europe, especially in the European Union.

#### 13.1.1 Monitoring Well-Being

Since the time of the ancient Greek philosophers to the present, well-being has been a complex, comprehensive concept of fundamental interest to mankind. Sometimes we find broad consensus about the components of well-being, but more often we encounter divergent opinions. It is relatively easy to identify historical events and pro-

cesses that have a negative impact on well-being: wars, civil wars, riots, epidemics, famines, large fires, plagues, natural disasters, illness and fatalities—all of which lead to much pain, destruction, and death. Hence, one can say with a certain degree of confidence that the history of the well-being of the people of Europe has not always been positive—history shows a lack of sustainable peace and welfare. Even after World War II, Europe did not experience peace and prosperity because of the Cold War, a period not of open warfare but of military and social tensions that had a negative impact on the well-being of many Europeans. Even in recent decades, peace and prosperity were accompanied by new threats of terrorism and other political disasters.

Since the middle of the last century, researchers have introduced new instruments for assessing well-being (Michalos 2014). Two complimentary approaches have been developed to measure social progress: “objective” and “subjective” indicators of well-being batteries of social indicators are constructed on a worldwide scale to monitor “subjectively” the quality of life in societies and the well-being of individuals (Land et al. 2012; Helliwell et al. 2013). People are asked survey questions to determine how satisfied they are with their lives overall and with

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various life domains such as social life, family life, and work life. Survey responses, collected over the last several decades, are maintained in comprehensive data archives (especially Veenhoven 1993, 2000, 2015).

The goal of this chapter is to present the results of well-being research for the European continent with emphasis on the European Union with its 28 member states, which includes the “Eurozone” of 19 countries sharing the currency of the “Euro.” Attention is also given to the 47 European countries belonging to the Council of Europe,<sup>1</sup> and to a few reference countries outside of Europe. The well-being of the people in the European countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union (i.e., Eastern bloc countries) is reported in Chap. 15.

In our effort to describe well-being within a European context, we first discuss the historical development of European populations and states. We then analyze the long-term development of well-being in Europe, both cross-nationally and in comparison to other world regions, using four core dimensions of well-being: health, material living conditions, education, and overall subjective well-being. Next, we turn to the patterns of well-being within countries and to social, political, and economic inequalities that exist among population groups (e.g., age, gender, poverty, education, unemployment, and social cohesion). We then discuss the well-being of smaller, often disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities, immigrants, and other populations characterized by Europeans as “socially excluded” from the mainstream of collective life.

We also examine how patterns of well-being are shaped by different types of welfare state

regimes,<sup>2</sup> in particular with regard to income inequality and poverty and to participation in the labor force. Although individuals are to some degree masters of their own well-being, individual well-being is also strongly influenced by macro characteristics of society and institutional arrangements that are beyond the control of the individual. Welfare state regimes are of special significance in Europe, where the concept of the welfare state had its origins—the welfare state influences the distribution of well-being among individuals and social groups. Finally, we draw conclusions and highlight major challenges to the well-being of Europeans that lie ahead.

### 13.1.2 Terms and Concepts of Well-Being in Europe

When Adam Smith published in 1776 his famous book, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, his ideas reflected the challenging conditions of his time, namely, the accumulation of wealth. Today, we live in different times in which living conditions are much better; the focus now is changing to well-being, not merely the creation of wealth. Well-being is not only a popular term present in everyday communication in many languages, but it is also a scientific construct in the social sciences. The scientific exploration of well-being prompted a public discussion, which in turn garnered the attention of policy makers at supranational organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Union, and the European Commission.

<sup>1</sup>The Council of Europe, founded in 1949, is an intergovernmental organization which includes 47 European states and promotes human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It is separate from the European Union and cannot make binding laws for their members.

<sup>2</sup>The term *welfare regime* or *welfare state regime* refers to complex socio-political-economic public policy arrangements including governmental, business, and private nongovernmental actors and activities. “To talk of ‘a regime’ is to denote the fact that in the relation between state and economy a complex of legal and organizational features are systematically interwoven” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 2).

### 13.1.2.1 Well-Being in Everyday Language

The use of the term *well-being* dates back to ancient Greek, when well-being was interpreted as “eudaimonia,” a concept that focuses on the good life and good society. In Latin, the concept *salus* was used to mean well-being too. Later, in medieval Germany, “*wol varn*” reflected well-being in the sense of “to live happy” (Glatzer 2001). There are more languages than there are European states,<sup>3</sup> many of which have a word meaning well-being. Examples include *bien-être* (French); *bien estar* (Spanish); *benessere* (Italian). In German, well-being is represented by *wohlfahrt*, *wohlergehen*, and *wohl*, whereas *wohlbefinden* and *wohlfühlen* have exclusively subjective denotations and demonstrate the ongoing differentiation of well-being.

In addition to the scientific use of these terms, their presence in everyday language has increased significantly in relation to other related words such as “wellness” and “feel good.” The terms *well-being* and *quality of life* seem to have been adopted by the scientific community at large over the past several decades.

### 13.1.2.2 Well-Being in Economic and Social Sciences

Well-being, as an explicit scientific concept, emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century when the well-known economist Arthur Cecil Pigou (1920) proposed the term *qualité de vie* in the sense of noneconomic welfare. Book titles containing the term *well-being* were not published before the 1970s. The concept of well-being in Germany incorporated other concepts such as the “good life” and “the good society” (Allmendinger 2001) and is now a guiding concept in modern German government initiatives.

Most research on well-being focuses on outcomes (years of average life expectancy) rather than inputs (e.g., social expenditures in health) or throughputs (e.g., particular health system arrangements), thus providing direct information

about people’s lives. In social science research, well-being, quality of life, and welfare are defined in multidimensional ways and are examined using a variety of social indicators. The varying approaches reflect emphasis either on objective assessments of well-being (i.e., assessment of well-being by experts) or on subjective evaluations (i.e., people’s evaluations of their own lives). The concept of well-being seems to be more closely associated with the latter, whereas the concepts of quality of life and welfare are associated with the former.

Many additional elements go into making a good society, for example, mutual trust, tolerance, and confidence in institutions. Social and economic sciences have developed broad conceptual and practical instruments for measuring and monitoring societies in Europe and the world.

### 13.1.2.3 Well-Being in Supranational Organizations

The OECD, which includes most European states and other economically advanced countries as well, promoted the concept of well-being (OECD 1974) and proclaimed in 1976 “The heart of the problem is the well-being of individual human beings and the way in which this is affected by their relations with other human beings” (OECD 1976: 12). In recent years, the OECD has launched a *Better Life Initiative* (OECD 2011, 2013a), which attempts to capture the quality of life of people in the OECD countries.

The European Commission, the executive body of the European Union, joined efforts to improve social reporting and monitoring in its memorandum *GDP and Beyond* (Commission of the European Communities 2009). The goal is to develop a comprehensive set of social indicators that are as appealing as the gross domestic product (GDP) but more inclusive of the environmental and social aspects of progress. In the meantime, an expert group within the European Union has agreed on a detailed set of quality-of-life indicators covering the full range of dimensions and bringing together objective and subjective data (De Smedt 2015). The recommendations of the *Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and*

<sup>3</sup>For example, a small country like Switzerland has four official languages: French, German, Italian, and Rhaeto-Romanic.

*Social Progress* (Stiglitz et al. 2009) resulted in significant economic, sociological, and political discourse concerning the measurement of progress of societies.

Last but not least the Council of Europe participated in this discussion, emphasizing “well-being for all” (*le bien-être pour tous*) or collective well-being (Council of Europe 2008; Farrell 2015) to overcome the shortcomings of individual well-being. The debate reflects the notion of social cohesion as a goal of modern society; hence, well-being cannot be attained until it is shared among people.

#### 13.1.2.4 Well-Being in the Welfare State Debate

The idea of the welfare state originated in Western Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century and is more or less a distinctive characteristic of European societies today (Bahle et al. 2010). Welfare state debates revolve primarily around measures and instruments of welfare institutions and social policy. But when welfare is defined in terms of outcomes that are directly related to people, then the idea of “welfare” comes close to that of well-being: “The essence of the welfare state is government-protected minimum standards of income, nutrition, health assured to every citizen as a right, not as a charity” (Wilensky 1975: 1). In modern times, the terms *well-being* and *welfare* are frequently used synonymously: Welfare or well-being refers to an overall condition reflecting happiness and contentment, plus one’s standard of living (Library of Economics and Liberty 2015).

There is often the misunderstanding that only the poor benefit from the welfare state, but the welfare state contributes to the well-being of all citizens in different ways. Many social scientists argue that the welfare state provides societal conditions designed to enhance well-being for all. The underlying rationale is mainly that the different types of welfare states impact well-being through the production of collective goods and the redistribution of resources among social groups. However, a modern conception of the welfare state reflects the notion of *self-sufficiency*, a concept central to the well-being of individuals in

Europe (see Sect. 13.6 for a complete discussion of this issue).

## 13.2 Historical Background

We discuss the historical background of the well-being of people in Europe by first focusing on the emergence of Europe, then discussing the modernization and political restructuring of Europe, and ending with the consolidation of the European Union.

### 13.2.1 The Emergence of Europe

The history of the concept of well-being in Europe can be traced back over two millennia. In Greek mythology, the god Zeus chose as a mistress an attractive woman named Europe. The Greek explorer and geographer Pytheas of Massalia (380 Before the Common Era [BCE]–300 BCE) was, as historians tell it, the earliest explorer who mapped out the geographic contours of what is now Europe. Specifically, in about 340 BCE, Pytheas explored the previously unknown region north of the Mediterranean Sea (Black 2005: 172).

Geographically, Europe is part of the large continent of Eurasia—Europe and Asia—but traditionally Europe is recognized as a continent of its own. Europe’s natural borders are roughly the Atlantic Ocean to the west, the Arctic Ocean to the north, the Ural Mountains to the east, and the Mediterranean Sea to the south. It is characterized by a broadly diversified natural environment, which can be regarded as a major asset of the continent (Andera 2006). According to geographers, the geographical conditions of Europe are favorable for physical well-being (Landes 1999). For example, the Gulf Stream, which moves through the Atlantic Ocean along Europe’s border, provides an amenable climate. Scientists refer to the “privileged European climate” and a “favourable environment” (Landes 1999: 18, 20). Compared to other continents, Europe is geographically privileged because the people of Europe did not experience large-scale natural

threats as on other continents such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tornados, tsunamis, and bushfires. However, geographers now question whether this situation is sustainable. Climate change may alter the continent's physical conditions.<sup>4</sup>

Europe is the second smallest continent (Australia is the smallest), with a population of approximately 730 million people, of which about 500 million people belong to the European Union. The continent of Europe has never been ruled by one governmental unit, nor by a select few. The Frankish empire of Charlemagne (768–814), who is sometimes called the “Father of Europe,” was the only European empire that encompassed most of Western Europe for several decades. Charlemagne's regime occurred during the period of feudalism and involved most of modern Europe—France and Germany, Austria and Switzerland, Belgium and The Netherlands, and the upper half of Italy (Parker 1999: 106). When Charlemagne's empire was divided among his heirs, it marked the beginning of a more than 1000-year process of splitting Europe into many middle-sized and small territories. Only the French governor Napoleon, who ruled for only about 15 years (1799–1814), created another Europe-like state. In time, Europe comprised smaller and larger states that appeared and disappeared, following the worldwide pattern of the rise and decline of nations (Olson 1982). For example, Poland and Hungary, which became large states in the Middle Ages, were gradually reduced in size and at times dissolved through political conflicts and wars. In contrast, German areas were characterized by “Kleinstaaterei” (*territorial fragmentation*), a proliferation of small states in central Europe. In earlier centuries, Germany comprised 300 territorial units. Modern Germany, now the largest state in the European Union, was formed in 1871 by unifying 39 states under Prussian leadership. Europe includes 48 states, all of which belong to the European Council (Farell 2015) and 28 of which are members of the European Union (European Union

2015); 19 share the Euro currency. Whereas the European Council is an organization whose main purpose is to integrate Europe in cultural and democratic terms, the European Union is more political—its visionary goal is often the establishment of a supranational state. The small continent of Europe currently has the same number of states as Asia, fewer states than Africa, and many more than Latin and North America. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Europe is viewed as a diverse constellation of many nation-states that have changed significantly during the course of history and are now on the path to build a supranational state (see Sect. 13.2.3).

### 13.2.2 Modernization and Political Structuring

The sociopolitical development of Europe, according to some authors, reflects “modernization” (Glatzer 2001). Historical ethnologists speak of the modernization of Europe as a singular process that traces its roots to the beginning of the past millennium (Peter 2011: 22), whereas sociologists regard modernization as a universal, multidimensional process of social change beginning with the Industrial Revolution in England (1760–1830) and the Political Revolution in France (1789–1794) (Bendix 1969). Overall, modernization, despite some negative material and human costs, has had an overwhelmingly positive effect on well-being (Zapf 1979) and has increased individuals' prospects for a better quality of life (De Jong 2015).

The Scandinavian political scientist Stein Rokkan (1975, 2000) and others (cf. Flora 1983) summarized the sociopolitical history of Europe using a general model of political development. This model comprises four phases that occurred in Europe, with particular national variations: (1) state formation, (2) nation building, (3) mass democratization, and (4) the emergence of welfare states. *State formation* refers to the establishment of a central authority (government) and an administrative infrastructure (state bureaucracy) that gained control over a territory and was able to defend its borders. In contrast, *nation building*

<sup>4</sup>For example, people in the Netherlands are fearful of a rising ocean level.

refers to the sociopolitical integration of people and the development of a national identity on the basis of a common history, language, and values. Although some European countries were already formed in the Middle Ages (e.g., England, France, Sweden), other countries did not achieve national independence and territorial consolidation until the nineteenth (e.g., Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway) or even the twentieth century (e.g., Finland, Ireland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary). The French Revolution of 1789 propagated the idea of national sovereignty and the nation-state as a normative ideal (which presupposes congruence between nation and state). However, the nation-states of Europe were besieged by conflict, nationalist and separatist movements, wars of independence, the breakup of multinational empires (like the Austro-Hungarian monarchy), and a history of ever-changing borders (a process that continues today).

The third phase, *mass democratization*, refers to the implementation of parliamentary rule and civil liberties. The early states were far from being democratic. In fact, most of them were absolute or constitutional monarchies. Parliamentary rule was gradually instituted in the nineteenth century with significant national variation (Flora 1983). Limited suffrage for men was granted before suffrage for women. Political participation rights for the masses, including the right to organize, freedom of assembly, and freedom of the press, gave ordinary citizens a way to express their political demands. This situation, in turn, led to the foundation of political parties and mobilized the citizenry. Conservative, liberal, social-democratic, and socialist parties emerged everywhere in Europe, but with different “strengths,” with different ideas of what constituted well-being, and in different national constellations and alliances. Such is the essence of the variations of the political history of the European nation-states since the nineteenth century.


Following mass democratization, the *emergence of the welfare state* marks the fourth phase in the political development of Europe. This

phase refers to the institutionalization of social citizenship rights and the redistribution of wealth via government programs. The different political goals and visions of society, advocated by various political parties, are clearly reflected in the different types of welfare states that have emerged in Europe (mostly Western Europe) since the second half of the nineteenth century. Irrespective of the specific ideological stance, the European welfare state, broadly understood as an entity characterized by political intervention in markets, differs significantly from most political entities elsewhere in the world. The concept of the welfare state shifted public understanding of well-being from a liberal individualistic view to include other concepts such as social solidarity, social security, and social justice. In the times of globalization, the political structuring of Europe paved way for the current phase, the phase of supranational unification, namely the European Union.

### 13.2.3 The Foundation and Growth of the European Union

Efforts to enter into closer cooperation and eventually to create a supranational partnership began in the 1950s with the foundation in 1953 of the European Coal and Steel Community and in 1957 of the European Economic Community, which was later renamed the European Union. The subsequent growth of the European Union as a supranational political entity can be interpreted as Europe’s response to the challenges of globalization, a worldwide process that took place in recent decades (OECD 2010). Since the foundation of the European Union in 1957, membership has increased in several waves, including the so-called big Eastern enlargement of 2004 (Fig. 13.1).

The European Union now includes almost all countries of the former Western Europe; only Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland are not members. Many Eastern European countries joined the European Union after the fall of the Iron Curtain, which separated East from West. These



**Fig. 13.1** Expansion of the membership of the European Union (EU) since 1957 (Drawing by Kolja Glatzer; data from European Union 2015)

include countries formerly part of the Russian Federation, which constituted the East bloc, and those that were formerly part of Yugoslavia, which had an independent socialist regime. An immediate consequence of the successive waves of membership, especially of the southern and eastern European countries, has been an increase in socioeconomic diversity. Most of the European Union member states entered into a close financial relationship by introducing in 1999 a common currency, the Euro. The Eurozone, which enforces financial integration and mutual dependency, currently comprises 19 countries.

The European Union has gone through the processes of state formation and nation building and has evolved into multilevel state structures involving national, subnational, and supranational organizations. The different levels of political responsibility have significant implications for the management of well-being. In 2015, the European Union had 28 members (Fig. 13.2) with significant differences in terms of population size, history, and socioeconomic conditions. One can get an idea of the rate of growth of the European Union by noting that 15 countries joined from 1995 to 2004, whereas 28 have





**Fig. 13.2** Member states of the European Union (EU-28), 2014. (Ssolbergj [CC BY-SA 3.0 (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0>) or GFDL (<http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html>)], via Wikimedia

Commons) ([https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Member\\_States\\_of\\_the\\_European\\_Union\\_\(polar\\_stereo\\_graphic\\_projection\)\\_EN.svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Member_States_of_the_European_Union_(polar_stereo_graphic_projection)_EN.svg))

joined since 2013 (see Fig. 13.1). The sizes of the populations of the respective countries vary from 0.4 million for Malta to 80.8 million for Germany (see bulleted list below). Six of the countries are large, with more than 30 million citizens; seven of the countries are small, with fewer than 3 million; and 15 are in between. Each of these 28 sovereign states has its own unique history of well-being that evolved under very different conditions. In earlier times, the countries were often in conflict; however, they have managed to maintain peace for the last 70 years.

The countries of the European Union comprise well-known subareas characterized by special relationships with one another (in parentheses, millions of inhabitants):

- Northern Europe: Sweden (9.6), Denmark (5.6), Finland (5.5)
- Central Europe: Germany (80.8), Poland (38.5), the Czech Republic (10.5),<sup>5</sup> Austria (8.5), Slovakia (5.4), Slovenia (2.1)
- Western Europe: France (65.9), United Kingdom (64.3) (Majority Vote for “Brexit” in 2016), Netherlands (16.8), Belgium (11.2), Luxembourg (0.5)
- Southern Europe: Italy (60.8), Spain (46.5), Greece (11.0), Portugal (10.4), Cyprus (0.9), Malta (0.4)
- Southeastern Europe: Romania (19.9), Hungary (9.9), Bulgaria (7.2), Croatia (4.2)

<sup>5</sup>The Czech Republic and Slovakia, formerly unified, have been separate states since 2001.

- Northeastern Europe/Baltic States: Estonia (1.3), Latvia (2.0), Lithuania (2.9)

The majority of European countries are members of the European Union, but some significant countries are not. As mentioned previously, three Western European countries, Switzerland, Norway, and Iceland, are not members of the European Union; the first two are among the wealthiest countries in Europe. Some smaller countries in the Balkan region are not European Union members but a few of them are on the candidate list: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, all of which, except for Albania, were parts of the former Yugoslavia. The remaining geographically large part of Eastern Europe includes Belarus, Moldavia, Russia, and the Ukraine. A small section of Turkey north of the Bosphorus is also considered European territory.<sup>6</sup> Several of the world's smallest city states,<sup>7</sup> also known for their prosperous way of life do not belong to the European Union. Stories about these states and their people are often covered in the news media because of their wealth and affluent lifestyle.

The extreme diversity within Europe, characterized by small and large states with different degrees of autonomy and independence, is rooted in long-standing traditions and cultures. To determine whether being a member of the

European Union engenders a feeling of belonging and enhances one's sense of well-being, researchers have long conducted public opinion polls. These surveys ask about "attitudes toward the unification of Western Europe," "attitudes toward the membership of the European community," and "the feeling that one's country has benefited from being a member of the European Community" (European Commission 1994). From 1973 to 1994, about two thirds of the respondents felt that belonging to a unified Europe was beneficial. Since 1994, a more critical attitude, known as "Euroscepticism," has emerged (Wessels 2007). *Euroscepticism* is defined as the "body of criticism of the European Union (European Union), and opposition to the process of political European integration, existing throughout the political spectrum" (Euroscepticism 2015). Despite the growing scepticism, Europeans exhibit considerable trust in one another, which is in total contrast to the hostile situation that existed in the first half of the twentieth century. And, Europeans' cohesion of today is of high relevance for Europeans' well-being (Delhey and Dragolov 2015).

In general, European identity is relatively strong at the national level, moderate at regional and local levels, and weak at the European level. Moreover, many Europeans link their national identity with a European identity. "The highest level of identification exists in the six original member-countries, closely followed by European South; the farther away from this core of the Union one gets in geographical and/or temporal terms, the weaker identification becomes" (Scheuer and Schmitt 2009: 522). Also, it has recently been noted that support for European integration is weaker among young Europeans than among older Europeans. If they will become more pro-Europe over time is an open question and a problem for the future development of Europe. Although the European Union has a long way to go to be considered a successful supranational entity, its contribution to the 70 years of peace in Europe seems without question.

<sup>6</sup>Some territories outside of the European continent—the outermost regions—belong to the European Union because they constitute a part a member country of the European Union: Azores and Madeira, Canary Islands, British, Dutch and French overseas territories, Greenland and others. They are not under consideration in this study.

<sup>7</sup>The European city-states with a reputation for luxurious lifestyles and happiness are the Pyrenean Principality of Andorra in the Pyrenees mountains with 76,000 inhabitants (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andorra>); Liechtenstein, the Alps state, with 37,000 inhabitants ([www.liechtenstein.li/en/country-and-people/state](http://www.liechtenstein.li/en/country-and-people/state)); the Principality of Monaco, on the Mediterranean, 37,000 inhabitants (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monaco>); San Marino, the oldest state in the world, with 32,000 inhabitants ([en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San\\_Marino](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/San_Marino)); and the Vatican City State, an ecclesial state governed by the Pope (<http://www.vaticanstate.va>).

### 13.3 Long-Term Characteristics of Well-Being in Europe

Of the many multifaceted developments that have influenced the well-being of the people of Europe, several are worth mentioning. We believe that the most positive development is the success of governmental policies in establishing long-term economic development and sustainable democracies. The most negative developments are war, civil strike, and the extermination of millions of people. We discuss these two developments in some detail.

#### 13.3.1 Economic Development

Europe has not always been a comparatively prosperous continent in the long run. There was a decline in economic well-being in Western Europe in the first millennium: “By the year 1000, Europe’s income levels had fallen below those in Asia and North Africa” (Maddison 2001: 49). However, during Late Medieval Era, early economic progress enabled West European per capita income to increase from \$1000 to \$1500. The big economic push later came with the rise of Capitalist economies and with the advent of industrialization in Europe by the middle of the eighteenth century.

Under the leadership of the United Kingdom, the countries of Europe increased their GDP per capita, much more so in the west and the north and less so in the south and east (Fig. 13.3). “By 1820, its levels of income and productivity were more than twice as high as in the rest of the world. By 1913, the income level in Western Europe and its offshoots was more than six times that in the rest of the world” (Maddison 2001: 49). Scholars refer to this economic success and modernization of Europe as “European Exceptionalism” (Landes 1999: 29). One can argue that the colonial empires of Europe<sup>8</sup> managed to enrich the European econ-


omy as well as its culture. Europe before WWI amassed one third of the world GDP.

The increase of income and wealth afforded a higher standard of living for a large segment of people in Europe. At the turn of the twentieth century, the average income provided a decent living for most. But the average increase in income was accompanied by economic inequality—the rich got richer and the poor became poorer. Economic well-being has long been equated with a decline in poverty. In medieval times, poverty was widespread: About 30–40 % of Europeans living in cities were poor. Poverty has since come to be regarded as a social evil, and the eradication of poverty an accepted societal goal. Poverty has, in fact, diminished over the millennia. It should be noted that *poverty* is a complex concept and that today’s view of poverty is not at all akin to the poverty that existed in medieval times (Atkinson 1998).

#### 13.3.2 The Spread of Democracy

That democracy is good for the well-being of people is a universal conviction of philosophers and ordinary people alike. Democratic ideas were strongly articulated in the French Revolution of 1789. Democracy followed in many countries in Europe. Different “developments made it possible for a majority of people in a majority of states around the world to claim the benefits associated with citizenship, and suffrage and practice democracy” (Schaeffer 2015: 99). Especially WWI and WWII were followed by efforts to push for more political rights. After 1990, political scientists referred to an “explosion of democracy” when many communist countries adopted democratic constitutions. As far as we can tell, the creation and implementation of democratic rights has always been a happy event for most people. However, with respect to suffrage, democracy was a difficult journey for men but more so for women. People had to fight hard for universal suffrage (Fig. 13.4). The spread of democracies is a success story in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

<sup>8</sup>The exploitation of African wealth by the Europeans is discussed by Wolfgang Glatzer and is highly controversial.



**Fig. 13.3** Gross domestic product per capita in selected countries of Europe, 1820–2010 (Data from van Zanden et al. 2014: 67)


In sum, the sociopolitical environment that existed in Western Europe supported democratic institutions and the establishment of welfare states first in Western Europe (Flora 1983) and later, though incompletely thus far, in Eastern Europe. It should be noted, however, that despite the strong correlation between happiness and democracy, democracy does not automatically bring higher levels of happiness. Also in democracies there are good and bad governments that influence life satisfaction. But there seems to be no doubt that the rise of democracy improved people's control over their lives, which is a prerequisite to well-being overall.

### 13.3.3 Wars and Civil Strife

Death of loved ones means sorrow and life dissatisfaction for those who are left behind. The sadness that people feel when their loved ones die unnaturally or prematurely (i.e., they are killed in wars, terrorist attacks, natural disasters,

and political conflict) is more pronounced. The pain is deep and long-lasting. The wars in Europe brought death and destruction to millions of people. These wars destroyed communities and caused much pain and suffering (Bös and Rosenbrock 2015).

Major wars occurred during each century of the past millennium, e.g., in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, France and the United Kingdom waged the Hundred Years' War for dominance in Europe. The 30 Years' War, 1618–1648, often cited for its particular brutality (Kuczynski 1991), was one among several religious wars fought in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries between the Catholic countries and those that had become Protestant after the Reformation. In the eighteenth century, the Nordic Wars broke out when the kingdom of Sweden tried to expand its influence to central Europe. At the turn of the eighteenth century, the Napoleonic wars wreaked havoc on large parts of Europe, reaching into Russia as far as Moscow. Over the centuries, the eastern region of Europe has been affected by many wars



**Fig. 13.4** The establishment of universal suffrage in the countries of the European Union: timeline of women's suffrage joining men's suffrage, 1906–1960 (Drawing by Kolja Glatzer; data from Flora 1983; Inter-Parliamentary Union n.d)

**Sidebar 13.1 The End of World War II and a New Beginning: One Family's Experience**

I (Wolfgang Glatzer) was born September 15, 1944, shortly before the end of World War II, on a farm in Silesia, Germany—the Germany that instigated the war and at that time was well on its way to losing it. The Allies were pushing for victory and Germany at that time was usurped in battle after battle. My uncle (mother's brother) was killed at the front in the war with Russia. Russian troops began moving into our village—lower Silesia—in the early part of 1945. On January 22, 1945, the people in my village received the order to evacuate and escape to the West. My father, a baker, was captured by US forces and was sent to Texas as a prisoner of war; therefore, he could not help us. Fortunately, a young Polish worker (who was ordered to work on our farm back in 1940) helped us guide our horse-drawn wagon from East to West. Polish families, who had been deported from eastern Poland by the Russians, were in line to take possession of evacuated German homes and land. My family made that journey—we crossed the mighty Odra River and continued westward, day by day, in the bitterly cold weather, through much of eastern Germany. For 2 months, we travelled more than 500 km. Horses pulled the carriages and wagons, each of which carried two families, their food, and hay for the horses. We moved from village to village, where, most of the time, we received assistance from others—a place to sleep and food to eat. We avoided large cities to reduce the risk of being shelled. In the distant horizon, we saw huge fires from the city of Dresden; the fires lit up the sky, a result of one of the most severe bombing attacks of World War II. Fortunately, we managed to avoid encounters with military personnel. On March 24, 1945, after our long trip in extreme cold and arduous weather, we finally reached a Franconian village close to the river Main in the American Zone, where we settled and began to rebuild our lives. My family has been living there ever since—more than seven decades.

between Poland and Russia. In the nineteenth century, France and Germany, arch-enemies at the time, were engulfed in the Franco-German War. Finally, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed the two World Wars that caused enormous human pain and suffering and destroyed much of the infrastructure of Europe. As soon as one war ends, economic recovery follows, which is then followed by another war, and the cycle resumes.

In the Middle Ages, epidemics and famines caused many hardships in Europe, comparable in many respects to the hardships brought about by wars. For example, the Great Famine of 1315–1317 caused millions of deaths. A religious crusade and witch hunt covered much of the landscape in Europe from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries, during which approximately 60,000 people were killed, the majority of whom were women accused of witchcraft. Given these circumstances, these were times of uncharacteristically low well-being in Europe.

**13.3.4 Europe During and After World War II**

World War II is regarded as a breakdown of civilization and modern society, surely “the deadliest military conflict in human history” (World War II casualties 2015). From 1939 until 1945, a majority of the world's nations participated in a global war that resulted in the deaths of 50–85 million people. The Holocaust alone accounted for the deaths of more than 11 million people. The war also resulted in the widespread destruction of infrastructure and whole cities that covered much of the landscape of Europe.

At the end of World War II, on the 8th of May 1945, Germany was declared the “defeated evil transgressor.” Even German historians admitted that “the 8th of May was the end of a murderous dictatorship” (Weidenfeld 1989: 16). Germany had to accept the loss of large territories in the German East and of millions of refugees who fled from Silesia and other former German territories (Sidebar 13.1).



Beyond the single case of the Glatzer family, there were already at this time large surveys focused on the subjective perception of life of Europeans. One example is a transatlantic survey conducted by Gallup in 1948 in the United States and Western Europe (France, Germany [only the British-occupied zone], Italy, the Netherlands, Norway), which involved 8616 Europeans and 1015 US citizens (Buchanan and Cantril 1953). On the basis of this survey, it was estimated that in this postwar period, 26 % of the American public and 39 % of the European public felt dissatisfied with their lives. More than half, however, said things were “all right,” Americans (57 %) more so than Europeans (50 %). Twice as many Americans (15 %) as Europeans (7 %) said that they were “very satisfied with the way they are getting on currently.” From the point of view of U.S. citizens compared to that of Europeans, the United States was clearly better off than Europe. For this early postwar period in Europe, the satisfaction level of 57 % seems surprisingly high. One explanation could be that people made relative judgments; that is, they considered the disastrous experience they had just gone through against a more hopeful future. Hope for a better future will surely contribute to people’s life satisfaction.

The impact of World War II on Europe’s economic performance was devastating in the long run. By 1940, at the beginning of the WW II, most West European countries had attained a high GDP per capita that was unprecedented and equivalent to approximately \$4500 per capita—about the same as in 1950. Germany in particular experienced a severe economic setback. Other European countries such as Great Britain, France, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy regained the economic ground they had lost during the war. Each country, though, suffered a significant setback in economic growth during the war with the exception of the United States (OECD 2014c: 64). The United States was an economic powerhouse before and after the war. The US government and the American people were sufficiently well-off; as such, they were able to send voluminous care packages to Europe and initiated an ambitious program of financial and technical support known as the Marshall Plan (Mee 2015). The Marshall Plan helped Germans and other

Europeans overcome the misery and devastation of the war. Germany recovered quickly in the 1950s, and reached in the 1960s an economic position slightly trailing that of Great Britain but ahead of France. The economic success of West Germany in the 1950s, unique in Europe, was called the *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic miracle).<sup>9</sup>

The end of WW II marked the starting point of a new beginning—a Europe that was more peaceful and more prosperous, even given the political tensions between East and West (characterized as the Cold War). Specifically, in the early postwar years, Europe was divided into two spheres of influence by the Western and the Eastern alliances, and Germany was separated into the Federal Republic of Germany in the West and the German Democratic Republic in the East. The former was gradually integrated into the Western Alliance; the latter was integrated into the Soviet Union until 1990, when the Soviet empire was dismantled. Eastern and Western Europe were divided by an “Iron Curtain”: the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the West and those of the Warsaw Pact in the East. The relationship between Eastern and Western Europe was hostile to say the least. A change came after 1990, when the Iron Curtain came down unexpectedly, and *glasnost* and *Perestroika* opened the Russian hemisphere to Western ideas and ways of life. The political climate in Europe has since been transformed to a more tolerant and cooperative relationship. Recently, however, a new “cold war” seems to be on the horizon (Rahman 2015).

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### 13.4 Seventy Years of Advanced Well-Being After 1945

This section is concerned with an exceptional era in Europe, the 70 years after WWII (1945–2015), a period without a major war, a great depression, or the breakdown of an institutionalized democracy. First, we use traditional quality-of-life

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<sup>9</sup>The top economic position of Germany ended finally when it was unified in 1990 because a poor part of East Germany was added to the rather rich section that was West Germany.

criteria to assess well-being during the 70 post-war years compared with long-term past. Specifically, we assess the history of well-being of Europeans in terms of human development using the criteria of standard of living, education, health, and subjective well-being.<sup>10</sup>

### 13.4.1 Societal Characteristics After 1945: Cold War, Economic Growth, Democracy

Although most people in Europe did not personally experience a war after 1945, they were nevertheless confronted with war-like events. Europe was free of wars in the second half of the twentieth century and made significant strides to overcome hostilities characteristic of the first half. However, some conflicts had a negative toll on well-being in an otherwise peaceful era. The Cold War broke out between the East and the West—former allies in WWII. Street riots and social upheaval were manifestations of dissatisfaction with the sociopolitical living conditions. For example, after World War II, people expressed their dissatisfaction with the communist regimes in Eastern Europe by rioting (e.g., in Poland and in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Prague in 1969). The brutal suppression of the political movements resulted in a sense of

social resignation among Europeans living in the satellite states of the Soviet Union. Different types of regional conflicts also occurred in post-war Western Europe. For example, people fought for more autonomy: in the South Tyrol conflict in Italy, the Basque conflict in Spain, and the Northern Irish conflict in Great Britain. Civil war broke out in Yugoslavia—the country factions battled each other, which led finally to military intervention by the United Nations and the North American Treaty Organization. In recent times, the conflict in the Ukraine has affected much of the sociopolitical landscape of Europe. A new type of cold war seems to be building, affecting people's well-being.

In terms of the economy, the increase of GDP per capita in the 70 years after 1945 seems extraordinary. GDP per capita for Western Europe was \$4518 in 1940 (in purchasing power parity for 1990) and \$20,841 in 2010 (OECD 2010: 65). The Netherlands and Great Britain were the highest performers (measured by GDP); the Eastern Europe was far below.

The history of democracy in Europe is a story of “disappointed success.” In the 70 years after 1945, democracy spread: The process began with the traditional democracies of Western Europe that were unleashed as a result of WWII (e.g., democratic constitutions were introduced 1945 in Austria and 1949 in Germany). Political movements resulted in the toppling of authoritarian regimes (e.g., 1974 in Greece, 1976 in Portugal, and 1977 in Spain). After the breakdown of the Soviet bloc, many East European countries introduced democratic reforms. However, much evidence reported in the news media indicates that democracy has a long way to go to become firmly institutionalized in the countries of the former Soviet bloc.

### 13.4.2 Human Development

To construct a modern comprehensive picture of well-being of Europeans, one must first define values and criteria and then choose relevant dimensions and indicators. One well-known approach is the Human Development Index

<sup>10</sup>Living conditions and well-being in Europe have been studied extensively by social scientists, so one can find many publications on the topic: Significant examples include the comparison of European Union states (Gabriel 1992) and the analyses of the social structure of Europe (Mau and Verwiebe 2009; Therborn 1995). The *Index of Social Progress* (Estes 1988) covers Europe and the world beyond. The European System of Social Indicators is detailed and oriented toward a combination of objective and subjective indicators for European people (Berger-Schmitt 2001). Wealth in a broad sense and from a world-wide perspective is discussed by the World Bank (2010): Wealth and well-being across different welfare regimes are covered in recent studies (Holtmann 2014). A recurrent question involves convergence or divergence in Europe and its satellites (Langlois et al. 1994). Whereas older studies concentrated on objective living conditions (Weller 1996), more recent investigations focus on subjective well-being and social cohesion (Ahrendt et al. 2015; Alber et al. 2008; Delhey and Dragolov 2015).

(HDI), developed by the United Nations Development Programme. Based on a number of objective dimensions, “The Human Development Index is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living” (United Nations Development Program *n.d.*). The HDI is designed to capture the “capabilities” of people.

According to HDI data from 2013, European countries seem extremely successful compared to the rest of the world. Nearly all member states of the European Union attained top ratings in human development, which boils down to more than 0.8 HDI points. Worldwide, only 49 nations received this rating; of those, 26 were from the European Union (Member states of the European Union 2015). The 2013 HDI values range from 0.810 (Latvia) to 0.915 (Netherlands). All European Union member countries have achieved similar HDI scores. Exceptions include the following:

- Romania and Bulgaria were classified as “high human development,” one level lower than the top category, but close behind the first-status nations.
- Norway (0.944) and Switzerland (0.917) were at the top of the HDI rating scale, together with Australia, but they do not belong to the European Union.
- Additional countries from southeastern Europe that scored lowest on the HDI scale in Europe were still in the category “high human development” (e.g., Albania, 0.716) or one level below, “medium human development” (e.g., Moldova, 0.663). These countries obviously still carry the burden of their socialist past.

A broad spectrum of European countries fall between the few top countries and several moderately developed ones. In total, the HDI data indicate that Europe is a highly developed, relatively homogeneous continent. Because of significant worldwide inequalities with respect to health, standard of living, and education, an inequality-adjusted HDI was developed to monitor disparities. HDI documentation, available from 1980,


shows continuing growth among European countries, but at a lower rate over time. For example, between 1980 and 2013, Sweden’s HDI increased from 0.776 to 0.898 and Poland’s, from 0.687 to 0.834. The gap among the European countries has also changed over time.

In the next sections, we consider each of the core dimensions represented in the HDI—health, standard of living, and education—because they are considered to be among the most important indicators of well-being.

### 13.4.3 Health

Health is closely related to well-being because illness is one of the most important factors contributing to ill-being. The World Health Organization has defined health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and infirmity” (World Health Organization 2005). Statistical monitoring of health began early because of its high significance for people and governments. In this context, “Health status indicators have traditionally played a major role in assessing social progress over time and making cross-country comparisons” (Atkinson et al. 2002: 151), and “Health outcomes are generally measured in terms of mortality, morbidity and the ability to function” (2002: 153). Because there are dozens of health indicators too numerous to discuss here, we selected five to capture the health status of Europeans: life expectancy at birth, happy life years, healthy life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and the years of retirement that men and women can expect (Fig. 13.5).

The data show that life expectancy at birth has increased continually in European countries (van Zanden et al. 2014, Chapter 6). Italy in southern Europe has the highest life expectancy among the European Union countries; Poland in eastern central Europe has the lowest. The usual rank order changed because Italy moved ahead of the northern and western European countries, which is a special success. Most countries had similar values: In 2010, 18 of the 28 European Union countries had a life expectancy between 80 and



**Fig. 13.5** Years of average life expectancy, years of healthy life expectancy at age 60, and infant mortality rates for selected European countries, 1950–2010

83 years (OECD 2011: 109). Many well-being indicators in Europe fall into the broad “middle field.” We find similar values for the well-being components for the majority of countries, with some outliers at the upper and the lower ends.


A major factor contributing to longer life expectancy has been the noticeable decline in infant mortality rates between 1950 and 2010 (Fig. 13.5). Differences among European countries are minimal at present. Nevertheless, the increase in life expectancy, which is primarily the result of medical progress, is continuously threatened by illnesses such as HIV and Ebola and the emergence of drug-resistant pathogens.

Opinions differ as to whether additional years of life expectancy really contribute to a happy or healthy life. When one modifies overall life expectancy by subtracting unhappy or unhealthy years, one finds the “years of a happy life” are on average about 25 years less than the life expect-

tancy. Another indicator for life in better health is the *healthy life expectancy*, which varies between 18.5 years in Italy and 16.2 years in Poland. Many European countries have similar healthy life expectancy years (Fig. 13.5). Despite the criticisms of the use of the uncorrected life expectancy, it is broadly recognized as a viable indicator of well-being.

The number of years that people live in retirement is of special interest from both a personal and a public policy perspective. The data show a large increase in expected retirement years<sup>11</sup> since 1970. From 1970 to 2012, women’s years in retirement increased from 15.0 to 22.5 years and those for men, from 11.0 to 18.0 years (OECD 2014a: 105). France leads in Europe with

<sup>11</sup>“Expected years in retirement” is a calculation of the remaining years of life expectancy from the time one exits the labor force (men and women).



**Fig. 13.6** Perceived health status of men and women in the countries of the European Union, 2009. Question: *How is your health in general? Is it very good, good, fair, poor, very poor?* The figure shows the added percentages

of adults who responded that they perceived their health to be “good” or “very good.” “Adult Population” includes all people 15 years and over (Data from OECD 2014a: 125)

27.4 years of retirement for women and 22.6 years for men. Portugal has the shortest number of retirement years for both men and women. The figures for German men and women are about halfway between the highest and lowest values. The chances that one will spend about two decades in retirement, almost half of one’s working life, have increased considerably. It is beneficial for the individual but a huge financial burden on society.

One should not, of course, expect to see similar trends with regard to citizens’ perceptions of their health status—regardless of an objective analysis of increased life expectancy and improved health status. It may be difficult for people to evaluate their own health, but the perceived health status is clearly a component of well-being. Well-being researchers believe that it is also important that surveys capture how people feel about their health rather than simply determining how healthy they are based on medical diagnoses.

A majority of citizens in all European countries rate their own health status as “good” or “very good” (Fig. 13.6). This definition may be nonprofessional but the subjective health status of European population shows considerable

cross-national variation with countries like Ireland at the top (83.4 %) and Portugal at the bottom (49.7 %). The northern and western European countries rank in the upper half. The results for southern Europe are puzzling: Citizens of Greece and Spain express surprisingly high rates of satisfaction with their own health, whereas people in Portugal report low rates. Citizens in the postsocialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe rate their health status lowest in Europe. In all European countries, more men than women report themselves to be in “good” or “very good” health, but the data show that men die at a lower average age than women. The difference is greatest in the less-developed welfare states of southern Europe and central eastern Europe, which indicates that women are at a special advantage in these countries.

The subjective description of health is also concerned with long-term illnesses or health problems (OECD 2011: 113). These conditions are presumably linked to modern living styles, such as smoking, drinking alcoholic beverages, and physical inactivity. The number of people who regard their long-term health as “poor” or “very poor” ranges from 22 % for Italy to 42 % for Finland. Although people’s health has gener-

ally improved over time, a significant number of people feel dissatisfied with their health, and illness remains a significant dimension of ill-being.

### 13.4.4 Material Standard of Living


Today's per capita GDP follows a typical pattern: At the top are the northern countries, followed by the western European countries, which in turn are followed by the countries of central Europe. Behind them are the southern countries and finally the eastern countries. There are only a few exceptions to this pattern. Changes occurred only rarely (e.g., Germany lost its top position after unification). The East Germans who were incorporated into West Germany from 1990 onward were far less wealthy than the West Germans, which contributed to a somewhat lower position of Germany as a whole.

It should be noted that the GDP expresses the volume of economic activity in the formal economy and ignores production in the shadow and household sectors of the economy. Because both

sectors were especially substantial in the past, the increase in the average standard of living is over-estimated in GDP figures. The second major shortcoming of the aggregate per capita GDP is that it neglects the distribution of income and wealth among households of different sizes and social classes. These topics are discussed in more detail in Sect. 13.5.

Although these indicators may denote economic progress in Europe, they tell us little about how people feel about their economic situation. People tell us how they feel about their economic situation in the answers they give when asked whether they have difficulties making ends meet. As is often said, on average, European economies generate enough for everyone, but problems arise from the unequal distribution of income and wealth.

The fact that a majority of individuals express a subjectively perceived state of economic well-being is a significant attainment. In 2008, only a minority of Europeans reported that they had difficulty making ends meet; the majority were more positive (Fig. 13.7).



**Fig. 13.7** Percentage of people in European countries who reported they were unable to make ends meet, 2008. *Graph* shows percentage of the adult population of each country (Data from OECD 2011: 48)



We find the lowest percentage in Germany, followed by the Netherlands and Finland, with the highest percentages in Greece, Portugal, and Italy. Of the people who report living in poverty, a higher percentage say they have “difficulties” rather than “strong difficulties” to make ends meet. The responses indicate that a majority of people in modern European countries say they have little difficulty making ends meet and that this goal was satisfactorily reached at the end of the last century.

Money is regarded as a material resource, but other survey questions relate to the material possessions of European households, which seem to be below the minimum material well-being standards of most societies. When they were asked questions related to living and housing conditions, 3 % of Europeans said they lacked an “indoor flushing toilet” and 35 % claimed that they suffered from a “shortage of space.” As many as 10 % missed “having a meal with chicken or fish every second day,” and 37 % could not afford “paying for a week’s annual holiday away from home” (Ahrendt et al. 2015: 643, Fig. 29.20). Material living conditions ranged from luxurious lifestyles to severe material deprivation among minorities in various countries. These results reflect the fact that economic well-being is stratified in Europe, which seems to challenge its goal of cohesion and integration.

### 13.4.5 Education

Education is not only an expression of personal competence; it is also the key to better living conditions, better jobs, and better positions and status in society. Education is regarded as an important element of well-being as well as a means to sustain and increase well-being. One can characterize the level of education of a country’s population by estimating the degree of literacy, by measuring the years of schooling, or by determining the level of educational attainment. The educational profile of a country changes slowly despite quickly rising educational levels


for the younger ones because the younger generation has to complete their education and to enter into adulthood.

Traditional indicators of literacy have become obsolete as more people have become educated. Once countries come close to 100 % literacy, this indicator does not seem to convey significant information (OECD 2014b).<sup>12</sup> In recent times, entry into the information society has been achieved by increasing the years of schooling.

In the past, years of schooling were indicative of progress in Western Europe, which was close behind its Western counterparts in America and Australia, ahead of Eastern Europe, and far ahead of the countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa (OECD 2014b: 95). In 2012, the average years of schooling in the European Union countries ranged from 12.9 years in Germany (previously, most frequently the leader) to 8.0 years in Portugal, the only European country to have fewer than 9 years of schooling (Fig. 13.8). Other southern European countries like Italy and Spain also had low values. Many countries were relatively close, with 10–12 years of schooling. As with other indicators, Europe is characterized by a broad middle field with a few leaders and some laggards. However, the increase in the number of school years per person stagnated from 2010 forward. Nevertheless, education remains a high priority for the European welfare states (compare education in Sect. 13.6.4).

Compared with other life domains, satisfaction with one’s own education was comparatively low. Members of the older generations were always at a disadvantage in relation to the increasing educational opportunities available to the younger generations, which probably devalued their educational status and their well-being. But the benefits of higher degrees may be diminished when more and more of the younger cohorts attain higher degrees.

<sup>12</sup>This is not the case for immigrants and their children, for whom language is a key problem.



**Fig. 13.8** Years of schooling in selected European Union countries, 1950–2010 and 2012. 1950–1980 (OECD concept): Average years of education in the population aged 15 years and older. 1980–2012 (Human Development Report Concept): Mean years of schooling received by


people ages 25 and older, converted from education attainment levels using official durations at each level; a new component of the HDI since 2012 (Data from United Nations Development Programme 2010: 17; van Zanden et al. 2014: 88–100)

### 13.4.6 Overall Subjective Well-Being: Satisfaction with Life

It is never fully reliable to characterize a country by just one indicator, but if one had to choose just one, the decision would be for the general satisfaction with life of the individual. What social scientists have to trust, if they regard the indicator “life satisfaction” as valid, is that the people being surveyed take into consideration all those aspects that are relevant to their lives. Among a number of quality-of-life surveys that were carried out in European countries and elsewhere, one survey from Eurostat conducted in 2013 measured life satisfaction on an 11-point scale (0–10, with 1 reflecting “high dissatisfaction” and 10 “high satisfaction”). The results indicated that the European populations shared a clear pattern of different levels of satisfaction that were on average on the same level as those of the United States (European Commission 2015) (Fig. 13.9; see also Fig. 13.19).

One finds the largest group of countries with highly satisfied populations in northern and central Europe: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Ireland. These eight European Union countries, which were at the top of both Europe’s and the world’s satisfaction hierarchy in 2013, expressed values ranging from 7.4 to 8.0 (on a scale of 0–10). These results have been reproduced in a number other surveys. It has been hypothesized that these populations express high levels of satisfaction because their countries are relatively small, which facilitates social cohesion and national identity. These countries are also characterized by increasing economic wealth, long-term stable democracies, and welfare state regimes, all of which probably contributes to their success.

In contrast, 12 countries in southern and eastern Europe fall below the European Union average in terms of satisfaction: the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Western European



**Fig. 13.9** Life satisfaction in European Union (EU) countries according to European region, 2013. Life satisfaction scale from 0 to 10 in response to the question: “how satisfied are you with your life these days? 11-point

scale: 0 = not satisfied at all; 10 = fully satisfied.” Countries marked with “\*” have populations that exceed 30 million (Data from Eurostat 2015)

countries with an authoritarian past until the late 1970s (Greece, Portugal, Spain), countries under socialist rule until 1991 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary), and Italy and Cyprus. Their satisfaction levels range from 8 to 6.9. Most of these countries are among the poorer countries of Europe. They did not institute democratic welfare regimes like the countries in northern Europe, and they continue to experience economic difficulties. Of particular interest is Greece, which, at the time of this writing, is undergoing serious political and economic turmoil. This turmoil has led to discussion of a possible “Grexit,” or withdrawal from the European Union, which presumably can be avoided.

In terms of level of satisfaction, an overwhelming majority of the European population lies in the middle (7.0–7.3): This group includes four large European countries (France, Germany, United Kingdom, and Poland) and four small ones (Malta, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia). These results indicate that the European Union remains a satisfying place to live.

The satisfaction hierarchy of the European countries has remained relatively stable during the years 2013, and 2011, when a second representative survey was carried through (Ahrendt et al. 2015). Only a few countries changed positions: Greece and Spain fell eight ranks, however, thereby illustrating that the dilemma of most of the southern European Union states is both objective and subjective. In contrast, Poland and Slovakia climbed several levels in the satisfaction hierarchy, possibly reflecting the reality that the socialist past is “history.”

The non-European Union members inside the territorial boundaries of the European Union are at the top of the satisfaction hierarchy and may represent a challenge to the European Union members. However, their situation may be affected by the fact that they have access to special resources not available in European Union countries: oil in Norway, fish in Iceland, and financial services in Switzerland. However, dissatisfaction does exist in these areas. For example, the countries that were formerly part of Yugoslavia

that are candidates for European Union membership have much higher dissatisfaction ratings than other European Union countries. Adding the dissatisfied Balkan states to the European Union may have the effect of lowering the overall satisfaction level of the European Union. Current problems with large numbers of immigrants seeking refuge in the European Union may also have a negative impact on the satisfaction level of the European Union population.

The countries of the European Union have a strong attraction for the many dissatisfied peoples who live beyond its borders. The low levels of satisfaction in Algeria (5.4), Morocco (5.4), Egypt, and the African continent motivate large numbers of people from these areas to attempt to reach Europe. Many dissatisfied citizens of Turkey (4.9), which is a traditional migration country for Germany, and of the Ukraine and Russia (5.5), which are engaged in local wars, also struggle to enter European Union countries. A possible solution to this dilemma is to reduce the discrepancies between the European Union and its neighbors.

Since the 1960s, there have been discussions about horizontal disparities (i.e., the level of satisfaction may be higher or lower in different life domains). One would expect that most people try to gain a high level of satisfaction in all life domains, but empirical studies show that this is not the case. European responses indicate ladders of satisfaction in which family life (2011) or personal relationships (2013) are at the top, and standard of living (2011) or financial situation (2013) is toward the bottom (Fig. 13.10).

This finding may appear surprising for wealthy societies as Europe. The material needs of Europeans seem difficult to satisfy, especially if there are significant inequalities. Social support and personal relationships seem to be important, contributing to the well-being of family members and friends. Paradoxically, separation and divorce may keep family satisfaction high, because the dissatisfied couples probably divorce and drop out of the married population, thereby increasing the average satisfaction level of the remaining family members. Figure 13.10 shows horizontal satisfaction discrepancies that were similar in 2011 and 2013, though the researcher did not

choose the same categories. Additional studies support the hypothesis that those domains that are characterized by a high level of individual responsibility receive higher levels of satisfaction than those domains in which the state or some other institution takes responsibility (Glatzer 2008).

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

## 13.5 Disadvantaged Population Groups and Minorities

Even though the population in Europe is, as mentioned previously, relatively homogeneous, different segments of the population experience varying degrees of well-being. “Diversity” seems broadly accepted and is tolerated whereas “inequalities” and “disadvantages” are widely criticized and are often major drivers of social unrest. However, the boundary between tolerated diversities and disparaged inequalities is blurred, and both factors are often sources of deep conflict. Various European constitutions define categories of people who have to be protected from discrimination on the basis of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, and sexual orientation. Because a complete discussion of disadvantaged population groups is beyond the scope of this chapter, we focus on groups disadvantaged as a function of age, gender (women), poverty level, education, ethnicity, migration status, and social isolation (Fig. 13.10).

### 13.5.1 Age

In every society, relations between younger and older population groups have to be balanced with respect to their participation in societal activities and their well-being. Younger people in particular suffer from unemployment. Members of the older generation fear poverty, and they worry about support in times of infirmity and dementia. However, young people (16–24 years) and those of early old age (65–74 years) show a higher level of life satisfaction than one would expect, especially given the fact that they are often considered disadvantaged (Fig. 13.11). The adjacent age groups (25–34 years and 74 and more years)

**Fig. 13.10** Average satisfaction for selected life domains in the European Union (EU-28), 2011 and 2013. European Union average for 28 countries, 2011: 10-point satisfaction scale ranging from 1 to 10; 2013: 11-point satisfaction scale from 0 to 10 (Drawing by Kolja Glatzer; data from Ahrendt et al. 2015: 634, Fig. 29.1 and Eurostat 2015)



**Fig. 13.11** Life satisfaction for selected sociostructural and disadvantaged population groups in the European Union, 2011. Categories are gender, age, education, income, unemployment, citizenship, and illness. Question: all things considered, how satisfied would you say you are with your life these days? Please, tell me on a scale of 1–10, where 1 means “very dissatisfied” and 10 means “very satisfied.” Legend: Gender (male/female), age

(below 24/25–34/35–49/50–64/above 75); Education (Only compulsory level or less/Completed secondary level/Tertiary level); Income (poorest quartile/second quartile/third quartile/richest quartile); Unemployment (below 12 months/above 12 months); Citizenship: Non-European Union (EU) citizens; Illness (slightly limited by illness/severely limited by illness) (Data from Ahrendt et al. 2015: 633, Fig. 29.9)

also show a relatively high level of life satisfaction. In comparison, the “active” population (25–64) has a comparatively low level of life satisfaction. In most cases, European researchers

found that life satisfaction is related to age by a U-shaped curve (OECD 2014a: 135), but this view has been questioned by other researchers (Ahrendt et al. 2015). Perhaps people in the

middle age groups are overly burdened by family responsibilities, whereas the younger and older people are to some degree exempt from these responsibilities. An additional argument is that those in the older age group who are dissatisfied pass away sooner and therefore may not be included in the sample of the older population, giving the skewed impression that satisfaction among the elderly is higher than in the other age groups.

The U-shaped curve only indicates differences between age groups at a point in time and provides a cross-sectional view. It does not imply that the young begin with a high level of satisfaction, then lose ground during the middle years of their adult life, and regain a high level when they become older. Longitudinal research would be needed to prove such a life-course trajectory.

People in different age brackets seem to exhibit differences in feelings of well-being, but the differences are not large enough to account for social unrest. However, as the percentage of older people in the population increases over time, the challenge will be how a small number of people in the middle age group can support the increasing number of older people with respect to financial and eldercare matters. A difficult goal for future public policy is to develop policies and programs to achieve a balance between the demands of the young and the old.

### 13.5.2 Gender

Just as it is necessary to find a balance between the generations, it is necessary to find a balance between the sexes. Disadvantages faced by women compared with men are well-documented: Women achieved the right to vote later than men; for a long time, higher education was not available to women; women did not have the same employment opportunities as men; and, in the business world, the top positions were held by men. These differences varied by country. On a positive note, there have been substantial improvements related to these issues.

Overall, men and women in Europe have the same subjective well-being score (7.1) on the

10-point scale (cf. Fig. 13.11). This finding contradicts the expectation that, because the conditions of women's lives are regarded as more disadvantageous, their life satisfaction score should be lower than that of men. However, the situation varies across the European countries. One finds more satisfied men than women in Hungary, Slovenia, and Portugal and more satisfied women than men in Finland, Ireland, and Denmark. Other countries report a balance in satisfaction levels between the sexes: Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Women and men express equal levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Perhaps this equality in life satisfaction has been influenced by the women's movement across the whole of Europe. Perhaps men and women derive life satisfaction from different sources.

Other measures of well-being show that gender differences interact with a host of other factors. For example, studies with the affect balance scale show that women experience much less positive affect (e.g., feeling recognized by others) during the day than men (Bradburn 2015). In most European countries, the positive affect balance score is higher for men, which means that they experience more positive emotions during the day.

### 13.5.3 Education

A recent OECD report (2011:145) states that "educational levels have increased in all countries." Those who earn higher educational degrees attain higher levels of satisfaction than those who earn no or the lowest degree (cf. Fig. 13.11). One can argue that a higher educational degree leads to a better position in society and hence contributes to a higher level of life satisfaction. In Europe, evidence suggests that the educational system contributes to life satisfaction. However, the differences from country to country seem to be extreme. Among the European Union countries, Portugal, Spain, and Slovenia show particularly large gaps between people with low levels of compulsory education and those with tertiary



education. In contrast, in Ireland, Sweden, and Denmark, the gap in the life satisfaction levels of the highly and the less well-educated is not large (OECD 2011: 276). In sum, educational attainment seems to affect well-being differently, depending on the country and culture.

The fact that levels of education have improved everywhere in Europe raises an interesting question: Does widespread education increase the level of life satisfaction or does educational attainment contribute less to life satisfaction as education becomes increasingly universal? The assumption is that the benefits of education diminish as it becomes increasingly widespread. This phenomenon reflects an “education paradox”: When more and more people attain higher educational degrees, the positive outcomes of education are diminished.

### 13.5.4 Low Income and Poverty

We have known for some time that income is highly correlated with life satisfaction (Fig. 13.11). This finding is not surprising because nearly everything in life that people want can be obtained by money. Goods and services can be bought with money; other ways to satisfy needs (for example, health, security, romance) can also be achieved directly or indirectly with money. Thus, money contributes indirectly to well-being.

According to the “Easterlin Paradox” (Easterlin 2015), the relationship between income and happiness is elusive. When we correlate income and happiness over time, we find no or only a weak relationship. That is, when income rises, happiness remains stable. However, in cross-sectional studies, evidence suggests that income and happiness are positively related; however, the relationship is not linear. Specifically, happiness increases when income increases up to a certain point, then it levels off. The effect of income on life satisfaction of the poor in a rich country with a growing economy is less well investigated. European societies show dramatically different poverty rates, and about 10–23 % fall under the poverty threshold of 60 % of the median income. Former socialist countries

like the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary have the lowest poverty rates; Spain, Estonia, and Austria have the highest poverty rates. A broad middle field of European countries have poverty rates between 12 % and 20 %.

### 13.5.5 Unemployment

In many European countries, a significant segment of the population, in particular young people, suffer from unemployment. Economists regard a certain level of unemployment in free economies as unavoidable. But unemployment has dire consequences on people’s lives. The first unemployment studies in Europe showed the dramatic effect of unemployment on family well-being (Lazarsfeld et al. 1933). Recent studies of the well-being of the unemployed in Europe indicate that unemployed individuals report the lowest levels of life satisfaction. Moreover, the long-term unemployed are much more dissatisfied than the short-term unemployed (Fig. 13.11). It turns out that unemployment and illness are the most significant threats to well-being in Europe. Unemployment insurance may provide partial relief to the unemployed, but money cannot fully compensate for all of the downsides of unemployment.

### 13.5.6 Minorities and Migrants

Minorities are ethnically or linguistically homogeneous groups within nations who are often the targets of prejudice, discrimination, and, in some cases, violence. They are frequently harassed by hate groups. We also see interethnic conflict (i.e., conflict between different minority groups). Estimates vary as to the number of ethnic minorities in Europe: 54–300, depending on definitions. The number of people who belong to these groups is estimated to be about 100 million or 14 % of the European population. Minority groups exist in every European country (Ethnic Groups in Europe 2015). Some groups are ancient, such as the “Sorbs and Wenden,” Slavic tribes who came to Germany 1400 years ago and have maintained their own culture and language to this day. The

Jews, considered a minority worldwide, were repeatedly persecuted in Europe, especially during the Holocaust era of the Nazi regime. They are still considered a minority, but the public now feels a strong sense of responsibility to protect them. The Roma people (also known as gypsies or Romani) are a widespread minority who have long struggled for fair treatment in many European countries. They are often discriminated against. There are also locally restricted minorities in a larger country, such as the Basques in Spain, who became embroiled in a quasimilitary conflict with the Spanish government. Belgium is an example of a whole country that is divided ethnically—between the Dutch-speaking Flemish and the French-speaking Walloon. Moreover, large minority groups exist within even larger communities, such as the Turks in Berlin (e.g., Berlin is viewed as the largest Turkish city outside Turkey). Of particular concern is the Muslim population in Europe: A very small number of individuals within that community seem to have become radicalized and engage in terrorist activities in Europe and elsewhere. The list of minorities in each country is endless and beyond the scope of this chapter. Minorities sometimes receive special political attention, for example, the Council of Europe declared in 1995 a Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

It is difficult to evaluate the levels of well-being of minorities in Europe. However, credible data can be found in studies on tolerance (i.e., tolerance toward minority population groups). In 2007, a Gallup survey conducted in various European countries asked whether “Europe is a good place for racial and ethnic minorities.” From 11 % to 33 % of respondents did not think that their own country was tolerant of ethnic minorities. Citizens of the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark, however, felt that their countries are good places to live for racial and ethnic minorities (Fig. 13.12).


We have witnessed many waves of migration for centuries between different parts of Europe and abroad; such migrations continue to cause social malaise in contemporary Europe. Most often, migrants attain a higher level of life satisfaction in their adopted country than in their home

country but score lower levels of satisfaction than the resident population (see Fig. 13.11). The most significant issue today is the stream of immigrants coming from North Africa, some Baltic countries, and Turkey. Prospective immigrants sometimes experience difficulties crossing the highly protected borders of Europe and the Mediterranean Sea; some perish in shipwrecks. These casualties at Europe’s southern border have created a dilemma for the European Union, namely, how to control and distribute the flow of migrants into the European countries while ensuring their safety and welfare. Perhaps the new migrants could be assimilated into communities of older migrants who have been integrated to varying degrees into their host country with subsequent generations. In any case, migration remains a major topic of debate in the European Union.

### 13.5.7 Social Isolation

Most people would agree that living with others is preferable to living alone. People who are widowed, divorced, or separated tend to live alone not by choice. People living alone may not necessarily lack social support; they may have their own social networks outside the household. An increasing number of people in Europe live alone and, as far as we know, they are less satisfied than people who have stable relationships. Europeans experience varying levels of social contacts with friends and relatives at least once a week (OECD 2011: 175). The percentage of people who have relatives or friends they can count on for help in times of need also differs (OECD 2011: 174).

One sees significant disparities in Europe concerning close relationships: Most adults in European societies are married, but there are large cross-national and cross-cultural variations (OECD 2014c: 93). The marriage rate of the adult population is highest in Catholic countries like Italy, Portugal, Greece, and Spain, surely due to religious tradition. Estonia, Hungary, Sweden, and Finland, which represent Protestant Christianity, have fewer married couples. Some nonmarried people live with a nonmarried “domestic partner” (OECD 2014c: 93). The larg-



**Fig. 13.12** Europe as a “Good Place” for racial and ethnic minorities as perceived by the inhabitants of European Union (EU) countries, 2007. Question: “Is the city or area where you live a good place or not a good place to live for

racial and ethnic minorities?” (Ordered by the percentage of “good place” responses). Telephone and face-to-face interviews with approximately 1000 adults (15 and above) in each country (Data from Nyiri and English 2007)

est numbers of nonmarried partners are found in Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Slovenia. The family model for the Catholic south differs from that for the Protestant north of Europe, which seems to have implications for well-being. People with relatives or friends can count on their social networks in times of need. People in Iceland, Denmark, and Sweden frequently have a stronger support system than people in Portugal, Estonia, and Italy (OECD 2011: 174).

Despite the trend toward increasing individualization in modern societies at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the majority of Europeans do not report being lonely. However, the differences between the northern and southern countries in response to a survey question about loneliness are remarkable: Loneliness is lowest in Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Finland and highest in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Italy, and Greece. The Protestant culture of the north contrasts with the Catholic cul-

ture in the south. As we have seen previously, the broad homogeneous “middle field” of countries report a moderate degree of loneliness. The challenges inherent in supporting people who lack a significant social network will continue to mount.

### 13.6 Welfare State, Self-Sufficiency, and Well-Being

We have classified the European welfare states using the well-known typology of Esping-Andersen (1990) and supplemented by other

authors. We added two types to cover the southern European countries and central/eastern European countries, which were not included in Esping-Andersen’s original welfare state regime typology (Sidebars 13.2, 13.3, 13.4, 13.5 and 13.6).

The first three regime types can be interpreted as ideal types with a clear vision of society; the latter two are residual types that have some features in common but are diverse and less coherent in other respects. It should be noted that all currently existing welfare states in Europe represent a blend of the different ideal types without losing their distinctive features. Sweden, Norway,

#### Sidebar 13.2 The Liberal Welfare State

Advocates of the liberal version of the welfare state believe in the superior efficiency of market production and distribution of rewards. Therefore, they do not see the necessity for political intervention in the marketplace; rather, they regard it as detrimental. For the same reason, they want to restrict the public provision of goods and services to “pure” public goods (such as defense, police, courts) and to exclude those services that can also be provided by the private sector. They believe that social problems will be solved by economic growth and by having as many people as possible earn their living by gainful employment. Even if combating poverty is accepted as a social policy goal, it is assumed that this purpose is best served when social transfers are targeted to “the deserving poor” and the level of benefits is kept at a minimum to provide incentives for participation in the labor market. Because liberals believe in the incentive effects of unequal rewards, the reduction of income inequalities *per se* is not a priority for them; it becomes necessary only if some minimum threshold (e.g., the poverty line) is violated.

#### Sidebar 13.3 The Conservative-Corporatist Welfare State

Proponents of the conservative-corporatist welfare state do not share the unconditional belief of the liberals in the superiority of markets. They accept the capitalist market economy but recognize the necessity of regulating markets, especially labor markets, in order to avoid the negative consequences of capitalist production, above all the exploitation of labor and mass poverty. On the other hand, they also acknowledge the role of the state to care for the subsistence of those segments of the population *not* integrated into the active labor force (the sick, the elderly, children, housewives). This belief is reflected in the establishment of social security/protection systems for these groups to be financed by compulsory contributions. Conservative welfare states rely heavily on social transfers but give a higher priority to social *security* (in the sense of income maintenance) than to social *equality*. With regard to the provision of public goods and services, conservatives share the liberal belief in the superiority of markets and are likely to be restrictive. They believe that income redistribution by social transfers to groups outside the labor market is sufficient to give them the purchasing power to buy the necessary goods and services and that certain services (such as child-rearing and care) will be provided anyway by families.

#### Sidebar 13.4 The Social-Democratic Welfare State

Advocates of the social-democratic welfare state do not believe in the “distributive justice” of capitalist market economies (although they generally accept their “allocative efficiency”) but want (and feel legitimized) to correct the distributive results by political means. First, they put a heavy emphasis on social justice, by which they mean less inequality in living conditions, not just the absence of poverty. This goal is to be achieved by universal optimal rather than minimal benefits, to be financed from general tax revenues (i.e., without a direct link to individual contributions). It is thus accepted that striving for more equality involves a high degree of wealth redistribution and high levels of taxation. Second, they place a high priority on the public provision of goods and services to make up for the deficiencies of the private markets. This approach applies above all to the domain of *social* services, which, if provided by the market, would be subject to the (lack of) purchasing power of those most in need of these services. Third, they recognize the necessity to regulate labor markets and thereby to limit the scope of inequality through the distribution of market income on the one hand and to secure high levels of employment on the other. The latter goal is also pursued by extended active labor market policies.

#### Sidebar 13.5 The Rudimentary Welfare State

The rudimentary welfare state shares many of the characteristics of the conservative-corporatist model but attributes a lesser role to the state. Public schemes for social protection and state-run social services are less well-developed. Instead, more responsibility for people’s well-being is assigned to families and kinship and to voluntary charitable organizations, above all those run by the churches.


#### Sidebar 13.6 The Postsocialist Welfare State

The postsocialist welfare state, in contrast, shares certain features of the social-democratic model, in particular the concern for equality of living conditions and the preference for government intervention to achieve these results. More importantly, the countries classified as “post-socialist”—although they have undergone profound political and socioeconomic transformations since the demise of communist rule—are still characterized by the legacies of their past from the postwar period to the 1990s.

Denmark, and Finland represent the social-democratic welfare state in its most typical form, but its main characteristics are also shared by the Netherlands. The Western European countries of Germany, Austria, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg represent the conservative type of welfare state. The liberal welfare state type is approximated by the United Kingdom and

Ireland.<sup>13</sup> Characteristics of the rudimentary welfare state are typically found in the southern European countries of Italy, Spain, Portugal, and

<sup>13</sup>For the sake of comparison, we have also chosen to subsume under the liberal welfare state the non-European countries of the United States, Canada, and Australia, which are regarded by many scholars as more typical representatives of this type of regime.



**Fig. 13.13** Employment and unemployment rates by type of welfare state, 2000–2013. Employment rate as percentage of population aged 15–64. Unemployment rate

as percentage of population aged 15–64 years, employed or actively seeking employment (Data from OECD 2015)

Greece. Finally, the central Eastern European countries of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and the Slovak Republics are classified as postsocialist regimes.<sup>14</sup> This classification roughly resembles the main geographical regions in Europe suggested in the introduction.

### 13.6.1 Employment and Unemployment

“Self-sufficiency is promoted by ensuring active social and economic participation by people” (OECD 2011: 31). Paid employment, which is considered the prime indicator for self-sufficiency, provides economic resources that enable people to support themselves and their families. Only in cases when they are—temporarily or permanently—unable to earn their living

by paid employment does the state step in to provide substitute “social income.” Moreover, as mentioned previously, active participation in the labor force promotes social interaction with fellow workers, allowing one to participate in social activities beyond the workplace. Participation in the labor force gives people a sense of dignity; it makes them feel that they are valuable members of society. Therefore, participation in the labor force contributes to subjective well-being at the micro level and to social cohesion and social integration at the macro level.

When the employment rate is used to evaluate the performance of countries in terms of self-sufficiency, it immediately becomes evident that the different types of welfare states have distinct profiles (Fig. 13.13).

On average, employment rates are consistently highest in countries with a social-democratic regime. All of the social-democratic countries (with the exception of Finland) have long had employment rates of more than 70 % of the population between 15 and 64 years, rates which have been matched by the United Kingdom

<sup>14</sup>Some smaller countries (for instance the Baltic States, Malta, and Cyprus), for which the quality of data often appears to be less reliable, have been excluded from the analysis.




and only recently by Austria and Germany. This finding comes as no surprise, given the high priority that these countries assign to an active labor market policy and full employment. On the other hand, it contradicts the widely held view that (all too) generous welfare states would make it easy *not* to participate in the labor market.

European countries using the conservative model of the welfare state perform less well (with the partial exception of Germany and Austria in recent years, as mentioned above), although their employment rates are still above the European Union average. Employment rates in the rudimentary welfare states of southern Europe and the postsocialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe are clearly below the European Union average and often do not exceed 60 %, the only exceptions being Portugal and the Czech Republic. Although employment rates in the eastern European countries were improving slowly, there has been a clear downward trend in recent years in the southern European countries because of the financial and economic crises.

The main reason for the cross-national differences in employment rates is the different levels of inclusion of women in the labor markets (Fig. 13.14). The employment rates for men are similar, with a slightly decreasing trend over time. However, employment rates for women differ sharply, although they have been rising in most European countries over the last decades, with some exceptions. In the Scandinavian countries, the employment rates for men and women are almost the same, especially among the younger cohorts. In most other European countries, the differences in employment rates for men and women sometimes exceed more than ten percentage points. Surprisingly, employment rates for women are fairly low in postsocialist countries, despite the ideological claims of their former regimes of gender equality.

Unemployment indicates the *lack* of economic participation and a *loss of income* that make self-sufficiency problematic, if not impossible. Moreover, numerous studies show the severe social and psychological consequences of unemploy-



**Fig. 13.14** Employment rates of men and women by type of European welfare state, 2013 (Data from OECD 2015)

ment, especially long-term unemployment, for physical and mental health, for social exclusion, even stigmatization, and for loss of self-esteem.

Unemployment rates measure the lack of available jobs for those who are seeking work. Whereas employment rates are measured as a percentage of the *entire working-age population* (15–64 years), unemployment rates are usually defined as a percentage of the *dependent labor force* (employed and unemployed, but excluding the self-employed), leaving aside those not seeking a job at all. Therefore, unemployment rates seem to be stronger indicators for evaluating labor market policies to provide jobs than for measuring the “activity level” of the working-age population. It is thus possible that two countries may show the same unemployment rates but highly different employment rates. In the latter case, the country with the higher employment rate would be preferable because of its higher “activity level.”

A comparison of unemployment rates across European countries (Fig. 13.13) shows a pattern similar to that of employment rates, but with some differences. Unemployment rates are generally much more volatile because they more directly reflect the fluctuations in economic activities. Unemployment rates in the years after 2000 were lowest in the developed welfare states, whether social-democratic, conservative, or liberal. All of these countries (except for Ireland in recent years) had unemployment rates well below the European Union average. The fact that the differences *between* the clusters were small compared to the variation *within* each cluster indicates that national labor market policies may be more or less effective, regardless of the type of welfare state.

In the countries of eastern and southern Europe, unemployment rates are generally above the European Union average. However, the post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe have exhibited a slowly decreasing trend, suggesting that the problems of the economic transformation will gradually be overcome. In contrast, unemployment in the southern European countries is rising dramatically in the wake of the recent economic crisis, sometimes to levels of more than 20 % in

the countries that were hit hardest (Greece, Spain).


Whereas the employment rate reveals a considerable gender gap, as shown above, the unemployment rate exhibits no such gender gap. If anything, women have a slight advantage in the more developed and a slight disadvantage in the less developed welfare states.

### 13.6.2 Income Distribution and Poverty

In the OECD framework for social indicators mentioned before, income inequality is listed as the prime indicator of *equity*, particularly *equity in outcomes*. “Income inequality is a natural starting point for considering equity across the whole of society” (OECD 2011: 33). Because social policy concerns are “more strongly focussed on those at the bottom end of the distribution” (OECD 2011: 33), it is recommended that one use poverty measures in addition to overall inequality.

Although income inequality refers only to financial resources, it can be regarded as the core of social inequalities because the command over financial resources has far-reaching effects on social inequalities in other fields, for instance, health and education, lifestyle, and social status (Böhnke and Kohler 2010; Whelan and Maître 2008). Moreover, researchers have argued (Stiglitz 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett 2010) that the degree of social inequality has important consequences in other spheres of social life, beyond the obvious monetary dimension, above all with regard to social cohesion.

The following indicators are used in this analysis: (1) the Gini coefficient as a measure of income inequality; (2) relative poverty rates, as measured by a poverty line of 50 % of the median household net equivalent income. The results of the analysis are fairly consistent and can be summarized as follows (Fig. 13.15): According to welfare state regime theory, disposable income inequality follows a clear rank-order based on regime type: Countries using the social-democratic model show the lowest degree of



**Fig. 13.15** Income inequality and relative poverty by type of European welfare state, 1990–2010. Data refer to surveys performed most closely to the year indicated; relative poverty line defined as 50 % of median equivalent income; income inequality is measured by the Gini index (Data from OECD 2015)


inequality; the countries using the liberal model exhibit the highest degree of inequality; and the conservative countries of continental Europe are in between. Both the southern European countries and the countries of the liberal cluster have similarly high rates of inequality, whereas the postsocialist countries of central and Eastern Europe are characterized by surprisingly low levels of income inequality. It is suggested that the latter is likely due to low inequality in the primary income distribution (as part of their socialist heritage) rather than to redistributive activities of their current welfare states. Since the mid-1990s, income inequality has increased in most but not in all countries (notably in Sweden and Denmark, which were formerly characterized by outstandingly low levels of inequality).

The extent of relative poverty follows the same pattern as income inequality (Fig. 13.15). In the countries of the social-democratic and the conservative clusters, poverty rates are below 10 %, whereas the countries of the liberal cluster and the southern European countries have poverty rates above 10 %. In the last two decades, poverty has been rising in most European coun-

tries, but relatively more so in those countries where poverty rates initially were low (Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany). On the other hand, poverty has decreased in some countries with initially high poverty rates (Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Portugal). The postsocialist countries (with the exception of Poland) show low, but rising poverty rates because of increasing spreads in income distribution following the economic transformation.

Because many people may be just above but still in danger of falling below the poverty line, a more lenient threshold of 60 % of median equivalent income, called the at-risk-of-poverty line, has been suggested. Indeed, by increasing the threshold line by 10 percentage points, the percentage of the population falling below this line almost doubles. However, the pattern of cross-national differences looks the same.

If one looks at the overall poverty rate of a population as a function of age, that is, children and adolescents (0–17), the working-age population (18–65), and the retirement-age population (over 65 years), the young and the elderly are the most vulnerable groups, and the risk of poverty is



**Fig. 13.16** Relative poverty rates by age groups by type of welfare state, 2010. Relative poverty line defined as 50 % of median equivalent income (Data from OECD 2014c)


lowest in the working-age population (Fig. 13.16). There are, however, significant cross-national differences. In some countries (the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Hungary, Slovakia), the poverty rate among the elderly is actually lower than that of the working-age population. Likewise, the poverty rate among the younger generation is consistently above the population average, except for the Scandinavian countries. These findings lend additional support to the supposition that welfare state arrangements (pension schemes, child allowances) are of crucial importance for the living conditions and well-being of particular groups of people.

### 13.6.3 Health

Over the last 50 years, the average life expectancy in European countries has increased by about 10 years and has reached the threshold level of 80 years in most countries. Whereas the early increases were due mainly to decreasing infant mortality rates, the more recent increases

have been affected by lower mortality rates and increasing longevity in the older age groups (see Figs. 13.5 and 13.17).

The different types of welfare states exhibit only small differences in average life expectancy, probably because the goal of longer life expectancy is politically uncontroversial and because many factors, such as the demographic structure and the working and living conditions, influence life expectancy apart from social policies. Nonetheless, 50 years ago, life expectancy was greatest (even then more than 70 years) in the social-democratic welfare states, followed closely by the liberal welfare states, whereas in the conservative and rudimentary welfare states of continental and southern Europe, life expectancy was still below 70 years. Since then, however, rates of average life expectancy have converged. The advances made in the postsocialist countries have been more limited, probably because the socioeconomic transformation processes in these countries after the demise of communism brought other social problems to the fore.



**Fig. 13.17** Life expectancy and infant mortality rates by type of welfare state, 1960–2010. Infant mortality measured by deaths per 1000 live births (Data from OECD 2013b)

It is well documented that women live longer on average than men. Interestingly, however, this gap in favor of women varies among welfare state types. The life expectancy gender gap is smallest (less than 5 years) in the social-democratic and the liberal welfare states, that is, those with the highest life expectancy, and largest in the postsocialist countries (more than 7 years) with the lowest overall life expectancy.


The factor with the most influence on increasing life expectancy is the reduction of the infant mortality rate, which leads to relatively large increases in “life years gained.” The impact of social and health policies on the infant mortality rate is much more visible than on life expectancy in general (Fig. 13.17). Although it is low compared to other regions of the world, the infant mortality rate in European countries has been cut further over the last five decades to levels below five deaths per 1000 live births. Today, all European countries can boast infant mortality rates that are lower than those of the most advanced countries (Sweden, Finland) only 30 years ago.

The pattern of change in the infant mortality rate is the same as that for life expectancy, but it is more pronounced. The social-democratic and the liberal welfare states have the lowest rates;

the other countries have followed suit but at an increased pace. Particularly in southern Europe and central Eastern Europe, the reduction in the infant mortality rate has proceeded rapidly. In Portugal and Poland, for instance, infant mortality rates in 1960 were ten times higher than they are now. Tremendous progress has been made in achieving lower levels, whereby variation within and across country clusters has been reduced.

### 13.6.4 Education

To characterize the level of education of a country’s population as a component of its well-being, it is necessary to measure the level of educational attainment in the adult population (aged 25 years or more), not just the enrollment ratios of the younger generation currently in educational institutions. The following analysis is based on three levels of educational attainment, as defined in the International Standard Classification of Education developed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization: (1) below upper secondary level; (2) upper secondary level; (3) tertiary level. Attainment of these levels of education is highly correlated with years of



**Fig. 13.18** Trends in educational attainment by type of welfare state, 2000–2013 (Data from OECD 2014b)

schooling, but it also provides information about the *quality* of education.

We used the following two indicators to measure trends in educational attainment: (1) the percentage of adults (25–64 years) who have attained at least the upper secondary level<sup>15</sup>; and (2) the percentage of adults who have attained the tertiary level of education.<sup>16</sup> The percentage of tertiary-educated adults is significant because it tends to be associated with better jobs and higher relative earnings.

Cross-national differences and recent trends in educational development can be summarized as follows (Fig. 13.18): In the member countries of the European Union, on average, three out of four adults have completed at least upper secondary education. This ratio is remarkably high compared to that of earlier periods, even after World War II, and can be considered the result of governments' efforts to expand and improve their educational systems. In most countries, the percentages have continued to rise during the past

decade, but the more advanced countries have reached a saturation level of about 80 %.

Apart from the United States and Canada, the postsocialist countries of central Eastern Europe have the most people with at least an upper secondary education.<sup>17</sup> But also in the Scandinavian countries, and in Austria and Germany as well, more than 80 % of the adult population has attained at least an upper secondary education. The southern European countries are clearly behind in educational development. In these countries, barely more than every second adult has attained this level, although these countries have made considerable progress since 2000.

This same pattern is observed when examining the percentage of adults with tertiary education, but with some qualifications. First, the percentage of citizens with tertiary education has increased, which signifies the strategic importance of higher education for contemporary societies. On average in the European Union, the proportion of citizens at this advanced level of

<sup>15</sup>The percentage of adults below the upper secondary level can thus be calculated as the remaining percentage up to 100 %.

<sup>16</sup>It should be noted that this percentage is just a fraction of the first indicator.

<sup>17</sup>Although it may be true that these countries have undertaken special efforts to raise the educational level of their citizens, the reported figures may at least partly be artefacts resulting from problems in classifying their educational systems.



education has risen from 20 % to almost 30 % within a decade. The highest percentages of tertiary-educated citizens are found in the liberal countries, followed by the social-democratic and, at some distance, the conservative welfare states. In stark contrast to the number of adults with at least an upper secondary education, the postsocialist countries have the lowest percentages of people with tertiary education, even lower than the southern European countries.


Second, there is a greater variation within clusters of welfare state regimes, which indicates a lower correlation between the type of welfare state and achievement in education, suggesting that education policy follows a logic different from that of social and welfare policies.

### 13.6.5 Overall Life Satisfaction by Type of Welfare State

Overall life satisfaction can be regarded as a summary indicator of subjective well-being. For analyzing overall life satisfaction in European countries, we used data from the European Quality of Life Survey (2011/2012), which covered all 28 European Union member states. Life


satisfaction in Europe correlates with the types of welfare states in the various countries. This finding seems to be at odds with an earlier study by Veenhoven, who claimed that “there appears to be no link between the size of the welfare state and the level of wellbeing within it” (2000: 91). However, this apparent contradiction seems to be due to a different conceptualization of “welfare states.” In this study, we focus on (categorically different) *types* of welfare states (“welfare regimes”), whereas Veenhoven refers to the *size* of welfare states, measured by social security expenditures (as percentage of GDP). But, as has been argued in welfare state regime theory (Esping-Andersen 1990: 18ff.), social expenditures as such do not capture the essential qualitative differences between welfare states in terms of goals and content.

The highest level of overall life satisfaction is reported for citizens in the social-democratic welfare states, followed by those in the conservative and the liberal welfare states (Fig. 13.19). All of the aforementioned countries have life satisfaction scores above the European Union average, whereas all southern European countries (except Spain) and all central Eastern European countries are below the European Union average.



**Fig. 13.19** Overall life satisfaction for adult population by type of welfare state, 2011. Adult population includes all people aged 18 years and over. Satisfaction Scale 1–10

(Data from Ahrendt et al. 2015: 629; European Quality of Life Survey 2012)



**Fig. 13.20** Correlation of life satisfaction with household disposable income in countries of the European Union, 2011. Satisfaction Scale 1–10; circles represent

population size of countries; household equivalized disposable income (Data from Ahrendt et al. 2015: 631, Fig. 29.6)

Although there is some variation within the clusters of countries, the average score for the post-socialist countries is lower than that for the southern European countries. Also, there is virtually no difference between the overall life satisfaction scores of men and women.

The differences in mean life satisfaction scores may not appear large, but they correspond fairly well to the differences in objective living conditions. For example, the correlation between the national median household income (measured in purchasing power parity) and the mean life satisfaction scores in European Union countries is  $r = 0.84$  (Ahrendt et al. 2015: 630) (Fig. 13.20).

The institutions of the welfare state have a substantial impact on individual well-being, in particular, on modifying income distribution and on limiting social inequalities. Although the general intention of the welfare state is to contribute to the well-being of its people, different types of welfare states emphasize different goals, such as reaching full employment or reducing income

inequality and combating poverty (see Figs. 13.13, 13.14 and 13.15). Hence, they pursue different strategies and differ in their performance with regard to these goals (Goodin et al. 1999).

## 13.7 Summary

### 13.7.1 Long-Term Change

One can point to clearly negative and positive aspects of long-term development in Europe since the Middle Ages. Because of the many wars and catastrophes, the development of living conditions was profoundly delayed and disturbed time and again, and people were deprived of the necessities of a decent life. People lived for long periods with violence and brutality. Wars and other forms of civil conflict claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. The people of Europe also experienced severe epidemics, famines, large fires, and other natural disasters though presumably less than on other continents.

As soon as they recovered from one disaster, often another one was just around the corner. Given these conditions, many Europeans did not achieve high levels of well-being in objective and subjective terms. Peaceful interludes and protected areas were the exception. It is also not included that people who were able to engage in authoritarian or brutal behavior did experience high levels of personal satisfaction in these difficult times.

Nevertheless, material living conditions improved due to economic growth that, on average, increased income, wealth, consumption, and nutrition. Health and sanitary conditions improved, leading to a dramatically prolonged average life expectancy. Opportunities for political participation improved when suffrage was introduced first for men, then for women. The rise of democracy enabled people to exercise more control over their living conditions, and democratic institutions provided a foundation for claims of well-being on the basis of the political process.

But, Europeans were confronted with new health threats such as infectious diseases; economic growth was adversely affected; and country after country had to bear the cost of unrestricted and unregulated growth, such as damage to the environment. Although the rise of democracy increased people's control over their living conditions, democracy no longer seemed to address everyday problems. In a mixture of progress and regression, conditions both improved and deteriorated. Compared with the rollercoaster development of well-being in the past, the period of relative peace and prosperity that existed for 70 years after the Second World War can be considered as historically unique and unprecedented.

### 13.7.2 Recent Crises

Economic growth occurs in cycles, and the downward trend sometimes dips so low that experts speak of a "crisis." Although the current economic difficulties are not as bad as those that occurred during the postwar period, they have

been defined as a "crisis" by international and European institutions (Ahrendt et al. 2015; OECD 2015). A comparison of well-being data for the years 2007 and 2012 can be used to probe how far the crisis found resonance in peoples' minds. Surprisingly, we found no evidence for a significant change in life satisfaction for Europe as a whole, but some countries gained and others lost in levels of satisfaction. The economic crisis has affected the European countries differently, and people seem to experience its adverse effects differently too.

When people were asked whether "they could make ends meet," the percentage saying "no" was astonishingly high. There is a difference between general satisfaction with life and the ability to make ends meet—because the latter seems to be more sensitive to economic conditions. In general, urban areas seem to be more affected than rural areas. More importantly, those in the lower income bracket experienced the economic crisis more keenly than those in the higher income bracket. The economic crisis of 2013 did not adversely impact Europe as a whole, but individual countries were affected differently, as were the different socioeconomic groups.

### 13.7.3 Future Prospects

Going forward, what can people expect in respect to their well-being? It is not sufficient to develop what is called objective well-being. People require living conditions that are satisfying in both objective and subjective terms. One core element of subjective well-being is overall satisfaction with life, a goal that is comprehensive but difficult to attain and to maintain at a high level. For example, we have learned that, if we reach a new level of well-being, often new threats to that level arise: High levels of good health are challenged by newly emerging diseases; increasing levels of education lose the power to reward because of greater competition for good jobs; and economic growth results in additional costs of economic growth. We should also be aware that satisfaction with life is not a sufficient indicator of a good society, but a life without an adequate

level of satisfaction is not worth living. Since the times of the ancient Greek philosophers, scholars and intellectuals have engaged in deep philosophical debates about the value of satisfaction with life or happiness. A quote often cited in this context is, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied...” (Mills 2007).

This saying is a challenge especially for European intellectuals. Its flaw is that satisfaction is related only to one’s own desires and ignores the plight of other people. Often the opposite is true: People who are satisfied with their own lives tend to be generous with their time and resources in caring for others. Although life satisfaction may be viewed by many people as a “hedonistic” concept, for many others, it is an “empathic” concept. One’s own level of satisfaction also depends on the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of close relatives and friends. Moreover, in our global society, we are steadily informed by the mass media about the suffering of people around the world, be it the abduction of young women in Africa, earthquake damage in Nepal, war victims in the Ukraine, or the terrorist attacks of the 11th of September 2001 in the United States. Many people in Europe and around the world were dismayed and saddened by these events, and similar sources of dissatisfaction will presumably increase. The sense of well-being in the future will be less dependent on individual components and more on national and global components and should be enriched with feelings of solidarity, sympathy, recognition, attention, fairness, security, and trust (Becker and Krättschmer-Hahn 2010).

European governments and media often convey the impression that economic growth is the best way to solve the problems of contemporary societies and elevate happiness in modern Europe. It is disappointing that the concept of *qualitative growth*, which takes into account the potentially negative outcomes of pure quantitative growth and highlights the search for better outcomes, remains in the background. It should be the focal point of attention among public policy officials. A shift in public opinion is needed to make issues of well-being and quality of life the focus of attention.

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Robert A. Cummins and Tanja Capic

## 14.1 Introduction

Oceania is a discrete subregion of the Asia-Pacific region—the world’s largest, most populated, and most culturally diverse region. Oceania itself includes an area of approximately 3.3 million square miles, the vast expanse of which is open waters. Though the region includes 20,000–30,000 islands and smaller islets, it has a combined population of only about 37 million people living in 14 countries (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Solomon Islands) and 25 dependencies (e.g., American Samoa, French Polynesia, Guam, Hawaii, New Caledonia, Northern Mariana Islands, Midway Islands, Pitcairn Island) (Map 14.1). Despite their proximity to the region, Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia,

Malaysia, and the Philippines are not considered part of Oceania but instead are grouped with the Southeast Asian group of nations. Despite the vastness of the earth’s area covered by Oceania, 93 % of the region’s total population resides in just three of its countries: Australia (23.1 million), Papua New Guinea (7.3 million), and New Zealand (4.5 million) (World Bank 2014d). Oceania is geographically divided into three culturally heterogeneous subregions—Melanesia (subregion of Oceania that comprises the four countries of Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea, plus dependencies such as New Caledonia belonging to France and West Papua belonging to Indonesia); Micronesia (subregion of Oceania that comprises thousands of small islands in the western Pacific Ocean; the subregion is divided politically into five sovereign states: the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, and Palau, and three U.S. territories); and Polynesia (subregion of Oceania that comprises over 1000 islands scattered over the central and southern Pacific Ocean; larger political entities include Tonga, Samoa, Malietoa, Tahiti, Hawaii, New Zealand Maori, Fiji, Cook Islands, and Tuvalu). See McKnight (1995) for more details.

This chapter targets three countries within the Oceania region: Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. Australia and New Zealand are relatively homogeneous in character, whereas Papua New Guinea is representative of the

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Imagining himself a “long-winged Hawk” exploiting “ample fields of air” to “wander round the world,” Robert Burton (1621: 408) would seek to verify the many claims made by explorers of his time. This would include establishing whether “*that hungry Spaniard’s discovery of the Unknown Land of Australia, or Magellanica, be as true as that of Mercurius Britannicus ... And yet in likelihood it may be so, for without all question it being extended from the Tropick of Capricorn to the circle of Antarctick, and lying as it doth in the temperate Zone, cannot choose but yield in time some flourishing Kingdoms to succeeding ages ...*”

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**Map 14.1** Regional map of Oceania (CIA 2015; public domain)

remaining small islands in the region. The discussion of Oceania is divided into two parts: The first part focuses on Australia and New Zealand; the second part focuses on Papua New Guinea. However, before discussing these two distinct population segments in Oceania, we first provide the reader with a brief history of the entire region.

## 14.2 An Historical Account

Well-being in Oceania is inseparably linked to the vastness of the region's size, to the diversity of its numerous cultures and societies and, until the nineteenth century, to the isolation of these countries and peoples both from one another and from the rest of the world. The well-being of people in Oceania also is linked to its often harsh weather conditions, low-lying atolls, and to the scarcity of fresh water and productive agricultural land (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2014b).

Countries in the region differ appreciably from each other because of their unique social histories, history of colonization, and the extent to which the indigenous peoples participate in the society's governance. Each society is confronted by a similar set of social challenges to well-being that are experienced by other societies within the region, albeit the resource base available to each in responding to these challenges varies considerably (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2014b).

We analyze the quality of life in these societies in terms of three major dimensions of well-being: economic, health, and educational. These dimensions are extrapolated from the most highly regarded index of comparative objective life quality between nations, namely the *Human Development Index* (HDI) (United Nations Development Programme 2010). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has published the HDI as a series since 1990. Operationally, the HDI is based on a definition of quality of life that takes into account the three

major dimensions of well-being just mentioned: economic, health, and educational. Gross national income per capita is used as the major indicator of economic well-being. Health well-being is captured through life expectancy at birth. Educational well-being is captured using two major indicators, namely mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling. Because the history of well-being of a country or region is not complete without considering subjective well-being (SWB) (i.e., the extent to which people are happy with life overall), we also applied indicators of SWB to analyze the well-being of the people of Oceania.

### 14.2.1 Discovery and Exploration: Development in Isolation

The existence of the Pacific Ocean was confirmed in 1513 when it was first seen from the shores of America by the Spanish explorer and conquistador Vasco Núñez de Balboa. Spanish exploration of the nearest coast lines subsequently was undertaken by Ferdinand Magellan during his first voyage to the region from 1519 to 1521. Explorations increased significantly after 1565 when a circumnavigator and Augustinian priest, Fr. Andrés de Urdaneta, discovered a reliable wind system that would return ships to their point of origin in the Americas. Subsequent voyages led by Abel Tasman (first voyage 1642–1643) and Captain James Cook (first voyage 1768–1771) opened the entire region to Western exploration (Exploration of the Pacific 2014).

The responses of indigenous peoples to the arrival of the Western explorers varied considerably. As reflected in the chronicles that travelled on the Cook expeditions, the initial response appears to have been one of “shock and awe”—shock at the physical appearance of the travellers (bearded, white-skinned people dressed in arms and speaking a language that locals could not understand) and awe at the powerfulness of their weapons and the massive size of the ships on which they travelled (Denoon et al. 2004). During the first two of the three expeditions that Cook would make to the region, he and his crew were

treated by the people they encountered as virtual demigods who brought with them baskets of trinkets, tools, knives, and other highly valued artefacts. Local people, in turn, responded to the gift giving through exchanges of hospitality and by opportunities for the ships’ crews to replenish their dwindling supplies of fresh water, food, and the like. All may have gone well for a long period had not a dispute broken out between the islanders and the explorers on 14 February 1779. In response to islanders taking one of the ship’s small boats, Cook made a bungled effort to retaliate by abducting the Hawaiian King, Kalani’ōpu’u. The islanders responded swiftly to this attack on their homeland and the monarchy. The outcome of the confrontation resulted in the deaths of Captain Cook and several of his crew members. A virtual “closed to visitors” sign was posted on the shores of Hawaii to prevent future visits by explorers.

The story of Captain Cook and the indigenous people of Hawaii is emblematic of what most explorers experienced in their encounters with the region’s diverse populations—open hospitality, followed by a period of mutual observation, followed by some type of conflict, and, in the end, the assertion of cultural and military superiority by the exploring powers (Denoon et al. 2004). In the Hawaiian case, local people initially gained the upper hand. Over time, however, Westerners would return to Hawaii and elsewhere in the region in numbers and with weapons sufficient to overwhelm whatever defense systems local people had constructed to ward off unwanted visitors. In time, nearly all of the major island groupings in the Pacific would be conquered and claimed as territories or colonies of one or another of Europe’s major seafaring nations (i.e., Britain, France, Spain, and Holland). This situation continued until the last quarter of the twentieth century, when large numbers of the sparsely populated, small-island developing states regained their sovereignty: Tonga (1970), Fiji (1970), Papua New Guinea (1975), Solomon Islands (1978), Tuvalu (1978), Kiribati (1979), Vanuatu (1980), Marshall Islands (1986), Federated States of Micronesia (1986), and Palau (1994).

### 14.2.2 Colonization and Well-Being: A Clash of Cultures

The state of well-being in the island states of the Pacific prior to colonization was far from ideal but, following colonization, was even less so—especially in the early years of colonization (Wolfers 2012). From excavated burials in Tahiti, Fiji, Hawaii, and elsewhere, we know that average life expectancy was generally short (certainly less than 40 and closer to 30–35 years).<sup>1</sup> We also know that rates of infant and child mortality were high. Education of the young was informal and performed largely by family members or group elders who passed on their society's traditions and values through the sharing of oral histories, legends, and myths. We also know that considerable conflict existed within and between the diverse factions of the region and that substantial numbers of young people lost their lives to recurring intergroup conflicts—many of which were fought by people living in the same island chain. Warriors were much valued, and their victories became the substance of legends. The region's gods were numerous, omnipresent, and impersonal. They were also all-powerful in that they controlled the land, the ocean, the sky, and the riches that these resources provided. Many of the most powerful gods were conceived of as women, such as Pele (Hawaii's goddess of volcanoes), thereby suggesting a valuing of the feminine and women. Work roles appear to have been clearly demarcated, with men responsible for agriculture, fishing, and hunting whereas women were responsible for cooking, child rearing, and caring for the elderly, sick, and infirm. With notable exceptions (Goettner-Abendroth 2009; Hommon 2013; Hviding and Rio 2011), governance of most of the precolonized indigenous societies appears to have been exclusively in the hands of men.

<sup>1</sup>Multiple sources were consulted in identifying the cultural patterns and shifts in well-being among the indigenous populations of Oceania during the period of colonization: Addison and Sand 2008; Clark and Anderson 2011; Denoon et al. 2004; Goettner-Abendroth 2009; Hommon 2013; Hviding and Rio 2011.

From studies undertaken throughout the region, certain communal values emerged repeatedly. These values, in turn, provide insights into what indigenous people valued, and continue to value, as important elements in achieving a sense of well-being: (1) cooperation rather than competition; (2) sharing rather than acquisition; and (3) conservation rather than consumption. These values are manifested in all aspects of the lives of the region's indigenous peoples (Burt and Bolton 2014; Feinberg 2004; Young-Leslie and Moore 2012).

Given all of the above, the early years of colonization proved devastating to many of Oceania's peoples (Wolfers 2012). The devastation was brought about by three primary drivers: (1) the introduction of communicable diseases against which local populations had no immunities<sup>2</sup>; (2) the devaluing by colonizers of the indigenous culture; and (3) a clash in the organizing principles and values on which indigenous societies were based. The suppression of indigenous religions and mysticism also was a central feature of colonization and significantly weakened the spiritual ties that people had to one another and to the land. The loss of traditional agricultural lands and fishing sites, combined with the confinement of indigenous people to less productive areas lands, also worked to their disadvantage.

### 14.2.3 Well-Being in the Late and Postcolonial Periods: The Quest for Recognition and Global Participation

As evidenced by both the objective and subjective social indicator data reported below for

<sup>2</sup>The introduction of "new" infectious diseases into the region (syphilis, tuberculosis, typhoid, influenza, smallpox), for example, took the lives of as many as 90 % of the population of Tahiti and other islands of French Polynesia in the 19th century (Martin and Combes 1996). The pattern was the same for other colonized island groups, albeit precise numbers concerning the extent of fatalities that resulted from exposure to introduced diseases will never be known. These fatalities, nearly to the point of extinction, were in addition to the many lives that were lost as a result of open combat with colonizers.



Papua New Guinea and for the indigenous populations of Australia and New Zealand, colonization also brought with it many benefits for the region's small-island developing societies. Most of these advances in well-being, however, were not manifest until after the conclusion of World War II, an event that had profound consequences for many of the region's indigenous societies. Central to these advances in well-being have been (1) significant improvements in years of average life expectancy; (2) the establishment of formal health and educational systems, including university-level education; (3) the creation of social programs that provide at least minimal levels of financial support for the aged, orphaned children, persons with severe disabilities, and others who are unable to compete in the region's expanding market economies; and (4) a resurgence of traditional indigenous culture, albeit the new cultures reflect a mixture of Western and indigenous beliefs and practices (Burt and Bolton 2014; International Social Security Administration 2012; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2014b). Perhaps these significant gains in well-being are due to globalization. That is, the majority of the people, especially the Australians and New Zealanders, became more active at the global level. They focused outward and conducted themselves as global citizens. They were engaged in international affairs economically, politically, socially, and in almost every walk of life.

Significant postcolonization improvements also have been made in the region's physical infrastructure including the building of roads, the development of local and interisland transportation systems, and the creation of reliable communications networks (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2013, 2014b). The region's nations also are becoming actors in the global market place via their agricultural exports and thriving tourist industries (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2013). The significance of these gains on the region's collective well-being is reflected in their higher than average rates of economic growth and in their ris-

ing levels of per capita income (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2014a).

Unfortunately, the social and economic disparities that existed in the region's nations prior to independence persist. Regional disparities in well-being are especially significant between rural and urban dwellers and between people who live on the country's principal island versus residents of its outer islands and atolls. These disparities are not expected to disappear in the short term and most likely will increase because these recently independent societies continue to succeed with their modernization efforts.

We now turn our attention to a discussion of changes over time in the well-being of three of the region's largest countries, namely Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea. As previously mentioned, the discussion is divided into two parts. The first part, because of the commonalities between these two societies, focuses on Australia and New Zealand. The second part focuses on Papua New Guinea, a representative of the many small island countries in Oceania.

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### 14.3 Australia and New Zealand

Australia is the world's sixth largest country by area. It comprises the mainland of the Australian continent, the island of Tasmania, and numerous smaller islands. The population of 23 million is highly urbanized and concentrated in the eastern states. New Zealand comprises two main landmasses—the volcanic North and the sedimentary South Islands—together with numerous smaller islands. It is situated some 1500 km east of Australia and, because of its remoteness, it was one of the last lands on earth to be settled by humans. It has a population of about 4.5 million people. Māori, the indigenous people, comprise some 15 % of the New Zealand population whereas Europeans comprise 67 %. Today, about 23 % of New Zealand's population were born overseas (Statistics New Zealand 2006a), which is comparable to the proportion in Australia.

The earliest human remains in Australia date to about 50,000 Before the Common Era (BCE),



which is the era when Australia was first inhabited. Australia was claimed by Great Britain in 1770 and settled through the relocation of British prisoners to the colony of New South Wales. Over the following decades, an additional five self-governing Crown Colonies were established; in 1901, they formed a federation, the Commonwealth of Australia (Parliament Education Office 2010).

Polynesians settled New Zealand in 1250–1300 CE and developed a distinctive Māori culture. In 1840, the British and Māori signed the Treaty of Waitangi, making New Zealand a colony of the British Empire. Unbeknownst to the Maori, however, two different versions of the treaty were signed (one in English and the other in Maori). Tragically for the Maori, the second treaty transferred control over large portions of Maori land to the European control and ownership, a deceitful act that is only today being resolved through the country's judicial system. However, as immigrant numbers increased, larger tracts of Māori land were used for European settlement, and conflicts escalated into the New Zealand Wars from 1845 to 1872. The Māori were defeated, and more of their land was confiscated. Although much of the land has since been returned or compensated, social disruption over these illegal seizures continues (New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage 2014).

The single national language of Australia and New Zealand is English. The number of individual languages listed for Australia is 390 (Ethnologue 2014). Of these, 140 are the languages of immigrants and are spoken at home by a small proportion of the population. Of about 250 Australian indigenous languages, only 145 remain, of which 110 are severely or critically endangered. English is the predominant language in New Zealand, spoken by 98 % of the population. There are two other official languages: Māori, which is spoken by 4.1 % of the population, was declared in 1987, and New Zealand Sign Language, used by approximately 24,000 people, in 2006 (Statistics New Zealand 2006b).

Australia and New Zealand were colonized by Europeans fewer than 250 years ago, creating two cultural groups within each nation: the indig-

enous people and the colonizers. This chapter is concerned mainly with the history of objective well-being, encapsulated in terms of economic well-being, health, and education, with an emphasis on the period since 1945. It also, within the limited historical resources available, addresses changes in SWB and changes in how quality of life has been regarded within each population over this period. Two aspects of these changes are given special attention: (1) the national approaches that have been undertaken to promote individual and collective well-being; and (2) changes in the well-being of vulnerable and disadvantaged population groups relative to general population standards. These disadvantaged groups include women, children, people who are elderly, people who are poor, and people who are disabled.

Australia and New Zealand are culturally similar compared to Papua New Guinea. In terms of their influence on the region, the island-continent of Australia dominates. It has the largest landmass, the largest population, and the most economic resources. The other economically developed country is New Zealand, which has a strong influence among the Pacific Island nations.

Australia and New Zealand have existed in an atmosphere of friendly cooperation since settlement. They sent fighting forces to join the Allies in both world wars. During World War II, Japanese forces invaded Papua New Guinea Troops from Australia, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands opposed them. The only direct contact with war in Australia was when Japanese bombs fell on the northern capital city of Darwin. Neither Australia nor New Zealand has experienced foreign invaders on their soil since settlement (National Archives of Australia 2011; New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage 2014).

Although Australia and New Zealand are young countries, each had an indigenous population at the time of settlement. Over the entire period of recorded history, the quality of life of these peoples has remained relatively disadvantaged compared to that of the settlers (Mitrou et al. 2014).

Three themes flow through this description:

1. The changing meaning of well-being within the historical context
2. The major changes in well-being that have been realized, especially as linked to historical events and initiatives
3. The implications of these changes in well-being, which are addressed in the discussion.

### 14.3.1 Well-Being of the People of Australia and New Zealand

In this section, we describe the well-being of Australians and New Zealanders in terms of the three major objective dimensions described above—economic, health, and educational—and in terms of SWB). We focus on the indicators that comprise the HDI because the community of quality-of-life scholars recognizes these as the three major dimensions of well-being at the national level.

#### 14.3.1.1 Economic Well-Being of the People of Australia and New Zealand

European settlement of Australia began in 1788 with a consignment of English convicts, guarded by a detachment of Royal Marines. Although the convicts were well equipped, few had knowledge of farming: The first crops failed, and the colony nearly starved to death. The first immigrant free settlers arrived in 1793. Although conditions gradually improved, life was extremely hard for everyone and brutal for the convicts. Whereas men endured forced labor and severe forms of punishment, women were assigned as domestic servants, with many forced into prostitution.

The first export was timber. The first successful wheat crop was produced in 1789 and became a major export along with wool and, more recently, coal and natural gas. However, it was the discovery of gold in 1851 that really transformed the nation's finances. Australia now has the world's 12th-largest economy and its 5th-highest per capita income. However, its Gini index is 35.2 (medium), which places it 46th in terms of equality of income distribution; Sweden's Gini index is 25.0 and that of the


United States is 40.8. Thus, the much loved (by Australians) egalitarianism (Poleg 2004) does not extend to income. However, there are minimum wage and social security safety nets, which provide, at minimum, an income of about one third of the average wage.

The level of unemployment has varied greatly over the years but has been at about 4–6 % over the past decade (Fig. 14.1) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1977, 2014; Butlin 1977). Thus, Australia largely escaped the ravages of the recent general financial crisis. In 2004, the wealth (assets minus liabilities) of the average Australian household was about \$500,000 (D430,000). For most Australians, their home represents their single biggest asset. For many, it also represents their largest liability. The average mortgage at that time was \$113,000, dwarfing other kinds of financial liabilities. Thus, the economic well-being of people with a mortgage is highly vulnerable to factors affecting loan repayments.

On the asset side of the ledger, about 20 % of Australians own property in addition to their home, usually a holiday home or an investment property. The next most valuable asset for most Australians is their superannuation (the amount deducted regularly from employees' incomes in a contributory pension), which is compulsory for full-time employees, at an average value of \$63,000.

There are also substantial geographical differences in wealth. The average net worth of a Sydney household in 2003–2004 was \$640,600, due largely to the high value of property. The lowest average net wealth for any geographic group is for Tasmanians not living in Hobart, at \$289,000.

The first European settlers to come to New Zealand were traders who came to exploit the country's natural resources, often in the form of "an uncontrolled plunder," which involved seal-skins, seal and whale oil, timber, flax, and tattooed Māori heads. In the 1830s, shore whaling stations were established, usually with a farm for self-sufficiency in food. Such farms heralded the change from an economy based on extractive industries to one based on farming. This change was enhanced by the beginning of systematic



**Fig. 14.1** Population unemployment rate for primary education completers, Australia and New Zealand, 1945–2014 (Data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012; World Bank 2014e)

colonization in 1840. By 1853, wool made up 22 % of the value of exports, second only to timber (31 %). The Australian gold rushes were then at their height, and the infant New Zealand farming industry found there a ready market for such basic foodstuffs as potatoes, grain, butter, and cheese.


Over the decade from 1861 to 1871, gold dominated exports. However, the introduction of refrigerated transport allowed solid diversification of New Zealand farm production and decreased dependence on Australia as an export market.

A welfare state was established from the 1930s. By the 1950s, New Zealanders enjoyed one of the highest standards of living in the world, but the 1970s saw a deep recession. During the following decade, the country underwent major economic changes, which transformed it during the 1980s from a protectionist to a liberalized free trade economy (Evans 1994).

The Global Financial Crisis had a major impact on New Zealand, with the gross domestic product (GDP) shrinking for five consecutive quarters, the longest recession in over 30 years, with unemployment rising to 6.1 % in 2009 (Fig.

14.2) (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 2014). Due partly to these recessions, New Zealand has experienced a fairly consistent “brain drain” since the 1970s, with around one quarter of highly skilled workers living overseas, mostly in Australia and Britain. This proportion is the largest from any developed nation. In 2009–2010, an annual target of 45,000–50,000 permanent residence approvals was set by the New Zealand Immigration Service—more than one new migrant for every 100 New Zealand residents. Although this procedure has produced a “brain gain” of educated professionals from Europe and lesser developed countries, the overall outflow still dominates.

Today, New Zealand has a modern, prosperous, and developed market economy that depends greatly on international trade, mainly with Australia, the European Union, the United States, China, South Korea, and Japan. It has an estimated GDP per capita of roughly USD28,250. The real GDP growth rate in 2011 was 1.4 %, and 2.5 % for 2012. However, it has only small manufacturing and high-tech sectors, with the economy strongly focused on tourism and primary industries.



**Fig. 14.2** Population unemployment rate for secondary education completers, Australia and New Zealand, 1945–2014 (Data from UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2012; World Bank 2014e)

### 14.3.1.2 Health Well-Being of the People of Australia and New Zealand

Australians have universal health coverage and good access to health facilities. Their life expectancy is fourth highest in the world after Iceland, Japan, and Hong Kong. Life expectancy in 2010 was 79.5 years for men and 84.0 years for women.


On the downside, Australians are famous for their out-of-doors lifestyle, most especially for recreation, and one consequence is the highest rate of skin cancer in the world. Around one third of Australians are diagnosed with cancer before age 75, and skin cancer is the fourth most common type. The second largest preventable cause of disease is cigarette smoking, responsible for 7.8 % of the total mortality and disease. Ranked third in preventable causes is hypertension at 7.6 %, with obesity fourth at 7.5 %. Australia ranks 35th in the world, and near the top of developed nations, for its proportion of obese adults.

A “love affair” with alcohol has traditionally been a defining national characteristic. In 1789, the New South Wales Corps (aka The Rum Corps) was formed in England as a permanent regiment to relieve the Royal Marines who had accompanied the First Fleet to Australia. Due to the remoteness and unpopularity of the posting, they comprised a motley crew. The colony was

short of coins, and, after their arrival, rum soon became the medium of trade. According to folklore, alcohol consumption reached its all-time high of 13.6 l of pure alcohol *per head of population* in the 1830s. More recent estimates (World Health Organization 2011) rate Australian total alcohol consumption among people aged greater than 15 years as 44th highest among nations.

A further threat to population health is an increase in the aging population (Fig. 14.3) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008, 2013a). Despite substantial immigration, the population grew by only 1.7 % from 2009 to 2010. Although the proportion of people over the age of 65 was 12 % in 1997, it is projected to be 18 % in 2021 and 26 % in 2051. The provision of adequate health care to this aging population is anticipated to strain the resources of Australia’s publicly funded universal health care system, Medicare Australia.

The most recent national health and life-style initiative is the National Disability Insurance Scheme. This health care program was initiated by the Australian government for Australians with a disability. The scheme commenced in 2013 with the aim to provide reasonable and necessary support for people with significant and permanent disability. It is funded by all



**Fig. 14.3** Australian population age 65 and over, 1945–2013 (Data from Australian Bureau of Statistics 2008, 2013a)

Australians through an increase in the Medicare tax.

In New Zealand, in the decades following colonization, the major concern was producing enough food for survival. Systematic health services did not exist. About 9 % of women died of complications of childbirth. Infectious diseases were also major killers (Te Ara—Encyclopaedia of New Zealand 2014).


The first organized system of public health was introduced by the Public Health Act of 1872, whereby a central board of health was set up in each province. By 1938, a free health system was legislated but never fully realized due to ongoing disputes between the medical profession and the government. Thus, health services evolved as a dual system of public and private health care. This scheme, established in 1941, continues to this day.

Overall expenditure on health care is considerably below average for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Fig. 14.4) (World Bank 2014b). In 2005, New Zealand spent 8 % of its GDP on health care, or USD3390 per capita, of which 60 % was government expenditure. This per capita expenditure has decreased over the past few decades, and so has the health of the population.

As examples of this trend, in the 1960s, New Zealand had the lowest infant mortality rate in the world, but by 1999 it had dropped to 12th lowest (7.4 deaths per 1000 live births—more than twice the infant mortality of Japan). The numbers of people dying of asthma, cancer, diabetes, and heart disease have also increased. In 2010, New Zealand was last among 14 developed countries in the level of medications used, due to the costs involved, and citizens showed the highest level of anxiety about health care.

Personal costs are incurred at initial access to the medical system. These costs, which are usually through a general practitioner, represent fees ranging between USD13 and USD33. However, discounted rates are available for disadvantaged citizens. Specialty care, which is generally delivered through the public hospital outpatient department, is fully covered by government expenditure.

The reasons for the ever-escalating cost of medical care are similar to those in other advanced industrial countries. The leading causes of death have changed from infectious diseases such as cholera and smallpox to chronic conditions such as heart disease, cancer, and strokes. Additionally, the number of older people, who suffer most from these conditions, has steadily increased. Obesity has also increased as a percentage of the total population, as it has within



**Fig. 14.4** New Zealand health expenditure (percentage gross domestic product [GDP]), 1995–2012 (Data from World Bank 2014b)

other OECD countries. In comparative terms, New Zealand is seventh, with 20.9 % of the adult population having a BMI greater than 30. However, despite these negative statistics, general population longevity remains high, with life expectancy at birth being 82 years for women and 80 years for men.

### 14.3.1.3 Educational Well-Being of the People of Australia and New Zealand


In the early 1800s in Australia, the few rural schools were generally small, one-room affairs on land donated by a local farmer. In the city, private schools were set up by the various churches, but no standard for education existed. However, by the 1830s, the idea took hold that crime was the result of ignorance; ignorance was the result of a lack of education; and, therefore, education would decrease the amount of crime. From that time, state funds began to be diverted to public education. Compulsory education for both girls and boys was introduced in the 1870s. It was, however, difficult to enforce, with those charged

with monitoring commonly able to visit a particular area only once a year. The teachers were also poorly trained. The few established teachers' colleges were not well attended because the extra study involved did not translate into increased pay (McCreadie 2006).

Contemporary education includes primary education (primary schools), followed by secondary education (secondary schools), and tertiary education (universities and providers of vocational training). Childhood education is primarily the responsibility of each state or territory government, which provides funding and regulates the public and private schools within its governing area. The federal government helps fund the public universities.

School education is compulsory from the age of 5 to 6 to the age of 15 to 17, depending on the state or territory. Today, over three quarters of students stay at school until they are 17 (Fig. 14.5) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001, 2013b). Government schools educate approximately 65 % of Australian students, with approximately 34 % in Catholic and independent





**Fig. 14.5** Apparent student retention rate in Australia (year 7/8 to year 12), 1968–2013 (Data from Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001, 2013b)

schools. Although the former are free, some uniform and equipment costs must be met by parents, estimated to average around \$300 per year per child. Regardless of whether a school is part of the government, run by the Roman Catholic Church, or part of an independent system, it is required to adhere to the curriculum frameworks of its state or territory.

An evaluation of educational standards in countries by the Programme for International Student Assessment 2009 ranked the Australian education system as sixth to ninth, depending on the academic area. Also in 2009, the tertiary education system comprised 41 universities, of which 37 were public institutions, 2 were private, and 2 were Australian branches of overseas universities. These are supplemented by 3 other self-accrediting higher education institutions and over 150 non-self-accrediting higher education providers. These form a diverse group of specialized, mainly private, providers that include, for example, colleges of theology, natural therapies, and accounting.


In New Zealand, although a few early settlers in the 1850s were extremely well educated, about 25 % could not read or write, and another 14 % could only read (Swarbrick 2012). Moreover, before 1877, their children were lucky to get an

education because it was neither compulsory nor free. The few available schools were in towns and were established by religious groups or provincial governments. Their fees made them accessible only to the rich.

The Education Act 1877 caused a major change. It established free, compulsory primary education to year 8 for all New Zealand children, and public schools were set up by regional education boards. Of the approximately 730 public primary schools in 1877, 78 % were country schools with one or two teachers. They provided education for about half of the primary school-age children.

However, the provision of government funding was contingent on each child meeting a certain level of attendance. If this requirement was not met, parents had to help pay the teacher's salary. Thus, country schools were chronically underfunded. Many pupils lived considerable distances from their school and could not meet the attendance requirement due to bad weather in winter and being required to help harvest crops in summer. Indeed, some schools adjusted their holidays so that low attendance during busy farming periods would not mean a funding cut.

Teachers for rural schools were hard to attract. They often shared their workload with



**Fig. 14.6** New Zealanders aged 15 and over with tertiary qualifications, 1991–2009 (Data from Education Counts New Zealand 2009)

pupil-teachers, who were older children teaching while still studying. The dominant teaching method involved rote learning, where children chanted facts until they had memorized them. To keep order in the classroom, use of a strap or cane was the norm, only abolished in the 1980s.

In 1903, free secondary places at district high schools were offered to pupils who had successfully completed their primary schooling, but most still left school when they were about 12 years of age. To supplement rural teaching, radio broadcasts to schools began in 1931, and correspondence school broadcasts were made from 1937. However, a downturn in farming in the 1990s caused people to leave rural communities; as a result, many country schools disappeared.

Today, primary and secondary schooling is compulsory for children aged 6–16. This education at public schools is free. New Zealand has an adult literacy rate of 99 %, and about half of the population aged 15 years and older hold a tertiary qualification (Fig. 14.6) (Education Counts New Zealand 2009). The OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment ranks New Zealand’s education system as the seventh best in the world.

#### 14.3.1.4 Subjective Well-Being of the People of Australia and New Zealand

The first systematic measures of the SWB of Australians were made in 1984 by Headey, Holmstrom, and Wearing. Respondents to their Victorian Quality of Life Panel were interviewed four times between 1981 and 1987. The researchers observed that people appeared to have an “equilibrium level” for their SWB, and this discovery triggered much subsequent research. Then, in 2001, two new surveys were commenced, both of which are extant. One is the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey and the other is the Australian Unity Well-being Index (AUWI).

Each AUWI survey is based on a new sample of 2000 randomly selected adults across Australia. It incorporates the Personal Well-being Index (International Wellbeing Group 2013), which measures SWB through the average level of satisfaction across seven life domains: health, personal relationships, safety, standard of living, achieving in life, community connectedness, and future security. A total of 30 surveys had been conducted to September 2014. A detailed report is constructed from the results of each survey; these can be downloaded from the Australian

Centre on Quality of Life Web site at Deakin University (<http://www.deakin.edu.au/research/acqol/instruments/>).

Over the past 12 years, the mean scores from the 30 surveys differed from one another by just 3.0 percentage points. This result attests to both the homeostatic control of SWB and to the political and economic stability of the country during this period.

The average level of subjective life quality for Australia is always in the top cluster of countries within international comparative surveys. Australia also has relatively high levels of other commonly measured subjective variables, such as trust between citizens and low levels of perceived corruption. For example, the General Social Survey in 2007 found about half of respondents (54 %) felt that “most people” could be trusted, and they were even more likely to trust their doctor (89 %) and local police (76 %). The high level of trust in police is a major factor underpinning social stability.

A major aim of the AUWI surveys is to identify demographic subgroups with the highest and the lowest levels of SWB. It has been found that groups with very high levels are dominated by those with high income, employment, and the presence of a partner. Groups with extremely low levels are dominated by very low income, the absence of a partner, and unemployment. It is apparent that within both extremes, adequate money, relationships, and employment are common defining characteristics.

In New Zealand, the first hundred years of British rule were tumultuous for the new colony. The population faced uncertain food supplies, danger from the native Māori, and an economy that oscillated between good times and bad. This period shaped the psyche of New Zealanders in many ways. One was to engender a spirit of common threat and egalitarianism that shaped the social consciousness of its citizens and, so, their perceived life quality, from that time to the present.

In 1893, New Zealand became the first nation in the world to grant women the right to vote. It was also the first nation in the world to recognize unrestricted universal suffrage for all people regardless of race, property ownership, or any other requisite. New Zealand passed such progressive legislation well ahead of the rest of the world, with Australia being the next to follow suit 9 years later in 1902. Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Canada all granted women the right to vote in the intervening years between New Zealand’s landmark legislation and the United States’ passing of the 19th Amendment in 1920.

The country’s culture has also been strongly influenced by globalization and increased immigration from the Pacific Islands and Asia. In recent times, national pride has been lifted by the use of New Zealand’s diverse landscape as the backdrop for the *Lord of the Rings* film trilogy.

With all this as background, it is surprising to discover that general population levels of SWB are lower than expected. These data have come from various sources. Most recently, the Sovereign Wellbeing Index, produced by the Auckland University of Technology in 2012, applied the single item of General Life Satisfaction (GLS: “satisfaction with life as a whole”) to a general population sample. They reported a mean score that lies below average in comparison to 23 European countries.

Confirming these low values, Ganglmair-Wooliscroft and Lawson (2008) reported a GLS value of 70 points from a general population sample. In relation to these low results, Alexandra Ganglmair-Wooliscroft (personal communication) confirmed that using a different measure of SWB, in the form of the Personal Wellbeing Index, in three different general population surveys over a period of 8 years, using different data collection methods, resulted in SWB results that were consistent and low (67.4/66.3/67.5 points). These low values in relation to Australian data are something of a

conundrum since, in so many respects, the two countries are so similar.

### 14.3.2 Well-Being of Disadvantaged Groups in Australia and New Zealand

In this section we focus on the well-being of the two major disadvantaged groups in Oceania: the Australian Aborigines and the Māori people of New Zealand. In 2011, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population was estimated to be about 669,900 people, comprising 3.0 % of the total Australian population (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013c). Contrary to the common perception that most of these people live in remote areas, the majority (79 %) live in cities and regional centers, with about one third living in major cities (35 %). Only a quarter live in remote (8 %) or very remote (14 %) areas. Their number is increasing. In 2009, the total fertility rate for indigenous women was 2.6 babies, compared with 1.9 for all women in Australia.

The indigenous population at the time of colonization is estimated to have been up to one million people. This population declined rapidly over the next 150 years due to infectious disease and maltreatment. Traditional ownership of land—Aboriginal title—was not recognized until 1992, when the High Court overturned the legal doctrine that Australia had been *terra nullius* (land belonging to no one) before the European occupation.

In 2008, about 11 % of indigenous adults spoke an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander language as their main language at home, whereas about 40 % spoke at least some words of an indigenous language.

Prior to European settlement, the Australian Aborigines had no currency. Now, they remain severely economically disadvantaged. Only 65 % of working-age indigenous Australians were in the labor force in 2008 (Fig. 14.7) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011), compared with 79 % for all Australians. Unsurprisingly, therefore, indigenous households were nearly 2.5 times as likely to be in the lowest income bracket as non-

indigenous households (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2011b).


This economic disadvantage is reflected in all of the generic statistics of societal functioning. In 2006, one in five indigenous adults reported being a victim of violence in the prior 12 months, and indigenous people comprised more than one quarter of all prisoners.

The remote communities are often the most dysfunctional social units in Australia. Of the 22 % of indigenous people who inhabit rural communities (approximately 150,000 people), 87 % reside in a discrete indigenous community, usually comprising fewer than 50 people. Such communities generally lack services that most Australians take for granted. For example, 58 % depend on bore water, 9 % have no organized water supply, and 32 % rely on a community generator for electricity.


One of the tragedies underlying these appalling statistics is they occur despite higher per capita government expenditure. In 2007, the comparative health care expenditure for every \$1.00 spent on nonindigenous persons was, for indigenous persons, \$1.31 for community support and \$3.60 for welfare.

It can be no surprise that the economic disadvantage outlined above is reflected by relatively poor health within the indigenous population. Their health disadvantage covers the full spectrum of medical disorders, so the list that follows is indicative only. The infant mortality rate is high (Fig. 14.8) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013a) and, for those who survive, life expectancy for indigenous men is 11.5 years less than that for nonindigenous (67.2 vs. 78.7 years), whereas for women it is 9.7 years less (72.9 vs. 82.6 years). This lower life expectancy can be largely attributed to a higher incidence of diseases such as diabetes mellitus (the rate of obesity is double), respiratory disorders (the proportion of current daily smokers is double), ear disease, eye disorders, and some cancers. Hospitalization due to psychological distress and disorders is also relatively high.

To determine self-perceived distress, the 2008 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Survey collected information using five



**Fig. 14.7** Labor force participation rates for indigenous Australians, 1994–2011 (Data from Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011)



**Fig. 14.8** Infant mortality rates for indigenous and nonindigenous Australians, 1991–2012 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013a)

questions from the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale. A high score indicates that the person may be having feelings of anxiety or


depression regularly (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2010b). Nearly one third (31 %) of indigenous adults (aged 15 years and over) had

high/very high levels of psychological distress—more than twice the rate for nonindigenous Australians. These high/very high levels were more prevalent among women (34 %) than men (27 %).

Prior to European settlement, the indigenous population had no written language. Education was informal through oral tradition, social learning, and demonstration. These traditions are still highly valued by many indigenous parents, a majority of whom (77 %) have not themselves completed year 12 (Australian Bureau of Statistics and Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2008). Coupled with other multiple facets of disadvantage, one result is that many indigenous children have a fractured schooling experience, leaving the education system earlier than their nonindigenous counterparts (Fig. 14.9) (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013b). Only about 75 % of indigenous year 3 and year 7 children meet the national minimum standards for reading and numeracy, compared to about 95 % of nonindigenous students.

A core element in their educational disadvantage is the high incidence of family dysfunction. In 2008, nearly half (49 %) of all indigenous households comprised families with dependent children and, of these families, more than a third (39 %) were one-parent families (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2011b). Nearly half of all indigenous children were living in jobless families in 2006, whereas the rate of child protection notifications was close to eight times the rate for other children. Despite these bleak statistics, there is an upward trend in retention rates. In 2008, 30 % of indigenous people aged 25–34 years had completed year 12 compared with only 7 % of those aged 55 years.

Turning to SWB, we have to acknowledge that there are very few data on this topic, and the one known source misinterprets their data. A 2008 survey (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2010b) reports that the majority of indigenous adults in their sample reported feeling happy (72 %), calm and peaceful (59 %), and full of life (57 %). However, among the general population, these



**Fig. 14.9** Apparent school retention rates for indigenous and nonindigenous children (years 7/8–12), 1999–2013 (Data from Australian Bureau of Statistics 2013b)



percentages are far higher due to a natural positivity bias in these forms of data.

An important issue, for which there are no known data, is whether indigenous people who maintain a traditional lifestyle have normal levels of SWB. It is a possibility due to associated, strong spiritual beliefs. The indigenous culture includes practices and ceremonies centered on a belief in the Dreamtime, in which reverence for the land and oral traditions are emphasized. These beliefs are manifested in magnificent ancient rock art and a strong music tradition that continues to this day.

The Djab Wurrung and Jardwadjali people of western Victoria may also have inspired one of Australia's strongest religions, Australian Rules football. They are credited with inventing Marn Grook, a type of football played with possum hide. Certainly a disproportionate number of indigenous men excel at this game, supplying one in ten players at the highest level.

In summary, there are strong indications that the quality of life for these multiply disadvantaged people is improving. For example, indigenous death rates from circulatory disease decreased between 1991 and 1997. In terms of education, 78 % of young adults aged 25–34 years completed year 10 (16 years) in 2008 compared to only 27 % just two decades earlier. Increasing numbers of indigenous people are also graduating from university and assuming professional and leadership roles. The tide of disadvantage has been slow to turn but at least is now running in the right direction.

The indigenous Māori (pronounced *maori*) are the largest ethnic minority in New Zealand. In 2006 they comprised an estimated 620,000 people, or 15 % of the national population. An additional 120,000 Māori live in Australia. The original settlers from eastern Polynesia arrived in canoes from 1250 to 1300 CE. Over the next 500 years they formed tribal groups and developed a unique culture, with their own language, mythology, crafts, and performing arts. Horticulture flourished using plants they introduced, and later a prominent warrior culture emerged.

In the period from first contact with European traders in 1792 to the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840,


contact between the two groups had become increasingly hostile. Although the treaty was initially successful, disputed land sales again led to conflict in the 1860s. The resulting social upheaval, decades of conflict, and epidemics of introduced disease took a devastating toll on the Māori population, which went into a dramatic decline.

By the start of the twentieth century, the Māori population had begun to recover, and efforts were made to increase their standing in wider New Zealand society. A protest movement in the 1960s advocated Māori issues; in 1980 political groups started to seek redress from the Crown for their claims. A settlement act was finally passed in 2005, which included a Crown apology and financial and commercial redress. Since that time, traditional Māori culture has enjoyed a revival, and Māori are active in all spheres of New Zealand society. The Māori language (known as *Te Reo Māori*) is spoken to some extent by about a quarter of all Māori (4 % of the total New Zealand population).

When we focus on the economic well-being of the Māoris, we see that, before organized settlement began in 1840, imports consisted mainly of goods for bartering with the Māoris. The major item was muskets, which were keenly sought after. This early trade exacerbated the protracted armed conflicts of the nineteenth century and led directly to Māori economic disadvantage, which is ongoing.

Māori are substantially overrepresented in a wide range of negative social and economic statistics (New Zealand Ministry of Social Development 2010) that include more than simply lower levels of income. Defining deprivation as a state of observable disadvantage relative to the local community, in terms of both material and social variables, roughly 65 % of all Māori live in the 30 % most deprived areas of New Zealand compared to 22 % of New Zealand Europeans.

Having fewer assets means increased vulnerability to changing economic conditions, as was exemplified during the recent Global Financial Crisis. From March 2008 to early 2010, the GDP



**Fig. 14.10** Unemployment rates for New Zealand Māori and Europeans, 1987–2014 (Data from Statistics New Zealand 2014)


fell by 3.4 %. During this period, the unemployment rate for New Zealand Europeans rose from 3.9 % to 4.4 % whereas for Māori it rose from 10.7 to 14.2 % (Fig. 14.10) (Statistics New Zealand 2014). As a further indication of disadvantage, Māori make up almost 50 % of the prison population, which is double the proportion of Aboriginals in Australia. On the positive side, Māori culture has seen a resurgence in recent years that has carried some economic benefits, such as their traditional arts of carving, weaving, and tattooing becoming more mainstream.

When we look at health well-being, we note that, given their lower socioeconomic status, it naturally follows that Māori suffer more health problems, including higher levels of alcohol and drug abuse, smoking, and obesity. Their less frequent use of health care services also means that late diagnosis and treatment intervention produce higher levels of morbidity and mortality in many manageable conditions, such as cervical cancer and diabetes. This inequality in mortality due to conditions amenable to health care interventions

is shown in Fig. 14.11 (New Zealand Ministry of Health 2010).

Although Māori life expectancy has increased over the past 50 years, it remains considerably below that of other New Zealanders. In 2006, Māori male life expectancy at birth was 62 years compared with 69 for non-Māori men (women 64 vs 69 years) (New Zealand Ministry of Social Development 2010).

Their poorer health status is also reflected in higher rate of contact with mental health services, with estimates that this involves some 60 % of Māori people. A strong factor correlating with the need for this contact, as well as with their higher levels of crime and suicide, is domestic violence. A recent study by the New Zealand Family Violence Clearinghouse (Dobbs and Eruera 2014) showed that Māori women and children are more likely to experience domestic violence than any other ethnic group. As with indigenous Australians, blame is often laid, through an ongoing sense of injustice, on the perceived inadequacy of compensation for historical



**Fig. 14.11** Mortality rate differences between Māori and non-Māori peoples, 1996–2006 (New Zealand Ministry of Health 2010)

grievances. Although socioeconomic initiatives aimed at dealing with these issues have been implemented, clearly much remains to be done.


Next we consider their education well-being. The first free primary schools were established in 1877. Before this time, Māori children could attend native schools. These were usually located in remote communities, and, through these schools, some Māori learned to read and write from as early as 1814. To establish a native school, the parents first had to ask for a school and then had to subsidize the teacher's salary. By 1874, there were 64 such schools. After 1877, even though Māori children could also attend general primary schools, the separate system for Māori was maintained and continued until the 1960s.

In contemporary times, educational attainment reflects the general level of indigenous disadvantage. Māori children are less likely to attend an early childhood education service before entering primary school (Fig. 14.12) (Education Counts New Zealand 2014) and are also less likely to successfully complete secondary school. Only 47 % of Māori school-leavers finish high school with a full qualification compared to 74 %

of European children. This disparity is exemplified through the global PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) rankings. Although New Zealand generally rates well, once the PISA scores are disaggregated, the European students are second in the world and Māori students are 34th (Matthews 2012). Educational disadvantage is also reflected in the fertility rates for teenagers aged 15–19 years. For New Zealand overall in 2009, there were 29.6 births per 1000 women; the rate for Māori women was 71.6.

Are the Māori happy people? Like indigenous people everywhere, Māori have suffered a disconnection with their past due to the loss of their language, culture, land, and traditions in the years following colonization. Land dispossession, in particular, has been proposed as a causal element in ongoing Māori disadvantage.

Overall, Māori people score lower on SWB than New Zealand Europeans. Within a random population sample, the Personal Wellbeing Index produced an average for Māori of about 60–64 points compared to about 68 points for Europeans. Curiously, an examination of individual life domains within the Personal Wellbeing Index showed that satisfaction with personal relation-



**Fig. 14.12** Early childhood attendance rate for the New Zealand Māori and European populations, 2000–2014 (Data from Education Counts New Zealand 2014)

ships showed the biggest difference (−5.4 points) between the groups. This result is unexpected in the light of Māori cultural norms emphasizing communality; however, it also emphasizes the vulnerability of Māori people, because this is the most powerful domain to maintain normal levels of SWB.

In confirmation of this vulnerability, Māori SWB was also more adversely affected by the economic recession of 2007–2010 than the SWB of New Zealand Europeans (Sibley et al. 2011). One explanation of this phenomenon is that the recession made existing social inequities between the two groups more salient. As economic and social inequities increase in a society, those at the bottom who watch the gap widen between themselves and others may feel worse off than before.

Although as yet unmentioned, race relations remain a contentious issue in New Zealand society. Māori advocates continue to push for further

redress, claiming that their concerns are being marginalized or ignored. Conversely, critics denounce the scale of assistance given to Māori as amounting to preferential treatment for a select group of people on the basis of race. What is uncontentious is that, in a manner similar to the Australian Aboriginal people, the indigenous Māori people remain comprehensively socially and economically disadvantaged compared to the races who have colonized their country.

#### 14.4 Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea occupies the eastern half of the island of New Guinea (the western portion is part of Indonesia) and numerous offshore islands. It is located to the north of eastern Australia, just south of the equator. The current population is about 7.5 million. Many remote Papuan tribes

still have only marginal contact with the outside world (Survival International 2014).

“New Guinea” (Nueva Guinea) was the name coined by the Spanish explorer Yñigo Ortiz de Retez. In 1545, he noted the resemblance of the people to those he had earlier seen along the Guinea coast of Africa (McKinnon et al. 2008). From 1884, the northern half of the country was a German colony, whereas the southern half was colonized by the United Kingdom and transferred to Australia in 1904. In World War II, about 216,000 Japanese, Australians, and Americans died in the New Guinea campaign (1942–1945) (Fenton 2013). Following WWII, the two colonies combined as Papua New Guinea. A peaceful independence from Australia occurred in 1975, and it was admitted to membership of the United Nations. It is governed with 22 semiautonomous provinces (National Statistical Office of Papua New Guinea 2011).

Papua New Guinea is one of the most culturally diverse countries in the world, with 848 different listed languages (Ethnologue 2014), which is 12 % of the world’s total. Of these, 836 are still spoken; however, most have fewer than 1000 speakers (Ethnologue 2014). English is the language of government and of the educational system, but it is not widely spoken. Even in Parliament, much of the debate is conducted in Tok Pisin (commonly known in English as New Guinea Pidgin). The other official language is HiriMotu (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2014).

Papua New Guinea sent fighting forces to join the Allies in both world wars. During WW II, Papua New Guinea was invaded by the Japanese forces. Opposing them were troops from Australia, New Zealand, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands (National Archives of Australia 2011; New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage 2014).

In the following section we describe the well-being of the people of Papua New Guinea in terms of four major dimensions: economic well-


being, health well-being, educational well-being, and SWB.

#### 14.4.1 Economic Well-Being of the People of Papua New Guinea

In the eighteenth century, Portuguese traders carried the sweet potato to New Guinea. This simple act had far-reaching consequences on the quality of life for the indigenous people. Their traditional staple crop had been the taro plant, but the sweet potato provided far higher crop yields. This change not only increased the general level of population nutrition, with surplus production as a cash crop, but also gave rise to a significant rise in population, particularly in the highlands.

Today, the majority of the population still live in traditional societies and practice subsistence-based agriculture. Thus, Papua New Guinea remains a largely agrarian society, with agriculture in general providing a livelihood for 85 % of the population. Agriculture accounts for some 30 % of the GDP, with the main export being palm oil. However, in terms of the number of households participating in its production, coffee from the highlands remains the major export crop, followed by cocoa and coconut oil/copra from the coastal areas.

These renewable resources are further supplemented by vast tracts of forest and marine stocks. Papua New Guinea is also richly endowed with mineral deposits. Thus, the country has a huge potential for economic development. However, exploiting these resources presents many levels of difficulty. These difficulties include the rugged terrain, which includes high mountain ranges and valleys, swamps and islands; the high cost of developing infrastructure; serious law-and-order problems in some areas; and a restrictive system of customary land title. Only about 3 % of the land of Papua New Guinea is in private hands. Despite these difficulties, mineral deposits,



**Fig. 14.13** Australian gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate, 1963–2013 (Data from World Bank 2014a)

including gold, oil, and copper, account for about 70 % of export earnings.

In March 2006, the United Nations Development Programme Policy called for the designation of Papua New Guinea as developing country to be downgraded to that of least-developed country. This change was the result of protracted economic and social stagnation (United Nations 2006). However, by 2012, Papua New Guinea had enjoyed several years of positive economic growth, at over 6 % per year since 2007, which was maintained even during the Global Financial Crisis years of 2008–2009 (Fig. 14.13) (World Bank 2014a). Despite this positive development, many people continue to live in extreme poverty, with about one third of the population living on less than USD1.25 per day.

There seems little doubt that the economic development of Papua New Guinea is greatly hindered by the continuing tribal structure. Moreover, this situation is unlikely to change.

The Papua New Guinea Constitution is explicit in its directive that the “traditional villages and communities remain as viable units of Papua New Guinean society.”

#### 14.4.2 Health Well-Being of the People of Papua New Guinea

The slave trade in Papua New Guinea was rife between 1863 and 1911. Over 61,000 indigenous people were taken from coastal regions to work on plantations in Fiji, New Caledonia, and Queensland. Mortality and morbidity rates were high due to both the forced nature of the recruitment processes and the epidemic diseases introduced by the Europeans.

Conflict in that period between the natives and whites was endemic and increasingly brutal. As the colonial administration developed over this 50-year period, it allowed greater coordina-



tion in controlling the natives. The conflict progressed from reciprocated raids to systematic punitive expeditions that involved shelling coastal settlements from man-of-war ships, burning villages, and mass slaughter. To make matters even worse, the lethality of intertribal warfare was greatly increased as guns replaced bows and spears. Overall, the scale of violence was devastating for the indigenous population, with lasting consequences for indigenous quality of life and health.


Given the country’s low GDP and problems of accessibility, it should be no surprise that the development of health services was slow. In contemporary Papua New Guinea, health care is provided through a network of 2400 community aid posts, 500 rural health centers, and 18 provincial hospitals. At the village level, each aid post serves up to 6 villages and up to 3000 people. The workers provide basic primary health care and information. In 2010, public expenditure on health was 4.1 % of GDP (\$101 per person). In comparison, Australia has one physician per 300

people and spends 9.0 % of GDP (\$3685 per person) on health.

There are also major problems in obtaining accurate health data. This fact is evident from the large discrepancies between local reports, based on community experience, and official health statistics (see Ashwell and Barclay 2010). Estimates of population health should be regarded with caution. Nevertheless, all statistics point to the poor level of population health.

Malaria is the leading cause of illness and death. In 2003, over 70,000 cases of laboratory-confirmed malaria were reported, along with 537 deaths. However, it is estimated that the true number of cases was over 1.7 million. Papua New Guinea also has the highest known incidence of HIV and AIDS in the Pacific region and meets the criteria for a generalized HIV/AIDS epidemic. Lack of HIV/AIDS awareness is a major problem, especially in rural areas.

As a final indicator of the overall picture, the rate of maternal mortality is among the highest in the Western Pacific. In 2013, there were 220 esti-



**Fig. 14.14** Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 births for selected countries of Oceania, 1990–2013 (Data from the World Health Organization 2014)

mated maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in Papua New Guinea compared to eight in New Zealand and six in Australia (Fig. 14.14) (World Health Organization 2014). Contributing reasons are infrequent skilled attendance at birth, poor accessibility, lack of adequate delivery facilities, and low levels of trust in public services.

### 14.4.3 Education Well-Being of the People of Papua New Guinea

Until 1986, Papua New Guinea operated without a coherent, written philosophy of education. It was thus one of the last nations to develop a modern formal education system. A huge issue for educators is the most appropriate language of instruction. In addition to the many hundreds of indigenous languages, there is Papua New Guinean Pidgin (Tok Pisin), which originally developed in the northern part of the country and is spoken by about half of the population. It is a hybrid language with grammar and syntax borrowed from Melanesian and vocabulary derived from English, together with numerous other sources including indigenous

languages. The other lingua franca, *HiriMotu*, developed in the southern coast, is spoken by about 10 % of the population. In addition, formally educated Papua New Guineans use English. Thus, there is no one dominant indigenous language.

Before World War II, schools were run by various churches whose teachers taught in the local vernaculars. The first government mandate on education, in 1955, made English the only medium of instruction. However, grass-roots resistance was strong, and in 1993 there was a formal return to the use of local languages in the early years of basic education. As a consequence, in 2000, the Department of Education reported that kindergarten and grades 1 and 2 were being taught in some 380 indigenous languages, plus Pidgin and English. Since then even more languages have been introduced, a large number of which had not previously been written.

An obvious logistic difficulty is finding teachers who are fluent in local languages. As one consequence, many of those employed as teachers do not have formal qualifications. A further problem is encountered by children advancing to higher grades where an official language is used. Although the issue of whether teaching in local




Fig. 14.15 Literacy rates for Papua New Guinea, 2000–2012 (Data from World Bank 2012)

languages has better literacy outcomes is still debated, this issue must also be seen in the context of maintaining endangered languages (Skutnabb-Kangas 2003). It is the constitutional responsibility of government to foster indigenous and minority languages via the medium of mother tongue education.

The current situation is that primary education (grades 1–6) is provided by 2600 community schools, but only 5 national high schools offer full-time grades 11 and 12. Although there are also six universities, apart from other major tertiary institutions, illiteracy remains a major problem. Today, only about 63 % of people aged 15 and over can read and write (Fig. 14.15) (World Bank 2012), with an even lower percentage of women.

#### 14.4.4 Subjective Well-Being of the People of Papua New Guinea

There are no reliable data on SWB in Papua New Guinea. Any effort to make such a measurement would be defeated by the fact that 80 % of the population live in rural settlements, many of which are difficult to access, by the enormous number of languages, and by the high level of illiteracy. The lack of data on subjective measures is a major limitation to understanding the full picture of quality of life. Moreover, estimates of SWB made by reference to objective indicators are generally unreliable.

However, whereas this unreliability applies under benign life conditions, under challenging objective life conditions, the relationship becomes much more reliable (Cummins 2000). Thus, because the general circumstances of living within Papua New Guinea are challenging in the extreme, it is almost certain that the level of SWB would be very low. Indeed, the statistics depict a society that is almost out of control. Port

Moresby has recently been described as “the most dangerous and unliveable city on earth” with the city under constant threat from “Raskol” gangs.

The appalling social conditions reflect dysfunction at the highest levels. Due to the tribal nature of the population and the prospect of wealth and authority, elections attract large numbers of candidates representing many different parties. One consequence is that the ruling party is always a fragile coalition because there is little common ideology binding parties together. Members of Parliament are virtually free to cross the floor when it suits their vested interest to vote in a particular way. One result is very low levels of trust in parliament, politicians, and police. A Transparency International survey (2013) found that 37 % of people reported they had paid a bribe to police in the last 12 months. This finding compares with 2 % in Australia and 1 % in Denmark. Papua New Guinea is also one of the worst places in the world for gender-based violence and sexual violence involving children.

The high rate of illiteracy goes hand in hand with belief in the occult. Papua New Guinea only recently repealed the Sorcery Act of 1971, which, among other things, made killing a person accused of sorcery potentially defensible. There is also widespread xenophobia, with asy-

**Table 14.1** Human development index for three countries within Oceania (United Nations Development Programme 2010)

	Human development index, rank	Nonincome human development index, rank
Australia	2nd	1st
New Zealand	3rd	2nd
Papua New Guinea	137th	146th

lum seekers and refugees being particularly vulnerable to racism among the local population. In summary, living conditions are so objectively hostile that it is almost inconceivable that levels of SWB could be anything other than very low.


## 14.5 Comparative Analysis

As mentioned in Sect. 1, the most highly regarded index of comparative objective life quality between nations is the HDI (Table 14.1) (United Nations Development Programme 2010), published as a series since 1990 by the UNDP. It combines four national indicators: life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling (combined), and gross national income per capita. A nonincome index also measures the extent to which a country is efficiently using its income for advancement of life expect-

tancy and education. The report ranks 186 countries.

The relative positions of Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea are consistent with the descriptions provided in this chapter. Both Australia and New Zealand have stable democracies, supportive social structures, and mature economies, and overall offer a high quality of life to their citizens. Papua New Guinea, in contrast, has a fragile parliamentary system, a largely dysfunctional society, a poor economy due in large part to the poor use of resources, and low quality of life.

In final confirmation of the poor international standing of Papua New Guinea, the comprehensive objective Index of Social Progress has been applied globally by Estes (2010) covering the period since 1970. This index reports the extent to which the world's nations are succeeding in their social and economic development objectives. It comprises 41 indicators divided into 10 subindexes: Education, Health Status, Women



**Fig. 14.16** Life expectancy of five population groups within the Oceania region, 1961–2011 (Data from Australian Bureau of Statistics 2010a; Australian Institute

of Health and Welfare 2011a; Statistics New Zealand 2011; World Bank 2014c)

Status, Defense Effort, Economic, Demographic, Environmental, Social Chaos, Cultural Diversity, and Welfare Effort. Although the index score for Papua New Guinea increased over the period 2000–2009, its ranking hardly changed, moving from 134th to 131st out of the 162 countries rated.

This chapter has established a reliable picture of two first-world countries, both ranking high on all indicators of life quality, and one country that is at the bottom end of the quality-of-life scale. However, it has also established that within both Australia and New Zealand there are indigenous people who are much less advantaged, many of whom have living conditions little different from those of the people in Papua New Guinea. Their disadvantage is also evident in their lower rates of life expectancy compared to those of the general populations of Australian and New Zealand (Fig. 14.16). In fact, in 2000, Australia had one of the world's worst life expectancy gaps between indigenous and nonindigenous people (United Nations Development Programme 2004), which was first recognized by the Australian Government in 2008.

These discrepancies in quality of life between indigenous and nonindigenous populations are harder to understand historically in New Zealand than in Australia. In New Zealand, the tribes showed an early level of unity in signing the Treaty of Waitangi, and, in 1893, New Zealand recognized unrestricted universal suffrage for all people regardless of race. Moreover, the treaty confirms Māori customary title (recognizes that when a state acquires sovereignty over another country, the preexisting rights of the indigenous population remain) to the land. Even though this recognition was widely abused, as has been described, the fact of the principle remained and was reaffirmed in 1993.

In Australia the situation was very different. Although Australia enacted “universal” suffrage in 1902, their indigenous people were excluded. Aboriginal people were not given universal voting rights until 1965. Aboriginal people were only included in the census from 1967 and could not claim rights to land on the basis of tradi-

tional occupation until 1975. Yet, despite these separate conditions of national inclusion, the indigenous peoples of both countries seem currently to share approximately the same levels of disadvantage in comparison with the general population of their lands. Clearly, positive discrimination and special assistance to these people are required but what form these measures should take is unclear.

The most obvious solutions involve the provision of higher per capita government expenditure. These expenditures are ongoing in Australia and have been previously described. Clearly, however, additional government expenditure has not solved the problem. An additional major initiative was instituted in 2007. Lawyer and Aboriginal leader Noel Pearson supported a set of simultaneous interventions to be applied to 36 dysfunctional remote Aboriginal communities. These included compulsory management of Aboriginal people's income, the deployment of police and health workers, and a ban on alcohol. It did not work. In 2009, Galarrwuy Yunupingu, a respected elder and spokesman for the involved communities, said of the intervention “It is now 3 years old but it hasn't made Aboriginal people any richer or healthier or happier, “he said”. It is really and truly dragging people down to create more misery. ... Let's start again” (ABC News 2009).

For the New Zealand Māori, recent interventions have targeted family violence, which is a major problem, described (Dobbs and Eruera 2014) as an epidemic. The authors outline the Mauri Ora framework for interventions developed by Māori practitioners. This framework is founded in a Māori worldview using Māori cultural values, beliefs, and practices to address violence. Within this framework, mauri ora has been defined as one of a number of Māori terms for well-being/wellness of both the collective and the individual. It is regarded as the maintenance of balance between wairu (spiritual well-being), hinengaro, (intellectual well-being), ngākau (emotional well-being), and tinana (physical well-being). Although evidence for the efficacy of this form of intervention appears

to be anecdotal at this time, at least the framework provides practitioners with a culturally valid approach to the reduction of family violence.

In addition to its indigenous population, each country contains many other disadvantaged groups. The largest of these groups is represented by people who have a disability. The final issue to be addressed is what measures are being taken to advance the quality of life of these people.

In terms of whole-population initiatives, the grandest program in recent years is without doubt the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme. Financed by a new direct tax on the whole population, the scheme directly funds “reasonable and necessary support” for people with significant and permanent disability “to assist them to reach their goals, objectives and aspirations.” This scheme encompasses inclusion and access to mainstream services and community-based activities, which are regarded by the National Disability Insurance Scheme as “a shared responsibility.” The scheme began on a trial basis in 2013, and an evaluation of the trial commenced in February 2014.

The New Zealand Disability Strategy was launched on 30 April 2001. It is a vision for a society that highly values the lives of and continually enhances the full participation of disabled people. It provides a framework to guide government agencies making policy and services that impact disabled people. However, at this stage, the strategy appears to be more advisory and aspirational than one taking direct action.

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## 14.6 Conclusion

The contrast between Australia and New Zealand and Papua New Guinea could not be more profound. Although Australia and New Zealand have amply fulfilled Burton’s 1621 prophesy of yielding “some flourishing Kingdoms to succeeding ages,” Papua New Guinea could not be so described. The reason for its failure to capitalize on its abundant natural resources is social. It has too many tribes with too many cultures, whose history of internecine warfare continues to

impede national progress. Whether a strong leader or a nationally uniting event will bring these people together with a sense of national purpose remains to be seen. In the meantime, social and economic progress will be slow.

On the bright side, Papua New Guinea is making significant gains in quality of life. It has enjoyed several years of positive economic growth—over 6 % per year since 2007. The country has rich mineral resources that can generate much needed revenue, thus enhancing the economic well-being of much of the population. The potential for a surge in economic well-being is there and should be realized given the right institutional conditions. Although the health and safety statistics of Papua New Guinea show poor health conditions relative to Australia and New Zealand and to much of the rest of the world, they also show a semblance of progress. Health and safety have increased over the years and are likely to continue to increase. For example, the infant mortality rate has decreased significantly over the last three decades. Expenditures on health care services are on the rise. Life expectancy is also increasing. The challenges related to the eradication of malaria and HIV/AIDS are great but not insurmountable. Papua New Guinea has made significant progress in education: Literacy rates have climbed steadily between 2000 and 2012.

Australia and New Zealand have many positive features and few negative ones. On the positive side, most economic indicators (e.g., unemployment, labor force participation among the indigenous population) point to significant gains. The same can be said about health and education well-being. Life expectancy has increased significantly in both countries, even in relation to the indigenous population. Health care expenditures also increased. The student retention rates in both Australia and New Zealand have gone up, even with respect to their indigenous people. The data paint a very positive quality-of-life picture for these two societies.

**Acknowledgment** We express our deep gratitude to Professor Joseph Sirgy and Professor Richard Estes, whose insightful assistance facilitated the production of this chapter. We also acknowledge the expert assistance of Ann-Marie James and Pamela Fried in chapter editing and formatting.



## Supplemental Tables

**Supplemental Table 14.1** Demography  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Demography**  
**REGION: Oceania (N=3)**

Country	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban			
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
Australia	10.3	15.8	22.0	23.5	2.3	1.4	1.6	1.6	81.5	85.5	88.7	89.3
New Zealand	2.4	3.2	4.4	4.5	1.7	0.6	1.1	1.5	76.0	83.7	86.2	86.3
Papua New Guinea	2.0	3.7	6.9	7.5	1.7	2.6	2.3	2.1	3.7	14.0	13.0	13.0
Regional Average	4.9	7.6	11.1	11.8	1.9	1.5	1.6	1.7	53.8	61.0	62.6	62.8

Population: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates

% Population growth rate: Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a percentage

% Urban: Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

i World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

j World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

k World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

l World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

**Supplemental Table 14.2** Education  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Education**  
**REGION: Oceania (N=3)**

Country	% Secondary school enrollment				% Adult literacy				% Tertiary education			
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
Australia			130.8	135.8						27.8	79.8	88.5
New Zealand		83.7	119.1	118.6						32.1	82.6	79.0
Papua New Guinea		11.5	40.2	40.2			62.9	62.9		1.5		1.9
Regional Average		47.6	96.7	98.2			62.9	62.9		20.5	81.2	56.5

% Secondary school enrollment: Gross enrollment ratio. Secondary. All programs. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition

% Adult literacy: Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, 'literacy' also encompasses 'numeracy', the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100

% Tertiary education: Gross enrollment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving

a

b World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

c World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

d World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

e

f World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

g World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

h World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

i

j World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

k World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

l World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

**Supplemental Table 14.3** Health  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Health**  
**REGION: Oceania (N=3)**

Country	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1k live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate			TB incidence per 100k				
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t
Australia	70.8	75.6	81.7	82.2	20.4	9.3	4.0	3.4	24.9	11.3	4.8	4.0	52.5	4.4	5.0	6.0		6.9	6.0	6.2
New Zealand	71.2	73.8	80.7	81.4	22.6	11.3	5.3	5.2	27.9	13.8	6.4	6.3	38.2	13.5	12.0	8.0		11.1	9.5	7.3
Papua New Guinea	38.5	54.9	62.0	62.4	134.3	70.0	50.7	47.3	199.8	96.9	66.7	61.4		58.1	240.0	220.0		93.9	355.0	347.0
Regional Average	60.2	68.1	74.8	75.3	59.1	30.2	20.0	18.6	84.2	40.7	26.0	23.9	45.4	25.4	85.7	78.0		37.3	123.5	120.2

Avg. years life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

Infant <1/1k live born: Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching 1 year of age, per 1000 live births in a given year.

Child mortality <5/1K: Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age 5, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year.

Maternal mortality rate: Maternal mortality rate is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births. The data are estimated with a regression model using information on the proportion of maternal deaths among non-AIDS deaths in women ages 15–49, fertility, birth attendants, and GDP.

TB incidence per 100k: Incidence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of new pulmonary, smear positive, and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis cases. Incidence includes patients with HIV.

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>  
g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>  
h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>  
i World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>  
j World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>  
k World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>  
l World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>  
m <http://www.gapminder.org/data/documentation/gd010/>  
n <http://www.gapminder.org/data/documentation/gd010/>  
o World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>  
p World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>  
q <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>  
r <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>  
s World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>  
t World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

**Supplemental Table 14.4** Income  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Income**  
**REGION: Oceania (N=3)**

Country	GDP (Billions of constant 2005 USD)				PCGDP (constant 2005 USD)				% Growth in GDP				Gini or other measure of wealth disparity			
	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p
Australia	138.8	351.6	797.0	888.6	13510.6	22313.1	36175.1	37828.3	2.4	5.2	2.0	2.5		32.5		32.5
New Zealand		67.6	121.2	129.7		20807.3	27856.4	29201.1		1.6	1.4	2.5				
Papua New Guinea	1.0	2.8	6.5	8.2	528.4	751.6	947.5	1120.6	6.2	4.0	7.7	5.5				
Regional Average	69.9	140.6	308.2	342.2	7019.5	14624.0	21659.7	22716.7	4.3	3.6	3.7	3.5		32.5	#/0!	32.5

GDP (constant 2005 USD): GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 USD. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2005 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used

PCGDP (constant 2005 USD): GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars

% Growth in GDP: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources

GINI or other measure of wealth disparity: Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of

recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality

a World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

b World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

c World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

d World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

e World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

f World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

g World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

h World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

i World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

j World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

k World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

l World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

m

n World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

o World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

p World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>



**Supplemental Table 14.5** Subjective well-being  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Subjective well-being**  
**REGION: Oceania (N=3)**

Country	World Values Survey (WVS), 1981-2014					
	WVS 1 1981-84	WVS 2 1990-04	WVS 3 1995-98	WVS 4 1999-04	WVS 5 2005-09	WVS 6 2010-14
Source	a	b	c	d	e	f
Australia	7.9		7.6		7.3	7.2
New Zealand			7.7		7.9	7.7
Papua New Guinea						
Regional Average	7.9		7.6		7.6	7.4

Mean life satisfaction: Averaged value of responses to the following survey question: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means you are “completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?

a WVS 1 1981–84: V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

b WVS 2 1990–04: V96.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

c WVS 3 1995–98: V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

d WVS 4 1999–04: V81.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

e WVS 5 2005–09: V22.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

f WVS 6 2010–14: V23.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

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# Well-Being in the Transition Economies of the Successor States of the Former Soviet Union: The Challenges of Change

# 15

Carol Graham and Aurite Werman

*Sukhov went off to sleep, and he was completely content. Fate had been kind in many ways that day; he hadn't been put in the cells, the gang had not been sent to the Socialist Community Center, he'd fiddled himself an extra bowl of porridge for dinner .... the day had gone by without a single cloud—almost a happy day. There were three thousand six hundred and fifty-three days like that in his sentence, from reveille to lights out. The three extra days were because of the leap years. —Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich**

(Malouf 2011: 4)

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## 15.1 Introduction

We examine well-being trends in the context of turbulent economic and political change in transition and posttransition economies of the Eastern Bloc, defined here as the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and those of the former Soviet Union (FSU) that had centrally planned economies and socialist governments or were part of the former Soviet bloc before 1989.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The transition countries of the former USSR are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. Posttransition countries are the eleven CEE member states that joined the EU between 2004 and 2013 (EU-11): Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Although Croatia joined the EU in 2013, we did not include it as an EU country in our calculations because we only have data through 2011.

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Central planning brought varying degrees of political repression, with the extreme described in the preceding quote, but also, for most citizens, universal guarantees of social services and economic security. With the transition, these countries experienced a fundamental restructuring of their economic, political, and social welfare systems, which led to unprecedented changes in the lives of most citizens.

Although all of these countries experienced decades of centrally planned economies and political repression, they brought very different histories and institutional compositions to the Soviet era. The Eastern European countries had a longer term trajectory of markets and democracy and a shared cultural history with Europe. The countries of the former Russian empire, meanwhile, had little experience with democracy prior to the Soviet period, although they were fairly sophisticated economically. Many of the countries of Central Asia entered the Soviet period with underdeveloped states and markets, and some were pastoral and even nomadic societies, as in the case of Mongolia. Not surprisingly, these different experiences and economic and political trajectories resulted in very different



outcomes, both under central planning and during the transition.

These different histories and vast internal diversity were made more complex by borders that were drawn only recently. They were all influenced by the shared experience with Communist governments and central planning. Yet, because of their different starting points and different levels of prior experience with markets and democracy, they entered the transition process with different institutional capacities. For the most part, as we demonstrate, the countries that had had market economies and democratic government in the past—and that were also more closely linked to Europe—fared much better during the transition, although there were winners and losers within them. A theme of this chapter is the vast differences in outcomes, both across countries and the individuals within them and the extent to which these differences are reflected in well-being indicators.

Although they are diverse and in different countries, the vast majority of citizens lived in societies that lacked political and economic freedoms but provided guaranteed access to basic public goods, such as health and education, and universal, if not always fulfilling, employment to all citizens. The transition to market economies and political freedom was as abrupt as it was dramatic, and those countries that had prior experience with markets and democracy were in a better position to manage it, whereas the particularly vulnerable groups within all countries, such as the elderly, had the most difficult time coping.

The effects of these complex changes on the lives of ordinary citizens are reflected in both *objective* indicators of economic progress, such as gross national product (GNP) per capita, income inequality, and unemployment rates and in *subjective* well-being metrics, such as life satisfaction and satisfaction with jobs, standard of living, and public goods. The latter metrics attempt to measure the various dimensions of well-being that extend beyond income. We provide, to the extent we can, an analysis of both. Objective and subjective indicators of progress

tend to run in the same direction, yet there are, at times, differences between them (discussed in detail below).

This chapter covers the period from the 1980s through 2012 and uses data from a number of sources, including the World Development Indicators, the World Values Survey, the Gallup World Poll, and the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS). Our analytical approach is based in the new science of well-being. Scholars from a range of disciplines, including economics and psychology, are now using well-being metrics to explore the effects of environmental, institutional, and policy variables on well-being.

We are, of course, attempting to draw broad conclusions about a tremendously diverse group of countries, and we will inevitably miss important differences across specific countries. To make more meaningful comparisons, we split the transition countries into two groups: European Union (EU) and non-EU, the broad assumption being that those that have been accepted in the EU have made more complete economic and political transitions.<sup>2</sup>

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## 15.2 The Transition: Why the Past Matters to the Future

### 15.2.1 A Varied Experience

The transition experience—e.g., the transition from centrally planned economies and polities to free markets and democratic governments—varied a great deal, both across and within countries, and there were clear “winners” and “losers” in the process. The trends during the transition are stark. Economic growth was consistently negative in the region as a whole from 1989 until 1996 (Milanović 1998). Mortality rates increased in all

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<sup>2</sup>The EU countries in this analysis are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Although Croatia joined the EU in 2013, we did not include it as an EU country in the calculations because we only had data through 2011.



countries except the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Cornia 1994), especially among men aged 15–54. The total number of the poor (using the \$4/day purchasing power parity (PPP)-adjusted poverty line) increased from 14 million people in 1987–1988 to more than 168 million in 1993–1995 (from 4 % to 45 % of the population) (Milanović 1998).

In terms of subjective well-being (and again the pretransition data are spotty), residents of the Russian Federation reported lower levels than those of developing countries such as India and Nigeria as early as these indicators were recorded, in 1982. By the 1990s, subjective well-being levels fell to even more unprecedented levels; in fact, they fell to the world's lowest levels ever recorded (Inglehart et al. 2013). World Values Survey data for a few transition countries suggested that life satisfaction was higher in the 1980s than it was in 1990s (Easterlin 2009). Easterlin (2009) also noted an increase in anomie in the period leading up to the transition (1978–1990) and then an increase in mental stress between the 1980s and 1990s, as the transition progressed.

Although many deprivations occurred in the pretransition period, with lack of freedom being paramount among them, there were also significant securities that enhanced well-being, such as guaranteed employment and universally available social safety nets (e.g., social welfare and social support systems) (Milanović 1998). These securities were disrupted if not destroyed by the transition. At the same time, it is unlikely that the picture would have been better had the increasingly stretched centrally planned system remained in place. The dramatic changes of the time were driven by broad public momentum that stemmed from public frustration and unhappiness with the state of things under central planning.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Citizens of the FSU expressed significantly lower levels of support for the successor regimes throughout the transformation, however. On average, only 32 % of FSU respondents expressed positive support for the new regime across the transition to date, compared with an average of 60 % for CEE respondents. For the three FSU regimes, there was a modest, but generally steady, increase in the

Although income and consumption measures improved by the end of the 1990s and people gained rights and freedoms, many residents of transition countries remained dissatisfied. According to data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for 2006, only 25 % of respondents agreed with the statement that the economic situation in their country was better in 2006 than in 1989 (Guriev and Zhuravskaya 2009). Public opinion surveys in the 2000s documented an emergent “communist nostalgia” in CEE, i.e., a positive evaluation of the socialist economic system and an approval of the return of communist rule, especially among older respondents and in the FSU countries, for example, Ukraine and the Central Asian countries, as opposed to the CEE (Ekman and Linde 2005). This finding is reflected in our empirical results.

### 15.2.2 Starting on the Path Toward Reform

The transition from command to market economy was an enormous undertaking for all of the FSU countries. The highly centralized socialist economic system had focused on full employment, price controls, and gross production at the cost of efficient allocation of labor and capital, innovation, and the growth of enterprise. The political discourse that accompanied the fall of the Soviet Union called for democracy and a capitalist economy governed by protection of private property and a sound legal framework. Shortly after 1989, the CEE nations in particular had in mind a model for their future economies and sought to emulate the economies of their Western neighbors. Others, such as the pastoral societies of Central Asia, had neither the education nor the social or technical skills that would have made

percentage of citizens who supported the transition regime over time. Among the CEE regimes, support increased slowly through 1995 and then fell back to initial levels in 1998. Russia was slightly different, with a big increase in support from 1991 to 1994 and relatively steady support thereafter (with a spike at the time of the 1997 presidential elections [Mishler and Rose 1997: 324]).

them EU-eligible nor the cultural and historical affinity with Europe that would have fostered interest in joining the EU.

Thus not all countries were equally positioned to take on the reforms required for success in the new era of markets and democracies as they began the transition. The outcomes reveal a great deal of related path dependency and reflect countries' initial endowments; their choice of and commitment to policy reforms; and their ability to implement them.

There were three clear groups of countries, with some heterogeneity among them. The first are those referenced above, the CEE countries that wanted to "return" to Europe, to which they historically belonged. The second were the truly Soviet countries: Russia, Ukraine, and the close neighbors, who had little tradition of either markets or democracy. They were the most dominated by central planning but also had reasonable resource endowments. The third set of countries—which includes the countries in Central Asia—was the furthest away from either Europe or Russia (both in distance and in shared experience). They not only lacked a tradition of democracy and market economies but also had entered into the Soviet central planning period with the challenges faced by typical underdeveloped economies. As such, they had even greater obstacles to overcome when they entered the transition process. Not surprisingly, their situation remains the most precarious.

The return to Europe for the first set of countries was facilitated by the fact that the EU embraced and guided policy for the Central European states, the Baltics, and eventually, Romania and Bulgaria. It was clear from the outset that these countries wanted market economies and democracies and would do their utmost to rejoin the West. Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania underwent radical shifts to the market—e.g., "shock therapy." They liberalized prices, reduced budget deficits, unified exchange rates, and implemented extensive and at times controversial privatization of state enterprises. Hungary, southeast Europe, and most of the FSU undertook more slowly paced reforms. Through gradual reform, they sought to build a

quality framework for a market economy and address inflation, budget deficits, privatization, and monetary expansion. Its proponents argued that gradualism would avoid the extreme pain of shock therapy, or in some cases, that gradualism could help retain the more appealing tenets of socialism, such as the substantial social safety net.

### 15.2.3 Reform in Action

The most problematic of the reforms undertaken simultaneously were deregulation and inflation. Deregulation was made difficult and complicated by the wealthy and politically connected who sought to take advantage of the international arbitrage opportunities that state-owned enterprises offered. Stakes in state-owned enterprises throughout the FSU were concentrated in the hands of a few. Meanwhile, 13 countries experienced hyperinflations in the 1990s that were exacerbated by the perception that transition economies needed to maintain the same social benefits that they had become accustomed to and perhaps to increase public spending in order to better align with Western European nations.

Stabilization is a rocky process, and, as of the 1990s, was achieved only by Central Europe and the Baltic states. Poland and Estonia successfully stabilized by fixing their currencies or adopting a currency board, as did Bulgaria and Lithuania. Reform followed a much messier trajectory in the nations that were not embraced by the EU and that eventually formed the Commonwealth of Independent States. Nations like Ukraine and Kazakhstan, perceived by the EU as non-Western and perhaps export threats, did not receive the same financial or policy assistance that nations like Poland and Slovenia did. Other countries in the FSU experienced currency crises brought on by enormous public debt (hyperinflation had reduced state revenues in some instances). Russia experienced a financial crisis that culminated in the devaluation of the ruble, and Bulgaria experienced a crisis stemming from its faltering financial sector.

Three transition paths emerge among the transition economies: market democracies with sub-

stantial private ownership (Poland and the Czech Republic), market economies still bogged down by bureaucracy (Bulgaria and Ukraine), and dictatorships (Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) in which public ownership and state control are central features. Both Anders Åslund (2007) and Branko Milanović (1998) highlighted the extent to which the postcommunist countries experienced, with a few exceptions, some of the most dramatic increases in inequality seen since it has been accurately measured. In addition to the dramatic nature of the transitions, part of this change was due to the fact that pretransition inequality was at low levels that were not compatible with market systems with incentives for productivity and innovation.<sup>4</sup>

As privatization created enormous wealth for a few, real average income declined for the majority of the population, especially in Russia. Most countries went from zero unemployment to rates that resembled those in developing economies at the same time that public benefits were being cut dramatically. In contrast, the Central European countries that most closely mirrored the EU enjoyed relatively lower levels of income inequality and lower unemployment, more closely resembling European levels. These nations, including Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, were, for the most part, able to maintain the egalitarian income distribution they had had before the transition.

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## 15.3 Objective Trends and Indicators

In comparing trends pre- and posttransition, we suffer from the absence of counteracts. In other words, the economic and political situations were deteriorating in many of these countries

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<sup>4</sup>The pretransition economies lacked what Birdsall and Graham (1999) have called “constructive inequality,” which is that which rewards work, effort, and productivity and innovation. This type of inequality is distinct from “destructive inequality,” which is defined as levels of inequality that are so high and persistent that they discourage savings, effort, and investments in the future by the poor.

prior to the transition, and we do not know what would have happened in the absence of this deterioration. Pre-1989 data are either nonexistent or untrustworthy (Lipton et al. 1990). Some indicators exist, ranging from trends in life expectancy to rates of alcoholism. These indicators then worsened during the initial years of transition.


### 15.3.1 Economic Trends

The economic trends for the transition economies speak for themselves. In 1996, overall gross domestic product (GDP) was about 80 % of its 1987 level in Eastern Europe and about 60 % of its 1987 level in the FSU, but it recovered in the late 1990s, with the extent of the recovery varying a great deal across countries (Milanović 1998). As with many indicators, the recovery in the EU group of countries was much more complete than in the non-EU group (Fig. 15.1). Although GDP recovered, meanwhile, income inequality, which widened significantly (from artificially low levels), remained at much higher levels than it was before. As in the case of GDP trends, those countries that started the process better endowed and that had a longer trajectory of markets and democracy prior to the Soviet period fared much better (Fig. 15.2).

The costs of transition in terms of reduced output and increased unemployment were enormous, as were the social costs of transition to a market economy. The state sector had employed 90 % of the labor force in many FSU countries, and its shrinkage had obvious effects on unemployment (Milanović 1998).


### 15.3.2 Social Welfare Indicators

Perhaps the most dramatic trend was in the structure of the social welfare system. Free health care, education, and childcare, distributed via state sector employment, were all reduced sharply following the initiation of the transition, as were pensions and wages for the state-sector employees who remained. The unemployed no longer



**Fig. 15.1** Real per capita GDP growth in the transition economies of the nation-states of the former Eastern Bloc, 1981–2012. The per capita growth variable is calculated using gross domestic product per capita and purchasing

power parity (constant 2005 international dollars). Data are not available for all countries for all years (Data from World Bank 2014)




**Fig. 15.2** Income inequality in the transition economies of the nation-states of the former Eastern Bloc, 1985–2011. Data are not available for all countries for all years (Data from World Bank 2013, 2014)

received the government pensions or family allowances they had previously enjoyed and had to seek out whatever benefits were available—a huge normative departure. This change created perverse incentives to remain in unproductive and nonlucrative state-sector jobs, where available, in order to avoid the loss of health and other benefits. This practice, in turn, slowed the transition process, limited productivity, and served as a drain on fiscal resources in some countries, particularly Russia and Ukraine (Eggers et al. 2006; Gaddy and Ickes 2002).


Indeed, one of the most marked features of the transition is the large number of people—and indeed countries—that remain stuck in what Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes have famously termed the “virtual economy,” stuck between state and market, in a system that depends on central government revenues and barter between public enterprises and their employees. The divergence between vibrant cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg on the one hand, and Perm and Koryak Okrug in Siberia (which has the lowest population density in Russia) in rural

Russia on the other, for example, or between vibrant economies in Poland and the Czech Republic, and stagnating and incomplete transitions in Ukraine, Belarus, and the “stans,” is remarkable. Civil society, meanwhile, was sorely underdeveloped because many countries had no recent experience with political participation or free press, among other things.

Societies accustomed to having universally available and state-provided services were ill-equipped for a shift that required much more individual initiative to receive access to social welfare benefits (Graham 1994, 1998). The reduction in quality and size of socialist programs across the board led to a tangible loss of welfare. Mortality and morbidity increased substantially in some cases, particularly in the FSU (Fig. 15.3). Direct subsidies and social transfers had been allocated disproportionately to the impoverished and had done a great deal to equalize the income distribution, although the effects were not uniform across the countries, depending on the structure of transfers (Milanović 1998) (Fig. 15.4).



**Fig. 15.3** Life expectancy at birth in the transition economies of the nation-states of the former Eastern Bloc, 1980–2011. Data are not available for all countries for all years (Data from World Bank 2014)



**Fig. 15.4** Social contributions (% of revenue) in the transition economies of the nation-states of the former Eastern Bloc, 1990–2011. Data are not available for all countries for all years (Data from World Bank 2014)

We saw major differences in health trajectories across our various groups of countries as well. EU member states converged to their Western counterparts across indicators whereas FSU states stagnated or fell behind (though Russia and Ukraine began to converge in the late 1990s). The Baltic States, meanwhile, initially followed a trajectory resembling that of Russia but subsequently sustained continued improvements in general health indicators (Nolte et al. 2004). The situation remains far more difficult among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, with some countries experiencing a reversal in life expectancy.


In all industrialized countries, men have a lower life expectancy than women but the difference is much larger in this set of countries. In addition, whereas in the countries of the EU gender-related differences appear to have narrowed in recent years, to just over 6 years in 2000, the FSU saw a further increase in the late 1990s, following substantial fluctuations since the mid-1980s, to 11 years in 2000. This last increase was, however, driven mainly by the recent reversal in mortality trends in Russia and Ukraine, whereas the Caucasus countries experi-

enced considerable declines in the late 1990s, to about 5 years in 2000, largely because of steady deterioration in male mortality rates (Fig. 15.3). Life expectancy for Russian men dropped to roughly 50 years of age.

The transition from socialism also altered family structures in the FSU. The command economy had encouraged high labor participation of both men and women and had encouraged families to have children by offering sizable family allowances, free childcare, and education. With the loss of many of these societal constructs, accompanied by burgeoning unemployment, women often transitioned from paying jobs to domestic work and childcare. Fertility rates fell concurrently (Milanović 1998) (Fig. 15.5).

Investments in education made considerable progress under communism, particularly for those countries in the Soviet Union that were the least developed. Between 1950 and 1990, the percentage of the population in the FSU with no schooling fell rapidly, with the largest change occurring in the east. Those countries with strongest ties to communism began with an uneducated populace of over 35 %, compared to 16 %





**Fig. 15.5** Fertility rates in the transition economies of the nation-states of the former Eastern Bloc, 1980–2011. Total fertility rate equals average births per woman. Data

are not available for all countries for all years. (Data from World Bank 2014)

in their western Soviet Union counterparts. By 1990, the percentage of the population with no schooling in the eastern Soviet Union had fallen to below 10 % (Figs. 15.6).


With the fall of the Soviet Union, education became more expensive and less accessible for a majority of the population; at the same time, the economic returns from acquiring an education, and especially higher education, rose considerably. As the pay differential between low-skilled and high-skilled laborers grew, the marginal benefit from attaining a higher level of education grew as well.

### 15.3.3 Vulnerable Groups

The transition from market to socialist economy was particularly difficult for marginalized groups in the FSU, including women, the elderly, the very young, and the “new poor.” Although there was also likely a differential in how “first peoples” in particular countries fared, we cannot define and identify a consistent set of “first peoples” across this wide set of countries.

Women were disproportionately and adversely affected by the consequences of transition, especially by unemployment and underemployment. The loss of maternal and childcare benefits and the deterioration of social safety nets reduced their ability to participate in the labor force, in government, and in political parties (Ishkanian 2004). The gender-driven discrepancy in outcomes was, however, gradually reduced over the course of the transition (Slay 2009). The elderly in the FSU suffered similarly from a decline in or loss of pensions, which increased the incidence of poverty. It was also more difficult for them to adjust to economic hardship due to their more limited capacity to adapt (Bezemer 2006), their physical frailty, and their status outside of the labor force. Partly due to the decline in family allowances and health benefits, children were even more likely to fall into chronic poverty than were the elderly, particularly in those FSU states further east (Slay 2009).

In addition to the suffering of traditional disadvantaged groups in the early 1990s, the economic transition also created a “new poor,” consisting of farm workers and petty traders; public servants in sectors such as education,



**Fig. 15.6** Percentage of population with no schooling in the nation-states of the former Eastern Bloc, 1950–2010. Data are not available for all countries for all years (Data from Barro and Lee 2010, 2014)

health, science and the arts; youth with no work experience; and the internally displaced (Slay 2009). Although Jews had seen an increase in grassroots anti-Semitic sentiment during the last years of the Soviet Union, by 1991 the status of Soviet Jews changed drastically. Those willing to flee the economic instability of the transition emigrated to Israel—vast numbers of Jews from Russia and Ukraine in particular did so in the early 1990s—whereas others could not and lost a sense of community in places that experienced a mass exodus (Trier 1996).

The different fates of the wide range of other minority groups throughout the region, from the Roma in the Eastern European countries, to the separatist movements in Chechnya, are too diverse to discuss comprehensively. Minorities in some countries experienced more freedom, economic opportunity, and higher levels of life satisfaction once political freedoms were established, whereas others remained marginalized due to different balances in ethnic and racial composition across countries and even regions within them (Graham et al. 2004). Some, like the separatists in Chechnya, became radicalized over time.

## 15.4 Subjective Well-Being Trends

We address the two distinct dimensions of subjective well-being where possible in our empirical analysis. Hedonic well-being assesses the way in which people experience their daily lives and the quality of their lives. Evaluative well-being metrics capture how people think of their lives as a whole (Stone and Mackie 2013). This dimension implicitly includes Aristotle's view of happiness as people's capacities to lead purposeful or fulfilling lives.

A large number of studies, including those by Graham (2009, 2011b), found remarkable consistency in the determinants of happiness (evaluative well-being) around the world, in countries as different as Afghanistan and Sweden. Within countries, income influences happiness, but only so much after basic needs are well met; health, employment, stable partnerships, friendships, and freedom are also very important (see also Blanchflower and Oswald 2004; Helliwell et al. 2013; Layard 2005). There is also a consistent U-shaped relationship between happiness and age, with the low and/or turning point ranging

from roughly 44–50 years, depending on the country. This consistency in the basic determinants of well-being allows scholars to control for these factors and to study the effects of variables that vary more, such as inflation and unemployment rates, crime and corruption, and obesity and exercising, among others. We use the metrics as a lens into well-being trends in the transition economies.

### 15.4.1 Adaptation and Progress Paradoxes

There are also some methodological challenges that are relevant to the transition economies. The first of these is adaptation, which is a psychological preservation mechanism. People can adapt to most (but not all) conditions, such as poor health, crime and corruption, and poverty, and report to be “happy.” This ability is in part due to low expectations in contexts where people do not have the capacity to make choices or control their lives. Graham’s research shows that individuals are more likely to adapt to unpleasant certainty than they are to change and uncertainty (Graham 2011a; Graham and Chattopadhyay 2009; Graham et al. 2011).

A related theme is the different effects of a variable’s *changes* versus *levels* on well-being. Higher levels of per capita GNP and the better public goods, more freedoms, and better environmental quality that go along with them, are typically associated with higher levels of well-being. Yet, we also find that respondents in the process of change, such as during times of rapid economic growth, tend to be less happy than the average. The reason for this “paradox of unhappy growth” is that increasing inequality, changing rewards to different skill sets, and large differentials in rewards across similar cohorts often accompany rapid growth (Graham and Lora 2009; Graham and Pettinato 2002a, b).

Progress can be accompanied by a paradox. Progress and change often bring higher levels of evaluative well-being but also higher levels of stress and sometimes anger at the same time, as we found in a recent study of the effects on well-

being of newly acquired access to information technology. Life gets better but is also more complicated (Graham and Nikolova 2013a, b). These issues are highly salient in the transition countries. The progress paradox has been marked and rapid; unpleasant certainty in the pretransition era has shifted to extreme economic and political uncertainty. We noted a major variance across winning and losing cohorts, both within and across countries.


### 15.4.2 General Trends in Subjective Well-Being

Not surprisingly, subjective well-being trends in this diverse set of countries reflect the dramatic nature of transition, in both income and non income dimensions of life. In general, life satisfaction displays a V-shaped trend, with levels falling dramatically with the onset of the transition (mirroring the dramatic changes in economic growth levels and patterns) and then recovering toward pretransition levels, albeit incompletely in most countries, from roughly 2005 on (Easterlin 2009) (Fig. 15.7).

#### 15.4.2.1 Adaptation to Uncertainty

Uncertainty is a key reason for the incomplete recovery in life satisfaction. The transition from the Soviet era of centrally planned economies to relatively unfettered markets and open politics is perhaps one of the most striking examples of moving millions of people from unpleasant certainty to uncertainty. The V-shaped pattern in life satisfaction and the incomplete recovery reflect the extent to which citizens in the region are still bothered by this uncertainty and the different fates of winners and losers in the process (Fig. 15.7).

A clear marker of the latter trend is the marked increase in inequality of life satisfaction in the transition economies. In 1990, for example, one of the earliest points for which we have comparable data for life satisfaction in this set of countries, there were no significant differences in the life satisfaction of the “rich” (roughly labeled) and the “poor” (Easterlin 2009). Since that time,



**Fig. 15.7** The Done Better Than Classmates variable is based on the response to the question of whether the respondent has done better in life than her classmates (measured on a scale of 1–5, whereby 1 is strongly dis-

agree and 5 is strongly agree). The Higher Income Rank in 1989 variable is a binary indicator of whether the respondent believed to have had a higher income rank in 1989 than in 2006 (Data from Barro and Lee 2014)

inequality in life satisfaction has increased notably in both capitalist and transition economies, but the largest differences are clearly in the transition economies (in part because their starting point was so equal) (Table 15.1).

#### 15.4.2.2 Income and Life Satisfaction

The adverse changes in life satisfaction in the transition economies were most notable for lower income groups, especially the unemployed and the elderly. If one looks more closely across domains, one sees important differences that also reflect the general trends in who gained or lost the most in the process. In general, the satisfaction levels with material living and employment are higher, reflecting the extent to which the opening to the market created new opportunities for employment and for differentiation in earnings as a reward to individual effort. On the other hand, satisfaction levels in the domains of health and family security are lower than before, reflecting the extent to which universal (and unsustain-

able) social welfare systems were eroded by the transition (Easterlin 2009).

Another notable and lasting trend in this set of countries is the extent to which life satisfaction levels are significantly lower than their income levels would predict, both at the country and individual levels. In other words, most countries in this group are below the “line of best fit,” which is where they theoretically should be if a cross-country regression of life satisfaction on per capita GDP were performed, as Easterlin (2009) did. At the individual level, citizens of these countries are, on average, less satisfied with their lives than are those of other countries with comparable levels of income (in both cases, adjusted for PPP). What we are not able to do, due to data limitations, is to conduct a similar exercise in the pretransition period to see if the low average life satisfaction levels were a preexisting trend in this set of countries (and in part related to shared cultural and other experiences).

**Table 15.1** Average and inequality of life satisfaction, 1989–1999

Country	Life satisfaction (1–10)			Life satisfaction (1–10)			Life satisfaction (1–10)		
	Initial year	Mean	Life sat. gini	Midpoint year	Mean	Life sat. gini	End year	Mean	Life sat. gini
Belarus	1990	5.5	0.23	1996	4.4	0.28	1999	4.8	0.26
Bulgaria	1991	5.0	0.26	–	–	–	1998	5.0	0.29
Czech Republic	1991	6.7	0.18	–	–	–	1998	6.7	0.17
Estonia	1989.5	6.0	0.20	1996	5.0	0.26	1999	5.9	0.21
Hungary	1990	6.0	0.23	–	–	–	1998.5	5.8	0.23
Latvia	1989.5	5.7	0.24	1996	4.9	0.26	1998	5.3	0.26
Lithuania	1989.5	6.0	0.22	1996	5.0	0.30	1999	5.1	0.29
Poland	1989	6.6	0.19	–	–	–	1997.5	6.4	0.22
Romania	1993	5.9	0.23	–	–	–	1998	5.0	0.30
Russia	1990	5.4	0.25	1995	4.5	0.32	1998	4.7	0.31
Slovakia	1991	6.6	0.21	–	–	–	1998	6.1	0.21
Slovenia	1991	6.3	0.20	1995	6.5	0.18	1999	7.2	0.17

Data from Easterlin (2009: 143)

### 15.4.2.3 The Role of Institutions


We also noted significant differences across countries. Countries that began the transition with better initial conditions, including a history of experience with markets and democracies, and that, not coincidentally, subsequently joined the EU, for the most part, demonstrated higher average levels of life satisfaction compared with those of comparable income levels in nontransition economies. Figure 15.8 shows that both of the dimensions of well-being—evaluative (overall life evaluation as measured by the best possible life question<sup>5</sup>) and hedonic (daily experience, as measured by smiling yesterday)—were consistently higher in the EU countries than they were in the non-EU countries from 2005 to 2012. At the same time, stress was also higher in the EU countries, with a slight increase in the gap in the years following the 2009 financial crisis. This finding most likely reflects the extent to which citizens of the EU countries were more affected by the prolonged crisis in the Eurozone.

<sup>5</sup>Best possible life (BPL) measures the respondent's assessment of her current life relative to her best possible life on a scale of 0–10, where 0 is the worst possible life, and 10 is the best possible life.

### 15.4.3 Inequality in Transition: Uneven Progress Within Countries

One of the most notable traits in well-being trends in this region is the extent to which they differ across cohorts within countries as well as across the broad set of countries noted above. Measured happiness in the transition economies follows the same U-shaped relation with age that it has in most countries in the world but differs in the fact that, for the most part, the turning point is slightly older on average (50 rather than 44–47 years) and is slightly slower to recover. The turning point in the age-happiness relationship is 52 years for the EU-10 (Rodriguez-Pose and Maslouskaite 2012) compared with 62 years for Ukrainians, 35 years for the Swiss, and the global average of 46 years (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004). The older turning point in the transition countries in the end reflects longer periods of unhappiness over the life cycle in this set of countries.

The fact that several features of the transition have not favored the elderly is reflected in their reported well-being levels. They were, for the most part, more vested in the old system of central planning, less likely to be trained for the new



**Fig. 15.8** Best possible life, transition economies of the nation-states of the former Eastern Bloc, 2005–2012. Best possible life measures the respondent’s assessment of her current life relative to her best possible life on a scale of

0–10, where 0 is the worst possible life, and 10 is the best possible life. Data are not available for all countries for all years (Data from Gallup World Poll 2014)

opportunities that the market economy introduced, and less able to adapt to the overall changes. At the same time, they were much more likely to be dependent on state pension systems with shrinking benefits, due to fiscal constraints, and rising costs for basic goods, due to the introduction of market pricing. And, as is typical with age, they were the cohorts that were most reliant on health care systems that were either eroding or in transition.

Cohorts with less education, and in particular less than college level education, were also losers in the transition. Many of the jobs that the free market introduced were in the financial, technology, and service sectors, jobs which the uneducated were not well positioned to fill. The largest declines in employment, meanwhile, occurred with the privatization of large state-owned enterprises that often employed large numbers of blue collar workers.

Finally, we noted gender differences in the well-being trends. As in most of the world, women reported higher levels of well-being, as measured by the best possible life question, than men, with the exception of Russia. Looking across domains, women were more likely to be

affected negatively by the deterioration of family life (and the related loss of generous childcare subsidies that made women’s participation in the labor force much easier in the pretransition era), whereas the well-being of men was more closely related to employment conditions and the labor market (Easterlin 2009).

#### 15.4.4 Inequality in Transition: Democracy, Markets, and Well-Being Trends

##### 15.4.4.1 Trends in Income Inequality and Life Satisfaction

The rise in income inequality in the transition economies in the past decades was much more marked than in other regions or countries, even those that have led the trend, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia (Graham 2014). Not surprisingly, there has also been an associated rise in inequality in life satisfaction (Table 15.1).

Along with widening income and life satisfaction inequality, we noted a differentiation in the



relationship between income and life satisfaction across cohorts within the transition economies. In general, the relationship was strongest for the lowest income groups, whereas for all income groups it was strongest at the beginning of the transition, perhaps because of the high degree of uncertainty in all domains during that period (Easterlin 2009). In addition, high inequality was seen as more problematic in transition economies than elsewhere, likely because former socialist states have stronger preferences for equality or at least a long trajectory of fairly equitable distributions.

#### 15.4.4.2 The Missing “Democracy Premium”

Equally notable, these trends were not offset by the expected “democracy” premium. For the most part, around the world, individual freedoms and democratic governance are associated with higher levels of well-being, both within and across countries. A cross-country analysis of European nations, for example, finds a significant positive relation between democracy and happiness (Dorn et al. 2007). The transition economies do not completely fit this pattern. Easterlin (2009, 2012) found no association between happiness and democracy in the transition. This result is perhaps unsurprising, given that the abrupt arrival of democracy (and then its varied quality across countries) coincided with unprecedented changes and uncertainty in the economic and social realms, with the marked differences between the fates of winners and losers.

Grosjean et al. (2013) found that citizens’ attitudes about markets, democracies, and supporting institutions depended on the stage of transition and the business cycle. Amidst the economic crisis from 2006 to 2010, pretransition attitudes declined in CEE countries that were hit by a negative economic shock but increased in the less democratic countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Ironically, whereas the crisis lowered pretransition attitudes in general, it increased the demand for democratic reforms among the youth and groups excluded from the current political-economic system in corrupt and less liberalized transition countries.

#### 15.4.4.3 Perceptions of Institutions Shape Expectations of the Future

The “prospect of upward mobility” hypothesis, which we have studied in a number of other contexts, posits that individuals who are poorer than average in the present, but expect to be richer than average in the future, exhibit a reduced level of support for redistributive policies. In general, it posits that if people believe in the opportunity structure in their country, they are willing to invest in their future and work within it rather than seek to rely on connections. In the transition countries, we found that this hypothesis held for the countries that joined the EU but not as well for those that remained outside it (Cojocaru 2012).

Almost half of the adults in Eastern Europe believe that it is very important to have connections to get a good government job. But there are cross-country differences. Respondents in transition countries that joined the EU were more likely to believe that inequality of opportunity is correlated with individual effort and hard work rather than with access to connections or lack thereof, and inequality of opportunity was perceived to be widespread outside of the EU but less so in EU countries (Cojocaru 2012).

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## 15.5 Conclusions

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the FSU experienced turbulent economic, political, and institutional reforms, which brought about changes and experiences unknown during socialism. It is hard to generalize about such a diverse set of countries, all of which faced a traumatic transition experience but entered it with very different initial conditions and are emerging from it with various degrees of success. Transitions such as these are long processes. Some countries may still turn around and achieve sustainable growth and political stability; others, and particularly those with deeper governance and economic challenges, may continue to fall further and further behind.

Overall trends in life satisfaction reflect the dramatic nature of the transition and the associ-

ated drops in GNP and the erosion of important supporting social welfare mechanisms. As economic growth and stability recovered, so did life satisfaction, with the greatest increases in the economic domain and much less progress in the domains of health and family life. As inequality increased, meanwhile, so did inequality in life satisfaction, with the gaps between the happiest and least happy in society increasing together with the gaps in income.

Within and across countries, well-being trends clearly varied between the winners and losers of transition. Winners and losers are found among countries and cohorts of particular ages, income, and education within them. Those countries with historical linkages to Europe and with economic, political, and judicial institutions that most closely resembled those of their European counterparts fared the best and were, not surprisingly, also on the path to EU membership.

Those countries that were closer to the Soviet empire and whose historical legacy shared a great deal with Russia, such as the Ukraine and Belarus, fared worse, had less complete transitions in both economic and political realms, had larger increases in inequality, and life satisfaction levels that dropped more and recovered less.

Finally, the outlying countries in Central Asia, which were dominated by central planning at early stages in their economic development process, emerged from the transition with the dual challenges of economic and political underdevelopment and the transition to markets and democracy. Not surprisingly, their objective indicators today reflect much lower levels of progress in both economic and political domains, and their levels of life satisfaction are also lower. There are some “outlier” countries on this front, such as Uzbekistan and Belarus, where surprisingly high levels of life satisfaction may be the result of low expectations or the fear of reporting otherwise in the context of repressive regimes.

Within countries, younger people who were better equipped to adapt to new economic and political systems, such as those with more skills and particular kinds of education, and who thus had better odds of being employed, were the clear “winners” in the process. This result is reflected in their life satisfaction, their satisfaction with

political and economic regimes, and their faith in the system in general.

It is unlikely that the differences in both objective and well-being subjective indicators will be resolved any time soon because of the strong degree of dependence on the path taken that has persisted across countries and the related institutional weakness that impedes successful structural reforms in the “losing” countries. It is also not obvious that these different outcomes were “caused” by the transition. In the absence of counterfactual data, i.e., how these countries would have fared had central planning persisted, it is difficult to tell.

What the transition did was provide major opportunities for change—including economic and political freedom—for those countries (and cohorts within them) that were positioned to take advantage of the opportunities. Because some countries were much better able to do so than others, the transition widened preexisting differences among them, both in terms of economic and institutional indicators and of life satisfaction and individuals’ perceptions of their ability to take advantage of those opportunities and lead successful lives.

A major challenge for policy, both for leaders within the countries and for the international financial institutions, which extends beyond the provision of safety nets is the crafting of new mechanisms to facilitate the participation of those individuals who have fallen behind. The differences in outcomes, demonstrated as well by well-being indicators, within and across countries, will continue to pose a challenge to economic and political stability in the region, as the turbulent events in Ukraine in 2014 demonstrate. Deeper understanding of well-being trends as factors driving further splits between those in the EU and those outside it, however, must be the subject of future research and will provide important inputs into policy questions, both within and across countries.

**Acknowledgements** We thank Milena Nikolova for extensive support with the data analysis and chapter edits and for her inputs from her extensive first-hand knowledge of the transition economies; we also thank Richard Estes, Joe Sirgy, and several anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.

## Supplemental Tables

**Supplemental Table 15.1** Demography

**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Demography**

**REGION: CIS (N=18)**

	Country Source	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
South Central Asia	Kazakhstan (CIS)	9.7	15.4	16.3	17.3	4.4	1.2	1.4	1.5	44.2	56.0	53.7	53.3
South Central Asia	Kyrgyzstan (CIS)	2.2	4.0	5.4	5.8	3.1	1.9	1.2	2.0	34.2	38.4	35.3	35.6
South Central Asia	Tajikistan (CIS)	2.1	4.5	7.6	8.4	3.4	3.1	2.4	2.4	33.2	33.2	26.5	26.7
South Central Asia	Turkmenistan (CIS)	1.6	3.2	5.0	5.3	3.4	2.5	1.3	1.3	46.4	46.0	48.4	49.7
South Central Asia	Uzbekistan (CIS)	8.6	18.2	28.6	30.7	3.5	2.5	2.8	1.6	34.0	40.7	36.2	36.3
East Europe	Belarus (CIS)	8.2	10.0	9.5	9.5	1.0	0.7	−0.2	0.0	32.4	61.8	74.6	76.3
East Europe	Bulgaria (CIS)	7.9	9.0	7.4	7.2	1.0	0.0	−0.7	−0.5	37.1	64.6	72.3	73.6
East Europe	Moldova (CIS)	2.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	2.5	1.0	−0.1	−0.1	23.4	44.2	44.9	44.9
East Europe	Romania (CIS)	18.4	22.8	20.2	19.9	0.8	0.4	−0.6	−0.4	34.2	49.6	53.8	54.4
East Europe	Russian Federation (CIS)	119.9	143.9	142.8	143.8	1.5	0.8	0.0	0.2	53.7	71.9	73.7	73.9
East Europe	Ukraine (CIS)	42.7	50.9	45.9	45.4	1.3	0.3	−0.4	−0.3	46.8	64.7	68.7	69.5
East Europe	Estonia (CIS)	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.3	0.7	0.7	−0.2	−0.3	57.5	70.8	68.1	67.6
East Europe	Latvia (CIS)	2.1	2.6	2.1	2.0	0.7	0.7	−2.1	−1.1	52.9	68.6	67.7	67.4
East Europe	Lithuania (CIS)	2.8	3.5	3.1	2.9	1.6	0.9	−2.1	−1.0	39.5	65.0	66.8	66.5

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 15.1** (continued)

	Country Source	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
North Europe	Albania (CIS)	1.6	3.0	2.9	2.9	3.0	2.1	−0.5	−0.1	30.7	35.1	52.2	56.4
North Europe	Croatia (CIS)	4.1	4.7	4.4	4.2	0.6	0.4	−0.3	−0.5	30.2	52.3	57.5	58.7
North Europe	Macedonia, TFYR (CIS)	1.5	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.4	0.5	0.1	0.1	34.0	55.7	57.0	57.0
North Europe	Slovenia (CIS)	1.6	1.9	2.0	2.1	0.9	0.5	0.4	0.1	28.2	49.6	50.0	49.7
	South Central Asia (N=5)	4.8	9.1	12.6	13.5	3.6	2.2	1.8	1.8	38.4	42.9	40.0	40.3
	East Europe (N=9)	22.9	27.5	26.2	26.2	1.2	0.6	−0.7	−0.4	41.9	62.4	65.6	66.0
	North Europe (N=4)	2.2	2.9	2.9	2.8	1.5	0.9	−0.1	−0.1	30.8	48.2	54.2	55.4
	Regional Average	13.3	16.9	17.2	17.5	1.9	1.1	0.1	0.3	38.5	53.8	56.0	56.5

Population: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates

% Population growth rate: Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year  $t-1$  to  $t$ , expressed as a percentage

% Urban: Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

i World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

j World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

k World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

l World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

**Supplemental Table 15.2** Education  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Education**  
**REGION: CIS (N=18)**

	Country Source	% Secondary school enrollment				% Adult literacy				% Tertiary education			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
South Central Asia	Kazakhstan (CIS)		103.2	102.2	100.5			99.7	99.7		38.7	56.3	55.3
South Central Asia	Kyrgyzstan (CIS)		109.0	84.0	88.2			99.2	99.2		28.0	42.1	47.6
South Central Asia	Tajikistan (CIS)			84.4	87.0			99.7	99.7		20.1	22.7	24.5
South Central Asia	Turkmenistan (CIS)				85.4			99.6	99.6		22.4		8.0
South Central Asia	Uzbekistan (CIS)		107.0	104.5	105.2			99.5	99.5		15.1	9.9	8.9
East Europe	Belarus (CIS)		98.9	107.0	105.1			99.6	99.6		43.7	79.0	92.9
East Europe	Bulgaria (CIS)		93.4	90.4	98.7			98.4	98.4		17.1	58.0	66.5
East Europe	Moldova (CIS)			88.0	88.3			99.1	99.1		33.2	38.1	41.3
East Europe	Romania (CIS)			94.9	95.0			98.6	98.6		15.4	56.8	51.6
East Europe	Russian Federation (CIS)		99.1	84.9	97.2			99.7	99.7		52.1	75.5	76.1
East Europe	Ukraine (CIS)		97.2	95.4	98.9			99.7	99.7		46.8	76.7	79.0
East Europe	Estonia (CIS)		99.1	109.1	104.7			99.9	99.9		22.0	71.7	78.0
East Europe	Latvia (CIS)		104.2	98.5	106.9			99.9	99.9		23.5	70.6	66.4
East Europe	Lithuania (CIS)		106.4	106.7	107.7			99.8	99.8		31.6	80.8	70.0
North Europe	Albania (CIS)		79.8	82.4	82.4			96.8	96.8		6.9	43.6	58.5
North Europe	Croatia (CIS)			98.4	98.4			99.1	99.1		16.9	55.8	61.6
North Europe	Macedonia, TFYR (CIS)			81.9	82.8			97.5	97.5		23.0	37.1	38.5
North Europe	Slovenia (CIS)		83.8	97.8	110.2			99.7	99.7		18.7	88.5	84.4
	South Central Asia (N=5)		106.4	96.4	93.3			99.6	99.6		24.9	32.8	28.9

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 15.2** (continued)

	Country	% Secondary school enrollment				% Adult literacy				% Tertiary education			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
East Europe (N=9)		99.8	97.2	100.3			99.4	99.4			31.7	67.4	69.1
North Europe (N=4)		81.8	90.1	93.5			98.3	98.3			16.4	56.2	60.8
Regional Average		98.4	94.7	96.8			99.2	99.2			26.4	56.6	56.1

% Secondary school enrollment: Gross enrollment ratio. Secondary. All programs. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition

% Adult literacy: Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, 'literacy' also encompasses 'numeracy', the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100

% Tertiary education: Gross enrollment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving

a World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

b World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

c World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

d World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

e World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

f UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

g World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

h World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

i World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

j World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

k World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

l World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>



**Supplemental Table 15.3** Health  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Health**  
**REGION: CIS (N=18)**

	Country	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1k live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate			TB incidence per 100k				
		1960	1985	2010	2013–14	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t
South Central Asia	Kazakhstan (CIS)	58.4	68.5	68.3	70.5		49.6	19.3	14.6		59.1	21.6	16.3			40.0	26.0		80.7	223.0	139.0
South Central Asia	Kyrgyzstan (CIS)	56.1	64.9	69.3	70.2		64.2	26.7	21.6		78.9	30.3	24.2			79.0	75.0		52.5	210.0	141.0
South Central Asia	Tajikistan (CIS)	56.2	63.3	67.0	67.4		94.2	44.7	40.9		121.6	52.7	47.7			48.0	44.0		54.7	196.0	100.0
South Central Asia	Turkmenistan (CIS)	54.5	62.3	65.0	65.5		81.7	51.0	46.6		103.6	61.0	55.2			65.0	61.0		49.8	175.0	72.0
South Central Asia	Uzbekistan (CIS)	58.9	66.8	67.9	68.2		68.8	40.2	36.7		85.2	46.8	42.5			40.0	36.0		47.8	118.0	80.0
East Europe	Belarus (CIS)	67.7	71.0	70.4	72.5		16.0	4.7	3.7		19.4	6.1	4.9			2.0	1.0		48.9	71.0	70.0
East Europe	Bulgaria (CIS)	69.2	71.2	73.5	74.5	40.6	19.7	11.3	10.1	46.4	23.5	13.0	11.6	43.6	12.6	8.0	5.0		28.5	54.0	29.0
East Europe	Moldova (CIS)	61.8	66.1	68.5	68.8		31.7	14.9	13.3		39.0	17.4	15.4			41.0	21.0		76.5	176.0	159.0
East Europe	Romania (CIS)	65.6	69.7	73.5	74.5		31.8	12.1	10.5	76.7	38.9	13.9	12.0	84.8	137.1	30.0	33.0		55.7	147.0	87.0
East Europe	Russian Federation (CIS)	66.1	67.9	68.9	71.1		25.0	10.2	8.6		29.9	11.8	10.1			31.0	24.0		44.9	136.0	89.0
East Europe	Ukraine (CIS)	68.3	69.6	70.3	71.2		19.4	10.1	8.6		22.8	11.8	10.0			29.0	23.0		47.2	127.0	96.0

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 15.3** (continued)

	Country Source	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1k live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate				TB incidence per 100k			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–14	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t
East Europe	Estonia (CIS)	67.9	69.4	75.4	76.4		19.0	3.6	2.7		23.1	4.5	3.4			6.0	11.0		35.4	42.0	22.0
East Europe	Latvia (CIS)	69.8	69.3	73.5	74.0		16.8	8.2	7.4		21.0	9.4	8.4			29.0	13.0		47.4	75.0	50.0
East Europe	Lithuania (CIS)	69.8	70.5	73.3	74.2		15.4	5.5	4.0		19.1	6.7	4.9			9.0	11.0		41.0	86.0	65.0
North Europe	Albania (CIS)	62.3	71.5	77.0	77.5		45.7	14.8	13.3		53.9	16.5	14.9		32.1	21.0	21.0		30.9	20.0	18.0
North Europe	Croatia (CIS)	64.6	70.9	76.5	77.1		15.8	4.5	3.8		18.1	5.3	4.5		4.8	15.0	13.0		76.7	29.0	13.0
North Europe	Macedonia, TFYR (CIS)	60.6	69.8	74.7	75.2		45.0	8.7	5.8		49.5	9.9	6.6			7.0	7.0			33.0	17.0
North Europe	Slovenia (CIS)	69.0	71.4	79.4	80.3		12.3	2.6	2.3		14.4	3.3	2.9			8.0	7.0		47.5	14.0	7.5
	South Central Asia (N=5)	56.8	65.2	67.5	68.3		71.7	36.4	32.1		89.7	42.5	37.2			54.4	48.4		57.1	184.4	106.4
	East Europe (N=9)	67.4	69.4	71.9	73.0	40.6	21.6	9.0	7.7	61.6	26.3	10.5	9.0	64.2	74.9	20.6	15.8		47.3	101.6	74.1
	North Europe (N=4)	64.1	70.9	76.9	77.5		29.7	7.7	6.3		34.0	8.8	7.2		18.5	12.8	12.0		51.7	24.0	13.9
	Regional Average	63.7	68.6	71.8	72.7	40.6	37.3	16.3	14.1	61.6	45.6	19.0	16.4	64.2	46.7	28.2	24.0		50.9	107.3	69.7

Avg. years life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life

Infant <1/1k live born: Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1000 live births in a given year

Child mortality <5/1K: Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year

Maternal mortality rate: Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births. The data are estimated with a regression model using information on the proportion of maternal deaths among non-AIDS deaths in women ages 15–49, fertility, birth attendants, and GDP

TB incidence per 100k: Incidence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of new pulmonary, smear positive, and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis cases. Incidence includes patients with HIV

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

i World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

j World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

k World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

l World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

m World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

n World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

o World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

p World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

q <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>

r <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>

s World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

t World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

**Supplemental Table 15.4** Income  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Income**  
**REGION: CIS (N=18)**

	Country Source	GDP (Billions of constant 2005 USD)				PCGDP (constant 2005 USD)			% Growth in GDP				GINI or other measure of wealth disparity				
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p
South Central Asia	Kazakhstan (CIS)			77.2	96.4			4732.7	5575.5			7.3	4.3		25.7	28.6	28.6
South Central Asia	Kyrgyzstan (CIS)		2.4	3.1	3.7		593.8	561.0	637.3		3.3	−0.5	3.6		26.0	35.4	33.4
South Central Asia	Tajikistan (CIS)		3.5	3.2	4.2		774.4	417.1	500.6		3.5	6.5	6.7		30.8	30.8	
South Central Asia	Turkmenistan (CIS)		5.6	13.3	20.6		1646.7	2632.4	3873.8		11.0	9.2	10.3		26.4		26.4
South Central Asia	Uzbekistan (CIS)		9.8	21.6	29.5		512.8	755.3	960.0		9.1	8.5	8.1		25.0		25.0
East Europe	Belarus (CIS)			42.9	47.3			4524.2	4998.3			7.7	1.6		22.8	27.7	26.5
East Europe	Bulgaria (CIS)		23.1	33.7	35.5		2581.1	4559.7	4915.8		2.7	0.7	1.7		35.8	34.3	
East Europe	Moldova (CIS)		5.2	3.5	4.2		1466.9	983.2	1190.7		−5.3	7.1	4.6		24.1	32.1	30.6
East Europe	Romania (CIS)		97.1	114.1	123.4		4264.9	5634.9	6195.8		−0.1	−0.9	1.8		28.2	27.3	
East Europe	Russian Federation (CIS)			909.3	999.8			6365.2	6843.9			4.5	0.6		23.8	39.7	39.7
East Europe	Ukraine (CIS)		137.3	90.6	89.0		2677.5	1974.6	2081.0		2.6	4.2	−6.8		23.3	24.8	24.8

East Europe	Estonia (CIS)		13.8	16.2			10364.5	12348.1			2.5	2.1		23.0	32.2	32.7
East Europe	Latvia (CIS)		16.9	19.9			8058.8	9973.6			-2.9	2.4		22.5	35.3	36.0
East Europe	Lithuania (CIS)		27.7	32.4			8941.4	11073.9			1.6	2.9		22.5	33.8	32.6
North Europe	Albania (CIS)	5.5	10.7	11.6		1847.5	3685.6	3994.6		1.8	3.7	1.9			30.0	29.0
North Europe	Croatia (CIS)		46.5	44.7			10523.9	10561.3			-1.7	-0.4		22.8	33.6	33.6
North Europe	Macedonia, TFYR (CIS)		7.6	8.3			3620.1	3917.3			3.4	3.8			44.2	44.2
North Europe	Slovenia (CIS)		39.6	39.4			19327.4	19110.6			1.2	2.6		23.6	24.9	24.9
	South Central Asia (N=5)	5.3	23.7	30.9		881.9	1819.7	2309.4		6.7	6.2	6.6		25.8	31.6	28.8
	East Europe (N=9)	65.7	139.2	152.0		2747.6	5711.8	6624.6		0.0	2.7	1.2		23.1	32.2	31.6
	North Europe (N=4)	5.5	26.1	26.0		1847.5	9289.3	9395.9		1.8	1.6	2.0		23.2	33.2	32.9
	Regional Average	32.2	82.0	90.3		1818.4	5425.7	6041.8		3.2	3.4	2.9		24.0	32.3	31.1

GDP (constant 2005 USD): GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2005 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used

PCGDP (constant 2005 USD): GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars

% Growth in GDP: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources

**Supplemental Table 15.4** (continued)

GINI or other measure of wealth disparity: Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality

a

b World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

c World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

d World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

e

f World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

g World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

h World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

i

j World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

k World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

l World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

m

n World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

o World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

p World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>



**Supplemental Table 15.5** Subjective Well-Being  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Subjective Well-Being**  
**REGION: CIS (N=18)**

	Country	World Values Survey (WVS), 1981–2014					
		WVS 1 1981–1984	WVS 2 1990–2004	WVS 3 1995–1998	WVS 4 1999–2004	WVS 5 2005–2009	WVS 6 2010–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f
South Central Asia	Kazakhstan (CIS)						7.2
South Central Asia	Kyrgyzstan (CIS)				6.5		7.0
South Central Asia	Tajikistan (CIS)						
South Central Asia	Turkmenistan (CIS)						
South Central Asia	Uzbekistan (CIS)						7.9
East Europe	Belarus (CIS)		5.5	4.4			5.8
East Europe	Bulgaria (CIS)			4.7		5.2	
East Europe	Moldova (CIS)			3.7	4.6	5.5	
East Europe	Romania (CIS)			4.9		5.8	6.7
East Europe	Russian Federation (CIS)		5.4	4.5		6.1	6.2
East Europe	Ukraine (CIS)			4.0		5.7	5.9
East Europe	Estonia (CIS)			5.0			6.3
East Europe	Latvia (CIS)			4.9			
East Europe	Lithuania (CIS)			5.0			
North Europe	Albania (CIS)						
North Europe	Croatia (CIS)			6.2			
North Europe	Macedonia, TFYR (CIS)			5.7	5.1		
North Europe	Slovenia (CIS)			6.5		7.2	7.4
	South Central Asia (N=5)	NA	NA	NA	6.5	NA	7.4
	East Europe (N=9)	NA	5.4	4.5	4.6	5.6	6.2
	North Europe (N=4)	NA	NA	6.1	5.1	7.2	7.4
	Regional Average	NA	5.4	4.9	5.4	5.9	6.7

Mean life satisfaction: Averaged value of responses to the following survey question: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means you are “completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole?  
a WVS 1 1981–1984. V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
b WVS 2 1990–2004. V96.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
c WVS 3 1995–1998. V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
d WVS 4 1999–2004. V81.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
e WVS 5 2005–2009. V22.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?  
f WVS 6 2010–2014. V23.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

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# The History of Well-Being in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

# 16

Habib Tiliouine and Mohammed Meziane

*Whosoever doeth right, whether male or female, and is a believer, him verily we shall quicken with good life, and We shall pay them a recompense in proportion to the best of what they used to do*

(Qur'an 16:97)

*Throughout history many nations have suffered a physical defeat, but that has never marked the end of a nation. But when a nation has become the victim of a psychological defeat, then that marks the end of a nation.*

(Khalidun, Ibn 1989)

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## 16.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a brief account of the history and the current state of well-being in the 21-country region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (Map 16.1). The chapter discusses the multiple exogenous and endogenous factors that have shaped the well-being of the region's diverse populations who share the vast lands included in the region. However, in view of the complexity of the issues focused upon and the varied populations, our focus is limited to specific questions that address the same set of well-being issues discussed throughout the book. From a historical point of view, for example, we ask how the well-being of MENA inhabitants has evolved over time. What significant changes have occurred in these regions in terms of the adequacy of provisions in the major areas of life, mainly health care, education, economy, wise governance, and political freedoms and civil liberties, as well as in the varying ways in which people experience their lives and their subjective

satisfaction with their lives in general? To what extent are the region's nations succeeding in fully integrating all segments of the population, including marginalized population groups, under the more or less same sociopolitical framework or governance structure? And, what are the most important social, political, and economic gains realized by the region's countries since regaining their independence from European colonizers? The distinctiveness of the analysis that follows lies in the use of the broad concept of well-being as a basis for assessing the nature and extent of social progress that has occurred in the MENA region following decolonization. Our assumption is that well-being is a cultural phenomenon that can best be represented through a number of domains of life, namely health, education, and the introduction of various levels of instruction, income, and wealth distribution; provisions for civil liberties and political freedom; and the subjective judgments concerning the extent to which the region's peoples are satisfied with life and their conditions of living. We assume that, at least, health encompasses preserving life and ensuring an equilibrated use of mental and physical resources. Education gives one the knowledge and skills necessary to promote active citizen-

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**Map. 16.1** Map of North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) region (N = 21) (Nations Online Project 2016)

ship. A decent income guarantees the satisfaction of at least basic needs and promotes financial autonomy. Civil liberties allow individuals and groups to express themselves freely and to participate actively in the lives of their communities as responsible and contributive citizens. Finally, an enhanced satisfaction with life and subjective well-being (SWB) suggests the extent to which individuals assess themselves to be living rewarding lives and realizing personal and collective potentials. Each of these primary areas of life and living is discussed below. The contribution of Islam and, where appropriate, of Judaism in fostering improved life realities in these lands populated predominately by Muslims and Jews also is considered.

### 16.1.1 Defining the Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East and North Africa, or simply MENA, generally designates the region stretching from Morocco in northwest Africa to Iran in southwest Asia and south/southwest to Sudan (Map 16.1). These lands comprise geographic points that link Africa, Europe, and Asia. MENA populations have been strongly linked historically, partly because of the centuries-old, well-established land and sea networks found

throughout the region. Moreover, much of the region's land mass consists of deserts or other nonagricultural lands that force the region's people into close proximity with one another, e.g., less than 10 % of the Middle East land is cultivable.

### 16.1.2 The Region's Contribution to World Civilization

The presence of the MENA region in most of the world's major events since antiquity, including those that confront us today, is beyond question. The MENA region, for example, has been the home of many famous, globally influential civilizations. Examples of the region's influence are to be found in (1) the Phoenicians, who developed sailing and writing techniques and thereby reigned over the coastal areas of the Mediterranean Sea from 1550 Before the Common Era (BCE) to 300 BCE; (2) the Babylonians,<sup>1</sup> who in the beginning of the second millennium BCE, developed the advanced *Hammurabi Code of Laws*, urban

<sup>1</sup>Babylonia was an ancient Akkadian-speaking Semitic state and cultural region based in central-southern Mesopotamia (present-day Iraq). A small Amorite-ruled state emerged in 1894 BC, which contained at that time the minor city of Babylon.



planning, the 60-min hour, and advanced agricultural cultivation skills; and (3) the Persians and the Turks, who are often cited for their global empires, the Silk Road, their marvelous carpet industry, and, among other things, as being the first people to use paper money. In North Africa, the architectural oeuvres of the Pharaohs (3100 BCE–870 BCE) continue to inspire people everywhere. The secrets of their highly sophisticated social organizations and medical techniques have yet to be fully uncovered. Their neighbors of the Nubian lands (800 BCE—to about 320 of the Common Era [CE]) linked the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa to the rest of the world and enriched human culture and knowledge. Carthage (575 BCE–146 BCE) and the Berber dynasties controlled the southern coasts of the Mediterranean Sea and reached deep into the sub-Saharan regions.

### 16.1.3 Monotheism and the Region's Contributions to World Religious Development

One of the most important characteristics of the Middle East is that it has been the cradle of the monotheistic Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The teachings of these religions continue to exert a major impact on the way of life and culture of people worldwide. But, because Islam is considered by Muslims as the last revealed, and most authentic religion, the majority of the region's inhabitants are Muslims (Estes and Tiliouine 2014). The Prophet of Islam, Mohammed (born in 570 CE), a native of Mecca in present-day Saudi Arabia, succeeded in only 13 years in laying down the basics of a strong new nation and united the entire Arabian peninsula into a single Islamic polity. He had a short life (63 years), but his companions completed the mission by spreading Islam across the three continents of the then-known world (Africa, Asia, and Europe), which, in turn, led to what is referred to as the Golden Age of Islam of the eighth and fifteenth centuries (Renima et al. 2016). Some of the major successes of this period include the establishment of Arabic as the lan-

guage of science and as the unifying language for the Islamic world; the compilation of the Prophet's sayings (the *Hadith*); and the translation and expansion of important intellectual works into Arabic, including those of major Greek philosophers. Islam's religious schools, the *madrassas*, proliferated during this period and succeeded in delivering high-quality education at the primary, secondary, and postsecondary levels (see a short review in Tiliouine 2014b). The world's first universities emerged in North Africa: Al-Qarawiyyin in Fes, Morocco (859 CE) and Al-Azhar in Egypt (970–972 CE). By comparison, Europe's earliest universities were not established until 1088, with the founding of the University of Bologna in Italy. Compared with the relatively slow pace of development occurring in other regions of the world, the accomplishments of the MENA countries in all areas of science and the humanities were rapid and, historically, centuries ahead of their counterparts (Hunke 1997). Recent estimates of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for the countries of the MENA region in the tenth century indicate they were among the wealthiest regions of the world compared with those of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Western Europe for the same period (Maddison 2003, cited in Drine 2012).

### 16.1.4 Colonization and the Unraveling of the Region's Social and Political Integrity

Unfortunately, as Europe struggled through the last vestiges of the Middle Ages, the Muslim world plunged into internal conflicts, ceased to be creative, and became the victim of recurrent and, ultimately, devastating foreign invasions. For instance, the Mongols' destruction of Baghdad in the year 1258 led to the end of the glorious era of the Abbasids (Madden 2014). On the southern front, soon after it lost control of Andalusia in present-day Spain, North Africa suffered continuous incursions from rising Spanish forces. North African lands were then



ruled by many small, rival royal dynasties. They eventually called on the Ottomans to help combat the Spanish armies (Hanioglu 2010). Similar scenarios occurred in the Mashrek (Arab Middle East) with the Crusades, initiated in 1096 by Western Christians and continuing for two centuries until 1291. During this period, the rise of and domination by the originally Turkish Muslim Dynasty of Ottomans had an everlasting effect on Islam as a whole. At its height in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire became the most powerful state in the world, controlling much of southeast Europe, western Asia, the Caucasus, and most of North Africa and down to the Horn of Africa (Hanioglu 2010). The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I led to the emergence of the new state of Turkey as well as to the creation of the modern Balkans and most of the current Middle Eastern states.

With the slow decline of the Ottomans, Islamic territories started to fall victim to Western colonial powers that sought principally to exploit the peoples and resources of their new colonies. France and Britain were particularly adept at this approach to colonization, but, over time, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Belgium adopted similar approaches to the Islamic lands they occupied, e.g., the Sykes-Picot secret agreements of 1916.

### 16.1.5 Decolonization and the Re-attainment of Political Independence

In the mid-twentieth century, most Islamic MENA countries slowly acquired their political independence. But, another phase of turmoil began. In the midst of the liberation battles, Britain announced its intention to abandon the League of Nations' Mandate for Palestine<sup>2</sup> and turned over the future

<sup>2</sup>Palestine is a geographic region in Western Asia between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. It is some-

of the territory to the United Nations (UN). The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 (II) to partition Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and an international zone. In 1948, Israel declared its independence, war between Arabs and Israelis escalated, and troops from six Arab states entered the fighting. Approximately one million Palestinians fled to neighboring states as political refugees, whereas others were expelled by Israeli forces. Palestinians were replaced by thousands of Jews who emigrated to the newly established State of Israel from all over the world. The conflict that ensued over these previously Arab-occupied lands is still unresolved and is a continuing source of human suffering in the region for Arabs and Jews alike.<sup>3</sup> Interestingly, Palestine was upgraded to a nonmember observer state by the UN General Assembly on 29 November 2012. Therefore, the two-state solution (Israel and Palestine) is gradually gaining international consensus, albeit such a consensus still has not yet been achieved. Other persistent conflicts that require peaceful settlement include the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara region in North Africa (Map 16.1) as well as disputes between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over small islands in the Arab/Persian Gulf.

times considered to include adjoining territories. The region is also known as the Land of Israel, the Holy Land, or Promised Land and historically has been known as the southern portion of wider regional designations such as Canaan, Syria, as-Sham, and the Levant. Many people do not recognize the land of Palestine in contemporary times but, in this chapter and consistent with the authors' perspective, Palestine is treated as a political entity within the MENA region.

<sup>3</sup>During a 7-week period in the summer of 2014, Israeli soldiers killed 2130 Palestinians, including 577 children and 102 elderly persons living in the Gaza Strip. The injured totaled 11,066, of whom 3374 were children and 410 elderly persons. Over one half of all major hospitals and clinics in Gaza were damaged, and approximately 18,000 housing units were damaged or demolished, rendering 108,000 persons homeless. As many as 290,000 people were displaced as a result of these conflicts (World Health Organization 2014b).

### 16.1.6 The MENA Region's Current Paradoxes: Attaining Unity in the Midst of Diversity

When they are viewed using all developmental and well-being measures, the MENA countries are no longer in leading positions. Most of them are highly unstable and have deteriorating social conditions. Some of them have been identified as either “failed” or “failing” states in which governments are unable to maintain national borders, provide reasonable levels of internal security, and provide for at least the basic material needs of their growing populations, e.g., Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon (Estes 2012). Even worse, many people within these countries live under the most precarious situations resulting from long-standing civil and intraregional conflicts. Curiously, the *Misery Index* of 2013 ranked Iran 2nd, Egypt 6th, Turkey 13th, Tunisia 17th, Jordan 23rd, Saudi Arabia 40th, and Israel 72nd on a list of 89 countries that are experiencing the highest levels of collective misery. This index is calculated by combining the rates of inflation, lending, and unemployment minus year-on-year per capita GDP growth. Only the small country of Qatar (population 2.4 million in 2015) appears in the quartile of low-misery countries (Hanke 2014).

Also relevant to this portrayal of the region's overall well-being is the fact that many MENA countries were at the bottom of the list in a recent report ranking 132 countries on a number of dimensions related to social progress, with Yemen 125th and Iraq 118th. The few exceptions were Israel (39th); the oil-rich countries of the UAE (37th), Kuwait (40th), and Saudi Arabia (65th); and Turkey (64th). The highest ranking country in North Africa was Tunisia (70th) (Porter et al. 2014). Porter et al. (2014) define social progress as “the capacity of a society to meet the basic human needs of its citizens, establish the building blocks that allow citizens and communities to enhance and sustain the quality of their lives, and create the conditions for all individuals to reach their full potential” (p. 13). These rankings corroborate earlier findings of Estes and Tiliouine (2014) with respect to social progress in Islamic countries in general.

What we have cited thus far are preliminary illustrations of the often gloomy situation of the countries of the MENA region considered as a group. Unfortunately, these illustrations stand in stark contrast to a number of assets that the people of the MENA region have that could enable them to enjoy a decent life including their long and distinguished histories as highly civilized peoples: their geographic position controlling central routes of world trade<sup>4</sup>; their large reserves of crude oil and natural gas<sup>5</sup>; a huge potential for renewable energy, including solar energy; their considerable financial capacities; and rich human capital. If used strategically, the sheer breadth and depth of these extensive natural and man-made resources could help advance the overall well-being in steadily increasing numbers of the region's people and their countries (Drine 2012).

The total population of the 20 MENA countries selected for special consideration in this chapter was estimated at 104.27 million people in 1950. These figures soared to 468.3 million in 2013, an increase of 450 % in about 60 years. They represent 6.5 % of the total world population, estimated at 7238 million in 2013. The countries with the largest populations are Egypt (82.1 million), followed by Iran (77.5 million) and Turkey (74.9 million). The smallest countries are those of the Gulf countries: Bahrain (1.3 million), UAE (1.4 million), and Qatar (2.4 million) (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). Population growth rates in the MENA region vary considerably from country to country and are clearly reflected in their respective age pyramids, which confirm the preponderance of children 15 years of age or younger in nearly all MENA countries. Recent population estimates have established that Lebanon (+9.4 %) has the highest rate of population increase and Syria (−9.7 %) the lowest owing to the complex political situation that has resulted in millions of people fleeing the

<sup>4</sup>For example, the strategic waterway of the Arabian/Persian Gulf; the Suez Canal, which links the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles straits (also known as the Turkish straits), which link the Black and Aegean Seas.

<sup>5</sup>Sixty percent of the world's reserves of oil and about half of the reserves of natural gas.

country. MENA population size and growth rates vary considerably with those reported for the world as a whole (+1.1 %) (Central Intelligence Agency 2014). It is true that net population growth trends of this size impose severe social and economic constraints on the ability of MENA members both to hasten the pace of their development and to reduce the growing levels of social discontent, but especially that which exists among the region's high number of jobless workers, including young people and university graduates (Estes and Tiliouine 2014; Tiliouine and Meziane 2012). Making solid investments in education, training, and related youth issues would help in the long run toward successful development efforts and, in turn, advance both the objective and subjective conditions associated with well-being.

## 16.2 Progress in Well-Being: The Region's Remarkable Changes in the Presence of Continuing Conflict


The region's comparatively recent social successes following decades of domination by external powers are closely associated with the domains reflected on the United Nations *Human Development Index*. The gains since 1960 have been steady and have been significant despite the legacy of dependency and poverty that continues to pervade the region. These gains have been made possible through close public-private partnerships between the region's governments and those governed. Despite the many challenges that confront the region, these gains are clearly reflected in the region's social indicator performances in the sectors of health, education, income, and SWB.

### 16.2.1 Health Status of the Region's Diverse Peoples

Good health and satisfaction with the state of one's health are main contributors to both the social progress of nations (e.g., Porter et al. 2014)


and to the core dimensions in human development. Taken together, they are powerful measures of well-being (United Nations Development Programme 2011). Hence, promoting public health has become a legitimate policy target.

Recent reports indicate that, as a whole, MENA countries have made dramatic progress in reducing mortality and prolonging life, as evidenced by life-expectancy-at-birth data, accepted as an indicator of social development and of quality of health services. Figures 16.1a and 16.1b show a consistent increase in average year of life expectancy across all MENA countries from 1980 to 2012, with the exception of the war-ravaged conflict zones of Iraq and Syria. These data corroborate those reported by the World Health Organization (2014a), indicating that, on average, life expectancy at birth increased by about 6 years over 30 years (from 67.53 in 1990, to 70.79 in 2000, to 73.42 in 2012). Life expectancy at birth is substantially higher in some MENA countries: 82 years in Israel, 80 in Lebanon, and 79 in Qatar. In 2012, the five richest Gulf States had an average life expectancy of 77 years compared to the lowest figures of 64 years for the poorest and most conflict-ridden countries of Yemen and 63 years in the Sudan



**Fig. 16.1a** Group average years of life expectancy, 1990, 2000, and 2014 (N = 21) (Data from World Health Organization 2015)

**Fig. 16.1b** Group average years of life expectancy by 2012 (N = 21) (Data from World Health Organization 2015)



(Figs. 16.1a and 16.1b). As a group, though, average life expectancy for MENA member states is higher than that reported for the world as a whole (average = 67.9 years) (Estes and Tiliouine 2014).

Despite the region's stellar achievement in lengthening the years of life expectancy, many challenges continue to confront the region's nations. For instance, *The Global Burden of Disease: Generating Evidence, Guiding Policy: Middle East and North Africa Regional Edition* (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation 2013) stresses that, in the MENA region, non communicable diseases—such as heart disease (up 44 %), stroke (up 35 %), and diabetes (up 87 %)—cause more premature death and disability than they did in the past. Preventable risk factors such as poor diet, high blood pressure, high body mass index (an indicator of obesity), and smoking contribute to the growing burden of infectious and communicable diseases in the region. Water pipe (*Shisha*) smoking causes considerable harm to smokers and to public health. In comparison, because the cultural and religious values of MENA to a large extent safeguard the population against it, HIV/AIDS has a low prevalence (0.1 %) among adults aged 15–49, one of the lowest

rates in the world in 2012. However, such statistics can be misleading because the number of new infections in MENA continues to grow and AIDS-related deaths are also on the rise (Setayesh et al. 2014).

Despite improvements in life expectancy at birth, a substantial disease burden from contagious communicable, newborn, nutritional, and maternal causes persists in the low-income countries of the region. Policy makers should be provided with standardized data on diseases, injuries, and potentially preventable risk factors to make decisions that will improve well-being for all. Also, as a prerequisite to reestablishing normally functioning health services, major efforts should be made to halt armed hostilities in MENA conflict zones.

## 16.2.2 The History of Access to Education in MENA Countries

Education plays a major role in any attempt to establish long-lasting economic growth and to achieve a better life. Available evidence suggests that education impacts heavily on all aspects of

life, such as a lowered fertility rate, healthier and better-educated children, and stronger national identity (International Labour Organization 2014).

Early forms of schooling under Islam were devoted solely to teaching the correct reciting and understanding of the *Holy Book*. But, because of the evolving needs of the newly established multi-ethnic empire and its encounter with other cultures, a genuine educational system gradually took shape. Family structures, mosques, and religious congregations (*Majalis*) annexed to the mosques, which initially constituted the central spaces for learning different kinds of religious and scientific knowledge, could not meet the expanding needs of the new complex society. The traditional Islamic educational system provided needed professionals through a well-organized certification system: Imams (mosque personnel), teachers, clergymen, Islamic lawyers (*Kadis*), historians, and others. This system was divided into three stages: (a) elementary education (*Qur'anic* school); (b) middle and secondary school education (*madrassas*); and (c) higher education (*Jami'as*) (Heggoy 1984; Tiliouine 2014b).

The fact that the community provided generous funding in the form of donations and alms payments helped these educational institutions flourish (short review in Tiliouine 2014b). Nevertheless, European expansion into Muslim regions led to clashes between this traditional schooling and the modern European educational system. For instance, in Algeria, the French colonials confiscated lands and resources belonging to educational institutions, which gradually led to the destruction of a large number of these institutions (Turin 1983). At the same time, the French did not provide adequate educational opportunities for all Algerians. Consequently, the majority of people fell victim to illiteracy. In 1954, for instance, 86 % of the Algerian school-aged population was unschooled. In comparison, illiteracy was rare before the arrival of the European colonials (Heggoy 1984).

With the exception of Turkey, where, after its defeat in World War I, Kamel Atatürk followed the French enlightenment model and suppressed

all Islamic teaching in Turkish schools, formalized secular education on March 22, 1926, and closed *medersas*, none of the other MENA countries explicitly adhered to a totally secular educational system. Islamic education continues to be part of official school curricula, and most people accept the benefits of modern education.

Today, most countries in the MENA region offer their citizens at least 9 years of compulsory education. However, variations are found from country to country. Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and the UAE offer 9 years of compulsory education, whereas Jordan and Qatar offer a minimum of 12 years. Citizens of Saudi Arabia, however, are entitled to just 6 years of compulsory education (Al Masah Capital 2014).

Unlike the traditional system of education, modern schooling is considered primarily a government responsibility across the region. UNESCO figures (World Bank 2014) indicate that, as a group, the MENA countries spend about 3.8 % of the GDP on education, with high expenditures recorded in Morocco (5.4 %), Saudi Arabia (5.1 %), Jordan (5.0 %), and Oman (4.3 %). In comparison, developed nations such as Japan and Singapore spend 3.8 % and 3.2 %, respectively, of their GDP on education (Al Masah Capital 2014). The contribution of the private sector to investment in education remains low if we exclude Qatar, the UAE, and Lebanon.

Enrollment at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels has greatly improved, though preprimary enrollments (preparatory education) continue to lag. The region's gross enrollment ratio (i.e., the number of students enrolled at a certain level of education as a percentage of the population of the age group that officially corresponds to that level) at the primary level stands above 100. At 84 and 31, enrollment ratios at the secondary and tertiary levels in MENA are reasonable compared to the world averages of 70 and 30, respectively. However, MENA enrollment of 36 at the preprimary level is far behind the world average of 50 and those of many of the developed countries (Al Masah Capital: MENA Education Sector 2014).




As a consequence of the efforts made in this field, adult literacy rates, which reflect the efforts made by individual countries to extend the most basic literacy skills to their populations, have increased tremendously. For instance, from 1986 to 2011, gains topped 9.1 in percentage points (from 74.5 to 83.6). When we look at individual countries, Israel has the highest adult literacy rates (97.1), followed by Qatar (96.3) and Turkey (95.3). Yemen (63.9) and Morocco (67.1) have the lowest rates (Figs. 16.2a and 16.2b). Islamic countries as a whole had low adult literacy levels of 48.1 %, whereas the world’s average is similar to the MENA average, i.e., 82.7 % compared to 82.3 % (Figs. 16.3 and 16.4) (Estes and Tiliouine 2014).

Virtually all MENA countries have made great progress during the past 25 years in offering educational opportunities, including higher education. The combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratios exceeded 90 % in Israel (96.72 %), Libya (94.38 %), Saudi Arabia (92.07 %), Iran (86.96 %), and Turkey (84.63 %). They have remained much lower in Yemen (55.97


%), Iraq (62.62 %), and Morocco (67.15 %). The situation in Iraq is regrettable: It has lost 6.16 percentage points. With the exception of Jordan, for which the level remained relatively stable (with an increase of just 0.61), other countries registered remarkable gains, with the highest in Turkey (27.33), Morocco (26.15), Algeria (21.76), and Oman (20.85) (Estes and Tiliouine 2014).

Another area of concern for the MENA countries is the quality of their educational standards, which remain low in the region as a whole. The World Economic Forum’s *Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014* (Schwab 2013) indicates that the overwhelming majority of MENA countries registered low on the parameters related to the quality of the educational system, such as primary education, higher education and training, enrollment rates, level of access to the Internet in schools, and availability of specialized research and training services. Only three small countries, Qatar, Lebanon, and the UAE, have high rankings. Moreover, within MENA, the quality of education in countries like Egypt and Libya is lower




**Fig. 16.2a** Color-coded adult literacy rates in the Middle East and North Africa, 1986 (N = 21) (Data from UNESCO 1990)






**Fig. 16.2b** Color-coded adult literacy rates in the Middle East and North Africa, 2011 (N = 21) (Data from UNESCO 2014)



**Fig. 16.3** Adult literacy rates (2013) and rates of perceived public corruption (2014), MENA countries (N = 21) (Data from Transparency International 2015; UNESCO 2015)



**Fig. 16.4** Percent adult literacy rate (2014) and average happiness levels (2014), MENA countries (N = 21) (Data from UNESCO 2015; Veenhoven 2014)

than that in the other MENA countries (Schwab 2013).


The ongoing harsh social unrest in the region is leading to the erosion of the achieved educational gains. A recently published report about Syria indicated that by December 2013, 4000 schools were closed due to direct damage or were being used to shelter internally displaced persons. The school nonattendance rate reached 51.8%. These figures represent a tremendous setback if one considers that Syria ranked 21 out of 136 countries in net school enrollment in 2010 (Syrian Center for Policy Research 2014).

In summary, MENA states generally succeeded in guaranteeing high levels of educational opportunities for their children, with narrow gaps between gender groups and rural versus urban groups. The effects of providing these opportunities are numerous: pressure on public budgets to maintain the cost of educational institutions; increased demand for higher educational oppor-

tunities; rising pressure for more convenient jobs for youth; and the urgent need to face the high dropout levels and to improve the curricula. Moreover, providing quality education includes meeting the challenges of globalization and its consequences on rapidly changing economic contexts.

### 16.2.3 Income and Economic Issues

Scholars consistently debate the relationship between positive perceptions of well-being and economic wealth at the individual as well as the population level. At least, they agree in rejecting the GDP as the sole measure of social prosperity. Additionally, scientific evidence suggests that below a certain level, low economic resources strongly predict low well-being (see Chap. 4). This observation is understandable because poor people and poor communities usually struggle to



**Fig. 16.5** Percent of gross domestic product growth and external debt for the Middle East and North Africa (N = 21), 2012–2014 (Data from World Bank 2015)


satisfy basic life necessities (such as food and housing), which results in slowing progress toward self-actualization, as stipulated in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory. Therefore, we briefly examine to what extent the MENA countries are succeeding on economic indicators (Figs. 16.5, 16.6, 16.7, and 16.8).

It should be stressed in the beginning that prior to 1950 most of the MENA region’s countries were undergoing the decolonization process and the region’s map as known to us today was still under construction. This partly explains the lack of economic statistics for that period. Even “approximate” data are not available, but underdevelopment and lack of modern life facilities were shared characteristics across the MENA region during the first half of the twentieth century (Youssef 2004: 91). For instance, Egypt, the most populous MENA country, relied largely on cotton for government revenues, and Saudi Arabia’s major source of income was the taxes paid by pilgrims on their way to the holy cities. The MENA region as a whole therefore exhibited some of the lowest levels of socioeconomic development in the world (Yousef 2004).


However, the search for oil, which started in the 1930s, led to the discovery of huge reserves in the Arab Peninsula, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Algeria.<sup>6</sup> By the 1970s, and due to the increase in oil prices internationally, oil-exporting countries experienced robust economic growth and huge increases in per capita income.

Worthy of notice is the fact that not all MENA countries are rich in oil, so a high degree of economic heterogeneity prevails in the region. Data confirm that, whereas a few MENA countries are doing well on a limited number of the selected economic indicators, the majority of them still have a long way to go if they are to achieve economic outcomes at levels realized by the world as a whole. If one considers the widely used indicator of per capita gross domestic product (PCGDP) as a proxy for well-being, the North African countries (N = 6) had an average PCGDP of 6167 USD in 2011. PCGDP levels were especially low for the poorest MENA members, such as Yemen (2300 USD). Per capita incomes at this level


<sup>6</sup>Details on the development of the petroleum industry could be found in History of the Petroleum Industry 2016.



**Fig. 16.6** Percent of external debt for the Middle East and North Africa 2012–2014 (N = 21) (Data from World Bank 2015)



**Fig. 16.7** Increasing and decreasing gross domestic product (GDP) by external debt level, MENA countries (Data from World Bank 2015)



**Fig. 16.8** Poverty rate and Gini indices for the Middle East and North Africa, 2011 and 2014 (N = 21) (Data from World Bank 2015)

were in sharp contrast with those reported for MENA's richest member states, i.e., Qatar (98,900 USD) and Kuwait (41,700 USD), which were about 50 times higher than those of its poorest member states. Israel's PCGDP reached 31,500 USD, more than ten times greater than that of Palestine (South Bank and Gaza strip combined) (Central Intelligence Agency 2015b).

The wealth gap that exists within the MENA countries continues to widen, especially as population growth rates stabilize. Stunning differences in wealth are especially prominent among the countries with significantly different rates of population and economic growth, i.e.,  $-10.5\%$  for resource-poor but population-rich Yemen versus  $+18.8\%$  for oil-rich Qatar (Estes and Tiliouine 2014). Social unrest has had devastating effects on the economy of the region. For instance, by the end of 2013, Syria's total economic loss since the start of the conflict was estimated at 143.8 billion USD, which is equivalent to 276 % of the GDP for 2010 in constant prices (Syrian Center for Policy Research 2014). The Israeli war on the Gaza Strip resulted in 5 billion

USD of damage to homes and infrastructure in 4 weeks. Similar trends are occurring in other countries such as Libya, Yemen, and Iraq. The economic situation of the first Arab Spring countries of Tunisia and Egypt remains bleak. Both have difficulties in providing the basic necessities.

Economic development within MENA nations is further complicated by the high levels of foreign indebtedness of the majority of MENA's poorest countries (Fig. 16.6), e.g., Lebanon (150.7 %). However, some countries, such as Algeria, have made early repayment of their external debt a priority. As a result, Algeria now has the lowest level of external debt among the MENA countries. Even so, the heavy levels of external debt of the majority of the MENA members severely limit their ability to introduce developmental initiatives at home (Fig. 16.6).

Similarly, average unemployment (and underemployment) levels within MENA countries are high (16.4 % in North Africa and 12.98 % in the selected countries of the Middle East), much higher than that of the world as a whole (9.1 %).

Israel, with an unemployment rate of around 5 %, is an exception. Joblessness among young people exceeds 25 % and is well above that for women, for whom joblessness is the norm rather than the exception (Estes and Tiliouine 2014; Tiliouine and Meziane 2012). However, conflict zones such as Syria continue to experience a wide range of drastic social losses; for instance, 54.3 % of the labor force was unemployed by the end of 2013 (Syrian Center for Policy Research 2014). In the Gaza strip, unemployment is at least 25 %, which seriously hinders any development efforts.

In addition, poverty rates are high within and between the member states of the MENA region (Fig. 16.7). Unemployment rates by country confirm that large numbers of people within MENA countries live well below nationally established poverty thresholds. The percentage of people living below the poverty level for the MENA members (21.2 %) is close to that reported for the world as a whole (22.4 %). This value is in contrast with the numerous resources available in this region. Poverty levels are especially unfavorable within the poorest countries, i.e., 45.2 % in Yemen and 46.5 % in Sudan (United Nations Development Programme 2011). Paradoxically, poverty levels have increased for many nations since the Arab Spring of 2011. In Syria, where the situation is the worst, three of four Syrians lived in poverty at the end of 2013, with more than half the population (54.3 %) living in extreme poverty and lacking basic necessities such as food (Syrian Center for Policy Research 2014).

Gini coefficient scores, a universal measure of income inequality, of MENA states attest to increasing income inequality both within and between the members of the MENA region, i.e., an average Gini score of more than 36 for the MENA region as a whole. Though lower than 39.0 reported for the world as a whole, they can be troublesome in countries such as Qatar (41.1), Morocco (40.9), and Tunisia (40.8). The lowest levels of income inequality are reported for Iraq (30.9) and for Egypt and Bahrain (32.1). The Gini coefficient for Israel, 37.6, is similar to that of the other developed countries (Fig. 16.8).

Unless some genuine development measures are undertaken on behalf of these countries, income inequality will continue to increase. In addition to creating poverty, this inequality contributes to social unrest and political instability within the most heavily affected countries and subregions. Too many of the MENA member states are trapped in a quagmire of economic inequality in combination with high levels of political instability (Estes and Tiliouine 2014; Tiliouine and Meziane 2012).

### 16.2.4 Political and Civil Liberties (Levels of Social Chaos)

Democracy, though far from perfect, is generally accepted as the best way to govern a nation in modern times. It is intimately linked with improved human conditions and respect for human dignity. Democratic countries are the most stable and the most successful nations. Unfortunately, democracy has so far failed to take root in the Islamic world. Although a discussion of the reasons for this situation is beyond the scope of this chapter, it should be mentioned that the Islamic world has thus far been unable to overcome many of life's dichotomies: traditional versus modern, conservative versus progressive, universal versus national, original versus imported. For some people of the MENA region, this situation exists because, as in the past, colonialism is continuously conspiring against the Muslim people and their diverse resources. To them, this situation is exemplified in the support given to the totalitarian regimes that have, over time, governed the Islamic nations and in their unconditional backing of Israel on the holy Islamic land (Pew Research Center 2011). This "conspiracy theory," which is based on centuries of tensions between the Muslims and the West, is brandished by conservative Muslims even when the roots of the failures could be found elsewhere. Low levels of education among the populace play an important role in holding back positive social change (Pew Research Center 2011).



However, to understand the nature of the confrontations between the different ideologies extant in the MENA region, it is important to consider the sociopolitical context. First, no particular type of political organization is clearly prescribed in the original Islamic texts. Just a few years after the death of the Prophet, power shifted to the hands of royal dynasties, which were characterized by absolute authoritarianism. But, in most cases, religious and civil counsels advised the monarchs on key issues of their subjects. These counsels represented a way to practice *Shura*, a consultancy system developed in the application of *Sharia*. However, many scholars see in *Shura* a broad concept and a number of practices that can be developed as the Islamic equivalent of modern democracy (Shavit 2010), including allowing for political freedoms and civil liberties and enhancing people's participation in public life through free vote and free associations. These arguments have been echoed by the Islamic reformist movements, born in the period known as *Nahda* (Arab awakening) in the middle of the nineteenth century. Jamal Ad-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), Mohammed Abduh (1849–1905), and Rachid Rida (1865–1935) were the main scholars representing the reformist call in the Middle East. Their main appeal was for the unity of the Islamic world in the face of European imperialism and the return to “pure” Islamic faith, a movement known as *Salafism*. Their ideas and preaching inspired many groups who actively took part in the liberation struggles. Subsequently, these movements became political forces, mainly through the then-modern media: newspapers and magazines. After the liberation of their respective countries, they claimed their share of political power. They evolved holding divergent and to some extent opposing views: e.g., Jihadis-Salafis, who denounce Western democracy and exercise a violent discourse against its defenders; the Islamic Brotherhood, which seeks to integrate some aspects of modern democracy but refuses others (e.g., Shavit 2010). They also clashed with other political forces, mainly the Arab Nationalist movements, which have been to a large extent a secular movement (Ayyad 1999), and with the liberal ideologies (Hatina 2011).


Michel Aflaq (1910–1989), who began as a communist, is widely considered to be the founder of the Ba'athist movement. The principal ideas of such an Arab nationalist movement have been to promote the development and the creation of a unified Arab state (as opposed to a principally Islamic unified state as desired by Islamic movements) and the rebirth of Arab culture, values, and society. Both the Islamist-inspired groups and the Arab nationalist movements saw the occupation of Palestinian lands as a major threat to the Arab and Islamic nations. They could therefore rally the Arab masses behind them.

The Arab nationalist movements succeeded in holding power in many of the MENA Arab countries. For instance, they were in power in Iraq from 1968 to 2003, when Saddam Hussein was overthrown by the Americans. The other Ba'athist party, which has been in power since 1966, is that of Syria (currently led by the Assad family). Egypt, the largest Arab country, embraced the Arab nationalist ideology much earlier. The highly influential Gamal Abdel Nasser led the Free Officers coup d'état to overthrow the Egyptian monarchy in 1952. Other Arab countries also fell into the hands of individuals with similar ideologies with a socialist preference, such as Algeria with Houari Boumédiène in 1965 and Libya with Muammar Kaddafi in 1969. In the beginning, all of them adopted single-party regimes and based their rule on a revolutionary legitimacy, refusing any form of political pluralism and cultivating a revolutionary/progressive discourse. The cold war between the Western block (led by the United States) and the Eastern bloc (led by the former Soviet Union) was in their favor. Despite declaring nonalignment, they were more inclined to support the Soviet Union, their main supplier of arms and of training for their troops, who faced the Israelis in the wars of 1967 and 1973. In the meantime, liberalism remained marginal and lacked popular backing (Hatina 2011).

What the revolutionary or progressive Arab regimes actually achieved in terms of providing for the well-being of their people is not yet known. It appears that the main achievements


have been to help regain political freedom and, to some extent, to restore state sovereignty over basic resources such as the hydrocarbon sector and launching construction workshops. Some of these regimes also succeeded in providing the populace with more modern educational opportunities. However, in our view, the harm they caused greatly outweighs the advantages: They preserved their power by building alliances with their own ethnic and religious minorities and favored the military and secret services. These latter groups were involved in all major decisions centers, the result being that militia governments took over their own states. They also failed to rally the main political powers around a negotiated societal agenda and extinguished feelings of citizenship among the people. The repercussions, evident in the instability and erosion of all social and economic gains in these areas, have been devastating. The whole nation-state system that they helped to establish is currently threatened.

The prevalence of corruption is one aspect of this failure. It is mainly the result of groups who are part of the state “nomenklatura” but who exploit their positions for private advantage. Using the *Corruption Perceptions Index*, which ranks countries and territories on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be (on a scale of 0–100, where 0 = highly corrupt; 100 = very clean), data show that the UAE (69), Qatar (68), Israel (61), and Turkey (50) are the least corrupt in the region. The most corrupt are Sudan (11), Libya (15), Iraq (16), and Syria (17) (Fig. 16.9) (Transparency International 2015). Corruption and other societal ills create bitterness among the majority of the marginalized populations. In turn, they weaken official institutions and doom all efforts to enforce a state of law. The abrupt fall of some of the totalitarian regimes as a consequence of the Arab Spring activities attests to this. The role of modern social media should not be downplayed in these contests. Furthermore, most of the countries fall into the category of failing



**Fig. 16.9** Perceived corruption and Fragile State Index scores in the Middle East and North Africa, 2014 (N = 21); low scores on the Corruption Perceptions Index indi-

cate high levels of corruption and vice versa. (Data from Transparency International 2015; Vision of Humanity 2015)



**Fig. 16.10** (a–c) Political freedom (a), civil liberties (b), and global terrorism (c) in the Middle East and North Africa (N = 21) (Data from Freedom House 2015; Vision of Humanity 2015)

states (Estes and Tiliouine 2014). Using the Fragile States Index 2014,<sup>7</sup> countries are ranked into 11 groups, ranging from “very high alert” to “very sustainable.” Sudan is in the “high alert” category; three MENA countries (Yemen, Iraq, and Syria) are also in the “high alert” group; Egypt is in the “alert” group; Libya, Iran, and Lebanon are in the “very high warning” group; Israel, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia are in the “high warning” group; Bahrain is in the “warning” group; Kuwait and Oman are in the\* group; and Qatar and the UAE are in the “stable” group. None of the

MENA countries is found in the “very stable” category (Fig. 16.9).

In comparison, other MENA countries, mainly the Gulf States, Turkey, and Iran, followed different pathways. The Gulf countries, with the exception of Oman (independent since 1650), have newly created monarchies (Saudi Arabia 1932; Kuwait 1961; Bahrain 1971; Qatar 1971; UAE 1971) (see Commins 2012). Their political systems differ from those of other Arab nations, ranging from absolute to constitutional monarchies. Despite their undeniable success in modernizing the infrastructures of their respective countries and in improving outcomes on many human development indicators, their records in allowing for political freedoms and civil liberties remain poor (Fig. 16.10a, b).

Iran is also highly influential in the region. It overthrew its longstanding *Shah* system in 1979 and replaced it with a republic that tries to create a balance between an Islamic theocracy and elements of modern democracy. Among the peculiarities of this system is the fact that the Supreme

<sup>7</sup>For 11 years now, the Fragile States Index, created by the Fund for Peace and published by Foreign Policy (media organization), has taken stock of the year’s events, using 12 social, economic, and political indicators to analyze how wars, peace accords, environmental calamities, and political movements have pushed countries toward stability or closer to the brink of collapse. The index then ranks the countries accordingly, from most fragile to least (Foreign Policy 2015).

Leader of Iran (a religious figure) is responsible for the delineation and supervision of “the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” which means that “he sets the tone and direction of Iran’s domestic and foreign policies.” Unlike any other country in the world, the Supreme Leader “is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and controls the Islamic Republic’s intelligence and security operations; he alone can declare war or peace. He has the power to appoint and dismiss the leaders of the judiciary, the state radio and television networks, and the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. He also appoints six of the twelve members of the Council of Guardians, the powerful body that oversees the activities of Parliament and determines which candidates are qualified to run for public office” (Iran Chamber Society 2015).

The president is the second highest ranking official in Iran; his power is in many ways curtailed by the constitution, which subordinates the entire executive branch to the Supreme Leader. In comparison, Turkey took a completely different path. In the early 1920s, Kamel Atatürk opted for a total rupture with the Islamic tradition in favor of a laic state. But a genuine multiparty political system did not see light until the 1950s. Now, Turkey has the second largest standing armed force in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a coalition of 28 states from North America and Europe who have agreed to mutual defense in response to any attack by any external party. The *Justice and Development Party* has been the major ruling force in the country since 2002. It officially abandoned its initial Islamic ideology in favor of “conservative democracy.” It succeeded in building Turkey into an emerging regional power. Using the Estes Index of Social Progress, it tops (57) the list of Organization of Islamic Cooperation members (Estes and Tiliouine 2014). It also ranked 64th out of 132 nations on a more recent measure of social development (2014), preceded within the region only by the UAE (37th), Israel (39th), Kuwait (40th), and Saudi Arabia (65th) (Porter et al. 2014: 88).

To conclude, Islamic MENA countries followed diverse routes to assert their sovereignty

and ensure their independence within the inherited borders randomly set during the European colonial era. Many of these borders are being violently disputed. Moreover, the Arab Spring revolts do not seem to have achieved the desired changes. The region is beset by unprecedented chaos, leading to increasing suffering among civilians, with children and women being the prime targets. Although the internal movements within countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen have succeeded in overthrowing their long-standing totalitarian regimes, the counter-revolutionary movements have not yet ended, e.g., Egypt. The struggles remain unresolved in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. The now 60-year-old Arab–Israeli conflict remains highly explosive, given the increasing possibility that weapons of mass destruction may be called upon to force a “peace” between the conflicting parties. Both Israelis and Palestinians will have better development prospects if they succeed in brokering a peaceful settlement of the conflict. However, in the midst of everything, religious and ethnic divisions have been awakened, encouraging the terrorist insurgency to reappear (Fig. 16.10c).

Considerable frustration is rising in the Islamic world as a whole because the leaders of these nations continue to deny their populations genuine political reforms and civil liberties. The Islamist movements have benefitted by repeatedly defeating the Arab nationalists, mainly through their inability to work out a negotiated settlement and to end Israeli occupation. However, the claim made by these extremist movements to belong to the faith of Islam and to fight under its name (Estes and Sirgy 2014; Tiliouine and Meziane 2012) has greatly damaged the image of Islam and its followers internationally. Nevertheless, encouraging initiatives are continuously changing the situation for the better. These initiatives are led mainly by individual entrepreneurs who keep their businesses running despite all hindrances, as in Lebanon and Egypt. Many intellectuals, nongovernmental organizations, and religious figures are also positively contributing to enhancing human rights and preserving peace in many affected regions.

## 16.2.5 Happiness and SWB

The last 40 years or so have witnessed a great interest in researching psychosociological factors that may help advance sustainable development in societies. SWB and “happiness” have been proposed as key concepts toward this end and have been explored in diverse social contexts worldwide. This movement has led to an increased recognition of these factors as basic elements to complement economic indicators in assessing social progress and hence inform and orient policy making and community sustainability. For instance, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously adopted on July 19th 2011 resolution 65/309 under the title “Happiness: towards a holistic approach to development,” calling on member states to undertake steps that give more importance to happiness and well-being in determining how to achieve and measure social and economic development. Subsequently, 20 March was proclaimed the International Day of Happiness. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development also published guidelines on how best to measure people’s SWB (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2013) as key in nations’ priorities.

Few studies of the subjective quality of life and the different attitudes of MENA people exist in the literature. However, some large surveys have partially addressed these issues in a few MENA countries. For instance, the first wave of the Arab Barometer surveys (Arab Barometer I 2009), initiated in 2005, reported low satisfaction with overall economic conditions (only 3.7 % of Lebanese and 13.6 % of Palestinians felt positive); limited confidence in future improvements of the situation (11.4 % of Algerian respondents expected the worst compared to 19.4 % of Moroccans). Also, trusting others in one’s country as an indicator of societal well-being was generally low (e.g., only 16 % of Lebanese held positive views). For example, respondents reported no trust in the following institutions: the prime minister (29.9 %); the courts (28.6 %); parliament (34.8 %); the police (22.1 %); political parties (47.4 %); more than half of Algerians and Moroccans had no trust in their countries’ politi-

cal parties and only one third of the sampled population positively assessed the present political situation in their respective countries, whereas 47.1 % chose the opposite answer. Respondents were also interviewed about how safe they felt in their respective cities/towns/villages. The general picture is discouraging: On average, only 79.3 % of respondents chose the “very safe” and “safe” answers (Arab Barometer I 2009).


### 16.2.5.1 Happiness

Researchers have estimated happiness or well-being in many different ways. In the Gallup World Poll, respondents are asked to imagine a ladder, where 0 represents the worst possible life and 10 the best possible life, and to report the step of the ladder they feel they currently stand on. Country averages in the MENA region, where data are available, is 5.8. The highest scores are those of the UAE (7.3), followed by Israel (7.0). Nevertheless, all scores remain much lower than the highest score worldwide (8.5) (Clifton 2012).

Similarly, the rankings of 85 countries in the World Happiness Report of 2013 indicated that people in the MENA region generally experienced low levels of happiness. Some exceptions were Israel, which ranked 11th, followed by the UAE (14th) and some of the small Gulf countries; Oman (23rd), Qatar (27th), Kuwait (32nd) and Saudi Arabia (33rd). Bahrain (79th) and Libya (78th) fell in the quartile of low-happiness countries, which are currently experiencing social instability (Helliwell et al. 2014). In Veenhoven’s (2014) estimations of “Happy Life Years” and “Average Happiness” (2000–2009) across 149 countries, a similar pattern emerged. Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon were at the lowest end; the UAE, Israel, and Qatar were at the highest end (Fig. 16.11).

### 16.2.5.2 Negative Emotions

The situation in Egypt mentioned previously was echoed by the Negative Experience Index, which measures respondents’ levels of sadness, stress, anger, physical pain, and worry on the day before the survey. The findings in this analysis are based on Gallup interviews in 148 countries in 2011 (Clifton 2012). Egypt ranked 5th worldwide. Iraq, Palestine, and Bahrain, all Arab countries



**Fig. 16.11** Happy life years and average happiness in the Middle East and North Africa, 2013 (N = 21) (Data from Helliwell et al. 2014; Veenhoven 2014)

experiencing turmoil, occupied the highest ranks. Morocco had the lowest score of negative emotions in North Africa but remained far below the best score, which was registered in Somaliland. Israel’s score was just below the average, perhaps because of the recurrent security threats (Clifton 2012).

**16.2.5.3 Personal Well-Being Index**

Large-scale surveys of well-being of the general population in MENA are rare. However, the first measure of SWB was conducted in Algeria beginning in 2003 using the Personal Well-being Index (PWI) (Tiliouine et al. 2006). The PWI score is generally computed from the average satisfaction ratings across seven domains: standard of living, personal health, achievements in life, personal relationships, personal safety, community connectedness, and future security. An eighth domain concerning satisfaction with religiosity/spirituality was added.

The same measure was later used in a series of surveys that took place during the same 18-month interval. The results indicated that, since 2005 (Tiliouine 2014a), the PWI mean scores have been remarkably stable. This result was linked to

the improving economic prospects and the stability in the country following the official “National Reconciliation” after the armed struggle of the 1990s that killed 200,000 people and caused billions of dollars in damage. The conclusions support the vulnerability of the well-being of a population when social turmoil dominates people’s lives, as has been the case in Egypt and Tunisia where positive affects decrease and feelings of despair increase (Clifton 2012).

The results also indicated that many other factors determine SWB. Religious practice and satisfaction with Islamic religiosity/spirituality are closely linked with high well-being scores, mainly in middle age. The state of one’s health does not engender such a strong relationship. Religiosity has a buffering effect on SWB as well as on psychological well-being or eudaemonic well-being. Religion can be important because it provides its followers with meaning in life, a frame of reference, or a philosophy of life.

When normative ranges of the PWI in Algeria were calculated using the mean scores from the survey and compared to normative ranges from Australia, the domain of community connectedness showed a similar trend; health was very



close, but achievements in life and future security were much lower. Meanwhile, safety and personal relationships were much higher in Algeria. It was concluded that the sense of community belongingness was similarly high in both countries, but problems linked to underdevelopment impinged on Algerians' perceptions of their future and of their personal relationships. However, one cannot exclude a cultural bias that causes people to differ in the style of their responses to survey questionnaires. For instance, Davey and Rato (2012, cited in Tiliouine 2014a) report a PWI normative range of 61.2–67.1 in China, which is much lower than that in Australia (73.7–76.7). The range for Algeria lies between the two but is narrower (66.4–68.8).

Further research on subjective quality of life is needed. Such research is expected to help provide solid knowledge on the dynamics of these societies and will certainly help formulate strategies and policies with regard to the real needs and aspirations of the people of this region.

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### 16.3 The Well-Being of Minorities and Specific Segments of the Population

The status of minority populations and vulnerable people is intimately linked to the general situation and developmental level of the countries in which they live. Ideally, a developed nation is one where all people are treated with equity, fundamental rights are respected, and participation in public life is enhanced. However, as mentioned earlier, MENA countries in general are markedly behind in social equity, political freedoms, civil liberties, and equal economic opportunities. We briefly illustrate the situation of some of these groups of people in the MENA region. We begin with minorities, then discuss specific groups. The order of the groups does not indicate any preference.

#### 16.3.1 Minorities

A minority is generally defined as “a small group of people within a community or country, differing from the main population in race, religion,

language, or political persuasion” (Oxford Dictionaries 2015) or “a culturally, ethnically, or racially distinct group that coexists with but is subordinate to a more dominant group” (Encyclopedia Britannica 2014). Specific sub-populations exist in any population but are characterized by being different from other groups in some aspect, such as gender (e.g., women), age (e.g., children, youth, and the elderly), or specific needs related to a physical or mental disability. Women have historically been excluded to varying degrees from active participation in public life, despite the fact that they are powerful leaders of social change. The remaining groups require different types of assistance or adapted environments to ensure their autonomy, a life of dignity, and hence improved well-being. Unfortunately, they are usually more vulnerable whenever their societies experience economic hardship and political volatility, which can have a negative effect on their quality of life.

#### 16.3.2 The Well-Being of Minority Groups

All MENA countries without exception have minority groups. These groups differ in size but are easily distinguishable by ethnicity or religious faith, or both: Christian Arabs and non-Arab Circassians in Jordan; Christian Copts in Egypt; Maronite Christians and Shi'a Muslims in Lebanon and Iran; Kurds and Allawis in Syria; Shi'a Muslims and Kurds in Iraq; Kurds and Shi'a in Turkey; Sunni Muslims in the majority Shi'a country of Iran; Muslim Arabs and Christian Arabs, who became a minority in Israel after 1948; Berbers in most North African countries.

The overwhelming majority of MENA's minorities have historically shared the lands in which they currently live. In the past, being a member of a minority was not grounds for repression. Ma'oz (1999) said that ethnic conflicts did not surface until after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1921 because Muslim ethnic communities were considered an integral part of the Muslim *Umma* (community). In fact, several minority figures assumed power in past Islamic empires and also within the Ottoman Empire. For

instance, Muhammad Ali, the founder of the dynasty that ruled Egypt before 1952, was Albanian. Almost all minorities were actively involved in fighting European colonialism and later the authoritarian regimes associated with the recent “Arab Spring” of North Africa. The “divide to better reign” principle followed by European colonial powers was behind most of the tension between local groups, as was the case of France in Algeria and Lebanon and Britain in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East (Ma’oz 1999).

The current situation of most members of minority groups in MENA countries is bleak. When applying the “Peoples Under Threat” measure (specifically designed to identify civilians at risk of genocide, mass killing, or other systematic violent repression in need of protection), among the 68 countries where the indicator was significant, 10 countries belonged to the MENA region in 2013 (Minority Rights Group International 2013: 228–233). More prominent are the areas where armed conflicts are widespread, i.e., in Syria, sectarian divides have grown between Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, and Druze, especially since 2012. Minorities, such as Christians and Alawites, fear being further targeted if the Bashar al-Assad regime collapses.

In Iraq, the political scene is characterized by deep divisions and a highly fractionalized central political system. Under the label of preserving national unity, political maneuvering has led to the further victimization of particular minority groups in the MENA region. For example, Saddam Hussein’s Tikriti population held all leading positions in Iraq while using all means, including chemical weapons, against the Kurds, who represented one fifth of the Iraqi population, and marginalized the Shi’a Muslims. The conflict was further accentuated after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. In 2013, the sectarian conflict between the Shi’a and Sunni communities escalated. Under the Shiites’ strong hold over the country, even Tariq al-Hashimi, the Sunni vice-president, was sentenced to death *in absentia* on terrorism charges. Christians, Turkmanis, Yezidis, and other minorities in Iraq continued to be targeted by more numerous population groups with the result that large numbers of their group

remained displaced in neighboring countries and refugee camps administered by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The continuing existence of a community of smaller minorities, such as the Sabeen Mandaeans, is in doubt given the highly negative value placed on minority group populations—even in countries that contain large numbers of sectarian minorities vis-à-vis the larger Islamic community (*ummah*) (Minority Rights Group International 2013: 233–245).

Christians in Egypt share a social and cultural background with Muslim Egyptians, but both groups feel threatened by Islamic extremists who are motivated to bring down even the popular governments that they elected. Both groups suffered many attacks on their mosques, churches, and properties used for nonsectarian purposes in 2012. In Libya, instability negatively affects the integration of minorities, such as Berbers and Black Africans. In Tunisia, the country that fostered and gave leadership to the Arab Spring, the situation of minorities worsened after the fall of the Benali regime. One to 2 % of the Berber community and fewer than 2000 Jews, as well as a small number of Baha’is were affected by a series of atrocities that led to the slaughter of many of their members (Minority Rights Group International 2013: 198).

Even seemingly stable countries have suffered high levels of political tension that focuses on their minority populations. In Iran, Ahwazi Arabs, Azeris, Bahá’is, Baluchis, Christians, Kurds, and a small population of Jews are threatened to the point of social exclusion, even death (Minority Rights Group International 2013: 204). The Iranian constitution, in Article 13, recognizes only Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians as religious minorities deserving treatment equal to that of Muslims. In Saudi Arabia, the most conservative Islamic country, restrictions remain tight for women and non-Sunni Muslims. Shi’a Muslims comprise 10–15 % of the population and live mostly in the eastern province of al-Ahasa and al-Qatif. Human rights reports indicate that there is systematic discrimination against Shi’a Muslims in education, employment, and justice. Shi’as are also under-represented at the higher levels of government.

Kurds, Alevis, Roma, Armenians, and other Christians in Turkey also live under discrimination. The situation of the Palestinian refugees is very sad. Their refugee camps have been targeted in all internal conflicts in the host countries, such as in Lebanon where they represent 10 % of the population, and in Iraq and Syria. They have been waiting for a fair solution of the Palestinian problem for more than 60 years. There are now about six million refugees. Facing marginalization and discrimination, these residents are without basic human rights. Minority Rights Group International (2013: 213) stresses that besides their lack of political and civil rights, they are denied access to public health care and depend largely on aid and the charity sector for whatever health care they get.

The prospects for well-being in the MENA countries will improve only when they are recognized as multiethnic and multicultural entities and when stability returns. Foreign interventions have always worsened the situation, which favors a negotiated solution among the local populations.

### **16.3.3 The Special Situation of Women and Youth in the MENA Region**

Women are recognized as important agents of social change around the world. Successful developmental initiatives should, therefore, ensure gender equality to the fullest extent possible as a major policy priority (United Nations and League of Arab States 2013; United Nations Development Programme 2011). To be effective, this equality should target women's increased access to and control over resources, freedom of movement, freedom from the risk of violence, decision making over family formation, having a greater public presence in society, and actively participating in policy making (World Bank 2013). In the following paragraphs, we consider briefly the situation of women and that of equally disenfranchised young people in the MENA region with regard to health resources, education, employment, and civil liberties and, more broadly, increasing participation in both private and public decision making.

#### **16.3.3.1 Health Indicators of Women and Youth**

Young women and, in particular, young people living in rural areas and who are afflicted with serious physical disability, experience severe deficiencies in both access to and the quality of health services available to them (World Bank 2013). In MENA countries, malnutrition also is a major contributor to child mortality, especially among impoverished families and households (World Bank 2014). This issue is worsening in those states with a high degree of physical insecurity, i.e., the war-torn states of Iraq, Syria, among others. Youth also are subject to higher rates of mortality that are often associated with tobacco smoking, obesity, and road accidents. Youth are more often involved in road accidents, for example, than are people of other ages. Young people also incur an increased number of deformities, permanent physical disabilities and psychological disorders (United Nations and League of Arab States 2013).

#### **16.3.3.2 Education and Employment of Women and Youth**

Except in Kuwait, unemployment is higher among women than among men (United Nations Development Programme 2011). The UNDP report clearly shows a 30–40 % difference in unemployment rates between women and men in Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco. The Gender Inequality Index shows that there is still work to be done in this area (United Nations Development Programme 2011). Those MENA countries that are rated as high and medium human development nations have high scores on the Gender Inequality Index.

As stipulated in the International Convention on the Rights of the Children of 1989, adapted schooling opportunities are considered the fundamental right of any child regardless of his state of health or level of disability. MENA countries have achieved significant progress in this area, mainly in generalizing primary school enrollment and literacy. The report on Arab Millennium Development Goals has stressed that most countries in the region are also succeeding in guaranteeing gender parity in enrollment in primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Nevertheless,

their achievements in the areas of hunger, food security, access to water, improved sanitation in rural areas, and child and maternal mortality rates have been poor. Political volatility and conflicts in the region since 2010 led many hard-won gains to be halted or reversed. Increased poverty levels are one of the direct consequences of widespread unrest (United Nations and League of Arab States 2013; Estes and Tiliouine 2014).

No one can remain a student forever; getting a suitable job is the only way to guarantee advancement to full citizenship. The fragile economic situation in the MENA region hinders this goal because of the large number of young people. Youth can be considered an asset if they are properly prepared as a productive labor supply and good citizens. However, many countries fail to integrate them into society as employees.

The MENA region is characterized by high unemployment rates compared to other regions of the world, with the exception of the Sahel region (World Bank 2013). Youth unemployment rates are particularly high, mainly in Arab countries, and can show considerable variation. For example, the 1.6 % rate in Qatar stands in stark contrast to the 30.7 % seen in Tunisia. Even worse, youth with university degrees have great difficulty getting jobs. Because of the weak capacity of the industrial sector, the jobs offered cannot meet the growing demand. Meanwhile, the public sector, which is the dominant employer, offers a limited number of opportunities. The World Bank report (2013) stressed that governments employ almost 20 % of all workers—somewhat higher than in Eastern European and Organization for Cooperation countries but much higher than in Latin America or in Asia. This lack of opportunity has limited students' educational choices in MENA in general. Moreover, many graduates prefer to wait for as long as 10 years for a government job rather than accept another job. The assurance of a permanent job with minimal grievance and little chance of layoff may be a strong motive. Governments facing high rates of unemployment use the public sector as a way to absorb the high demand. The effect of this practice on management and on job productivity is bad and may in the long run create a negative work culture.

Efforts should be made to improve employment opportunities for young people. Unemployed youth can engage in improper behavior, such as violence. Unemployment is also linked to delay of marriage and increased poverty. Moreover, disparities in employment opportunities between rural and urban areas lead youth to search for employment in already crowded urban areas. Insecurity and war have made the situation worse because people flee villages and rural areas to find refuge in larger cities.

### 16.3.3.3 Women's Civil Liberties and Participation in Decision Making

Even though Islam proclaimed that women have the right to participate in all social and economic activities, regional cultural traditions continue to restrict their active participation in these areas, including in decisions about their personal lives. They are not even allowed to drive a car in some countries. Nevertheless, women in MENA countries continue to struggle to obtain their rights. Tawakel Karman, a Yemeni woman, was awarded the 2011 Nobel Prize for peace: a symbolic win.

In general, the status of women is defined differently from one MENA country to the other, depending on how the country interprets the *Sharia* (Islamic traditional law): in terms of jurisprudence (*Fikh*), customary law (*Urf*), or civil law, which is inspired by international law. In all cases, economic recovery and social cohesion remain conditioned to properly tackling the question of women who remain disadvantaged relative to men.

Some MENA governments have recently implemented a system of quotas to increase women's participation in political institutions, which has resulted in greater representation of women in parliament (Table 16.1). Algeria has the most women, with 146 women representing 31.6 % of the parliament members. Other MENA countries follow: Tunisia, 28.1 %; Iraq, 25.2 %; Saudi Arabia, 19.9 %; and the UAE, 18.3 %. Countries with no or few women representatives are Yemen (0.3 %) and Qatar (0.0 %) (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2014). Nevertheless, the ste-

**Table 16.1** Women in MENA countries with quota systems in place, 2011–14 (N = 11) (Data from [International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2014](#))

Country	Election year	Type of quota	Results of last election	Women in parliament (%)
Algeria	2012	Quotas for the single/lower house	146 of 462	31.6
		Quotas for the single/lower house		
Egypt	2012	Quotas for the single/lower house	10 of 508	2.0
Iraq	2014	Quotas for the single/lower house	83 of 328	25.3
		Quotas for the single/lower house		
Jordan	2013	Quotas for the single/lower house	18 of 150	12.0
		Quotas for the single/lower house		
Lebanon	2009	No legislated	4 of 128	3.1
Libya	2014	Quotas for the single/lower house	30 of 200	15.0
		Quotas for the single/lower house		
Occupied Palestinian Territories	2006	Quotas for the single/lower house	17 of 132	12.9
		Quotas for the single/lower house		
Saudi Arabia	2013	Quotas for the single/lower house	30 of 151	19.9
Sudan	2010	Legislated quotas for the single/lower house	88 of 354	24.9
Tunisia	2014	Quotas for the single/lower house	68 of 217	31.3
Turkey	2011	Voluntary quotas	78 of 550	14.2

reotype that men make better leaders persists, as seen in many international surveys.

Lastly, the proportion of people age 65 and older is increasing across the MENA region as a result of improved access to health care and stable birth rates. Despite their numerous problems, these societies should include these issues in their development strategies. The prevalence of disability (physical, sensory, intellectual, and mental health impairment) is generally estimated by WHO at 10 % worldwide. Extrapolating this number would indicate more than 45 million disabled individuals in the MENA region. In times of social turmoil, the number of disabilities is expected to increase. Peaceful negotiation of these conflicts is the first step toward avoiding more physical and mental casualties. Strategies targeting social inclusion in all economic and social life domains along with combating social stigma and discrimination against the disabled should be strengthened.

## 16.4 Concluding Remarks

It should be reiterated that, throughout history, the MENA region has been an important contributor to the world's prosperity, intellectual

achievements, peace, and harmony. Paradoxically, the region's historic wealth, its contributions to global civilization, and its strategic geopolitical position in the Middle East and North Africa have not been favorable to its contemporary level of well-being. This situation prevails despite the region's large reserves of vital energy sources, favorable transportation systems, and high levels of human capital (more than half a billion people).

Instituted during the colonial era within randomly set and conflict-ridden borders, the newly created states of the MENA region inherited a huge potential for discord and conflict because of their intrinsic multiethnic and multireligious nature. Moreover, the region's postcolonial era was dominated by populist nationalist movements that, typically, ignored the democratic expectations of the region's people. The Cold War and the recurrent failures to free the occupied lands of Palestine and Syria fractioned the region further and have contributed to conflict within the individual countries and the region as a whole. The current gradual collapse of the nationalist ideologies is creating a vacuum, mostly benefiting intransigent Islamic extremists followed by a general decline in the overall political well-being of the populace. A more concilia-



tory agenda is needed to strengthen democratic choices and to restore legitimate governments based on the free choice of the people. This approach should apply not only to Arab countries but also to other MENA countries with such culturally heterogeneous populations as Iran and Turkey.

As discussed earlier, MENA countries differ greatly in their levels of development and hence in the needs of their populations. A first group of MENA countries is constituted by highly unstable regions such as Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. In these areas, regaining stability and security is the utmost priority. It is difficult to watch the dissipation of many of the hard-won advances of the last four decades, e.g., improved educational opportunities and prolonged life expectation, leading once again to extremism, death, displacement, exodus, widespread ill-health, hunger, and all other forms of human misery.

Our analyses have identified another group of MENA nations that are relatively stable but have only slowly made progress in the areas of health care and education: Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, and Turkey. Unfortunately, progress in civil liberties in these countries remains wanting. The leaders of these countries need to deal with the widening gap between rich and poor, provide employment opportunities for youth, settle conflicts with minorities, allow more gender parity, help the economically and socially vulnerable population subgroups, and enhance economic approaches designed to create wealth for a larger share of their total population. Israel shares many of the characteristics of this group of nations but has proved resilient in facing different, often difficult, security and economic crises due mainly to the country's international financial and military backing.

The last subgroup of countries includes the oil-rich Gulf States of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. These countries have experienced enormous successes in

modernizing their countries' infrastructures, providing for access to health care, and opening educational opportunities to at least the middle mass of their populations (see Figs. 16.1a,b and 16.2a,b). Several also have built far-reaching financial empires that engage in business with all regions of the world. However, and unless handled differently, these gains may evaporate precipitously due to the volatility of international financial and energy markets. Should the current restrictions on civil liberties (see Fig. 16.10a–c), including the marginalization of minorities and women, continue over even the near term these countries are at serious risk of the civil unrest found in other MENA nations. Intimations of such turmoil have been noted recently in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Combating income inequality and economic corruption in other nations of the region must be a priority as well.

The situation in the MENA countries should be a source of considerable concern for the world as a whole, not only because of the region's historical cultural and geostrategic importance but also as a source of critically needed global energy resources. A worsening situation can easily upset world peace and contribute to a loss of social progress that already is underway in many of the world's peripheral developing countries (Estes 2007, 2015). The number of young people being recruited by the extremist state called Daesh (or ISIS/ISIL) in Iraq and Syria, even among young Westerners, is an example of a dangerous situation that may lead to a more global terrorist wave (Estes and Sirgy 2014). Improvements therefore should be all-inclusive: quality education, decent employment, gender parity, freedom, enhanced participation in public life, and the introduction of genuine participatory democracies in which people themselves both identify and pursue individual and collective goals. International groups and other regions of the world have much to contribute to sustain the high and rapid levels of positive social change occurring throughout the Middle East and West Asia.



## Supplemental Tables

**Supplemental Table 16.1** Demography  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Demography**  
**REGION: MENA (N = 22)**

	Country	Population (Mil)				% Population growth rate				% Urban			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l
North Africa	Algeria	11.3	22.8	37.1	39.9	2.5	3.1	1.9	1.8	30.5	48.0	67.5	70.1
North Africa	Egypt, UAR	28.0	50.3	78.1	83.4	2.8	2.3	1.7	1.6	37.9	43.9	43.0	43.1
North Africa	Libya	1.4	3.7	6.0	6.3	3.3	3.4	1.3	0.8	27.3	75.5	77.6	78.4
North Africa	Morocco	12.3	22.3	31.6	33.5	3.0	2.3	1.2	1.5	29.4	44.8	57.7	59.7
North Africa	Sudan	7.5	17.1	35.7	38.8	2.9	3.2	2.3	2.1	10.7	22.9	33.1	33.6
North Africa	Tunisia	4.2	7.3	10.5	11.0	1.8	3.0	1.0	1.0	37.5	53.8	65.9	66.6
West Asia	Armenia	1.9	3.3	3.0	3.0	3.6	1.6	-0.2	0.2	51.3	67.1	63.6	62.8
West Asia	Azerbaijan	3.9	6.7	9.1	9.5	3.3	1.6	1.2	1.3	52.7	53.5	53.4	54.4
West Asia	Bahrain	0.2	0.4	1.3	1.3	3.5	3.0	4.9	0.9	82.3	87.2	88.5	88.7
West Asia	Cyprus	0.6	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.0	0.9	1.2	1.0	35.6	64.7	67.6	67.0
West Asia	Georgia	3.6	4.7	4.5	4.5	1.8	0.9	0.9	0.4	43.1	54.2	52.9	53.5
West Asia	Iraq	7.3	15.6	31.0	34.3	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.5	42.9	68.8	69.0	69.4
West Asia	Israel	2.1	4.2	7.6	8.2	3.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	76.8	89.8	91.8	92.1
West Asia	Jordan	0.8	2.6	6.0	6.6	4.8	3.6	2.2	2.3	50.9	67.0	82.5	83.4
West Asia	Kuwait	0.3	1.7	3.0	3.5	9.8	4.7	4.8	3.2	74.9	97.9	98.3	98.3
West Asia	Lebanon	1.8	2.7	4.3	4.5	3.3	0.4	2.2	1.0	42.3	79.4	87.2	87.7
West Asia	Oman	0.6	1.5	2.8	3.9	2.3	4.6	5.1	7.8	16.4	57.1	75.2	77.2
West Asia	Qatar	0.0	0.4	1.7	2.3	7.1	8.4	11.2	4.5	85.3	90.1	98.7	99.2
West Asia	Saudi Arabia	4.1	13.3	27.3	29.4	3.0	5.3	1.7	1.9	31.3	72.6	82.1	82.9
West Asia	Syria	4.6	10.7	21.5	23.3	3.2	3.4	2.4	2.0	36.8	47.9	55.7	57.3
West Asia	Turkey	27.6	49.2	72.1	75.8	2.5	2.1	1.3	1.2	31.5	52.4	70.7	72.9
West Asia	Yemen	5.1	9.7	22.8	25.0	1.5	4.0	2.4	2.3	9.1	18.4	31.7	34.0
	North Africa (N=6)	10.8	20.6	33.2	35.5	2.7	2.9	1.5	1.5	28.9	48.2	57.5	58.6
	West Asia (N=16)	4.0	8.0	13.7	14.8	3.6	3.0	2.9	2.1	47.7	66.8	73.0	73.8
	Regional Average	5.9	11.4	19.0	20.4	3.3	3.0	2.5	2.0	42.6	61.7	68.8	69.6

Population: Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship—except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates

% Population growth rate: Population growth (annual %) is the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year  $t - 1$  to  $t$ , expressed as a percentage

% Urban: Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national statistical offices. It is calculated using World Bank population estimates and urban ratios from the United Nations World Urbanization Prospects

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW>

i World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

j World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

k World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

l World Bank: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS>

**Supplemental Table 16.2** Education  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Education**  
**REGION: MENA (N= 22)**

	Country Source	% Secondary school enrollment				% Adult literacy				% Tertiary education			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
			b	c	d		f	g	h		j	k	l
North Africa	Algeria		45.0	95.4	97.6		49.6		72.6		9.1	28.8	33.3
North Africa	Egypt, UAR		55.3	75.9	89.0		44.4	72.0	73.9		17.8	33.5	32.9
North Africa	Libya		79.3		104.3		60.2	89.9	89.9		9.6		9.6
North Africa	Morocco		30.8	62.5	68.9		30.3	56.1	67.1		6.0	14.3	16.2
North Africa	Sudan			41.7	40.7		32.4	73.4	73.4			15.2	17.2
North Africa	Tunisia		37.0	89.0	90.6		48.2	79.1	79.7		5.3	35.2	33.7
West Asia	Armenia			96.6	96.6			99.6	99.6		17.6	50.6	46.1
West Asia	Azerbaijan		96.9	98.8	100.3			99.8	99.8		24.4	19.3	20.4
West Asia	Bahrain		92.3	96.4	101.5			94.6	94.6		12.2	36.6	40.4
West Asia	Cyprus		72.4	91.4	95.3			98.7	98.7		4.0	48.3	45.9
West Asia	Georgia		110.8	86.8	100.6			99.7	99.7			28.3	33.1
West Asia	Iraq		49.2	53.1	53.1			79.0	79.0		10.4		16.0
West Asia	Israel		90.4	101.9	102.2		91.8	97.8	97.8		34.7	62.4	66.5
West Asia	Jordan		81.5	89.9	87.8			92.6	97.9		20.4	40.4	46.6
West Asia	Kuwait		88.2	100.3	100.3		74.5	93.9	95.5		15.1	28.5	28.5
West Asia	Lebanon		65.1	74.3	75.0			89.6	89.6		26.3	47.8	47.9
West Asia	Oman		25.1	96.2	91.2			86.9	86.9		0.3	24.7	28.1
West Asia	Qatar		82.8	104.3	111.6		75.6	96.3	96.7		16.8	10.0	14.3
West Asia	Saudi Arabia			102.9	124.3			94.4	94.4		9.2	37.3	57.5
West Asia	Syria		54.9	72.5	47.7			85.1	85.1		17.2	25.7	31.0
West Asia	Turkey		40.4	84.4	102.2		76.0	92.7	94.9		8.9	55.9	79.3
West Asia	Yemen			44.3	49.2			66.4	66.4			10.9	10.3

North Africa (N=6)		49.5	72.9	81.8		44.2	74.1	76.1		9.6	25.4	23.8
West Asia (N=16)		73.1	87.1	89.9		79.5	91.7	92.3		15.5	35.1	38.2
Regional Average		66.5	83.8	87.7		58.3	87.5	87.9		14.0	32.7	34.3

% Secondary school enrollment: Gross enrollment ratio. Secondary. All programs. Total is the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age. GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition

Adult (15+) literacy rate (%). Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, 'literacy' also encompasses 'numeracy', the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations. This indicator is calculated by dividing the number of literates aged 15 years and over by the corresponding age group population and multiplying the result by 100

% Tertiary education: Gross enrollment ratio. Tertiary (ISCED 5 and 6). Total is the total enrollment in tertiary education (ISCED 5 and 6), regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving

b World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

c World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

d World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.SEC.ENRR>

UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

UNESCO (2002) – Estimated Illiteracy Rate and Illiterate Population Aged 15 Years and Older by Country, 1970–2015, Paris.

f World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

g World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

h World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.ZS>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

j World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

k World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

l World Bank: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR>; UNESCO Institute for Statistics <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>

**Supplemental Table 16.3** Health  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Health**  
**REGION: MENA (N= 22)**

	Country	Avg. years life expectancy				Infant <1/1k live born				Child mortality <5/1K				Maternal mortality rate			TB incidence per 100k				
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t
North Africa	Algeria	46.1	64.1	70.6	71.0	148.4	57.3	23.5	21.6	246.6	71.3	27.4	25.2			92.0	89.0		60.5	90.0	81.0
North Africa	Egypt, UAR	48.0	61.8	70.5	71.1	206.1	83.1	19.9	18.6	307.8	117.5	23.5	21.8	46.1	64.3	50.0	45.0		2.6	21.0	16.0
North Africa	Libya	42.6	66.8	74.8	75.4	164.4	46.0	14.3	12.4	281.5	55.1	16.7	14.5			15.0	15.0		8.7	40.0	40.0
North Africa	Morocco	48.4	61.4	70.2	70.9	146.5	77.8	29.2	26.1	242.7	103.9	34.0	30.4			130.0	120.0		120.3	100.0	104.0
North Africa	Sudan	48.2	54.8	61.5	62.0	107.2	84.6	55.1	51.2	178.0	136.1	83.3	76.6			390.0	360.0		8.8	133.0	108.0
North Africa	Tunisia	42.0	65.9	74.6	73.6	189.2	51.8	14.9	13.1	283.2	68.3	17.4	15.2			48.0	46.0		34.6	23.0	32.0
West Asia	Armenia	65.9	69.5	74.2	74.5		51.3	16.2	14.0		61.3	18.1	15.6			31.0	29.0		23.0	77.0	49.0
West Asia	Azerbaijan	60.8	65.4	70.5	70.7		79.7	33.8	29.9		100.7	38.9	34.2			27.0	26.0		56.5	341.0	85.0
West Asia	Bahrain	52.1	71.4	76.3	76.7	134.6	21.1	6.7	5.2	200.3	25.0	7.8	6.1		14.7	24.0	22.0		46.3	37.0	18.0
West Asia	Cyprus	69.6	75.7	79.3	79.8		12.2	3.1	2.8		13.4	3.9	3.6			10.0	10.0		8.7	3.8	5.8
West Asia	Georgia	63.4	69.8	73.7	74.1		42.8	14.6	11.7		50.2	16.4	13.1			42.0	41.0		39.1	175.0	116.0
West Asia	Iraq	48.0	62.1	68.8	69.5	132.3	46.8	30.1	28.0	196.6	60.7	36.7	34.0			73.0	67.0		41.6	48.0	45.0
West Asia	Israel	72.0	75.2	81.6	82.1		12.1	3.6	3.2		14.4	4.5	4.0		8.0	5.0	2.0		8.7	6.7	5.8
West Asia	Jordan	52.7	68.3	73.4	73.9	107.9	35.6	17.5	16.0	157.1	44.4	20.5	18.7	167.3		53.0	50.0		29.1	7.2	5.8
West Asia	Kuwait	60.3	71.2	74.2	74.5	100.2	19.7	9.2	8.1	144.7	23.2	10.8	9.5		3.7	13.0	14.0		41.4	26.0	24.0

West Asia	Lebanon	63.3	68.9	79.3	80.1	57.7	33.2	8.9	7.8	77.5	41.1	10.4	9.1			18.0	16.0		72.6	11.0	16.0
West Asia	Oman	42.7	63.9	76.0	76.9	232.5	50.3	10.0	9.8	380.5	66.0	11.6	11.4			12.0	11.0		57.5	13.0	11.0
West Asia	Qatar	61.2	74.2	78.1	78.6		23.6	7.7	7.0		28.1	9.0	8.2			7.0	6.0		67.4	46.0	40.0
West Asia	Saudi Arabia	45.7	66.6	75.1	75.7		52.2	14.7	13.4		68.9	17.1	15.5			16.0	16.0		29.9	16.0	14.0
West Asia	Syria	52.8	68.3	74.9	74.7	121.5	37.5	13.1	11.9	179.5	47.1	15.2	14.6		6.2	50.0	49.0		20.3	26.0	17.0
West Asia	Turkey	45.4	61.7	74.2	75.2	169.2	70.9	19.5	16.5	253.7	98.3	23.0	19.2			22.0	20.0		63.0	31.0	20.0
West Asia	Yemen	32.4	55.0	62.5	63.1	269.5	105.2	45.5	40.4	403.5	152.8	58.8	51.3			290.0	270.0		35.7	80.0	48.0
	North Africa (N=6)	45.9	62.4	70.4	70.7	160.3	66.8	26.2	23.8	256.6	92.0	33.7	30.6	46.1	64.3	120.8	112.5		39.2	67.8	63.5
	West Asia (N=16)	55.5	68.0	74.5	75.0	147.3	43.4	15.9	14.1	221.5	56.0	18.9	16.8	167.3	8.2	43.3	40.6		40.0	59.0	32.5
	Regional Average	52.9	66.5	73.4	73.8	152.5	49.8	18.7	16.8	235.5	65.8	23.0	20.5	106.7	19.4	64.5	60.2		39.8	61.4	41.0

Avg. years life expectancy: Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life

Infant <1/1k live born: Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1000 live births in a given year

Child mortality <5/1K: Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year

Maternal mortality rate: Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births. The data are estimated with a regression model using information on the proportion of maternal deaths among non-AIDS deaths in women ages 15–49, fertility, birth attendants, and GDP

TB incidence per 100k: Incidence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of new pulmonary, smear positive, and extra-pulmonary tuberculosis cases. Incidence includes patients with HIV

a World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

b World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

c World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

d World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN>

e World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

f World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

g World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

(continued)



**Supplemental Table 16.3** (continued)

h World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.IMRT.IN>

i World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

j World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

k World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

l World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT>

m [http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality\\_data/en/](http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/); <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN>. Note: some estimates made from pregnancy-related deaths, birth rate, and population

n [http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality\\_data/en/](http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/); <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.CBRT.IN>

o World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

p World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.STA.MMRT>

q <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>

r <http://www.who.int/tb/country/data/download/en/>

s World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

t World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.TBS.INCD>

**Supplemental Table 16.4** Income  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Income**  
**REGION: MENA (N= 22)**

	Country	GDP (Billions of constant 2005 US\$)				PCGDP (constant 2005 US\$)				% Growth in GDP				GINI or other measure of wealth disparity			
		1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014	1960	1985	2010	2013–2014
		a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p
North Africa	Algeria	19.9	64.3	116.5	132.4	1765.6	2813.5	3143.6	3316.0	-13.6	3.7	3.6	4.1		40.2		40.2
North Africa	Egypt, UAR		40.3	121.0	131.4		800.1	1550.1	1575.9		6.6	5.1	2.2			30.8	30.8
North Africa	Libya			57.4	29.2			9494.3	4670.8			5.0	-24.0				
North Africa	Morocco		27.5	75.5	87.1		1223.3	2348.6	2557.1	-2.4	5.4	3.6	2.6			40.9	40.9
North Africa	Sudan	5.3	9.2	37.5	38.3	508.0	406.4	822.4	987.4	0.0	-6.3	3.5	3.1			35.3	35.3
North Africa	Tunisia		14.3	40.6	43.3		1975.9	3847.6	3979.4		5.6	3.2	2.5		43.4	35.8	35.8
West Asia	Armenia			5.9	7.1			1997.1	2382.3			2.2	3.4			31.1	30.3
West Asia	Azerbaijan			28.3	31.2			3126.7	3275.7			4.9	2.0			33.0	33.0
West Asia	Bahrain		5.8	20.9	24.4		13776.2	16721.8	18128.0		-4.8	4.3	4.5				
West Asia	Cyprus		7.3	20.6	18.7		13421.8	24852.4	21852.1		4.9	1.4	-2.3				
West Asia	Georgia		15.5	8.2	10.2		3315.1	1850.8	2254.4		4.9	6.3	4.8			42.1	41.4
West Asia	Iraq		19.5	66.4	83.6		1254.5	2145.0	2438.8		1.5	5.5	-6.4			29.5	29.5
West Asia	Israel	10.9	50.9	177.1	201.6	5145.1	12034.4	23225.4	24540.6	11.2	3.4	5.8	2.8		36.5	42.8	42.8
West Asia	Jordan		5.9	17.0	19.0		2243.0	2818.1	2878.2		3.5	2.3	3.1		36.1	33.7	33.7

(continued)

**Supplemental Table 16.4** (continued)

West Asia	Kuwait			85.6	101.6			28617.0	30146.9		-4.3	-2.4	1.5				
West Asia	Lebanon		12.5	30.8	33.0		4686.2	7083.9	7315.2			8.0	2.0				
West Asia	Oman	0.3	16.3	41.2	45.3	507.1	10861.5	14686.9	12472.0	1.1	14.0	4.8	3.9				
West Asia	Qatar			101.9	137.9			58257.0	60796.5			16.7	6.2				
West Asia	Saudi Arabia		167.1	425.1	523.4		12588.6	15597.0	17819.7		-5.5	4.8	3.5				
West Asia	Syria	2.6	12.8	32.0	32.0	563.1	1204.5	1637.4	1637.4	10.8	6.1	5.7	5.7				
West Asia	Turkey	64.6	206.0	565.1	672.8	2345.7	4189.6	7833.6	8871.9	1.2	4.2	9.2	2.9		43.6	38.8	40.0
West Asia	Yemen			20.0	18.1			878.1	742.2			3.3	4.2				
	North Africa (N=6)	12.6	31.1	74.7	77.0	1136.8	1443.8	3534.4	2847.8	-5.3	3.0	4.0	-1.6		41.8	35.7	36.6
	West Asia (N=16)	19.6	47.2	102.9	122.5	2140.3	7234.1	13208.0	13597.0	6.1	2.5	5.2	2.6		38.7	35.9	35.8
	Regional Average	17.3	42.2	95.2	110.1	1805.8	5424.7	10569.8	10665.4	1.2	2.7	4.9	1.5		39.9	35.8	36.1

GDP (constant 2005 US\$): GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2005 official exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used

PCGDP (constant 2005 US\$): GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. dollars

% Growth in GDP: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources

GINI or other measure of wealth disparity: Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of

recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality

a World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

b World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

c World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

d World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD>

e World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

f World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

g World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

h World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD>

i World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

j World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

k World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

l World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>

m

n World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

o World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

p World Bank, Development Research Group; US Census Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI>

**Supplemental Table 16.5** Subjective Well-Being  
**SOCIAL INDICATORS: Subjective Well-Being**  
**REGION: MENA (N= 22)**

	World Values Survey (WVS), 1981–2014						
	Country	WVS 1 1981–84	WVS 2 1990–04	WVS 3 1995–98	WVS 4 1999–04	WVS 5 2005–09	WVS 6 2010–14
	Source	a	b	c	d	e	f
North Africa	Algeria				5.7		6.3
North Africa	Egypt, UAR				5.4	5.7	4.9
North Africa	Libya						7.3
North Africa	Morocco				5.8	5.3	5.9
North Africa	Sudan						
North Africa	Tunisia						5.6
West Asia	Armenia			4.3			5.2
West Asia	Azerbaijan			5.4			6.7
West Asia	Bahrain						6.8
West Asia	Cyprus					7.4	7.2
West Asia	Georgia			4.7		5.0	5.5
West Asia	Iraq				5.2	4.5	5.9
West Asia	Israel				7.0		
West Asia	Jordan				5.6	7.1	6.6
West Asia	Kuwait						7.2
West Asia	Lebanon						6.5
West Asia	Oman						
West Asia	Qatar						8.0
West Asia	Saudi Arabia				7.3		
West Asia	Syria						
West Asia	Turkey		6.4	6.2	5.8	7.5	7.2
West Asia	Yemen						5.9
	North Africa (N=6)				5.6	5.5	6.0
	West Asia (N=16)		6.4	5.1	6.2	6.3	6.6
	Regional Average		6.4	5.1	6.0	6.1	6.4

Mean life satisfaction: Averaged value of responses to the following survey question: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Using this card on which 1 means you are “completely dissatisfied” and 10 means you are “completely satisfied” where would you put your satisfaction with your life as a whole? a WVS 1 1981–84 V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? b WVS 2 1990–04 V96.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? c WVS 3 1995–98 V65.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? d WVS 4 1999–04 V81.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? e WVS 5 2005–09 V22.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? f WVS 6 2010–14 V23.- All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

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Birger Poppel

*Some day when I have laid me down  
Some day when I am dead,  
the vision I saw  
Will move someone else.  
Someone else will see it.  
The new generation  
Will get to see it.  
Therefore, I gasped for air  
Therefore, I tried to catch my breath,  
as captivated as I was.*

(An unknown poet from Ammassalik)

## 17.1 Introduction

Pictures of pristine Arctic nature, of snow-covered landscapes and icy seascapes, Northern Lights, breath-taking glaciers, deep fiords, magnificent terrestrial and marine wildlife such as seals and whales, muskoxen, reindeer, Arctic

foxes, and the iconic polar bear would probably be among the first associations to spring to mind when one mentions the Arctic. Another association might be the Arctic as “the canary in the coal mine,” given the thorough documentation that not only is the Arctic affected by global warming, it is also witnessing the largest increases in temperature, rapid decrease of the sea ice in the Polar Sea, and different impacts of a changing climate (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme [AMAP] 2011).

What often seems to be forgotten is that the Arctic, however sparsely, is populated. Depending on how one delimits the area (Map 17.1), between 4 and 10 million people inhabit the Arctic,<sup>1</sup> of which between 400,000 and 1.3 million belong to

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Portions of the research reported in this chapter were previously published in *Global Handbook of Quality of Life—Exploration of Well-Being of Nations and Continents*, Living conditions and perceived quality of life among indigenous peoples in the Arctic, 2015, pp. 715–747, Poppel, B. © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015); with permission of Springer.

Portions of the research reported in this chapter were previously published in *Human Development Report: Regional Processes and Global Linkages*, Health and Well-being, 2014, Ratio, A., Poppel, B., Young, K. [Tema Nord 2014:567], Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers, with permission of the publisher.

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<sup>1</sup>There are different definitions of the Arctic and the total population varies accordingly. The four million people figure comes from the delimitation defined by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP). The delimitation (e.g., used in the *ECONOR I & II Reports*) that is basis for the ten million population figure includes larger areas of the Russian Arctic than the one used by AMAP.

## Arctic administrative areas

compiled by  
Winfried K. Dallmann,  
Norwegian Polar Institute



**Map 17.1** Map of the Circumpolar Arctic region and Arctic administrative areas (Compiled by Winfried K. Dallmann. Norwegian Polar Institute; [http://www.](http://www.arctic-council.org/images/PDF_attachments/Maps/admin_areas_wNunavik.pdf)

[arctic-council.org/images/PDF\\_attachments/Maps/admin\\_areas\\_wNunavik.pdf](http://www.arctic-council.org/images/PDF_attachments/Maps/admin_areas_wNunavik.pdf))

one of the indigenous peoples of the circumpolar Arctic. The nonindigenous segment of the total Arctic population (circa 90 %) comprises permanent residents, including descendants of immigrants, and immigrants on short-term contracts (Bogoyavlenski and Siggner 2004:29; Duhaime and Caron 2006:17).

The habitation of the Arctic has taken place over thousands of years, beginning in Eurasia and eventually, through a series of migrations, spreading into Europe and from the eastern part of

Siberia via the North American Arctic to Greenland. The indigenous peoples of the Arctic are among the oldest peoples living on the planet today. However, due to immigrants, especially from the mother states, the indigenous peoples constitute a minority in most Arctic regions apart from Greenland and Nunavut and Nunavik in the Canadian Arctic (Heleniak 2014). Despite a number of challenges, including major impacts of climate change, many indigenous peoples of the Arctic still engage in subsistence activities

and thus contribute to their household economies by hunting, fishing, herding, and gathering. But all, and not only the “newcomers” to the Arctic, are to some degree involved in the market economy. The term *mixed economy* thus covers the way of life of many indigenous people (Poppel and Kruse 2009).

“Rapid change” is probably one of the most often used expressions to characterize the economic, social, political, and cultural changes of the Arctic since World War II. The justification for this expression is manifold. It reflects a combination of modernization processes, including massive investments in exploitation of both renewable and nonrenewable resources and development of health care and education systems, housing, and infrastructure facilities. A growing self-awareness of the Arctic indigenous peoples has accelerated the quest for enhancing quality of life and self-determination and has eventually led to devolution of power from the former colonial powers to northern communities and regions and to establishment of new governance arrangements with more local and regional decision-making power.

This chapter provides both historical and contemporary pieces of the Arctic puzzle, including the history and actual state of well-being of the peoples of the Arctic. At the same time, the complexity and diversity of the circumpolar Arctic preclude an all-embracing, sufficiently detailed discussion.

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## 17.2 The Arctic: A Geographical Approach

The word Arctic originates from the Greek word *Arktos*, which means “bear.” The name does not refer to the most prominent Arctic predator, the polar bear, which in recent decades has become an Arctic icon. It refers rather to the constellations the Great Bear (*Ursa Major*) and the Little Bear (*Ursa Minor*). The Great Bear contains a large number of stars, including a formation called the Dipper (the Plough) and the two Pointer Stars that point to *Stella Polaris*, the Polar Star, also called the North Star, which, for millennia, has served as a guide for Arctic travellers (Fægteborg 2013).

The Arctic has several names: the circumpolar Arctic, the circumpolar region, the High North, the northern Polar Regions and nicknames like Top of the World and the last frontier. These names contribute to the characterization of the northernmost, vast landmasses and cryosphere (from the Greek *cryos* meaning cold or frost and *sphaira* meaning ball) in the northern hemisphere around the North Pole (90° N) and from the North Pole reaching 2000 km into Siberia and 4000 km along the shores of Greenland and Eastern Canada.

Because the Arctic, except for Iceland, contains regions of nation-states with capitals far away from the circumpolar North, there are no obviously definitive borders. The boundaries of the Arctic can be defined in various ways:

- The Polar Circle, located at a latitude of 66°, 33'46" N, defines the limits to the northern regions with midnight sun and winter dark;
- The 10 °C (50 °F) July isotherm, indicating that north of this boundary average temperatures in the warmest month, July, never exceed 10 °C (50 °F); this isotherm corresponds roughly to:
- The northern tree line demarcates the northernmost areas where trees grow;
- The 60°N as the southern Arctic border (as applied by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme [AMAP] with further specifications [Fægteborg 2013])

For different purposes, the boundaries can be defined by applying regional and administrative boundaries of the nation-states. The Arctic contains vast landmasses and a cryosphere in all of its manifestations of water: snow, ice (ice on rivers and lakes, glaciers, ice caps, ice sheets, and sea ice) and permafrost (AMAP 2011: vi).

The Arctic Ocean borders on three continents: North America, Asia, and Europe and includes the waters around and between the regions of the circumpolar Arctic from the Bering Sea, Baffin Bay, Davis Strait, Hudson Bay, Denmark Strait, Greenland Sea and to the Atlantic Ocean. Furthermore, there are a number of lakes and rivers that are frozen during the winter and often function as ice roads. Large landmasses in the Arctic are permanently covered with ice, most



prominently the Greenland ice cap, which covers roughly 80 % of the total area of Greenland. The permanent ice coverage gains volume from snow and loses volume by feeding glaciers that eventually reach Arctic waters and melt. Ground (soil, sediment, and rock) that does not thaw for two consecutive years is called permafrost. Permafrost exists in large parts of the Arctic and forms the foundation for many Arctic towns and large infrastructure complexes.

The Arctic cryosphere is changing because of global warming. One sees diminishing and unstable sea ice, thawing permafrost and erosion, faster melting and retreating glaciers. These changes have huge implications for the health and well-being of people and societies, both in and outside the Arctic.

Eight nation-states encompass Arctic territories. The list below covers both the nation-states and their Arctic territories and regions including self-governing regions<sup>2</sup>:

- *United States*: Alaska
- *Canada*: Yukon, Northwest Territories (including the Inuvialuit Settlement Region), Nunavut, Nunavik (Northern Quebec), and Nunatsiavut (Northern Labrador)
- *Denmark*: Greenland, Faroe Islands
- *Iceland*
- *Norway*: Finnmark, Nordland, Troms
- *Sweden*: Norrbotten, Västerbotten
- *Finland*: Lapland, Oulu, Kainuu
- *The Russian Federation*: Murmansk Oblast, Kareliya Republic, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Komi Republic, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, Taimyr Autonomous Okrug, Evenkia Autonomous Okrug, Sakha Republic, Magadan Oblast, Koryakia Autonomous Okrug, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup>This definition of Arctic is applied in the analyses of well-being below.

<sup>3</sup>As of January 1, 2007, Taymyr, Evenkia, and Koryak Autonomous Okrug (AO) ceased to exist as distinct federal subjects and were fully absorbed into the Krasnoyarsk kray and Kamchatka kray, although some statistics continue to be produced for these former AOs.

### 17.3 The Arctic Region in Global Perspective

From the first contacts between the indigenous peoples of the Arctic and Europeans and North Americans, and as these contacts eventually became more frequent, the indigenous peoples gradually became part of and eventually also active partners in a more globalized world. The Sámi, for instance, are assumed to have had contacts before year 1000 Common Era (CE) whereas other Arctic peoples like the East Greenlanders did not meet Europeans until the late twentieth century and some of the Canadian Inuit even later. The kind of contact varied, ranging from barter and trading, being employed at the trading posts or in the colonies, to being subjects for taxation and direct exploitation.

Especially during the last 50 years, economic, social, and cultural life in the Arctic regions has been more heavily influenced by decisions made and activities carried out south of the Arctic. Examples include improved access to health care; infrastructure development; educational and cultural impacts of Internet access; dependence on world market prices of fish and raw materials; and impacts from industrial development both inside the Arctic and outside the Arctic through transboundary pollution. These examples illustrate the implications of the Arctic being a part of a more globalized world and the necessity for Arctic residents to closely follow developments outside the Arctic.

The circumpolar Arctic has, especially since the 1980s, inspired a growing interest for geopolitical, industrial, logistical, and environmental reasons. The fact that all Arctic states and states outside the Arctic, e.g., the European Union, have developed Arctic strategies emphasizes the increased significance of the Arctic (Heininen 2012).

Some of the reasons for this interest are global warming and the impact of climate change, the potential opening of new sea routes (the Northwest Passage as well as the Northeast Sea Route), and the expected easier access to mineral, oil, and gas deposits as sea ice decreases and eventually disappears and large landmasses are covered with less snow and ice.



Furthermore, there is a concern that the increased tensions between Russia and the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization outside the Arctic might be reflected in more collaborative relationships between the Arctic states. Increased tensions in the Arctic might complicate day-to-day collaboration and the development of joint agreements within the auspices of the Arctic Council on search and rescue and environmental protection initiatives. Increased tensions might also complicate future negotiations between Russia and the other four Arctic coastal states (the so-called Arctic Five: Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark, and Norway) bordering on the Arctic Ocean. Negotiations will be based on the extended continental shelf claims to the Arctic Ocean including the North Pole that the five Arctic states have made beyond their exclusive economic zones in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) (The Ilulissat Declaration 2008; United Nations 1982).

The increasing focus on the Arctic during the 1980s reached a (first) peak in 1987 when Mikhail Gorbachev (then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) made a speech in Murmansk about Arctic collaboration on reducing military activity, increasing economic collaboration, and advocating joint efforts in research and environmental protection. The Murmansk Speech initiated the so-called Rovaniemi process that led to the formation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy in 1991 and eventually the foundation of the Arctic Council in 1996 (Young 1998).

The Arctic Council was founded as a high-level intergovernmental forum to provide a vehicle for cooperation on, among other issues, sustainable development and environmental issues and for coordination and interaction among the eight Arctic states (Canada, the United States, the Russian Federation, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark/Greenland/Faroe Islands, and Iceland). The Arctic Council further included the indigenous peoples of the Arctic as Permanent

Participants<sup>4</sup> in the Arctic Council. This event signalled an acknowledgment of the growing activity and significant political impact of indigenous peoples and their organizations in the changing regional political landscape in the Arctic.

The Declaration of the Foundation of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, September 19, 1996) emphasized the well-being of the indigenous peoples and other residents of the Arctic in addition to other key elements such as sustainable development and biodiversity in the agenda of what has been called “The Age of the Arctic” (Osherenko and Young 2005):

AFFIRMING our commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic, including recognition of the special relationship and unique contributions to the Arctic of the indigenous people and their communities;

AFFIRMING our commitment to sustainable development in the Arctic region, including economic and social development, improved health conditions and cultural well-being;

AFFIRMING concurrently our commitment to the protection of the Arctic environment, including the health of Arctic ecosystems, maintenance of biodiversity in the Arctic region and conservation and sustainable use of natural resources (Ottawa Declaration 1996)<sup>5</sup>

Since the last decade of the old millennium, the Arctic has been a focus of interest as “the canary in the coalmine” because global warming is impacting climate and the cryosphere in the Arctic, particularly in the circumpolar regions. As a result, humans and societies in the circumpolar North are experiencing the impacts of these

<sup>4</sup>The six Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council are Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North, and Sámi Council (<http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants> - accessed January 6, 2016). The Permanent Participants represent the estimated 500,000 indigenous people of the circumpolar region (as defined by the Arctic Council) in the Arctic Council.

<sup>5</sup>See also <https://oarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/85>. Accessed 1 February 2016.

changes more swiftly than those in other parts of the world (Arctic Climate Impact Association 2005; AMAP 2011; Hovelsrud et al. 2011a).

The latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2013) states in the chapter on Polar regions that “There is increased evidence that climate change will have large effects on Arctic communities, especially where narrowly based economies leave a smaller range of adaptive choices” and “Impacts on the health and well-being of Arctic residents from climate change are significant and projected to increase—especially for many indigenous peoples (*high confidence*) (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2013 Chapter 28:3).

## 17.4 Political Systems/Structures

A crude categorization suggests the following drivers and initiators for different stages in the development of Arctic political systems and structures:

1. The first (the indigenous) settlers: structures based on families/households/clans and communities to optimize livelihoods as subsistence hunters, fishermen, gatherers (the precontact era);
2. The early colonization: colonial powers defending interests locally (trading posts, mission stations) against foreign whalers and uninvited traders (the early contact era);
3. The expanding colonization and nation building: establishing borders/defending territories/creating territorial administrations (the era of colonization); and
4. Decolonization: responding to indigenous peoples’/groups’/residents’ aspirations and wishes for self-governance by devolution of power to municipal/regional/political and administrative entities (the era of decolonization).

Even if they have gained some degree of self-governance, all of the Arctic regions except Iceland are part of and influenced by the political systems of and the economic relations with the

former mother countries and with policies of the national parliaments and governments.

### 17.4.1 Colonizing the Arctic

Colonization of the Arctic—incorporation of vast northern territories in southern mother countries—took place in different time periods (from the sixteenth century onward) in different ways but always with assimilation as part of the colonial policy and always to expand and defend territorial sovereignty and increase the resource base of the colonizing powers. The covetable resources that contributed to the wealth of the mother countries—whale oil, fur, ivory, and mineral resources—changed over the centuries.

#### 17.4.1.1 Alaska

The Russian American Company was granted a trade monopoly (primarily trading fur) in 1799 following roughly half a century of Russian exploration in Alaska. The Russian colonization of Alaska ended in 1867 when the United States purchased Alaska from Russia (Schweitzer et al. 2014:107–108; Vaughan 1994:187). Statehood was granted Alaskans in 1959, but what was equally important to the indigenous groups was the recognition of their land rights because access to land was (and is) a precondition for exercising subsistence activities (Poppel 2006). In 1980, the United States Congress passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (1980). Apart from conservation, the act also attempted to return subsistence rights to indigenous peoples of Alaska on the basis of local residency and wildlife harvest being a necessity for sustenance.

#### 17.4.1.2 Arctic Canada

In 1870, Rupert’s Land and the North-West Territory (jointly named Northwest Territories) was transferred to the Dominion of Canada (Grant 2010:144); from September 1, 1880 the remaining British possessions (except Newfoundland) were transferred to Canada, thus forming one of the largest countries in the world (Ibid:166–167). In the following decades, the

Canadian government was increasingly occupied with defining and protecting its Arctic borders.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Inuit of northern Canada had sporadic contacts with Europeans and North Americans who came to the region for whaling and trading for fur and ivory. Contacts between the indigenous peoples of the Canadian Arctic and newcomers became more frequent as mineral exploration and exploitation developed in the last decade of the 19th and the first half of the twentieth centuries (for example, the Klondike gold rush and oil extraction at Norman Wells). The significantly increased military presence during World War II and during the following Cold War was accompanied by the construction of infrastructure and military facilities. These activities had significant impact on many, but not all, indigenous people's way of life, because some choose to maintain their traditional way of living by staying away from these activities (Abele 2009: 25).

During and after World War II and because of the tension during the Cold War, military presence increased. Furthermore, the increased demand for skilled labor generated by mineral exploitation and the modernization of the Canadian Arctic, including the introduction of welfare state arrangements, the establishment of territories, and negotiation of land claims agreements, resulted in increased immigration from, especially, the southern part of Canada to fill the jobs.

To secure Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic, a number of coercive relocations took place, the so-called High Arctic Relocation (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1994).

Yukon became the first territory in 1898 and was given representation in the Federal Parliament 4 years later. The Northwest Territories was given similar parliamentary representation in 1952, and the legislative assembly of the Northwest Territories became a fully elected body in 1975 (initially members had been appointed; it then became a mix of elected and appointed members).

The following agreements cover what the Canadian Inuit call "Inuit Nunangat" (the place where Inuit live) (Abele 2009:29):

- The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement was signed in 1975
- Inuvialuit Final Agreement was signed in 1984
- The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement was signed in 1993; 6 years later the Northwest Territories was divided into two territories: Northwest Territories and Nunavut (Hicks and White 2015)
- The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement was signed in 2005 resulting in the establishment of the Nunatsiavut self-government in 2006.

### 17.4.1.3 Greenland

In 1721 the Norwegian-Danish missionary Hans Egede embarked on a mission to Greenland to find and to minister to the descendants of the Norse/Vikings who arrived in Greenland shortly before 1000 CE. It was a combined mercantile and clerical expedition. A mission and trading post was planned that would be funded by a trading company that was granted certain privileges. The following decades, a number of settlements (the so-called colonies) containing both mission stations and trading posts were established along the west coast of Greenland.

Common regulations were introduced with the so-called *Instrux* (Instructions) in 1787, giving the authority for both trade and local administration to the Royal Greenland Trade. This mixture of trade and administration ended in 1912 (Fægteborg 2013:48–49), but Greenland's colonial status remained unchanged until a revision of the Danish Constitution in 1953 included Greenland as a constituency in the Danish Kingdom alongside the Faroe Islands. The Greenlanders were, however, still only marginally included in decisions about their own affairs (Lidegaard 1991).

Following more than 200 years of colonization and two decades of modernization (for obvious reasons, termed Danization), increasing demand in the 1950s and 1960s for more self-determination eventually led to an agreement about the introduction of a Greenlandic Home Rule arrangement in 1979 (Office of the Prime Minister 1978). As the gradual devolution of

power foreseen in the *Home Rule Act* was implemented in the beginning of the new millennium, the next step in the process toward independence was initiated by the Greenlandic Parliament. By 2009, a self-governance agreement developed by a joint Danish-Greenlandic Commission was signed by the Greenlandic and Danish governments. The *Act on Greenland Self-Government* does not declare Greenland an independent state, but it prescribes the road to independence for the Greenlanders when a majority in a plebiscite vote in favor of an independent Greenland. Further concessions were included, such as the recognition of the Greenlanders as a people according to international law and the Greenlanders' right to subsurface minerals (*Act on Greenland Self-Government* 2009).

#### 17.4.1.4 Iceland and the Faroe Islands

The historical developments of Iceland and the Faroe Islands differ from the rest of the Arctic countries and regions. The islands were first inhabited more than 1000 years ago when the Norse spread from Norway and settled as farmers. The first settlers of Iceland founded the Althing in 930 CE, the first parliamentary institution.

Both the Faroe Islands and Iceland were part of the Danish-Norwegian kingdom (since 874 and 1264, respectively, ruled by Norway and afterward by Denmark) and stayed part of the Danish kingdom when, by the Treaty of Kiel in 1814, the Danish-Norwegian union was dissolved. Iceland became independent in 1918 and since 1944 has been a republic. The Faroe Islands negotiated a Home Rule arrangement with the Danish state in 1948 and are, like Greenland, still part of the Danish Realm.

#### 17.4.1.5 Sápmi (Northernmost Part of Fennoscandia)

According to Broderstad and Dahl (2004), relations between the Sámi and the nation-states have changed since the Middle Ages. Until the mid-nineteenth century, when the Swedish-Finnish and Danish-Norwegian states expanded their territories in the north, they acknowledged Sámi rights. The second period, from 1850 to 1950, was characterized by attempts to assimilate the

Sámi and to remove their rights. After World War II, the implementation of the Nordic welfare model focused on individual rights rather than on collective rights for members of ethnic groups (Broderstad and Dahl 2004:87).

The implications of this point of departure and the fact that the Fennoscandian central governments are unitary political systems thus far are that political authority is not delegated to self-governing entities in the Norwegian, Swedish, or Finnish parts of Sápmi. Sámi parliaments have been approved, however, by the national parliaments (1987: Norway; 1992: Sweden; and 1995: Finland) (Josefsen 2005). The parliaments represent the respective Sámi peoples, and their authority is limited to providing advisory and not legally binding recommendations to the national parliaments (Poelzer and Wilson 2014).

#### 17.4.1.6 Arctic Russia

Whereas the first human habitation of the circumpolar Arctic took place in Siberia several thousand years BCE, the first Europeans did not travel into Siberia from the south before the sixteenth century. The Russian expansion and colonization of the North, Siberia, and the Far East was completed by 1697—it took barely 100 years (Vaughan 1994: 98). Troops followed trappers, traders, and merchants' agents and created a system based on a grid of tax- and tribute-collection stations set up along the river valleys. This period was the beginning of the Tsarist colonization of Siberia and the Russian North, based economically on fur tribute from the indigenous peoples in the colonized regions. The tsarist influence on local affairs was, however, limited.

Soon after the October Revolution of 1917, a *Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia* was signed, proclaiming the principles of equality among the peoples of Russia. A legal category, "the small peoples of the north" was created (AHDR 2004: 87). Following some experiments with clan and nomadic soviets, local soviets were established in the 1920s and 1930s (Vaughan 1994:282). The overall consequences of the political restructuring and the economic reorganization during the Soviet era until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were that "... the aboriginal peoples of the north were over-

whelmed by a far reaching assimilation into the rest of Soviet society ...” (p. 285), resulting in a “replacement of religious beliefs,” “re-shaping of social structure,” “disappearance of true nomadism,” and destruction of hunting grounds, fisheries, and reindeer pastures due to extraction of minerals oil and gas (Ibid).

The Constitution and national legislation established rights for the indigenous and small-numbered peoples (fewer than 50,000) of the North, Siberia, and the Far East. However, the 2015 edition of *The Indigenous World* stated that a “...number of legislative changes have affected indigenous peoples’ rights and control over their lands and natural resources and have increasingly restricted their participation in decision-making with regard to these lands, ...” (International Working Group on Indigenous Affairs 2015).

#### 17.4.2 Historical Trauma and Arctic Well-Being

The various groups of immigrants and the states colonizing the different regions of the Arctic all had distinct, long-lasting effects on the regions and the indigenous peoples. Compared to the European colonialism conducted on the continents of Africa, South America, and Asia and the genocide of many North American Indians, colonization in the Arctic was generally less brutal but far from the impression of “the well intentioned patron” acting “in the best interest of the natives” that the colonial powers wanted to convey.

The modernization processes that the different colonial powers initiated in the post-World War II era improved physical health and housing standards and established an infrastructure that facilitated communication and travel in many remote areas of the Arctic. It is also a fact that the rapid socioeconomic changes resulted in major social problems in indigenous societies, such as elevated rates of substance abuse, child neglect, and violence (including domestic violence). Although suicide rates are not necessarily a good measure of the well-being of a society, to the degree that elevated rates of suicide represent a barometer of

social suffering in subgroups within a society, many indigenous peoples of the Arctic clearly suffer sharply elevated levels of mental distress, especially young people. To illustrate this point, a 2015 Denmark Radio program noted that only one Greenlander born in the 1950s died by suicide between the ages of 10 and 14, but 17 born in the 1980s did so (DR 2015).

One often emphasized explanation for the increase in suicides is that the major changes in livelihood and living conditions often left the indigenous peoples in the role of spectators to and sometimes as victims of development. The actions and policies of the colonial powers that resulted in social stress and trauma include relocation of Arctic indigenous peoples (such as the Aleut Evacuation in World War II (Kohlhoff 1995); the Inughuit relocation from Uummannaq (in the former Thule district) to Qaanaaq in 1953 (Brøsted and Fægteborg); the Canadian High Arctic Relocation from 1953 to 1955); and the boarding school programs that were enacted to different extents in most of the Arctic. The victims of some of these infringements have sued for acknowledgment of the trauma they endured.

In Canada, the concerted efforts of associations representing the indigenous peoples to have their grievances heard and acknowledged resulted, after years of official denial, in public hearings and the establishment of commissions. In Canada, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1991–1995) investigated, among other incidents, the High Arctic Relocation (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1994). The most recent such commission in Canada was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The first paragraph of the summary of the TRC’s Final Report reads:

For over a century, the central goals of Canada’s Aboriginal policy were to eliminate Aboriginal governments; ignore Aboriginal rights; terminate the Treaties (where treaties existed); and, through a process of assimilation, cause Aboriginal peoples to cease to exist as distinct legal, social, cultural, religious, and racial entities in Canada. The establishment and operation of residential schools were a central element of this policy, which can best be described as “cultural genocide.” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 2015).



Coming to terms with historical trauma, the legacy of the recent past, is key to improving the well-being of Arctic indigenous peoples in the coming decades.

### 17.4.3 Economic Development in the Circumpolar Arctic

The eight countries of the circumpolar Arctic, the Russian Federation, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, have experienced different economic and political developments and have developed different welfare systems. It might be assumed that living conditions, living standards, and individual well-being vary among the Arctic regions. Consequently, we highlight some key features in the economic and political development in the regions with a focus on the indigenous peoples but without going into detail and not attempting to cover all eras, regions, and population groups.

No matter the difference in their living conditions, all Arctic indigenous peoples lived a subsistence lifestyle as hunters, fishermen, gatherers, or herders until a closer, more permanent contact with Europeans or North Americans evolved. Most often, the different indigenous groups were nomadic or semi-nomadic, living off the land or the sea and thus depending on the presence of marine and terrestrial mammals and fish and migrating according to the seasonal changes in the ecosystem.

In the Russian and North American Arctic as well as in Greenland, trade and colonization were promoted by chartered companies that were granted monopoly status and given public duties like defense and jurisdiction (Vaughan 1994:116–141). In the northern part of Fennoscandia, as in the Russian Arctic, the indigenous peoples often paid tribute to the colonizers.

Whereas the Sámi are now known primarily for reindeer herding, they were originally hunters and gatherers in the northernmost part of Fennoscandia (Norway, Sweden, and Finland and the neighboring region of Russia, also called

Sápmi). Being under pressure, they moved north in Norway and Sweden during the iron age (until 800, the beginning of the Viking Age). Trade was developed with the southern neighbors and the Sámi paid taxes to Swedish kings. In the early seventeenth century, the Sámi became reindeer herders (Larsen and Fondahl 2014:111).

Sápmi includes vast areas, nowadays used primarily for reindeer husbandry, 146,000 sq. km in the Norwegian and 114,000 sq. km in Finnish parts of Sápmi, which corresponds closely to more than one third of the total surface area of Norway and Finland, respectively. Reindeer husbandry involves roughly 3000 people in Norway and between 5000 and 6000 people in Finland occupied with 240,000 and 200,000 reindeer in the two regions, respectively (Oskal et al. 2009).

The habitation of the Russian Arctic was, at the beginning of the twentieth century, facilitated by the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway (1891–1916). From 1906 to 1914, an estimated 4 million people migrated to Siberia to create better living conditions (Schweitzer et al. 2014:111). The abundance of natural resources, especially oil and gas exploitation, and the creation of industrial and research centers were the basis for a growing population in the Soviet Arctic during the twentieth century. However, not all migrated voluntarily. Several millions (more exact figures are still debated) of political and other prisoners were transported to forced labor camps and labor settlements, especially from the 1930s to the 1950s, and a large number died in the camps due to starvation, hard work, and the extreme climatic conditions (Alexeeva and Fægteborg 2002:137).

### 17.4.4 Wage Labor and Modernization of the Arctic

The cash economy and wage labor were introduced in the Arctic regions at different times: in Greenland as early as in the middle of the eighteenth century, shortly after the colonization by Denmark (Marquardt 2005) and in most other



parts of the circumpolar north, generally after World War II.

The traditional harvest- and herding-based subsistence economy thus developed into a mixed economy where subsistence still contributes significantly to the food supply and the different living conditions (see e.g., Poppel 2006; Poppel and Kruse 2009) of most Arctic indigenous households and plays a role in many nonindigenous households.

In many ways, the Arctic is a region of contrasts, especially when the focus is on economic development and its impact. Rapid economic development, especially since World War II, and in some regions in Arctic Canada, even later, has characterized the circumpolar Arctic.

There have been a variety of motives for the regional modernization processes in the Arctic. Exercising sovereignty over the different Arctic states' northernmost regions was definitely a significant driver during the Cold War. The Nordic countries were, at least to some degree, motivated by an ambition to implement the Nordic welfare model in the Arctic regions. It was considered an embarrassment to the Nordic parliamentarians when their health and socioeconomic conditions were far below the standards of those in the southern parts of the respective countries.


Another major driver has been and still is the abundance of resources: renewable (especially fish and shellfish) and nonrenewable resources. Extraction of oil and gas became a major economic activity in the last part of the twentieth century (AMAP 2011), not least in the Russian Arctic, where extraction was often followed by environmental problems due to oil spills (Forbes 2005; Stammler and Forbes 2006). Oil extraction started in Alaska in the 1970s; later it extended north of the Norwegian coast and, at the end of 2013, also north of the Russian coast. The systematic mineral extraction in Greenland dates back to the middle of the eighteenth century

(graphite mining); since then, mining has been conducted periodically (Fægteborg 2013; Sejersen 2014). The most prominent mineral exploitation was the cryolite mine at Ivittut in South West Greenland.<sup>6</sup> The Alaskan-Yukon gold rush took place in the 1890s, and mineral extraction in Siberia and the Kola Peninsula was started by the Soviet Union before World War II and still contributes significantly to the Russian economy. The iron mine in Kiruna in the Swedish Arctic (Norbotton) has been in operation since 1898 and is the largest underground mine in the world. In the other Arctic regions, mineral exploitation was modest before World War II. Since then, mineral extraction has attracted major companies to the Arctic, and mining and hydrocarbon production are now major contributors to gross regional products (GRP) and to the national economies, including the Russian Arctic, Alaska, Canada, and Norway. It is, however, important to stress that these activities do not necessarily benefit local communities or regional economies in terms of GDP because the economic results may be transferred to companies and shareholders outside the Arctic (Duhaim 2004; Duhaim and Caron 2006).

Figure 17.1 shows the distribution of the GRP in the Arctic regions (Huskey et al. 2014:164). The diversity is striking: Mining and petroleum contribute a large part of the production value in the Arctic regions of Russia, Alaska, and Canada, whereas the category "other services," which includes activities such as tourism, is a major contributor in the Arctic regions, in the Nordic countries, and in Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Public sector activities contribute between 25 % and 40 % in all Arctic regions except the Russian Arctic.

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<sup>6</sup>The cryolite mine was in operation from 1854 to 1987 and was an important supplier to the US production of fighter planes during World War II.



**Fig. 17.1** Distribution of gross regional product for Arctic regions, 2005 (Data from Huskey et al. 2014)

## 17.5 The Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic

The Arctic and sub-Arctic parts of Fennoscandia (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Karelia, and the Kola Peninsula) have, for at least 5000 years, long before contemporary frontiers were established, been inhabited by the Sámi peoples. Archaeological findings seem to document the fact that ancestors of the Sámi hunted and gathered food in the region much earlier. This region (including the Kola Peninsula) is referred to as Sápmi and includes vast areas used primarily for raising reindeer (Oskal et al. 2009).

*... we Sami are one people united through our common history, culture, language and land areas. and as a confirmation that the borders of our nations shall not or cannot break our solidarity,... (Sami Parliamentary Council 2005)*

Herders, hunters, and gatherers have for thousands of years inhabited the Russian Arctic, ranging from Fennoscandia to the Bering Strait and south to the Primorsky Province, about 60 % of the entire Russian territory (Fægteborg and Alexeeva 2015).

It is estimated that 1.4 million indigenous people live in the Russian Arctic. This figure also includes larger groups of indigenous peoples such as Yakuts, Komi, and Karelians (Heleniak 2014; Fægteborg and Alexeeva 2015). In today's Russia, the legal terms "numerically small Native peoples" and "numerically small peoples of the North" include smaller groups of indigenous peoples such as Khanty, Nenets-Samoyed, Evenk, Even, and Chukchi (Heleniak 2014; Fægteborg and Alexeeva 2015). Originally, most of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic were nomadic or semi-nomadic. Both the total number and the fraction of nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples in the Arctic have declined. Only about 15,000 people in the Russian Arctic (mostly Nenets in Yamal) were still semi-

nomadic in the beginning of the twenty-first century (AHDR 2004).

The first migrations across the Bering Strait had their point of departure in the eastern part of Siberia, and the ancestors of the Aleut and Yupik that migrated to the North American continent had their roots in what is now Chukotka and Kamchatka. Since roughly 4500 BCE, a number of migrations departing from eastern Siberia populated parts of the North American continent and parts of Greenland. The Saqqaq culture was followed by the Dorset culture, which disappeared around 1500 CE.

*From time immemorial, Inuit have been living in the Arctic. Our home in the circumpolar world, Inuit Nunaat, stretches from Greenland to Canada, Alaska and the coastal regions of Chukotka, Russia. Our use and occupation of Arctic lands and waters pre-dates recorded history. Our unique knowledge, experience of the Arctic, and language are the foundation of our way of life and culture. (Inuit Circumpolar Council 2009)*

The last migration, the Thule culture, originated from Alaska. The Thule peoples are the forefathers of the Inuit, who now live in the Arctic and define their homeland “Inuit Nunaat,” Land of the Inuit (Inuit meaning human beings in the mother tongue of the Inuit). Nowadays, the total number of Inuit is about 150,000.

The Norse people came from Norway via Iceland to Greenland and eventually to the Atlantic coast of North America. They settled in Greenland from roughly 900 to 1400 CE. The last evidence of the Norse settlement is from the early fifteenth century, and the reason why they disappeared is still debated. The Greenlandic descendants of the Thule people now number about 50,000 (out of a total population of 56,000) and comprise one of the only indigenous major populations in the Arctic and globally.

### 17.5.1 Iceland and the Faroe Islands

The history of Iceland and the Faroe Islands is unlike that of the rest of the Arctic countries and regions, because the islands never experienced major groups of immigrants following the first settlers. The islands were first inhabited more than 1100 years ago when Norse people (Norwegian Vikings) migrated from Norway westward and settled on the North Atlantic islands. They were the first settlers; they found no indigenous population on the islands. They sustained themselves by farming. Some of the settlers in Iceland migrated further and settled in Greenland, from where some travelled to and settled on the eastern part of the North American Atlantic coast.

The total populations of Iceland and of the Faroe Islands are roughly 330,000 (2013) and 49,000 (2013), respectively (Nordic Statistical Yearbook 2014).

### 17.5.2 More Recent Settlement of the Arctic: Visitors and Immigrants from the South

The history of the Arctic is a narrative of migrations: The first millennia of migrations and settlements were primarily north to north migrations; from the fifteenth century onward, they were almost entirely south to north.

The indigenous peoples of the Arctic were all subsistence hunters, gatherers, or fishermen when the first meetings with Europeans took place. These meetings, sometimes confrontations, took place over a long period of time<sup>7</sup>: before 900 CE (the Sámi in Fennoscandia); between 1000 and 1100 CE (the Nentsy in northern Siberia); 1585 (the West Greenlanders); 1642 (the Chukchi in North East Siberia, now called Chukotka); 1771 (the Copper Inuit/Kitlintermiut in what is now the

<sup>7</sup>Colonization and different forms of outside influences might not correlate exactly with the years listed.

Kitikmeot Region of Nunavut and the Inuvik Region of Northwest Territories); 1820s (the Inupiat [northern Alaska] and the Netsilik Inuit in what is now the Kitikmeot Region of Nunavut) (Vaughan 1994:13).

The presence of Europeans on the North American continent dates back more than 1000 years, with the Norse as the first European settlers on the East coast. Hunting and trading fur attracted European immigrants over the next several hundred years. With the establishment of the British-based Hudson's Bay Company in 1672, trade became more organized, and the company developed into one of the largest owners of property. Many fur traders and missionaries settled in small, remote settlements of the Canadian North without major conflict with the original inhabitants. Sustained contact between settlers from the south and Inuit from the northern parts of Canada is a more recent phenomenon (Government of Canada 1996:37)

In the so-called Age of Discovery and ever since, people of different origins and trades, of diverse religious beliefs, and with a variety of goals have been attracted by the circumpolar North. Because the waters of the Arctic have been abundant with marine mammals, fish, and shellfish and the tundra and the forests have been the habitat for a large number of species including furred animals, the renewable resources of the Arctic have provided for a more permanent habitation of both indigenous peoples and other Arctic residents. Both renewable and nonrenewable resources have been a primary reason for a variety of short-term visitors like whalers, fishermen, businessmen and trading companies, and prospectors for gold and other minerals who wanted to prosper from the resources of the Arctic.

Missionaries from a variety of churches and religious communities went to the Arctic to work among the indigenous peoples; others were religious dissenters (Vaughan 1999: 100). Explorers and scientists came to the Arctic in quest of discoveries, to study and map the geography, geology, peoples, and cultures, often for short periods. At the state level, coordinated efforts have been made to colonize regions of the Arctic,

and, especially since World War II and during the Cold War, military personnel were stationed on observatory bases and air bases to secure sovereignty.

The object of securing sovereignty was sometimes accompanied by other goals such as modernization of former colonies (e.g., Greenland) and mineral exploitation (e.g., North Slope Borough in Alaska and several places in northern Russia). Fulfilling these goals created a demand for migrant workers, public servants, and educators that contributed to the growing number of Arctic residents.

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## 17.6 Well-Being of the Circumpolar Arctic: Application of the United Nations Human Development Index

The United Nations (UN) Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index that combines indicators related to health (infant mortality and life expectancy), education (measured by educational attainment), and income (gross national income [GNI] per capita). Whereas the UN HDI is computed at a state level, a regional approach is needed to compare human development in the circumpolar Arctic. The increased focus on human development in the Arctic has initiated a number of efforts to gather and organize data to facilitate inter- and intraregional comparisons of human development and socioeconomic conditions in the Arctic. The sources of the data in this section are primarily ArcticStat (n.d.) and the Circumpolar Health Observatory but to add to and substantiate these data archives, we also included Web sites of national and regional statistical institutes, including the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International Monetary Fund. These sources were used to apply the UN HDI to the circumpolar Arctic. To further illustrate well-being among Inuit, Sámi, and the indigenous peoples of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula, some of the findings from the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (Kruse et al.

2008; Poppel 2015a, b; Poppel et al. 2007) have been added to the respective HDI subsections below on health, education, and economic well-being.

### 17.6.1 Health Well-Being

A cold and frequently harsh climate is not the only health challenge facing Arctic residents, who often live far away from health care facilities. The warming climate has already begun to affect food and water supplies in some parts of the Arctic (Rautio et al. 2014: 308–310). Research since the 1990s has documented transboundary pollution for southern industrial areas (Rautio et al. 2014: 310–311). For example, the amount of mercury in marine mammals that for millennia have been part of the Arctic diet has now reached a level where health practitioners advise pregnant and breast-feeding women to avoid eating seal and whale meat (Jeppesen et al. 2011).

Health conditions vary across the Arctic: between regions and between population groups, including between indigenous and nonindigenous people. In most cases, there are significant differences in health conditions among Arctic residents and people living in the southern parts of the Arctic states (Rautio et al. 2014: 300). On the basis of comparisons between a number of health indicators (such as life expectancy; infant mortality rate; and incidence of tuberculosis, lung cancer, and sexually transmitted diseases), Rautio et al. conclude the following:

In general terms, circumpolar regions basically fall into four groups in terms of their health status:

- The Nordic countries—these rank the highest in every health indicator, and there is generally little difference between north and south or between indigenous and nonindigenous people.
- Alaska, Yukon, and Northwest Territories—health status in these jurisdictions is comparable to, or even better than, the national average of the United States and Canada;

however, within these regions there are significant disparities between indigenous and nonindigenous people.

- Greenland and Nunavut—with over 85 % of the population indigenous, there is a wide gap in health status between these regions and Denmark and Canada.
- The Russian Arctic—while the regions in the European North tend to fare better than those in Siberia for almost any health indicator, the Arctic region tends toward the lower end of the spectrum (Rautio et al. 2014: 300).


The two health indicators used in the HDI, infant mortality and life expectancy, both substantiate this conclusion.

#### 17.6.1.1 Infant Mortality


Figure 17.2 compares infant mortality rates in all Arctic regions and states. Most of the Russian Arctic regions as well as Greenland and Nunavut have infant mortality rates just below or higher than 10 per 1000 live births, whereas northern Fennoscandia, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland rank lowest, with infant mortality rates around or below 5. The infant mortality rates of the latter are at roughly the same level as those of the Arctic states of which they are a part. Compared with infant mortality rates 30 years or more ago, most regions show marked improvements. In Greenland, for instance, rates have decreased by two thirds from 33 deaths per 1000 (1980–1984) to approximately 11. Iceland and the northern regions of Fennoscandia as well as Yukon and Northwest Territories have experienced substantially decreased infant mortality rates.

#### 17.6.1.2 Life Expectancy

Longevity, defined as the number of years a newborn can be expected to live, follow the same pattern as infant mortality. The longevity of women compared with men is greater everywhere. In the north of Norway, Sweden, and Finland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland, life expectancy is greater than 80 years for women and greater than 75 years for men. In all other regions (apart from the Northwest Territories), life expectancy is lower.



**Fig. 17.2** Infant mortality rates (deaths per 1000 live births), various periods (Data from national statistical institutes covering Arctic regions)



**Fig. 17.3** Male life expectancy for selected arctic regions and periods (Data from national statistical institutes covering Arctic regions)

In the Russian Arctic regions, life expectancy for women is 10–15 years higher than for their male counterparts. In some of these regions life expectancy for men is between 50 and 55 years.

Figure 17.3 shows male life expectancy for selected Arctic regions and selected periods and years. The figure illustrates the major differences

between some of the Russian Arctic regions (Chukotka, and Nenets AO)<sup>8</sup> and Iceland and

<sup>8</sup>“AO” refers to discrete political units, Autonomous Okrugs, that were previously subjected to rule by the former Soviet Union. Today, all are independent territories in their own right but retain the original title as part of their name to reflect their previous political histories.



Nordland in northern Norway and illustrates large increases in life expectancy within a few decades. Greenland is an example of the latter.

Due to generally improved living conditions (such as better housing and access to health care) in the Arctic since World War II, life expectancy has increased considerably in many regions. In Greenland, life expectancy in the mid-1950s was 51 and 55 years for men and women, respectively. Sixty years later, a decade into the twenty-first century, life expectancy was 69 and 73 years, an increase of almost 20 years. In just 20 years since the early 1990s, both Iceland and the northern parts of Finland and Norway have experienced increased life expectancy of 4–5 years.


The positive message is that the regions ranking lowest (regions of the Russian Arctic with a few exceptions: Koryak AO, Evenki AO and Magadan Oblast) experienced a decrease in infant mortality rates and an increase in life expectancy. Furthermore, these regions also made significant progress compared to most other Arctic regions.

The increased longevity, in parallel with a general decrease in fertility, adds to an age distribution in the Arctic that follows the aging population trend experienced in North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia (Heleniak 2014; Rasmussen 2011).

### 17.6.1.3 Mortality Rate of the Inuit People in Greenland

Figure 17.4, prepared by Professor Peter Bjerregaard (one of the founding fathers of Arctic public health research), shows the dramatic decline in the mortality rate among Greenlanders in the first half of the twentieth century, as rates of death from tuberculosis and acute infections were lowered.

Although many basic health indicators have improved, the indigenous populations of the Arctic regions suffer from higher rates of injury and lethal violence, both homicide and suicide, than the populations of the nation-states in which they reside. Although attempts have been made to measure rates and summarize trends around




**Fig. 17.4** Age-adjusted mortality from major causes of death in the Inuit population of Greenland, 1924–2009 (Data from Bjerregaard and Larsen 2016)

the Arctic (Larsen and Fondahl 2014: 308–310), few attempts have been made to explain *why* the rates of critical social pathologies are higher in the Arctic.


**17.6.1.4 Suicide Rate of Alaska Natives, Inuit in Nunavut, and Greenlanders**

One important question is whether the indigenous societies of the Arctic were always as violent as they are today. Historical data for suicide by Inuit in Alaska, Nunavut, and Greenland present societies where historical rates of suicide were low,

but the 1970s and 1980s saw tragic increases in the number of people taking their lives—an increase and new normal rates that are without equal on the planet. It should be noted that there are few, if any, other societies in the world where such a suicide transition can be documented, because their transitions were far less recent than those of the Inuit and occurred before systematic record-keeping began (Figs. 17.5a and 17.5b) The latter figure shows the significant age and gender differences among Inuit in Nunavut, with extremely high suicide rates among young men between 15 and 30 years of age.



**Fig. 17.5a** Rates of death by suicide for Alaska Natives, Inuit in Nunavut, and Greenlanders, 1900–2014, 5-year rolling averages (Data from Hicks 2016)



**Fig. 17.5b** Rates of death by suicide by Inuit in Nunavut per 100,000 population by age and gender (Data from Hicks 2016)

The temporal sequence in which the regional suicide transitions occurred, first in Alaska, then Greenland, then Nunavut) is noteworthy because it mirrors, roughly one generation later, processes of active colonialism at the community level. We can use the decline in the incidence of tuberculosis as a historical marker of the early years of active colonialism at the community level. The historical sequence in which Inuit infectious disease rates fell (as a result of the introduction of Western medicine) was the same as that in which Inuit rates of death by suicide later rose across the Arctic (Hicks 2009).

An attempt to explain the causal factors behind this suicide transition was made in the Nunavut Suicide Prevention Strategy, a partnership between the Government of Nunavut, the representative Inuit organization Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., the police, and an interagency suicide prevention body:

The trauma experienced firsthand by Inuit in the settlement transitional period has had an immense impact on all following generations, as many Inuit who were negatively affected in this period did not ever heal. This unresolved trauma compromised their ability to cope with stress in a healthy manner. Negative behavior often followed in the form of alcohol abuse, sexual, physical, and emotional abuse, child neglect, and violent crime. It is important to note that elevated suicide rates emerged within the first generation of Inuit youth who grew up in communities. In the absence of an adequate healing process, a continuous cycle of trauma has been created, which has been passed from generation to generation. This is referred to as the intergenerational transmission of historical trauma. The understanding that historical trauma can be passed from one generation to the next does not excuse afflicted individuals who harm others; nor does the examination of the roots of historical trauma in Nunavut allow definitive blame for the current suicide rate to be placed on any single entity. Rather, understanding historical trauma and how it is transmitted from generation to generation is an imperative first step in breaking its cycle in Nunavut.’ (Nunavut Suicide Prevention Strategy 2010: 6–7).

A recent study examining the high of rate of homicide in Greenland (which is as high as 15 times that of Denmark) noted the similarity to the situations prevailing in Alaska and northern

Canada and noted, “low socioeconomic development and high inequality will increase the homicide rate of a given country” (Christensen et al. 2015).

Arctic governments and indigenous organizations have been slow to develop and implement strategies, programs, and services to address elevated rates of lethal violence in their communities, but work is now underway in most regions. One challenge is strengthening culturally appropriate mental health services in small, isolated communities. A 5-year suicide follow-back (or psychological autopsy) study conducted in Nunavut found that depression and other mental disorders were significant risk factors for suicide behavior in the territory (Chachamovich et al. 2015). This higher burden of psychiatric illness signifies the importance of clinical risk factors that are relevant to suicide globally, in addition to others which may be culturally distinct.

#### 17.6.1.5 Some Findings on Health from the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic

It is well documented that life expectancy dropped dramatically in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s. This was especially the case in remote regions, which suffered because some regional health care services were abolished (Heleniak 2014:64). Most results from the answers to the health section of the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic (SLiCA) questionnaire point to a health status that is generally worse in Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula (diagnosed but untreated medical problems is just one example). Medical research has substantiated that self-rated health is a fairly good predictor of life expectancy (de Salvo et al. 2006). The results from self-rated health present a diverse picture: fewer than 50 % (Chukotka) and 95 % (Greenland) of the indigenous residents perceive that their health is “good,” “very good,” or “excellent.” At the same time, the results show that one out of five in all regions/countries (except Canada and Greenland) rate their health “poor or fair” (Poppel 2015b:722).

## 17.6.2 Education and Intellectual Well-Being

For the first residents of the Arctic, living off the land and sea, hunting, fishing and gathering, transfer of knowledge from one generation to the next was essential to survive in and adapt to extreme weather and changing environmental conditions. Given that a mixed subsistence and market economy is still prevalent in large parts of the circumpolar North, the intergenerational and informal transfer of knowledge is still important for many households and communities (also because the subsistence lifestyle, apart from providing households with healthy diets, is part of the social and cultural glue of many northern communities (Poppel and Kruse 2011). At the same time, traditional knowledge is challenged by the impacts of climate change.

The rapid socioeconomic, sociocultural, and political changes; the quest of Arctic indigenous peoples for self-determination; the requests of Arctic communities and regions to benefit from increasing economic activities, including resource extraction and the resulting industrial activities; and the desire to be part of and partners in a more globalized world necessitate increased levels of formal education. Therefore, most Arctic regions have developed educational programs, and education is a political top priority resulting in investments in both the public school system and in postsecondary and tertiary educational institutions such as colleges and universities.

The second *Arctic Human Development Report* (AHDR 2014) cites 177 universities, university colleges, and university branch campuses in the Arctic, most of which are members of University of the Arctic (UArctic), a cooperative network of universities, colleges, and other institutions and organizations engaged in Arctic education. Roughly one quarter of the total higher education institutions are universities, and most of the institutions of higher education are located in the Russian Arctic. No universities are located in the Canadian North. In general, there are more institutions of higher education in areas and regions with a higher population density, larger

cities, and industrial development. Areas and regions with a large proportion of indigenous peoples most often have fewer universities and university colleges (Hirshberg and Petrov 2014).

Level of education can be measured in various ways. The HDI focuses on expected years of schooling, whereas the second *Arctic Human Development Report* (Larsen and Fondahl 2014) measures the level of education by the proportion of the population (15 years and over) with post-secondary and tertiary educations, respectively, because educational attainment reflects both educational status and development in the Arctic states (Larsen and Fondahl 2014). As stated in the second *Arctic Human Development Report* (2014), “Regional educational attainment levels not only reflect the initiative of young people and residents desirous of an education, but also the demand for an educated work force in both the public and private sector. Often, this demand is met by immigrant labor that moves to the region on either a short or long-term basis” (Rautio et al. 2014:317). Figure 17.6 shows the educational attainment by regions of the Arctic.


Iceland, northern Fennoscandia, the Russian North, and Yukon rank highest when postsecondary educational attainment is measured, whereas Greenland and most of the North American Arctic lag behind. These numbers obviously reflect the different histories and educational policies of the northern regions, which are also reflected in the locations institutions of higher education.

### 17.6.2.1 SLiCA Findings: Education—Formal and Informal

Roughly eight out of ten people attended post-secondary school (high school or a vocational school/college) in Norway, Chukotka, Alaska, and the Kola Peninsula. The percentage is somewhat lower in Greenland, and just 15 % of the Swedish Sámi (this might be, at least partly, because of the age composition of the Swedish Sámi sample).

As subsistence harvest activities are still important to the indigenous peoples in the Arctic, knowing about the continued intergenerational transfer of traditional knowledge is important.

**Fig. 17.6** Attainment of tertiary education among adults aged 25–64, selected arctic regions, development from 2000–2004 to 2005–2009 (Data from national statistical institutes covering Arctic regions)



SLiCA respondents were asked about traditional education skills learned as a child and the skills learned or improved since childhood. A majority among the Inuit and Sámi in Norway, the Kola Peninsula, and Chukotka said that they learned 11 or more traditional skills, and more than 8 of 10 indigenous residents in all regions/countries stated that they had learned or improved traditional skills since childhood (Poppel 2015b:722–23).

### 17.6.3 Economic Well-Being

The circumpolar North spans the whole range of economic activities from subsistence hunting, fishing, gathering, and reindeer herding via small-scale processing activities, fisheries of different scales, construction and resale, public and private services to large-scale construction, mineral, and oil exploration and exploitation activities. This variety of activities is not only present across the Arctic but often also within regions. The diversification is generally considered to strengthen local and regional economies but often also causes conflicts when mining activities are planned in areas where hunting or herding constitutes the local means of making a living.

#### 17.6.3.1 Economic Measurements Using the Gross Regional Product

The living standard dimension of the HDI, income, is measured by GNI per capita. Comparing the Arctic regions presupposes that GNI exists or can fairly easily be calculated on a regional basis (gross regional income [GRI]) and that the currencies can be compared because if these conditions are not both present, we use the regional measure, GRP.<sup>9</sup>

The geographical categorization used to rank the Arctic regions according to the health indicators does not apply to or reflect the ranking of the Arctic regions according to income, although there are parallels. Table 17.1 gives details about

<sup>9</sup>Gross domestic product is measured in domestic currencies of each country, and each country experiences different consumer patterns, price levels, and inflation rates. Comparing GRP per capita thus presupposes the existence of regional statistical assessments of production value, a procedure that converts GRP (in basic prices) in domestic currencies to a common currency (USD) and creates a new statistic referred to as purchasing power parity [PPP]. Furthermore, using the so-called gross domestic product deflators, the values are adjusted for inflation when changes in GRP from 2000 to 2009 (where data were available, otherwise for a shorter period of time – c.f. Table 17.1) are calculated.

**Table 17.1** Gross regional product by arctic region, 2000 and 2009

Country/Region	GRP (fixed prices) 2000 = 100 per capita USD PPP		GRP-change 2000-2009* fixed prices (2000 = 100)		Country/Region
	2000	2009			
United States	35029	36609	0.05		United States
Alaska	41292	52381	0.27		Alaska
Canada	28509	30938	0.09		Canada
Yukon	31776	43240	0.36		Yukon
Northwest Territories	50486	63608	0.26		Northwest Territories
Nunavut	24646	32283	0.31		Nunavut
<i>Northern Canada</i>	37480	48128	0.28		<i>Northern Canada</i>
Denmark	28864				Denmark
Greenland	18139	22584	0.25		Greenland
Faroe Islands	22346	25941	0.16		Faroe Islands
Iceland	28879	22260	0.23		Iceland
Norway	36174	38415	0.06		Norway
Nordland	18709	22447	0.20		Nordland
Troms	19305	22879	0.19		Troms
Finnmark	18230	21840	0.20		Finnmark
<i>Northern Norway</i>					<i>Northern Norway</i>
Sweden	27985				Sweden
Västerbotten	22577	26902	0.19		Västerbotten
Norrbottn	25117	28377	0.13		Norrbottn
<i>Northern Sweden</i>					<i>Northern Sweden</i>
Finland	48634	40313	0.02		Finland
Kainuu	29147	27924	0.07	* 2000-2007	Kainuu
Oulu/Pohjois-Pohjanmaa	42784	37030	0.04	* 2000-2007	Oulu/Pohjois-Pohjanmaa
Lappi	40995	38447	0.05	* 2000-2007	Lappi
<i>Northern Finland</i>	40375	36256	0.00	* 2000-2007	<i>Northern Finland</i>
Russian Federation	5375	8926	0.66		Russian Federation
Murmansk Oblast	8097	9493	0.17		Murmansk Oblast
Kareliya Republic	5277	6115	0.16		Kareliya Republic
Arkhangelsk Oblast	6134	10138	0.65		Arkhangelsk Oblast
- Nenets AO	39697	121971	2.07		- Nenets AO
Komi Republic	7758	12466	0.61		Komi Republic
Yamalo-Nenets AO	32249	47233	0.46		Yamalo-Nenets AO
Khanty-Mansi AO	40320	46784	0.16		Khanty-Mansi AO
Taymyr AO	6801	6237	0.08	** 2000-2005	Taymyr AO
Evenki AO	4505	7825	0.74	** 2000-2005	Evenki AO
Sakha Republic	11698	13713	0.17		Sakha Republic
Magadan Oblast	9000	11718	0.30		Magadan Oblast
Koryak AO	14093	10201	0.28	** 2000-2005	Koryak AO
Chukotka AO	8965	36551	3.08		Chukotka AO
<i>Northern Russia</i>	5375	21402	0.37		<i>Northern Russia</i>
Total Northern Regions					Total Northern Regions

\*AO Autonomous Okrug, GRP Gross regional product, PPP Purchasing power parity, USD US dollar

\*Colors indicate the direction of change: green indicates a better situation during the first decade of the twenty-first millennium; yellow indicates the status quo; red indicated a retrograde step



incomes in all Arctic regions in 2000 and in 2009 and therefore provides a way to compare developments within the first decade of the twenty-first century.

In 2000, the per capita GRPs in some of the Russian regions such as Yamalo-Nenets AO, Khanti-Mansi AO, and Nenets AO were among the highest in the circumpolar North and above USD PPP 40,000. At the same time, the rest of the Russian Arctic regions had GRP per capita below USD PPP 15,000. The regions with the highest GRP per capita (USD 25,000 and above) included Alaska and the three Canadian Arctic regions as well as the Arctic regions of Finland and Norrbotten (northern Sweden). GRP data for the last year of the first decade of the twenty-first century are not available for all regions, and GRPs for these regions have been measured for the period including the last year for which data were available.<sup>10</sup>

The more significant changes in the economic human development indicator (GRP USD PPP in fixed prices) from 2000 to 2009 (2005 or 2007 for some regions) include:

- A decrease of more than 20 % in the Icelandic GRP from 2000 to 2009 (due to the huge impacts of the financial crisis) (Matthiasson 2013). The Icelandic economy has gradually recovered, and the Icelandic GDP in 2013 was almost at the same level as in 2008
- The decrease from 2000 to 2005 in the GRP of Koryak AO and Taymyr AO
- The generally high percentage increases in most Russian Arctic regions caused by intensified oil, gas, and mineral exploration and the increasing world market prices.

In Table 17.1, the HDI indicator for economic well-being, GNI per capita, is replaced by GRP per capita. The colors indicate direction of change: “green” indicates a better situation dur-

ing the first decade of the 21st millennium; “yellow” indicates status quo; and “red” indicates a retrograde step.

Comparing GRPs with national GDPs indicates that several regions such as Alaska, the Canadian territories, and some of the Russian regions have higher GRPs per capita than the respective national GDPs. Considering the implications for economic well-being, it is important to stress that this does not necessarily imply that Arctic residents in these regions are economically better off and have higher living standards than their fellow citizens south of the Arctic borders. One reason is that there is a net transfer of value out of the Arctic. Resource development might have regional economic spin-offs and generate income locally, but often, major extractive activities are decoupled from both local and regional economic activities and therefore contribute more to economic activities and to large corporations and economic centers outside the Arctic (e.g., Duhaime 2004). Another reason is that neither production value nor conventional income measures tell about the living costs that are substantially higher in the Arctic.

The data from 2009, and for some regions, the data for 2005 and 2007, respectively, indicate a narrowing of the income differences (measured by GRP) and thus a somewhat decreased disparity between the Arctic regions measured by the gross production value of the regions. The background for the decreased disparity between Arctic regions is economic growth, primarily in the Russian Arctic, based on oil, gas, and mineral resource exploitation. The dramatic decrease in oil prices in recent years (2014–2015) at the same time shows the vulnerabilities of regions relying on mineral extraction.

It should be noted, however, that GRP only tells us about the total added value of production. It does not reveal the distribution of income and thus the intraregional income differences nor does it tell us about potential negative externalities (environmental problems, for example). Finally, it is important, when considering future economic well-being, to acknowledge that the nonrenewable resources that have been extracted

<sup>10</sup>The GRP time series for the three Finnish Arctic regions are only available for the period 2000–2005 and for three of the Russian Arctic regions (Evenki AO, Taymyr AO and Koryak AO). GRP data are only available for the period 2000–2007.

for the region represent a loss of wealth for future generations (Mäenpää 2009).

### 17.6.3.2 Findings About Living Standards, Income, and Poverty from the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic

Whereas the HDI measures GNI per capita, the SLiCA project measures individual and household income as well as income inequalities and poverty. Income differences in the Arctic exist not only between regions and countries but also within regions and countries.

Both relative<sup>11</sup> and absolute<sup>12</sup> poverty were measured on the basis of detailed self-reported income information. About 40–50 % of households in Greenland, Alaska, Chukotka, and the Kola Peninsula are relatively poor (with incomes below 60 % of the median income). The largest proportion of relatively poor (53 %) is in Chukotka, whereas fewer than two out of ten Norwegian Sámi can be counted as relatively poor (data are not available from Canada and Sweden). Using an absolute poverty level reveals large discrepancies between indigenous households in Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula (roughly three out of ten households live in absolute poverty) at one end of the scale, and Norway and northern Alaska (less than one household out of ten) at the other end of the scale. About 15–18 % of the indigenous households in Greenland and northern Canada live in absolute poverty.

Indigenous individuals and households in Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula have considerably lower incomes<sup>13</sup> (Swedish data are not available) than households in Greenland, northern Alaska, and northern Norway, with the income level in Norway ranking highest.

There seems to be a relation between income differences (measured as “part of the population in poverty”) and satisfaction with the standard of living. Between seven and eight out of ten indigenous Chukotkans and residents of the Kola Peninsula state that they are somewhat or very dissatisfied with their standard of living. One in ten Norwegian Sámi and roughly every fourth Inuit in Greenland and Inupiat in northern Alaska are dissatisfied with living standards.

An overall assessment of living standards measured by cash income must include the subsistence harvest (see Sect. 17.7.3.3), including what is shared and received from or given away to family and fellow community members. The subsistence harvest contributes significantly to the food supply of many households and thus compensates for food that otherwise would have been bought in a local grocery or supermarket. At the same time, SLiCA data from the Inuit survey regions documented that subsistence activities depend on cash and that, when there was a correlation between cash income and subsistence activities, individuals with higher incomes took part in more subsistence activities (Kruse et al. 2008).

The answers to the question about the household’s ability to make ends meet economically reflected the same economic reality and the perceptions referred to above: 85 % of the indigenous residents in both Russian SLiCA survey regions reported that they were only able to make ends meet with some or great difficulty (Poppel 2015a:723–724)

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## 17.7 Well-Being Among Indigenous and Other Arctic Residents

The terms *subjective well-being*, *quality of life*, and *happiness* increasingly appear in a variety of assessments, surveys, and analyses of the Arctic. Recent examples include the AHDR (AHDR 2004; Larsen and Fondahl 2014), the Arctic Social Indicator (ASI) project (Larsen et al. 2010, 2014), the SLiCA (Andersen and Poppel 2002; Kruse et al. 2008; Poppel 2014a, b, 2015a, b),

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<sup>11</sup>Relative poverty was measured using the Eurostat definition for households: “the households earning less than 60 per cent of the median income.”

<sup>12</sup>To measure absolute poverty, the United States definition and standard were applied.

<sup>13</sup>The incomes include all sources of income: wages, earnings from self-employment, and transfer income. The income figures are measured in USD and are PPP-adjusted.

and chapters focusing on well-being in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Nuttall et al. 2005) and in the Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost in the Arctic Report (Hovelsrud et al. 2011b). This trend reflects discourses about human development, not only in the Arctic but also on a global scale in both political and academic forums. In discussions related to Arctic human development this trend might be seen as an indication of an increasing demand from indigenous and other Arctic residents to be acknowledged as active participants in developing the Arctic rather than as passive recipients of the consequences of rapid social and economic changes.

### 17.7.1 The Arctic Human Development Report

The first AHDR (2004) focused on well-being in the chapter “Human Health and Well-being.” Well-being was considered in close relation to and determined by a number of different health indicators as well as by other overall living condition dimensions such as “local control” and “spiritual values” (AHDR 2004:157). Furthermore, the first AHDR stated, “[c]ommunity cohesion’ and individual and community ‘resilience’ are important for well-being, but these factors are seldom reflected in health statistics. We need to find ways to quantify these factors and their role in quality of life in a way that makes it possible to compare the situation across the Arctic nations” (AHDR 2004: 166). The AHDR then concluded as follows:

Residents of the Arctic—settlers as well as Indigenous peoples—regularly emphasize the importance of at least three dimensions of human development over and above those included in the HDI:

- Fate control (controlling one’s own destiny)
- Maintaining cultural identity
- Living close to nature (AHDR 2004: 240).

### 17.7.2 Arctic Social Indicators

The recommendations of the AHDR were followed up in the ASI project (Larsen et al. 2010, 2014). The first ASI study defined a set of indicators within six domains, the first three of which are closely related to the HDI and the last three of which are Arctic specific:

- Health and population
- Material well-being
- Education
- Fate control
- Cultural well-being
- Closeness to nature

In the second ASI study (Larsen et al. 2014), the indicators were applied to different Arctic regions; domains were tested in several regions; and one survey instrument, the SLiCA (Kruse et al. 2008; Poppel 2015b; Poppel et al. 2007), was applied to the homelands of the Inuit, the Inuit Nunaat.

### 17.7.3 Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic

The goal of the SLiCA was that “Human development shall be measured in ways that reflect subjective well-being; thus partnerships with the respondents—in SLiCA the indigenous peoples of the Arctic—is key to study and understand living conditions and welfare priorities.” (Poppel 2015b).

SLiCA was initiated in 1997/98. To contribute to a concerted effort to assess human development in the Arctic by applying relevant indicators, the first SLiCA results were organized according to the six domains recommended by the AHDR (2004) (see also [www.arcticliving-conditions.org](http://www.arcticliving-conditions.org)).

The goal of this section is to present SLiCA findings on the three additional well-being dimensions:

- Control of destiny/fate control
- Cultural continuity/cultural well-being
- Ties to nature/closeness to nature

**17.7.3.1 Control of Destiny/Fate Control**


Control of destiny/fate control can, according to Dahl and his co-authors, be measured using indicators within the following categories: political power and political activism, decision-making power, economic control, knowledge construction, and human rights (Dahl et al. 2010:131). Many indicators within these categories can be found in publicly available assessments and reports at an aggregate level. The same availability of data does not generally exist if the research focus is the individual’s evaluation of, for instance, distribution of power and influence on decision making. SLiCA illustrates some aspects of individuals’ perceptions about political knowledge and influence.

Most Inuit, Sámi, and indigenous people in Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula find “decisions made by government” important or very important to their own lives, ranging from 74 % in the Kola Peninsula to 91 % in Chukotka.


A majority in all survey regions also indicate an interest in “politics in general.” The variation in responses to this question is, however, larger: 50–60 % in the Kola Peninsula say they are interested or very interested, whereas more than 80 % of the Sámi in northern Norway and northern Sweden declare an interest in politics in general (Fig. 17.7) (Poppel et al. 2007).

The Norwegian Sámi are interested, declare that they are also knowledgeable, and find government decisions important to them, but disagree on the statement that their own vote is not important. At the other end of the spectrum of perceptions related to interest in and knowledge of politics, roughly half the indigenous people of the Kola Peninsula expressed interest in politics, but only every fourth felt her/himself to be knowledgeable about politics. Almost half of the indigenous people of the Kola Peninsula agreed with the statement that it did not matter how she or he voted. Still, three out of four found government decisions important.

There are several reasons for the Arctic being center stage in discussions at conferences and in international forums, but a fundamentally important one is certainly that global warming and the



**Fig. 17.7** Level of political knowledge and interest and perceived importance of politics (Data from Poppel et al. 2007)



**Fig. 17.8** Satisfaction with influence over the management of natural resources such as fish, game, petroleum and mining, and over reduction of local environmental problems (Data from Poppel et al. 2007, 2011)

resulting climate change manifest themselves more rapidly in the circumpolar regions than elsewhere, thus affecting people's livelihoods, living conditions, subjective well-being, and quality of life (Arctic Council 2013; Hovelsrud et al. 2011a, b; Nuttall et al. 2005; Rasmussen 2011).

Whereas Inuit and Sámi across the circumpolar Arctic and the indigenous peoples of Chukotka identify a number of environmental problems in their communities, their satisfaction with their influence as indigenous people to reduce environmental problems is, at best, modest (Fig. 17.8). Only in Alaska, more than half (62 %) are somewhat or very satisfied, whereas the percentage in Greenland is 46 %, in northern Norway 30 %, and in the two Russian regions, 15 % in Chukotka and 10 % in the Kola Peninsula (Poppel et al. 2007).

The picture is much the same when the focus is on evaluating the influence that the indigenous people have on management of nonrenewable natural resources like oil, gas, and minerals. The most significant difference is that only 10 % of the Norwegian Sámi are somewhat or very satisfied with their influence. This level of satisfaction is the same as that reported among the indigenous people in Chukotka and a little higher than in the

Kola Peninsula. The Alaskan Inupiat are an exception: They report a higher degree of satisfaction with influence over the management of natural resources.<sup>14</sup>

Analyses of the explanatory power of different aspects of "fate control" on "satisfaction with quality of life" and "quality of life in this community" seem to support the importance of influence in the management of natural resources (Poppel 2015a). If one takes into account the importance to subjective well-being of nature and subsistence activities, having influence over these aspects of life seems of particular importance to the indigenous peoples in the SLiCA survey regions.

### 17.7.3.2 Cultural Well-Being and Cultural Continuity

The way in which cultural activities and cultural values are transferred from generation to generation (e.g., mastery of language, traditional values and self-identification, spirituality, participation in cultural events, and use of media) and how they are valued (e.g., satisfaction with communi-

<sup>14</sup>See Kruse (2010) for a comparative study of living conditions and quality of life among Inupiat in 1973 and 2002/03, before and after oil extraction started.

**Table 17.2** Activities and customs important/very important to maintaining indigenous identity, by country

	Canada	Greenland (%)	Chukotka (%)	Alaska (%)	Norway (%)	Sweden (%)	Kola Peninsula
Traditional food	*	95	98	96	84	79	*
Hunting and fishing	*	79	99	95	72	77	*
Naming kinship relationships	*	87	100	90	96	87	*
Harvesting of wild berries and plants	*	75	98	89	78	80	*
Occupation or profession	*	87	77	87	76	56	*
Preservation of traditional foods	*	85	89	96	78	85	*
Use of indigenous language	*	98	84	84	90	63	*
Participation in traditional cultural events	*	71	81	85	83	64	*
Childhood upbringing	*	96	98	94	93	89	*
Clothes worn	*	78	71	76	60	58	*
Contacts with other indigenous people	*	95	58	93	91	88	*
Indigenous poetry and literature	*	79	61	73	58	40	*
Religious and spiritual beliefs	*	79	66	81	57	33	*
View of nature	*	97	98	96	92	96	*
Meeting expectations of family and indigenous friends	*	88	81	94	82	78	*

Data from [www.arcticlivingconditions.org](http://www.arcticlivingconditions.org), Table 142 & SLiCA database [not publicly accessible]

\*Data not available

ties' promotion of traditional values and the individual application of traditional values in personal life) are embedded in several living condition dimensions, but all aspects are considered to be resources and are assumed to affect quality of life. A few SLiCA findings on self-perceived identity and language are introduced below as examples of the strength of cultural continuity and cultural well-being.

With respect to *self-perceived identity among Arctic indigenous peoples*, all SLiCA respondents were asked whether, and to what degree, a number of activities and customs were important in maintaining their indigenous identity (Table 17.2).

The results across the Arctic are strikingly similar. More than three out of four (with only

two exceptions) of the Arctic indigenous peoples in the SLiCA survey regions find the same activities and customs important or very important to their identity: view of nature, eating traditional food,<sup>15</sup> preservation of traditional food, harvesting of wild berries and plants, language use,

<sup>15</sup>Traditional food (in the English-speaking regions often called "country food") is the overall term for meat, fish, herbs, and vegetables harvested locally or regionally and either prepared traditionally (e.g., boiled, fried, dried, or fermented), eaten raw, or prepared according to more modern recipes (Poppel and Kruse 2009). The term *traditional food* was not used as such in the questionnaire but related to what is considered traditional in the different regions, e.g., Inupiat/Yupik food in northern Alaska and Kalaalimernit, Greenlandic food in Greenland.



naming kinship relationships, childhood upbringing, contacts with other indigenous people, and meeting expectations of family and indigenous friends. Whereas these values all point to the living conditions dimension of cultural continuity (and many also relate to ties to nature), the latter identity markers also highlight the importance of family and friends, close interpersonal relationships, and social networks. There are also significant differences between the regions—for example, when it comes to “use of indigenous language” and “religious and spiritual beliefs.”

With respect to *language retention*, the right of indigenous peoples to speak and write their mother tongue and to use the indigenous language as the language of instruction has been a major issue in most, if not all, indigenous peoples’ fights for recognition as peoples and for self-determination. One of the traumas, both individually and collectively, for many indigenous peoples has been the way many children were sent to boarding schools for several years, far from their families, restricted and sometimes forbidden from speaking their mother tongue. This situation pertained in, for instance, Alaska, Canada, and among the Sámi in the 1950s and the following decades (Smith 2009).

Table 17.3 contains findings related to language issues: individual, self-perceived language abilities, and relationships. Study results showed significant differences in the ability of indigenous peoples to understand, speak, read, and write their respective indigenous languages: The Swedish Sámi ranked lowest, not only among the Sámi but also compared to the other indigenous groups. Twice as many of the Kola Sámi and almost three times as many of the Norwegian

Sámi perceived their language abilities as very good or relatively good compared with the Swedish Sámi. Among the Inuit, the Greenlanders ranked highest in all four categories of language management because almost everyone stated that they understood and spoke Greenlandic very or relatively well; more than eight out of ten reported that they read and wrote Greenlandic very or relatively well. The self-perceived language skills in Greenland ranked somewhat higher than those of the Canadian Inuit and considerably higher than the language skills of the Inupiat in northern Alaska.

The language abilities were reflected in responses to “current use of indigenous language in household” (Table 17.4). The three regions where language skills were perceived to be highest, Greenland, Arctic Canada, and northern Norway—are also the regions where the largest segments of the indigenous people reported that they spoke the indigenous language most or all the time in the household.

Given the fact that many languages of small-numbered indigenous peoples are either threatened or on the verge of extinction, the survey results seemed to substantiate, e.g., Greenland, that public policy over a longer period, combined with a concerted effort, can enhance an overall goal, despite all odds.

### 17.7.3.3 Living Close to Nature

The statements from organizations representing the majority of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic prefacing this chapter present concordant perceptions stressing the indigenous peoples’ history dating back thousands of years and the connectedness to and the dependency on nature and the natural environment.

**Table 17.3** Language: fluency in indigenous language = understand, speak, read, and write (very or relatively well)

	Northern Canada (%)	Greenland (%)	Chukotka (%)	Northern Alaska (%)	Northern Norway (%)	Northern Sweden (%)	Kola Peninsula (%)
Understand	92	97	61	54	84	34	65
Speak	89	96	55	45	75	28	56
Read	70	88	42	29	62	19	36
Write	73	84	40	22	44	12	26

Data from Poppel et al. (2007, 2011)

**Table 17.4** Language: fluency in indigenous language = currently use indigenous language in household

“Currently use indigenous language in household”							
	Northern Canada (%)	Greenland (%)	Chukotka (%)	Northern Alaska (%)	Northern Norway (%)	Northern Sweden (%)	Kola Peninsula (%)
All the time	50	82	17	14	40	*	15
Most of the time	22	11	11	16	16	*	8
Some of the time or less	28	8	73	70	44	*	77
Total	100	101	101	100	100	*	100

Data from Poppel et al. (2007, 2011)

\*Data not available

In all survey regions (except Canada, where the question was not asked), more than nine out of ten Inuit and Sámi found “the way I view nature” as a very important or important identity marker. Nature and wildlife activities like hunting and fishing and harvesting of wild berries and plants ranked high among indigenous identity markers. These identity markers substantiated the meaning of “ties to nature” as a human dimension domain focusing on important aspects of well-being for Arctic indigenous peoples.

From the beginning of the SLiCA research process, subsistence activities<sup>16</sup> were the focus of the discussions between researchers and indigenous experts because the assumption was that the mixed cash and subsistence harvest economy was still a prevailing mode of production in many Arctic communities and regions. Using SLiCA data for the Inuit homelands, Poppel and Kruse (2009) concluded that subsistence harvest is not just a matter of “meat on the table,” although

food security has recently become an even more significant issue in Arctic communities. Subsistence encompasses a number of aspects:

- The economic aspect—the importance to the economy of the household;
- The nutritional aspect—part of the diet of the household (more nutritious than store-bought food);
- The social aspect—including intergenerational transfer of knowledge;
- The sociocultural aspect—principles of sharing and community relations;
- The identity aspect—markers of identity related to subsistence; and
- The integration aspect—the mix of subsistence and cash activities (Poppel and Kruse 2009)

Survey results confirmed that subsistence activities were as important in Sápmi as in the Inuit-populated regions. The overall finding was that the vast majority of the Inuit and Sámi have participated in several subsistence-, and thus nature-related activities over the last 12 months.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>16</sup>We defined subsistence activities as harvesting local resources: hunting, fishing, herding, husbandry, gathering, and other harvest activities that people conduct as a nonmarket activity with the primary purpose of contributing harvest products to the household, to share with family and community members (including ‘meat gifts’) or to sell locally outside the market economic sector. A ‘Household Production Model’ was developed to be tried out as a part of the research effort (Kruse et al. 2008; Usher et al. 2003).

<sup>17</sup>Unpublished paper: *Are subsistence activities, harvest of renewable resources and herding important to indigenous peoples in modern Arctic economies and cultures?* Presented by B. Poppel at the IPY Oslo Science Conference 2010, June 8–12.

**Table 17.5** Proportion of meat and fish harvested by household traditional food by country

	Canada	Greenland (%)	Chukotka (%)	Alaska (%)	Norway (%)	Sweden (%)	Kola Peninsula (%)
None	*	25	18	8	6	14	42
Less than half	*	38	38	31	37	44	35
About half	*	15	27	25	17	43	22
More than half	*	21	17	36	40		
	*	100	100	100	100	100	100

Data from Poppel et al. (2007, 2011)

\* Data Not Available

Table 17.5 shows the proportion of meat and fish consumed by the household that people perceive as also being harvested by a household member. The consumption of traditional food harvested by one or more household members is significant in all regions, although with variations (Poppel 2006; Poppel and Kruse 2009; see footnote 15).

To elucidate the strength of traditional values, a number of questions were asked about “satisfaction with community’s promotion of indigenous values,” of which one was “respect for nature” (see Sect. 17.7.3.2). A vast majority of indigenous residents in five out of seven Arctic regions and countries (there are no data for Canada) reported that they were very or somewhat satisfied with the promotion of “respect for nature.” Only in Chukotka, a majority of 57 % was “somewhat or very dissatisfied” with the promotion of “respect for nature.” Given that the vast majority of Inuit in Greenland, Chukotka, and Alaska confirmed that they apply traditional values in their lives, it seems reasonable to interpret the answers about satisfaction with a community’s promotion of “respect for nature” as supporting the assumption that nature is important to the indigenous people.

Infrastructure projects (e.g., hydropower stations), extractive industries, and climate change are just a few examples of human activities with huge environmental impacts. If contact with nature and nature-based activities is important to people, the way nature changes and the impact of access to and use of nature and its resources would seemingly also be of concern. Therefore, it

seems fair to assume that the influence people have on these changes would be of vital importance. The SLiCA project thus included questions about the environmental concerns of the Arctic indigenous peoples in the survey regions as well as perceptions of influence on “the management of fish and game” and “the development of oil, gas and minerals” (Poppel et al. 2011).

A majority cited the following problems in the region where they lived: contamination of local sites, pollution of local lakes and streams, and pollution from industrial development. Most Greenlanders perceived pollution from other countries as a problem, whereas erosion of coastal areas and river banks was a concern for the majority of indigenous people in Alaska, Chukotka, and the Kola Peninsula. Three out of four cited climate change as a problem in their communities (Poppel et al. 2011).

There are marked differences from region to region: The vast majority and a considerably larger part of the indigenous peoples of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula, respectively, were concerned about the above-mentioned problems. This concern might be a response to a number of environmental disasters in the wake of the rapid development of oil, gas, and mineral exploitation in the Russian Arctic (Forbes 2005; Stammler and Forbes 2006).

The identification of and concern with environmental problems and their assumed impact on “ties to nature” are not generally paralleled by a high score on satisfaction with influence on the “drivers for change.” Only in northern Alaska is more than half of the indigenous population

somewhat or very satisfied with the influence indigenous people have on renewable resources, nonrenewable resource development, and reduction of environmental problems. The Sámi, especially in Sweden, rate their influence very low. The indigenous people of the two Russian regions also rate their influence very low. At the same time, they are the ones most concerned with the environmental problems they identify (Poppel et al. 2011).

#### **17.7.3.4 Summary of Findings on Indicators Specific to Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic**

To learn about the well-being of the Inuit, the Sámi, and the indigenous peoples of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula, the SLiCA asked almost 8000 Arctic indigenous residents about their perceptions and priorities within well-being domains that reach beyond and add valuable insights to the HDI. The domains and the indicators beneath were selected with the indigenous partners of SLiCA to more fully reflect the welfare priorities of Arctic indigenous peoples. The indicators can be clustered under the following headings: control of destiny/fate control; cultural well-being/cultural continuity; and living close to nature.

The overall SLiCA findings were that the prevailing lifestyle for many Arctic indigenous people is still the mixed economy, combining subsistence activities with cash income. This lifestyle provides the necessary cash income and includes activities that are important for food security, a healthy diet, social relationships, and cultural continuity. Furthermore, hunting, fishing, herding, and gathering create the closeness to nature that is important to the identity of most indigenous peoples. The results regarding what is important to identity were similar across the Arctic and included “eating traditional food” and the “importance of family and friends.” The relation between “speaking the indigenous language” and “identity” ranked differently in the different regions and reflected the possibilities and the obstacles that former colonial powers established to retain the indigenous language. The Greenlandic Inuit, for example, reported the importance of language to identity and that

Greenlandic was spoken at home as well as at work. This finding correlates with the long-term public policy of giving priority to the Greenlandic language and ultimately establishing Greenlandic as the official language.

Whereas Inuit and Sámi across the circumpolar Arctic and the indigenous peoples of Chukotka reported that “closeness to nature” and subsistence activities were important in many aspects, the self-reported influence to reduce environmental problems was, at best, modest. The picture is much the same when the focus is on evaluating the influence indigenous people have on management of nonrenewable natural resources like oil, gas, and minerals, with the Alaskan Inupiat being an exception.

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
### **17.8 Findings from Studies Assessing Arctic Human Development by Measuring Subjective or Community Well-Being and Quality of Life**

A number of measures have been developed to better express the individual’s subjective perception of his or her life situation. Happiness is one such measure. The question often asked in international surveys, in order to identify “the happiest countries in the world,” is “How satisfied are you with your life as whole?” This question was also part of the questionnaire used in the SLiCA and in the Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey. Some key findings are presented below.

#### **17.8.1 Perceived Quality of Life among Inuit and Sámi and Indigenous Peoples of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula: Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic**

The SLiCA is an attempt to measure quality of life among Inuit, Sámi, and the indigenous peoples of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula (Poppel 2015b), both by addressing a variety of living

**Fig. 17.9** Satisfaction with life as a whole. Percentage “very or somewhat satisfied.” (Data from Poppel 2015a; Poppel et al. 2007, 2011)



conditions and by asking for people’s self-evaluation. The “quality of life as a whole” question was asked in three SLiCA survey regions (Alaska, Greenland, and Sweden), whereas a question asking about “quality of life in this community” was asked in all SLiCA survey regions.


Among indigenous people in Greenland, northern Alaska, and northern Sweden, 9 out of 10 were “somewhat” or “very satisfied” with their life as a whole (Fig. 17.9). Taking into account that living standards are typically lower among the indigenous peoples of the Arctic than among nonindigenous peoples, these findings support the assumptions that other than material factors influence subjective well-being (Poppel, 2015a).

Both overall satisfaction with life as a whole and satisfaction with a number of specific dimensions of peoples’ lives were analyzed, which made it possible to assess to what degree satisfaction with these specific dimensions can explain satisfaction with life in general. Analysis of the data for Greenland and Alaska combined led to the conclusion that satisfaction with an individual’s actual job or outcome of actual fishing and hunting activities was less important to overall satisfaction with life than job opportunities and the amount of fish and game locally available. This finding means that availability and accessi-

bility seem to mean more to the quality of life of Inuit than satisfaction with the actual job and actual catch. Also important in explaining overall well-being is the combination of market and non-market activities (hunting and fishing, for example) and the influence people have over natural resources and the environment (Kruse et al. 2008; Poppel 2015a; Poppel and Kruse 2009).

Figure 17.10 refers to “satisfaction with quality of life in this community,” i.e., the perceived quality of community life where the respondent lives, including the quality of life of the respondent. Of those interviewed, more than three out of four Sámi living in northern Sweden and northern Norway and Inuit in northern Alaska were somewhat or very satisfied with the quality of life in their community.<sup>18</sup> The corresponding figure in Greenland was seven out of ten. A significantly smaller proportion, only one out of seven, of the indigenous people of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula were somewhat or very satisfied with the quality of life in their community. Other SLiCA findings suggest a correlation

<sup>18</sup>Interviews were conducted in different periods in the different regions/countries due to lack of coordination between funding agencies: northern Canada (2001); Alaska (2002–2003); Greenland (2004–2006); Chukotka (2004–2006); northern Norway (2006–2008); northern Sweden (2006–2008), and Kola Peninsula (2006–2008).



**Fig. 17.10** Satisfaction with the quality of life in this community, percentage “very or somewhat satisfied.” (Data from Poppel 2015a)

between a low rating of satisfaction with quality of life in the respondent’s community, different kinds of social problems such as unemployment, domestic violence, and suicide, lower self-rated health, and poor health care among indigenous people in the two Arctic Russian survey regions (Poppel 2015a).

### 17.8.2 Canadian Community Well-Being Index

Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada has developed and published The Community Well-Being (CWB) Index for 1981, 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, and 2011 (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2015).<sup>19</sup> A special study, *Community Well-Being: Report on Trends in Inuit Communities, 1981–2011*, compared the communities in the four Inuit

<sup>19</sup>The index for 1981–2006 is based on Statistics Canada’s population census data and composed using indicators on income (income per capita), education (high school and university completion rates), housing (quantity and quality), and labor force activity (employment and labor force participation rates). The figures for 2011 are based on the 2011 National Household Survey.

land-claim regions with a total of 50 communities (both Inuit and non-Inuit) with First Nations communities and nonindigenous communities across Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2015).

Figure 17.12 shows that the average community well-being score for Inuit communities increased by 15 points over the 30-year period 1981–2011. The increase in well-being slowed in the latter part of the period from 12 points during the first 15 years to only 3 points in the last 15 years. Compared to First Nations and non-aboriginal communities, Inuit communities were marginally better off than First Nations but ranked lower than nonaboriginal communities.

Given that the Inuit Community Well-Being Index comprises a number of indicators (income, education, housing, and labor market) as well as data from all four Inuit regions, looking at the subcomponents and regions revealed some significant details. Figure 17.11 shows that the 16-point difference between Inuit and non-aboriginal communities covered major discrepancies in education and housing whereas non-aboriginal communities were considerably better off (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2015).


A comparison of CWB component scores for the four Inuit regions indicates parallel development in community well-being over the 30-year period (Fig. 17.12), except for Nunavik, which had the lowest score in 1986 but has now caught up to Nunavut. Both lag behind Nunatsiavut and the Inuvialuit region. A review of the Inuit region CWB components reveals a levelling off in several components such as housing, high school completion, and labor market participation and increased scores in income.

### 17.8.3 The Aboriginal Economic Benchmark Report


In 2015, the National Aboriginal Economic Development Board (NAEDB)<sup>20</sup> published the

<sup>20</sup>The NAEDB was established in 1990 and was “appointed by Order-in-Council to provide policy and program advice to the federal government on Aboriginal economic development” (NAEDB 2012: 2).





**Fig. 17.11** Community well-being averages over time: Inuit, First Nations, and nonaboriginal communities, 1981–2011 (Data from Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2015). Source: Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2015



**Fig. 17.12** Average community well-being scores: nonaboriginal communities and Inuit regions, 1981–2011 (Data from Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 2015)

Aboriginal Economic Benchmark Report (NAEDB 2015). The 2015 report focuses on the economic progress of First Nations, Inuit, and Métis in Canada and builds on three core indicators: employment, income, and wealth and well-being as well as five underlying indicators:

education, entrepreneurship and business development, governance, lands and resources, and infrastructure. The report is based on official statistics from Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada’s National Household Survey from 2011) as well as from a number of other sources to establish

baseline indicators. In total, more than 100 indicators were used to assess the economic development of indigenous peoples in Canada and to compare the findings with the development of nonindigenous Canadians (NAEDB 2015).

The NAEDB report compares socioeconomic conditions among the different aboriginal and nonaboriginal groups; the community well-being index is calculated according to this typology. Because all Inuit communities are located in the Canadian North, some results concerning Inuit and Inuit communities are briefly discussed below. It should be noted that Inuit communities also include non-Inuit residents of these communities. The report's conclusions, in brief, about Inuit and Inuit communities are that "The Inuit have made gains between 2006 and 2011" (NAEDB 2015: 3).

"Gaps between the Inuit and the non-Aboriginal population were reduced for unemployment rates and average income. However, gaps in postsecondary completion rates and the proportion of homes in need of major repair increased. At 4.9 %, university completion rates for the Inuit group remained the lowest among heritage groups, while the university completion rate for the non-Aboriginal population was 25.8 %. The proportion of homes in need of major repair increased for Inuit, the only heritage group whose conditions worsened relative to the non-Aboriginal population for this indicator." (NAEDB 2015: 3). Furthermore, the report concludes that Inuit, despite having made progress in reducing the gap in overcrowded dwellings, still live in the most overcrowded dwellings.

Based on the CWB developed by Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, the AEBR further concludes "Community well-being scores increased by 1 point for Inuit communities from 2006 to 2011 compared with two points for non-Aboriginal communities" and that the gap in CWB scores between non-Aboriginal communities increased by 1 point from 2006 to 2011 for Inuit communities (NAEDB 2015: 26).

#### 17.8.4 Quality of Life in Northern Canada and Alaska

In a report from the Gordon Foundation, *Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Public Opinion Survey, Vol. 2* (Gordon Foundation 2015) conducted in 2015, a number of living conditions, perceptions, and attitudes, including respondents' overall rating of quality of life, were analyzed. The 2015 survey was a follow-up to a 2010 survey, and the analyses are the first based on an international comparative study (9000 interviews). Almost 3000 people were interviewed in Canada: 770 (of which 213 were indigenous) resided in North West Territories, Yukon, and Nunavut. In Alaska, 108 respondents out of 500 were indigenous. The analysis compared responses in northern and southern Canada, Alaska, and the continental United States as well as between indigenous and nonindigenous residents<sup>21</sup> and reached among others the following conclusions (Gordon Foundation 2015):

The lowest household incomes are reported by Indigenous respondents in Nunavut, where the number of occupants and expenses are highest. In Alaska, 20 per cent of Indigenous respondents in the sample report household incomes of less than \$ 20,000 and only 11 per cent report incomes of \$ 100,000 or more compared with 33 per cent of non-Indigenous respondents. The unemployment rate at 27 per cent is over four times higher than the non-Indigenous sample at six per cent. As well, considerably fewer Indigenous respondents are employed full-time, 36 per cent compared with 58 per cent. The difference is no less stark in Alaska: 26 per cent unemployment among Indigenous respondents compared with only eight per cent among others in the state. In terms of Quality of life and health, indigenous respondents in the Canadian North are not as positive as non-Indigenous respondents, as 51 per cent of Indigenous respondents rate their quality of life good, compared with 81 per cent of non-Indigenous respondents. Compared with other territories, Indigenous respondents in Nunavut are the least

<sup>21</sup>The report notes "that the indigenous portion of the sample captured in each of the territories is considerably lower than found in the population" (Gordon Foundation 2015:66).

positive about their quality of life and health. ... The gap in rated quality of life is even wider in Alaska where 48 per cent of Indigenous respondents and 70 per cent of non-Indigenous respondents are positive. Rated health follows same pattern as quality of life, with Indigenous respondents less apt to rate themselves positively (52 per cent) compared with non-Indigenous respondents (70 per cent). This is also true in Alaska (49 per cent versus 65 per cent among non-Indigenous respondents). (Gordon Foundation 2015: 67)

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## 17.9 Conclusion

The livelihood and living conditions of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic have changed rapidly since World War II—the period in history that has seen the largest immigration of newcomers. Characterizing the development of the changes in the Arctic as “rapid” is not a cliché. The indigenous peoples have, generally speaking, proven to be both resilient and adaptive despite hardships due to injustices arising from a lack of social and cultural empathy from colonial powers. In many regions, and through the different arrangements they negotiated with the states they found themselves to be citizens of, indigenous peoples have managed largely to maintain critically important aspects of their lifestyles, including close relations to nature through subsistence use of the land water and their living resources. Many indigenous peoples have also succeeded in retaining their ancestral languages.

The indigenous people make up roughly 10 % of the total Arctic population. A majority of the Arctic population are, from a historical perspective, newcomers. All Arctic regions depend on exploitation of natural resources (renewable and/or nonrenewable), and all are impacted by globalization and climate change. These impacts have resulted in multifaceted challenges because the changes are intertwined with demographic, socioeconomic, and sociocultural changes.

A key question, therefore, is how the changes have impacted the living conditions and well-being of the indigenous and other residents of the Arctic. A precondition for being able to answer this question is developing relevant indicators to measure and compare human development.

Attempts to apply the conventional indicators of the HDI met with many obstacles because of the lack of comparable official statistics for the different Arctic jurisdictions. Furthermore, assessing individual well-being and quality of life, as well as monitoring indicators reflecting what is most important to indigenous and other Arctic residents such as ties to nature, cultural continuity and vitality, and control of destiny, is an even bigger challenge.

That being said, the more intense international focus on the Arctic, the increased self-awareness of indigenous peoples, and their creation of national and international organizations as well as the establishment of international collaborative entities such as the Arctic Council has resulted in a number of promising initiatives focusing on human development in the circumpolar North: the AHDR, the Arctic Social Indicators, and the SLiCA.

The overall findings, which are based on official statistics, indicate that, generally speaking, conditions have improved during the first decade of the twenty-first century in physical health (measured by infant mortality rate and years of life expectancy), educational attainment (measured by people with a tertiary education), and income (measured by GRP per capita). The most recent figures and the actual rankings vary among the different indicators, but in recent decades all Arctic regions have experienced improvements in physical health, education, and economic well-being as measured by the HDI indicators. In comparison, the overall mental health status of many indigenous populations has suffered.

There are, however, huge differences between regions and between population groups (especially indigenous and nonindigenous) within regions. One expression of increased social suffering is the rapid rise in the rate of death by suicide in several Arctic indigenous populations, especially among young people.

Surveys comparing well-being among indigenous and nonindigenous groups in Alaska and Arctic Canada confirm that nonindigenous residents rate their individual well-being higher than indigenous residents do. The SLiCA focused on quality of life of Inuit, Sámi, and the indigenous

peoples of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula and concluded that despite facing social problems the majority of Inuit and Sámi were satisfied or very satisfied with the quality of life in their community. Among the indigenous people in the two Russian survey regions, the Kola Peninsula and Chukotka, however, fewer than two out of ten were satisfied with the quality of life in their community. Furthermore, more than nine out of ten Inuit surveyed in Greenland and Northern Alaska, and also Swedish Sámi, reported that they were satisfied or very satisfied with their quality of life as a whole. The availability of fish and wildlife as well as the availability of wage jobs were important explanatory factors, indicating that to these indigenous residents a mixed lifestyle is still of utmost importance.

**Acknowledgements** The author is grateful to Jack Hicks and MarieKathrine Poppel for inspiration and insightful contributions and to Hunter Snyder for the first proof-reading.

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
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## Part IV

# Special Issues Related to the Well-Being of Nations and Population Groups

*The world is changing. It is no longer a world just for boys and men.*  
(Alice Walker – Walker, A. (1982). *The Color Purple* (p. 136). [pocket book]. New York:  
Pocket Books.)

*Happiness is not a matter of intensity, but of balance, order, rhythm and harmony.*  
(Thomas Merton – Merton, T. (n.d.). *Brainy Quote*. [Web site]. <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/t/thomasmert385072.html>. Accessed 6 February 2016.)



**K'an** – Fourth day of the Maya calendar. Mixed media on paper—22" × 30". © 2015 Lylia Forero Carr. Used with permission.

Elizabeth Eckermann

*The education of women is the best way to save the environment.*

(Wilson—E. O. Wilson n.d.)

*Gender inequality is a far-reaching societal impairment, not merely a special deprivation of women. That social understanding is urgent as well as momentous.*

(Sen 2005: 250)

## 18.1 Introduction

A comprehensive history of women and well-being requires two key shifts from the traditional audit of a disadvantaged population. First, it is vital to move beyond simple documentation of the specific objective conditions and subjective experiences of women and girls to examine diversity and changes in gender relations across time and space (Eckermann 2014). Second, we must acknowledge that women and girls are not just victims of negative power but also have constitutive power themselves as active agents in both their own and others' lives (Nussbaum 2001). The public policy implications of these two departures from orthodoxy are, as Sen (2005: 250) suggests, profound:

The importance of women's agency and voice reflects itself in nearly every field of social life. Even though for many purposes such simple indicators as women's education, employment and land ownership have much predictive power, there are broader influences on women's agency that also need consideration... It is necessary to widen

the focus from women's well-being, seen on its own, to women's agency. We need a fuller cognizance of the power and reach of women's enlightened and constructive agency and an adequate appreciation of the fact that women's power and initiative can uplift the lives of all human beings—women, men and children.

Examination of the history of well-being research reveals a largely disembodied and gender neutral understanding of the human condition. Even Aristotle, in his exploration of the concept of happiness, overlooked gender as a key variable, other than representing women as "irrational beings" (Freeland 1999; Gayle 2008; Lange 2003). Sex socialization and gender socialization have only been regarded as significant differentiators of quality-of-life and well-being experiences in the past two decades. This situation can largely be attributed to an earlier dearth of conceptual sophistication about the subtler role of gender socialization in framing human experience and the consequent lack of perceived need to develop measures to sex disaggregate and gender analyse quality-of-life findings. Furthermore, early accounts of the history of gender relationships in non-Western contexts were largely written by Western, albeit female, anthropologists (for example, Ruth Benedict and

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Margaret Mead). Women writers originating from the South<sup>1</sup> (particularly India, South Africa, and South America) have recently started providing a very different version of their gendered cultural history and emphasize the intricate nexus between gender, class, and racial oppression.

This chapter takes a historical journey through quality-of-life and well-being research, using a gender lens, and explores how gender mediates other dimensions of life such as class, age, generation, cultural context, and race to produce gendered patterns of well-being across the world (Eckermann 2014).

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## 18.2 Methods

The best way to encapsulate the global progress of women and gender relationships is to build a timeline tracing the sequence of key events that have impacted gendered understandings of well-being from ancient times to the present and suggest policy implications for the future. Given the sparse documentation in academia of women's well-being predating the twentieth century, we are required to look beyond the field of academic inquiry into women's period literature, journals, letters, and poetry to obtain an accurate understanding of female discourses across the globe in ancient, colonial, and precolonial times. Systematic quantitative recording of global changes in women's and girls' education, health, decision making, political power, and economic role has been possible only since 1995 with the introduction by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) of the Gender-related Development Index (GDI), which is a gender-specific version of the Human Development Index (HDI), the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), and later the Gender Inequality Index (GII). The subcomponents of these indices provide a comprehensive picture of progress in women's objective well-being compared to that of men

since 1995. The GDI, as a gender-sensitive elaboration of the HDI, addressed gender gaps in life expectancy, education (adult literacy and school enrollment), and income. The GEM measured women's access to power in economics, politics, and other forms of decision making. The successor of these two measures, the GII, was introduced into the Human Development reports beginning in 2010 to counter the criticisms of the validity of its predecessor indices. The GII provides a composite measure of gender disparity in reproductive health, empowerment, and labor market participation. The specific indicators to measure reproductive health are maternal mortality rate and adolescent birth rates. Empowerment is measured by the proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by women and the proportion of adult women and men aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education. Economic status is expressed as labor market participation, and the indicator is labor force participation rate of men and women aged 15 years and older.

Systematic recording of changes in women's subjective well-being across the globe is an even more recent addition to the quantitative and qualitative quality-of-life toolbox and is exemplified in the *World Values Survey* and the *Personal Well-being Index* measures. These tools are used to establish baseline data and gauge shifts in subjective well-being over time. The Household Income and Labour Survey Australia provides a sample data set for examining changing gender relations in the shares of paid and unpaid work.

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## 18.3 Timeline

The trajectory of differential life chances for men and women can be traced back to the beginnings of recorded history as outlined in the chapters in Part 1, which cover the Western, Eastern, and South Asian traditions of well-being. Even cave drawings by the first humans depicted highly specialized roles in survival based on physical strength, which generated discrepant rewards. This gender-based unequal share of the spoils of human development has persisted for thousands of years and continues in many parts of the world (United Nations Development Programme 2015).

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<sup>1</sup>The North–South divide is broadly considered a socioeconomic and political divide. Generally, definitions of the Global North include North America, Western Europe, and developed parts of East Asia. The Global South is made up of Africa, Latin America, and developing Asia including the Middle East (North–South divide 2016).



Figure 18.1 depicts key events in the uneven and gradual dismantling of gender discrimination and in the improvement in women's well-being from ancient times to the present. The journey takes us from the example of a matrilineal, gender equitable Chera Dynasty of the Sangam Age (300 Before the Common Era–400 Common Era) in what is now the state of Kerala, India, to the end of the international United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) campaign in 2015. During that time, major strides toward equitable gender relations have been achieved in health, basic rights, leadership roles, and economic independence and power. For some countries, however, universal suffrage and female political representation, universal quality education, universal high quality health coverage, and optimum social and economic conditions for maximizing quality of life and well-being remained an elusive dream in 2015. For example, progress on MDG5, Target 5.A, which aims to “Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio (MMR),” reveals that, although “the number of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births—decreased globally by around 45 % between 1990 and 2013, this rate of decrease is unlikely to lead to the achievement of the targeted 75 % reduction by 2015.” In particular, “of the 89 countries with the highest maternal mortality ratios in 1990 (100 or more) 13 have made insufficient or no progress at all, with an average annual decline of less than 2 % between 1990 and 2013” (World Health Organization 2015: 15).

Major challenges for gender equity persist as do opportunities for addressing these challenges. Some of these are reflected in the SDG outcome documents developed by the 193 United Nations member states and 23 international organizations charged with monitoring international progress into the middle of the twenty-first century.


### 18.3.1 Ancient Times to World War II

The historical literature provides details of more than 40 matrilineal societies (Narayan 2014). No doubt many other examples of matriarchal, matri-

lineal, and matrifocal communities, both past and present, in various parts of the world have not been adequately recorded. Debates continue in anthropological circles about the degree of freedom that female lineage confers, and some Darwinist commentators argue that matrilineality represents an early evolutionary stage of human development. Whatever perspective one takes on these matters, matriarchal, matrilineal, and matrifocal communities provide useful benchmarks against which we can measure advances in gender relationships in what remains a predominantly patriarchal world.

One of the largest remaining matrilineal societies is the Minangkabau in Sumatra, where female lineage since ancient times has conferred considerable power in relation to family location and use of family resources. Similarly, the Mosuo from southwest China, who number over 40,000, have always practiced female lineage. To this day, Mosuo women are in charge of family finances, do not marry, and have extensive personal freedom. Another case study from antiquity where gender equity was promoted through education as well as social, economic, and political empowerment of women, and continues today, is in South Asia. The state of Kerala in southwest India has a long history of elevated status for women and girls (Maddox 1999). Unlike in other parts of India, from 300 BCE to 400 CE, the Chera Dynasty of the Sangam Age had a matrilineal society in the area that now forms the state of Kerala, and son-preference was absent. Women owned land, which was passed down through the female line; women were involved as key decision makers in affairs of state and finance; and female literacy was seen as the cornerstone of a successful society (Population Connection 2012). The continuation of this long tradition of female agency in Kerala accounts for the status of women's health, education, economic and social power, and general well-being into the twenty-first century, despite continuing high population density and low overall gross domestic product. The historical elevated status of women provided the ideal base for further landmark developments in gender equity in Kerala with the establishment of a Protestant





**Fig. 18.1** Timeline of key events in the improvement of women's well-being

School for Girls in 1819 by the early missionaries and the rise of communism in 1957.

However, widespread interest in women's rights in most regions of the South came much later. It coincided with more general moves toward equity, including the rise of justice-based, nongovernmental organizations, socially conscious missionaries throughout the South, and communism in countries like China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Lao PDR. Writing on women's rights in the South slowly increased in the 1980s but burgeoned after the 1995 United Nations (UN) Conference on Women in Beijing.

It was also a long time before any society in the North (see footnote 1) would achieve Kerala's level of gender equity even after substantial economic development and lowering of population densities. With the Agrarian and Industrial Revolutions in Europe, physical strength no longer exclusively defined gender roles, but social, economic, and political devaluing of women persisted long after technology had freed women from their disadvantage in physical strength (Kaminski 1998; Rowbotham 2013; Tarbin and Broomhall 2008). In the North it was not until the French Revolution and the philosophical enlightenment that the inequalities in power, income, leisure, and status between groups of individuals, including between men and women, were even seriously debated. However, many of these enlightened ideas were not translated into concrete action for centuries, including the late introduction of full female suffrage in France in 1944, in Italy in 1945, in Belgium in 1948, in Greece in 1952, and in Switzerland not until 1971.

In Europe, the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries of the Common Era witnessed major challenges to traditional forms of political, economic, and social power that were instrumental in shaping the massive social transformation of the Industrial and French Revolutions. The challenges to the ownership of feudal land, traditional production methods, the power of religious orders (particularly the Roman Catholic Church), and the absolute power of the monarchy were designed to benefit all citizens, but the issue of gender inequities simmered beneath the debates.

These developments and their associated discourses spread rapidly across the Western world.

The Industrial Revolution was a double-edged sword for women. Although it gave women remunerated work outside of the home, precipitating a degree of economic independence and mobility (and in some cases an improved standard of living), the working conditions were often unsafe and unsanitary, and the work was repetitive, boring, and arduous. Furthermore, women were paid lower wages than men for equal work and were subjected to the double burden of paid and unpaid work. Arriving home tired after a full shift in the factories, they started their second shift attending to domestic chores in the family (the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey (Melbourne Institute 2015) suggests not much has changed in the past 300 years). Young women often cut short their already limited education to support their families by working in the factories and became economically essential to family maintenance. However, exposure to the public domain made women aware of new technologies for birth control and the need to avoid pregnancies. The eventual decrease in fertility, reduction in maternal mortality, and subsequent increased longevity certainly contributed to improved well-being, despite increased exposure to industrial hazards.

The French Revolution was also a mixed blessing for women. Although all sectors of French society had come to appreciate the benefits of female education, female literacy was largely seen as an avenue for educating children. Female suffrage and female political representation were seen as going against the natural order of women's primary role in the private sphere. In *Emile* (1762), the Enlightenment author Jean-Jacques Rousseau, although strongly promoting the education of women and girls, reinforced the traditional French understanding of women as both biologically and socially distinct from, and inferior to, men. This attitude contributed to the exclusion of gender equity from the broader agenda of human rights inherent within the spirit of the Revolution. It is little wonder that France was one of the last countries in Europe to grant

universal suffrage in 1944. However, the sentiments of the French Revolution were exported across the globe, and women fared better in applying those sentiments in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, especially in the early suffragette movements.

Outside of the Western world, other than the limited examples of matriarchal and matrilineal societies mentioned above, traditional patriarchal regimes persisted as they had since ancient times. Traditional gendered inequities were in fact often exacerbated by the strictures of imperialism and colonialism. The black feminist publishing house Seriti Sa Sechaba and the Congress of South African Writers published anthologies, poems, and stories by marginalized groups such as domestic servants that attest to the interplay between class, race, and gender in multiplying the oppression of black women in colonial times and later (Oosthuizen 1987). Thus both the North and the South entered the nineteenth century with gendered patterns of culture that had changed minimally since the Middle Ages. These gendered patterns were detrimental to fulfilling the potential of both men and women, and the inherent inequality represented “a far reaching societal impairment” (Sen 2005: 250).

### 18.3.1.1 Political and Economic Equality and the Suffragette Movement

The first signs of significant social movements to improve the lot of women in the Western context came in the women’s suffragette movement from the mid-nineteenth century, although in isolated instances, selected groups of women were given the vote in Sweden, Corsica, and the United States in the eighteenth century. However, even when full female suffrage and political representation were granted sequentially in countries across the world throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, there was no guarantee that this right would lead to improved well-being for women. Female suffrage is certainly a prerequisite for improved well-being for women, but political equality is not a sufficient condition, as the past century has shown.

The first country in the world to institute full female suffrage was Corsica in 1755, even before the Industrial and French Revolutions. However, by 1769, female suffrage was revoked. Prior to this time, Sweden (1718) provided limited suffrage to land-owning women in 1718; during the French Revolution, Poland gave land-owning women over 30 years of age the vote in 1795. It was a century before the next countries and states issued full female suffrage: New Zealand in 1893 and the state of South Australia in 1894. By the middle of the twentieth century, Finland (1906), the United Kingdom (1928), Turkey (1934), France (1944), Italy (1945), China and Belgium (1948), India (1950), and Greece (1952), among other countries, had given women full rights to vote and to stand for political office. The rate of universal suffrage granting escalated after the Second World War, during which the capacity of women to succeed in both the civilian workforce and in combat situations was established. Successive governments found it difficult to invoke traditional understandings of the gender division of labor in light of women’s demonstrated capabilities in paid work, yet it was not until 1971 that Switzerland granted full suffrage.

### 18.3.1.2 Health

“*Death borders upon our birth and our cradle stands in the grave.*” (Joseph Hall, Bishop of Exeter [1564–1656], cited in Chamberlain 2006). A defining domain of well-being is health, and in women’s health the key indicator of progress is the maternal mortality rate (MMR), which currently varies widely across regions and countries (World Health Organization 2015) (see Table 18.1 and Figs. 18.7 and 18.8). Historical data are hard to find on maternal mortality ratios, but we have anecdotal narratives (such as the quote from the Bishop of Exeter above) and unsubstantiated statistics that suggest that maternal and infant mortality rates were high in all parts of the world until the nineteenth century. Until the discovery of germ theory (1860s), the introduction of contraception (from the 1890s), the widespread training of midwives (from 1900), introduction of public hygiene and nutrition campaigns (from the 1920s), and extensive use of antibiotics

**Table 18.1** Global and regional progress in achieving selected Millennium Development Goal (MDG) outcomes: MDG 5, 1990–2015

	Target	Performance levels						
		Global	AFR	AMR	SEAR	EUR	EMR	WPR
<b>Millennium Development Goal (MDG) Target 5.A: reduce Maternal Mortality Rates (MMR) by 75 %, 1990–2015</b>								
Reduction in MMR 1990–2015 (%)	75	45	49	37	64	59	50	60
Births attended by skilled personnel (%)	90	74	51	96	68	98	67	96
<b>Millennium Development Goal (MDG) TARGET 5.B: achieve universal access to reproductive health by 2015</b>								
Antenatal coverage = or >1 visit, 2007–2014, (%)	100	83	77	96	77	...	78	95
Unmet need for family planning 2012, (%)	0	12	24	9	13	10	18	6

*AFR* African region, *AMR* Region of the Americas, *EMR* Eastern Mediterranean region, *EUR* European region, *SEAR* Southeast Asia region, *WPR* Western Pacific region

Data from World Health Organization (2015)


(1930s), women from all over the world (and their babies) died before, during, and after childbirth at alarming rates (Campbell 1924; Fildes et al. 1992; Morantz et al. 1982; Preston and Haines 1991; Schofield 1986). The main causes of death were puerperal pyrexia, haemorrhage, convulsions, and illegal abortions.

Loudon (1992) argued that in England maternal mortality rates were about 1,000 per 100,000 live births at the start of the 1700s and reduced to 400–500 per 100,000 births throughout the nineteenth century. The Registrar General Reports (Fig. 18.2) provide higher maternal mortality rates in England and Wales in the nineteenth century, peaking at more than 70 per 1,000 total births during plague epidemics and falling rapidly after the 1930s (Chamberlain 2006). Chamberlain attributed this decline to the widespread use of midwives, improved public health campaigns, contraception, and the introduction of female obstetricians and gynaecologists as well as the introduction of antibiotics and chemotherapy.

However, in Third and Fourth World countries, MMRs remain high, and the causes of death currently parallel those predominant in nineteenth century Europe. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the least safe place to be pregnant. Sierra Leone still had 1,100 maternal deaths per 100,000

live births in 2013. In parts of Nigeria, MMRs have risen to over 3,200 during famine and civil strife in combination with the HIV/AIDS epidemic over the past decade. Furthermore, MMRs and infant mortality rates (IMRs) remain high among Fourth World communities living in First World countries, such as the indigenous populations of Canada and Australia (Holland 2015). Similarly, indigenous communities in newly developed countries such as Malaysia (Orang Asli) and ethnic minorities in rapidly developing countries like Laos (such as Lavan and Ta Oi) suffer many times the MMR of the respective national averages. The impact on the communities of high levels of MMR and IMR is devastating, but these deaths are often met with a smile of quiet resignation as a “normal” part of life (Eckermann 2014). The challenge is to find out what lies behind the smile.

Minimal eighteenth and nineteenth century literature exists on maternal and infant mortality in the non-Western world other than through songs, stories, and sayings passed down from generation to generation. One example is the traditional Tagalog (Philippines) saying that “A woman giving birth has her one foot in the grave” (UNICEF 2004), which is similar to the above quote by the Bishop of Exeter describing the risks of giving birth in seventeenth century



**Fig. 18.2** Maternal mortality rates per 100,000 births in England and Wales, 1850–1970 (Data from Registrar General Reports from Chamberlain 2006)

Britain. In Lao PDR, a baby is not given its full name (or acknowledged personhood) until it is 12 months old because the cost of a funeral for the large percentage who die in the first year is prohibitive (Eckermann 2006; Lao baby names 2007).

Van der Kwaak and Dasgupta (2006) argued that the first scientific citations of gender and nonreproductive aspects of health and well-being in the West were in the nineteenth century. They referred to the system for routinely recording the causes of death set up by Farr in 1839 as the benchmark for studies in health statuses of different social groups with reference to socioeconomic class disparities and gender relations. A general malaise is reflected in much of the female-authored literature in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; gendered aspects of diseases and disorders such as chlorosis, consumption, hysteria, tuberculosis, anorexia, and fainting spells dominate narratives (Sontag 1978).

Women's health issues are particularly well-documented throughout this period in the pioneering communities of the United States and during and after the American Civil War.

Following the nineteenth century spotlight on pregnancy and maternal mortality in Western

countries, the emphasis in public health campaigns broadened to the notion of a healthy woman as a productive woman. For example, connections between female health and preserving American culture were drawn: Women were presented as needing to be physically healthy in order to perform their many roles as mother, wife, moral guardian, and social reproducer (Borish 1990, 1995; Morantz 1977). But there was a lack of congruence between the public portrayal of pioneering women's health and their actual well-being. Although urban reformers and farmers defending farm life believed rural women enjoyed outstanding physical and mental health—compared to urban women—an examination of farm women's opinions of their well-being and the material culture of their lives yields a dramatically different view. “These women perceived their dismal well-being as not only physical, but also social and cultural, noting the lack of appreciation shown for their domestic labors and their contributions to the rural household” (Borish 1995: 25).

On the other, less progressive end of the health spectrum, Victorian women were repeatedly chastised in much of the medical literature from the nineteenth century across the United States

and Europe through a diagnosis labelled “female hysteria”; as a result, many women considered to be mentally unstable were sent to asylums (Briggs 2000; King 1993). Sane women could find themselves labelled insane and institutionalized for anything from postnatal depression to alcoholism or senile dementia, and even for social transgressions such as infidelity (considered to be “moral insanity”), or for simply being opinionated or outspoken (Lutes 2002; Parry 2006; Wallace 2012; Worell 2001). The primitive and oppressive treatment of women suffering from mental health problems included the use of antimony (a toxic chemical now used in fire retardants, which was used to keep patients in a state of nausea, making acts of violence less likely) and blood cooling and thinning by way of leech-letting (Kornstein and Clayton 2004). Primitive as these methods were, they represented an important shift away from the idea of mental health control from without, via chains and shackles, and toward control from within, via treatment or cure (Wallace 2012). An interesting linkage between women’s gynaecological and mental health was drawn by many authors in this era. It was commonly assumed throughout much of medical history that the female reproduction system and the female neurological system were one and the same or so intertwined that there was not much difference. It could be argued that versions of female hysteria and the insulting notion that a woman’s ovaries control her mind and body are still grappled with today in discussions of gender inequity.

### 18.3.1.3 Family and Religion

Throughout history “many societies have relegated both religion and women to the ‘private’ sphere of life.” Salbi (2003: 3) argued that “the administration of religious rather than secular laws regulating issues of concern to women, such as marriage, divorce, and wealth distribution” has put women at a distinct disadvantage. In response, women have struggled to have their grievances addressed by secular rather than religious laws, which is exemplified by dowry abuses throughout South Asia and the struggles for rights by Palestinian women in Israel. Salbi (2003: 3) sug-

gested that the only way for “women’s issues to be governed by universalist principles” was to remove this historical dichotomy between the public and private spheres, “thus overriding the ‘particularist principles which tend to perpetuate the subordination of women.’” This situation is true of women’s experiences of well-being in both the North and the South.

Uchem (2003) provided an iconic example from the Igbo African Culture where women have been subordinated by both ancient traditional religion and the colonial influence of the Roman Catholic Church. Uchem (2003: 2) argued that “the status of women among the Igbo has suffered under the perpetuation of religious myths related to human origin and ‘female evil,’ which have rationalized and legitimized the subordination of women under colonial and missionary policies, reinforcing gender biases in Igbo culture.”

As with many institutions, religion has been a double-edged sword in terms of women’s well-being in both the North and South. Undoubtedly, “religion provides ways for people to deal with the hardships associated with war and often promises a better life. It also serves as a uniting force for populations in their resistance of unjust, corrupt or ineffective governments and provides an identity for minority groups that otherwise don’t fit in” (Salbi 2003: 2). However, individuals can also “fall prey to religious extremists who utilize religion for political gain and resort to violence as a means to obtain their goals” (Salbi 2003: 2). Fundamentalism can be at odds with the liberation of women as in “the cases of the Muslims in India and Palestinians in Israel” where “women’s struggle for their rights as women has been said to undermine the national/religious struggle.” Consequently, the “one-dimensionality of insisting that communal identity take precedence undermines feminist efforts” (Salbi 2003: 2). This effect is similar to the impact of the Roman Catholic Church on contraception and family planning in countries like the Philippines, where women’s rights and health outcomes can be severely undermined by fundamentalist approaches to family life.

Vohra (2003: 2) applied this tension between religion and feminism to the “internalization of



female ideologies in Hinduism that have resulted in a feeling of powerlessness among Indian women.” She pointed to the practice of dowry, where assets are “given along with the bride as compensation for her weakness and inferiority as a woman” and this tradition is “perpetuated by women out of their own sense of devaluation.” Vohra argued that “while laws related to women are in need of reform, so is the self-perception of Indian women.” She suggested that reconciliation between apparently mutually exclusive worldviews is possible “by reconstructing the notion of gender in Hinduism” to encourage women to “become aware of their rights and inherent worth as human beings, enhancing their confidence and self-reliance and encouraging them to work to improve women’s access to property, employment and education.”

Key themes in women-authored Western literature of the eighteenth century cover similar domains: household conventions as definitive of a woman’s place in society and power struggles as women challenge dominant religious discourses (extending as far as legal jurisdiction). In America, eighteenth century women’s literature focussed on women’s experiences of the Revolutionary War and civil unrest.

Women’s well-being at the beginning of eighteenth century Europe was characterized by the household and its associated discourse, with the ecclesiastical court as the omnipresent and parallel institution that supervised social order and family policies pertaining to the household, community, and larger society. Its jurisdiction was extended to some of the most intimate aspects of individuals’ personal lives: for a woman, this meant her relationship with her husband and children. Studies of the household offered a set of rules to order the emotional content of individuals (Rowe 2002). For example, Vintilă-Ghițulescu (2008) conducted a study of the normative role the Roman Catholic Church played in Romania in reinforcing roles of women in the home and in the community, focusing particularly on the emotional ramifications of divorce (2008). Although the ecclesiastical tribunal attempted to mediate and offer solutions for women whose health suffered under a somewhat oppressive regime, the author

noted that the church’s counselling or mediation efforts coalesced around the central idea that a woman should remain by the side of her spouse (it was her preordained role) and should she stray from this role—regardless of the risks to her own well-being—the church must act in a way to ensure that the woman assumes the same role in a different environment. “A divorcée should have her dowry returned so that she could remarry and join another family; otherwise she should return and live in her father’s household” (Vintilă-Ghițulescu 2008: 15–16).

Studying female-authored artefacts during this period (familial and political letters, account books, visual sources, and artworks) is one (albeit limited) way to gain insight into how women expressed themselves and how they were represented by contemporaries. This area of scholarship is underdeveloped at present (Broomhall and Spinks 2011). Primary sources like Hannah More’s *Coelebs in Search of a Wife: Comprehending Observations on Domestic Habits and Manners, Religion and Morals* (1809) seem to support the purported general malaise of women during this period, whereas others emphasize as a positive attribute the enhanced capacity of women to express themselves in writing.

The passing of the Witchcraft Act of 1735 in Great Britain marked the beginning of the Church of England’s diminishing dominion over women’s well-being. Religion had been a primary motivator behind the witch hunts of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe (Roberts 2014). In fact, female victimization throughout history and across cultural contexts regularly occurs when women are attaining economic independence from men (Hoch-Smith and Spring 1978). Many argue that witch hunts were substantially tools for the suppression of women (encouraged by the Church of England) and that such rituals frequently develop at precisely those times when men are losing the economic advantages of having a subordinate female class to serve their needs (Bullough 1973; Nelson 1975; Roberts 2014).

Clark and Richardson (1977: 120) suggested that the witchcraft hysteria came to an end

because a new male-female equilibrium was established such that men were no longer threatened by new gender-role relationships: “If the persecution of witches was rooted in male anxiety about the sexual power of women, an anxiety that burst forth in persecution as the old patriarchal culture was disintegrating, then the witch craze would end only as women attained a new status and men began to find themselves relatively secure with it.”

Roberts (2014) and Clark and Richardson (1977) have suggested that religious discrimination is often merely an expression of deeper economic and political conflicts, and, indeed, the eighteenth century social conflict between men and women over jobs and family roles was central in the witch-hunt holocaust sanctioned by the Christian churches. However, without the presence of a worldview that made this discriminatory action toward women seem universally right and just, it is unlikely that it would have taken place. The criminalization of witch hunts represented a collective shift (across nations) in thinking about what constitutes acceptable treatment of women.

In parts of the world it became less acceptable to regard women as part of a unit (a couple) that constituted a mere economic necessity (Amussen 1988; Hufton 1975). In eighteenth century Romania, for example, the wife’s dowry and the husband’s assets formed the nucleus around which coalesced the financial resources needed for the survival of the couple and the upbringing of children. Moreover, these assets were going to constitute later the patrimony which would help the children form their own family units. Single or divorced women in Romanian society (and indeed, Great Britain and Europe, where witch hunts were a popular religious ritual) represented a real threat to the moral order established by the Roman Catholic Church: They could “destabilise social order and contribute to the ruin of a household” (Vintilă-Ghițulescu 2008).

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, however, The Revolutionary War brought American women into many new causes (Ballard 1785–1812; Brown 1996). In 1766, Daughters of Liberty started to appear throughout America,

and they began to question their role in society, demanding that women receive a better education in order to be better equipped to do so (Ballard 1785–1812; Brown 1996; Madigan 2009). This attitude was reflected in much of the female-authored literature of the time, for example, Mary Wollstonecraft’s *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* (1792), which explored the emotional excess associated with the discourse of sensibility and how it was also identifiable with greater suffering (Barker-Benfield 1989).

Other collections of poetry, letters, and journals written by women in the late eighteenth century reveal similar discontent with their preordained roles within society (Brophy 1991; Haggerty 1998; Kerber 1980; Parka 1976). For example, the diaries of eighteenth-century midwife and healer, Martha Ballard, unravel the medical practices, household economies, religious rivalries, and sexual mores of women in the New England frontier. Between 1785 and 1812, Martha Ballard kept a diary that recorded her arduous work and domestic life in Hallowell on the Kennebec River, District of Maine. Her writing also illustrates struggles and tragedies within her own family and local crimes and scandals and provides a woman’s perspective on political events then unfolding in the nascent years of the American republic (Ulrich 1991).

Particularly in America, colonial women who were literate were beginning to voice their objections to patriarchy and became involved in politics and current affairs (Fithian, as cited in Farish 1957; Isaac 1999; Rowe 2002). For example, in 1773, the vestry of Bruton Parish asked two women to testify to what they knew about a particular reverend’s orthodoxy. Their testimony about his religious opinions contributed to the vestry’s rejection of the reverend’s bid for the pulpit (Isaac 1999). These small but significant acknowledgements of women as valid and contributing members of society represent sizeable shifts in collective attitudes toward, and treatment of, women, thus encouraging a closer investigation of their health and well-being in the coming century.

Although religion may have offered, in both Western and non-Western contexts, “a haven of

sorts for women through its glorification of traditional roles” (Salbi 2003: 2), the private sphere often proved far from a haven when it came to women’s safety. Women’s well-being by the nineteenth century was characterized by a new onus on family violence as a social problem, an emerging awareness of women’s mental health, suffragette/suffragist movements, and breakthroughs in women’s education. In addition, a more attentive focus on women’s physical health during the decades leading up to “the vote”<sup>2</sup> led to some of the earliest critiques of normative discourses of the female body.

#### 18.3.1.4 Violence

Women’s well-being, according to Joanne McEwan (in Broomhall and Van Gent 2011: 247), was dictated by “normative social expectations regarding gender roles within marriage and assumptions about legitimate spousal interactions.” Her chapter on eighteenth-century cases of domestic violence in London explores how witnesses linked wife-beating with ideas about masculinity and, more specifically, masculine authority. She supports Iorga’s notion that, although women’s plight was acknowledged, they still had little power over their own dominion. Though domestic abuse was a punishable offence in eighteenth-century London, it was only as a misdemeanour of common assault. Therefore, abused wives had little recourse for assistance or protection under the law, and the prohibitive cost of applying for remedies like legal separation was a barrier for a majority of London women (in Broomhall and Van Gent 2011: 249).

Historians have suggested that Western attitudes toward violence in general underwent a significant change between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, during which there was a transition from “a society justified by hierarchy and status to one justified by the social contract” (Clark 1992; Wiener 1998; Wood 2004a, b).

During the early industrialization of Britain, Frederick Engels noted in his 1844 classic, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, that conditions of poverty had led to an increase in sexual violence and rape—with prostitutes and factory-working women being the most victimized. By the same token, “Expressions of everyday violence such as public brawling and other examples of interpersonal violence previously considered minor and so tolerated by both authority and the communities in which they occurred were steadily criminalized from the late eighteenth century on” (Rowbotham 2013). The latter view is supported by many sources highlighting the ways in which “unnecessary violence”—particularly toward women—was publicly condemned, or at least disapproved of: “... excessive violence dragged down everyone’s reputation. Rules about ‘legitimate’ violence set the tone of a neighbourhood and it did no-one any good to break them” (Bourke 1994: 73) and “... [neighbours would] prevent or moderate a wife beating by a combination of surveillance and reproach. When a fight seemed likely they watched a couple closely... Surveillance was usually accompanied by reproaches for the husband... The most common community response to a wife-beating was simply to help the wife, either by nursing her or offering her shelter” (Tomes 1978: 336).

Shifts in the cultural milieu over time began reflecting practical changes in daily life. For women, this meant re-conceptualization of social power and shifting gender ideologies and expectations. As outward displays of violence became less acceptable, physical strength and brute force lost influence as markers of masculinity (Simpson 2012). Rather, as Wiener (1998) argues, an increasing condemnation of violent behavior in the nineteenth century saw the passage of legislation to protect vulnerable groups, such as women and children, from male violence. The courts also punished this violence with more severity.

It could be argued that here lay the beginnings of conceptualizing and reprimanding workplace harassment—for the benefit of women—but the doctrine of the two spheres ensured that domestic violence remained hidden from public view or

<sup>2</sup>The periods before and after the turn of the century when women were given the right to vote around the world, starting with New Zealand in 1893 through to the United Kingdom in 1928.

condemnation (Clark 1987; Lea 2002). Exceptions can be seen in female-authored literature from the second half of the century, such as Ellen Wood's (1861/2008) novel *East Lynne*, which brings to light ways in which the Victorian family served to disempower and disenfranchise women, highlighting the violent injustices its heroine suffers at the hands of male family members. Interestingly, the source of the novel's conflict is economic disparities between the heroine and her husband, which supports the notion that female economic emancipation was a key source of agitation with regard to the treatment of women throughout the previous century (Clark and Richardson 1977; Hoch-Smith and Spring 1978; Nelson 1975).

Criminologist John Lea (2002) contested that a privatization of violence occurred in the latter half of the nineteenth century, resulting in a reduction in public visibility of and the flow of information to the criminal justice system about violence in the private sphere of the home. The author maintains that modern (Victorian) gender and family relations became consolidated to the disadvantage of women. As family life moved out of the public sphere—a process led by the suburbanization of the better-off sections of the working class—the criminal justice system lost its jurisdiction over domestic violence. It is a valid counterargument and one that persists to this day: If the overriding concern is to defend the stability of the family rather than to treat the perpetrator of domestic violence as a criminal offender, violence (behind closed doors) will persist.

### 18.3.1.5 Education

The first official record of a woman receiving a tertiary education comes from Spain, where Juliana Morell received a doctorate in 1608. Evidence indicates that administrators of the Spanish colonies encouraged female education at all levels throughout the 1600s. Later that century, there are records of women graduating from universities in Utrecht in Holland, Quebec in Canada, New Orleans, various parts of Sweden, and Padua and Bologna in Italy. However, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-

ries, these records are sparse and even sparser in the South.

Despite the ancient history of female freedom in India in the Vedic period, women's rights deteriorated during the medieval period. It was not until 1846 that the first school for girls was established in Bengal and in 1847 in Calcutta. These schools were closely followed by a school for girls in Pune in 1848, with the first woman teacher in India, and the Bethune School in 1849, which became the first women's college in India in 1879. As in other parts of the world, the impetus for female education came from middle class men, who saw it as desirable for girls to be trained to converse intelligently with their future husbands and to teach basic literacy and numeracy to their future children (Rama 2009: 105). Rama (2009: 105) argues that in "precolonial India elite Hindu and Muslim girls were taught either informally or formally at home and in village schools" and that the content of that education was very limited.

Other parts of Asia went through a similar trajectory. For example, in China "it was only after the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) at the end of the Qing Dynasty that a campaign to establish girls' schools began" (Wong 1995: 345). Prior to this period, women's education was distinct from men's in that the "aim of traditional women's education was limited to the teaching of social ethics and family traditions with an emphasis on how to become a virtuous wife and good mother."

Similar motives for female education and literacy emerged in the North, but the motives evolved over time toward issues of leadership and rights. The changing structure of the nineteenth century family unit in American pioneering communities increasingly required women to modernize their values and the values they imparted to their children. As the primary care givers, they were expected to educate their children in a new way: preparing them to enter a modern society, focusing on enlightened ideas about progress and individual freedom. It was argued that in order for them to shape the nation's youth effectively, they had to be better educated themselves. Catherine Beecher (1855), a well-known women's education reformist, considered women as

natural teachers and saw teaching as an extension of their domestic role.

Although many supporters of women's education at the time shared Beecher's belief that higher education was necessary to make women more effective wives, mothers, and teachers, a few started to see education as a means to change women's lives and to give them the same opportunities as men (Dyhouse 1995; Howarth 2000; Tullberg 1998). The first women's college in the United States was Bethlehem Female Seminary (now co-ed Moravian College), which was established in 1742. The first to remain an all-female college was the Single Sister's House (now Salem College), established in 1772 originally as a primary school, then a high school, and finally a college. Nearly a century later, a radical agenda accompanied the establishment of Wellesley College as a privately funded liberal arts college for women in Massachusetts in 1870 and the foundation of another seven sister colleges across the country soon after. Far from only preparing women to become effective wives, mothers, and teachers, Wellesley College was founded with the specific intention of equipping women with the skills to lead the country through "...great conflicts" and "vast reforms in social life." Wellesley has been largely headed by female presidents over its 145-year history and actively encouraged women to move into leadership positions. Soong May-Ling (later Madame Chiang Kai-shek), Madeleine Albright, and Hillary Rodham Clinton are among the long list of political leaders who are alumni of Wellesley College.

In Britain, from 1860 onward, the few became a few more as the suffrage movement gained momentum in establishing many institutions of higher education for women (Girton College, Bedford College for Women, Westfield College) designed not only to educate, but also to mobilize and politicize. Institutions like The Langham Place Group embraced not just education but also suffrage for women, employment opportunities, and reform of the law regarding married women's property (see Jones 2009; Phillips 2004; Spender 1987). Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, the current social order was being challenged in several countries, and a new philosophy

was emerging, imbued with ideals of liberty, personal freedom, and legal reform.

By the twentieth century, this change was being translated into public recognition of women, as the following section on post-War II developments reveals. Women started assuming leadership positions in politics, administration, and the economy.

American anatomist Florence Rena Sabin (1929), who in 1925 became the first woman to be elected to the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, said in her acceptance speech for the 1929 Pictorial Review Annual Achievement Award, "It matters little whether men or women have the more brains; all we women need to do to exert our proper influence is just to use all the brains we have."

#### 18.3.1.6 Body Image

The eighteenth century was a notable period for the reputation and social advance of the medical profession in both Europe and America (Cunningham and French 1990). Because medicine was almost exclusively a male profession, knowledge and observation of the female body left much to be desired. Unachievable expectations for how the female body should look were set, and therein lay a myriad of consequential health issues for women.

For example, in American studies, the correlation between a woman's physical appearance and how she was treated had much to do with determining her mental and physical health (Banner 1983; Mazur 1986). Banner described two opposing images of female beauty: the "steel engraving lady" (early eighteenth century) and the "voluptuous woman" (late eighteenth century). The steel engraving lady was delicate and fragile, in both appearance and in health, and warranted protection (Mazur 1986: 284–285). She was a model of proprietary and admiration but at the same time susceptible to damage. The thin woman represented high social class whereas the voluptuous woman represented the lower classes (often actresses or prostitutes). Lea (2002: 20), also, identified the distinction of body image as representative of social class as problematic for a woman's self-esteem: "But women in public



faced the intrusive gaze of men, and the distinction between respectability and non-respectability in mode of dress, appearance etc., became continuously more important. Important strategies of dress, walk, not looking back when stared at had to be developed, and any women who appeared outside these conventions was open to labelling as deviant or prostitute.” This nexus between affluence and thinness was later reinforced in the 1930s by the famous quote from Wallis Simpson, Duchess of Windsor, who proclaimed that “You can never be too rich or too thin” (Knowles 2009). That sentiment appears to have persisted into the twenty-first century as a dominant theme in discourses about women’s appearance.

### 18.3.2 Post World War II

The dramatic social changes of the twentieth century saw far-reaching transformation of gender relationships that impacted women’s and girls’ lives in all parts of the globe. After WWII we have more data on developing and non-Western countries, much of which are authored and initiated by women. The massive movement of women from the domestic sphere to the public sphere in many parts of the world during the Second World War created a watershed in women’s voices. In many countries it was the first time that women had entered the paid workforce. After the war, many women did not want to return to the domestic realm despite significant government incentives for them to do so (including post-war baby bonuses).

The mass movement of women into the paid workforce started to break down the traditional gender division of labor because the women chose occupations that had previously been reserved for men. By the 1960s, in many parts of the world, men were also entering formerly feminized occupations such as primary school teaching and nursing. This two-way flow of occupational choices led to social, legislative, and political calls for equal pay. Thus the experience of working during the Second World War was a major trigger for the social transformation

of women’s economic power, education, and political engagement.

Sirimavo Bandaranaike was the first female head of state in Ceylon in 1960, followed by Indira Gandhi of India in 1966, Golda Meir of Israel in 1969, and Elisabeth Domitien of the Central African Republic in 1975. Since 1960, more than 70 women have been heads of state worldwide, and some of them have served several terms in office.

Blaszczyk (2002: 2) argued that, in terms of women’s leadership in business, “the watershed moment was the 1970s, when female entrepreneurship was invigorated by the feminist movement and national legislation that encouraged equal opportunity.” She noted that “by the late 1980s, women owned half of all American businesses” and “by 1989, they accounted for more than a third of MBAs earned in the United States in a single year.” Women came into their own by the turn of the century when “the number of American companies owned or controlled by women grew dramatically” and “three American women headed companies with earnings that exceeded \$1 billion.” In 2015, 4.6 % of CEO positions at S&P 500 companies were held by women. These are undoubtedly remarkable achievements given the short history of women’s leadership in modern times; however, the goal should be that women comprise 50 % CEOs, 50 % of world leaders, and 50 % of leading professionals.

In the 1950s, for the first time, fertility became more controllable with the introduction of the contraceptive pill and other modern contraceptive technologies, allowing women more choices. These developments impacted significantly on the format of the family, including reduction in family size. Reliable methods of family planning also allowed governments greater flexibility in housing, infrastructure, and social and economic planning.

In most rural communities (especially in poorer regions), women had always been integral to the production process but often in an unpaid capacity. Ironically, the movement of women into the public sphere was not without its disadvantages.



### 18.3.2.1 Economic Equality, Family, and Work

The lack of a reciprocal movement of men into the domestic sphere resulted in double-shift labor for working women, which significantly impacted their well-being much as it did when women moved into the factories during the Industrial Revolution. The Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, which has been collecting data since 2001, suggests that women in the paid workforce still predominantly do a double shift when they get home, which impacts on their well-being. The HILDA research shows that the majority of men do not increase their hours of housework after marriage whereas women's hours of housework increase dramatically upon marriage. This finding holds true even when couples decide not to have children or before the children are born. Thus, despite significant changes in the format of the family since the 1950s, women still undertake the majority of domestic work in the household. This burden is exacerbated in women-headed, single-parent households, which constitute a significant proportion of household formations internationally (Eckermann 2015). The subjective well-being data point to this group of women (particularly divorced and separated women) as having the lowest quality of life of all groups other than people who care for the frail, disabled, and infirm (Cummins 2014).


Over the past 70 years, women's wages for equal work have caught up with men's in a few spheres such as medicine and law. However, in sectors that remain feminized, such as nursing, women's wages remain lower than men's for equivalent work, and women are systematically underrepresented in senior executive and higher salary levels. Furthermore, the World Values Survey wave 6 suggests that across countries, even in the second decade of the twenty-first century, a wide variation remains in attitudes of both men and women to women's right to paid employment. For example, in response to the statement "when jobs are scarce men should have more right to a job than women" (Fig. 18.3), a majority of both men and women in Sweden (96 %) disagreed, but the majority agreed in

Egypt (82 %) and Kuwait (61 %). In Japan, 30 % agreed, 17 % disagreed, and the majority either did not know or did not care either way.

### 18.3.2.2 Human Rights, Politics, and Feminism

Widespread interest in women's rights in most regions of the world came after the Second World War and as a consequence of the suffragette gains in the prior period and the rise of feminism. In the North, gender issues were highlighted by the evidence of women's capacity to fully function in the public sphere during and after the Second World War and from women's key roles in the civil rights movement, which built on suffragette sentiments. Many women were not prepared to return to exclusively domestic duties, having experienced the public spheres of paid work and administrative decision making, and, in some cases, armed combat. In the South, attention to women's rights and well-being coincided with more general moves toward equity, including the formation of justice-based nongovernmental organizations, socially conscious missionaries, and communism in countries like China, Cuba, Vietnam, and Lao PDR. In fact India, Chile, China, Cuba, Lebanon, and Panama were instrumental in framing the wording of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 from which many women's rights covenants have sprung. However, in some parts of the world, those debates are still at an early stage.

The civil rights movement had an effect on the feminist movements of the 1960s across the globe that led to major international initiatives by the end of the twentieth century. International organizations such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Development Programme, and UNICEF have worked alongside women's organizations, governmental agencies, civil rights movements, local communities, and nongovernmental organizations over the past 60 years to address the social, economic, and cultural dimensions of gender inequality and now systematically report on progress in countries across the globe. Although they had major responsibilities in the civil rights movement, "until recently women's accomplishments have



**Fig. 18.3** World Values Survey Wave 6 v45: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.” Responses by country (Egypt 2012, Japan 2010,

Sweden 2011, Kuwait 2013) (Data from World Values Survey Wave 6 2014)

been absent from historical analysis and were ignored by the contemporary press. Yet through their dedication, organizational skills, teaching, and leadership, it was women who served as the backbone of the civil rights movement” (Ezra 2009).

Prior to the United Nations Beijing Conference on Women in 1995, the United Nations Development Programme introduced two new measures of gender inequality, the GDI and the GEM, to assess human development (United Nations Development Programme 2013), which started the systematic sex disaggregation of data in many fields and provided the tools to measure progress in gender equality. Since that time, further refinements of gender measurement and analytical tools have taken place (including widespread introduction of the GII) that allowed for worldwide comparative analysis of the effects of gender on well-being since 2010. Use of these indicators reflects the crucial point that “poverty eradication without gender equality is impossible

and a contradiction in terms” because “the eradication of poverty requires equal opportunities and full and equal participation of women and men as agents and beneficiaries of people-centred sustainable development” (United Nations Development Programme 1997: 109–110). This understanding of the nexus between poverty and gender discrimination underscored the creation of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in 1976; the agendas of the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994 and of the UN Conference on Women Beijing in 1995; and the formulation of all eight of the MDGs in 2000 and the SDGs in 2015.

The 12 areas of concern in the Beijing Platform for Action (see attached e-file of strategic objectives) address women and poverty; education and the training of women; women and health; violence against women; women and armed conflict; women in the economy; women in power and decision making; institutional

mechanisms for the advancement of women; human rights of women; women and the media; women and the environment; and the girl child.


These events again proved to be turning points but this time they were universal—no country could escape the global surveillance of their gender dealings, and governments became accountable for their levels of domestic violence, unequal pay, gendered health outcomes, and unequal educational opportunities and were obliged to report to the international community on progress in these areas. These events culminated in the MDGs, which the United Nations required final reporting on in 2015.

Reporting on MDGs has revealed that gender-based poverty, high MMRs, female infanticide, selective abortions (Sen 2005: 226–228), high rates of domestic violence, and unequal pay and educational opportunities persist in many parts of the world (World Health Organization 2015). The Beijing Platform for Action is very much a work-in-progress as countries struggle with geographic, religious, political, social, economic, cultural,

and attitudinal barriers and challenges to universal human rights.


The World Values Survey indicates that, despite several decades of global commitment to political, economic, and social equality between the sexes, huge variations remain in attitudinal values. To the statement “on the whole, men make better political leaders than women do,” over 50 % of Egyptians and 49 % of Kuwaitis strongly agreed, whereas only 4 % of the Swedish and Japanese populations strongly agreed with the statement (Fig. 18.4).

Similar discrepancies in attitudes toward the importance of women’s rights are evident between countries in the World Values Survey data from 2010 to 2013 (Fig. 18.5). Over 80 % of Swedes argued that women’s rights are an essential ingredient for democracy compared with 36 % of Japanese, 30 % of Kuwaitis, and 24 % of Egyptians. Sixteen percent of Kuwaiti respondents to the Wave 6 Volume 139 survey said that women having the same rights as men was not an essential ingredient of democracy, compared to



**Fig. 18.4** World Values Survey—Wave 6 v51: “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.” Responses by country (Egypt 2012, Japan 2010, Kuwait

2013, Sweden 2011) (Data from World Values Survey Wave 6 2010–2014)



**Fig. 18.5** World Values Survey—Wave 6 v139: “Women have the same rights as men: Essential to democracy or not.” Responses by country (Egypt 2012, Japan 2010,

Kuwait 2013, Sweden 2011) (Data from World Values Survey Wave 6 2010–2014)

less than 1 % of Swedes, 2 % of Japanese, and 4 % of Egyptians. The remainder of respondents’ attitudes for each of these countries ranged between these two extremes.


**18.3.2.3 Health**

A key rights issue raised in the Beijing Platform for Action was the growing trend in several countries toward gender-skewed birth rates since the 1960s that defy the natural sex imbalance in favor of boys of 102–106 births per 100 female births. Technological advancements such as amniocentesis and ultrasound have been important in improving health outcomes, especially in providing advance care for unborn babies with health problems. However, the use of these techniques for prenatal sex selection since the 1980s has serious ethical, social, economic, and gendered consequences. For example, in China, under the one-child policy, the sex ratio of newborns in favor of boys rose from 106/100 in 1964 to 123/100 in 2005 (Fig. 18.6).

Similar rates were found in the Republic of Korea, many of the Central Asian and Central European States, and South Asia. The attitude toward being born female implied in this outcome impacts the well-being of girls and women as exemplified in the traditional Indian saying “having a girl is like watering your neighbour’s garden.” Son-preference has economic as well as social and cultural roots.

Recent data suggest a slight reversal of this sex-at-birth skew in Asia since the relaxation of the one-child policy in China, the legislation discouraging sex-selective abortion in India (Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques [Regulation and Prevention of Misuse] Act, 1994), and the government policies addressing the impact on an aging population of insufficient female offspring carers in Korea. However, it is too soon to establish whether this is a trend.

The Central Intelligence Agency’s *World Factbook 2013–2014* (Central Intelligence Agency 2013) data suggested that by 2011 China



**Fig. 18.6** China: The ratio of boys per 100 girls as reported in population censuses, 1953–2005 (Data from China population censuses and surveys 1953–2005)

and Korea were redressing the imbalance. The countries with the most skewed reported sex ratio at birth in 2011 were Liechtenstein (1.26), Curacao (1.15), Macao and Azerbaijan (each 1.14), China (1.13), Vietnam, India, and Armenia (each 1.12), and Albania and Georgia (each 1.11).

However, addressing the gender skew at birth does not address survival rates and gender differences in mortality, morbidity, and treatment across the life span from differential nutritional status in childhood, to differential rates of life expectancy (usually favouring females), and gerontological intervention.

As emphasized previously, the most sensitive indicator of inequality across the globe is the MMR. The impact of MMRs on well-being is felt across families, communities, and nations, which is why MMR was the key area of attention in the MDGs. The indicators used to inform progress on meeting Target 5.A of the MDGs (see Sect. 18.3) are percentage reduction in the MMR and percentage of births attended by skilled health personnel. As seen in Table 18.1, some progress has been made in these two indicators on a global and regional basis, especially in the Americas (AMR), Europe (EUR), and the Western Pacific (WPR), but Africa (AFR) and the Middle East

(EMR) are likely to fall short on both measures, and the Americas are particularly low on reducing the MMR, albeit from a lower MMR baseline than other regions.

MDG Target 5B refers to achieving by 2015 “universal access to reproductive health” with specific targets of 100 % antenatal care coverage and 0 % unmet need for family planning. Although the Western Pacific region of the WHO achieved 95 % antenatal coverage by 2014 and the American region 96 %, the African, Southeast Asian, and Mediterranean regions lagged behind with 77–78 % coverage. In unmet need for family planning, the regional discrepancy was also substantial, with 24 % for the African region and 18 % for the Mediterranean region compared to 13 %, 10 %, 9 %, and 6 %, respectively, for Southeast Asia, Europe, America, and the Western Pacific (Table 18.1) (World Health Organization 2015). Wide discrepancies remain within these regions. For example, in the Western Pacific region, despite its overall success in meeting MGG Targets 5A and 5B, countries like Papua New Guinea lag far behind their particular targets, with subareas within the country faring even worse.

If we look at countries within regions, we get an even greater range of progress results on



**Fig. 18.7** Selected countries that have underperformed on Millennium Development Goal 5.1: Maternal mortality rate (MMR) (Data from United Nations 2013; United Nations Women 2015; World Health Organization 2015)

MDG 5. In some cases, little change has occurred or MMR rates have risen or fluctuate widely (Fig. 18.7). Many of these countries did not meet the 2015 targets for MDG 5A for MMR. For example, Cameroon, Chad, the republic of Congo, Lesotho, Liberia, and Somalia were far from meeting their MMR targets, and all have experienced increases at some point between 1990 and 2015.

However, many other countries have made dramatic progress in MMRs and easily met or exceeded the 2015 MDG 5A targets, especially for births attended by skilled health personnel (Fig. 18.8). For example Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Eritrea have experienced steady declines in MMR since 1990 and were well below the target by 2010, with the Maldives down from 850 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 60 in 2010.


Maternal mortality rate is just one indicator of well-being for pregnant women and those who have recently given birth. To get a clear comparative picture of women's well-being related to

child bearing, one needs data on maternal morbidity and disability (especially incontinence from unresolved vaginal fistula) and qualitative and quantitative measures of subjective well-being as well as service availability.

A popular saying in the West, "men die and women get sick," reflects the almost universal life expectancy advantage for women but the morbidity advantage for men as exemplified in the Global Burden of Disease assessments. The health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE<sup>3</sup>) rate provides a more complete picture of health outcomes than does the life expectancy at birth rate. The HALE rate for women in the Western Pacific Region from 2002 to 2007 was between 70 and 80 years in five high-income countries and did not exceed 60 years in many countries in the low

<sup>3</sup>The health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE) rate attempts to capture a more complete estimate of health than the standard life expectancy rate. HALE estimates represent the number of expected years of life equivalent to years lived in full health; therefore it is a measure not only of quantity but also of quality of life.





**Fig. 18.8** Selected countries that have exceeded the Millennium Development Goal 5.1, Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) (Data from United Nations 2013; United Nations Women 2015; World Health Organization 2015)

and lower-middle income categories. The improvement between 2002 and 2007 was more marked in the lower-income countries, whereas the high-income countries with an already high HALE, as expected, saw little change.

The subjective quality-of-life literature suggests a mixed bag across countries, with women expressing higher levels of subjective well-being than men in some contexts but lower levels in other contexts (Eckermann 2014). One of the key issues contributing to women’s compromised well-being is gender-based violence.

**18.3.2.4 Gender-Based Violence**


Successive World Development Reports have identified violence against women as a major contributor to the burden of disease, and Murray and Lopez (1996) confirmed that the burden from all forms of violence falls disproportionately on women of all ages. World Health Organization multicountry comparisons of reported lifetime exposure to gender-based physical and sexual violence are presented in Fig. 18.9. The extreme differences, from 9 % exposure in Singapore to

76 % exposure in Samoa, suggest a strong cultural component to the behavior.

This issue remains a major challenge across the world. Despite legislative and health promotion campaigns in all countries, no country has significantly reduced domestic violence since the 1990s. This difference may be partly because more women are willing to report violence than in the past, but even 9 % of the female population experiencing domestic violence is unacceptable. The impact on women’s well-being reverberates across generations. Violence not only “causes physical injury, it also undermines the social, economic, psychological, spiritual and emotional well-being of the victim, the perpetrator and society as a whole” (Eckermann 2001: 196) and is best encapsulated in the following quote from a domestic violence survivor. “The scars mend soon enough but damage to the soul stays forever.”

**18.3.2.5 Education**

“A mother’s education is more important to her child’s survival than is household income or



**Fig. 18.9** Lifetime physical and sexual violence prevalence ordered alphabetically by country (Data from Krug et al. 2002)

wealth” (United Nations Development Programme 2013: 89). Increases since 1990 in female literacy as well as in the number of girls completing primary, secondary, and even tertiary education have been dramatic, but in the least developed countries the number of women with at least secondary education remains at 17.9 % compared with men at 27.1 %, so major challenges remain. The equivalent values worldwide are 53.3 % for women and 62.9 % for men (United Nations Development Programme 2013: 159).


When we look at attitudes to girls’ and women’s education, we see continuing resistance in some parts of the world (Fig. 18.10). For example, in Kuwait and Egypt, 36 % of respondents to the World Values Survey strongly agreed or agreed with the statement that “a university education is more important for a boy than a girl,” whereas 15 % of Japanese respondents and only 2 % of Swedish respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement.

Positive government and community attitudes to women’s and girls’ education, along with pro-

active policy, can produce rapid and dramatic results. The state of Kerala in India re-emerged as the iconic positive example in the twentieth century of the impact of female education on all aspects of well-being and for all members of the community. A concerted policy for 100 % female literacy and extended education of women and girls in Kerala in the second half of the twentieth century has produced the best health and well-being outcomes in all of India despite Kerala being one of the poorest and most densely populated states of India. Female literacy rates (for those aged 7 and above) rose from 36.43 % in 1951 to 91.98 % in 2011, which has had a positive effect on health, employment, and empowerment indicators as well as on subjective well-being.

**18.3.2.6 Subjective Well-Being**

The predominantly quantitative approach to assessing well-being improvements in objective conditions for women contained in the GDI, GEM, GII, and MDGs has more recently been complemented with qualitative and quantitative



**Fig. 18.10** World Values Survey Wave 6 v52: “A University education is more important for a boy than for a girl.” Responses by country (Egypt 2012, Japan 2010, Kuwait 2013, Sweden 2011) (Data from World Values Survey 2010–2014)

measures of the subjective dimensions of well-being (see Parts 1 and 2 of this volume for a detailed history of the international rise of the quality-of-life and well-being movement). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Better Life Index, the Personal Well-being Index, and the World Values Survey are just a few of the burgeoning measurement tools that provide comparative templates for comparison of subjective well-being across space and time.

The recent cross-national research provides often contradictory findings on the differences between the quality-of-life experiences of men and women (Eckermann 2014). In some cultural contexts, women have better subjective well-being outcomes than men, despite worse objective conditions of life. Cummins (2014) argues that a gender bias in resilience socialization accounts for much of this advantage for women in countries like Australia as measured by the Personal Wellbeing Index (PWI). In other contexts, men fare better than women (Baltatescu 2014; Uglanova 2014). In the postsocialist coun-

tries of Eastern and Central Europe in particular, although the well-being scores of both men and women conform to the U-curve configuration identified by Blanchflower and Oswald (2008), the subjective well-being scores of women tend to remain lower across the life span (Baltatescu 2014; Michon 2014; Uglanova 2014) because life challenges for women are difficult enough to compromise the usual subjective well-being set point.

### 18.3.3 The Twenty-First Century and the Future

In the twenty-first century, the global picture for gender progress in individual countries will continue to use the GII (2012 onward) as one of the next generation-gendered indicators from the GDI and GEM (1990–2012). However, by the end of the twentieth century, it had already become obvious that gross domestic product, HDI, GDI, and GEM were not sufficient indicators of progress in society. The development of

subjective well-being indicators to provide a subjective reflection of progress alongside objective indicators created an opportunity to reflect on progress in gender relations across the world. The OECD embraced noneconomic indicators of progress in its Better Life Index (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2011). Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme (2013: 28) acknowledged the growing “interest in using subjective data to measure well-being and human progress and to inform public policy” following in the footsteps of Bhutan’s move to Gross National Happiness as its guiding policy template.

Problems with the assumption within objective measures of progress of the “rational economic agent” can be overcome by using subjective methods. However, these methods cannot stand alone as measures of progress because comparability issues prevail. Thus, our toolkit for assessing progress in gender relationships in the twenty-first century will include an eclectic mix of objective and subjective measures of economic, social, political, cultural, and personal well-being. The Women’s Well-being and Development Foundation argues that “the development of women and their communities requires a comprehensive and multi-faceted approach that addresses both personal and collective challenges.” Melding objective indicators with subjective well-being assessments and use of new tools to gauge levels of well-being and impact of interventions will inform policy makers, service providers, and communities generally about remaining gaps in understanding gender inequalities and challenges including global inequalities in choices and opportunities for women and girls.

The post-MDG agenda for the second decade of the current century provides an ideal forum for high-lighting gender dimensions of quality of life and well-being. Gender relationships are central to all aspects of well-being from education, work, health, leisure, reproduction, and child-rearing to political decision making and creating environments free of violence and abuse. High subjective well-being as a complementary aspiration for global advancement, alongside economic and social progress, is where the personal and the

public dimensions of gender equality meet. If we hold a vision of making the private troubles of the past the public issues for the present and future, we can avoid historical mistakes. One can make this case especially for the hidden aspects of gendered abuse such as domestic violence, sexual violation, and work-based exploitation.

The future will see a significant move from concentration on first-world women to women’s enhancement in the South (United Nations Development Programme 2013), and the focus of research and hopefully research funding and resources too will reflect this shift. The gender agenda will be broadened to examine the proactive role of women as well as their disadvantaged status, thus moving beyond approaching women as victims, which has dominated gender-based policies since the time of the suffragettes. Examining gender relations alongside sex disaggregated health, economic, educational, and social indicators will provide a more comprehensive understanding of how all members of society gain from gender equality.

“Findings from the WVS [World Values Survey] indicate that support for gender equality is not just a consequence of democratization. It is part of a broader cultural change that is transforming industrialized societies with mass demands for increasingly democratic institutions. Although a majority of the world’s population still believes that men make better political leaders than women, this view is fading in advanced industrialized societies, and also among young people in less prosperous countries” (World Values Survey n.d.). However, as the 2014 Human Development Report (UNDP 2015) reveals, even among advanced industrial nations there is some way to go to achieve gender equity. Comparing the ranking of countries on the Human Development Index with their ranking on the Gender Inequality Index, we find that Australia is ranked 2nd on HDI but only 19th on GII. The United States is ranked 5th on HDI but a low 47th on GII; similarly, New Zealand is 7th on HDI but 34th on GII and Canada, 8th on HDI and 23rd on GII. The country that ranks highest on GII, Slovenia, is 25th on the HDI. Other countries that are pulling above their weight in the

HDI/GII ranking are Italy (HDI 26th, GII 8th) and China (HDI 91st, GII 37th). Thus some less economically developed nations have been able to achieve a high degree of gender equity (as measured by the GII) despite their economic position.

Economic development is just one of the many factors that have contributed to the enormous strides that women have made since they were purportedly dragged around by the hair by Neanderthal men in ancient times. Progress toward gender equity, and concomitant enhanced well-being, is evident in all spheres of life, including health, education, work, political representation and leadership, and income and economic leadership. The rate of this gender equality advancement has accelerated since World War II with the granting of universal suffrage; improved health care; the development of reliable family planning methods; concerted efforts to increase female literacy and education; the invention of technologies to reduce domestic labor commitments; changes in gendered roles in the domestic domain; equal rights and equal pay legislation in most countries; and positive discrimination in leadership recruitment. However, the reported progress on meeting many of the gender-related MDGs, like the reports on GDI and GII, suggests that progress is uneven across the globe.

Our remaining challenge is to ensure that the many gains some women have made to improve their well-being are shared equally by all women and girls worldwide going forward. The importance of universal progress is reflected in the fact that this challenge was the central theme of the UN Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, of goal number 3 of the MDGs for 2015, and of the SDG deliberations related to sustainable gender equality and empowerment of all women and girls.

**Acknowledgments** I wish to acknowledge the valuable input of Jess Shulman, who undertook the very thorough search and review of the eighteenth and nineteenth century women and well-being literature; Veena Kondaveeti, who generously assisted with the development of the women and well-being timeline diagram; and Pamela Fried, Richard Estes and Joe Sirgy who carefully and skillfully proofread and edited the final version of the manuscript.

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# The Role of Technology in the History of Well-Being: Transformative Market Phenomena Over Time

Audrey N. Selian and Lee McKnight

*Our lives today are strung with a profound and constant tension between the virtues of more technology and the personal necessity of less. ... What is this global force that elicits both love and repulsion? How should we approach it? Can we resist it, or is each and every new technology inevitable?*

(Kelly 2010)

*The more there is to invent with, the greater will be the number of inventions.*

(William Fielding Ogburn (1922))

## 19.1 Introduction

Technology is defined as “a manner of accomplishing a task, esp. using technical processes, methods, or knowledge” (Merriam-Webster 2012). Technology, in turn, creates the fabric of human life by transforming the threads of our everyday experiences with the environment we live in and one another. The earliest human technologies were handmade flint sharpened tools used to skin animals and, in the process, create art and clothing. Such tools were used to assist in hunting and to control the spaces inhabited by the earliest peoples in the surrounding ecosystem on which they depended. In more recent centuries, technologies were created to help humans cultivate crops and manage water, thereby providing food security and improving well-being on many levels essential to survival. Technology is often

the difference between prosperity and poverty in both developed and developing economies, as well as in the social organization and fragmentation that result in intraregional warfare. Technology fuels the wealth of nations and individuals through commerce and trade, as innovations unleash the creative destruction of markets, firms, and workplaces. The impacts of technology changes on people and communities are also profound.

From re-inventing avenues for political participation, to providing information and transparency, to financial access, to basic matters of housing and feeding the planet’s burgeoning population, to mapping the human genome, among others, it is fair to say that nearly every dimension of human well-being today is affected by technology. The accumulated innovations accessible on and through the Internet are a particularly ubiquitous and transformative example impacting most nations substantially by the early twenty-first century. The history of more than a half century of technology innovation and synthesis in packet switching, data communication, semiconductors, software, service, computation, and network architecture enabling the Internet innovation ecosystem is largely forgot-

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ten by the public even if its impact on human well-being half a century later is self-evident. The ubiquity of mobile handsets likely in every reader's hand or pocket is evidence of the pervasiveness of technology and its apparent significance for human well-being. Commercial Web sites are used to make purchases or to work remotely (e.g., Amazon.com, eBay.com, or Basecamp.com, Slack.com, respectively), whereas social media channels may to push for life-changing political news to the public, to communicate with family and friends and sometimes, to find a long lost friend. Social media are used both locally and globally and have been some of the most innovative inventions of the recent past, e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Weibo. The myriad daily encounters of humans and machines, both directly and indirectly, are all examples of the way(s) in which technology can affect well-being with a powerful multiplier effect.

Popular intuition and conventional wisdom correctly surmise that the unintended consequences of new technology and automation (the use of control systems for operating equipment such as machinery, industrial processes in factories, boilers and heat-treating ovens, routers on digital networks, flying aircraft, and other applications) with minimal or reduced human intervention (Automation 2015), the effects of creative destruction would also include job loss and industrial restructuring, resulting in an intensely competitive environment where some firms, communities, and entire regions and cultures could fall behind, or even disappear (Schumpeter 1934). It is no accident that technologies are diffused along S-curves (a general concept developed by Everett Rogers [1983] and others), building on epidemiologic data that show in graphical form a cumulative percentage of adopters of a new technology over time—gradual at first, more rapid with increases in adoption, and then plateauing until only a small portion of non-adopting “laggards” remain). These validate the intuition that only small portions of the population are usually consistently ready for new solutions and change; these curves provide a visual illustration of the cycle of the introduction, gradual growth, and maturation of technological

innovations over time, capturing the human experience of adaptation to technology with reasonable accuracy.

Technology as a *causal* factor to (or “driver” of) human well-being outcomes is difficult to discern in real time because unintended consequences and reverse feedback loops—both positive and negative—of a technology may not be easily detectable. In other words, there could be many contributing and complex elements that drive a particular subjective or even objective assessment of an aspect of well-being. It is also difficult to isolate technology in terms of its causality, as part of a symbiosis of the past and the present, of engineering and of human custom, and of technical and social phenomena. It is created and changed by human action while it is being used by human actors to interact with the structures of their own creation; in this sense it is recursive (Orlikowski 1992: 398–427).

Some scholars, such as Borgmann (1984), Ellul (1964) broadly, Pacey (1983: 4–6), and Deneen (2008: 65–67), suggest a heightened awareness of the sociological aspects of technology that is considering technology as its own “cultural system”, the full amalgamation of all the technology we have invented so far, plus the products of those inventions, plus anything else our collective minds have produced (Kelly 2010: 10). In some ways, Fukuyama's (1992: 126) reference to the emergent “global culture,” as a technologically driven global liberal political economy, is about this standardization that he argues portends “the end of history.” These are difficult questions, and it is clear that the way we think about technology is a key part of assessing the relationship of technology with well-being. Pacey (1999) and Winner (1986) were among the scholars who explored this phenomenon in depth. Popular media often place disproportionate focus on the technology itself, who is credited with having invented it, and how it works rather than on what led to it, its role as a source of present and future creativity, and its philosophical implications for our everyday lives. There are clearly evident path dependencies that have carried forward the widespread adoption of certain technologies (e.g., railway gauges, heating solu-

tions like gas as a function of pipes laid and sources, the QWERTY keyboard format, early Internet dial-up on copper lines), since the emergence of our cave-dwelling ancestors through to the present day; it is not unfair to presume that, to some extent, continued demand for new technologies is a reasonably proxy indicator itself that technology is improving our human lives and driving more good than bad outcomes.

This chapter addresses empirical, philosophical, socioeconomic, and developmental aspects of technology in its broadest sense as well as the impact of technological innovation on the evolution of human society. The chapter reviews concepts and phenomena that characterize its study and relationship to well-being over time. During the decades that followed WWII, information and communication technologies (ICTs) in particular have transformed the fabric of social interaction globally and are therefore emphasized in the chapter. With the global growth and adoption of the Internet and mobile technologies, the dramatic impact of ICTs on well-being, especially in fostering worldwide communication between peoples, is clear, profound, and rapidly changing. Further change and opportunities to improve human well-being are readily foreseeable as artificial intelligence, cognitive radios, 5G, and Internet of Things technologies emerge and get integrated, even if they are not yet fully understandable (McKnight 2016). After having introduced the broad topic of technology and human well-being in the prior section, the remainder of this chapter attempts to answer the following questions: (1) What are the major historical milestones of technology? (2) How is the role of technology conceptualized in theory and what attributions of power and influence accompany these theoretical frameworks? (3) What important nuances should be flagged in a review of the role of technology in society today? (4) How can analysis of technology through time be segmented into a useful systems framework that separates technology inputs from throughputs, to outcomes? (5) What have been the longitudinal impacts of technology on the core indicators (education, health, and income) of human development?

### 19.1.1 The Major Milestones of Technology History

Appendix C outlines major technological milestones in a compilation of scientific, medical, mechanical, agricultural, and communications technology innovations over time. The information summarized in this appendix is intended to serve as a *general point of reference and chronology for readers of this chapter*, with an emphasis on the tremendous leaps forward that have been achieved largely in the twentieth century and, more particularly, during the decades that followed the end of World War II.

### 19.1.2 A Brief Glance at Technology History

The ancient Greek word *technelogos* meant art, skill, craft, or craftiness; ingenuity would have been the closest translation. *Techné* was used to indicate the ability to “outwit circumstances” according to Kelly’s 2010 work on *What Technology Wants*. To the best of our knowledge, it was in Aristotle’s treatise on *Rhetoric* that the word *techné* was first joined to the term *logos* (meaning word or speech or literacy) to yield the term *technelogos*, which was barely used thereafter for many centuries. Kelly further stated that until 1939, the colloquial use of the term *technology* was basically absent until Johann Beckmann from Gottingen University in Germany used it extensively in 1802 to refer to his many innovations.

From the *Stone Age* (the period lasted roughly 3.4 million years and ended between 6000 BCE and 4000 BCE with the advent of metal working—Stone Age 2015) to the *Information Age* (also known as the Computer Age, Digital Age, or New Media Age), technology and human well-being have been intertwined in the provision of basic human needs related to energy, water, and transportation infrastructure. We can already observe the first semantic indicators of critical significance that exist for the technology for human well-being over the millennia: entire historical epochs have been named for key technical



innovations of their time, extending back to the Bronze, Metal, and Iron Ages. Examples of the former include smelting copper and alloying it with tin or other metals (Bronze Age 2015); examples of the latter include the use of iron in making cutting tools, weapons, personal ornaments, pottery, and systems of decorative design (Iron Age 2015).

The word technology entered common use in the early twentieth century (Technology 2015). This fact does not indicate that technology was not already having significant impact on human well-being far earlier than this. White (1940: 156), for example, stated "... the chief glory of the later Middle Ages was not in its cathedrals or its epics or its scholasticism [though these certainly were among its major accomplishments]; it was the building for the first time in history of a complex civilization which rested not on the backs of forced labor but primarily on non-human power." Galileo's conviction in the early 1600s on grounds of heresy for supporting the position of heliocentrism was part of a cornerstone of events that characterized the creative tension between science and religion at this historical juncture; his use of telescopes to observe the phases of Venus circling the sun and moons orbiting Jupiter was challenging for theologians and natural philosophers because his observations contradicted the geocentric ideas of Ptolemy and Aristotle that were closely connected to beliefs of the Catholic Church. Within a year or two, the availability of good telescopes enabled Jesuit astronomers to repeat the observations. Nevertheless, whereas some argue that nearly a 1000 years of scientific progress in Europe was sacrificed at the behest of the Catholic Church, others support the idea that the foundations of academic enquiry in the form of universities such as those in Bologna (founded in 1088), Oxford, Salamanca, Cambridge, Padua, and others were laid at this time.

### 19.1.2.1 China and the Silk Road

Transportation and communication technologies have been woven into the fabric of social history since before the invention of the wheel. Transportation and logistics, with the help of

technology, have historically improved global communication, economy, trade, and cultural exchange. The Silk Road (209 Before the Common Era [BCE]—9 Common Era [CE]) was a transportation trade route that connected the East and the West and facilitated trade, business, and cultural exchange within China and across South Asia, Europe, and Africa. The "Four Great Inventions of China" (Fan et al. 2015) included papermaking, the printing press, the compass, and gunpowder, as well as other specialty goods such as tea and porcelain, were brought to the West through the sea route used by Marco Polo, who opened the possibilities of cultural exchange between China and the Western European, world. It is noteworthy that the Silk Road<sup>1</sup> (Silk Road 2014) between East and West certainly did not function just as a passage through the Near East. The Silk Road still exists today, and many countries are trying to revive the economic meaning that this route brought with it. The Editor of *The World Today*, Alan Philps (2015), suggests "The Silk Road—a name invented by a romantic German geographer, Ferdinand von Richthofen, in 1877—is most likely a misnomer. Its historic importance lies not in the number of bolts of silk carried by soft-footed camel caravans, but in the two-way traffic of ideas and technologies." Fifty-seven countries who are members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank support of the establishment of "One Belt and One Road," the Silk Road Economic Belt and the twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road, indicating the continued significance of transportation technologies and systems for advancement of human well-being even or perhaps especially in a time of

<sup>1</sup>The Silk Road was known as the ancient trade route across which goods and ideas flowed between East and West, linking China and Rome. Silk came westward, while wools, gold, and silver went east. China also received Nestorian Christianity and Buddhism (from India) via the road. Originating at Xi'an (Sian), the 4000-mile (6400-km) road, actually a caravan tract, followed the Great Wall of China to the northwest, bypassed the Takla Makan Desert, climbed the Pamirs (mountains), crossed Afghanistan, and went on to the Levant; and from the Levant (modern Iraq and Syria) the merchandise was shipped across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe and elsewhere.



advancing information technologies (Islam and Kabir 2015: 19).

Chinese Emperor Qin Shi Huang (259 BCE–210 BCE), the first emperor in the imperial Dynasty of Qin, became famous not only for the terracotta warriors, but also for early movements of unification and standardization in communications methods. To make them more convenient, he standardized logistical parameters, measuring units, Chinese written characters, and various currencies of exchange, thus leaving lasting impacts on the economy of the country. Qin Shi Huang also standardized the length of the [axles](#) of [carts](#) to facilitate transport on the road systems used by his subjects, just as Julius Casear did for the Roman Empire shortly thereafter (Neuman et al. 1999). Huang’s activities also marked the beginning of the gold standard-backed currency system, which many countries of the world today still accept. This dynasty thus established a solid foundation for the growth of the Chinese empire; contemporary China and the global economy 2000 years later still operate on some of its core innovations.

### 19.1.2.2 The Roman Era

Since Roman times, secure communication methods, such as Caesar’s cypher (one of the simplest and now widely known [encryption](#) techniques, which uses a type of [substitution cipher](#) in which each letter in the [plain text](#) is replaced by a letter some fixed number of positions down the [alphabet](#)) (Caesar’s cypher 2015) was a game-changing innovation. Mass transportation emerged because of technical standards that have endured for millennia, just as Caesar’s roadway standard has become today’s standard railway gauge (Neuman et al. 1999). These efforts helped spread the flow of innovations as part of trade. The construction of dams, canals, and water wheels was reliant on ancient inventions created with the technology of the time. Two examples of the canals that greatly improved global trade and transportation are the Panama Canal and the Suez Canal, both of which have expanded to meet contemporary needs for shipping standards and technologies in the twenty-first century.

### 19.1.2.3 Near and Middle East

Until the sixteenth century, the Near East led the world in technological innovation and advance; techniques in agriculture, irrigation, hydraulic engineering, and manufacture were an integral part of the life and skills of people who cultivated them in Islamic contexts and who passed them from Christian Spain into Italy and northern Europe. Some examples include the purification of potassium nitrate; the invention of the water clock, the astrolabe, and the first combination locks; innovations in mechanical engineering; Damascus steel; and various Arabic alchemical treatises. Indeed, Multhauf (1966: 167) illustrates that between 1144 and 1300, major Arabic alchemical works that were translated into Latin included the *Tabula Smaragdina*, the *Turba Philosophorum*, *The Secret of Creation* by Balinus, *De Perfecto Magisterio* (attributed to Aristotle), *De Anima* of Ibn Sina, *De Aluminibus et Salibus* (*On Alums and Salts*), and the *Secret of Secrets*, both by al-Razi, and parts of *Kitab al-Sab’in* (*the Book of Seventy*) by Jabir. This era, known as the Dark Ages in Europe, spanned several centuries, during which little was contributed to the advancement of technology vis-à-vis Muslim scholars and scientists. Adjusting such standards, a century or more later is neither easy nor cost-effective or desirable.

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## 19.2 Technology and Theory

In this section, we discuss two major theories of the role of technology in society: technology as a mirror and technology as a driver.

### 19.2.1 Technology as Mirror

The systems from which technologies emerge are often a mirror of the political, business, societal, and even cultural choices made by their leaders, and the impact of technology on the political economy has been embraced by many leaders throughout history.

Karl Marx, for example, perceived technology as the principal means by which to shift from one mode of production to another, even when it is laden with deep sociopolitical influences. In their original *Manifesto*, Marx and Engels described three situations in the world of 1848 upon which to base a revolution: the replacement of the industrial middle class by the wealthier industrial millionaires, the replacement of manufacturing by modern industry, and the emergence of a global market. For them, technology had several core facets that altered the face of an economy (and by extension, society), including its implications for savings on labor, the turnover of capital, and the sheer access it enabled to wider markets and thereby, economies of scale. These interactions and outputs of productive technologies had strong influences on human social relations and organizational infrastructure and thus also carried profound implications for the centers of power in any national context.

Many aspects of our wider political economic system, and of capitalism per se, are a mirror of the technical outcomes and processes that emanate from the devices we work with today. Quantitative analysis conducted at RAND in 1995 indicated a strong correlation between democracy and electronic network interconnectivity, which in this case consisted of a metric based on e-mail data; the correlation coefficient for *interconnectivity* was not only large, it was substantially larger than that of other traditional predictors of democracy. The physical configurations of industrial production, warfare, and communications not only transformed the exercise of power and the experience of citizenship but also introduced “inherently political technologies” that are, by their nature, centralized or decentralized, egalitarian or nonegalitarian, repressive or liberating (London 1995). That is not to say that a new technology that may appear to favor a return to small-batch, decentralized production such as 3D printing (the process by which three-dimensional structures are built from a digital file, using a layer-by-layer approach) may not also be centrally managed and produced. The systemic implications of how public services are delivered (and paid for or subsidized) cannot be

causally isolated or easily separated from the value of the actual technologies themselves. What remains to be seen is whether human well-being in the long run will be enhanced by one or another pattern of technology use, and whether the options before us today are indeed desirable for driving optimal well-being outcomes in the future.

On a related *theoretical plane*, it is interesting to note that the technologies that emerge within the sphere of a particular innovation community reflect the existing or desired *social* structures around them. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute social scientist Langdon Winner (1986: 19–30) espoused a self-aware “soft” technological determinism, suggesting that specific social or physical structures (or limitations) have to be in place in order for a given innovation to see the light of day. He presented a great example: managed nuclear power, for example, requires a well-organized, fully resourced centralized “command and control style” facility run by experts capable of managing it. The same logic applies to the use of particular kinds of weaponry; e.g., the atomic bomb requires a top-down, hierarchical, centralized system for its deployment.

On the other hand, the adoption of solar, biomass, or wind (renewable) technologies (and the requisite policies) is more likely to reflect a distributed, bottom-up ethos of a decentralized, comparatively less rigid or disciplined ecosystem. When top-down social structures are not needed to use technologies such as solar energy for individual homes, these technologies become democratic, populist tools. That said, the use of large-scale, alternative energy systems that are more cost effective than small-scale energy systems (given their potential safety and cost impact on the electrical grid) might be feasible only when (e.g., a fuel-cell farm selling excess energy back to a power grid) centralized control systems can technically accommodate distributed generation surges in energy production. The politics of energy technology development thus are reflected at the local level, and the adoption or rejection of new energy technologies reflects much more than just cost and know-how. One could surmise that certain types of technologies simply would be

unlikely to flourish in certain sociopolitical contexts, e.g., distributed microgrids in high command and control economies or government-run centralized nuclear facilities in advanced liberal societies.

### 19.2.2 Technology as Driver

Simplistic attempts to frame the role of technology as inherently democratizing are often misleading. The Web and related mobile tools are often given credit as imaginary societal and developmental “equalizers.” Technology and progress, however, while in theory optimally imagined to be working in concert, do not necessarily travel hand in hand toward greater human well-being. A global Internet that connects all people—at present actually about half of all people on the planet—does not feed its information to all people equally. Search engines are neither predisposed nor able to create some kind of “information paradise” of equal access and application of knowledge to advance human well-being. The work of scholars like Hindman et al. (2003) on the theories and power laws that support the phenomenon of “Googlearchy” attests to this fact. They explore whether the aggregate structure of the Web is antiegalitarian and how a “winners take all” power-law distribution prevails, whereby a few successful sites receive the bulk of online traffic (Hindman et al. 2003:1).

Although new technologies contribute to economic development and may thereby advance all global society over time, it is relevant to bear in mind that such diffusion of benefits likely depends on equitable patterns of income distribution (Senker 2000: 212) and on a variety of other variables like legislation, civil society action, and innovation/social entrepreneurship ecosystems that are not necessarily equally prevalent in some nations in the developing world. The subject of how modern communications may alter the way in which various entities of the private sector, the public sector, and civil society interact has spurred much debate.

Ithiel de Sola Pool (1983: 5), a revolutionary in the field of technology and the social sciences

(1917–1984), posited that the more dispersed, easily available, and decentralized the modes of communication are, the greater is the degree of freedom that should be possible (at least in theory). Such debates ask whether the new technology is conducive to fundamental shifts in the distribution of power and whether it may therefore encourage the dissolution of strong, centralized political hierarchies (Selian 2002: 2). De Sola Pool (1983) wrote that only in the unique history of the modern West did printing become a “technology of freedom”; he also observed that, as yet, there is no linear path between printing and liberalism because the reactions to liberation of any kind occur after *and not before* the disruption of the status quo.

For hard-core technological determinists, or those who attribute great influence to technology, the dearth of technology (and synonymously the capital to develop or pay for it) is in itself a commentary on its developmental status, social structure, and cultural values. Whereas liberal visions find validation in the viral mobilizing power of social networks like Twitter and Facebook, the idea that ICTs spread equivalent liberal principles and support democratic change is perhaps simplistic. Perhaps it is enough to say that new technology may allow more liberal forms of authority to emerge if the right social, cultural, political, and other conditions are present.

Steven Berlin Johnson references what he calls the “hummingbird” effect of an innovation—or cluster of innovations—in triggering changes that seem to belong to a different domain altogether (Johnson 2014a). Increases in energy- or information-sharing have set in motion unprecedented waves of social and business change via the Internet. “Observing hummingbird effects in history makes it clear that social transformations are not always the direct result of human agency and decision-making. Sometimes change comes about through the actions of political leaders or inventors or protest movements, who deliberately bring about some kind of new reality through their conscious planning” (Johnson 2014a). In other cases, Johnson states, ideas and innovations seem to have a life of their own, engendering changes in society that were not part of their cre-

ators' vision. The inventors of air-conditioning were not trying to redraw the political map of America when they set about to cool down living rooms and office buildings, but the technology they unleashed on the world enabled dramatic changes in American settlement patterns that in turn transformed the occupants of Congress and the White House (Johnson 2014b). Another notable example he cites is the early twentieth-century scientific and public health breakthrough of adding calcium hypochlorite (or chlorine) to drinking water to kill bacteria. This innovation not only had a dramatic impact on mortality rates but it also totally transformed recreational habits as thousands of chlorinated public baths and pools opened across America; it also changed all the rules of "public decency" and indeed the levels to which women revealed their bodies in public spaces (Johnson 2014b). Johnson's work illustrates the complex, multidimensional, path-dependent phenomena of shaping technology history and the journey of human development.

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### 19.3 Technology and Society Today

Is technology a panacea or curse for human society? We address this question and the issue of negative externalities of technology in this section.

#### 19.3.1 Panacea or Curse?

This section offers a philosophical view on the interactions of human beings and technology, as well as on how the adoption of technology occurs in systems. Every day, people on our planet wake up and go about their daily activities, using tools and devices such as clocks, electric teapots, and telephones that encompass hundreds if not thousands of prior technology innovations. These items may perhaps be bought, sold, and used as integrated technologies, layered one atop another over the sedimentary foundations of modern life. In many developed nations that demonstrate a relatively high capacity for supporting the foun-

dations of a functional national innovation system, we take for granted everything from the electric grid, to financial and transportation systems, and the appliances that cook, cool, and conserve our food, or create the stitching in our clothing. The devices and services we use to absorb news, information, and entertainment; run our households; communicate with friends, family, and co-workers; and know what to face when we step out our door are created and typically distributed across global technology supply chains spanning continents and nations.

There is a duality in the impact of technological development writ large: It is neither a blanket panacea that "sweeps human development off its feet" (UNDP 2001: iii), nor is it a phenomenon we can ignore. To a large extent it is important to consider the implications of technology not just as a function of directly positive or negative outcomes on society, but in the context of the rationality that guides its every move; "... technology as such cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put" (Marcuse 1964: 16). Marcuse's point was that there is nothing neutral about technology; the technological society that rendered it would be a system of domination, and therefore neither its effects nor its roots could be treated with indifference.

One way to appreciate the effect of human agency in providing "the greatest good to the greatest number" is to adopt a constructivist view on technology born out of the cycling and recycling of human knowledge and ingenuity through the millennia. Technology, in all its reflexive significance for the transformation (and projection) of our identities on the planet, is the net outcome of all that has been learned since human knowledge began to be codified. It is the literal, earthly incarnation of what some like Laszlo refer to as the Akashic field, something akin to a Jungian collective subconscious, a field that contains all the "in-formation" ever known and aggregated in the entire virtual vessel of human knowledge (Laszlo 2004). Its implications for the multiple spheres elaborated upon in this chapter, its linkages to innovation and growth and our daily lives, and its ultimate physical manifestations in the cables, masts, turbines, towers, tunnels, and

microchips that characterize our landscape, are undeniably positive, although it brings with it the responsibilities of better stewardship of our planet and better distribution of the gains it affords its billions of inhabitants. The “darker side of technology,” i.e., that which produces ill-being, is explored later in this chapter.

The impact of technology on human well-being thus has many aspects, with the less optimal consequences for some largely mitigated by the positive effects enjoyed by many others. Examples of those who may suffer (in an economic sense) could include those who were, in their heyday, the grandfathers of innovation; the producers (and adopters) of the Betamax and the VHS cassette), of Super 8 mm film, laser disc players, the turntable, cassette tape recorders, transistors radios, telex machines, fax machines, analog telephones, portable televisions, and the portable radio, the “Walkman.” However, the more or less effective bans and controls on particular weapons, on drugs and health care procedures, and on most monopolistic behaviors illustrate that society has choices to make and does place controls on technologies, routinely regulating and constraining the application of technology in instances that are deemed to have potential negative consequences or risks for society.

Where the impact of technologies has been unknown or hard to control, human beings have used regulation, policy, customary norms, and cultural mores to help shape the trajectories of how technologies could be developed and how they should be used and by whom (Neuman et al. 1999). Examples include setting minimum ages and license requirements to drive cars and to pilot planes or to determine when it is or is not legal to use mobile phones. There are situations, particularly in the public domain, where statistical probabilities of danger or accidents provide a sound basis for regulating user behavior of items such as mobile phones. With a mounting body of evidence that is, ironically, bolstered by technology itself, we have created the groundwork for both rules and norms to be applied to what is socially and legally acceptable and what is not.

In today’s context, the need for public investment to advance knowledge and transformative

technology is evident in the emergence of modern telecommunications infrastructure and the Internet. The Internet is an outcome of many decades (1950s–1990s) of prior state-sanctioned innovation. It is important to note that strategic initiatives and decisions to undertake large public and public-private projects are clearly more about the governing public institutions than the creative genius of one individual.

### 19.3.2 The Negative Externalities of Technology

It is also important to articulate the negative impacts of technology, because they are multifaceted and deeply intertwined with the dynamics described in this chapter. They are evident in on the both the micro and macro spheres and in economic, social, and cultural spheres, and they can be as latent as they can be blatant, including impacts on work life and social interaction. Technology at times produces perverse outcomes: Whereas it has shed the spotlight on human rights abuses and given the means to activist organizations like Amnesty International, Transparency International, and Freedom House to decry transgressors, it has also given those who abuse masses of people the tools to discover, repress, subjugate, and generally maintain the trappings of tyranny. Many governments throughout the world continue to use a variety of tools, including licensing, limits on access to newsprint, control over government advertising, jamming, and censorship, to inhibit independent voices (Selian 2002).

Examples of latent negative impacts of technology include the forced and gradual buy-in of consumers who succumb to a network effect, having to follow suit if they wish to share their documents or pictures. More obvious results stem from the aforementioned dynamics of Schumpeterian creative destruction; online commerce has taken a major toll on small businesses that do not operate at scale. Today, everything from bookstores to DVD/video rental stores to travel agencies have been forced to redefine the way they do business. On a macro-economic scale, decisions taken on how to adopt or apply



technology can also manifest in many spheres; mismatches between technology and an economic or political context can sometimes lead to disaster. For instance, a nation whose economy is largely reliant on technology exports may find that declining demand for a given good or service can have a devastating impact on society, decreasing individual human well-being, and hence emerging as a negative impact of technological change. Another nation prospering under one particular type of technology paradigm may see its business leaders, government policy makers, and educational institutions incapable of adapting to a particular technological change, thereby contributing to a livelihood problem stemming from an inability to connect innovative production technologies to firm or national competitive advantage.

The application of technology to military spheres has been the key driver for what is known as the “revolution in military affairs,” changes in the conduct of warfare driven by information, communications, and space technology. The innovations’ of American theoretical physicist and wartime head of the Los Alamos Laboratory, J. Robert Oppenheimer and his team, known for their work on the infamous Manhattan Project in 1941, resulted in the creation of the world’s first atomic bomb, which exploded over Japan in 1945 and killed many people very quickly. Many tens of thousands more suffered the after effects of radiation. Japanese novelist Kenzaburo Oe, a Nobel laureate for literature, wrote in his 1965 nonfiction work *Hiroshima Notes*, “From the instant the atomic bomb exploded, it became the symbol of all human evil; it was a savagely primitive demon and a most modern curse” (Valiunas 2006: 85–104)

Technology is not simply a forward-moving process incapable of regression. The presence of technology in one place can make its absence in another be perceived as a terrible negative externality; for example, those who innovate with various transportation or communication technologies in one tourist destination can destroy the market of a neighboring locale. Lack of innovation and improvement may further lead some technologies to be forgotten or withdrawn from

use. The “Great Withdrawal” in China is a good example: In the fifteenth century, innovations in irrigation, agriculture, furnaces, textiles, and water power stagnated and atrophied for no apparent reason (Smillie 1991:74). Examples abound of knowledge lost at the doorsteps of invasion, conflict, and colonialization. The decimation of the Aztec nation at the hands (and diseases) of Europeans, and the similar fates of the Incas of Peru and the Native Americans of North America, are but a few examples of the advances and losses of technological know-how impacting the well-being of societies and individuals. Through time, specific gains and losses of knowledge have written and rewritten the pages of history, and thus as well the story of human experience and well-being. Unintended consequences of technology can also emerge far later in time, cascading forward with potentially undesirable effects for decades and even centuries. What is seen and unseen in contemporary technology innovation may matter for human well-being today, tomorrow, and, in some cases, not just in the twenty-first century but quite possibly into the twenty second and twenty third centuries and beyond as well.

Understanding the complex web of research and human creativity that has culminated in the thousands of amenities technology has afforded us in developed societies requires an astute eye and mind. At the same time, taking just one step beyond the bounds of “life within infrastructure,” even the untrained eye or any child can tell immediately what is lacking or where technology has not been invested in as a priority. Once you have seen technology, it is hard to imagine life without it.

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## 19.4 A Framework for Understanding Technological Impact

This volume goes to great lengths to articulate the modalities of the measurement of human well-being across geographic areas. Technology is a cross-cutting theme that runs along the length of these studies, woven deep into the fab-



ric of many well-being trajectories over time albeit in varying latent and blatant ways. Well-being is essentially an experiential human phenomenon, even as it is also something that can be analyzed through objective indicators of standards and achievements through time. *The role of technology in providing material, tangible improvement to the core areas of the Human Development Index (HDI), which serves as the key methodological reference point for all of the geographically focused chapters, is intrinsic to both the measures and perceptions of well-being.* Data on technology development, implementation, adoption, and use, compiled by the World Bank, the World Health Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as well as other organizations, are referenced in this chapter to illustrate technology's objective impacts on well-being. Subjectively, there is a variety of case work for review as well.

Analyzing the complex relationship between technology and human well-being depends on accurately distinguishing between the determinants of well-being and its constituents; that is, what some have referred to as “well-being as an end” (Dasgupta 2001: 305). Determinants are sometimes expressed as commodity inputs, many of which are provided by societal and business ecosystem services, including areas reliant upon technological processes such as food and fuel supply chains; water distribution and purification systems; materials for shelter; and marketed crops, livestock, forest products, and minerals. The enablement of physical, environmental, and social conditions that govern how local resources and space are regulated (increasingly more with the use of information technology), is an important determinant of well-being. Thus, various elements of well-being that are a function of technological process or know-how can be seen as both constituent and determinant parts of well-being. For example, education and health, and the means by which they are delivered, administered, and achieved can be both ends in themselves and means to experiencing well-being

(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005a: 73–74).

In this section we use a systems model that breaks down the analysis of the impact of technology on well-being into several dynamic, inter-related categories or phenomena. We seek to measure the role of technology as a major input into a given system, where we capture the common indicators of technology (e.g., technological achievement) and demonstrate their link to well-being indicators such as those reflected by the HDI. Thereafter, we examine the measures of technology “throughput” indicators that are linked with indicators related to core technological infrastructure (e.g., electricity, sanitation, transportation, telecommunications). Finally, we examine the connection between these throughput indicators and the outcomes that we associate with enhanced human well-being, depicted by their HDI rankings. The HDI incorporates the approach developed by Amartya Sen (1985) that focused on “capabilities,” an approach to human well-being that emphasized the importance of ends (e.g., a decent standard of living) over means (e.g., income per capita). In the HDI, component indices for life expectancy, literacy, school enrollment, and income are aggregated into a unified index that allows for analysis of human well-being levels over time, as compared to a one-dimensional assessment of development on the basis of simple per capita income.

#### 19.4.1 The Input Ingredients for Technological Progress

Each subcomponent factor of the HDI has been strongly influenced by technological progress because the fulfillment of basic human needs related to health, education, and welfare (income productivity) requires iterative and sustained commitment to the delivery of services at scale. *Several of the sections that follow outline HDI-related data inputs and outcomes, while establishing a qualitative correlation with the improvements brought about by technology.* The qualitative correlations between the input, throughput, and output variables hold together

under the framework of innovation and what it comprises. With the inputs factors described below, the throughputs have emerged, and the outputs link directly to the HDI analysis presented in Sect. 19.5.

A landmark study in the *Human Rights Quarterly* in 2003 found a strong correlation between the Technology Achievement Index (TAI) (Desai et al. 2001)<sup>2</sup> and the HDI, confirming empirically that the utilization of technology (as well as its creation and dissemination) and human advancement exist within an essential, reciprocal relationship. This point is foundational for this chapter. This correlation means that countries categorized as least developed nations face acute deficits in technological development. The advancement of technology builds human capabilities through the swift dissemination of knowledge in medicine, communications, agriculture, energy and manufacturing, improvements in education, income, health, and political freedom, which in turn fuel the creation of knowledge for more technological change (Hill and Danda 2003: 1028–1029). Research findings corroborate this mutually reinforcing association with HDI values in certain areas as the TAI categories advance from “marginalized” to “dynamic” adopters and from “potential leaders” to “leaders.” The strength of this correlation and the results of this analysis support the conclusion that the importance of technology achievement for human development may be greatest under the least favorable conditions. We have an important reinforcing loop to acknowledge that propels certain well-being trajectories and outcomes.

<sup>2</sup>The TAI is not a measure of which country is leading in global technology development; it focuses rather on how well the country as a whole is participating in creating and using technology. It focuses on four dimensions of technological capacity that are important for reaping the benefits of the network age: creation of technology, diffusion of recent innovation, diffusion of old innovations, and human skills.

## 19.4.2 Innovation and Research and Development

Theories of national innovation systems (first developed by scholars such as Nelson, Freeman, and Lundvall in the 1980s) preceded broader innovation and more focused entrepreneurial ecosystem studies. These analyses looked at the interplay of enterprises, institutions, and people and are premised on an understanding that the interactions between actors are as important as overt inputs like investment in research and development. Innovation is a measure of the scope of human creativity and is also by proxy an important signaling tool of well-being or the immediate potential to achieve it.

Necessity may be the mother of invention, but the fabric of cooperation required to realize an effective new solution to serve society derives from those who are well-educated, in good health, and in a position to live without relative concern for their basic human needs. Unsurprisingly, rankings indicate that the more “efficient” countries achieve, on average, the better are their Global Innovation Index scores (Dutta et al. 2014: xviii). Just as some high income states are not able to demonstrate efficiency in the workings of their innovation systems, some lower income states surprisingly outperform their expectations and achieve higher than expected levels of overall well-being. When Global Innovation Index scores are plotted against gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in purchasing power parity [PPP] dollars), economies close to the trend line show results that are mostly in accordance with what is expected from their level of development.<sup>26</sup> Others that show relative weaknesses in their innovation systems when compared with countries of similar income levels (i.e., Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Greece) may be suffering from a phenomenon known as the “resource curse” or the “paradox of plenty” (Dutta et al. 2014: 28)—not unlike the Easterlin Paradox.

When one examines the efforts of a society to progress or develop technologically, one of the most powerful input indicators to address is innovation. There is an underlying assumption that

technological achievement is a function of the means of years of schooling, research and development (R&D) expenditures, and the number of scientists and engineers working in R&D (Table 19.1). Although data in this arena are not consistently available, there is clear evidence that where the data do exist, they appear only to show unquestionable improvement over time. Mean years of schooling in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) overall has increased by over 30 % in three decades, which correlates well with the absorptive capacity of such countries to use R&D expenditures to hire thousands of scientists and engineers. Comparatively speaking, there has been a 60 % jump in mean years of schooling in Latin America and the Caribbean and an 85 % increase in years of schooling in South Asia, with little concomitant allocation of funding for R&D as a percentage of gross national product. Although the table is not well populated, the absence of data is itself indicative of the reasonable extent of the will of a particular region to

make technological achievement as a national priority.

From the macro perspective, economies that are “catching up” are more dependent on technology transfer than on basic research, with R&D expenditures generally considered unprofitable in countries with low levels of human capital (Dutta et al. 2014). Economies at the lowest levels of development and thus of human well-being may be trapped in a vicious cycle: Low economic development does not offer a context that provides incentives for young people to pursue higher education; if they do pursue higher education, suitable positions in which to use their skills may not be available in their homeland, leading to emigration or “brain drain” as individuals seek to advance their well-being beyond national borders.


More detailed data about R&D from the World Bank demonstrates related aggregate inputs by region over time, from the first most robust available datasets from the mid-1990s to the present day seen in Fig. 19.1. Substantial increases in the last 5

**Table 19.1** Constituent parts of technological achievement

	Mean years of schooling				Research and development expenditures		Scientists and engineers in research and development
	1970	1980	1990	2000	As % of GNP	In business (as % of total)	(Per 100,000 people)
					1987–1997	1987–1997	1987–1997
Developing countries	N/A	3.9	4.9	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Least developed countries	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Arab states	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
East Asia and the Pacific	N/A	4.7	5.7		1.3	N/A	N/A
Latin American and the Caribbean	3.8	4.4	5.3	6.1	0.6	N/A	N/A
South Asia	2.1	3.0	3.9		0.6	N/A	152
Sub-Saharan Africa	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.9	N/A	2437
OECD	7.3	8.6	9.1	9.6	2.3	N/A	2585
High income OECD	7.7	9.2	9.5	10.0	2.4	N/A	3141

UNDP (2001: 45)

N/A not available or missing data, OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development



**Fig. 19.1** Average regional expenditure on research and development (as % of GDP) (Data from World Bank 2015a)



years in particular are evident in the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia, and the Pacific regions.

**19.4.2.1 Patents**

The filing of patents is used to protect new knowledge and is a strongly correlated output indicator of increasing technology and innovation, in turn relating to the overall likelihood of improvement in well-being. Figure 19.2 shows a nearly 230 % increase in total global patent applications over about three decades. The number of patents in the application stage has steadily increased since the information was first compiled in the World Intellectual Property Organization databases in 1980, with strong, steady growth particularly in Asia, North America, and Europe. The World Intellectual Property Organization (2014) found that the top five fields for technology patent applications in 2013–2014 under the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 1970 were computer technology, digital communication, electrical machinery, apparatus and energy, medical tech-

nology, and measurement, all of which rely on and embed information technology in their innovation and product development processes. Figure 19.3 depicts the evolution of all regions in the world over time as pertains to patentable innovations in computer technology. Another powerful proxy for relevant inputs where technology trajectories are concerned is the number of peer reviewed scientific and technical publications; data on this activity are available with consistency starting in 1985. Figures 19.3 and 19.4 depict the relative prominence of and commitment to technical documentation and research and demonstrate unsurprisingly that, whereas global technical publications have more than doubled in number over the last three decades, the deepest foundations for this work exist in North America, Europe and Central Asia, and East Asia & the Pacific. It is fair to say that the preponderance of high quality academic institutions and think tanks is both a driver and function of success in this arena.

**Fig. 19.2** Total patent applications (direct and PCT national phase entries), 1980–2013 (Data from World Intellectual Property Organization 2015)



**Fig. 19.3** Patent publications by computer technology 1980–2013 and five dominant fields of technology (Data from World Intellectual Property Association 2015)




Fig. 19.4 Scientific and technical journal articles over time (Data from World Bank 2015a)

### 19.4.2.2 Technology Begets Technology


Technological innovation and well-being analyses encompass more than just inputs (such as research expenditures) and directly related outputs (such as patents). It is important to point out that the R&D leading to innovation is not necessarily applied to alleviate poverty or to treat the problems of the poorest. For instance, in 1998 global spending on health research was \$70 billion, with just \$300 million dedicated to vaccines for HIV/AIDS and about \$100 million to malaria research; of 1223 new drugs marketed worldwide between 1975 and 1996, only 13 were developed to treat tropical diseases and only 4 were the direct result of pharmaceutical industry research (UNDP 2001: 3). Over the past decade, research by the McKinsey Global Institute suggests that knowledge-intensive flows relative to GDP have grown more quickly in developed economies than emerging economies (Fig. 19.5), perhaps reflecting their more highly skilled labor forces, better-developed innovation platforms, and more advanced

connectedness, especially in technology (Schwartz 2014). They suggest that, for emerging economies to even play in this game, they need to encourage better innovation and improve their infrastructure underlying Internet data and communication flows (Manyika et al. 2014: 9).

### 19.4.3 Technology Throughput Indicators


This subsection discusses how various technology input indicators are linked with indicators of technology “throughputs” such as electricity (Fig. 19.6), sanitation (Figs. 19.7 and 19.8), transportation, and telecommunications. Research reveals that the material prosperity that has been experienced by people over the last 50 years has increased overall objective human well-being. Infrastructure in the form of roads, variety and abundance in agricultural outputs, electric grids, functioning sanitation, and clean water are all non-negotiable priorities for most






**Fig. 19.5** The majority of knowledge-intensive inflows and outflows occur in developed economies. A knowledge-intensive flow is a flow with embedded information, ideas, or expertise that is transferred when exchanged. Foreign direct investment is classified as a knowledge-intensive


flow because it often entails the transfer of embedded ideas, management expertise, and technology. Relative area corresponds to the portion of global inflows/outflows (Data from Schwartz 2014)



**Fig. 19.6** Electrical power consumption (kWh per capita)



**Fig. 19.7** Sanitation coverage increased most in large parts of Asia and North Africa (Data from World Health Organization and UNICEF 2014)



**Fig. 19.8** Trends in rural sanitation coverage 1990–2012 (Data from World Health Organization and UNICEF 2014)

people today. We assert that the foundation of serving *basic human needs at scale* is without question a function of technology inputs, throughputs and the success of its outcomes in driving well-being.

**19.4.3.1 Electricity**

The basic technology infrastructure of the industrial era, electric power, is depicted in Fig. 19.6. The figure shows the production of power plants and combined heat and power plants (less trans-

mission, distribution, and transformation losses and own use by heat and power plants). This indicator is essentially a basic, powerful (no pun intended) throughput for the diffusion of other technologies, increasing the likelihood with its own growth that other key elements of successful development may be achieved where electrification and energy have been made a priority. The sheer scope of its increase since 1960 is a resounding confirmation of the extent to which it is a demand driven driver (and proxy measure) of the rate of introduction of new technologies.

### 19.4.3.2 Sanitation

Another vital output to consider is sanitation; those who must live without it are on the poor end of the economic spectrums wherever they live. For this reason, it has been among the core Millennium Development Goals articulated by the United Nations and is an area monitored carefully by those who specialize in water and sanitation programming. It is an area in which the correlation with technology is starkly clear; management of excreta and wastewater is a complex task for even the most advanced societies, coupled with the challenge that “90 % of wastewater in developing countries is discharged untreated directly into rivers, lakes or the ocean” (World Health Organization and UNICEF 2014: 44). As depicted in Fig. 19.7, although there are well over 40 countries today half of whose populations still do not have access to basic sanitation, tremendous progress has been made, particularly in Eastern Asia, where measures show 40 % increases in coverage since 1990. In Southern Asia, use of improved facilities has increased by 19 % since 1990 to reach 42 % of the population in 2012; sub-Saharan Africa, in contrast, has made much slower progress in sanitation—its sanitation coverage of 30 % reflects only a 5 % increase since 1990 (World Health Organization and UNICEF 2014: 16).

Access to improved sanitation has increased in all developing regions except Oceania, where it has remained steady at 35 %; of the 2.5 billion people without access to improved sanitation facilities, 784 million people today use a public or shared facility of an otherwise improved type


and 732 million use a facility that does not meet minimum hygiene standards, whereas the remaining billion practice open defecation. That said, open defecation as well has declined considerably over the same time period from 24 % in 1990 to 14 % in 2012 (World Health Organization and UNICEF 2014: 17). Moreover, as depicted in Fig. 19.8, sanitation services, including the removal of waste and the introduction of good practice for managing water and indoor plumbing, have improved, particularly in rural areas in nearly every region of the world between 1990 and 2012 (World Health Organization and UNICEF 2014: 75).

### 19.4.3.3 Automobiles

The other basic cornerstone of technological progress visible in every country of the world is the automobile. Between the mid-1990s and the present day, we have seen a quadrupling of global production and a compounded annual growth rate of 3.4 %, with a particularly stark jump in numbers in China in the last decade (Fig. 19.9). Advances toward connected cars and autonomous vehicles, while having exciting implications for human well-being in future, are beyond the scope of this chapter to address in detail (see McKnight 2016, for related work on digital architectures).

### 19.4.3.4 Telecommunications Indicators

The speed and power of technological diffusion is rarely illustrated as powerfully as with the example of telecommunications, which also happen to reflect some of the best objective outputs of societal innovation efforts. Since 1865, the ITU (previously the International Telegraph Union) has been a supranational regulatory and technical support body that has tracked and documented the penetration of communications technology and is an oft-cited source for all objective indicators related to the usage of fixed and mobile telephone lines and Internet usage. A look at the impact of fixed phones on productivity in the United States yields the following finding: “...the amount of US telecommunications investment at any point in time is a reliable predictor of



**Fig. 19.9** Automobile and truck production by region 1964–2014 (Data from Gao et al. 2014)


the level of US economic activity at a later point in time” (Kavetsos and Koutroumpis 2011: 743).

Figure 19.10 compares growth rates and, at its earliest dates, depicts the critical point at which mobile connectivity overtook fixed line connectivity early in the last decade; it captures a comparative view of the broad dynamics of fixed line, mobile, and Internet penetrations on a global level. The phenomenon of leapfrogging has thus proliferated; originally applied in the context of innovation studies and economic growth theory to describe the impact of radical innovation for new companies on incumbent positions, it refers to the use of cheaper methods to progress rapidly through the adoption of a modern system while skipping intermediary steps. The best known example is the deployment of wireless technology, where the costs of laying fixed-line copper wires were too high to establish a working telecommunications network.

According to the United Nations specialized agency, the ITU, developing countries are home to more than three quarters of all mobile-cellular subscriptions (International Telecommunication

Union 2014). *The number of mobile cellular subscriptions globally is fast approaching the number of people on the planet, having reached about 7 billion by the end of 2014.* More than half of these (3.6 billion subscriptions) are in the Asia-Pacific region (International Telecommunication Union 2014). By the end of 2013, Gartner Group estimated that there were already one billion smartphones and more than 420 million iPhones shipped to various parts of the world (Gartner Group 2014). The same group estimates that as of May 2015, worldwide sales of smartphones to end users reached 336 million units, an increase of nearly 20 % during the first quarter of the year, led by strong smartphone sales growth in many emerging markets (excluding China).

In developing countries, mobile penetration reached 90 % by the end of 2014, compared with 121 % in developed countries. Yet growth rates slow as markets approach saturation; the fastest growing regions were Asia/Pacific, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa (Gartner Group 2015). Mobile penetration in developing countries continues to grow at twice



**Fig. 19.10** Comparative view of mobile, fixed, and Internet penetration (per 100 people) (Data from International Telecommunication Union 2014)

the rate of developed countries (3.1 % compared with 1.5 %, respectively, in 2014) (Gartner Group 2015). Figure 19.11 depicts the relative rate of mobile cellular adoption per 100 inhabitants (International Telecommunication Union 2015).


As depicted in Fig. 19.12, approximately 43 out of every 100 persons on the planet are currently using the Internet. Global individual Internet user penetration has exceeded 40 %, with nearly one third of Internet users in developing countries; 44 % of households in total have Internet access at home, whereas global growth rates slowed to approximately 3.3 % (International Telecommunication Union 2014). More than four billion people in the world still do not yet use the Internet, more than 90 % of whom are in the developing world. For example, more than one out of two households in the Commonwealth of Independent States was online by 2014, whereas in Africa, that ratio escalated to one in ten households. The rate of household Internet access in Africa does, however, continue to grow at double-digit levels, approximately 18 % in 2014, more than three times the growth of the

world average (International Telecommunication Union 2014).


The convergence of the phenomena related to mobile penetration and the Internet access culminates in Fig. 19.13, which captures active mobile broadband per 100 inhabitants in total and by segment of the world. Nearly 87 out of every 100 people in the developed world is accessing the Internet from their mobile handset, and, their access to appropriate products and services contributing to better health, education, and income is unprecedented.

### 19.4.4 Technology Outputs and Well-Being

This section focuses on the link between technology throughputs and the ultimate outputs that drive and characterize human well-being; how do the solutions and tools we develop ultimately play a role in our levels of well-being? The culmination of all the throughput and outcome phenomena arising from improved technological




**Fig. 19.11** Mobile cellular suscriptions per 100 inhabitants (2001–2015) (Data from International Telecommunication Union 2015)



**Fig. 19.12** Percentage of individuals using the Internet by two worlds of development (2005–2014) (Data from International Telecommunication Union 2015)





**Fig. 19.13** Active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, 2007–2014 (Data from International Telecommunication Union 2015)

products and services is *innovation at scale* in those countries whose growth stories have been trending upward.

Technologies available at scale means that nearly every product or service offered in a society or community is riding upon their foundations. One of the most interesting examples that is clearly tied to enhanced well-being is the way the use of physical space and real estate is being reinvented in most major cities. Thanks to technology, today’s workforce and that of the future may at least in part no longer have to commute to work. A great outcome indicator in a specific niche area is the growth of co-working spaces in every region of the world. A success story in this sector is *We Work*, a US company with 39 locations across 16 cities that today has a net worth of about USD10 billion (CoWorkingEurope.net: 2015). Other significant examples include *Uber Office*, *Impact Hub*, and *Cove*.

The core outputs of technology are addressed in Sect. 19.5 on the relationship between technology and the core HDI components of education, economy, and health; everything from the labor

conditions of the masses, to modes of production, to the landscapes we live in and the traffic we face each day all rely on technology outputs that generate concrete well-being outcomes, some negative and most positive. In general, the conclusions we draw from the relationship between technology penetration/adoption and general social progress rest on a simple hypothesis: *countries that have not invested in their basic technical or social infrastructure are less likely to be capable of providing the conditions for high quality of life on an objective level.*

#### 19.4.4.1 Technology as Equalizer?

An examination of “equity” or relative gains in development as a function of technology by necessity draws on the discourse of the most recent major gatherings convened by the ITU on the *World Summit on the Information Society* in Geneva and Tunis in 2003 and 2005, as well as on the jargon of the “digital divide” as it was (probably) created by Al Hammond and Larry Irving at the U.S. National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the mid-

1990s (Rapaport 2009). However, as suggested by the *Human Development Report* in 2001, the technology divide does not have to follow the income divide (UNDP 2001: 1). As incomes increase so too does people's access to the benefits of technological advance; yet, it is particularly true today that opportunity areas abound for technology to reach the "have-nots" and work to their benefit. Hence, this situation may result in a digital dividend (Brotman 2002; World Bank 2016).

An entire movement of social entrepreneurs today, for example, is working to use the tools at their disposal to improve human development circumstances, innovating around access to last-mile health care (i.e., telemedicine, service delivery supported by enterprises like Sevamob in India, health data gathering such as the work of Mobilemetrix in the favelas of Brazil), livelihoods (i.e., online platforms like VARI in India supporting the ability of farmers to post crop produce for sale by Short Message Service [SMS] on basic 2G handsets), security (i.e., apps on mobile phones that help women flag when they are in unsecure areas) and political and social participation. Each of these vertical silos or sectors of opportunity for entrepreneurs effectively constitutes an area in which there have been failures in public sector capacity to deliver service. In each of these problem areas lie great opportunities for creativity and innovation, where the use of technology features prominently in thinking "out of the box" to provide needed services and products to populations that frequently have no alternatives. There is no "inevitability" inherent to the now slightly dated debate about the digital divide, and technology can still offer a leapfrog opportunity in a country with amenable policies (and possibly subsidies). It is still a clear challenge that capital does not flow easily to enterprises that seek to serve these markets.

According to the UNDP, technology use is often concentrated into urban areas, among the better educated and wealthier segments of society, in the young, and in the men (with the exception of the recent trends in social networking). Most women within developing countries fall into the deepest part of the divide because they

are frequently further removed from the information age than the men whose poverty they share. If access to and use of these technologies is proven to be directly linked to social and economic development, it is imperative to ensure that women in developing countries understand the significance of these technologies and use them (Hafkin and Taggart 2001: 1). Figure 19.14 demonstrates not only the challenges of access to technology but also its dark side: Women are nearly four times more likely to be stalked and twice as likely to be sexually harassed as men in the cyberworld (the world of intercomputer communication).

This observation is all the more important given that the propensity of women to be on line is higher than of men; 69 % of women use social networks compared to 60 % of men (Fig. 19.15). It is equally interesting to note that the numbers of adults in the United States (to the extent this may be a useful proxy for global analysis) off line is decreasing substantially every 5 years, with a new low of 15 % in 2015 (Anderson and Perrin: 2015). The equity perspectives on technology penetration and related societal consequences should continue to remain at the forefront of the broader discussion about impact on human well-being, even if the evidence suggests that health, education, and economic welfare are generally positively correlated to it. It is in this arena and in the analysis of subjective well-being that the critical questions about cost and benefit must be asked and answered.

#### 19.4.4.2 Technology and Subjective Well-Being

Technology and all its manifold implications exist in multiple dimensions for all of us, the social beings that have created it, and for those of us who are served by it. Technology ripples alongside to reflect the values, beliefs, norms, and customs that characterize our cultures and shared meanings; it shimmers on public surfaces where the politics of regulation, investment, and deployment reside. It is not just a tangible good or service; it may also reflect and affect people, their ideas, the way they think and feel, the organizations they work in, and the processes they co-





Fig. 19.14 Young women online and harassment statistics (Data from Pew Research Center 2014a)

Fig. 19.15 Social networking sites by gender (Data from Madden and Zickuhr 2011)



create, impacting well-being both directly and indirectly. Research about the dimensions of the *experience* of technology highlights the importance of a deep reflexive lens, one that can make sense not just of the explosions of new product[s]

or infrastructures as they are created, but of how these things are embedded into the very fabric of human experience (Pacey 1999: 2–3).

Research psychologist Edward Diener (1984) defined subjective well-being as the way in which

people evaluate their lives and thereby conclude their levels of quality of life and related satisfaction. It is thus in some ways a function of the human willingness to try new things and to adapt or adopt them to improve life, thereby simultaneously discarding practices that may be wasteful, inefficient, or harmful on various levels. Self-perception is a key part of one's subjective psychological well-being because it majorly influences life satisfaction; positive perceptions about oneself are likely to increase one's confidence and self-esteem, whereas negative self-perceptions in adolescence are linked with truancy and interference in the classroom (Petrides et al. 2004).

Whereas much of the phenomena related to technology creation, deployment, and adoption is relayed in this chapter in quantitative terms, the issue of how it is experienced and "given meaning to" is perhaps best conveyed in qualitative terms and often by sources focused on capturing trends in the shorter term. The segmentation of objective vs. subjective indicators here is important: Although the impact of technology on subjective happiness appears to draw the attention of the press and social critics (and the occasional philosopher), it seems this topic has been left largely unexamined by economists and social scientists (Surowiecki 2005).

To the extent that rudimentary technologies that enable proper sanitation, electrification, and the fulfillment of basic human needs create the comfort, leisure, and space for human beings to focus on their social ties, the corresponding improvements in objective indicators of social progress and human welfare may be taken at face value. To the extent that more sophisticated communication technologies amplify and expand our ability to connect to other people at great distances, enabling access to family members and friends in heretofore unprecedented models of virtual proximity, so too can we assume that technology expands and reinforces our objective well-being. A study confirms that technology addiction (defined generally as the compulsive need to use devices like smart phones, computers, or video games) positively predicts online social capital (Magsamen-Conrad et al. 2014),

which in turn positively predicts well-being. On a subjective level of analysis, the lens shifts to individual interpretations of meaning to these experiences and to norms and mores reflected in the expression of life satisfaction and happiness. Technology indeed has something of a "pull" effect on people throughout the world because it offers the prospect of personal and professional reinvention, alongside access to markets, information, and knowledge.

This situation requires an infinitely more complex equation to account for the variable emotional states, perceptions, cultural biases, habits, and patterns of human beings who generally take for granted the facets of the very "developed" lives they lead. The percentage of people in the United States who say they are very happy has fallen slightly since the early 1970s—even though the income of people born in 1940 has increased, on average, 116 % over the course of their working lives. Similarly, in Japan, where GDP quintupled over a span of two decades during which their economy was completely transformed, the population appeared to be no happier than they were in 1960 (Surowiecki 2005). There is a fascinating and unusual dichotomy in key well-being outcomes such as life satisfaction, daily stress, and the role of work-related mobile technology usage, providing evidence that behaviors related to technology usage can both positively and negatively influence employees' well-being (Witters and Liu 2014). Apparently, even after controlling for all key demographics, workers who leverage mobile technology more often outside of work are much more likely to be stressed on any given day, while simultaneously being more likely to rate their lives better.

Does our personal well-being get significantly affected by technological innovations? A practical interpretation and analysis of this question is not without its challenges. When the relationship between life satisfaction and frequency of television viewership was estimated in a cross-section of 22 European countries, findings suggested that heavy viewers reported, on average, lower levels of life satisfaction (Frey et al. 2005). It was further found that high television viewership was correlated to lower levels of life satis-

faction. That said, there is a significantly higher degree of life satisfaction found in the research cited above for individuals who possess relevant amenities and reside in countries with higher penetration rates (i.e., digital network participation in a country). This finding presupposes that there is an important distinction to be made between the presence of infrastructure and how it is used.

On average, individuals in countries with high broadband penetration report higher satisfaction levels, and mobile phone and Internet users in countries with high penetration report higher levels of life satisfaction, although the saturation of mobile phone networks plays a role in the relative levels reported (Kavetsos and Koutroumpis 2011:750) Is this merely because they likely live in more developed societies? The answer is unclear. The same researchers indicated that ownership of a fixed phone, a mobile phone, a compact disk player, a computer, and an Internet connection is associated with significantly higher levels of self-reported subjective well-being, the more so, the more of these technologies an individual possesses.

Research from the Pew Center in 2014 (Table 19.2), illustrates the range of mental priorities of individuals from around the world; naturally good health scores highest across the board. Owning a cell phone and a car for mobility also score highly in most parts of Africa and Latin America; interestingly, Internet access really does not figure among the top priorities although it may well cross-pollinate and affect the ability to maintain good health, access information that supports education, and support the success one has in their workplace.

#### 19.4.4.3 Technology and the Workplace

Technology is a defining characteristic of the average workplace; satisfaction at the work place is a great influencer of life satisfaction overall and is in many ways a function of the tools at the collective disposal of a productive workforce (Ahmed et al. 2010). Meanwhile, companies such as Research in Motion, Nokia, Microsoft, Apple, HTC, LG, and Samsung have succeeded (and failed) over the last decades in waging hard-

won battles for handset supremacy. The everyday experience of billions of people in their personal lives and as employees around the world has been transformed by personalized access to communication, information, applications, and services. The flood of information to which we are exposed shows no signs of abating. The “push” settings of our mobile devices drive content to us whether we seek it or not and have created a messaging and communications culture and experience that operates around the clock.

A recent article by the BBC cited the challenges of UK employers tackling an “epidemic” of staff checking work e-mails after-hours, resulting in collective diminutions of productivity and strains on the basic social capital of communities of employees working within close proximity in the same building (Kelion 2015). The same article referenced the emergence of a “macho culture” in which employees want to be seen as available by e-mail at all hours, causing stress and depression, while in fact making workers less efficient. Meantime, a report by Deloitte (2014) presents the new human capital “issue” that is as relevant to nation-states as it is to organizations: *the overwhelmed citizen or employee*. The reality is that we are as yet at a stage in time where the long-term implications of information overload are not well understood.

The concept of information overload and its potential threats to human well-being were raised as concerns in the 1990s at the dawn of the Internet Age. Although worst-case concerns were perhaps overblown, managing healthy work-life balance in an always-on digital environment is a challenge. Organizations face an imperative to find ways to absorb more technology while simultaneously making it simpler (Deloitte Development LLC 2014: 2–3), less stressful, and contributing to the well-being of their employees rather than detracting from it. The operating model of cloud computing, which can support “workplace as a service” offerings that provide a secure workplace accessible on a personal smart phone has been introduced by industry standards groups influenced by the Open Specifications Model (which the chapter authors have contributed to). Indeed, Forrester Research cites that



**Table 19.2** Globally, good health most important (subjective analysis) (Pew Research Center 2014)**Globally, Good Health Most Important***On a scale of 0 to 10, how important is \_\_\_ to you personally? Percent saying "10 – very important"*

	Good health	Good education for children	Safety from crime	Owning a home	A fulfilling job	Money for old age	Helping others	Owning a cell phone	Free time	Owning a car	Travel	Internet access
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<b>Middle East</b>												
Tunisia	<b>84</b>	78	82	81	60	64	63	65	44	54	<b>35</b>	38
Palest. ter.	<b>62</b>	57	54	59	53	38	39	39	31	39	29	<b>23</b>
Jordan	45	36	<b>54</b>	37	37	38	33	27	27	38	24	<b>19</b>
Egypt	44	38	<b>50</b>	40	30	38	23	22	21	39	20	<b>17</b>
Turkey	<b>42</b>	39	37	38	32	32	31	31	30	32	29	<b>25</b>
<b>MEDIAN</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>Asia</b>												
Thailand	82	<b>83</b>	64	75	46	77	36	47	35	36	<b>15</b>	24
Philippines	<b>77</b>	76	75	70	59	68	49	36	51	34	29	<b>22</b>
Malaysia	<b>65</b>	60	63	62	43	63	36	48	42	50	31	<b>29</b>
Vietnam	<b>65</b>	59	52	49	33	41	30	28	21	16	<b>14</b>	16
Pakistan	59	59	<b>63</b>	61	34	43	46	21	24	26	35	<b>10</b>
India	47	52	46	<b>52</b>	44	43	28	37	<b>21</b>	<b>21</b>	22	22
Indonesia	<b>46</b>	43	35	42	35	40	15	10	7	12	8	<b>4</b>
Bangladesh	36	37	39	26	<b>45</b>	26	11	24	8	12	8	<b>6</b>
China	<b>36</b>	31	26	30	23	26	9	16	11	9	<b>7</b>	11
<b>MEDIAN</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Latin America</b>												
Colombia	<b>90</b>	<b>90</b>	80	84	69	79	68	43	67	37	41	<b>33</b>
Chile	<b>90</b>	84	76	76	76	84	44	39	61	40	<b>33</b>	35
El Salvador	<b>89</b>	84	88	88	66	67	67	51	56	34	37	<b>30</b>
Venezuela	<b>88</b>	87	86	87	77	79	67	57	61	63	50	<b>48</b>
Nicaragua	<b>88</b>	83	85	86	63	67	67	52	44	36	<b>26</b>	30
Brazil	86	83	<b>87</b>	86	64	71	63	42	53	50	35	<b>34</b>
Argentina	83	<b>85</b>	76	79	66	57	54	23	41	26	32	<b>20</b>
Mexico	<b>79</b>	73	67	73	62	65	43	27	39	33	27	<b>23</b>
Peru	58	<b>62</b>	53	53	40	45	31	22	25	<b>11</b>	13	15
<b>MEDIAN</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Africa</b>												
Senegal	<b>84</b>	75	66	78	60	51	56	50	28	30	32	<b>19</b>
Ghana	<b>72</b>	71	68	67	68	65	60	59	59	55	40	<b>28</b>
Nigeria	<b>69</b>	66	66	62	61	53	48	57	47	52	34	<b>26</b>
Uganda	<b>68</b>	66	65	63	51	59	47	51	41	50	33	<b>23</b>
Tanzania	57	<b>62</b>	47	<b>62</b>	46	47	32	40	31	34	<b>24</b>	26
South Africa	57	55	58	<b>59</b>	53	53	43	45	41	44	<b>28</b>	30
Kenya	<b>50</b>	45	46	38	30	40	22	29	18	21	16	<b>13</b>
<b>MEDIAN</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Eastern Europe</b>												
Russia	<b>81</b>	69	70	62	65	63	<b>32</b>	53	45	42	37	36
Ukraine	<b>78</b>	65	64	75	59	63	32	39	38	29	31	<b>26</b>
Poland	<b>67</b>	50	52	47	40	53	28	31	35	30	<b>20</b>	26
<b>MEDIAN ALL COUNTRIES</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>24</b>

Note: Numbers in bold and green indicate the characteristic with the highest percentage for each country. Numbers in bold and orange indicate the characteristic with the lowest percentage for each country. Question was not asked in advanced economies.

Source: Spring 2014 Global Attitudes survey, Q14a-l.

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cloud computing will grow from a \$41 billion business in 2011 to a \$241 billion business by 2020 (Dignan 2011). Not only is our digital con-

tent tremendously greater in volume, it is increasingly available everywhere network infrastructure reaches, anytime. Facebook, the dominant social



network on the planet, as of Q1 2015, had 1.44 billion monthly active users (Statista 2015a). Twitter, a network originally limited to 140 character news bits and bytes, is now used by a little over 300 million people (Statista 2015b).

Drawing virtual lines within one's personal devices between that which is personal and that which is professionally delivered may or may not help restore some balance. The example of the rich digital service experience enabled by cloud computing and artificial intelligence (including for *Internet of Things* applications) belies contemporary fears of the job-destroying qualities of artificial intelligence. Assuming that particular technologies in aggregate do not have negative consequences on well-being and that prior evidence supports this observation, McKnight and Kuehn (2012) suggested that these examples of new architectures entering markets today will more likely than not result in advanced and improved well-being.

Interestingly, entertainment is a powerful predictor of how much time participants spend on *Facebook* (Hunt et al. 2012). Facebook was most often used when subjects were bored, as opposed to connecting with individuals to cultivate relationships (Fitzgerald 2012). According to a study from researchers at the University of Michigan, the more one uses *Facebook*, the more unhappy one is likely to be<sup>3</sup> (Konnikova 2015). Relatively little rigorous academic research has systematically examined how interacting with *Facebook* influences subjective well-being over time.

#### 19.4.4.4 Technology and Family Life

The impact of technology on family is equally challenging to assess. The mobile phone, laptop computer, and gaming stations are some of the countless devices present in many homes today. How do these change the way a family interacts? Research results support both sides of the opposing arguments that these devices are hindering our family relations or conversely, that they are

fostering it. With more than 66 % of all 8- to 18-year-olds owning their own cell phones, the image of a teenager with a cell phone in hand is almost "iconic" in our society (Rideout et al. 2010, p. 18); further, most homes today use the television as a focal point, with parents going so far as to allow media devices to "babysit" their children when they are otherwise occupied.

These dynamics fundamentally alter the communication interactions of family members in households. Findings conclude that watching television at mealtime is a distraction and makes it difficult for family members to engage in conversation, therefore resulting in the prevention of important family connections (Fiese et al. 2008: 7–8). The presence of media during the ritual of family mealtime could have detrimental effects on the development of a family system, and it is apparent that media devices do affect the way a family unit socializes and, as a result, affects its essential relationships (Villegas 2013). On the other hand, the ability to transcend space and time and to connect with people (including friends and family members) at any time engenders a strong ability to form connections with others. There may in fact be no way of answering these questions because people do not just react to technology, they actively shape its uses and influences (Fischer 1992).

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## 19.5 Technology and the Indicators of Human Development

In this section we address the impact of technology on human well-being in relation to the three dimensions of the HDI, namely education, economic, and health well-being. We begin with the impact of technology in the educational sector.

### 19.5.1 Technology and Education Well-Being

For the purposes of this analysis, education well-being is defined as the component parts and processes supported in the delivery of education

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<sup>3</sup>Researchers analyzed the moods and habits of 82 young adults; the results were published in the *Public Library of Science* and widely referenced in popular media. For example, see Devgan and Stern (2013).


content to learning students, whatever their age, captured by mean years of schooling and reflected by general literacy. The relationship of technology with education is multifaceted and complex. Naturally, technology is a function of education, but it has also fundamentally altered the practical component parts mentioned above, including (1) formulation and verifiability of content; (2) dissemination and delivery of content; and (3) testing and evaluation of students. To some extent, our method of analysis in previous sections may also apply to these parts as inputs, throughputs, and outcomes, respectively. Technology has affected everything from the processes and modalities of learning (i.e., over distance) to the appraisal and assessment of pupils. Some would argue that the systematization of the latter to templated methods on standardized tests has stripped away some necessary aspects of interactive and Socratic dialogue. Possible negative externalities related to education well-being include the real possibility that technology-mediated learning may not fit with the learning styles of all students, particularly children; results include individuals slipping through the cracks of an education system, impersonal experiences, and possible alienation from the common social interactions that deeply influence the experience of being in a classroom. The possibility of a less authentic interaction with a teacher is also potentially a serious loss and opportunity cost of increasing technology in educational environments. On the other hand, the feat of moving many millions of people along the backbone of public education systems from grade to grade (and on to university) is intensely challenging and arguably impossible without technology.

It follows that technological innovation is a direct manifestation of human potential and thereby of the education that feeds and foments it. It is thus a reflexive relationship; at the same time, for centuries, education has occurred according to the levels of technological development of the society in which it exists (Wang 2014: iii). With its evolution comes the societal requirement to keep up, to revise, and to find new ways of supporting the field of education such that individuals are poised as both adopters and


practitioners. The story of the twentieth century in many ways may be defined by truly massive increases in the numbers of educated people, although to be sure the starting points of countries in the West were already generally high. Such change was particularly dramatic in parts of the world where education was incorporated explicitly as part of the economic system's "production machine" (i.e., Eastern Europe and the communist system).

One of the best proxies for education well-being is adult literacy; fortunately, in most nations today, we surpass this easily to trace degrees of higher education as well. Without a literate and skilled population, economies cannot grow (Dutta et al. 2014: xviii). Max Roser's (2015) *Our World in Data* project provides great data upon which to reconstruct trends like those shown in Fig. 19.16, depicting the rapid rise of the global average level of education over the last century. There are clearly visible qualitative correlations between the rise of the global average of schooled populations (roughly estimated at just over 80 % in 2010, representing an approximate 67 % improvement since 1970), and the visible global increases in the research and development and publication work that drives technological advances.

Figure 19.17 illustrates the increasing global literacy rates, which have risen 48 % over the last four decades, to hit a worldwide average of about 83 %. Technology provides many devices and processes that can be woven into the instructional environment by a teacher to assist the teaching and learning process (Lawless and Pellegrino 2007: 578). Indeed, computer technology is neither a remedy for education challenges nor an answer for sector-wide educational reform, but it should be seen as a tool to support learning (Keengwe 2007: 169–180); many teachers do not successfully integrate these tools into their instruction in ways that support and maximize student learning. Mobile devices are unique in that they support "... taking advantage of a learner's specific location or moments of heightened motivation" (Kukulka-Hulme 2010: 353). New online tools like weblogs or wikis for easing the point of entry and access to information are



**Fig. 19.16** Percent of population aged 15 years and older enrolled in formal education (Visualization by Roser 2015; Data from Van Zanden et al. 2014)




**Fig. 19.17** More on rising education around the world, 1820–2010 (Visualization by Roser 2015; Data from Van Zanden et al. 2014)

undoubtedly a positive enforcer of technological utility.

Improvements in technology, increased access to the Internet, and the enhanced legitimacy of online learning through research are fueling a distance education revolution (Schachar and Neumann 2010: 318–334),” but the ability to transfer this mode of learning to primary education (K–12) students in the context of distance learning has been weak. The United States Department of Education (2010) suggests that far more research has been undertaken on higher education and that its *ad hoc* nature has unfortunately not lent itself to formulation of coherent theory. Meantime, there is a fascinating shift underway from pedagogy to self-guided learning, or the practice of teaching adult learners. It is a natural assertion to posit that people should receive more lifelong education in an information society even if they have completed their “formal education.” All trends related to technology and education well-being signal that this idea is both popular and increasing; indeed, the growth of the Technology, Entertainment, Design (TED) (2015) talks platform alone has been a powerful validation of this fact. By November 2012, TED

talks had been watched over one billion times worldwide on a ubiquitous platform curated by a small team that arguably creates magnitudes more value over and above the cost value of their operation (Fig. 19.18).

Shifting back to modalities of education delivery, a powerful proxy for the analysis of the impact of technology on education well-being lies in the overt adoption of online education applications and methods around the world. Online enrollment within degree-granting post-secondary institutions grew from about 1.6 million students taking at least one online course in 2002 to about 6.8 million in the fall of 2011, with 32 % of all higher education students taking at least one online course (Allen and Seaman 2013: 18). Higher education administrators appear to see online learning as strategic, and institutions continue to build capacity to meet the demand for online programs and courses. Based on responses from more than 2800 colleges and universities, the Babson Research Survey group asserted that the proportion of all students taking at least one online course was at an all-time high of 32 %; when their report series began in 2002, fewer than one-half of all higher education institutions



**Fig. 19.18** Light, moderate, and heavy users of formal systems of education organized by level of satisfaction with school (Data from Rideout et al. 2010)

reported that online education was critical to their long-term strategy; that number today is close to 70 % (Allen and Seaman 2013).

In terms of the subjective outcomes of these technology-induced transitions in teaching styles, research conducted for the Kaiser Family Foundation found that youth who spend more time with technology or “media” reported lower grades and lower levels of personal contentment (Rideout et al. 2010: 4). For purposes of comparison, young people were grouped into categories of heavy, moderate, and light media users (Table 19.3). Heavy users were those who consumed more than 16 h of media content in a typical day (21 % of all 8- to 18-year-olds); moderate users were those who consumed from 3 to 16 h of content (63 %); light users were those who consumed less than 3 h of media in a typical day (17 %). Nearly half (47 %) of all heavy media users said they usually got fair or poor grades (mostly Cs or lower), compared to 23 % of light media users. Heavy media users were also more likely to say they got into trouble a lot, were often sad or

unhappy, and were often bored. The relationships between media exposure and grades and between media exposure and personal contentment withstood controls for other potentially correlated factors such as age, gender, race, parent education, and household formats. This study was unable to establish whether there was a cause and effect relationship between media use and grades or between media use and personal contentment.

In another study conducted in Hong Kong by Helen W. M. Yeh (in the handbook by Wang 2014: 733), students confirmed that in fact ICTs and media actually helped them do academic work better and faster and enhanced their pace of work; they found online tasks and exercises helpful for their study and consolidation of subject knowledge. The only possible conclusion at present, given the variety of outcomes and opinions, is that the subjective well-being feelings of those receiving education informed or modulated by technology are a reflection of a multitude of other factors, including the intentions and inclinations of those using the tools at their disposal. There is no real way subjectively to qualify the good versus the bad in this domain.

**Table 19.3** Media, grades, and personal contentment

	Heavy users	Moderate users	Light users
Among all 8- to 18-year-olds, percent of heavy, moderate, and light media users who say they get mostly: <sup>a</sup>			
Good grades (As and Bs)	51 %	65 %	66 %
Fair/poor grades (Cs and below)	47 %	31 %	23 %
Among all 8- to 18-year-olds, percent of heavy, moderate, and light media users who say they: <sup>b</sup>			
Have a lot of friends	93 %	91 %	91 %
Get along well with their parents	84 %	90 %	90 %
Have been happy at school this year	72 %	81 %	82 %
Are often bored	60 %	53 %	48 %
Get into trouble a lot	33 %	21 %	16 %
Are often sad or unhappy	32 %	23 %	22 %

Statistical significance should be read across rows

<sup>a</sup>Students whose schools don't use grades are not shown

<sup>b</sup>Percent who say each statements is “a lot” or “some-what” like them

## 19.5.2 Technology and Economic Well-Being

The economic implications of technological advancement for the economy and income generation have run wide and deep, not only in their effect on modes of production but also in the way they have shaped access to capital and to markets and have driven growth. The importance of economic development lies in its ability to help improve measures of human welfare, so we must make a concerted effort to peer into the black box of technological phenomena (Rosenberg 1982: vii). As in previous sections of this chapter, the method of ascribing input, throughput, and outcome factors/indicators is a helpful frame.

### 19.5.2.1 Defining Economic Welfare and Development

Well-being improves with the level of economic development (Goklany 2004) These improve-


ments are generally greatest at the lowest levels of economic development and further validate the idea that economic development is a key factor in advancing well-being (Lomborg 2001: 324, 327). The results of a study of a number of well-being indicators, such as available food supplies per capita, life expectancy, infant mortality, economic development, education, and political rights and economic freedoms, support the idea that it is critical to focus on strengthening the domestic and international institutions that boost technological change and economic development. These institutions include free markets, free trade, individual property rights, the rule of law, and transparent government and bureaucracies (Goklany 2004: 75–76). The assertions in this section are thus both intuitive and empirically grounded; as available food supplies per capita per day increase with GDP per capita, life expectancy increases over time with per-capita income; infant mortality declines as a nation's income increases; postsecondary education enrollment increases with time and with affluence; and the more economically free a country's population, the higher is its economic growth (Goklany 2004: 56–69).

The impact of technology on economic well-being is evident in the principal agents that carry out economic activity: businesses. Businesses that have successfully leveraged modern technology have done so to great advantage in terms of enhancements to human productivity in the post-WWII era. Systems supporting automation, mass production, features like “just in time” supply chain and inventory management, customer relationship management, enterprise resource planning tools, and the logistics of sophisticated mass product distribution together have created a net result far superior to the sum of its parts in the economic base of most postindustrial economies. Digital technologies such as cloud computing, customer relationship management, distributed ledgers, networked databases, and inventory management give even the smallest firms access to sophisticated tools to operate and reduce their costs while supporting the transformation of local economies.

As Nobel Prize winners Joseph Schumpeter (1934) and his fellow Nobelist Robert Solow (1957) observed, technological change in input materials and processes accounts for a significant portion of economic growth. Romer (1990) confirmed this in *Endogenous Technological Change*, where he stated that technological change provided the incentive for capital accumulation, which in turn would be acted upon by people responding to market incentives and the fact that technical blueprints create replicable value with economies of scale. As technology transforms industrial techniques, practices, and indeed the goods and services (and their flow) in an economy, inputs begin to yield different productive outputs. Professor Solow (1957: 312–320), building upon the teachings of his mentor Schumpeter, highlighted the significance of the entrepreneur and distinguished in his research between the effects of technology and other causes of economic growth. His work, confirmed and elaborated upon by more recent scholarship, shows technological change and innovation as the most important factors by far in creating new jobs and improving productivity of firms across nations and regions.

The effect of technologies on emerging economies seeking to enhance their competitiveness and improve their productivity through new channels to growth (Bilbao-Osorio et al. 2013: 3) is uncontroversially powerful, both as the fuel for production at scale and the diversity of the base of products to be developed for export. The rapid increase of high technology exports (Fig. 19.19) in the economic repertoires of nations globally is undeniable. Widespread efforts today leverage technology with the goal of empowering people and invigorating socially motivated private sector initiatives to fill the emerging gaps in service from public sector failures. Much proactive work to find sustainable solutions is needed. These initiatives emphasize technology, whether environmental (renewable energy), communications, agricultural, or other, as a key component of their efforts.





**Fig. 19.19** Global high technology exports over time (current USD) (Data from World Bank 2015b)

### 19.5.2.2 Access to Capital

Access to capital and the volume at which this is possible today is very different from the situation in the mid-twentieth century, which is a big throughput factor that affects economic well-being as defined in this chapter. A major factor is the emergence of technology-supported virtual currencies at the topmost layers of technical innovation using the Internet as its foundation. For example, a San Francisco-based startup BTCJam has taken peer-to-peer lending to a global audience, using bitcoin to achieve its vision of bypassing the restrictions of fiat currencies and allowing any individual in the world to receive a loan via its platform (Cawrey 2014). In 2013 in the United States alone, more than three billion dollars was issued by the two largest P2P platforms for fiat currency loans, Lending Club and Prosper (Cawrey 2014). Whereas traditional wire transfers are not always easy to set up and can be costly, innovations like bitcoin allow borrowers to be approved to receive funds nearly instantaneously, irrespective of where they live and how credit-worthy they are deemed to be locally. Regulators are still debating whether vir-

tual currencies pose a real threat to systemic stability.

### 19.5.2.3 Access to Markets

Whereas natural markets have existed for millennia without real technology, technology in some sense is hard to extricate from markets. Invention and innovation almost by definition have amplified human ability to do just about everything at scale. Thus it is hard to imagine that a technology used in isolation, singled out, and starved of market forces to propagate and apply it could even yield the outcomes of the “*techne logos*.” Hence we see the intrinsic link between technology and economic well-being in the HDI definition of a decent standard of living (reflected by GNI per capita [PPP\$]), which in large part derives from unfettered access to liberalized markets, the capacity to generate diversified exports, and reasonably resistant patterns of protectionism. The backbone of both access to and the markets themselves today is almost entirely technology.

In *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, Thomas Friedman (2000: 139) spoke about financial markets: “... ever since the invention of the

transatlantic cable, in the pre WW I era of globalization, some sort of *Electronic Herd* [comprised of what he calls *Short Horn Cattle* and *Long Horn Cattle*] has been at work.” He defines “short horn cattle” as those involved in buying and selling stocks, bonds, and currencies on a daily basis, whereas his “long horn cattle” refers to large multinational corporations involved in foreign direct investment and the development of factories and their supply chains, utilities, energy plants, and other joint venture- or alliance-based projects that leave large footprints on the ground in developing countries (Friedman 2000: 115). Friedman identified the role of what he called the “*Supermarkets*,” that is, the megamarkets of Tokyo, Frankfurt, Sydney, Singapore, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Mumbai, Sao Paolo, Paris, Zurich, Chicago, London, and New York, which he suggested are possible because of these two forces that together reshape economies and the lives of people.

The advance of information technology and the Internet has provided an effective autobahn for international trade expansion upon which transmission and transaction costs have sunk to near zero and upon which anyone can drive (very fast), irrespective of whether they know how. Although this capability does not result in better or well-informed behavior, it does mean that, in the aggregate, the net outcome has been a better, albeit not necessarily optimal, distribution of wealth.


Although an advanced cyberinfrastructure catapults human beings into a supercharged stratosphere where access to every kind of real-time information is common, the content grows exponentially and the value of the network of networks adheres to Metcalfe’s law: The value of a telecommunications network is proportional to the square of the number of connected users of the system. Meantime, Moore’s law, another fundamental observation of the rate of technology innovation, states that the overall processing power of computers doubles every 2 years. Technical feats do not disrupt the reality that human beings can only handle so much stimulation and information.

Experts, particularly those in the domain of ICTs, have long recognized the place of technology in explaining growth outcomes. For reasons likely related to technopolitical and technosocial phenomena explained previously, it is not clear why technology emerges in some places and not in others and whether that inherently technical process is itself a synonym of progress and forward movement. Figure 19.20 demonstrates the importance of the contribution of ICT investment to GDP growth over the last 10 years, with further evidence from the OECD supporting the facts that these ICT investments have grown, across the board, from country to country, over the last 25 years. If one of the three pillars of the HDI is welfare, which is a function of per capita income levels of people around the world, it follows that the technology that drives industrialization phenomena is both cause and effect. Technology may spur industrialization, but it also flows from it in a recursive and circular fashion. This movement is related to the aforementioned interplay of innovations that spur others over time.

### 19.5.3 Technology and Health Well-Being

Health well-being through the lens of technological development is defined by the tools, processes of access, and products (including pharmaceuticals) and service delivery models successfully applied at scale. Global life expectancy statistics as compiled by the World Health Organization indicate a solid 10 % average improvement in life span (from age 64 to over 70) between 1990 and 2013, with the biggest leaps forward evident in Southeast Asia and Africa (Global Health Observatory Data Repository 2015).

People around the world subjectively rate health as one of their highest priorities, in most countries behind only economic concerns, such as unemployment, low wages, and high costs of living (Table 19.2). Health is often a politicized issue as governments try to meet societal expectations. The many ways of promoting and sustaining health sometimes lie outside the direct



**Fig. 19.20** Contribution of information and communication technology investment to gross domestic product growth, 1990–1995 and 1995–2002 (Data from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2011)

confines of the health sector; for example, technologies contributing to crop yields and the debated decisions around the use of genetically modified organisms, for example, have sparked exchanges about the impact of agricultural processes on health. This example encapsulates the broadest “circumstances in which people grow, live, work, and age, which strongly influence how people live and die” (World Health Organization 2010: ix).

A study cited in the *Human Development Report 2001* isolated the role of technology as a driver for reductions in mortality rates and further validated the role of education in this regard (Fig. 19.21). The data confirm that technical progress accounted for 40 to 50 % of the reduction in mortality between 1960 and 1990, making technology a relatively more important source of gains in mortality than higher incomes or higher education levels among women. In other words, whereas gains in income affected mortality rates across the board by an average of 20 % and gains in education levels affected them by 34.5 %, technology-related gains affected this key well-being indicator by over 45 %. Figure 19.22 is perhaps one of the more useful macro level snapshots capable of guiding our global understanding of health trends; in a span of 25 years, every region

of the world has made outstanding strides in the reduction of under-5 mortality rates. Although the Millennium Development Goals have not always been achieved, the data still signal incredibly positive changes.

None of these advancements would be possible without technology applications and interventions, which some would characterize as inputs and valuable tools. According to the World Health Organization, “... health systems performance has a number of aspects—including population health, health outcomes from treatment, clinical quality and the appropriateness of care, responsiveness, equity and productivity—and progress is varied in the development of performance measures and data collection techniques for these different aspects. Considerable progress has been made in such areas as acute hospital care, primary care and population health, [though] ... in areas as mental health, financial protection and health systems responsiveness, research is at earlier stages of development” (Smith et al. 2008: 15).

### 19.5.3.1 Tools

The impact of technology on health well-being, essentially represented by data on mortality and life expectancy, can be segmented in two broad




Fig. 19.21 Technology as a source of mortality reduction, 1960–1990 (Data from UNDP 2001)




Fig. 19.22 Under-five mortality trends, 1990–2015 (Data from WHO 2015)

categories: (1) the tools it creates for better diagnostics and treatment and (2) the systems it bolsters with these tools for administration and service delivery at scale. The use of “lightweight”

technologies in health care provision helps build prevention, promotion, and self-care, enabling a better absorption of knowledge by women and more knowledgeable interaction with health care

professionals (Mendonça et al. 2015). A wonderful example of this is the joint work of Pro Mujer (a leading women's development health and microfinance nonprofit social enterprise in Latin America), the Mayo Clinic, Pfizer, and the Sesame Workshop (a nonprofit educational organization behind the television program Sesame Street) to launch and operate a technology platform integrating mobile, Web, and video technology along with remote training and access to specialists (PR Newswire 2013). The lower cost technologies are and the easier the protocols of administration, the more favorable the results in prevention, particularly if used in the context of primary health care; the use of oral rehydration therapies for diarrhea in children is a good example. Overall, the data tend to support the fact that things are improving in health diagnostic, therapeutic, and other research activities related to medical R&D.

The role of technological access functions that have been applied or been relevant *directly* for healthy consumers include text messages (SMS), various software applications, and multiple media (SMS, photos) interventions; these functions support interactivity, which enables personalized continuous monitoring (according to types of ailments or chronic conditions, gender, age) in real time, and behavior support and change tools as necessary. According to the Pew Research Center (2012), 72 % of Internet users said they looked on line for health information within the past year, whereas 21 % of US adults said they used some form of technology to track their health data. Sensors, novel interactive displays, and advances in computing and networking contribute to the development of networked communities of users, whereas data drawn thereon hold great value in that they may be anonymized and aggregated for purposes of generating best practice (and cost savings). An extensive, important survey concluded that mobile technology text messaging interventions have been shown to increase adherence to antiretroviral medication in low-income settings and to increase smoking cessation in high-income settings (Free et al. 2013: 40). Although this finding is but a signpost for further study and requires substantial valida-

tion for the applicability of mobile technology for more diverse types of health interventions and self-management of chronic disease, it does signal that we are as yet in nascent stages of understanding how our technological tools may be administered and applied for wide health benefit outcomes. A glance at negative externalities as they relate to technology tools for health is informed by an anecdote from research undertaken by the authors on the role of ICTs in political development in the Caucasus in 2003–2004. It was sometimes seen as a good thing when money was not available to update medical equipment; doctors could not get complacent or lazy in circumstances where they had to work proactively with the outdated machines, to be highly creative, and, some argued, to be even more skilled than their counterparts in wealthy Western environments. Machines that do everything leave little room for human intervention.

### 19.5.3.2 Systems

The role of technology in supporting health systems consists of a relatively new concept. Managing people and costs in health care systems relies to a large extent on computer-based patient records in which data and services are expected to be delivered at scale. Health information technology has the potential to support safer, more effective, and more efficient delivery of health care through the implementation of multifunctional, interoperable systems. As managed care plans have evolved and grown, the ability of providers to adopt technology to gather, manage, and aggregate clinical data has never been more important. The National Library of Medicine in the United States has been at the forefront in stimulating research around the effective use of computer-based patient record systems and networked access to share data (Dick et al. 1997: 9). Integration delivery systems include health care providers, service providers, and facilities that together deliver a spectrum of services to specific populations.

The use of electronic health records to improve the quality of care in ambulatory care settings was demonstrated in a series of studies conducted at four sites (three U.S. medical centers and one

in the Netherlands) (Shekelle et al. 2006). The studies showed improvements in provider performance when clinical information management and decision support tools were made available within an electronic health record system, particularly when clinical information systems have the capacity to store data with high accuracy and ever-ready accessibility and can assist clinicians in translating context-specific information that can empower providers in their work. “All cost-benefit analyses predicted substantial savings from the use of electronic health records (and health care information exchange and interoperability) implementation: The quantifiable benefits are projected to outweigh the investment costs, though the predicted time needed for breakeven to be achieved varied from three to as many as 13 years” (Shekelle et al. 2006). It is worthy of mention that the use of these systems to manage health records also has risks: Privacy concerns and the possibility of uncontrolled data flow or leakage are a real issue for many patients.

Although many studies have identified advances in technology as a major driver of health spending, one study links the availability of specific technologies to higher use and spending (Baker et al. 2003: 546). Although it is possible that a large amount of health care spending does not produce higher quality, it is nonetheless likely that some new technologies do produce value for patients. For example, some research argues that the benefits for society of several recent advances are substantial and seemingly large enough to justify their large costs when compared with common cost-benefit benchmarks. Attempts to address the issue of technology availability and rising costs could end up badly misguided if implications for quality were not considered (Baker et al. 2003: 549).

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## 19.6 Technology in Modern Context

Technology has played an instrumental role in major world events, including in their aversion, their mitigation, their discovery, and on occasion their cause. The New York City terrorist attack on

September 11 2001 would not have been possible without extensive use of mobile communication tools, not to mention aviation technology. From the Egyptian Revolution of 2011, where at least 840 people were killed and more than 6000 injured (Mungin 2011), to the Ukrainian Euromaidan in 2014, whereupon UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein stated that the death toll in the conflict exceeded 5358 people (with another 12,235 people wounded from mid-April the prior year) (Euromaidan Canada Committee 2015), technology has allowed us to focus a global lens of enquiry on human rights abuses and violations in unprecedented ways. Indeed, many have argued that technology and social media for collective action were some of the key enablers of the Egyptian overthrow of their corrupt president Mubarak, despite the significant damage to the country.

Similarly, from September 11 in 2001 (where dramatic images of unprecedented destruction seared the screens of televisions across the world) to the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013, from the BP oil spill in 2010 and the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, to the most recent terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, technology has played a critical role in executing insidious man-made tragedies as well as in organizing mass responses. It is in great measure equally as powerful a force for good as for evil. From these major world events and disasters, we have learned that taking scientific, legal, and social responsibility for the technology we take for granted should be emphasized in technology education and in our culture.

At times, the implications of a newly invented technology cannot be foretold. A perfect example is what the technicians and developers designing the modern 2nd generation cellular telephone could not have foretold: that SMS capability would blossom into a boom industry. According to the ITU, the total number of SMSs sent globally tripled between 2007 and 2010, from an estimated 1.8 trillion to a staggering 6.1 trillion; close to 200,000 text messages are sent roughly every second. Assuming an average cost of USD 0.07 per SMS, in 2010 SMS traffic generated an



estimated USD812,000 per minute (ITU News 2010). Often, technology is repurposed, and the idea of leaving open the design (as in open source distributed, development communities and its uses is itself a development approach. Such ludic possibilities are referenced by some scholars (Vogiazou 2007: 41), who see this as part of the recursive shaping of their world and their societies.

Twitter, an online social networking service that enables users to read and send short messages (not longer than 140-characters) called tweets, is used for good and for bad. It is a perfect example of incorporating the will of the people to take part in the reshaping of their societies. Some of this outcome is intended, in that the tool is used to organize and galvanize mass opinion or actual movement. Some of the outcome is serendipitous, such as a tweet forecasting an earthquake in a given city. Twitter bears the badge of honor of being one of the sites banned in various countries in the Middle East where leaders are keen on preventing the mass mobilization capabilities of their populations. Twitter has been used in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen by activists who played crucial roles in the Arab Spring, partially by using social networking as a tool. Although its founders may have understood in broad terms what they were creating, it is unlikely they could have imagined the actual breadth of their footprint on the course of global events after launching their service. At the same time, it is being heavily leveraged by the Da'esh in 2015 in Syria, and it is the object of considerable cyber-warfare as virtual vigilantes (i.e., "Anonymous") hack at the accounts of their Islamic State enemies on line. Social networks today ride one atop another to reach the farthest edges of the technological nets that tie together global communities and populations. Disaster recovery and social media application interrelationships have become widely prominent where humanitarian crises occur; for example, *Ushahidi* uses basic SMS technology to generate meshed geomaps of postcatastrophe emergency areas to support emergency response. It was first developed in response to 2008 postelection violence in Kenya; students used it to such effect that

*Ushahidi* data challenged the data analytic capacities of large international organizations tasked with official emergency response, particularly in the example of the Haiti earthquake in 2010. As a result, people now use new technologies for medical procedures to cure the injured, to replace lethal weapons with nonlethal weapons, to use drones to limit (though as well in some cases to regrettably amplify) civilian casualties, and to use chemical, biological, or environmental measures to limit, restore, and recover the environment from pollution. Moreover, various technologies are also employed to use social media to release information, potentially locate and capture terrorists to prevent planned attacks, and to alter the course of security and social justice movements in the public.

In actual societal terms, social media have their fair share of challenges, including excessive Internet use causing physical ailments such as carpal tunnel syndrome and reduction of face-to-face socialization. We see many cases of social isolation and individual alienation, not to mention the potential exposure of inappropriate content to children. Misuse of social media is also seriously damaging to human well-being: Cyberbullying, privacy invasions, identity theft, and damage to the personal reputations of individuals or organizations from false but widely propagated "news" and rumors are but the tip of the iceberg.

Overall, however, most agree that social media have improved our societies by increasing transparency between citizens and their political leadership. Interaction between political leaders and average citizens make politics appear closer to people's daily lives. Information disseminates through these sites to inform people of news and to help them make better-informed decisions. Leaders are seen as more than icons; one can regularly observe them (perhaps staff-assisted) expressing their emotions and political views on the widely used social media platforms. US President Barack Obama is an example of a politician actively and effectively using social media. He started using Twitter in 2008 and successfully used it to interact with the public, which provided

him with a significant edge in his two presidential election campaigns.

By 2015, according to Fig. 19.23, there were over two billion active social media accounts in the world (Kemp 2015), over 3.2 billion active Internet users, and even more billions of mobile phone users whose actions and location are continually monitored (see Figs. 19.11 and 19.13). The expectation by forecasters is that mobile phones will help to push Internet penetration beyond 50 % of the world’s population by mid to late 2016 (Kemp 2015). The question worth asking at this point is: Will the spread of social media have positive consequences on human well-being? Most evidence would point to a cautious “yes,” though we should not forget the detractors or the reality of the stated negative influences or potential challenges.

If an extraterrestrial visitor appeared on Earth today to observe our global way of life and how our most populous urban centers are populated, what would be more obvious than the key organizing principles of our roads, buildings, communications, food, and water systems? All the knowledge of humanity is manifested in, and informed and defined by technology, which is why the fabric of our societies and the interactions of people are both a product and a source of technology. Technological systems interact with each other all the time, and the future holds great breakthrough potential. Just as circuit-switched networks for voice and packet-switched telecommunications for data co-existed for long periods

until the emergence of voice over Internet protocol or VoIP and just as dominant computing systems emerged to usurp telecommunications with disruptions like Skype, so too are the threads of our future being woven today. They will change the way we drive, cure disease, access information, talk to one another, and consume food and water. The *MIT Technology Review* (2015: 28–63) captures a wonderful cross-section of the most promising breakthroughs on the horizon, of which a snapshot yields the following list:

1. Magic Leap: the device that makes virtual objects appear in real life using an alternative next generation solution to stereoscopic 3-D, potentially useful in gaming, travel, and film. Spearheaded by Magic Leap, Microsoft.
2. Nanoarchitecture: materials whose structures can be precisely tailored so they are strong yet flexible and extremely light, potentially useful in energy efficient and versatile structures. Spearheaded by Caltech, HRL Labs, MIT.
3. Car-to-car Communication: cars that talk to one another to avoid crashes, to lower the incidence of road deaths. Spearheaded by General Motors, University of Michigan
4. Project Loon: a reliable and cost-effective way to beam Internet service from the sky to places lacking it, so that Internet access can help expand educational and economic opportunities to those offline. Spearheaded by Google, Facebook




Fig. 19.23 Global digital statistics by WeAreSocial.net (Kemp 2015; used with permission)

5. Liquid biopsy: a blood test to catch cancer early. Spearheaded by Chinese University of Hong Kong, Illumina, Johns Hopkins
6. Megascala desalination: pursuing the idea that seawater desalination can cost-effectively provide a substantial portion of a nation's water supply. Spearheaded by IDE Technologies, Poseidon Water, Desalitech, Evoqua
7. Apple Pay: a service that makes it practical to use one's smartphone as a wallet in everyday situations. Spearheaded by Apple, Visa, MasterCard, Google
8. Brain organoids: three-dimensional clusters of living neurons that can be grown in a laboratory from human stem cells for possible therapeutic purposes. Spearheaded by Institute of Molecular Biotechnology, Massachusetts General Hospital
9. Supercharged photosynthesis: engineering rice plants to extract energy from sunlight more efficiently so that crop yields are optimized. Spearheaded by International Rice Research Institute, University of Minnesota
10. Internet of DNA: technical standards that let DNA databases communicate so that one medical treatment can derive benefit from the experiences of millions of others. Spearheaded by Global Alliance for Genomics and Health, Google

All of these technologies and many more are continually going to impact all sectors of society and modern economies across the world. Together they constitute a great advance in our human ability to recognize, synthesize, understand, and tell the story of human well-being. The transformational properties of each of these and their obvious natural links to education, health, and income for the human population are obvious. What remains to be seen is the distribution of access to these once they are propagated by market forces.

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## 19.7 Concluding Thoughts

Technology, as the highest manifestation of human creativity, may be considered the essence of global human "culture." Indeed, it may be the

only force that transcends religion, politics, and norms and mores, even while serving as the vehicle for cultural and socioeconomic development that does not need to progress on a linear curve to affect change in human well-being. Steven Berlin Johnson's (2014a) show on PBS (and book), *How We Got to Now*, builds on the theme of innovation through a 500-year history that we take largely for granted in modern life, such as artificial cold, time, clean drinking water, and the lenses in our glasses. The story he tells essentially is one of the hobbyists, amateur inventors, entrepreneurs, and the collaborative networks whose unintended consequences together built the foundation of our modern world. It starts with the story of Galileo and his findings related to heliocentrism and physics and the revolutionary nature of the first clocks and chronometers that changed not only the management of economies but also the business of world exploration by ship. Concurrent with the massive shifts brought about by the Industrial Revolution, our human experience with time shifted forever, as masses left the fields and entered factories. Activities as simple as "clocking" in and keeping the same time in nearby cities were a huge challenge, as were the complications of travel when there was no unified way to support or access central time. Johnson cites the creativity of those who would utterly transform the US workforce and enable people to synchronize their activities. By 1883 ("known as the day of two noons"), the United States of America moved from running on multiple times to four unified time zones stretching from coast to coast.

Johnson's examples and narrative convey the connections between technology and the fabric of a nation's culture; cold storage and air conditioning contributed to the movement of American retirees to the suddenly habitable Sunbelt; sperm banks and freeze technology changed the way women could conceive babies outside the traditional structures of marriage; sound technology led to the ultrasound devices that can determine the gender of unborn babies; sanitation technologies revolutionized the way sewer systems worked and created the possibility of hypersanitized factory environments in which micro-chip manufacturing could flourish. Other break-

throughs in our ability to track and measure phenomena (including time and temperature) opened up a plethora of new possibilities for humanity, while lowering barriers and limits to human growth and habitation dynamics. Technology undoubtedly enhances our powers of observation and our ability to influence human well-being. Whether best captured by the metaphor of a hummingbird's wing or a rollercoaster, and irrespective of the subjective degrees of pleasure, comfort, and security that it imparts to the average human being, technology is empirically the single most important nonhuman determinant of human well-being globally.

The gains in the twentieth century in advancing human development were a function of technology breakthroughs and carry on into the emerging technologies destined to shape human well-being in the twenty-first century. From the rapid decline in mortality rates in the 1930s in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, to the increases in the 1970s in life expectancy at birth, all were fueled by medical technology (antibiotics, vaccines, scanning modalities), whereas progress in the nineteenth century evolved gradually as sanitation and diets improved (UNDP 2001: 2). Technological breakthroughs in plant breeding, fertilizers, and pesticides in the 1960s doubled world cereal yields in just four decades, leading to reductions in undernutrition in South Asia from around 40 % in the 1970s to 23 % by 1997 and the end of chronic famine (UNDP 2001: 2). A key recommendation of this chapter is need for new methods to measure technology and well-being, in particular to evaluate the quality of experience in the digital economy across the cloud-powered *Internet of Things*. The technological environment is ripe for new generations of data scientists to explore, thanks to the explosive growth in data resources continually generated by the ambient systems, machines, and technologies pervasively shaping the information environment in which human well-being is pursued. We may rightly or wrongly expect present trends of (disruptive) innovation to continue to be driven by information technology, thereby powering advances in materials, processes, and products both of biomaterials and cyberphysical processes.

Whatever our assumptions about trajectory, technological innovation may be anticipated to continue through the twenty-first century and beyond, thereby advancing human well-being even as its unintended consequences continue to arise and challenge societies and the individuals living within them. This chapter concludes with the idea that even as we strive to understand the inter-relationship between the technology of our modern world and our well-being, we must be ever conscious and vigilant that our technology is us and that we are our technology. Even in a literal sense, this goal rings true: Large systems of technology often behave like primitive organisms; this quasi-biological behavior (self-assembly, self-duplication, self-catalysis) apparent in both "... a working computer that could be made to evolve like DNA, and DNA that could be made into a working computer" has fantastic implications for the observable mimicry between what Kelly called "the made and the born" (Kelly 1994).

In this idea lies the ultimate hope—leaving both determinism and ideological assumptions aside, as the upward trending trajectory of human well-being catalogued empirically by this volume illustrates, the technologies on our planet today are exactly the manifestation of our indefatigable human spirit for finding purpose, solution, and betterment where there is no better way and no alternative. In our new Information Age and Social Media era, every subcomponent of the HDI, including the indices for education, health, and welfare, are being actively and dynamically worked upon using the manifold technological tools at our disposal to educate, narrate, inspire, and improve the lot of those who are marginalized or relegated to the fringes of global growth and economic prosperity. Digital dividend innovations to reach the last mile; hub and spoke models to facilitate easier replications and dissemination; leapfrog attempts to simulate infrastructure for basic human needs in the most far flung areas; and mobile/mapping tools to capture and remediate everything from rights violations to emergencies in the wake of disasters, to mother-to-child HIV transmission, are well underway (World Bank 2016).

The rampant emergence of open innovation processes that tie into all kinds of modern areas of innovation such as open application program interfaces and Internet of Things specifications, open source software, network neutrality, sharing economy resources, crowdsourcing platforms, citizen science, and the products and services developed by social entrepreneurship are but a few examples of how technology and its changing face are a direct result of the efforts of human beings to improve their lot (McKnight 2016). If the appropriate technology solutions as exemplified above are financed and deployed at scale, they will contribute to the emergence of “the world we all want”—a world in which technology and social intention together are woven systematically into the core of transformation and the greatest progress for the greatest number.

**Acknowledgements** With thanks for the research assistance of Yunxin Christina Wu, graduate research assistant, Syracuse University.

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## Part V

### Epilogue

*To those who have neither public nor private affections, the excitements of life are much curtailed, and in any case dwindle in value as the time approaches when all selfish interests must be terminated by death: while those who leave after them objects of personal affection, and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow-feeling with the collective interests of mankind, retain as lively an interest in life on the eve of death as in the vigour of youth and health. (John Stuart Mill – Mill, J. S. (2012). Utilitarianism. (Excerpted). In S. M. Cahn (Ed.), Classics of Western Philosophy (8th ed.) (p. 1193). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.)*



**Chikchan** – *Fifth day of the Maya calendar.* Mixed media on paper—22" × 30". © Lylia Forero Carr. Used with permission.



Richard J. Estes and M. Joseph Sirgy

## 20.1 Introduction

The first 19 chapters of this book focus on (1) the history of well-being from ancient to modern times, but, beginning with Part III, the focus shifts to the history of well-being worldwide since the end of World War II; (2) the changes in well-being associated with the three component sectors of development captured by the United Nations (UN) three-item *Human Development Index* (HDI)—health, education, and income; and (3) consideration of contemporary social events within a historical context. We have divided this chapter, the last of 20, into twelve sections, each of which emphasizes the most important national and regional well-being findings reported in Parts III and IV. We use the approach outlined in Chap. 6, which distinguishes between the objective and subjective dimensions of well-being, including a wide range of equity indicators that cut across both objective and subjective measures of well-being. We also articulate the approaches we used in discussing each of these contrasting elements of well-being throughout history over the long term but especially during the 65-year period since the end of the Second World War (1939–1945).

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*Wellness is the complete integration of body, mind, and spirit—the realization that everything we do, think, feel, and believe has an effect on our state of well-being.*  
Greg Anderson, Wellness Speaker and Author (Anderson n.d.)

Read more at <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/well-being.html#HR6sAokH3HhSxA8O.99>

More specifically, this chapter summarizes in seven organizing themes the book's major findings concerning national, regional, and international changes: (1) *philosophical* advances in well-being; (2) global advances in *population*; (3) global advances in *health*; (4) global advances in *education*; (5) global advances in *income and poverty reduction*; (6) global advances in *social welfare*, in particular, the steadily increasing levels of income security provided to the world's growing population via income security programs and other publicly and privately financed social initiatives; and (7) global advances in *subjective well-being*. All of these components are essential to assessing changes in well-being, and each reveals unique patterns of the human condition in various nations and regions of world. At the end of the chapter, we summarize the most salient post-World War II changes, which eventually will serve as the basis for a series of regional monographs and a second volume to this book. Interspersed throughout are discussions of advances in well-being that have occurred worldwide with respect to *women* and *other historically disadvantaged population groups* (such as children and youth, the elderly, persons with seri-



ous disabilities, those who are financially impoverished, and other social, political, cultural, religious, and sexual minority groups). We also discuss contributions made by medical and other technologies in advancing well-being over time that benefit people everywhere in the world (e.g., advances in telecommunications, transportation, preventive and curative health care, and finance and accounting technologies).

## 20.2 Conceptual Advances in Our Understanding of Well-Being

UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon (2013; UNDESA 2015), on inaugurating March 20 as the *International Day of Happiness*, said,

On this first International Day of Happiness, let us reinforce *our commitment to inclusive and sustainable human development* and renew our pledge to help others. When we contribute to the common good, we ourselves are enriched. Compassion promotes happiness and will help build the future we want.

The action agenda that flows from such an ambitious formulation of happiness (and, by inference, well-being) is large but is sufficiently meaningful that people living everywhere on the planet can become engaged in the process at various levels. The editors' approach to this engagement has been to build on the framework of the *Millennium Development Campaign* (MDC) and, more particularly, on the realization of the eight *Millennium Development Goals* (MDGs), each of which has its own set of operational goals and objectives (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] 2015a). The narrative that follows revolves around the MDC and the MDGs for all of the world's major geopolitical regions. We use time-series data as the foundation for analysis and include objective and subjective indicators of well-being to place the agenda in a better perspective concerning the regional analyses that have preceded this chapter.

More particularly, we pull together all of the major findings reported in the regional chapters of Parts III and IV. We summarize the regional data and worldwide well-being patterns and

trends. Further, the analysis is historical in nature and focuses on changes in well-being that have occurred over the long term but with particular attention given to social advances that have occurred worldwide during the last half of the twentieth century and the first two decades of the twenty-first century, i.e., 1950 to 2015.

We committed at the outset of this project to use a broad range of indicators associated with the HDI as the underlying analyses reported throughout the book (UNDP 1990; 2014). As stated previously, the HDI is one of the most frequently cited measures used in social development and well-being studies; therefore, it is appropriate that we use the HDI as the foundation for our own analyses, especially with respect to improvements in access to food and shelter, basic educational and employment opportunities, and the ability to participate meaningfully in other aspects of society's economy. The HDI also is associated with indicators that measure the degree of political freedom that exists in societies, a statistic that highlights their role as their own agents in helping to advance individual and collective well-being.

The factors that we focus on in this chapter, therefore, relate to the goals of the MDC. The chapter is intended to serve as a reference for other scholars of human well-being and its sustainability, that is, as a foundation for implementing the recently agreed upon Sustainable Development Goals of the new 15-year development plan of the United Nations (UN).

### 20.2.1 The Major Human Development Indices and Assessment Tools of Personal and Collective Well-Being

As mentioned previously, this book is organized around the HDI and its three constituent indicators—improving personal and collective advances in health, education, and at least a minimum standard of wealth accumulation. Nevertheless, these three components of the HDI are not sufficient to capture all of the substance

that we judge to be essential to a history of changes in worldwide well-being. We have also considered a secondary set of indicators and indices in the analysis that are associated with the goals and operational indicators of the eight MDGs of the UN. We also include subjective measures of well-being and life satisfaction to the total range of social indicators included in the analysis. The subjective components of well-being are as important as the objective indicators, albeit objective indicators lend themselves better to comparative data analysis than subjective ones (Cummins 2014; Veenhoven 2015).

Specifically, we have incorporated in this chapter findings obtained by applying supplemental indices to the HDI that were also developed by the UNDP and other major world think tanks such as Freedom House, the International Institute for Economics and Peace, the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI 2014), and Transparency International. The indices and other measures promulgated by these think tanks focus more specifically on the changing social status of women and on global trends with respect to advances in reducing extreme poverty in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These data begin in the middle of the 1990s and continue forward to 2015.

We included a detailed analysis of the changing status of women around the world that incorporates findings obtained from the *Gender Empowerment Index*, the influential *Gender Inequality Index*, and the *Gender Development Index*. These three indices, but especially the *Gender Inequality Index*, focus only on the well-being of women and girls; they were designed to complement the more generic HDI. We also report some of the detailed, impressive changes regarding poverty and the poor that have taken place worldwide since 1990 as measured on the *Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index* and the *Multidimensional Poverty Index*, which were developed jointly by the UNDP and the Oxford University *Poverty and Human Development Initiative*. These data are very rich and provide rigorous evidence of the global progress that has been achieved in reducing extreme

poverty among hundreds of millions of people living in Africa and East and South Asia.

Taken together, the six supplemental indices associated with the more universal HDI contain more than 21 statistically independent social indicators measuring very different dimensions of well-being. The data collected using these indexes can easily be aggregated and disaggregated to capture the well-being reality of people living in rural and urban communities as well as that of people living under different socio-political-economic systems and in different regions of the world and of the world as a whole.

### 20.2.2 Other Objective Indicators of Well-Being

Despite its prominence today, the HDI is but one of a series of indices used to assess well-being in earlier generations. The most frequently used early measures, among many others that were mostly economic in nature, included the following:

- the two-item *Misery Index* developed by economist Arthur Okun in 1953;
- the three-item *Physical Quality of Life Index* developed by Morris David Morris for the U.S. Overseas Development Council (Morris 1979);
- the multifaceted *Level of Living Index* developed by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development;
- the 41-item *Index of Social Progress* developed by Richard J. Estes of the University of Pennsylvania (Estes 2015);
- World Values Survey (2014);
- Social Progress Index (Stern et al. 2014);
- Gallup Organization Life Satisfaction Polls (Gallup Organization 2015); and
- the *Political Freedoms Index* developed in 1972 forward by the New York-based think tank Freedom House (2015).

The intellectual histories and methodological backgrounds associated with each of these well-being-related indices are reported in [Appendix B](#)

along with a list of other composite indices related to well-being that have emerged over the past decade.

### 20.2.3 The Importance of Self-Assessed Quality of Life in Measuring Well-Being

Measurement of self-assessed quality of life, well-being, and even happiness also has a long history in the social sciences. Of the measures used to assess the subjective dimensions of well-being, most are contained in national and international polls that collect data from a random sample of adults in each country in response to variations of the following general question: “*All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life today?*”? Respondents are offered preset responses to the question that arrange their self-assessed level of happiness and life satisfaction on a scale from “very happy/satisfied” to “very unhappy/dissatisfied.”

The most popular of these recent polls also are the most established and represent the broadest possible spectra of time, populations, and cultures—those conducted by the Gallup Organization Polls (Gallup Organization 2015), the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index polls (Healthways 2015), and the World Values Survey (WVS). Well-being data collected through these polls are rich, so we have cited findings from all three throughout the book. Other, more nuanced polls that measure well-being within a cultural-specific context include the LatinoBarometer, the EuroBarometer, the AsiaBarometer, and others identified in [Appendix C](#).

[Appendix C](#) also contains a partial listing of some of the most widely used and most influential approaches to assessing the subjective aspects of quality of life at the personal and collective levels. The appendix contains hyperlinks to nearly all of these polling sites so the interested reader can easily access a fuller description and in depth data reported by each poll.

## 20.3 Well-Being and the Human Development Index

The UN created the HDI during the early 1980s. The basic elements of the model were based on the earlier Physical Quality of Life Index (Morris 1979) as well as on the *Level of Living* method developed by Donald McGranahan and his colleagues at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development. The first UN report to make use of the more statistically robust HDI was the UNDP’s 1990 *Human Development Report: Concept and Measurement of Human Development* prepared under the leadership of Pakistani development economist Mahbub ul Haq (1934–1998) (Fig. 20.1) and the Indian Nobel Laureate in Economics Amartya Sen (1933–) (Fig. 20.2).

Then, as now, the purpose of the three-item index (health, education, and per capita income) was to monitor changes in the capacity of the world’s nations, especially poor nations, to respond to the basic social and materials needs of their steadily increasing populations. In subsequent years, the HDI was developed further.



**Fig. 20.1** Mahbub ul Haq (1934–1998) (Photo by Sniam; <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Mahbub-ul-Haq.jpg>)



**Fig. 20.2** Amartya Sen (1933–) (Photo by Elke Wetzig [Elya]; Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license; [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amartya\\_Sen\\_20071128\\_cologne.jpg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Amartya_Sen_20071128_cologne.jpg))

Today it includes specialized data related to the changing status of the world's women, to the chronically poor who comprise the majority populations of the world's least-developed nations, and to inequalities in wealth and income distribution. The HDI currently reports data for more than 188 countries representing approximately 95 % of the world's total population (UNDP 2015a).


The UNDP reports annually to the UN General Assembly on the changing social conditions that exist in all of the UN member states. Data from the *Gender Development Index*, the *Gender Inequality Index*, the *Gender Empowerment Index* (initially introduced in 1995), the *Multidimensional Poverty Index* (MPI), and the HDI have been reported annually in the *Human Development Report* since 2010. This series of reports published by the UNDP is topical in focus and includes a large number HDI and other statistical tables that focus in depth on various aspects of development and well-being.

### 20.3.1 Global and Regional Patterns and Trends in the Human Development Index Since 1980

The UN 2015 *Human Development Report* (UNDP 2015a) summarizes HDI scores for all of the world's countries and major regions by overall level of health, education, and economic development. The report also ranks countries and regions by performance scores and disaggregates the number so that the reader can see changes that have occurred in each of the three major component sectors of the HDI. The 2014 and 2015 reports also contain a rich array of supplemental tables, figures, charts, and graphs that show progress in development (or lack thereof) in other sectors not covered by the HDI. [Appendix A](#) contains sets of scores for the period 1980 to 2014. In either case, our HDI 2015 data cover 35 years of human progress since the end of the Second World War. In all cases, the scores reported on the HDI are discussed in considerable detail in Parts III and IV, the foundational chapters for this chapter. Several critical patterns concerning changes in well-being emerge from the trend line data reported by geopolitical region for the years 1980 to 2015 (Fig. 20.3).

It is essential to note that all eight of the world's major regions experienced significant improvements in their HDI scores between 1980 and the end of 2014, *albeit at a variable pace and rate of progress in well-being for the peoples of each region in each period*. These gains are often dramatic, especially those recorded for the world's socially least-developed countries but especially for those in developing Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Despite these differences, the general pattern is significantly upward in HDI scores for all of the world's regions. This upward movement can be partly attributed to the successful implementation of the UN MDC and the large investments made by businesses, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and private philanthropists in developing a wide range of well-

**Fig. 20.3** Human Development Index (HDI) scores by geopolitical region, 1980–2013. The figure excludes data for the very large, but sparsely populated, Oceania region. Annual HDI scores for many of the Oceania countries, however, are available in [Appendix A](#) and cover the same period reported in this figure (Data from UNDP 2014, Table 2)



being sectors in each region (and, subsequently, country and lower geopolitical units).


**20.3.2 Regional Trends in Well-Being, 1980–2013**

As confirmed throughout this book, significant variations in well-being exist at the regional level and in relation to designated population groups and societies at various stages of attainment of social, political, economic and general well-being. These data are summarized in Fig. 20.4 and [Appendix A](#), which report HDI scores and changes in average HDI scores by major geographic region and for the world as a whole. All of the findings reported in the figure are consistent with those reported in the region- and population-specific chapters of Parts III and IV.

Figure 20.4 shows HDI data for the most socially advanced regions Europe and Central

Asia, North America, and selected countries in the Latin America and Caribbean regions, regions that were already reasonably well off in terms of MDG attainment at the outset of the MDC. Regions falling below the world average trend line for HDI scores in declining order are East Asia and the Pacific, the Arab States, the many countries of South Asia, and those of sub-Saharan Africa. Despite these persistent disparities, average HDI scores rose for all seven of the highly heterogeneous regions identified in the figure. Given the progress that has taken place between 1980 and 2014, *every indication exists for believing that HDI scores will continue to improve for all world regions, including its poorest nations. At the same time, the more accelerated paces of well-being development occurred in all of the regions and their member nations.* This latter phenomenon is due primarily to the advanced standing already enjoyed by many socially advanced societies.





**Fig. 20.4** Percentage change in the Human Development Index scores by year and geographic region, 1980–1990, 1990–2000, 2000–2013 (Data from UNDP 2014, Table 2)

**20.3.2.1 High Versus Low Human Development Index Scores and the Dynamics of HDI Improvement**

Figure 20.4 summarizes the average annual percentage change in each of six major geopolitical regions and for the world as a whole for the 34-period 1980 to 2013. The figure shows average annual increases in HDI scores for the Arab States, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin American and the Caribbean, North America, South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and, on the far right, for the world as a whole (UNDP 2015a, b). All of the well-being gains experienced by individual countries and major geopolitical regions are impressive. The news is especially favorable for those regions for which well-being advances have been especially difficult to attain (Estes 2015).

Indeed, the well-being gains attained by the world’s socially least developing countries during the periods covered by Fig. 20.4 are truly remarkable, especially for the most recent time period reported—2000 to 2013. Well-being gains

for the countries of East Asia and the Pacific averaged 24 % and those of South Asia 25 % over the most recent 14-year period. In contrast, well-being gains in the North American region averaged 4 % and those for the same time period for Europe and Central Asia averaged 11 %. The importance of the differences in these numbers is that the world’s socially least developing countries are attaining higher levels of well-being *at a more rapid pace* than are the already economically advanced nations of Europe, Central Asia, and North America, for which average annual increases in HDI scores between 2000 and 2013 were 11 % and 4 %, respectively. This pattern suggests that, in time, well-being parity is an increasing possibility for a much larger share of the world’s population, a pattern that has not previously been recorded in history.

These region-specific findings must be regarded as remarkable and provide evidence that all regions of the world are making steady, substantial progress toward increasingly higher levels of well-being. The well-being gains reported here are reflected in longer overall years of aver-



age life expectancy, lower rates of infant and child mortality, decreased rates of maternal mortality, and, for most, major advances in per capita income levels and higher levels of self-assessed quality of life. These global findings support the findings reported in Chaps. 7 through 17 as well as in the two specialized chapters contained in Part IV that focus on women and technology.

### **20.3.2.2 Attainment Levels of the Human Development Index and Millennium Development Goals, 1980–2013**

In addition to identifying specific development goals to be achieved by 2015, the MDC also articulated a discrete set of operational objectives for each goal. These objectives were designed to accelerate the pace of the implementation of the MDGs by maintaining a laser-sharp focus on each dimension of the MDC. The MDGs and their associated objectives were judged essential to accelerating the pace at which the overarching intent of the MDC was to be achieved. This latter point is particularly important in promoting health, education, and income well-being among the world's poorest countries.

As summarized in the MDC, the MDGs were designed to (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve increased primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development (United Nations 2015a). The objectives associated with each of the MDGs are identified in the supplemental table reprinted at the end of this chapter. As of 2015, following decades of often contradictory planning, most governmental and nongovernmental actors engaged in international development assistance are now working within the same framework and toward the realization of the same well-being goals and objectives (i.e., state and “nonstate”

actors including nongovernmental organizations, businesses, and private philanthropies).

In reviewing the MDG outcomes summarized in Supplemental Table 20.1, the reader will note that the social indicator and goal areas highlighted in *green* are the ones that either were achieved or had been largely achieved by 2014. Others are well on their way to full realization, a major accomplishment given the poverty and weak social infrastructures that exist in many of the developing nations where these fundamental goals associated with well-being have or are being realized. On this basis alone, the MDC can be declared a success, parallel to the independent conclusions arrived at by scholars doing research unrelated to the UNDP and the MDC (Andrews and Khalema 2015). Today, from a well-being perspective, and due in large part to the sharply honed goals of the MDC, the majority of the world's socially least developing countries are more than 40 % ahead of where they started at the onset of the MDC in 1995. More advantaged developing countries have made even greater progress, such that, today, the 80 % of the world's population that resides in developing and least developing countries have made significant gains in advancing the objective and subjective conditions of their lives. Every indication exists that this process will continue well into the future and that, in time, some of the highest performing developing countries will likely join the worldwide group of most economically advanced. We have already seen this pattern occur following the collapse of the former Soviet Union when several of its successor countries either joined the European Union (EU) directly (e.g., the three nations of the Baltic region) or became candidate states for likely EU membership, e.g., the Ukraine, Turkey.


The gains in well-being associated with the MDC are impressive and can be directly attributed to carefully implemented actions on the part of all of the world's major well-being and development actors (not just the UN but also a wide range of nonstate actors) in accelerating the pace

of development in impoverished countries. The world’s socially least developed countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, South Sudan, Somalia, and more than 40 other nations—are likely to remain substantially less developed than the world’s most developed countries (Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute [SIPRI] 2014). The blocks highlighted in *red* in Supplemental Table 20.1 indicate goals and objectives of the MDC that remain unachieved and for which even greater levels of international cooperation are needed. These unaccomplished goals are essential to well-being and to the political and social stability of the nations involved. Unfortunately, the attainment of these critical well-being objectives seems many years away.

Charts and timelines such as those reported in the table are critically important in providing objective evidence of the relative successes and failures associated with clearly focused development and well-being plans. Members of the general public and policy officials alike can read them and arrive at more or less the same conclusions with respect to the well-being progress of nations.

**20.3.2.3 Average Annual Percentage Changes on the HDI for Countries Grouped by Major Geopolitical Region for the Periods 1980–1990, 1990–2000, and 2000–2013**

More detailed well-being trends that build on the HDI regional groupings reported in Figs. 20.3, 20.4, and 20.5 (showing average annual rates of social progress on the HDI by region and for the world as a whole for the 14-year period 2000 to 2013). Using a pie chart to reveal the magnitude of improvements that occurred in each region, the gains in well-being are especially noteworthy. *First*, the most significant well-being advances occurred among countries located in just three regions: (a) the chronically poor and diversity-ridden South Asia region (annual change = +1.39); (b) the chronically poor and often war-ravaged sub-Saharan Africa region (annual change = +1.37); and (c) the highly populous but rapidly developing East Asia and the Pacific region (annual change = 1.29). Taken together, these three regions make up the bulk of the



**Fig. 20.5** Average annual rate of change in Human Development Index scores by geopolitical region, 2000–2013. Data for the small island developing nations of

Oceania are included in this figure, but the reader is referred to [Appendix A](#) for the annual HDI scores for Australia and New Zealand (Data from UNDP 2014)

world's population and are home to more than 80 % of the world's extreme poor. The rapid improvements in well-being reflected in these 14-year HDI trend data are historical and may be partly attributed to the highly concentrated efforts undertaken through the MDC in cooperation with critical development assistance provided by private philanthropists (e.g., those of George Soros in rebuilding post-Soviet Central Asia) and those made by hundreds of private development assistance organizations.

The second set of world regions to experience the most significant well-being gains between 2000 and 2013 were: (d) the Arab States of the North Africa and West Asia region (annual change = +0.85); (e) the countries of Europe and Central Asia, but especially the latter group of Central Asian nations (annual change = +0.80); and, (f) Latin America and the Caribbean (annual change = +0.62). The small island developing countries of the South Pacific also attained HDI improvements equal to those of Latin America and the Caribbean (annual change = +0.62). The world annual HDI improvement for the world as a whole for the same time period was +0.73.

The regional and global gains in well-being reported above are very impressive and, indeed, more substantial than those anticipated prior to the implementation of the MDC. Further, the regional averages reported in Fig. 20.5 mask the often even larger country-specific improvements that occurred in each of the regions in Part III of the book. The magnitude of these changes in well-being and development is welcomed and sets a solid framework for even more significant changes over at least the near term.

### 20.3.3 The United Nation New Sustainable Development Goals

In 2015, the UN committed itself to extend the current MDC for an additional 15 years. The new plan, referred to as the "Post-2015" period, has 17 Sustainable Development Goals (Alonso et al. 2014; United Nations 2015a, b; UNDP 2015b)

designed to facilitate the pace and depth of progress among poor countries:

1. Poverty: "End poverty in all its forms everywhere."
2. Hunger and food security: "End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture."
3. Health: "Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all ages."
4. Education: "Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all."
5. Gender equality and women's empowerment: "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls."
6. Water and sanitation: "Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all."
7. Energy: "Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all."
8. Economic growth: "Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all."
9. Infrastructure and industrialization: "Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation."
10. Inequality: "Reduce inequality within and among countries."
11. Cities: "Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable."
12. Sustainable consumption and production: "Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns."
13. Climate change: "Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts."
14. Oceans: "Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development."
15. Biodiversity, forests, and desertification: "Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss."

- 16. Peace and justice: “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provider access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”
- 17. Partnerships: “Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.”

## 20.4 Global Progress in Health


Health is imperative in individual and collective well-being. In this section, we begin by discussing public investments in health followed by well-being outcomes from those investments.

### 20.4.1 Social Investments in Health, 1990–2011

Together with substantial investments in the education sector, governments also are making major investments in the health sector, especially through advanced approaches to urban sanitation,

effective means of waste disposal, and preventive vaccinations. These investments include expenditures for primary (acute care), secondary (e.g., on-going care for people with diabetes and hypertension), and tertiary care (long-term care for the elderly and others with permanent and disabling physical limitations) and, of equal importance, pre- and postnatal care for mothers and their infants. Since 1990, many developing countries also have developed aggressive food and drug safety programs as well as initiatives intended to reduce drug, alcohol, and illegal substance abuse. The data reported in this section summarize some of the important health gains associated with increasing levels of governmental investments in the sector. Many of these changes have been substantial and have laid the foundation for even more significant gains that will impact well-being in other sectors of social development.

The changing investments in the health sector are summarized in Fig. 20.6. These trends are reported as a percentage of regional and worldwide GDP for the years 1990, 1998, and 2011. More current data will soon appear in the new global report on health to be published by the



**Fig. 20.6** Percentages of public sector investments in health: 1990, 1998, 2011 (Data from UNDP 2014; World Bank 2015a)

World Health Organization (WHO). Here, and in the soon to be available report, several significant patterns in the health sectors have emerged for the world’s developing countries: (1) investments in health increased more or less steadily between 1990 and 2011; and (2) the regions with high levels of public investment in health are Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, sub-Saharan Africa, and, most recently, East Asia and the Pacific. Public spending in the health sectors was comparatively low for other world regions, albeit appreciable increases in spending on preventive and curative health care occurred between 1998 and 2011. A world annual expenditure of 10.1 % of global GDP on health is truly remarkable and reflects a major commitment by all of the world’s nations to substantially decrease rates of infant, child, and maternal mortality as well as the incidence of major illnesses and diseases. These expenditures also reflect major commitments on the part of less developed countries to preventive health care, but especially to the early detection and treatment of potential mass infections. The expectation, however, is that these expenditures will decline over the near future as increasingly larger numbers of people become immunized against communicable diseases and preventive health programs are introduced. More economically advanced countries have followed this pattern since 1950 and have been successful in bringing potential epidemics under control.

### 20.4.2 Gains in the Health Sector from 1945 to the Present

The outcomes associated with historic investments in preventive health services are reflected in Figs. 20.7, 20.8, 20.9 and 20.10, which show increases in annual years of life expectancy and declines in the numbers of infant, child, and maternal deaths for the years 1970–1975, 1995–2000, and 2013. The health trends summarized in these figures reflect significant health gains realized worldwide for all three periods. The changes are impressive, albeit rates of improvement vary by region. Even so, the 34-year worldwide changes are truly remarkable and reflect the appreciable outcomes associated with public and private sector investments in all levels of health care.

### 20.4.3 Advances in Global Health: Progress But with Qualifications

Smallpox was one of the earliest infectious diseases to come under control and, today, smallpox bacilli are confined to a limited number of scientific laboratories whose access is controlled by scientists in selected economically advanced countries (Garrett 2001). Poliomyelitis is another life-threatening, or at a minimum,






Fig. 20.7 Life expectancy, 1970–2013 (UNDP 2014; World Bank 2015a, b)



**Fig. 20.8** Infant mortality (Data from UNDP 2014; World Bank 2015a, b)




**Fig. 20.9** Child mortality (Data from UNDP 2014; World Bank 2015a, b)

severely disabling disease that is under the full control of the world’s most economically advanced countries. Effective immunizations exist to prevent infection by poliomyelitis, and small supplies of the viruses that cause this disease are confined to the deep freezers of selected pharmaceutical firms and government-supported research laboratories. Deaths associated with diphtheria, tetanus, typhus, and other highly contagious childhood diseases have vir-

tually been eliminated, thanks to the availability of effective, widely available low-cost vaccines designed to keep these life-threatening illnesses at bay. Cardiac and neurological diseases, cancer, and diabetes are just a few of the diseases that remain with us in large numbers and comprise many of the leading causes of death. These threats to health well-being are likely to remain with us for some time, despite appreciable advances in many areas.





**Fig. 20.10** Changes in maternal mortality, 1989–2013 (Data from UNDP 2014; WHO 2015)

*Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. (World Health Organization 1948)*

### 20.4.3.1 Lifestyle Diseases: The New Threat to Global and Regional Public Health

Lifestyle diseases, such as type II diabetes and morbid obesity, have emerged as major threats to health well-being. “Curing” these illnesses require far more than a vaccine and a simple syringe. Because these diseases are frequently associated with “risky behavior” engaged in by individuals, more complex interventions are and will continue to be needed to halt the “silent epidemics” that these diseases represent. Innovative approaches to halting drug abuse, including the abuse of prescription drugs, and to significantly reducing high-fat diets and low levels of exercise are needed to impact meaningfully on these and other behaviorally based diseases (Estren 2013).

Reducing the incidence of suicide, a leading cause of death in economically advanced coun-

tries, requires aggressive, multidisciplinary approaches—especially strategic outreach to at risk young adults, the solitary aged, and those struggling with serious mental illnesses. Suicide also represents yet another silent emergency inasmuch as those who take their own lives must be counted among the casualties of this global epidemic. To date, we have not succeeded in bringing this health challenge under control, particularly among the already identified populations and those who are subject to severe mental illnesses (Baudelot and Estabiet 2008).

Recent advances in reducing behaviorally related deaths have contributed appreciably to advances in psychological and social well-being (Mechanic and Mc Alpine 2000). However, greater attention must be given to the seriousness of the preventable lifestyle illnesses that have emerged worldwide since the early 1970s. These include diabetes, hypertension, pulmonary diseases associated with smoking, and obesity, which occurs in every region of the world, including Europe, where the health challenges associated with obesity were low during past decades (WHO 2015). Serious mental and behavior disorders also are on the increase, many related to the

abuse of alcohol, prescription medication, and street drugs, particularly by young people. The health care issues associated with these health issues are complex and typically require active partnerships between patients, care providers, and funders. Indeed, the bulk of substance abuse problems currently are being treated by laypersons in physical environments not suitable for treatment of complex health problems (e.g., the use of church or school meeting rooms to treat a broad range of substance abuse disorders in situations where complex medical care is actually needed). The absence of follow-up research on those who have used these facilities, for reasons of strict anonymity, makes it difficult to the assess outcomes of these services.

The large number of mental illnesses and the recurrent physical illnesses caused by poor sanitation and inadequate health care, including parasitic diseases such as river blindness and schistosomiasis, are examples of the health challenges confronting developing nations. Fortunately, the development of more accessible facilities to treat these illnesses is receiving increased attention by governments everywhere. Today, mental and physical diseases have attained parity with one another with the result that most

community and general hospitals now routinely include medical *and* psychiatric units (WHO 2015).

### 20.4.3.2 Changes in Leading Causes of Death: From Infectious and Communicable Diseases to Lifestyle Choices, 1900–2014

Figure 20.11 identifies the leading causes of death in the United States at four points in time: 1900, 1950, 2000, and 2013. The figure illustrates three broad patterns of causes of mortality that apply to other nations of the world: (1) the highly dynamic and changing nature of fatal diseases and illnesses throughout the world; (2) a general decline in infectious and communicable diseases as the leading causes of death in economically advanced countries; and (3) the emergence of lifestyle diseases and illnesses as threats to personal and collective health. Data for the United States are illustrative of comparable patterns occurring in other economically advanced countries, albeit great differences exist in the causes of death in economically developing vs. developed countries (WHO 2015).

	1900	1950	2000	2013
1	Pneumonia (all forms) and influenza	↑ Diseases of the heart	→ Diseases of heart	→ Diseases of heart
2	Tuberculosis (all forms)	↑ Malignant neoplasms, including neoplasms of lymphatic and hematopoietic tissues	→ Malignant neoplasms	→ Malignant neoplasms
3	Diarrhea, enteritis, and ulceration of the intestines	↑ Vascular lesions affecting central nervous system	→ Cerebrovascular diseases	↑ Chronic lower respiratory diseases
4	Diseases of the heart	↑ Accidents	↑ Chronic lower respiratory diseases	↑ Accidents (unintentional injuries)
5	Intracranial lesions of vascular origin	↑ Certain diseases of early infancy	↓ Accidents (unintentional injuries)	↓ Cerebrovascular diseases
6	Nephritis (all forms)	↓ Influenza and pneumonia, except pneumonia of newborn	↑ Diabetes mellitus	↑ Alzheimer's disease
7	All accidents	↓ Tuberculosis, all forms	↓ Influenza and pneumonia	↓ Diabetes mellitus
8	Cancer and other malignant tumors	↑ General arteriosclerosis	↑ Alzheimer's disease	↓ Influenza and pneumonia
9	Senility	↓ Chronic and unspecified nephritis and other renal sclerosis	→ Nephritis, nephrotic syndrome and nephrosis	→ Nephritis, nephrotic syndrome and nephrosis
10	Diphtheria	↑ Diabetes mellitus	↑ Septicemia	↑ Intentional self-harm (suicide)

**Fig. 20.11** The ten leading causes of death in the United States as percentage of all deaths, 1900, 1950, 2000, and 2014 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2015a)

The potential for highly contagious diseases likely will be with us for the foreseeable future, albeit they will differ dramatically in economically developing vs. developed countries. The most effective approach to prevention, ultimately, will be to limit public exposure to diseases such as Ebola, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS. However, the underlying sources of these diseases remain with us (with certain rare exceptions such as smallpox and poliomyelitis) and, hence, continue to pose threats to our collective well-being. The global decline in other infectious but curable diseases requires that we maintain a sense of prevention awareness, especially in the presence of such treatment-resistant diseases such as staphylococcus and methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*, or MRSA, infections. Diseases in both categories may ultimately prove to be beyond our reach over the near term, but a sense of optimism remains for believing that cures or new treatment methods for intractable diseases will be found in time (e.g., for HIV/AIDS, treatment-resistant tuberculosis).

Lifestyle illnesses that are under our control, such as type II diabetes and the growing epidemic of adult and child obesity found in rich and poor countries alike, fall into a separate category. The mechanisms that lead to these diseases increase with decreases in socioeconomic status but, in all cases, these diseases manifest themselves eventually among the even larger population groups (Stern and Kazaks 2015). So, too, will the currently high mortality rates associated with preventable accidents and the high rates of suicides among adolescents, young adults, and the solitary aged, even in those countries rated as “happy” or the “happiest” by public opinion polls (Habarta 2015; Szalavitz 2011). Tobacco smoking, recreational drug use, and the abuse of prescription medications are included as lifestyle threats to health and well-being. Most likely, they will continue to appear on the list of the most frequent causes of death worldwide. These risky behaviors interfere with the well-being of the affected individuals and that of their families, who suffer enormous emotional and financial consequences. The costs to nations of providing acute care for persons with chronic lifestyle ill-

nesses now overshadow the annual costs of care for non lifestyle illnesses (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2015b).

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
## 20.5 Global Progress in Education

Education is the cornerstone of effective movement in advancing individual and collective well-being. In this section, we begin by discussing public investments in education followed by well-being outcomes from those investments.

### 20.5.1 Investments in Education

Unlike in past decades, governments today invest significant resources in advancing the educational status of their citizens. They are joined in these efforts by private citizens, nongovernmental organizations, business enterprises, and private charities committed to the advancement of public education (Bishop and Green 2008). These efforts are directed at preschool (K-12) and primary school education (grades 1–6) as well as at education and career training for youth pursuing academic and technical training tracks (grades 7 to 12). Virtually all countries currently make substantial investments in postsecondary education, especially in national college and university systems. They also make major investments in technical education, which is especially critical to the development of countries whose economies depend primarily on manufacturing. In most countries, girls and women have equal access to formal education at the same levels as do boys and men, including post-tertiary technical and university education. Indeed, in many countries the proportion of university students who are women is substantially larger than that of men (Ratcliffe 2013; UNESCO 2015). All of these changes are fundamental and reflect substantial contributions to the well-being of the students involved as well as to the society as a whole.

Figure 20.12 reflects major investments in education made by countries grouped by geographic region and the world as a whole for the following periods: 1990, 1995–1997, and 2005–




**Fig. 20.12** Percent public sector investments in education, 1990, 1995–1997, 2005–2012 (Data from UNDP 2014; World Bank 2015a, b)

2013. The investment trends in education reflected in these figures are impressive and confirm that dramatic shifts have taken place on the part of all national regional governments since 1950 to invest in the human capital resource profiles of their populations, albeit the investment levels differ by region. Of special interest is the fact that the most dramatic shifts in education have occurred in the countries of North Africa and West Asia and in the sub-Saharan countries of Africa whose entire educational systems have expanded in response to the needs of their countries for a more technically educated workforce. Even so, these latter groups of countries, located principally in Africa, have invested progressively higher levels of their public resources into pre- and post-secondary education. These investments mark a dramatic departure from past educational investment patterns and suggest that well-being can be expected to increase steadily as the investment in education continues. One of the most significant outcomes is that adult literacy is now widespread in the countries and subregions of Africa and in the developing nations of Asia and Latin America, such that literacy, rather than illiteracy, has become the norm in the contemporary globalized world (Irogbé 2014).

## 20.5.2 Yields in Public Investments in Education

The most central patterns regarding the relationship between public investments in education and well-being (Figs. 20.13, 20.14, 20.15 and 20.16) reflect the fact that public expenditures in education for the world as a whole remained more or less constant between 1990 and 2012. However, the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean made more substantial investments in education during the 22-year period than any other world region—from 3.4 % in 1990 to 5.2 % in 2012. These investments closely parallel the overall advances in well-being reported for the region as a whole during the same period and the years following 2012. Substantial public investments in education also were made by the Arab States of North Africa and West Asia (4.8 % and 5.4 %, respectively) and, to a lesser extent, by the nations of North America (from the world’s highest in 1990 of 6.0 to 6.3 % in 2012).


Ironically, the nations that experienced the most serious ideological struggles for which re-education was the most needed—those of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States—allocated the lowest levels of public



**Fig. 20.13** Global primary education. In this and the three figures that follow, some numbers are greater than 100 % inasmuch as they reflect adults and other age nonappropriate enrollments by level of education, espe-

cially for elementary and secondary school enrollment levels. These numbers reflect important gains by governments in including adults in basic education programs (Data from UNDP 2014; World Bank 2015a, b)


**Fig. 20.14** Global secondary education (Data from UNDP 2014; World Bank 2015a, b)




expenditures to education—a substantial decline from 4.9 % of total central government expenditures in 1990 to a low of 3.4 % of public investments in 2012. The public sector expenditures of

the nations of Eastern Europe and Central Asia declined appreciably following the restoration of their independence after the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991. The results of these

**Fig. 20.15** Global tertiary education (Data from UNDP 2014; World Bank 2015a, b)



**Fig. 20.16** Global adult literacy (Data from UNDP 2014; World Bank 2015a, b)



declines are reflected in the considerably shortened life expectancy of men, the failure of much of the physical infrastructure, and the emergence of a governmental sector that was neither able to govern nor to provide for the most basic needs of widely dispersed populations. Not surprisingly, people’s self-assessed satisfaction with life plummeted during this period.

Education is a critical sector necessary for progressive advances in well-being. Progress in this sector is needed to ensure inclusive and quality education for all and to promote life-

long learning. Education is also crucial to the good life. Learning the skills necessary to cope with modern life and to be a productive citizen is imperative to the good life. We are delighted to report that major progress has been made toward increasing access to all levels of education virtually worldwide. Major progress has also been achieved in increasing enrollments in schools, especially for women and girls. Here is a notable outcome: *Enrollment in primary education in developing countries has reached 91 %.*



However, the road ahead remains long and challenging; today, for example, more than 57 million children in the most socially vulnerable subregions remain out of school (UNICEF 2012) and, therefore, unable to participate fully in the world's global international labor markets. Most of these children are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa and in other war-ravaged and conflict-affected areas of the world. The UN estimates that 103 million youth lack basic literacy skills worldwide with the majority of them being girls (United Nations 2015c).

Focusing on progress in education well-being between 1997 and 2012, we note that the Arab states have made measurable progress in all aspects of education—primary, secondary, tertiary, and literacy at large. The same pattern of social progress in education has taken place among the nations of East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe and Central Asia. Although sub-Saharan Africa made significant strides in primary education, comparable advances in educational infrastructure and enrollment levels have not occurred at the secondary and tertiary levels of education.

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## 20.6 Global Progress in Income, Wealth, and Poverty Alleviation

Both the popular and scholarly literature have addressed the issue of poverty and poverty alleviation (Landes 1999; Parlipiano et al.; Porter 2014). The issue is not a new one but its long-term nature lends support to the need to find solutions that address poverty. The news is typically filled with a sense of doom and gloom inasmuch as the gap between upper and lower income has consistently widened since at least 1980. What has not been discussed, however, is the use by governments of a wide range of measures to alleviate poverty. These initiatives include employer-employee financed social security programs that have nearly eliminated poverty among the elderly in many nations as well as the tax-supported social welfare programs that have been imple-

mented to ensure access on the part of all workers to basic health, education, housing, food, and other basic services (Social Security Administration 2015). Public discussions of these poverty issues also exclude the substantial transfers of wealth that occur through government-to-government foreign aid and technical assistance programs as well as the substantial contributions made by philanthropists to less-economically advantaged people and communities. Private transfers of wealth are well in excess of hundreds of billions of dollars each year and those amounts continue to increase annually (Dobrianksy 2003; Foundation Center 2015).

*An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics. Plutarch ancient Greek orator and biographer (c. 46–120 CE) (Plutarch n.d.)*

Poverty reduction has been a central goal of most nations since the onset of the Industrial Revolution and earlier. The reasons for the centrality of this goal in public policy are threefold: (1) Financial poverty condemns people to the lowest possible level of well-being and, at the same time, frequently transmits poverty from one generation to the next. (2) Poverty exerts enormous political pressures on the capacity of nations to meet even the most basic social and material needs of their steadily increasing populations. (3) Public and private expenditures for poverty reduce the capacity of nations and individuals to invest in higher levels of objective well-being, including health, education, universal welfare services, and support for the involuntarily unemployed (Day and Schiele 2012).

The World Bank (2015a, b) designates incomes of USD 2 or lower per day per person (or about USD 60 per month per person or USD 720 per year per person) as the standard for measuring the percentage of the populations of all countries that live in poverty, i.e., USD 2880 per year for a family of four (World Bank 2015a). The financial standard is intentionally low inas-

much as many developing countries are not substantially monetized; instead, farmers and other agricultural workers depend on themselves to produce their own food, places to live, and so on. These workers, however, need some cash to purchase goods and services, including health care, that they cannot produce using their own labor. The International Labour Organization (ILO) keeps track of monetized labor and the ability of agricultural, indeed, all workers to generate money that can be used to purchase necessary goods and services in local, national, regional, and global markets (ILO 2015).

Poverty levels in more economically advanced countries are assessed using a much higher standard of monetization because people must use currency of one type or another to purchase the goods and services they require. Currently, the income standard used for measuring poverty in economically advanced countries is USD 15 or less per day per person (i.e., USD 450 per person per month or USD 5400 per person per year or USD 21,600 for a family of four [Luxembourg Income Studies 2015]). This standard is a more reasonable one for postindustrial, service-based societies and better reflects the reality of the economic differences that exist between economically developing and already developed countries.

### 20.6.1 The Contribution of Social Welfare and Social Security in Advancing Economic Well-Being

Social welfare consists of a complex set of institutional arrangements between (1) families and households and extended kinship systems; (2) markets; (3) a broad range of private and voluntary organizations (also referred to as “nongovernmental organizations”); and (4) governments, or what is generally referred to as the public or state sector (Estes and Zhou 2015). The relationship that exists within and between these four core sectors is illustrated schematically in Fig. 20.17, which depicts the complex ways in which each one functions to reinforce society as


a whole, e.g., social security is privately financed by workers and employers but, owing to the size of the funds involved, is administered by the central government. Similarly, the funds used to support this near universal program are derived from employees (50 %) and employers (50 %), with the administrative costs of the program financed through general tax revenues at no direct cost to beneficiaries. All participants in the system receive benefits once certain age or other major life events occur. Current payments are made on a rolling basis such that payments made by pre-retired workers are used to finance payments to retired recipients.

### 20.6.2 Social Security as a Social Investment

Social security is the world’s most successful social program and today provides coverage to people in more than 170 nations, or approximately 90 % of the world’s total population (Social Security Administration 2015). The program is widely credited with eliminating poverty among the elderly and for providing a safety net not only for the aged but also for adult persons with severe physical or emotional disabilities (Alzheimer’s disease, severe neuromuscular degenerative diseases, and chronic mental illnesses among many other categories of long-term impairment).

The concept of *welfare* originates from the old English word “well-fare” or “fare well” and, in recent years, “well-being.” All three of these concepts embrace the objective and subjective components of well-being discussed throughout the book. Welfare and well-being are deeply embedded in history, sociology, anthropology, economics, and political science (especially public finance and public policy). The history associated with the concept goes back several millennia and is present in the cultural understanding of all societies—rich and poor, young and old, Northern, Eastern, Southern, and Western, Christian, Islamic, and Jewish.

The yields associated with social security programs are many and include such diverse pro-



**Fig. 20.17** The public-private development mix in social welfare and wealth redistribution. A range of social programs exist along each of the axes, e.g., state-supported, market-provided programs (e.g., subsidized housing and health care), state-supported family-provided programs (e.g., foster grandparent programs, subsidized child care), and market-supported, family-provided programs (e.g.,

student loans, food stamps). The pattern is repeated in the inner matrix, demonstrating an entirely different set of public-private partnerships, in this case emphasizing the contribution of nongovernmental organizations to the mix. Contextual and contemporary forces shape the character of all such arrangements (Estes and Zhou 2015)

grams as subsidized health, education, food, and housing programs as well as a wide range of benefits to military veterans and their families. They include income security for the aged and severely disabled and, in the case of young people, financial support for those with neuromuscular and other neurological degenerative diseases. The numbers of such persons in the United States exceeded 60 million in 2015 and included the aged, young people, and families in need of public support. Social security is the most widely accepted approach for providing for the income security needs of people during predictable periods of income insecurity. Otto von Bismarck of Germany first formulated the basic principles of social security in the 1880s to quiet the growing discontent among jobless and impoverished workers (Social Security 2015). The intention

then, as now, was to introduce high levels of social stability to nations by ensuring that at least the basic social and material needs of their populations would be met. Today, social security programs are established in more than 170 nations. Most include income security programs designed to aid families in dealing with income security problems associated with (1) old age, disability, and retirement; (2) work-related injury; (3) major medical illness including pregnancy; (4) involuntary job loss; and (5) family allowances to assist with the costs associated with raising large families. These programs have been highly successful and, given that they are financed jointly by workers and employers, they rarely carry the stigma associated with tax-supported welfare programs such as social security income support programs (SSSI, General Assistance); publicly organized

but privately financed and provided health care services (Medicaid); subsidized housing, food, and income support services for persons with severe disabilities and others who are jobless for reasons beyond their control.

The precise nature and extent of coverage of the five formally organized social security programs vary across countries as does the level of financial benefits associated with them. Some countries, mostly for ideological reasons associated with work, offer only three of the five core social security programs (old age, disability, sickness), whereas a small number of others offer a broad spectrum of income support schemes such as employment-related programs plus those for involuntary joblessness and large family size. Worker and employer contributions to the social security administration finance these programs. In turn, benefits are received directly from the central government and are rarely stigmatized. The United States, for example, offers four of the five social security schemes but has no privately financed provisions for family allowance (Ray and Calasanti 2013). The one exception is those families who are desperately poor and therefore eligible to receive assistance through programs that are financed through general taxation rather than employment-based schemes (e.g., through such highly stigmatized programs as *Aid to Families with Dependent Children*, *General Assistance*) and dozens of other highly specialized programs such as food coupons, publicly supported housing, subsidized health care, and childcare.

The most ambitious social security programs have all but eliminated financial poverty among their retired elderly populations. Poverty rates dropped from a high of 70 % at the outset of the Second World War to the low teens in 2015. Family allowance schemes have proven highly successfully in supplementing financial support services for large families and, even more centrally, to families whose primary income earner has experienced involuntary job loss. The impact of these privately and publicly financed support programs has been enormous. Each plan is designed such that payments are made to all eligible workers when certain criteria are met. These payments are made irrespective of the

resources of the individuals to whom the payments are made; but, ultimately, surplus social benefits are returned to the investment funds via general taxes assessed on each individual and household at the end of each fiscal year.

### 20.6.3 The Goals of Social Welfare Programs and Their Contributions to Personal and Collective Well-Being

The goals of social welfare programs are multifaceted. Using formally identified criteria, social welfare benefits reach rich and poor people alike in every society and with the same set of shared social goals: (1) to ensure adequate levels of *financial security* such that individuals and families can function as self-sufficiently as possible within society (e.g., through the promotion of basic and advanced education, the establishment of preventive and curative health services, the availability of adequate, affordable housing, participation in charitable arrangements and other activities for those unable to fully provide for their own needs); (2) to provide *supplemental income security programs and services* for those who are unable to meet their own needs (e.g., the working poor, persons with severe disabilities, persons with chronic illnesses, racial and ethnic minority groups that are blocked from participating fully in society); (3) to promote *the engagement of all responsible actors in the provision of welfare programs and services*—families and their kinship networks, governments, businesses and other key market actors, nongovernmental organizations, and persons who cannot provide adequately for their own needs (e.g., age-dependent children, youth, and the elderly; victims of incapacitating natural and man-made disasters; disabled veterans and other war heroes; solitary survivors without children; and many other socially vulnerable groups of people). These population groups and the more than 170 universal programs that are available worldwide to support them are identified in considerable depth by the International Social Security Association (ISSA 2015).

In a country well governed, poverty is something to be ashamed of. In a country badly governed, wealth is something to be ashamed of. (Confucius)

<http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/wealth.html#zmI4O;PRQZRW1i4L.99>

Social welfare programs reflect social investments designed to help people function at their highest possible level of self-sufficiency and well-being. With the exception of the services provided by the social democratic nations of Europe, most services in other economically advanced countries generally are time-limited and provide for people only during periods of predictable income insecurity. Longer-term social programs planned to serve people with extreme and longer-term needs are available in other economically advanced nations but, typically, have a wide range of eligibility requirements associated with them. Unfortunately, long-term income and other social support schemes often are associated with levels of social stigma and discourage many people in need from availing themselves of these publicly sponsored social benefits, e.g., welfare-sponsored income programs, food stamps, subsidized housing, and the like.

#### 20.6.4 International Development Assistance

A variety of international organizations contribute to reducing the inequalities brought about by the concentration of wealth. The aid-giving agencies of governmental development assistance organizations include the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, Department for International Development and more than 40 others—nearly all of which are aid agencies of economically advanced nations. All of these organizations use publicly generated tax revenues to support their international aid-granting

activities and are therefore accountable to their citizens for the priorities associated with the use of these funds. Most national development aid organizations carry out their responsibilities effectively and consistently with their needs and those of aid-receiving nations. Even so, the publics of many of the largest aid-granting nations frequently criticize these activities on the basis that such funds should be spent on domestic, rather than international, social programs (Moyo 2010). Research has shown, however, that public knowledge concerning the actual percentage of public GDP allocated to international aid is highly inaccurate (Goldberg 2009). Nonetheless, and as result of increasing globalization, the amount of international aid granted by these national development organizations continues to increase steadily while, at the same time, the level of their national indebtedness also increases. Figure 20.18 identifies those countries that provide the most substantial levels of foreign assistance via their public aid-granting bodies, and Fig. 20.19 identifies the top ten aid-receiving countries (OECD-DAC 2015).


Other international sources of aid directed at reducing disparities in income and wealth distribution include the following:

- National and international nongovernmental organizations such as charitable foundations, Doctors Without Borders, the American Friends Service Committee, and more than 200,000 other legally incorporated groups in the United States and Europe (National Center for Charitable Statistics 2015);
- Private philanthropists and philanthropies (Lane 2013); and,
- Volunteers in service—often associated with either governmental or nongovernmental organizations or may act on behalf of religious congregations that support their service-oriented activities (Rochester et al. 2012).











In 2014, American transfers of private philanthropic wealth exceeded USD 358.38 billion (Giving USA 2015; Nonprofit Times 2014). For illustrative purposes only, Figs. 20.20 and 20.21 identify the major sources of private giving in the



**Top 10 Donor Aid Countries**

	COUNTRY	AID DONATED
	 European Union	\$86.66 billion
1	 United States	\$31.55 billion
2	 United Kingdom	\$17.88 billion
3	 Germany	\$14.06 billion
4	 Japan	\$11.79 billion
5	 France	\$11.38 billion
6	 Sweden	\$5.83 billion
7	 Norway	\$5.58 billion
8	 Netherlands	\$5.44 billion
9	 Canada	\$4.91 billion
10	 Australia	\$4.85 billion

**Top 10 Development Assistance Committee Countries**

	COUNTRY	AID (% GNI)
1	 Norway	1.07%
2	 Sweden	1.02%
3	 Luxembourg	1.00%
4	 Denmark	0.85%
5	 United Kingdom	0.72%
6	 Netherlands	0.67%
7	 Finland	0.55%
8	 Switzerland	0.47%
9	 Belgium	0.45%
10	 Ireland	0.45%

**Fig. 20.18** Top 10 aid donor countries, 2012. The Office for Economic Cooperation and Development also lists countries by the amount of official development assistance (ODA) they give as a percentage of their gross national income. Five countries met the longstanding UN target for an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7 % in 2013 (Data from Development Aid 2015)

	COUNTRY	AID RECEIVED
1	 Afghanistan	\$6.73 billion
2	 Israel	\$6.18 billion
3	 Vietnam	\$4.12 billion
4	 Ethiopia	\$3.26 billion
5	 Turkey	\$3.03 billion
6	 Congo, Dem. Rep.	\$2.86 billion
7	 Tanzania	\$2.83 billion
8	 Kenya	\$2.65 billion
9	 Côte d'Ivoire	\$2.64 billion
10	 Bangladesh	\$2.15 billion

**Fig. 20.19** Top 10 aid recipient countries, 2012 (Development Aid 2015)

United States as well as the sectors to which this giving is applied. This pattern of private giving in support of public purposes is remarkable. Further, the pattern of charitable giving reported in these figures excludes the large sums of money that others give more informally in support of community service projects, which, most likely, exceed or equal formal transfers via nongovernmental intermediary bodies. These patterns of contemporary philanthropy represent historically high levels of voluntary contributions made by any group of people for charitable purposes (Breeze 2013; Stewardship Advocates 2015).

**20.6.5 Foreign Direct Investments Strengthens the Commercial Sector**


Large businesses also make major contributions to international development through a wide range of foreign direct investment (FDI) initiatives (i.e., business investments made to enrich and expand their own and the participating nations' commercial activities in countries into which FDI funds flow [Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay 2014; Moran 2011]). These investments can be substantial, such as the current Chinese investments in mining and other industries in sub-Saharan Africa (Kachiga 2013), or small, depending on the financial needs and business prospects of particular industries (e.g., the adoption of microcredit and microlending schemes). In all cases, these investments have had a substantial impact on the economies of the countries in which the investments are made, especially those countries that become highly dependent on FDI funds to enter and sustain a global economic presence. In every case, FDI strengthens business and, in turn, their positive outcome further strengthens FDI initiatives.

Foreign direct investments generally take one of three approaches (Guidewhois.com 2012; Foreign direct investments 2015):


1. *Horizontal FDI*: FDI in which a firm duplicates its home country-based functions in a host country, such as MacDonald's opening branches in a wide range of countries.



**Fig. 20.20** Charitable giving, United States, 2014, USD 358.38 billion (Data from Giving USA 2015)



**Fig. 20.21** Distribution of charitable funds, 2014, USD 358.38 billion (Data from Giving USA 2015)



2. *Platform FDI*: FDI that occurs using a third country or corporation to extend its core activities abroad, e.g., financial and investment services such as Deloitte Consulting that open major branches in a second country (England or France), which, in turn, opens new branches in developing countries (North African Arab States).
3. *Vertical FDI*: FDI of a vertical nature occurs when firms seek to diversify their core functions or activities through a secondary country—situations in which domestic businesses perform value-adding activities stage by stage in a vertical fashion in a host country (via the addition of new product lines or production techniques that are introduced gradually over time in developing countries, especially in the mining and other extraction industries).

The countries that receive FDI are expected to, and most with low levels of public corruption do, experience substantial economic and social benefits through a selection of the following approaches: (1) low corporate and individual income tax rates; (2) tax holidays; (3) tax forgiveness; (4) preferential trade tariffs; (5) the creation of special economic or export processing zones; (6) *maquiladoras* (large-scale factories located primarily along the Mexico-US border); (7) free land or land subsidies; (8) reimbursement for relocation and expatriation costs; (9) infrastructure subsidies; and (10) research and development support (Foreign direct investment 2015). Other variations of FDI usually include tax forgiveness or exclusion arrangements. Examples of each of these approaches to FDI are interspersed in Parts III and IV.

FDI is one of the most effective approaches to economic development in which businesses can engage at great benefit to themselves and to the host countries. This method has been effective from the perspective of international technical assistance (Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay 2014).

### 20.6.6 The Halving of Poverty Since 1981—Dramatic Gains in Well-Being

No phenomenon in development has been studied more often and in greater depth than that of poverty. The reasons for this concern are threefold: (1) poverty and poverty rates provide us with a reasonably clear picture of the extent to which people are able to participate as either consumers, producers, or both in their local, regional, and national economies; (2) changes in poverty rates provide us with important indicators concerning the changing capacity of people, businesses, and governments to provide for at least the basic social and material needs of their populations; and, (3) poverty rates serve as a base of comparison between the differing economic development levels of nations and geographic regions.

The primary agency within the United Nations system of agencies most concerned with poverty and poverty alleviation is the World Bank. Indeed, the Bank's headquarters in Washington DC has inscribed on its walls "*Our Dream Is a World Free of Poverty.*" The World Bank also sets the operational criteria used in the determination of poverty (currently set at USD 1.90 per capita per day) both within and between nations and, in turn, monitors the extent of global progress in eliminating poverty and its causes (World Bank 2015b).

In the Bank's October, 2015 report to the UN General Assembly it announced that *there has been marked progress on reducing poverty over the past decades. The world attained the first Millennium Development Goal target—to cut the 1990 poverty rate in half by 2015—5 years ahead of schedule, in 2010.* The Bank indicated,


however, that despite this progress, the number of people living in extreme poverty globally, though substantially lower, still remains unacceptably high (World Bank 2015b).

- According to the most recent estimates, in 2012, 12.7 % of the world's population residing in developing countries lived at or below USD 1.90 a day (Fig. 20.22). That's down from 37 % in 1990 and 44 % in 1981. This means that, in 2012, 896 million people residing in developing countries lived on less than USD 1.90 a day, compared with 1.95 billion in 1990, and 1.99 billion in 1981.
- Progress has been slower at higher poverty lines. Over 2.1 billion people in the developing world lived on less than USD 3.10 a day in 2012, compared with 2.9 billion in 1990, so even though the share of the population living under that threshold nearly halved, from 66 % in 1990 to 35 % in 2012, far too many people are living with far too little.

#### 20.6.6.1 Countries and Regions Experiencing the Most Dramatic Reductions in Poverty

As is apparent from the discussion above, global progress in reducing poverty worldwide has been, and is likely to remain, quite uneven, albeit dramatic shifts in poverty reduction are positive and increasing in virtually every world region (Fig. 20.22).

- East Asia saw the most dramatic reduction in extreme poverty, from 80 % in 1981 to 7.2 % in 2012. In South Asia, the share of the population living in extreme poverty is now the lowest since 1981, dropping from 58 % in 1981 to 18.7 % in 2012. Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa stood at 42.6 % in 2012.
- China alone accounted for most of the decline in extreme poverty over the past three decades. Between 1981 and 2011, 753 million people moved above the USD 1.90-a-day threshold. During the same time, the developing world as a whole saw a reduction in poverty of 1.1 billion.



**Fig. 20.22** World poverty rates by region: 1990, 1999, and 2011 (using 2011 and 2015 PPP estimates) (Data from Ferreira et al. 2015)

- In 2012, just over 77.8 % of the extremely poor lived in South Asia (309 million) and sub-Saharan Africa (388.7 million). In addition, 147 million lived in East Asia and Pacific.
- Fewer than 44 million of the extremely poor lived in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Eastern Europe and Central Asia combined.

Thus, and as summarized in Fig. 20.22, considerable progress has been realized in halving the total incidence of poverty from 1990 to the present. Still more efforts directed at poverty reduction are needed, however, if we are to succeed in removing the social, political, and economic drivers that sustain poverty among large numbers of the world's poor.

Efforts also must be undertaken to prevent the previous poor from slipping back into poverty, a phenomenon that is all too typical of many developing and developed nations. The year 2030 has been designated by the World Bank and the United Nations as the target date for, once again, halving the incidence of abject poverty among the world's then substantially larger population.

#### 20.6.6.2 South Asia's Goal of Putting Poverty in a Museum

To a great extent, much of the reduction in South Asian poverty occurred among women and children, especially as a result of ambitious programs of microcredit, microloans, and other unparalleled financial instruments that make available to the poor access to credit for establishing their own businesses at extremely favorable rates. American-trained economist and banker Muhammed Yunus and his Grameen (People's) Bank of Bangladesh were the primary forces behind the start of these financing schemes. After years of successful experimentation, commercial banks, government, and major international development organizations developed comparable approaches to the granting of credit and loans to the poor—including to the solitary poor who live on the streets of most South Asian cities (Yunus 2007). Yunus' statement of his goal of establishing concessionary loans to the poor was most clearly formulated in the closing passage of his widely read book, *Creating a World Without Poverty* (2007). Yunus wrote,

All human beings have the inner capacity not only to care for themselves but also to contribute to increasing the well-being of the world as a whole. Some get the chance to explore their potential to some degree. But many never get any opportunity to unwrap this wonderful gift they were born with. They die with their gifts unexplored, and the world is deprived of all they could have done.... It is possible to eliminate poverty from our world because it is not natural to human beings—it is artificially imposed on them. Let's dedicate ourselves to bringing an end to it at the earliest possible date and putting poverty in the museums once and for all (p. 233).

Dr. Yunus went on to win the Nobel Prize for Peace for his pioneering work in lifting hundreds of thousands, likely millions, of women and children out of desperate poverty. His approach of extending credit to the “non-credit-worthy,” even in the small amounts of the typical loan (USD 50–USD 200) reflects an enormous technological change in economics never before seen.

#### **20.6.6.3 Poverty Reduction in Central Asia and Other Successor States to the Former Soviet Union**

The Central European and Eastern Europe successor states to the former Soviet Union experienced levels of personal and institutional poverty never before witnessed in these countries prior to the collapse of the former Soviet Union in December 1991. Not only did the economic systems of these countries collapse but so, too, did their ideological and philosophical understandings of economics as they transitioned from a Marxist central approach to one dominated by regional and global free market economic forces. These transitions resulted in the economic displacement of much of the populations of these countries, a reality with which many continue to struggle today. Even so, the bottom of the economic collapse that occurred in this region has likely already been reached for the majority of Central Asian nations. Today, most are experiencing levels of recovery that equal, or actually exceed, those that existed during even their most stable years under communist rule.

Poverty levels in Central Asia are comparatively low relative to other parts of Asia as are

poverty levels in the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe—some of which are now at least middle-income member states or candidate members of the EU, such as Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Czech Republic. Others, particularly the Islamic nations of Central Asia, continue to struggle with the challenges of economic and ideological transformation resulting from the collapse of the former communist systems under which they functioned. It is likely that they will require another 5–10 years before they attain a level of social growth comparable to other, more politically progressive, successor states to the former Soviet Union (Freedom House 2015). The presence of authoritarian regimes is especially prominent among the poorest and least socially developed of the Islamic countries of central and central south Asia.

#### **20.6.6.4 Advances in Reducing Adult and Child Poverty in Central and South America**

Poverty rates in Latin America also declined dramatically—from a high of 24 % in 1981 to a low of 9 % in 2011 (Fig. 20.22). These regional advances in poverty reduction are remarkable given the comparatively brief period in which they occurred and the rapidly expanding population size of each of the region's countries. These advances also reflect the important contributions made by the commercial sectors in providing leadership in creating sustainable jobs and other employment opportunities that pay well above subsistence levels. Urbanization is a prominent feature of poverty reduction in Latin America and the Caribbean as well, despite the growing numbers of people living in the region's many slums, shantytowns, and favelas. Further, urbanized Latinos experience higher levels of well-being than do those continuing to reside in rural communities and small-to-moderate-sized cities (LatinoBarometer 2015).

The *North American Free Trade Agreement*, or NAFTA, between Canada, Mexico, and the United States also has had a major impact on the development of businesses not only in Mexico, the region's northern most country, but also in other subregions of Latin America on which

Mexico draws for its raw materials and, in some cases, low-skilled labor. Many of these latter workers are women who undertake piecemeal work within their own homes, e.g., handicrafts, small-scale electronic assembly. Unfortunately, considerable violence co-exists within many of Mexico's economic trading zones located along its border with the United States, such as Ciudad Juarez, Nuevo Laredo, Tijuana, among others. This violence is tied directly to the sudden wealth of these communities and to the emergence in recent decades of large-scale drug cartels, human trafficking, and other deeply enmeshed criminal networks that feed off the new financial prosperity of the region. It is unlikely that all of these organizations will be brought under control any time soon, given the high levels of internal public corruption associated with them.

#### **20.6.6.5 Poverty Reduction Success in Other World Regions and Subregions**

Tremendous successes also have occurred in reducing extreme poverty in other world regions. These gains are especially noteworthy among the developed countries of Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) as well as among selected small island developing countries of the South Pacific (Tahiti, Samoa). Reductions in extreme poverty also have occurred in the two nations of the North American region, with the most significant reductions taking place in Canada.

Poverty levels in the United States, however, continue to range between 10 % and 13 %, a range that has remained more or less constant for more than a century. Today, more than 47 million poor in the United States, including one in five American children, are classified officially as living in poverty. A disproportionate share of these children are children of color, children living in rural communities, and children living in single-parent families (most of whom are headed by women who themselves were previously children of poverty). A significant number of these children also live in foster care or in institutions that provide for the care of abandoned, neglected, unwanted, disabled, and physically abused children (United States Children's Bureau 2013).

Violence is closely associated with poverty in rich countries as is exposure to illicit drug use, sex abuse, alcohol consumption, and other social pathologies (Worthington 2015). High premature school dropout rates occur more frequently among children living in impoverished communities as well. Pregnancy is a major threat to economic security among these young people who often are poorly educated and who contribute to higher transgenerational fertility and poverty rates (Wagmiller and Adelman 2009).

## **20.7 Population, Population Growth, and Well-Being**

Population size depends on three factors, all which affect personal and collective well-being: (1) fertility, (2) migration, and (3) mortality. Fertility and migration are added to compute total population size; deaths are then subtracted from the total to arrive at net changes in population size (which can be higher or lower depending on the situation of the country in which the changes take place). Viewed from a global perspective, changes in population size are inseparable from overall levels of well-being, including those experienced by communities and families. This relationship was recognized as early as 1946 by famed sociologist Wilbert Moore, an early pioneer in quality-of-life and well-being research (Moore 1946). High net population growth, for example, places increasing demands on government to provide more food and land space, to provide more schools and health care, and to enhance opportunities so that as newborns age they can participate more fully in all aspects of communal life. In general, economically advanced nations can meet these needs readily, especially countries such as France that are eager to increase the numbers of their native population. For economically developing countries, however, higher rates of population growth can frustrate their social agendas by challenging their ability to meet national social goals as they seek to meet the most basic needs of their population (i.e., 80 % of the world's population live in developing countries and 80 % of births occurring in



these countries take place among the poorest populations [UNPOP 2015a). High fertility rates, in combination with longer annual years of life expectancy, the new norm for developing countries, place heavy demands on the financial resources of many of these countries.

*Almost half of the population of the world lives in rural regions and mostly in a state of poverty. Such inequalities in human development have been one of the primary reasons for unrest and, in some parts of the world, even violence. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, Indian Politician and Statesman (1931–2015) (Kalam n.d.)*

### 20.7.1 Population Growth Over the Long Term

Today's global population of 7.4 billion people is the largest ever recorded in human history. Indeed, the current size of the world's population exceeds the combined population of all of the people who walked the Earth since before the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (1750–1820/40). This growth trend is expected to continue at more or less the same rate until about 2050 when the global population will reach between 9 and 10 billion people. This projection is far more favorable than the 12 billion that were projected to populate the earth by 2050 in the 1960s when population growth rates were increasing exponentially (UNPOP 2015b). Dire predictions concerning a population size of 12, or even 13, billion people revived the early warnings of Thomas Malthus and other Social Darwinists of more than two centuries earlier concerning the limited “carrying capacity” of the planet relative to the unlimited ability of people to reproduce. In recent years, Malthusian overpopulation concerns contributed to the publication of such foreboding books as Paul Ehrlich's *The Population Bomb: Population Control or Race to Oblivion* and several reports issued by the highly influential Club of Rome: *The Limits to Growth: A Report of the Club of Rome on the*

*Predicament of Mankind; Mankind at the Turning Point: The Second Report of the Club of Rome; and Reshaping the International Order.*


Fortunately, these dire warnings have now subsided due to a combination of the “green revolution” and technological innovations in agriculture, access to reliable forms of contraception, and decisions by families themselves to limit the number and spacing of their offspring. Reliable programs of social welfare that provide for the social, economic, and health needs of populations as they age also have had a dramatic impact on reducing population growth (Dorling 2013). Adults no longer need to depend on their children as sources of financial support during periods of predictable income insecurity—old age and disability, job loss, sickness, and an abundance of age-dependent children (ISSA 2015).

### 20.7.2 World Population Size by Region

Population size varies appreciably by geopolitical region. Figure 20.23 shows regional population sizes for 1900, 1950, 2013 and that estimated for 2050. The world's most populous region in 2013, as discussed throughout the book, is Asia (north, East, South, and west), which includes 60.2 % of the world's total population. Africa is the second most populous region (14.9 %); the majority of the population lives in or below the Sahara Desert. Population sizes are much smaller for Europe in 2013 (10.5 %), Latin America (8.6 %), and North America (5.0 %) and much less than 1 % in Oceania and in Australia and New Zealand (0.1 %). Of importance to our discussion is that 80 % of the world's population resides in developing Africa, Asia, and Latin America, although many of the small island countries of the South Pacific are also among the poorest, and least reachable, nations.

Unfortunately, 82 % of the world's poor reside in the most populous nations and, in the absence of comprehensive social welfare programs and services, these regions have higher than annual fertility and maternal mortality rates and lower than annual years of life expectancy. Currently, there exists no reason for believing that these





**Fig. 20.23** Chart version of world population size by major geographic region, 1900–2050 (estimated) (Data from UNPOP 2015a, b)


underlying demographic trends will change any-time soon. This reality exists despite high levels of international aid and technical assistance to developing countries with accelerated rates of population growth. Global commitment to this goal will be carried forward beginning in 2015 with implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.

As one would expect, the regions experiencing the most serious challenges to well-being are also those that are the most and least populous. The flow of resources to these countries is slow and, in many cases, is the result of development aid (OECD-ODA 2015), outright charity (NCCS 2015), and time-limited grants made by globally wealthy philanthropists (Bellah and Madsen 2007; Damen and McCuiston 2010; Kittross 2013). This pattern is not likely to change appreciably over the near term given the numbers of people in need of basic services. The situation is especially problematic among the Arctic people of the circumpolar region and the people of low-lying islands of the South Pacific. The latter face the inevitability of large portions of their nations becoming submerged due to global warming, whereas the former are dealing with the rapidly melting snow and ice of the circumpolar region

that has served as their home and traditional hunting ground. The two processes are intertwined, particularly in relation to the impact of global warming, which is steadily increasing the vulnerability of the peoples of these nations to environmental forces over which they have no control (Beinecke and Dean 2014; National Resources Defense Council 2015; Poppel 2002).

### 20.7.3 Rural to Urban Migration and Its Impact on Well-Being

Everywhere in the world, rural to urban migration is a defining feature of modern life, i.e., more than 83 % of the population of economically advanced countries now lives in cities as does 46 % of the population of developing countries (Fig. 20.24). In addition, the percentage of people migrating to urban areas continues to increase at a rapid pace (UNPOP 2015b). These migrations take three forms: (1) *internal migration* of people from rural communities to urban centers (Ferrin 2010; United Nations-Habitat 2015); (2) *external migration* of people to another nation in search of increased economic opportunity and political freedom; and (3) *forced migration* of



**Fig. 20.24** Percentage of world’s population distributed by rural and urban dwellers and persons living in more and less developed regions, 1950–2020 (Data from UNPOP 2015a, b)

people due to internal conflicts or intraregional wars and other internal or regional conflicts. Each type of migration affects well-being differently, with the most favorable levels reported for skilled workers who migrate voluntarily to urban areas in search of improved economic or social conditions (Veenhoven 2015).

Migration has had a profound impact on the population size of nations but not on the overall population of the planet. Involuntary migration also significantly impacts the well-being of receiving countries, especially countries that receive little or no external support to finance the basic needs of large numbers of involuntary migrants, such as the forced migration of hundreds of thousands of Afghanis, Iraqis, and Syrians into neighboring countries who, themselves, are poor and are struggling to meet the basic needs of their own citizens. Fortunately, the global community in many such situations has provided money and in-kind contributions to make these “temporary” resettlements possible. When viewed from a well-being perspective, resettled refugees typically have appreciably

improved their own emotional and physical status whereas the receiving countries frequently experience increasing levels of financial stress. Another effect of the migrations from conflict zones is the loss of human resources (brain drain) from the very societies in which their contributions are most urgently needed. Refugees also experience the loss of large numbers of members of their extended families as well as the rich kinship and social network ties that existed in their country of origin.


From a positive perspective, voluntary migration of people from rural to urban centers has resulted in substantial improvements in well-being and in access to regular, well-paying employment, more competitive schools, and advanced health care and other systems of social care. Relocation to urban areas substantially improves the quality of their lives, albeit the loss of social capital in the process can be substantial. Even so, urban migrants make regular visits back to their rural communities to sustain their well-being and that of their distant relatives and kinship systems. Financial remittances from the

migrants, in this case including migrant and contract labor, to their distant families also have added substantially to the income base of their community or country of origin. In 2013 alone, known global foreign remittances from migrant workers exceeded USD 414 billion (World Bank 2013a, b).

### 20.7.4 The Rise of Global Cities

Figure 20.25 identifies the world’s largest urban centers—cities that function as global centers of financial, industrial, artistic, and cultural expres-

sion. The figure identifies just 20 of the largest urban agglomerations but easily could include 100 or more metropolitan areas that are home to 10 or more million people—all of which would be easily recognized by the reader. Some of these cities, such as Mexico City and Tokyo, have metropolitan populations exceeding 25 to 30 or more million people. The long-term implications of the rise of global cities, among others, is that, increasingly, growing numbers of people will be attracted to these urban centers, especially people migrating from rural to urban centers. In addition to rising globalization, rural communities will steadily lose much of their working age popula-



**Fig. 20.25** World’s largest metropolitan areas and cities. \*Asterisks indicate cities and metropolitan areas located in socially developing or least developing countries (UNPOP 2015a, b)

tion, leaving disproportionate numbers of elderly persons and children in rural societies. The resulting demographic picture is one in which rural communities are likely to consist primarily of age-dependent persons (young and old) who depend on remittances from their working-age family members for their basic support (Fullenkamp et al. 2008; Maimbo and Ratha 2005). This reality already exists in many of the remote rural communities of developing countries from which most working-age adults long ago migrated to economically sustainable urban centers.

The conclusion is that well-being and quality of life are closely associated with urban living. This finding may be due to increased economic, social, and political opportunities associated with urban life i.e., people are able to thrive at higher levels of well-being in environments that accord them increased opportunities for social mobility and access to a wide range of resources that are less available in rural communities (Kotkin 2007; Pacione 2009; Spooner 2015). Every expectation exists for believing well-being in this sector will continue as increasing numbers of people benefit from the unique socio-political-health-education advantages associated with urban life.

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## 20.8 Well-Being and the Advancement of Historically Disadvantaged Population Groups

The concept of “historically disadvantaged population groups” has its origin in the UN and its efforts to improve the status of persons who live on the periphery of society. These people include girls and women who, for centuries, and apart from long years of annual life expectancy, have been historically disadvantaged relative to men. Discrimination against girls and women is evident in religious texts that identify Eve (the woman) as being made from the rib of Adam (the man) and as the one who tricked Adam into eating of the “forbidden fruit,” after which all of humanity was assigned to a state outside that into

which men and women were originally born. Such stories appear in all of the Abrahamic traditions (Jewish, Christian, and Muslim) and in the Hindu teachings of South Asia, albeit some of the most worshipped and powerful gods (or manifestations of gods) are, indeed, women—Lakshmi, Durga, Kali, and Sarasvati. Polynesian culture also assigned high status to women deities (e.g., the all-powerful goddess of volcanoes, Pelé) but, in their daily lives, women were assigned a social status well below that of men. Elizabeth Eckermann in Chap. 18 provides an in-depth discussion of many of these contradictions. Other socially disenfranchised groups of people include children and youth, the elderly, the poor, persons with severe disabilities, migrants and refugees, and prisoners (International Organization for Migration 2015; Save the Children 2015; UNDP 2014; UNICEF 2012).

### 20.8.1 Advances in the Social, Political, and Economic Status of Women

Chapter 18 focuses on women and well-being. As Professor Eckermann explains, well-being research related to women has developed significantly in the last two decades. She takes the reader on a historical journey through well-being research, using a gender lens, exploring how gender mediates socioeconomic status, age, generation, cultural context, and race.

*The education of women is the best way to save the environment.* E. O. Wilson (Wilson n.d.)

The well-being of women has improved significantly during the past 50 years but more needs to be accomplished. Professor Eckermann discusses key events related to the gradual dismantling of gender discrimination from ancient times to the present—from the gender equitable Chera Dynasty of the Sangam Age in India (300 Before the Common Era–400 Common Era), to the

United Nations MDG campaign of 2015. Major strides toward the reduction of gender disparities have been achieved in many areas—health, basic rights, leadership roles, and economic independence. However, even in 2015, total gender equality in some countries remains an elusive dream. Gender inequality is most pronounced in the least developed countries and is concentrated in the Arab states of North Africa and West Asia, South Asia and wide expanses of sub-Saharan Africa.

The UN reports that many countries have failed to decrease already high levels of infant and child mortality rates as well as maternal mortality rates. Challenges lay ahead. In education, the challenge is gender parity in primary education (UNDP 2014). Only two thirds of developing countries have achieved parity for women in secondary education. In employment, women in many parts of the world lack equitable paid employment (e.g., women in Northern Africa hold fewer than one in five paid jobs in the non-agricultural sector). In politics, much disparity in leadership positions in government still exists.

As a result of continuing gender disparities, but building on past and recent successes, in 2015 the United Nations restated the goal of gender equality at the 2015 Summit on Sustainable Development: *Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls* (UNDP 2014). The UN Web site regarding the attainment of this goal states the following:

Gender equality is not only a fundamental human right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. Providing women and girls with equal access to education, health care, decent work, and representation in political and economic decision-making processes will fuel sustainable economies and benefit societies and humanity at large.

As reported in specialized studies conducted by the UN (UN Women 2015), considerable progress has occurred worldwide in achieving gender parity between men and women, especially as a result of the gains made through implementation of the MDGs focused on women (which include equal access to primary and sec-

ondary education for both girls and boys). Nevertheless, women and girls still suffer discrimination and violence in every part of the world.

### 20.8.1.1 Health and Women's Well-Being

A defining domain of women's well-being is health, and the key indicator used by quality-of-life researchers to gauge progress in this area is maternal mortality rate. Much progress has been made in reducing maternal mortality over the years, but unfortunately the data show wide variations across regions. Specifically, maternal mortality rates are high in Third and Fourth World countries. For example, in parts of Nigeria, maternal deaths registered more than 3200 of 100,000 births annually over the past decade. The problem is most accentuated among women of indigenous populations of First World countries (e.g., Canada, Australia). Overall, significant progress has been made in reducing maternal mortality rates especially in the Americas, Europe, and the Western Pacific; however, Africa and the Middle East fall short on this critical measure of well-being, and the countries of Latin America have showed considerable progress on the rate of women surviving childbirth, albeit their baseline was more favorable than that of other world regions.

To obtain a more comprehensive understanding of women's well-being related to child bearing, in addition to maternal mortality rates, quality-of-life researchers use other indicators such as maternal morbidity and disability, typically captured by measures of *health-adjusted life expectancy* (HALE). Based on the statistics cited by Professor Eckermann in Chap. 18, the HALE rate for women in the Western Pacific region from 2002 to 2007 was 70 to 80 years on average in five high-income countries; conversely, the HALE rate, as reported in Chap. 18, did not exceed 60 years in most low-income countries. However, significant progress was noted for this latter group of countries during the decades that followed the end of the Second World War.

### 20.8.1.2 Education and Women's Well-Being

Considerable progress in education for girls and women has been documented. Education has been recognized as a means to change women's lives and to improve gender equality in all walks of life. Educated women assume leadership positions in politics, administration, and the economy.

Since 1990, the good news is that female literacy and the number of girls completing primary, secondary, and even tertiary education has increased dramatically. The bad news is that the number of women in developing countries that offer some secondary education remains low compared to that of men (UNDP 2013). This situation does not mean that things cannot change for the better. Professor Eckermann (Chap. 18) points to the example of the state of Kerala in India. Government initiatives in education have been successful, producing rapid and dramatic results. These initiatives have produced the best health and well-being outcomes in all of India despite Kerala being one of the poorest and most densely populated states of India. Improved female literacy rates had a positive effect on health, employment, and subjective well-being.

### 20.8.1.3 Income and Women's Well-Being

Steadily increasing levels of income have played a significant role in reducing gender disparities and in making progress toward gender equality and women's well-being. Women's income and economic standing increased tremendously after the Second World War. Increased income played a significant role in far-reaching transformations of gender relationships. A large number of women moved from the domestic sphere to the public sphere (i.e., paid labor) in many parts of the world. This movement paved the way for the breakdown of traditional gender roles—women chose occupations that had previously been reserved for men. Conversely, men became more accepting of formerly feminized occupations (e.g., primary school teaching and nursing). This change, in turn, has led to social, legislative, and political calls for equal pay.

Unfortunately, men have not made as much progress as women in assuming major social roles in the domestic sphere—a sphere of influence traditionally relegated to women. This outcome has resulted in double-shift labor for working women—on the job and at home—which has adversely impacted their well-being. Women in single-parent households suffer even greater burdens than those living in two-adult households. On the bright side, gender disparity in income has been reduced in spheres such as medicine and law. However, gender disparity has not improved appreciably in other sectors of the economy and in occupations that continue to be primarily relegated to women such as teaching, nursing, social work, home care, and skilled health care.

### 20.8.1.4 Subjective Well-Being Among Women

The quality-of-life research literature suggests that women tend to report higher levels of subjective well-being than men in some contexts but not in others. That is, research provides contradictory findings on the differences between the quality-of-life experiences of men and women. It may be that men are socialized to be more resilient than women in some cultures, whereas the opposite is true in other cultures.

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## 20.9 Well-Being Advances in Other Sectors

A number of approaches exist for assessing changes in the well-being of populations, particularly those aspects related to the objective conditions of quality of life. They include (1) the United Nations Development Programme's HDI (UNDP 2014); (2) Anderson's Human Suffering Index (Anderson 2014); (3) Estes' Weighted Index of Social Progress (Estes 2015); and many other approaches that assess changes over time in selected sectors of human development such as corruption and terrorism (Estes and Sirgy 2014; International Institute for Economics and Peace 2014; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2014).



(See [Appendix B](#) for a list of the major indices used regionally and globally to assess changes in well-being over time.) These assessments also have a strong relationship with our self-assessment of quality of life or well-being, discussed elsewhere in this chapter. Quality of life among chronically hungry people, for example, is assessed to be low inasmuch as few people are able to experience high levels of well-being while they and their children go hungry. On the other hand, it is possible to experience progressively higher levels of well-being as long as the most basic physical and security needs are met on a sustainable basis (UNICEF 2012; Save the Children 2015).

*Human development is a process of enlarging people's choices. The most critical of these wide-ranging choices are to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. (UNDP 1990, p. 1) Human Development Report (UNDP 1990)*

### 20.9.1 Advances in Participatory Democracies


Participation in making and shaping the political decisions and public policies by which one lives is a critical element in freedom and well-being. Tragically, large numbers of the world's population continue to live under authoritarian regimes (Freedom House 2015). In 1990, for example, Transparency International (2014) estimated that only 46 % of the world's population lived in societies that were ruled by freely elected participatory democracies. Most people lived in countries classified as either "not free" or "partly free," including such highly populated countries as the People's Republic of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and many smaller countries located in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Freedom House 2015). Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the subsequent establishment of parliamentary

systems in many of the newly independent states of Central Asia that resulted from this collapse, the percentage of the world's population living in democratic societies increased from 46 % in 1990 to 63 % by 2013 (Freedom House 2015). That number, as summarized in the data reported in Fig. 20.26, continues to increase each year (Currie-Alder and Kanbur 2014; Stutz and Warf 2011).

This worldwide increase in political freedom is one of the most important gains in well-being since the end of the Second World War. Today, the protection of civil and political rights is prominent on the social agendas of all nations—those that are already free and those that are moving toward full freedom or will achieve that goal within the next decade. The dramatic increase in the number of people living under conditions of freedom is one of the great accomplishments of the last quarter of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century. The expectation is that the numbers of countries and the percentage of the world's population living in freedom will increase steadily during much of the first half of the current century.

### 20.9.2 Public Corruption: Significant Declines Still a Major Challenge to Well-Being

Political corruption involves the use of power by public officials for personal gain. Corruption can take the form of bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, influence peddling, graft, and embezzlement. Political corruption can occur at the highest levels of government and may involve tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars, such as occurred with the Marcos regime of the Philippines. Corruption also can occur at the micro level, the sphere in which people live their daily lives, involving small sums of money or other types of economic exchanges in order to obtain even the most perfunctory public services (e.g., getting passports stamped, legal documents issued, trash picked up, food weighed accurately). Corruption also facilitates criminal enter-



**Fig. 20.26** Number of countries and percentage of the world's population living in democratic and nondemocratic countries 1990 to 2013 by 5-year intervals (Transparency International 2014)

prises and, in turn, leads to a considerable sense of “disease” among those who have no control over it.

The misuse of public trust for personal gain can have an extremely negative impact on the well-being of people in that it undermines their sense of agency in getting necessary activities accomplished without having to “oil” the wheels of the corrupt system to which they are subjected. Such practices block the independence of individuals and even that of nations. In turn, recurrent and widespread corruption within nations detracts substantially from the willingness of other nations and businesses to engage in commerce with those countries in which corruption is pervasive.

So important is the issue of corruption to quality of life that, throughout the world, dozens of nongovernmental groups have emerged in recent decades that monitor and seek to reduce public corruption in nations. Some of these groups, such as the Berlin-based think tank Transparency International, have been extremely effective in identifying and changing patterns of public corruption. They have added substantially to the quality of life or well-being of those persons, business entities, and others who have been victimized through public corruption.

### 20.9.2.1 Low Levels of Perceived Public Corruption

Figure 20.27 presents Transparency International's list of the 20 most corruption-free nations in the world. Nearly all of these countries are member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and all have in place a variety of mechanisms for exposing either public or private corruption, and in most cases, both. These countries are judged to be safe places with which to do business. Individuals, in turn, will never, or at least rarely, be asked to pay the “corruption taxes” that are imposed on citizens of and visitors to high-corruption countries. Not surprisingly, nearly all of the countries identified in the figure are listed as countries characterized by either “high” or “very high” levels of human development on the HDI. Also, people rate their subjective quality of life much more favorably in these countries than in the high-corruption countries.

### 20.9.2.2 High Levels of Perceived Public Corruption

Figure 20.28 shows the 20 countries identified by Transparency International as having the highest levels of public corruption. Almost all of the countries are located in developing Africa and

RANK		COUNTRY	SCORE
1 <sup>ST</sup>	→	Denmark	92
2 <sup>ND</sup>	↓	New Zealand	91
3 <sup>RD</sup>	→	Finland	89
4 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Sweden	87
5 <sup>TH</sup>	→	Norway	86
6 <sup>TH</sup>	↑	Switzerland	86
7 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Singapore	84
8 <sup>TH</sup>	→	Netherlands	83
9 <sup>TH</sup>	↑	Luxembourg	82
10 <sup>TH</sup>	→	Canada	81
11 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Australia	80
12 <sup>TH</sup>	→	Germany	79
12 <sup>TH</sup>	→	Iceland	79
14 <sup>TH</sup>	→	United Kingdom	78
15 <sup>TH</sup>	↑	Belgium	76
15 <sup>TH</sup>	↑	Japan	76
17 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Barbados	74
17 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Hong Kong	74
17 <sup>TH</sup>	↑	Ireland	74
17 <sup>TH</sup>	↑	United States	74

**Fig. 20.27** Countries with the lowest levels of perceived public corruption. Arrows indicate change in rank position relative to the prior year: *yellow* = no change; *green* = positive change; and *red* = negative change (Data from Foreign Direct Investment 2015)

Asia and possess vast stores of natural and human resources, albeit they seem unable to take advantage of these resources to promote social, political, and economic well-being for their people. The majority of these countries also are politically autocratic, and most are besieged by internal turmoil or open conflicts with neighboring states on whom they depend for access to bring their goods and services to the international markets.

Not surprisingly, the majority of countries characterized as having high levels of public corruption also are grouped with nations with the lowest levels of human development. Self-assessed happiness and life satisfaction levels are low in these countries. Rarely do any of these countries use their natural or human resources to promote peace and stability either within or across their borders.

RANK		COUNTRY	SCORE
174 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Somalia	8
174 <sup>TH</sup>	→	North Korea	8
173 <sup>RD</sup>	↓	Sudan	11
172 <sup>ND</sup>	↑	Afghanistan	12
171 <sup>ST</sup>	→	South Sudan	15
170 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Iraq	16
169 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Turkmenistan	17
166 <sup>TH</sup>	→	Uzbekistan	18
166 <sup>TH</sup>	↑	Libya	18
166 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Eritrea	18
161 <sup>ST</sup>	↑	Yemen	19
161 <sup>ST</sup>	↓	Venezuela	19
161 <sup>ST</sup>	↑	Haiti	19
161 <sup>ST</sup>	↑	Guinea-Bissau	19
161 <sup>ST</sup>	↓	Angola	19
159 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Syria	20
159 <sup>TH</sup>	↓	Burundi	20
156 <sup>TH</sup>	→	Zimbabwe	21
156 <sup>TH</sup>	→	Myanmar	21
156 <sup>TH</sup>	↑	Cambodia	21

**Fig. 20.28** Countries with the highest levels of perceived public corruption. Arrows indicate change in rank position relative to the prior year: *yellow* = no change; *green* = positive change; and *red* = negative change (Data from Foreign Direct Investment 2015)

### 20.9.2.3 Public Corruption and the Road Ahead

Unlike many of the overarching issues discussed in this chapter, the well-being challenges associated with public corruption remain a central issue on the world agenda. Reductions in corruption have occurred in economically advanced countries. However, in much of the developing world, corruption is a phenomenon that persists and significantly undermines the sense of well-being experienced by people at all levels of social organization. Corruption is a serious issue in terms of the history of well-being and is reflected in the objective and subjective dimensions of how we assess quality of life. Having to pay bribes, no matter how small, to gain access to goods and services to which one already is entitled is demoralizing and weakens the social fabric on which nations and people depend. Corruption also pre-

vents many legitimate businesses from engaging in commerce with such countries, thereby further depriving those countries of significant opportunities on which broad-based social, political, and economic development is premised.

### 20.9.3 Sharp Decline in Violence-Related Deaths

Although the news media seem to focus on armed conflict and casualties of war (i.e., fatalities) in places such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, the fact is that the number of war fatalities is at its lowest point in human history. Today's world is particularly peaceful. There are fewer wars and fewer people dying in wars than at any time in history (Halloran 2015; SIPRI 2014).

Neil Halloran, a specialist in cinematic data visualization (<http://www.neilhallowan.com/>), and his team of technical specialists have confirmed that since the end of the Second World War, the number of deaths associated with violence has dropped precipitously. This finding is counterintuitive to public perception, but the pattern holds up under scrutiny (Fig. 20.29). The rate of homicides in most areas of the world, for example, has steadily declined—from 7.1 homicides per 100,000 people in 2003 to 6.2 in 2012. The rates of rape or sexual assault and of intimate

partner violence have declined significantly as well (Pinker 2011; Pinker and Mack 2014). Halloran and others believe that these important elements in well-being will continue well into the future with the result that fewer and fewer people will perish because of war-related and interpersonal violence (Halloran 2015).

### 20.10 Advances in Subjective Well-Being

Self-assessments represent an important component of measuring well-being. The majority of these assessments are provided by national surveys and polls such as the WVS, which is well recognized by quality-of-life researchers. The WVS uses the following survey item to capture subjective well-being: "All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?" Responses to this survey question are captured on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied).

Trend analyses based on WVS data show that from 1981 to 2007 subjective well-being rose in 45 of 52 countries for which long-term data are available. WVS experts attribute this positive trend in subjective well-being to increases in economic development, democratization, and rising social tolerance.




Fig. 20.29 Declining war fatalities over time (Pinker as cited by Halloran 2015; reprinted with permission)

*Well-being cannot exist just in your own head. Well-being is a combination of feeling good as well as actually having meaning, good relationships and accomplishment.*  
Martin Seligman (Seligman n.d.)

Read more at <http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/keywords/well-being.html#1qFub3L58bXRMhRI.99>

Despite the seeming universality of the concepts contained in this question, in reality, important cross-national and cross-cultural understandings are associated with each of the major concepts. Therefore, and to date at least, most opinion polls have been limited to either national or to culturally comparable regional levels (AsiaBarometer 2015; European Commission 2015; Inoguchi 2015; LatinoBarometer 2015). Rarely do we have subjective assessments that attempt to include the world as a whole. The conceptual and methodological problems associated with conducting such polls at this level of analysis are just too great to render polls at this level reliable and valid. Therefore, this section focuses only on the responses of people to polling questions administered at either the national or the culturally comparable level. We do not attempt to apply or consolidate these data at the global level inasmuch as this level of data aggregation is not valid.

### 20.10.1 Subjective Well-Being in Sub-Saharan Africa

In Chap. 7 on sub-Saharan Africa, Professors Møller and Roberts provide empirical evidence on levels of life satisfaction for 35 sub-Saharan African nations between 2000 and 2009. They report an appreciable spread in national averages in life satisfaction, with the highest rating of 6.2 (on a 10-point scale with 10 being “very satisfied” and 1 being “very dissatisfied”) in Malawi and the lowest rating of 2.6 in Togo. To put these figures in a global perspective, Togo was the lowest ranked of 149 nations, with Costa Rica scoring the highest (8.5).

Professors Møller and Roberts note that relatively few countries in sub-Saharan Africa have mean scores above the midpoint (5.0). These countries include Malawi, South Africa, Nigeria, Djibouti, Chad, and Namibia. They also note that the overall annual level of satisfaction for all of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa is 4.4, which is below that of North Africa (5.6) and the world (5.9). The authors attribute the low satisfaction scores to the reality on the ground, namely poverty, economic inequality, civil strife, and poor governance.

### 20.10.2 Subjective Well-Being in Latin America

Professors Mariano Rojas and Jose Garcia (Chap. 8) report that Gallup Survey data show that 10 of the 11 countries in the world with people indicating a high degree of subjective well-being are in Latin America. That is, Latin Americans clearly are happiest compared to other world regions. The data show that Latin Americans have life satisfaction levels that, in general, are at least as high as those of the Europeans and Anglo-Saxons. Specifically, annual life satisfaction scores in the four more populous countries in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina) are higher than those in countries such as the United States, Germany, Australia, and Spain.

Within the region, countries such as Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, Mexico, and Guatemala score the highest on life satisfaction. The survey data show that the trend during the last decade seems mostly positive, with only a few exceptions such as El Salvador, Venezuela, Honduras, and Chile.

The authors attribute the high satisfaction scores to good access to health, education, and other material benefits. Although the income of the majority of Latin Americans is not as high as that of those living in the developed countries, the authors contend that the happiness of Latin Americans may be based on factors other than economic well-being. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon world, Latin Americans may not be motivated by material resources. Instead, emphasis is

placed more on the family and on community social life. The authors point to survey data that show that the annual satisfaction with family life is high, with an annual average rate of “very satisfied” for Argentina and Mexico.

### 20.10.3 Subjective Well-Being in North America

In Chap. 9, Professors Richard Estes, Ken Land, Alex Michalos, Rhonda Phillips, and Joe Sirgy report on how satisfied and happy Canadians and Americans are. They point to survey data showing that Canada is ranked sixth in the world on happiness, whereas the United States is ranked 17th. In other words, despite being considered an economic “power house,” for the United States at least, “money cannot buy happiness.” However, North Americans seem to be materialistic. In other words, their economic well-being is viewed by most to be an important part of their life satisfaction. To demonstrate this point, the authors point to research that examined the relationship between trends in median household income and annual happiness levels. They assert that this research indicates that short-term increases/decreases in median household income associated with periods of economic expansion/contraction are reflected in short-term increases (decreases) in annual happiness. On the average, the mean life satisfaction scores for people in Canada seem to be slightly higher than for people in the United States. In addition, the annual scores in countries are stable—that is, these averages do not fluctuate much over time.

### 20.10.4 Subjective Well-Being in East Asia

Professors Inoguchi and Estes (Chap. 10) discuss the objective and subjective well-being of people in East Asia. Figure 10.22 shows statistics related to the self-assessment of personal happiness in selected East Asian countries (China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). A slight majority of people in China and Japan indicate that they are either “extremely happy” or “rather happy.” In

contrast, people in South Korea and Taiwan seem to be less happy—just half of the population report they are “extremely happy” or “rather happy.”

Altogether, subjective well-being in East Asia seems to be lower than that observed in Europe, North America, South America, and Oceania. Poverty, austerity, and other harsh conditions of life cannot account for this decrease in happiness because objective indicators of quality of life paint a positive picture—people in East Asia, by and large, have good living conditions. Could it be a cultural confound? One plausible explanation is the fact that people in East Asia tend to express more humility in responding to survey questions about their personal happiness. People in East Asia are influenced by Confucianism and Buddhism. Humility plays an important role in their psyche. Hence, people tend to report lower levels of personal happiness because doing so shows pride that goes against their cultural preference for public expressions of humility.

### 20.10.5 Subjective Well-Being in South Asia

Chapter 11 covers the well-being of people in South Asia. Professors Vijay Shrotryia and Krishna Mazumdar also discuss subjective well-being. They report an annual score of 4.94 (on a 10-point scale) for life satisfaction for the people in South Asia (where 1 represents the bottom of the happiness ladder or “worst possible life” and 10 represents the “best possible life”) (Fig. 11.10). This response is deflated compared to those of other world regions, particularly Europe, North America, South America, and Oceania. Within South Asia, people in Pakistan report the lowest levels of life satisfaction whereas people in India report the highest levels. Given the harsh reality of living conditions (e.g., rampant poverty and civil strife) in places such as Pakistan, no wonder their life satisfaction scores seem to be the most deflated.

The authors also discuss Bhutan and its experiment with the Gross National Happiness Index (GNH). In 1972, the Bhutanese king instituted gross national happiness as an important measure



of societal progress (in lieu of traditional measures such as GDP) and to guide public policy. In 2006, the Bhutan government reported that a large percentage of people in Bhutan felt happy with life. Professors Shrotryia and Mazumdar attribute this level of subjective well-being to the fact that Bhutan has been one of the most successful countries in South Asia in the development and delivery of social welfare and has a strong record of sound macroeconomic management, good governance, and rapid development of hydroelectric power resources. The authors explain that gross national happiness is based on four goals: (1) achieve equity in socioeconomic development; (2) preserve and promote cultural and spiritual heritage; (3) protect and preserve the environment; and (4) maintain good governance.

### **20.10.6 Subjective Well-Being in Southeast Asia**

Dr. Mahar Mangahas and Professor Edilberto de Jesus describe the state of subjective well-being of the people of Southeast Asia in Chap. 12. These authors report that the vast majority (at least 90 %) of people living in Southeast Asia (e.g., Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia) report that they are either “very happy” or “quite happy.”

Within this region, they report the following ranking: Singapore is the happiest country, followed by Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia. However, as a region, the annual happiness level of Southeast Asia is considerably below that of North America, but well above those of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

### **20.10.7 Subjective Well-Being in Europe**

Professors Wolfgang Glatzer and Jürgen Kohl describe the state of subjective well-being of the people of Europe in Chap. 13. They discuss the results of annual happiness surveys conducted among Europeans. The major finding is that Europeans and America share more or less the

same level of happiness. Within Europe, the countries with highly satisfied people tend to be located in northern and central Europe: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Ireland. The same countries rank highest among all of the world’s countries. The authors attribute this high level of subjective well-being to the fact that the countries are relatively small, a factor that enhances social cohesion and national identity. These countries also score favorably in terms of economic wealth, long-term stable democracies, and welfare state regimes.

In contrast, most of the countries in southern and Eastern Europe do not do as well as their northern and central counterparts. These include the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Western European countries with a history of authoritarian political regimes (Greece, Portugal, Spain), countries with a history of socialism (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary), and Italy and Cyprus. Most of these countries are also relatively poor economically (e.g., Greece).

### **20.10.8 Subjective Well-Being in Oceania**

Professor Robert Cummins and his associate Tanja Capic report in Chap. 14 on the subjective well-being of the people residing in Oceania (mostly in Australia, New Zealand, and Papua New Guinea). These authors provide evidence that Australia is consistently in the top cluster of all countries in terms of subjective well-being. They also point out that high levels of subjective well-being are concomitant with high levels of trust and low levels of perceived corruption. In contrast, survey data show that New Zealanders’ levels of subjective well-being are lower than those of Australians. The mean life satisfaction score in New Zealand is below the annual value compared with those of 23 European countries. These results are not easy to interpret, given that Australia and New Zealand are similar in many respects.

The authors acknowledge that there are no reliable survey data capturing the subjective well-being of the people of Papua New Guinea. However, the authors indicate that the general

circumstances of living in this country are challenging in the extreme—appalling social conditions that reflect dysfunction at the highest levels; hence, they do expect subjective well-being to be very low.

### **20.10.9 Subjective Well-Being in the Nation-States of the Former Eastern Bloc**

Findings from the WVS reported a sharp decline in subjective well-being in Russia and many other former communist countries during the 1990s. Professor Carol Graham and her associate Aurite Werman provide us with more information about this situation in Chap. 15. The authors describe subjective well-being in terms of the transition that occurred from 1986 until 1996 and the post-transition period. The authors provide much evidence suggesting that residents of the Russian Federation experienced lower levels of subjective well-being than those of developing countries such as India and Nigeria. By the 1990s, subjective well-being levels fell to the lowest levels ever recorded. Before the transition period, subjective well-being was not that bad. The authors attribute this fact to the sense of security (e.g., guaranteed employment, a universal safety net) that most people felt under communism even though communism brought with it a lack of political freedom. The transition obliterated this sense of security. The authors called this pattern the “paradox of unhappy growth.” That is, people who experience rapid change, such as rapid economic growth, tend to be less happy than the average. Change brings higher levels of stress and a sense of dislocation. Hence, the authors state that, in general, the pattern of life satisfaction over time is V-shaped, with the lowest levels occurring as the transition progresses and then recovering toward pretransition levels, from roughly 2005.

The authors also remark on the inequality of life satisfaction in the transition economies. Specifically, they provide evidence suggesting that there were no significant differences in life satisfaction between the rich and the poor. Since 1990, inequality in life satisfaction has increased considerably.

### **20.10.10 Subjective Well-Being in the Countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa**

Professors Habib Tiliouine and Mohammed Meziane report in Chap. 16 on the subjective well-being of the people residing in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (the Arab states plus Israel, Turkey, and Iran). These authors report evidence from the Gallup World Poll indicating that the annual value for the countries of the MENA region is 5.8 (on a 10-point scale where 1 represents “worst possible life” and 10 represents “best possible life”), with the United Arab Emirates scoring the highest (7.3), followed by Israel (7.0). The authors note that all country scores remain much lower than the highest score worldwide (8.5). Other surveys show a similar pattern: Israel and most of the Gulf countries rank comparatively high on happiness, with countries with a great deal of political instability and civil strife (e.g., Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, and Egypt) at the low end. Although most people in Israel report high levels of life satisfaction, the evidence also suggests a great deal of stress and negative emotion. The authors attribute this outcome to the security threat posed by militant Palestinians and the surrounding hostile Arab states.

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### **20.11 Final Thoughts and Recommendations for Future Research**

The focus of this chapter is to provide concluding commentary about the major changes in well-being experienced by the vast majority of people residing in various regions of the world after the Second World War. We have cited, for example, new and emerging studies of political life in which people are able to participate more actively in helping to shape the laws and public policies by which they would be governed. We have examined major threats to democratization—especially fraud, public corruption, centralization of political power in the hands of despots. We have discussed the world’s rapidly changing economic situation, especially with regard to the dis-

tribution of income and wealth across and within countries. Some of the findings reported under this topic proved to be highly discouraging, given the continued widening gap between the most and least economically privileged groups found in every society.

We also have identified advances in well-being for those persons and population groups that live on the margins of social, political, and economic life. We reexamined the role of women in society as well as the large numbers of persons who cannot provide fully for their own economic needs: children and youth, the elderly, the poor, persons with severe physical or emotional disabilities, prisoners, and illegal migrants. In each case, we applied the three dimensions of the HDI to illustrate the extent to which changes in well-being that occur at national and regional levels affect our empirical assessments of global well-being, with special emphasis on the impact of these changes on the least socially advantaged.

#### **Bill Gates on “Modernization and Innovation”**

*Our modern lifestyle is not a political creation. Before 1700, everybody was poor as hell. Life was short and brutish. It wasn't because we didn't have good politicians; we had some really good politicians. But then we started inventing—electricity, steam engines, microprocessors, understanding genetics and medicine and things like that. Yes, stability and education are important—I'm not taking anything away from that—but innovation is the real driver of progress. Bill Gates*

Read more: <http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/bill-gates-the-rolling-stone-interview-20140313#ixzz3nyOKSysu>

All of the findings reported in this chapter and throughout the book are historical in nature and reflect forces that continue to impact our daily lives. Some of these forces, such as global terrorism, are relatively new phenomena, but they, too,

are discussed in detail, given their critical importance to regional and global well-being (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2015).

Finally, the entire content reflects steady, significant progress in well-being over time and in all regions of the world. The well-being gains realized since the Second World War are especially remarkable, given their magnitude and the rapid pace at which they unfolded. The editors believe strongly that global well-being trends since at least 1945 will continue well into the future, despite the economic and political uncertainties that characterize some of the world's regions. The use of a historical approach to study well-being has resulted in an optimistic picture concerning the present and future states of well-being, quality of life, and life satisfaction.

This conclusion is reinforced by the findings reported in the just released book, *How Was Life? Global Well-Being Since 1820* (Van Zanden et al. 2014).<sup>1</sup> We make the argument

<sup>1</sup>The report examined 10 dimensions of well-being over time: per capita GDP, real wages, educational attainment, life expectancy, height, personal security, political institutions, environmental quality, income equality, and gender equality. The findings are clear. Education and health improved significantly. Literacy and schooling increased markedly since WWII. Life expectancy increased from an annual rate of 30 years in 1880 to 70 years on an annual basis by 2000. Political institutions improved dramatically over the years—although the dramatic increase was nonlinear and marked by violence. Personal security also increased, although there were “hot spots” such as homicide rates in the United States, Latin America, Africa, and the former Soviet Union. With respect to the quality of the environment, the report does not paint a positive picture. Biodiversity, for example, declined in all regions and worldwide. Per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have increased dramatically. The good news in this and other sectors is that we are beginning to see a slowdown in levels of environmental pollution and degradation. Income inequality also declined from the end of the nineteenth century until about 1970 but then began to increase and is still increasing to date. The end of communism in many countries may partly account for this trend. Gender inequality exhibits a noticeable variance: It has declined drastically in most parts of the world but not everywhere.

that well-being has improved significantly since the Second World War; the Office for Economic Cooperation and Development, the sponsor of the report, reviews general trends in well-being from 1820 to the present and arrives at many of the same conclusions. Overall, we believe that this and the many other global reports of well-being that we have cited throughout the book confirm that remarkable social gains have been achieved over the centuries. Today, humanity is in a much better position to advance individual and collective well-being than ever before. We have, however, arrived at a critical decision point with respect to the directions these efforts

should or will take. It is our hope that the progress that we have seen, particularly after World War II, will continue and that we will be able to track progress every 5 years to continue the analytical exercise of this volume. Throughout this book, we have provided substantial historical evidence of the various pathways that can be taken to achieve that new future. Lack of action is not a possibility if we are to sustain and add to the well-being gains already achieved. “Working together, we can inspire, innovate and accelerate sustainable social interventions that promote human wellbeing” (Halloran Philanthropies 2015).

## Supplemental Table

**Supplemental Table 20.1** Level of indicator achievement for the Millennium Development Goals, 2014 (UNDP 2014)

Goals and Targets	Africa			Asia				Latin America and the Caribbean	Caucasus and Central Asia
	Northern	Sub-Saharan	Eastern	South-Eastern	Southern	Western	Oceania		
<b>GOAL 1   Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger</b>									
Reduce extreme poverty by half	low poverty	very high poverty	moderate poverty	moderate poverty	very high poverty	low poverty	very high poverty	low poverty	low poverty
Productive and decent employment	large deficit	very large deficit	moderate deficit	large deficit	very large deficit	large deficit	very large deficit	moderate deficit	moderate deficit
Reduce hunger by half	low hunger	high hunger	moderate hunger	moderate hunger	high hunger	moderate hunger	moderate hunger	moderate hunger	moderate hunger
<b>GOAL 2   Achieve universal primary education</b>									
Universal primary schooling	high enrolment	moderate enrolment	high enrolment	high enrolment	high enrolment	high enrolment	moderate enrolment	high enrolment	high enrolment
<b>GOAL 3   Promote gender equality and empower women</b>									
Equal girls' enrolment in primary school	close to parity	close to parity	parity	parity	parity	close to parity	close to parity	parity	parity
Women's share of paid employment	low share	medium share	high share	medium share	low share	low share	medium share	high share	high share
Women's equal representation in national parliaments	moderate representation	moderate representation	moderate representation	low representation	low representation	low representation	very low representation	moderate representation	low representation
<b>GOAL 4   Reduce child mortality</b>									
Reduce mortality of under-five-year-olds by two thirds	low mortality	high mortality	low mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality	low mortality	low mortality
<b>GOAL 5   Improve maternal health</b>									
Reduce maternal mortality by three quarters	low mortality	very high mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality	moderate mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality	low mortality	low mortality
Access to reproductive health	moderate access	low access	high access	moderate access	moderate access	moderate access	low access	high access	moderate access
<b>GOAL 6   Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases</b>									
Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS	high incidence	high incidence	low incidence	low incidence	low incidence	low incidence	low incidence	low incidence	low incidence
Halt and reverse the spread of tuberculosis	low mortality	moderate mortality	low mortality	moderate mortality	moderate mortality	low mortality	high mortality	low mortality	low mortality
<b>GOAL 7   Ensure environmental sustainability</b>									
Halve proportion of population without improved drinking water	high coverage	low coverage	high coverage	moderate coverage	high coverage	high coverage	low coverage	high coverage	moderate coverage
Halve proportion of population without sanitation	high coverage	very low coverage	low coverage	low coverage	very low coverage	moderate coverage	very low coverage	moderate coverage	high coverage
Improve the lives of slum-dwellers	moderate proportion of slum-dwellers	very high proportion of slum-dwellers	moderate proportion of slum-dwellers	high proportion of slum-dwellers	high proportion of slum-dwellers	moderate proportion of slum-dwellers	moderate proportion of slum-dwellers	moderate proportion of slum-dwellers	—
<b>GOAL 8   Develop a global partnership for development</b>									
Internet users	high usage	moderate usage	high usage	high usage	moderate usage	high usage	moderate usage	high usage	high usage

The progress chart operates on two levels. The words in each box indicate the present degree of compliance with the target. The colours show progress towards the target according to the legend below:  
 Target already met or expected to be met by 2015. No progress or deterioration. Progress insufficient to reach the target if prevailing trends persist. Missing or insufficient data.

For the regional groupings and country data, see [migs.un.org](http://migs.un.org). Country experiences in each region may differ significantly from the regional average. Due to new data and revised methodologies, this Progress Chart is not comparable with previous versions. Sources: United Nations, based on data and estimates provided by: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; Inter-Parliamentary Union; International Labour Organization; International Telecommunication Union; UNAIDS; UNESCO; UN-Habitat; UNICEF; UN Population Division; World Bank; World Health Organization – based on statistics available as of June 2014. Compiled by Statistics Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations.



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## Appendices

## Appendix A: Trends in the Human Development Index, 1990–2014 (Table 2, UNDP 2015, pp. 212–215)

HDI rank	Country	Human development index (HDI)							HDI rank		Average annual HDI growth			
		Value							Change		(%)			
		1990	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2013	2009–2014 <sup>a</sup>	1990–2000	2000–2010	2010–2014	1990–2014
	Very high human development													
1	Norway	0.849	0.917	0.940	0.941	0.942	0.942	0.944	1	0	0.77	0.25	0.11	0.44
2	Australia	0.865	0.898	0.927	0.930	0.932	0.933	0.935	2	0	0.36	0.33	0.20	0.32
3	Switzerland	0.831	0.888	0.924	0.925	0.927	0.928	0.930	3	0	0.67	0.40	0.14	0.47
4	Denmark	0.799	0.862	0.908	0.920	0.921	0.923	0.923	4	1	0.76	0.53	0.41	0.61
5	Netherlands	0.829	0.877	0.909	0.919	0.920	0.920	0.922	5	0	0.56	0.36	0.34	0.44
6	Germany	0.801	0.855	0.906	0.911	0.915	0.915	0.916	6	3	0.66	0.58	0.26	0.56
6	Ireland	0.770	0.861	0.908	0.909	0.910	0.912	0.916	8	–2	1.12	0.54	0.21	0.72
8	United States	0.859	0.883	0.909	0.911	0.912	0.913	0.915	7	–3	0.28	0.28	0.18	0.26
9	Canada	0.849	0.867	0.903	0.909	0.910	0.912	0.913	8	1	0.22	0.41	0.28	0.31
9	New Zealand	0.820	0.874	0.905	0.907	0.909	0.911	0.913	10	–1	0.64	0.35	0.24	0.45
11	Singapore	0.718	0.819	0.897	0.903	0.905	0.909	0.912	11	11	1.33	0.92	0.41	1.00
12	Hong Kong, China (SAR)	0.781	0.825	0.898	0.902	0.906	0.908	0.910	12	2	0.55	0.85	0.32	0.64
13	Liechtenstein	..	..	0.902	0.903	0.906	0.907	0.908	13	–2	..	..	0.14	..
14	Sweden	0.815	0.897	0.901	0.903	0.904	0.905	0.907	14	–1	0.96	0.04	0.16	0.45
14	United Kingdom	0.773	0.865	0.906	0.901	0.901	0.902	0.907	15	–2	1.13	0.46	0.02	0.67
16	Iceland	0.802	0.859	0.892	0.896	0.897	0.899	0.899	16	–1	0.69	0.38	0.20	0.48
17	Korea (Republic of)	0.731	0.821	0.886	0.891	0.893	0.895	0.898	17	0	1.16	0.77	0.33	0.86
18	Israel	0.785	0.850	0.883	0.888	0.890	0.893	0.894	18	1	0.80	0.38	0.31	0.54
19	Luxembourg	0.779	0.851	0.886	0.888	0.888	0.890	0.892	19	–3	0.88	0.41	0.16	0.56
20	Japan	0.814	0.857	0.884	0.886	0.888	0.890	0.891	19	–3	0.51	0.31	0.18	0.37
21	Belgium	0.806	0.874	0.883	0.886	0.889	0.888	0.890	21	–2	0.81	0.10	0.21	0.41
22	France	0.779	0.848	0.881	0.884	0.886	0.887	0.888	22	–1	0.85	0.38	0.20	0.55
23	Austria	0.794	0.836	0.879	0.881	0.884	0.884	0.885	23	1	0.53	0.50	0.17	0.46
24	Finland	0.783	0.857	0.878	0.881	0.882	0.882	0.883	24	–1	0.90	0.25	0.13	0.50

25	Slovenia	0.766	0.824	0.876	0.877	0.878	0.878	0.880	25	-1	0.73	0.61	0.13	0.58
26	Spain	0.756	0.827	0.867	0.870	0.874	0.874	0.876	26	2	0.90	0.47	0.27	0.62
27	Italy	0.766	0.829	0.869	0.873	0.872	0.873	0.873	27	-1	0.79	0.47	0.13	0.55
28	Czech Republic	0.761	0.821	0.863	0.866	0.867	0.868	0.870	28	0	0.76	0.50	0.21	0.56
29	Greece	0.759	0.799	0.866	0.864	0.865	0.863	0.865	29	-2	0.51	0.81	-0.04	0.55
30	Estonia	0.726	0.780	0.838	0.849	0.855	0.859	0.861	30	3	0.73	0.71	0.69	0.71
31	Brunei Darussalam	0.782	0.819	0.843	0.847	0.852	0.852	0.856	31	1	0.46	0.29	0.37	0.38
32	Cyprus	0.733	0.800	0.848	0.852	0.852	0.850	0.850	32	-2	0.87	0.59	0.04	0.62
32	Qatar	0.754	0.809	0.844	0.841	0.848	0.849	0.850	33	-1	0.71	0.42	0.18	0.50
34	Andorra	..	..	0.823	0.821	0.844	0.844	0.845	34	..	..	..	0.66	..
35	Slovakia	0.738	0.763	0.827	0.832	0.836	0.839	0.844	36	3	0.34	0.82	0.48	0.56
36	Poland	0.713	0.786	0.829	0.833	0.838	0.840	0.843	35	1	0.99	0.53	0.41	0.70
37	Lithuania	0.730	0.754	0.827	0.831	0.833	0.837	0.839	37	-1	0.32	0.93	0.38	0.58
37	Malta	0.729	0.766	0.824	0.822	0.830	0.837	0.839	37	4	0.49	0.74	0.45	0.59
39	Saudi Arabia	0.690	0.744	0.805	0.816	0.826	0.836	0.837	39	10	0.76	0.79	1.00	0.81
40	Argentina	0.705	0.762	0.811	0.818	0.831	0.833	0.836	40	7	0.78	0.62	0.75	0.71
41	United Arab Emirates	0.726	0.797	0.828	0.829	0.831	0.833	0.835	40	-6	0.94	0.39	0.21	0.59
42	Chile	0.699	0.752	0.814	0.821	0.827	0.830	0.832	42	2	0.74	0.79	0.56	0.73
43	Portugal	0.710	0.782	0.819	0.825	0.827	0.828	0.830	43	0	0.97	0.47	0.33	0.65
44	Hungary	0.703	0.769	0.821	0.823	0.823	0.825	0.828	44	-4	0.90	0.67	0.21	0.69
45	Bahrain	0.746	0.794	0.819	0.817	0.819	0.821	0.824	45	-6	0.62	0.32	0.14	0.41
46	Latvia	0.692	0.727	0.811	0.812	0.813	0.816	0.819	47	-5	0.49	1.09	0.25	0.70
47	Croatia	0.670	0.749	0.807	0.814	0.817	0.817	0.818	46	-1	1.12	0.75	0.32	0.83
48	Kuwait	0.715	0.804	0.809	0.812	0.815	0.816	0.816	47	-3	1.18	0.06	0.23	0.55
49	Montenegro	..	..	0.792	0.798	0.798	0.801	0.802	49	1	..	..	0.32	..
	High human development													
50	Belarus	..	0.683	0.786	0.793	0.796	0.796	0.798	51	4	..	1.41	0.39	..
50	Russian Federation	0.729	0.717	0.783	0.790	0.795	0.797	0.798	50	8	-0.17	0.88	0.47	0.38
52	Oman	..	..	0.795	0.793	0.793	0.792	0.793	52	-4	..	..	-0.06	..
52	Romania	0.703	0.706	0.784	0.786	0.788	0.791	0.793	53	-1	0.04	1.06	0.26	0.50
52	Uruguay	0.692	0.742	0.780	0.784	0.788	0.790	0.793	54	4	0.70	0.50	0.40	0.57
55	Bahamas	..	0.778	0.774	0.778	0.783	0.786	0.790	55	2	..	-0.06	0.51	..

(continued)

HDI rank	Country	Human development index (HDI)							HDI rank		Average annual HDI growth			
		Value							Change		(% )			
		1990	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2013	2009–2014 <sup>a</sup>	1990–2000	2000–2010	2010–2014	1990–2014
56	Kazakhstan	0.690	0.679	0.766	0.772	0.778	0.785	0.788	56	6	–0.15	1.20	0.73	0.56
57	Barbados	0.716	0.753	0.780	0.786	0.793	0.785	0.785	56	–3	0.50	0.36	0.18	0.39
58	Antigua and Barbuda	..	..	0.782	0.778	0.781	0.781	0.783	58	–6	..	..	0.03	..
59	Bulgaria	0.695	0.713	0.773	0.775	0.778	0.779	0.782	59	0	0.26	0.81	0.29	0.49
60	Palau	..	0.743	0.767	0.770	0.775	0.775	0.780	62	0	..	0.31	0.44	..
60	Panama	0.656	0.714	0.761	0.759	0.772	0.777	0.780	60	4	0.85	0.64	0.61	0.72
62	Malaysia	0.641	0.723	0.769	0.772	0.774	0.777	0.779	60	1	1.21	0.62	0.32	0.82
63	Mauritius	0.619	0.674	0.756	0.762	0.772	0.775	0.777	62	6	0.86	1.15	0.68	0.95
64	Seychelles	..	0.715	0.743	0.752	0.761	0.767	0.772	68	8	..	0.39	0.97	..
64	Trinidad and Tobago	0.673	0.717	0.772	0.767	0.769	0.771	0.772	64	–4	0.63	0.74	0.01	0.57
66	Serbia	0.714	0.710	0.757	0.761	0.762	0.771	0.771	64	–1	–0.05	0.65	0.45	0.32
67	Cuba	0.675	0.685	0.778	0.776	0.772	0.768	0.769	66	–14	0.15	1.28	–0.28	0.54
67	Lebanon	..	..	0.756	0.761	0.761	0.768	0.769	66	1	..	..	0.43	..
69	Costa Rica	0.652	0.704	0.750	0.756	0.761	0.764	0.766	69	1	0.77	0.64	0.52	0.67
69	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.567	0.665	0.743	0.751	0.764	0.764	0.766	69	7	1.62	1.11	0.74	1.26
71	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.635	0.673	0.757	0.761	0.764	0.764	0.762	69	–4	0.59	1.17	0.18	0.76
72	Turkey	0.576	0.653	0.738	0.751	0.756	0.759	0.761	72	16	1.26	1.23	0.79	1.17
73	Sri Lanka	0.620	0.679	0.738	0.743	0.749	0.752	0.757	74	5	0.91	0.85	0.62	0.83
74	Mexico	0.648	0.699	0.746	0.748	0.754	0.755	0.756	73	–2	0.77	0.65	0.35	0.65
75	Brazil	0.608	0.683	0.737	0.742	0.746	0.752	0.755	74	3	1.18	0.76	0.60	0.91
76	Georgia	..	0.672	0.735	0.740	0.747	0.750	0.754	76	4	..	0.89	0.65	..
77	Saint Kitts and Nevis	..	..	0.739	0.741	0.743	0.747	0.752	79	..	..	..	0.44	..
78	Azerbaijan	..	0.640	0.741	0.742	0.745	0.749	0.751	77	–2	..	1.46	0.35	..
79	Grenada	..	..	0.737	0.739	0.740	0.742	0.750	82	..	..	..	0.43	..
80	Jordan	0.623	0.705	0.743	0.743	0.746	0.748	0.748	78	–8	1.25	0.53	0.17	0.77



81	The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	..	..	0.738	0.742	0.743	0.744	0.747	81	-2	..	..	0.31	..
81	Ukraine	0.705	0.668	0.732	0.738	0.743	0.746	0.747	80	2	-0.54	0.92	0.51	0.24
83	Algeria	0.574	0.640	0.725	0.730	0.732	0.734	0.736	84	4	1.09	1.26	0.35	1.04
84	Peru	0.613	0.677	0.718	0.722	0.728	0.732	0.734	85	15	1.00	0.58	0.57	0.75
85	Albania	0.624	0.656	0.722	0.728	0.729	0.732	0.733	85	2	0.50	0.96	0.35	0.67
85	Armenia	0.632	0.648	0.721	0.723	0.728	0.731	0.733	87	1	0.24	1.08	0.41	0.62
85	Bosnia and Herzegovina	..	..	0.710	0.724	0.726	0.729	0.733	89	2	..	..	0.78	..
88	Ecuador	0.645	0.674	0.717	0.723	0.727	0.730	0.732	88	5	0.45	0.61	0.52	0.53
89	Saint Lucia	..	0.683	0.730	0.730	0.730	0.729	0.729	89	-5	..	0.66	-0.02	..
90	China	0.501	0.588	0.699	0.707	0.718	0.723	0.727	93	13	1.62	1.74	1.02	1.57
90	Fiji	0.631	0.678	0.717	0.720	0.722	0.724	0.727	91	1	0.72	0.56	0.36	0.59
90	Mongolia	0.578	0.589	0.695	0.706	0.714	0.722	0.727	95	14	0.18	1.68	1.11	0.96
93	Thailand	0.572	0.648	0.716	0.721	0.723	0.724	0.726	91	3	1.25	1.00	0.35	1.00
94	Dominica	..	0.694	0.723	0.723	0.723	0.723	0.724	93	-10	..	0.41	0.03	..
94	Libya	0.679	0.731	0.756	0.711	0.745	0.738	0.724	83	-27	0.75	0.34	-1.07	0.27
96	Tunisia	0.567	0.654	0.714	0.715	0.719	0.720	0.721	96	-1	1.43	0.88	0.26	1.00
97	Colombia	0.596	0.654	0.706	0.713	0.715	0.718	0.720	97	3	0.93	0.76	0.50	0.79
97	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	..	0.674	0.711	0.713	0.715	0.717	0.720	98	-5	..	0.55	0.30	..
99	Jamaica	0.671	0.700	0.727	0.727	0.723	0.717	0.719	98	-23	0.42	0.38	-0.30	0.28
100	Tonga	0.650	0.671	0.713	0.716	0.717	0.716	0.717	100	-4	0.32	0.60	0.14	0.41
101	Belize	0.644	0.683	0.709	0.711	0.716	0.715	0.715	101	-7	0.59	0.38	0.19	0.43
101	Dominican Republic	0.596	0.655	0.701	0.704	0.708	0.711	0.715	103	0	0.95	0.68	0.50	0.76
103	Suriname	..	..	0.707	0.709	0.711	0.713	0.714	102	-5	..	..	0.24	..
104	Maldives	..	0.603	0.683	0.690	0.695	0.703	0.706	104	2	..	1.25	0.86	..
105	Samoa	0.621	0.649	0.696	0.698	0.700	0.701	0.702	105	-3	0.45	0.70	0.21	0.52
	Medium human development													
106	Botswana	0.584	0.561	0.681	0.688	0.691	0.696	0.698	106	1	-0.41	1.96	0.61	0.74
107	Moldova (Republic of)	0.652	0.597	0.672	0.679	0.683	0.690	0.693	107	2	-0.87	1.19	0.78	0.26

(continued)

HDI rank	Country	Human development index (HDI)							HDI rank		Average annual HDI growth			
		Value							Change		(%)			
		1990	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2013	2009–2014 <sup>a</sup>	1990–2000	2000–2010	2010–2014	1990–2014
108	Egypt	0.546	0.622	0.681	0.682	0.688	0.689	0.690	108	–3	1.31	0.90	0.33	0.98
109	Turkmenistan	..	..	0.666	0.671	0.677	0.682	0.688	109	..	..	..	0.80	..
110	Gabon	0.620	0.632	0.663	0.668	0.673	0.679	0.684	111	1	0.20	0.48	0.76	0.41
110	Indonesia	0.531	0.606	0.665	0.671	0.678	0.681	0.684	110	3	1.34	0.92	0.71	1.06
112	Paraguay	0.579	0.623	0.668	0.671	0.669	0.677	0.679	113	–1	0.74	0.70	0.41	0.67
113	Palestine, State of	..	..	0.670	0.675	0.685	0.679	0.677	111	–4	..	..	0.29	..
114	Uzbekistan	..	0.594	0.655	0.661	0.668	0.672	0.675	114	0	..	0.98	0.77	..
115	Philippines	0.586	0.623	0.654	0.653	0.657	0.664	0.668	115	–1	0.61	0.50	0.52	0.55
116	El Salvador	0.522	0.603	0.653	0.658	0.662	0.664	0.666	115	0	1.46	0.79	0.50	1.02
116	South Africa	0.621	0.632	0.643	0.651	0.659	0.663	0.666	117	4	0.17	0.18	0.87	0.29
116	Viet Nam	0.475	0.575	0.653	0.657	0.660	0.663	0.666	117	1	1.92	1.29	0.47	1.41
119	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.536	0.603	0.641	0.647	0.654	0.658	0.662	119	2	1.19	0.61	0.79	0.88
120	Kyrgyzstan	0.615	0.593	0.634	0.639	0.645	0.652	0.655	121	3	–0.37	0.68	0.84	0.26
121	Iraq	0.572	0.606	0.645	0.648	0.654	0.657	0.654	120	–2	0.58	0.62	0.34	0.56
122	Cabo Verde	..	0.572	0.629	0.637	0.639	0.643	0.646	122	2	..	0.96	0.66	..
123	Micronesia (Federated States of)	..	0.603	0.638	0.640	0.641	0.639	0.640	123	–2	..	0.56	0.06	..
124	Guyana	0.542	0.602	0.624	0.630	0.629	0.634	0.636	124	1	1.05	0.36	0.47	0.66
125	Nicaragua	0.495	0.565	0.619	0.623	0.625	0.628	0.631	125	1	1.34	0.91	0.51	1.02
126	Morocco	0.457	0.528	0.611	0.621	0.623	0.626	0.628	126	5	1.44	1.48	0.69	1.33
126	Namibia	0.578	0.556	0.610	0.616	0.620	0.625	0.628	128	3	–0.39	0.94	0.70	0.35
128	Guatemala	0.483	0.552	0.611	0.617	0.624	0.626	0.627	126	0	1.35	1.03	0.65	1.10
129	Tajikistan	0.616	0.535	0.608	0.612	0.617	0.621	0.624	129	1	–1.39	1.28	0.68	0.06
130	India	0.428	0.496	0.586	0.597	0.600	0.604	0.609	131	6	1.49	1.67	0.97	1.48
131	Honduras	0.507	0.557	0.610	0.612	0.607	0.604	0.606	131	–4	0.95	0.91	–0.16	0.75
132	Bhutan	..	..	0.573	0.582	0.589	0.595	0.605	134	..	..	..	1.39	..
133	Timor-Leste	..	0.468	0.600	0.611	0.604	0.601	0.595	133	1	..	2.51	–0.22	..

134	Syrian Arab Republic	0.553	0.586	0.639	0.635	0.623	0.608	0.594	130	-15	0.58	0.88	-1.82	0.30
134	Vanuatu	..	..	0.589	0.590	0.590	0.592	0.594	135	1	..	..	0.19	..
136	Congo	0.534	0.489	0.554	0.560	0.575`	0.582	0.591	138	2	-0.87	1.25	1.61	0.42
137	Kiribati	..	..	0.588	0.585	0.587	0.588	0.590	136	-1	..	..	0.09	..
138	Equatorial Guinea	..	0.526	0.591	0.590	0.584	0.584	0.587	137	-5	..	1.18	-0.18	..
139	Zambia	0.403	0.433	0.555	0.565	0.576	0.580	0.586	139	1	0.71	2.52	1.36	1.57
140	Ghana	0.456	0.485	0.554	0.566	0.572	0.577	0.579	140	-2	0.63	1.33	1.13	1.00
141	Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.397	0.462	0.539	0.552	0.562	0.570	0.575	141	2	1.51	1.56	1.62	1.55
142	Bangladesh	0.386	0.468	0.546	0.559	0.563	0.567	0.570	142	0	1.94	1.57	1.07	1.64
143	Cambodia	0.364	0.419	0.536	0.541	0.546	0.550	0.555	144	1	1.40	2.50	0.87	1.77
143	Sao Tome and Principe	0.455	0.491	0.544	0.548	0.552	0.553	0.555	143	-2	0.76	1.02	0.52	0.83
Low human development														
145	Kenya	0.473	0.447	0.529	0.535	0.539	0.544	0.548	145	0	-0.58	1.70	0.92	0.62
145	Nepal	0.384	0.451	0.531	0.536	0.540	0.543	0.548	146	3	1.62	1.64	0.78	1.49
147	Pakistan	0.399	0.444	0.522	0.527	0.532	0.536	0.538	147	0	1.07	1.62	0.79	1.25
148	Myanmar	0.352	0.425	0.520	0.524	0.528	0.531	0.536	148	1	1.90	2.03	0.72	1.76
149	Angola	..	0.390	0.509	0.521	0.524	0.530	0.532	149	1	..	2.70	1.11	..
150	Swaziland	0.536	0.496	0.525	0.528	0.529	0.530	0.531	149	-5	-0.78	0.57	0.28	-0.04
151	Tanzania (United Republic of)	0.369	0.392	0.500	0.506	0.510	0.516	0.521	151	2	0.60	2.46	1.05	1.44
152	Nigeria	..	..	0.493	0.499	0.505	0.510	0.514	152	2	..	..	1.06	..
153	Cameroon	0.443	0.437	0.486	0.496	0.501	0.507	0.512	154	6	-0.13	1.07	1.32	0.61
154	Madagascar	..	0.456	0.504	0.505	0.507	0.508	0.510	153	-4	..	1.02	0.27	..
155	Zimbabwe	0.499	0.428	0.461	0.474	0.491	0.501	0.509	158	12	-1.53	0.75	2.50	0.08
156	Mauritania	0.373	0.442	0.488	0.489	0.498	0.504	0.506	156	1	1.71	0.98	0.92	1.28
156	Solomon Islands	..	0.446	0.494	0.501	0.504	0.505	0.506	155	-2	..	1.02	0.57	..
158	Papua New Guinea	0.353	0.424	0.493	0.497	0.501	0.503	0.505	157	-2	1.87	1.51	0.60	1.51
159	Comoros	..	..	0.488	0.493	0.499	0.501	0.503	158	-1	..	..	0.75	..
160	Yemen	0.400	0.441	0.496	0.495	0.496	0.498	0.498	160	-8	0.99	1.19	0.08	0.92

(continued)

HDI rank	Country	Human development index (HDI)							HDI rank		Average annual HDI growth			
		Value							Change		(% )			
		1990	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2013	2009–2014 <sup>a</sup>	1990–2000	2000–2010	2010–2014	1990–2014
161	Lesotho	0.493	0.443	0.472	0.480	0.484	0.494	0.497	161	1	–1.05	0.62	1.30	0.03
162	Togo	0.404	0.426	0.459	0.468	0.470	0.473	0.484	167	3	0.52	0.76	1.29	0.75
163	Haiti	0.417	0.442	0.471	0.475	0.479	0.481	0.483	162	–3	0.58	0.62	0.67	0.61
163	Rwanda	0.244	0.333	0.453	0.464	0.476	0.479	0.483	163	5	3.16	3.13	1.61	2.89
163	Uganda	0.308	0.393	0.473	0.473	0.476	0.478	0.483	164	–2	2.47	1.86	0.51	1.89
166	Benin	0.344	0.392	0.468	0.473	0.475	0.477	0.480	165	–2	1.33	1.78	0.64	1.40
167	Sudan	0.331	0.400	0.465	0.466	0.476	0.477	0.479	165	–5	1.90	1.52	0.74	1.55
168	Djibouti	..	0.365	0.453	0.462	0.465	0.468	0.470	168	0	..	2.17	0.97	..
169	South Sudan	..	..	0.470	0.458	0.457	0.461	0.467	171	..	..	..	–0.15	..
170	Senegal	0.367	0.380	0.456	0.458	0.461	0.463	0.466	170	–3	0.36	1.83	0.55	1.00
171	Afghanistan	0.297	0.334	0.448	0.456	0.463	0.464	0.465	169	0	1.20	2.97	0.97	1.89
172	Côte d’Ivoire	0.389	0.398	0.444	0.445	0.452	0.458	0.462	172	0	0.23	1.12	0.98	0.72
173	Malawi	0.284	0.340	0.420	0.429	0.433	0.439	0.445	174	2	1.83	2.14	1.49	1.90
174	Ethiopia	..	0.284	0.412	0.423	0.429	0.436	0.442	175	2	..	3.78	1.78	..
175	Gambia	0.330	0.384	0.441	0.437	0.440	0.442	0.441	173	–2	1.55	1.38	–0.02	1.22
176	Congo (Democratic Republic of the)	0.355	0.329	0.408	0.418	0.423	0.430	0.433	176	3	–0.77	2.18	1.52	0.83
177	Liberia	..	0.359	0.405	0.414	0.419	0.424	0.430	177	1	..	1.20	1.50	..
178	Guinea-Bissau	..	..	0.413	0.417	0.417	0.418	0.420	178	–4	..	..	0.42	..
179	Mali	0.233	0.313	0.409	0.415	0.414	0.416	0.419	179	–3	2.97	2.73	0.61	2.47
180	Mozambique	0.218	0.300	0.401	0.405	0.408	0.413	0.416	180	0	3.25	2.96	0.94	2.74
181	Sierra Leone	0.262	0.299	0.388	0.394	0.397	0.408	0.413	182	0	1.32	2.63	1.59	1.91
182	Guinea	..	0.323	0.388	0.399	0.409	0.411	0.411	181	1	..	1.83	1.50	..
183	Burkina Faso	..	..	0.378	0.385	0.393	0.396	0.402	184	2	..	..	1.58	..
184	Burundi	0.295	0.301	0.390	0.392	0.395	0.397	0.400	183	0	0.20	2.62	0.66	1.28
185	Chad	..	0.332	0.371	0.382	0.386	0.388	0.392	186	1	..	1.12	1.37	..
186	Eritrea	..	..	0.381	0.386	0.390	0.390	0.391	185	–5	..	..	0.62	..
187	Central African Republic	0.314	0.310	0.362	0.368	0.373	0.348	0.350	187	0	–0.14	1.58	–0.84	0.45

188	Niger	0.214	0.257	0.326	0.333	0.342	0.345	0.348	188	0	1.85	2.40	1.69	2.05
Other countries or territories														
	Korea (Democratic People's Rep. of)	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Marshall Islands	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Monaco	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Nauru	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	San Marino	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Tuvalu	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
<b>Human development groups</b>														
	Very high human development	0.801	0.851	0.887	0.890	0.893	0.895	0.896	–	–	0.61	0.42	0.26	0.47
	High human development	0.592	0.642	0.723	0.730	0.737	0.741	0.744	–	–	0.81	1.20	0.71	0.95
	Medium human development	0.473	0.537	0.611	0.619	0.623	0.627	0.630	–	–	1.28	1.29	0.78	1.20
	Low human development	0.368	0.404	0.487	0.492	0.497	0.502	0.505	–	–	0.92	1.90	0.92	1.32
	<b>Developing countries</b>	0.513	0.568	0.642	0.649	0.654	0.658	0.660	–	–	1.02	1.23	0.70	1.06
<b>Regions</b>														
	Arab States	0.553	0.613	0.676	0.679	0.684	0.686	0.686	–	–	1.02	0.99	0.38	0.90
	East Asia and the Pacific	0.516	0.593	0.686	0.693	0.702	0.707	0.710	–	–	1.39	1.48	0.87	1.34
	Europe and Central Asia	0.651	0.665	0.731	0.739	0.743	0.746	0.748	–	–	0.22	0.94	0.59	0.58
	Latin America and the Caribbean	0.625	0.684	0.734	0.738	0.743	0.745	0.748	–	–	0.91	0.70	0.47	0.75
	South Asia	0.437	0.503	0.586	0.596	0.599	0.603	0.607	–	–	1.42	1.55	0.86	1.38
	Sub-Saharan Africa	0.400	0.422	0.499	0.505	0.510	0.514	0.518	–	–	0.54	1.68	0.94	1.08
	<b>Least developed countries</b>	0.348	0.399	0.484	0.491	0.495	0.499	0.502	–	–	1.39	1.95	0.92	1.54

(continued)

HDI rank	Country	Human development index (HDI)							HDI rank		Average annual HDI growth			
		Value							Change		(%)			
		1990	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2013	2009–2014 <sup>a</sup>	1990–2000	2000–2010	2010–2014	1990–2014
	<b>Small island developing states</b>	0.574	0.607	0.656	0.658	0.658	0.658	0.660	–	–	0.56	0.79	0.13	0.59
	<b>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</b>	0.785	0.834	0.872	0.875	0.877	0.879	0.880	–	–	0.61	0.44	0.24	0.48
	<b>World</b>	0.597	0.641	0.697	0.703	0.707	0.709	0.711	–	–	0.71	0.85	0.47	0.73

<sup>a</sup>A positive value indicates an improvement in rank

#### Definitions

Human Development Index (HDI): A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. See *Technical note 1* (<http://hdr.undp.org/en>) for details on how the HDI is calculated

Average annual HDI growth: A smoothed annualized growth of the HDI in a given period, calculated as the annual compound growth rate

#### Main data sources

Columns 1–7: HDRO calculations based on data from UNDESA (2015), UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2015), United Nations Statistics Division (2015), World Bank (2015a), Barro and Lee (2014) and IMF (2015)

Column 8: Calculated based on data in column 6

Column 9: Calculated based on HDI data from HDRO and data in column 7

Columns 10–13: Calculated based on data in columns 1, 2, 3 and 7



## Appendix B: Major Instruments Used to Measure Well-Being

Prepared by Richard J. Estes, M. Joseph Sirgy, Audrey Selian, and Emmaline G. Smith

### International Instruments and Indexes

Year	Innovation	Innovator	Significance of innovation—international indexes
1966	Level of living index	Jan Drenowski and Donald McGranahan, United Nations Research Institute for Social Development	<p>This type of index was developed as a system of “congruencies” between different levels of economic and social well-being. Patterns emerge from the application of the system that are useful in both distinguishing between and assessing the different levels of living prevalent in alternative societies. The system was applied primarily to developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America</p> <p>Reference: <a href="https://openlibrary.org/books/OL5342166M/The_level_of_living_index">https://openlibrary.org/books/OL5342166M/The_level_of_living_index</a></p>
Mid-1970s	Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI)	Morris David Morris, U.S. Overseas Development Council	<p>The PQLI was developed to assess the effectiveness of international financial and technical assistance to countries of developing Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Consists of three statistics: <i>basic literacy rate</i>, <i>infant mortality rate</i>, and <i>life expectancy at age 1</i>, all equally weighted on a 0–100 scale. A modified version of the PQLI served as the basis for the UN’s widely reported Human Development Index, which contains the same three elements</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_Quality_of_Life_Index">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_Quality_of_Life_Index</a></p>
1976–2014	Index of Social Progress (ISP/WISP)	Richard J. Estes, University of Pennsylvania	<p>The ISP/WISP measures level of social progress at the national, regional, and worldwide levels. The composite index consists of 41 social indicators distributed across 10 component subindexes: <i>Health Status</i>, <i>Education Status</i>, <i>Women Status</i>, <i>Economic Status</i>, <i>Population</i>, <i>Environment Status</i>, <i>Social Chaos</i>, <i>Defense Effort</i>, <i>Welfare Effort</i>, <i>Cultural Diversity</i></p> <p><a href="http://es.ucsb.edu/faculty/mcginnes/classes/es131/postings/WISP.pdf">http://es.ucsb.edu/faculty/mcginnes/classes/es131/postings/WISP.pdf</a></p>
1990	Human Development Index (HDI)	United Nations Development Programme. Created jointly by Indian economist <a href="#">Amartya Sen</a> and Pakistani economist <a href="#">Mahbub ul Haq</a>	<p>The HDI is a composite statistic of <a href="#">life expectancy</a>, education, and income <a href="#">indices</a> used to rank countries into four tiers of <a href="#">human development</a>.</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/data">http://hdr.undp.org/en/data</a></p>

(continued)

Year	Innovation	Innovator	Significance of innovation—international indexes
1990	Gender Inequality Index (GII)	United Nations Development Programme	<p>The GII measures gender inequalities in three important aspects of human development—reproductive health measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; empowerment, measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by women and proportion of adult women and men aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education; and economic status expressed as labor market participation and measured by labor force participation rate of women and men aged 15 years and older</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii">http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii</a></p>
1995	Gender-related Development Index (GDI)	United Nations Development Programme	<p>The GDI, together with the <a href="#">Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)</a>, was introduced in 1995 in the <a href="#">Human Development Report</a> written by the <a href="#">United Nations Development Program</a>. The aim of these measurements was to add a gender-sensitive dimension to the <a href="#">Human Development Index (HDI)</a>. The first measurement that they created as a result was the GDI. The GDI is defined as a distribution-sensitive measure that accounts for the human development impact of existing gender gaps in the three components of the HDI</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender-related_Development_Index">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gender-related_Development_Index</a></p>
2010	Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)	United Nations Development Programme	<p>The IHDI captures the HDI of the average person (as a result of self-repeating mechanisms targeting the development of an individual as such), which is less than the aggregate HDI when there is inequality in the distribution of health, education, and income. Under perfect equality, the HDI and IHDI are equal; the greater the difference between the two, the greater the inequality. In that sense, the IHDI is the actual level of human development (taking into account inequality), whereas the HDI can be viewed as an index of the potential human development that could be achieved if there were no inequality</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/inequality-adjusted-income-index">http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/inequality-adjusted-income-index</a></p>
2010	Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)	United Nations Development Programme in cooperation with the Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative	<p>The MPI reports the number of people who are multidimensionally poor (suffering deprivations in 33.33 % of weighted indicators) and the number of deprivations with which poor households typically contend. It reflects deprivations in very rudimentary services and core human functioning for people across 104 countries. Although deeply constrained by data limitations, MPI reveals a different pattern of poverty than income poverty because it illuminates a different set of deprivations</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multidimensional_Poverty_Index">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multidimensional_Poverty_Index</a></p>

2013	Social Progress Index (SPI)	Social Progress Imperative	<p>The SPI consists of 12 social indicators divided across three broad sectors of human development: <i>Basic Human Needs, Foundations of Well-being, and Opportunity</i>. The index incorporates four basic design principles:</p> <p>1. <i>Exclusively social and environmental indicators</i>: Our aim is to measure social progress directly rather than utilize economic proxies. By excluding economic indicators, we can, for the first time, analyze rigorously and systematically the relationship between economic development (measured for example by gross domestic product [GDP] per capita) and social development. Prior efforts to move “beyond GDP” have commingled social and economic indicators, making it more difficult to disentangle cause and effect</p> <p>2. <i>Outcomes not inputs</i>: Our aim is to measure the outcomes that matter to the lives of real people. For example, we want to measure the health and wellness achieved by a country, not how much effort is expended nor how much the country spends on health care</p> <p>3. <i>Actionability</i>: The SPI aims to be a practical tool that will help leaders and practitioners in government, business, and civil society implement policies and programs that will drive faster social progress. To achieve that goal, we measure outcomes in a granular way that links to practice. The SPI has been structured around 12 components and 54 distinct indicators. The framework allows us not only to provide an aggregate country score and ranking but also to support granular analyses of specific areas of strength and weakness. Transparency of measurement using a comprehensive framework helps change makers identify and act upon the most pressing issues in their societies</p> <p>4. <i>Relevance to all countries</i>: Our aim is to create a holistic measure of social progress that encompasses the health of societies. Most previous efforts have focused on the poorest countries, for understandable reasons. But knowing what constitutes a healthy society for higher-income countries is indispensable in charting a course to get there</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/publications">http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/publications</a></p>
1930s–2015	Gallup Poll, 2014	Gallup Organization	<p>The Gallup Organization has been collecting quality-of-life and well-being data from around the world for many decades. The polls are unique inasmuch as the same questions have been asked during each year and decade. Consequently, a large body of time-series of quality-of-life data is available through Gallup. These data, however, are proprietary and not available to either scholars or the general public without payment of a large fee. Even so, a sufficient number of reports analyzing the data contained in these polls have been published in various journals and books; therefore, one can gain significant insight into well-being trends and patterns occurring throughout the world without paying the propriety fees</p> <p>For a discussion of the global polls see: <a href="http://media.gallup.com/dataviz/www/WP_Questions_WHITE.pdf">http://media.gallup.com/dataviz/www/WP_Questions_WHITE.pdf</a></p>

(continued)

Year	Innovation	Innovator	Significance of innovation—international indexes
2013-	Human Suffering Index (HIS)	Ronald E. Anderson, University of Minnesota at Minneapolis	<p>The HIS is a compound indicator of distress, compiled by “adding together ten measures of human welfare related to economics, demography, health, and governance: income, inflation, demand for new jobs, urban population pressures, infant mortality, nutrition, access to clean water, energy use, adult literacy, and personal freedom” (Population Crisis Committee, Washington, DC)</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://www.soc.umn.edu/~rea/documents/Preprint%20of%20Human%20Suffering%20SpringerBrief%20v5%2013june13.pdf">http://www.soc.umn.edu/~rea/documents/Preprint%20of%20Human%20Suffering%20SpringerBrief%20v5%2013june13.pdf</a></p>
1995	Consumer Confidence Index (CCI)	Zagorski and McDonnell	<p>The U.S. CCI is an indicator designed to measure consumer confidence, which is defined as the degree of optimism on the state of the economy that consumers are expressing through their activities of savings and spending. Global consumer confidence is not measured. Country-by-country analysis indicates huge variance around the globe</p> <p>Reference: <a href="https://www.conference-board.org/data/consumerconfidence.cfm">https://www.conference-board.org/data/consumerconfidence.cfm</a></p>
1998	Index of Economic Well Being (IEWB)	Osberg and Sharpe	<p>Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is a poor indicator of economic well-being. It measures effective consumption poorly (ignoring the value of leisure and of longer life spans); it also ignores the value of accumulation for the benefit of future generations. Because incomes are uncertain and unequally distributed, the average also does not indicate the likelihood that any particular individual will share in prosperity or the degree of anxiety and insecurity with which individuals contemplate their futures. We argue that a better index of economic well-being should consider current effective per capita consumption flows; net societal accumulation of stocks of productive resources; income distribution; and economic security. The paper develops such an index of economic well-being for the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Norway, and Sweden for the period 1980–1999. It compares trends in economic well-being to trends in GDP per person. In every case, growth in economic well-being was less than growth in GDP per capita, although to different degrees in different countries</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://www.researchgate.net/publication/279605557_The_Index_of_Economic_Well-Being">http://www.researchgate.net/publication/279605557_The_Index_of_Economic_Well-Being</a></p>

1995	Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI)	Cobb et al.	<p>The GPI is a <b>metric</b> that has been suggested to replace, or supplement, <b>gross domestic product</b> (GDP) as a measure of economic growth. GPI is designed to take fuller account of the health of a nation’s economy by incorporating environmental and social factors that are not measured by GDP. For instance, some models of GPI decrease in value when the poverty rate increases. The GPI is used in green economics, sustainability, and more inclusive types of economics by factoring in environmental and carbon footprints that businesses produce or eliminate</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://www.ips-dc.org/">http://www.ips-dc.org/</a></p>
2006	Happy Planet Index (HPI)	<p>Nic Marks</p> <hr/> <p>New Economics Foundation</p>	<p>The HPI is the leading global measure of sustainable well-being. The HPI measures what matters: the extent to which countries deliver long, happy, sustainable lives for the people that live in them. The HPI uses global data on life expectancy, experienced well-being, and ecological footprint to calculate this. The index is an efficiency measure: It ranks countries on how many long and happy lives they produce per unit of environmental input. The 2012 HPI report (the third one published) ranks 151 countries</p> <p>See more at <a href="http://www.happyplanetindex.org/about/#sthash.QQjgAsxu.dpuf">http://www.happyplanetindex.org/about/#sthash.QQjgAsxu.dpuf</a></p>
1988	Quality of Life Index	Johnston	<p>Using the results of a study group, the Quality of Life Index is calculated on the basis of what variables affect individuals as they search for a new home, how much they would enjoy living in a place, and the impact of each selected variable. For example, the crime index affects the total Quality of Life Index negatively and the amusement index affects it positively. <b>Positive Variables Weighted for Quality of Life Index:</b> amusement, culture, education, medical, religion, restaurants, and weather. <b>Negative Variables Weighted for Quality of Life Index:</b> crime, earthquake, and mortality. <b>Index score:</b> The score for an area is compared to the national average of 100. A score of 200 indicates twice the national average, whereas 50 indicates half the national average</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://www.clrsearch.com/Johnston-Demographics/IA/Quality-of-Life">http://www.clrsearch.com/Johnston-Demographics/IA/Quality-of-Life</a></p>

## Sector-Specific Instruments and Indexes

Year	Innovation	Innovator	Significance of innovation—sector-specific indexes
Mid 1960s	Misery Index	The misery index was initiated by economist Arthur Okun, an adviser to President Lyndon Johnson in the 1960s	The Misery Index is an <a href="#">economic indicator</a> , created by an economist and found by adding the <a href="#">unemployment rate</a> to the <a href="#">inflation rate</a> . It is assumed that both a higher rate of unemployment and a worsening of <a href="#">inflation</a> create economic and social costs for a country Reference: <a href="http://www.miseryindex.us/">http://www.miseryindex.us/</a>
1996	Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)	Transparency International [Berlin]	Since the turn of the new millennium, <a href="#">Transparency International</a> has published the CPI, which ranks countries annually “by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.” The CPI generally defines <a href="#">corruption</a> as “the misuse of public power for private benefit” Reference: <a href="http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview">http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview</a>
2007	Global Peace Index (GPI)	The GPI is the product of the Australian-based <a href="#">Institute for Economics and Peace</a> (Steve Killelea). It was developed in consultation with an international panel of peace experts and collated by the <a href="#">Economist Intelligence Unit</a> .	The GPI uses 22 indicators to gauge peacefulness at the country and global levels. It also seeks to evaluate the level of harmony or discord within a nation; ten indicators broadly assess what might be described as safety and security in society. The assertion is that low crime rates, minimal incidences of terrorist acts and violent demonstrations, harmonious relations with neighboring countries, a stable political scene, and a small proportion of the population being internally displaced or refugees can be equated with peacefulness Reference: <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Peace_Index">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Peace_Index</a>
2012	Global Terrorism Index (GTI)	Steve Killelea and the Australian-based <a href="#">Vision of Humanity</a>	The GTI measures the impact of terrorism in 162 countries. To account for the lasting effects of terrorism, each country is given a score that represents a 5-year weighted average The number of terrorist attacks around the world has increased dramatically; more than 80 % of all terrorism occurs in only 5 countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Syria Reference: <a href="http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/our-gti-findings">http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/our-gti-findings</a>
1980-	Political Freedoms Index	Freedom House, New York	The Political Freedoms Index measures (1) electoral process—executive elections, legislative elections, and electoral framework; (2) political pluralism and participation—party systems, political opposition and competition, political choices dominated by powerful groups, and minority voting rights; and (3) functioning of government—corruption, transparency, and ability of elected officials to govern in practice. In 2014, data were reported for 195 countries and 14 related and disputed territories Reference: <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VL2EYWd0zIU">https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VL2EYWd0zIU</a>



1980-	Civil Liberties Index	Freedom House, New York	<p>The Civil Liberties Index measures (1) freedom of expression and belief—media, religious, and academic freedoms and free private discussion; (2) associational and organizational rights—free assembly, civic groups, and labor union rights; (3) rule of law—independent judges and prosecutors, due process, crime and disorder, and legal equality for minority and other groups; and (4) personal autonomy and individual rights—freedom of movement, business and property rights, women’s and family rights, and freedom from economic exploitation. In 2014, data were reported for 195 countries and 14 related and disputed territories</p> <p>Reference: <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VL2EYWd0zIU">https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2014#.VL2EYWd0zIU</a></p>
2013-	Global Burden of Disease (GBD)	Global burden of diseases, injuries, and risk factors study and <i>The Lancet</i>	<p>The GBD reports up-to-date evidence on levels and trends for age- and sex-specific all-cause and cause-specific mortality for the formation of global, regional, and national health policies. In the <i>Global Burden of Disease Study 2013</i>, the authors estimate yearly deaths for 188 countries between 1990 and 2013. The authors use the results to assess whether there is epidemiological convergence across countries</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(14)61682-2/fulltext">http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(14)61682-2/fulltext</a></p>
2013	Human Suffering Index, 2013	Ronald E. Anderson, University of Minnesota at Minneapolis	<p><i>Human Suffering and Quality of Life: Conceptualizing Stories and Statistics</i>. (2013). Dordrecht: Springer</p> <p>This brief monograph focused on suffering adds to human understanding of suffering by contextualizing both stories and statistics on suffering while showing that suffering adds a useful perspective to contemporary thought and research on quality of life, social well-being, and measures of societal progress. The scholarship on suffering is made more comprehensible in the book by using nine different conceptual frames that have been used for making sense of suffering. The primary focus of this work is within the last frame, the quality of life frame. Overall, this chapter shows how the research on quality of life and well-being can be enhanced by embracing human suffering</p>
2014	“Best Places” Index	<i>Money Magazine</i>	Reference: <a href="http://newhotelus.com/reviews/best-places-to-live-2015-money-magazine.html">http://newhotelus.com/reviews/best-places-to-live-2015-money-magazine.html</a>
1979-	International Living Retirement Index (ILRI)	<i>International Living Magazine</i>	Reference: <a href="http://internationalliving.com/publications/reports/retirement-index/">http://internationalliving.com/publications/reports/retirement-index/</a>
1987	Index of Social Health (ISH)	Marc Miringoff	<p>The ISH, which has been released annually since 1987, monitors the social well-being of American society. It is a composite measure of 16 social indicators that yields a single number for each year</p> <p>Reference: <a href="http://iisp.vassar.edu/ish.html">http://iisp.vassar.edu/ish.html</a></p>

## Subjective Well-Being Instruments and Indexes

Year	Transformational innovations in subjective well-being	Innovator	Significance of innovation
1925	Fluegel studied moods by having people record their emotional events; he then summed emotional reactions across moments	Fluegel, J. C.	Forerunner of modern experience sampling approaches to measuring subjective well-being Fluegel, J. C. (1925). A quantitative study of feeling and emotion in everyday life. <i>British Journal of Psychology. General Section</i> , 15(4), 318–355
1930s	The use of large-scale surveys as an assessment of well-being was first used	George Gallup, Gerald Gurin, and Hadley Cantril	<a href="http://www.gallup.com/poll/122453/Understanding-Gallup-Uses-Cantril-Scale.aspx">http://www.gallup.com/poll/122453/Understanding-Gallup-Uses-Cantril-Scale.aspx</a>
1969	Bradburn showed that pleasant and unpleasant affects are somewhat independent and have different correlates, not simply opposites	Norman Bradburn	<a href="http://fetzer.org/sites/default/files/images/stories/pdf/selfmeasures/SATISFACTION-BradburnScaleofPsychologicWell-Being.pdf">http://fetzer.org/sites/default/files/images/stories/pdf/selfmeasures/SATISFACTION-BradburnScaleofPsychologicWell-Being.pdf</a>
1976	Scientists found that global questions about people's overall evaluation of their lives yielded scores that joined well	Andrews and Withey	Andrews, F. M., & Withey, S. B. (1976). <i>Social indicators of well-being: Americans' perceptions of life quality</i> . Springer Science & Business Media

1976	Campbell found that demographic variables such as age, income, and education did not account for much variance in reports of well-being	Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers	Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., & Rodgers, W. L. (1976). <i>The quality of American life: Perceptions, evaluations, and satisfactions</i> . Russell Sage Foundation
1980s	The field of subjective well-being grew rapidly, becoming a science		Because Western society has an abundance of material goods, the need to go beyond survival in seeking happiness grew
1990	Omodei found that the degree to which a person's needs had been met was positively associated with the degree of life satisfaction	Omodei and Wearing	<p>This view fits with Freud's pleasure principle and Maslow's hierarchy</p> <p>Omodei, M. M., &amp; Wearing, A. J. (1990). Need satisfaction and involvement in personal projects: Toward an integrative model of subjective well-being. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i>, 59(4), 762-780</p>
1996	It was demonstrated that multi-item life satisfaction, pleasant affect, and unpleasant affect scales formed factors that were separable from each other	Lucas, Diener, and Suh	<p>Multi-item scales emerged that were more reliable and more accurate</p> <p>Lucas, R. E., Diener, E., &amp; Suh, E. (1996). Discriminant validity of well-being measures. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i>, 71, 616-628</p>

(continued)

Year	Transformational innovations in subjective well-being	Innovator	Significance of innovation
1999	Schwartz showed that situation variables can exert a substantial impact on life satisfaction and mood reports	Schwartz and Strack	They illustrated that life satisfaction judgments are not immutable Schwarz, N., & Strack, F. (1999). Reports of subjective well-being: Judgmental processes and their methodological implications. In D. Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwarz (Eds.), <i>Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology</i> (pp. 61–84). New York: Russell Sage Foundation
2000	The traits that are most commonly linked to subjective well-being are extraversion and neuroticism	Diener, Suh, Lucas, and Smith	Diener, E., Suh, E., Lucas, R., & Smith, H. (1999). Subjective well-being: Three decades of research. <i>Psychological Bulletin</i> , 125, 276–302
1999	Self-esteem and extroversion are less strongly associated with pleasant affects in collectivist cultures than in individualistic cultures	Diener, Lucas, Grob, Suh, and Shao	Cultural differences have a deep effect on what traits affect subjective well-being Lucas, R. E., Diener, E., Grob, A., Suh, E. M., & Shao, L. (2000). Cross-cultural evidence for the fundamental features of extraversion. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i> , 79(3), 452–470
2000	<i>Authentic happiness: Using the new positive psychology to realize your potential for lasting fulfillment</i>	Seligman, M. E. P.	Seligman, M. E. P. (2002). <i>Authentic happiness: Using the new positive psychology to realize your potential for lasting fulfillment</i> . New York: The Free Press
2005 > 2015	National accounts of subjective well-being	Diener, E., Oishi, S., & Lucas, R. E	Diener, E., Oishi, S., & Lucas, R. E. (2015). National accounts of subjective well-being. <i>American Psychologist</i> 70(3), 234–243
2013	<i>World happiness report, 2013</i> . A study conducted by Columbia University's Earth Institute	Helliwell, J., Layard, R., & Sachs, J	Helliwell, J., Layard, R., & Sachs, J. (Eds.). (2013). <i>World happiness report, 2013</i> . A study conducted by <i>Columbia University's Earth Institute</i> and published in cooperation with the United Nations Sustainment Development Solutions Network. Retrieved October 19, 2014 from <a href="http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf">http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/WorldHappinessReport2013_online.pdf</a>

Other subjective well-being indexes include the following:

- The EuroBarometer (<http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/>)
- The Americans' Changing Lives (<http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/>)
- The AsiaBarometer (<https://www.asiabarometer.org/>)
- The British Household Panel Survey (<https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps>)
- The Canadian General Social Survey (<http://www5.statcan.gc.ca/olc-cel/olc.action?ObjId=89F0115X&ObjType=2&lang=en&limit=0>)
- The European Values Study (<http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/>)
- The German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (<http://www.eui.eu/Research/Library/ResearchGuides/Economics/Statistics/DataPortal/GSOEP.aspx>)
- The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Household,\\_Income\\_and\\_Labour\\_Dynamics\\_in\\_Australia\\_Survey](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Household,_Income_and_Labour_Dynamics_in_Australia_Survey))
- The Hungarian Household Panel Survey (<http://www.tarki.hu/en/services/su/index.html>)
- The International Social Survey Programme (<http://www.issp.org/>)
- The Latinobarómetro (<http://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp>)
- The Midlife in the United States Survey (<http://www.midus.wisc.edu/>)
- The National Child Development Survey (<http://discover.ukdataservice.ac.uk/series/?sn=2000032>)
- The National Survey of Families and Households [United States] (<http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/nsfh/>)
- The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey [United States] (<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/communitysurvey/>)
- The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (<http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rllms-hse>)
- The Swedish Level of Living Survey (<http://snd.gu.se/en/catalogue/study/389>)
- The Swiss Household Panel Survey (<http://forscenter.ch/en/our-surveys/swiss-household-panel/>)
- The General Social Survey [United States] (<http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/>)
- The China General Social Survey ([http://www.src.ust.hk/survey/GSS\\_e.html](http://www.src.ust.hk/survey/GSS_e.html))

## Major Global Reports of Well-Being

Year	Title	Sponsoring Organization	Major reports of well-being and quality of life
2013	Report on the World Social Situation, 2013 (RWSS)	UN-DESA	Over the years, the report has served as a background document for discussion and policy analysis of socioeconomic matters at the intergovernmental level. Its goal is to contribute to the identification of emerging social trends of international concern and to the analysis of relationships among major development issues that have both international and national dimensions <a href="http://undesadspd.org/Poverty/InternationalDayofHappiness.aspx">http://undesadspd.org/Poverty/InternationalDayofHappiness.aspx</a>
2013	World Youth Report, 2013	UN Social Policy and Development Division	The report explores the situation of young migrants from the perspective of young migrants themselves. The report highlights some of the concerns, challenges, and successes experienced by young migrants based on their own lives and told in their own voices. Experiences during the different phases of migration are examined including preparation, journey and transit, challenges faced in the destination, and awareness and engagement of young people on migration issues <a href="http://undesadspd.org/WorldYouthReport/2013.aspx">http://undesadspd.org/WorldYouthReport/2013.aspx</a>
	Status of the World's Children, 2015	UNICEF	<a href="http://www.unicef.org/sowc/">http://www.unicef.org/sowc/</a>
	Status of the World's Women, 2015	Institute of Policy Studies	<a href="http://fpif.org/the_state_of_the_worlds_women/">http://fpif.org/the_state_of_the_worlds_women/</a>
2012	World Happiness Report	Earth Institute of Columbia University, among others	This report was commissioned by the United Nations Conference on Happiness (mandated by the UN General Assembly). Published by the Earth Institute and co-edited by the institute's director, Jeffrey Sachs, it reflects a new worldwide demand for more attention to happiness and absence of misery as criteria for government policy. It reviews the state of happiness in the world today and shows how the new science of happiness explains personal and national variations in happiness  The report shows that, where happiness is measured by how happy people are with their lives, (1) happier countries tend to be richer countries. But more important for happiness than income are social factors like the strength of social support, the absence of corruption, and the degree of personal freedom. (2) Over time, as living standards have risen, happiness has increased in some countries but not in others (for example, the United States). On average, the world has become a little happier in the last 30 years (by 0.14 times the standard deviation of happiness around the world). (3) Unemployment causes as much unhappiness as bereavement or separation. At work, job security and good relationships do more for job satisfaction than high pay and convenient hours. (4) Behaving well makes people happier. (5) Mental health is the biggest single factor affecting happiness in any country. Yet only a quarter of mentally ill people get treatment for their condition in advanced countries and fewer in poorer countries. (6) Stable family life and enduring marriages are important for the happiness of parents and children. (7) In advanced countries, women are happier than men, whereas the position in poorer countries is mixed. (8) Happiness is lowest in middle age  Reference: <a href="http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/2960">http://www.earth.columbia.edu/articles/view/2960</a>



## **Appendix C: Selected Milestones in the Advancement of Well-Being Since 1900**

by Richard J. Estes, University of Pennsylvania<sup>1</sup>

M. Joseph Sirgy, Virginia Tech

Audrey Selian, Halloran Philanthropies, and

Emmaline G. Smith, Management Institute of Quality of Life Studies (MIQOLS)

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<sup>1</sup>This list is not intended to be a comprehensive summary of all of the major changes that have occurred in well-being progress between 1900 and 2015. Rather, it is a *selected* list of some of the most important innovations that have occurred that have impacted the domains of special interest in this book—health, education, social welfare, technology and the like. For more comprehensive lists of all of the major social, political, economic, and technological changes that have occurred in these sectors, readers are referred to various entries in *Wikipedia* and to dozens of other major historical services.

## Core Domain: Selected Transformational Innovations in Health Since 1900

Year	Transformational health innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovations
3000 BC	Abacus developed	Chinese and other East Asians	Antecedent to development of computer
1823–1841	Automatic calculating machine	Babbage	Foundation for electronic computer development
1823–1841	Anesthesia invented	The earliest documented use of general anesthesia was by <a href="#">Hanaoka Seishū</a> in 1804. <sup>[1]</sup> He used a mixture of herbal extracts that he called tsūsensan. <a href="#">Crawford W. Long</a> used <a href="#">ether</a> as a general anesthetic in 1842. He did not publish an account of his successes with general anesthesia until 1849, however. The first public demonstration of general anesthesia was in 1846 by a Boston dentist named <a href="#">William T.G. Morton</a> at the <a href="#">Massachusetts General Hospital</a> . Dr. Morton gave an ether anesthetic for the removal of a neck tumor by surgeon <a href="#">John Collins Warren</a> (the first editor of the <i>New England Journal of Medicine</i> and dean of <a href="#">Harvard Medical School</a> ). About a decade later, <a href="#">cocaine</a> was introduced as the first viable local anesthetic. <a href="#">John H. Packard</a> , of Philadelphia, published the first notice of using ether for general anesthesia in 1872. <sup>[2]</sup> It wasn't until the 1930s that <a href="#">Dr. Harvey Cushing</a> tied the stress response to higher <a href="#">mortality rates</a> and began using local anesthetic for hernia repairs in addition to general anesthesia	Attempts at producing a state of <a href="#">general anesthesia</a> can be traced throughout <a href="#">recorded history</a> in the writings of the ancient <a href="#">Sumerians</a> , <a href="#">Babylonians</a> , <a href="#">Assyrians</a> , <a href="#">Egyptians</a> , <a href="#">Greeks</a> , <a href="#">Romans</a> , <a href="#">Indians</a> , and <a href="#">Chinese</a> . During the <a href="#">Middle Ages</a> , which correspond roughly to what is sometimes referred to as the <a href="#">Islamic Golden Age</a> , scientists and other scholars made significant advances in <a href="#">science</a> and <a href="#">medicine</a> in the <a href="#">Muslim world</a> and the <a href="#">Eastern world</a> , while their European counterparts also made important advances
1856	The gene established as the unit of inheritance	Gregor Mendel	Eventually led to electronic DNA sequencing—a process that may result in major advances in diseases source identification and treatment
1900 > 1920	Basic indicators for United States, 1900		Collected baseline data and subsequent changes in these data for all member states of the United Nations
	Average years of life expectancy, white male, US: 48.2		Systems of social indicators have been subsequently improved upon as countries have sought to use the data for purposes of national and subnational social planning

Average years of infant deaths per 1,000 live born, all races: NA		Data have had a significant impact on changing the capacities of countries to plan more strategically for both their own needs and those of other developing countries with which the countries are directly involved
Average maternal mortality death rate per 100,000 women: NA		
Number 1901–1905 of cases of tuberculosis per 10,000 adults: NA		
Suicide rate, males all ages, per 100,000: NA		
<b>1862</b> French microbiologist, Louis Pasteur, conducted experiments that supported the germ theory and effectively debunked the theory of spontaneous generation. His work involved the development of systems of inoculation including the first vaccine for rabies	<i>Louis Pasteur (1822–1895)</i>	Pasteur is best known, however, for his work in studies on fermenting beverages. He found that microorganisms could develop during this process. He invented a process in which liquids such as milk were heated to kill all bacteria and molds. This was first tested on April 20, 1862. This process was soon afterwards known as <i>pasteurization</i>
<b>1901–1905</b> First radio received, wireless transmission and reception by Marconi/first vacuum cleaner/first air conditioner /Wright brothers fly first gas motored and manned airplane/electrocardiogram	Multiple inventors associated with each innovation	Use of automated machines intended to advance communication and to reduce routine work  The ECG is especially effective in early detecting of a leading causes of death, i.e., health disease
<b>1909</b> A pioneer in pharmacology was the German scientist Paul Ehrlich who—after much trial and effort—synthesized the arsenic-based compound Salvarsan, the first effective treatment for syphilis, in 1909. Ehrlich, who coined the term “chemotherapy,” thus created the first antibiotic drug. A generation later, another German, Gerhard Domagk, who worked for Bayer, produced the first useful sulfa drug (another antibiotic). This drug was used to treat streptococcal, or strep, diseases, including meningitis	Paul Ehrlich (1854–1915) Gerhard Domagk (1895–1964)	During the 20th century life spans lengthened in most parts of the world. The flip side of this was the increased prominence of the diseases of aging, above all, heart disease and cancer, and a focus on treating and preventing these diseases. In a worrying development, some diseases that appeared to have been conquered by drug treatments, such as tuberculosis, developed resistance to those medications toward the end of the 20th century

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Year	Transformational health innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovations
	<b>1900 Emergence of the global sanitation movement</b> The Western world in the early twentieth century was faced with the same public health challenges as the previous century. Life expectancy was 50 years old. Many public health advances grew out of social reforms. Thirty-eight states created health departments	European and North American national health bodies, plus research laboratories, institutes, and universities	Stopped the spread of diseases associated with urban congestion: tuberculosis, cholera, smallpox
	<b>1900</b> United States Army Yellow Fever Commission (often called simply “The Reed Commission” after its leader, proved that the <i>Aedes aegypti</i> mosquito was the vector for yellow fever	Walter Reed (1857–1902)	This ended the belief that yellow fever spread by direct contact with infected people or “contaminated” objects and focused the people’s efforts on the eradication of the mosquito
	<b>1908</b> First Model-T car sold by Ford	Henry Ford	Mass production introduced and, at the same time, produced consumers from among their workers able to purchase a new form of transportation
	<b>1909</b> In the early twentieth century, the most common cause of death was from contagious diseases. Bubonic plague hit San Francisco and persisted until 1909. The <b>influenza outbreak of 1918</b> killed over 600,000 people and did not subside until the 1950s. It has recently been discovered to have been an avian flu strain		
	<b>1905</b> Austrian ophthalmologist, Eduard Zirm, performed the world’s first corneal transplant, restoring the sight of a man who had been blinded in an accident	Eduard Zirm	Marked the beginning of an entire series of successful organ transplants
	<b>1906 Meat inspection.</b> The book, <i>The Jungle</i> , by Sinclair graphically depicts conditions in the meat packing industry. Stimulated major reforms and regulation of the meat industry and, subsequently, all commercial food manufacturing and producing activities	Upton Sinclair	Partly as a result of this book and the work of reformers, the U.S. Meat Inspection Act of 1906 was established. The act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to order meat inspections and condemn any found unfit for human consumption
	<b>1910–1911</b> First talking motion picture/first automotive electrical ignition system/first laparoscopy	Various	Introduction of earliest electronic systems for cars and modern medicine

	<p><b>1911 Child labor:</b> By 1911 approximately 2 million American children under 16 were working in hazardous and unhealthy conditions, often 12 h a day, 6 days a week. Reformers worked tirelessly to address these dangerous child labor conditions with periodic successes</p>	<p>Theodore Roosevelt</p>	<p>In 1912 President Theodore Roosevelt’s first White House Conference urged creation of the Children’s Bureau to combat exploitation of children. Still much of the success would be in raising awareness of the hazards and conditions under which children were working. Legal reform would not come until the 1930s</p>
	<p><b>1916 Family planning.</b> Margaret Sanger published <i>What Every Girl Should Know</i>. It not only provided basic information about topics such as menstruation but also acknowledged the reality of sexual feelings in adolescents. It was followed in 1917 by <i>What Every Mother Should Know</i>. That year, Sanger was sent to the workhouse for “creating a public nuisance”</p>	<p>Margaret Sanger (1879–1966)</p>	<p>Sanger was a tireless pioneer for birth control via both children spacing and biomedical means. She used her own inheritance to finance research that, in time, led to the development of “the pill”</p> <p>Sanger was also a tireless advocate on behalf of women and their right to control their own reproductive choices. Her reputation, though, was eventually tarnished by her association with eugenicists and for racist writings that she published early in her career. Sanger distanced herself from both movements as successes in women’s rights to determine their own reproductive choices increased</p>
<p>1930, 1934</p>	<p>Jet engine invented independently by two inventors</p>	<p>Sir Frank Whittle and Dr. Hans Von Ohain</p>	

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Year	Transformational health innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovations
1920 > 1940	Basic Indicators for United States, 1920		This is only a partial listing of the hundreds of social indicators for which data were regularly reported following the establishment of the League of Nations
	Average years of life expectancy, White male, US: 56.3		
	Average years of infant deaths per 1,000 live born, all races: NA		
	Average maternal mortality death rate per 100,000 women: NA		
	Number of cases of tuberculosis per 10,000 adults: NA		
	Suicide rate, Males all ages, per 100,000: NA		
	<b>1928 Penicillin.</b> Scottish physician Alexander Fleming inadvertently discovered penicillin while studying molds. Fleming had served as a physician during WWI and had seen the horrific effect of infection in military hospitals	Alexander Fleming (1881–1955)	This discovery would be one of the most important discoveries of the 20th century for its ability to kill bacteria and fight infectious disease
	<b>1932 The Tuskegee Syphilis Study.</b> The Public Health Service, working with the Tuskegee Institute, began a study in Macon County, Alabama, to record the natural history of syphilis. The study involved 600 African American men—399 with syphilis and 201 who did not have the disease. Researchers told the men they were being treated for “bad blood,” a local term used to describe several ailments, including syphilis, anemia, and fatigue. In truth, they did not receive the proper treatment needed to cure their illness, so that the progression of the disease could be studied	Public Health Service. Some believe it only ended because an investigative reporter, James Jones, learned of the project and made it public	In exchange for taking part in the study, the men received free medical exams, free meals, and burial insurance. Although originally projected to last 6 months, the study actually went on for 40 years  Since then great efforts have been made to stop unethical treatment of human subjects. Jones’s book is entitled <i>Bad Blood</i>



<p>1940 &gt; 1960</p>	<p>Basic indicators for United States , 1940</p> <p>Average years of life expectancy, white male, US: 62.8</p> <p>Average years of infant deaths per 1,000 live born, all races: 51.9</p> <p>Average maternal mortality death rate per 100,000 women: NA</p> <p>Number of cases of tuberculosis per 10,000 adults:</p> <p>Suicide rate, Males all ages, per 100,000: 20.0</p>		<p>Again, this is just a partial listing of the hundreds of time-series social indicators published by the United Nations Statistical Office and selected international non-governmental organizations</p>
	<p><b>1948: The World Health Organization (WHO)</b> was established by the United Nations on April 7, 1948</p>	<p>United Nations</p>	<p>The WHO inherited much of the mandate and resources of its predecessor, the Health Organization (HO), which had been an agency of the much older League of Nations</p>
	<p><b>1948 Fluoridation of Water.</b> Fluoridation is the act of adding fluoride ions to water in order to reduce tooth decay in the general population</p>		<p>Many North American and European municipalities fluoridate their water supplies, citing effectiveness in reducing tooth decay, safety of fluoridation, and the low cost to do so</p>
	<p><b>1954 The Polio Vaccine.</b> The first effective polio vaccine was developed by <a href="#">Jonas Salk (1914–1995)</a>, although it was the vaccine developed by <a href="#">Albert Sabin (1906–1993)</a> that was used for mass inoculation. The first inoculations of children against polio began in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on February 23, 1954</p>	<p><a href="#">Jonas Salk (1914–1995)</a> <a href="#">Albert Sabin (1906–1993)</a></p>	<p>Through mass immunization, the disease was wiped out in the Americas. Through World Health Organization and UNDP initiatives, the disease is rapidly disappearing worldwide</p>
	<p><b>1940s, 1950s Earliest beginnings of successful organ transplants.</b> In the late 1940s and early 1950s, a team of doctors at Boston’s Peter Bent Brigham Hospital carried out a series of human kidney grafts, some of which functioned for days or even months. In 1954 the surgeons transplanted a kidney from 23-year-old Ronald Herrick into his twin brother Richard; since donor and recipient were genetically identical, the procedure succeeded</p>		<p>Organ transplantation emerges as an entirely new method for treating major body organs. First heart transplant by an interdisciplinary team in South Africa, but patient died. Successful transplantation occurred in the United States and set a new standard for dramatic care of the terminally ill</p>

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Year	Transformational health innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovations
1960 > 1980	Basic indicators for New York, 1960		<p><b>1942 &gt; forward:</b> This is the major period post-WWII. The US central government moves into a position of ascendancy and state powers are reduced. Acting on behalf of the nation as a whole, and due to the size of its military and military police function, the United States emerges as the world’s most powerful nation—replacing the roles previous held by the United Kingdom, France, Germany and other great powers of Europe</p> <p>Nuclearization of nations becomes an increasing reality as larger numbers of countries become members of the “nuclear club”: the United Kingdom, France, Israel, North Korea Russia People’s Republic of China, South Africa, and so on</p> <p>Palliative care emerges as a widely accepted approach for treating the terminally ill. The goal is not to reverse or treat the illness but to keep patients comfortable and pain-free during their last stages of terminal illness</p>
	Average years of life expectancy, white males, US: 67.6		
	Average years of infant deaths per 1,000 live born, all races: 26.0		
	Average maternal mortality death rate per 100,000 women: NA		
	Number of cases of tuberculosis per 10,000 adults: NA		
	Suicide rate, males all ages, per 100,000: 19.9		
	<p><b>1960s The first successful lung, pancreas, and liver transplants took place.</b> In 1967, the world marveled when South African surgeon Christiaan Barnard replaced the diseased heart of dentist Louis Washkansky with that of a young accident victim. Although immunosuppressive drugs prevented rejection, Washkansky died of pneumonia 18 days later</p>		
	<p><b>1960 The Birth Control Pill.</b> Searle receives FDA approval to sell Enovid as a birth control pill. The development of the first highly effective contraceptive transforms women’s lives around the world and opens the door to the sexual revolution. Searle was the first and only pharmaceutical company to sell an oral contraceptive, and it had a lucrative monopoly. Other pharmaceutical companies quickly jumped on the band wagon</p>	Searle Pharmaceuticals	<p>Women given control over their reproductive cycles through biochemicals. Has had a dramatic impact on birth rates as well as rates of infant and child deaths. The social status of women also has been accelerated from childbearing to advanced education, work, and professional careers</p>

	<p><b>1962 Growth of Environmentalism</b> In 1962, <a href="#">Rachel Carson (1907–1964)</a>'s <i>Silent Spring</i> led to greater awareness of the dangers of chemical pesticides to humans. <i>Silent Spring</i> played in the history of environmentalism roughly the same role that <i>Uncle Tom's Cabin</i> played in the abolitionist movement. That same year the Migrant Health Act was passed, providing support for clinics serving agricultural workers</p>	<p><a href="#">Rachel Carson (1907–1964)</a></p>	<p>Raised public awareness of the dangers of uncontrolled corporate development with proper acknowledgment of these developments on the environment and health of people and all living things</p>
	<p><b>1964 Tobacco Declared a Hazard</b> On January 11, 1964, <a href="#">Luther L. Terry, M.D. 1911–1985</a>), Surgeon General of the U.S. Public Health Service, released the report of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health. That landmark document is now referred to as the first Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health</p>	<p><a href="#">Luther L. Terry, M.D. (1911–1985)</a></p>	<p>America's first widely publicized official organization to give recognition to the fact that cigarette smoking is a cause of cancer and other serious diseases</p>
	<p><b>1966 The Global Impact of Vaccines</b> International Smallpox Eradication Program was established in 1966. It was led by the U.S. Public Health Service. The worldwide eradication of smallpox was accomplished in 1977</p>	<p>U.S. Public Health Service</p>	<p>The agencies' activities in research and clinical practice contributed to the worldwide eradication of smallpox in 1977</p>
	<p><b>1976 Legionnaires Disease</b> In 1976, 221 attendees at a convention of the American Legion in Philadelphia fell sick and 34 died. The mysterious disease was named Legionnaires disease or legionellosis</p>	<p>U.S. Public Health Services</p>	<p>The underlying causes and effective treatment of legionellosis were established</p>
1980 > 2000	<p>Basic indicators for New York, 1980</p> <p>Average years of life expectancy, white males, US: 70.8</p> <p>Average years of infant deaths per 1,000 live born: 12.6</p> <p>Average maternal mortality death rate per 100,000 women: NA</p> <p>Number of cases of tuberculosis per 10,000 adults: NA</p> <p>Suicide rate, Males all ages, per 100,000: 20.3</p>		

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Year	Transformational health innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovations
	<b>1981: A Deadly New Virus</b> A mysterious epidemic was identified as <b>acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)</b> . It was found to be caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). It is now a global pandemic. More than 23 million people with AIDS have died since 1981. Millions more are living with HIV	U.S. Public Health Services	The underlying causes and interim approaches to treatment of HIV/AIDS implemented
	<b>1990 The Human Genome Project Begins</b> In 1990, the Human Genome Project was formally established. The project endeavored to map the human genome down to the nucleotide (or base pair) level and to identify all the genes present in it. Once achieved, this information was to have major public health ramifications	The U.S. National Institutes of Health	1980–1990 Increasing numbers of terminally ill persons choose to die in the comfort of their own homes rather than in hospital or nursing homes 1990 Provided financial and technical assistance in mapping all aspects of the human genome
	<b>1998 The Tobacco Settlement</b> In 1998 the Master Settlement Agreement was signed with the tobacco industry; 46 states settled lawsuits in which they sought to recover tobacco-related health care costs and to hold the tobacco companies accountable for decades of wrongdoing	U.S. Legal System	Introduced financial costs for systematic spread of permanently disabling lung diseases associated with smoking and the use of tobacco by-products
2000 > 2015	Basic indicators for New York, 2000, 2014		
	Average years of life expectancy, white males, US: 74.8, 76.3		
	Average years of infant deaths per 1,000 live born: 6.9, 6.1		
	Average maternal mortality death rate per 100,000 women: NA		
	Number of cases of tuberculosis per 10,000 adults: NA		
	Suicide rate, males all ages, per 100,000: 18.8, 19.8		

<p><b>2010</b> Spanish doctors conducted the world’s first full-face transplant on a man injured in a shooting accident. A number of partial face transplants had already taken place around the world</p>		
<p><b>2001 Bioterrorism</b> 1 month after the September 11th tragedy, anthrax-contaminated letters were mailed to the <i>New York Post</i>, NBC’s offices in New York and the U.S. Senate. <b>Letters to Senator Tom Daschle and Senator Patrick Leahy</b> carried a more potent form of anthrax. The CDC confirmed anthrax cases at American Media, in Florida, and at the New York offices of CBS and ABC, also indicating that the anthrax was transmitted by mail. Twenty-three people contracted anthrax, five of whom died. Many more people were exposed</p>	<p>U.S. Centers for Disease Control</p>	<p>Identified the sources and potential deadly uses of weaponized anthrax in civilian populations and unknown targeted individuals</p>
<p><b>2002 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)</b>. An atypical form of pneumonia, first appeared in China in 2002. SARS is now known to be caused by the SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV), a novel highly contagious coronavirus. After China suppressed news of the outbreak, the disease spread rapidly, reaching neighboring countries in late February 2003, and then to other countries via international travelers. Toronto had a serious SARS outbreak, which fully tested its public health readiness</p>		<p>The last case in this outbreak occurred in June 2003</p>
<p><b>2003 Human Genome Project Completed</b> In 2003, the Human Genome Project was completed after 13 years of work. There were clear practical results even before the work was complete. The field of <b>public health genomics</b> appeared. This emerging field assesses the impact of genes and their interaction with behavior, diet, and the environment on the population’s health</p>		

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### Core Domain: Selected Transformational Educational Innovations Since 1900

Year	Transformational educational innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovation
1900 > 1920	<b>1900</b> The Association of American Universities is founded to promote higher standards	Multiple inventors	Puts U.S. universities on an equal footing with their European counterparts
	First radio received wireless transmission and reception by Marconi/first vacuum cleaner/first air conditioner/Wright brothers fly first-gas motored and manned airplane/electrocardiogram		Introduction of ground-breaking communications systems that bring people located at great distances from one another together. Medical innovations immediately result in the savings of tens of thousands of lives
	<b>1905</b> The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching is founded. It is chartered by an act of Congress in 1906, the same year the foundation encouraged the adoption of a standard system for equating “seat time” (the amount of time spent in a class) to high school credits. Still in use today, this system came to be called the “Carnegie Unit”		Other important achievements of the foundation during the first half of the 20th century include the “landmark ‘ <a href="#">Flexner Report</a> ’ on medical education, the development of the Graduate Record Examination, the founding of the Educational Testing Service, and the creation of the Teachers Insurance Annuity Association of America (TIAA-CREF).” Carnegie Foundation’s home page
	<b>1905</b> Alfred Binet’s article, “New Methods for the Diagnosis of the Intellectual Level of Subnormals,” is published in France	Alfred Binet	It describes his work with Theodore Simon in the development of a measurement instrument that would identify students with mental retardation. The Binet-Simon Scale, as it is called, is an effective means of measuring intelligence
	<b>1911</b> The first Montessori school in the United States opens in Tarrytown, New York	Maria Montessori	Two years later (1913), Maria Montessori visits the United States and Alexander Graham Bell and his wife Mabel found the Montessori Educational Association at their Washington, DC, home
<b>1916</b> John Dewey’s <i>Democracy and Education. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education</i> is published. Dewey’s views help advance the ideas of the “progressive education movement”	John Dewey	An outgrowth of the progressive political movement, progressive education seeks to make schools more effective agents of democracy. His daughter, Evelyn Dewey, coauthors <i>Schools of Tomorrow</i> with her father and goes on to write several books on her own	

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Year	Transformational educational innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovation
1920 > 1940	<b>1924</b> Max Wertheimer describes the principles of Gestalt Theory to the Kant Society in Berlin	Max Wertheimer	<u>Gestalt Theory</u> , with its emphasis on learning through insight and grasping the whole concept, becomes important later in the 20th century in the development of cognitive views of learning and teaching
	<b>1929</b> Jean Piaget’s <i>The Child’s Conception of the World</i> is published	Jean Piaget	His theory of cognitive development becomes an important influence in American developmental psychology and education
	<b>1939</b> The Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (first called the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale) is developed by David Wechsler. It introduces the concept of the “deviation IQ,” which calculates IQ scores based on how far subjects’ scores differ (or deviate) from the average (mean) score of others who are the same age, rather than calculating them with the ratio (MA/CA multiplied by 100) system	David Wechsler	Wechsler intelligence tests, particularly the <i>Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children</i> , are still widely used in U.S. schools to help identify students needing special education
1940 > 1960	<b>1944</b> The <i>G.I. Bill of Rights</i> , officially known as the <i>Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944</i> , is signed by FDR on June 22. Some 7.8 million World War II veterans take advantage of the <i>GI Bill</i> during the 7 years benefits are offered	Franklin Roosevelt	More than two million attend colleges or universities, nearly doubling the college population. About 238,000 become teachers. Because the law provides the same opportunity to every veteran, regardless of background, the long-standing tradition that a college education was only for the wealthy is broken
1945	The concept of a computerized encyclopedia to hold the world’s knowledge speculated by/Atomic bomb developed/frozen food popularized	Various Vannevar Bush	Sophisticated knowledge made available to the masses, often without cost
		WWII team of German-American physicists	Invention of atom bomb threatens the future of humanity. To date, used only by the United States against Japan during WWII
	<b>1953</b> Burrhus Frederic (B.F.) Skinner’s <i>Science and Human Behavior</i> is published. His form of behaviorism (operant conditioning), which emphasizes changes in behavior due to reinforcement, becomes widely accepted and influences many aspects of American education	B.F. Skinner	Learning principles applied to education are now universally accepted

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Year	Transformational educational innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovation
	<b>1954</b> On May 17th, the U.S. Supreme Court announces its decision in the case of <i>Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka</i> , ruling that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal,” thus overturning its previous ruling in the 1896 case of <i>Plessy v. Ferguson</i> . <i>Brown v. Board of Education</i> is actually a combination of five cases from different parts of the country	B.F. Skinner	It is a historic first step in the long and still unfinished journey toward equality in U.S. education
	<b>1956</b> <i>The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals; Handbook I: Cognitive Domain</i> is published. Often referred to simply as “Bloom’s Taxonomy” because of its primary author, Benjamin S. Bloom, the document actually has four coauthors (M.D. Engelhart, E.J. Furst, W.H. Hill, and David Krathwohl)		Still widely used today, Bloom’s Taxonomy divides the cognitive domain into six levels: knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis. <i>Handbook II: Affective Domain</i> , edited by Krathwohl, Bloom, and Masia, is published in 1964. Taxonomies for the psychomotor domain have been published by other writers
	<b>1958</b> At least partially because of Sputnik, science and science education become important concerns in the United States, resulting in the passage of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), which authorizes increased funding for scientific research as well as science, mathematics, and foreign language education		Science and science education rise in prominence
1960 > 1980	<b>1965</b> Project Head Start, a preschool education program for children from low-income families, begins as an 8-week summer program		Part of the “War on Poverty,” the program continues to this day as the longest-running anti-poverty program in the United States
	<b>1966</b> Jerome Bruner’s <i>Toward a Theory of Instruction</i> is published	Jerome Bruner	His views regarding learning help to popularize the cognitive learning theory as an alternative to behaviorism
	<b>1970</b> Jean Piaget’s book, <i>The Science of Education</i> , is published	Jean Piaget	His learning cycle model helps to popularize discovery-based teaching approaches, particularly in the sciences
	<b>1971</b> Michael Hart, founder of Project Gutenberg, invents the e-Book	Michael Hart	E-book are now universal and widely accepted
	<b>1974</b> The Equal Educational Opportunities Act is passed. It prohibits discrimination and requires schools to take action to overcome barriers that prevent equal protection		The legislation has been particularly important in protecting the rights of students with limited English proficiency

(continued)

Year	Transformational educational innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovation
	<b>1975</b> The Education of All Handicapped Children Act (PL 94-142) becomes federal law. It requires that a free, appropriate public education, suited to the student’s individual needs, and offered in the least restrictive setting, be provided for all “handicapped” children. States are given until 1978 (later extended to 1981) to fully implement the law		A major milestone for handicapped children and their formal schooling
1980 > 2000	<b>1981</b> John Holt’s book, <i>Teach Your Own: A Hopeful Path for Education</i>	John Holt	Adds momentum to the homeschooling movement
	<b>1986</b> Christa McAuliffe is chosen by NASA from among more than 11,000 applicants to be the first teacher-astronaut, but her mission ends tragically as the Space Shuttle Challenger explodes 73 s after its launch, killing McAuliffe and the other six members of the crew	Christa McAuliffe	First teacher to join the space program
	<b>1989</b> The University of Phoenix establishes their “online campus,” the first to offer online bachelor’s and master’s degrees		The university becomes the “largest private university in North America”
2000 > 2015	<b>2001</b> The controversial No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) is approved by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush on January 8, 2002	George W. Bush	The law reauthorizes the ESEA of 1965 and replaces the Bilingual Education Act of 1968; mandates high-stakes student testing, holds schools accountable for student achievement levels, and provides penalties for schools that do not make adequate yearly progress toward meeting the goals of NCLB

**Core Domain: Selected Transformational Innovations in Income and Wealth Since 1900**

Year	Transformational innovation in income and wealth	Innovator	Significance of innovation
1900 > 1920	<b>1909</b> The United Kingdom sets a national minimum wage under the Trade Boards Act		Milestone in guaranteeing minimum wage
	<b>1909</b> Governmentally guaranteed insures for personal savings, mortgages, student loans, etc.		Milestone in insuring savings, mortgages, and student loans
	<b>1916</b> The United States passes a new tax law, which institutes income tax, rates beginning at 1 % and rising to 7 % for the wealthy		Fundamentally changed the way government interacted with its citizens

(continued)

Year	Transformational innovation in income and wealth	Innovator	Significance of innovation
1920 > 1940	<b>1935</b> Emergence of Securities & Exchange Commissions in most economically advanced countries		Imposes industry and government oversight of trading in stocks, bonds, commodities, and other investment instruments
	<b>1935</b> The United States institutes social security, as have most European nations at this time to protect against joblessness, injury, and other conditions		The emergence of the welfare state
	<b>1938</b> In the United States the introduction of minimum wage standards for unskilled and semiskilled workers		Income protection for unskilled and semiskilled workers
	<b>1938</b> The United States Congress passes the Fair Labor Standards Act. Puts age restrictions on child labor		First attempt to prevent abuses related to child labor
1940 > 1960	<b>1950s</b> In Europe and the United States the demand for more public services gives rise to new taxes in order to pay for them. As a result, taxes become a tool for redistributing wealth and evening out inequalities with welfare		
1960 > 1980	<b>1971</b> United States President Nixon eliminates gold and silver standards to support intrinsic value of paper currency, which permits the value of currency to float in the open market		
2000 > 2015	<b>2000</b> The International Labor Organization (ILO) comes into effect. Over 160 countries came together to agree on this act to help eliminate mistreatment of workers and improve equality		

### Secondary Domain: Selected Transformational Innovations in Technology Since 1900

Year	Transformational technological innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovation
3000 BCE	Abacus developed	Chinese and other East Asians	Antecedent to development of computer
1823–1841	Automatic calculating machine	Charles Babbage	Foundation for electronic computer development

(continued)

Year	Transformational technological innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovation
1842	Chemical fertilizer industry is launched with factory owned by Lawes	Various	Increased agricultural yields by many times
1833	Morse code developed	Samuel More	Communications reduced to a very few symbols that are widely understood and converted to both manual and electric forms
1856	Mendel establishes the gene as unit of inheritance	Gregor Mendal	Lays the foundation for both genetic inheritance and, in time, DNA analysis
1871	Discovery of DNA	Miescher	Lays the foundation for understanding the genetic basis of disease
1881	Maize refined into agricultural crop	Varied	Makes available one of the most steadily available agricultural products as a major source of food for tens of millions of people
	Hybridized corn produced	Varied	Protects corn against major infectious diseases
1890s	First gas powered tractor is built/ combined harvester reduces man hours of labor on land/X-ray	Multiple inventors	Earliest beginnings of mechanized agriculture; improved agricultural production by more than 10 fold
1900 > 1920	1900 The Zeppelin invented	Count Ferdinand von Zeppelin	Inspires the possibility of air travel, a form of travel not previously thought possible
	<b>1903</b> The first gas-motored and manned airplane invented by the Wright Brothers opening the door for all modern-day aviation.		
	<b>1901 &gt; 1905</b> First radio received wireless transmission and reception by Marconi/first vacuum cleaner/first air conditioner /Wright brothers fly first gas motored and manned airplane/electrocardiogram	Multiple	Succeeds in bring widely dispersed people together by radio, airplane. More critical advances in using electricity to diagnose make life-taking illnesses and diseases
	<b>1905</b> The Theory of Relativity published, revolutionizing physics at its most fundamental level	Albert Einstein	Unifying space and time into the space-time continuum, and explaining the concepts of time dilation and the principle of conservation of mass-energy. Einstein was awarded the 1921 Nobel Prize in Physics for his work
	<b>1908</b> The first Model-T car sold to the public by Henry Ford. This begins the age of personal motorized transportation, which was affordable and available to all	Henry Ford	Automation and assembly line techniques introduced into large-scale manufacturing and economic production

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Year	Transformational technological innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovation
1920 > 1940	<b>1921</b> First robot built		A major innovation in human labor saving
	<b>1924</b> The first mechanical television built, which was the precursor to the modern television	John Logie Baird	Analog computers use changeable aspects of physical phenomena such as electrical or mechanical quantities to model the problem. Eventually outdated by digital computers, but widely used in their time
	<b>1930</b> The “differential analyzer” or first analog computer invented at MIT	Vannevar Bush	
	<b>1937</b> The photocopier invented by Chester Carlson		
	<b>1937</b> The concept of a theoretical computing machine developed, which can be adapted to simulate the logic of a computer program	Alan Turing	Turing is considered the father of computer science as well as artificial intelligence. The Turing machine and Turing research made possible all modern-day computer technology
1940 > 1960	<b>1945</b> The first atomic bombs dropped on Japan, August 6		The United States became the first and only country to deploy atomic weapons, changing the rules of warfare engagement forever
1947	Transistor invented by Gordon Bell/ Mobile phone first invented but not sold commercially until 1983	Gordon Bell	
	First cardiac defibrillation/Shannon establishes basic theory for digital communication		
1953	Watson & Crick discover DNA structure and its digital genetic code.	Watson and Crick	The key to genetic codes opens the door to scientific inquiry and application
1957–1958	All available known elementary particles assembled	Arthur Rosenfeld	The basic building blocks of the universe identified and systematized
	Fortran, COBOL, and other early computer languages emerge		
	First pacemaker		
	First fetal ultrasound	Furman	Saves tens of millions of lives All for early diagnosis and treatment of infants requiring fetal surgery and early intervention

(continued)



Year	Transformational technological innovations	Innovator	Significance of innovation
1960 > 1980	<b>1966</b> “ARPANET” idea published by Lawrence Roberts. This was a plan for the Internet, essentially packet switching between connected computers		The ARPANET eventually grew into today’s Internet. Although greatly evolved from the original ARPANET, Internet is still fundamentally similar and would not be possible without the advances of ARPANET
	<b>1967</b> The first handheld calculator invented		
	<b>1968</b> The first computer mouse invented		Home access to the Internet revolutionized the scope of computers and the uses for Internet uses
	<b>1970</b> The floppy disk was invented for external computer storage		
	<b>1973</b> The Ethernet (local computer network) was invented for home computing with the Internet		
	<b>1973</b> The first personal handheld cellphone is unveiled by Motorola Industries. Dr. Martin Cooper is the first person credited with making a call on a portable phone.		
	<b>1971</b> Microprocessor invented/ Hounsfield invents CT Scanner	Faggin, Mazor & Hoff	
	<b>1974</b> UPC codes are assigned to every product		
1980 > 2000	<b>1977</b> Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) invented, greatly improving diagnosing capabilities	Raymond Damadian	
	<b>1984</b> The first Apple Macintosh computer is invented by Steve Jobs		
2000 > 2015	<b>1990</b> The World Wide Web and Internet Protocol (HTTP) and WWW language (HTML) created by Tims Burners-Lee to expand the Internet capabilities and possibilities		
	<b>2003</b> Toyota releases its first hybrid car model, due to growing environmental concerns		
	<b>2009</b> A robotic hand was successfully connected to an amputee, allowing him to feel sensations and control the device with his thoughts		
	<b>2014</b> Technological breakthrough in developing a power source based on nuclear fusion small enough to fit on a truck and could be ready for use in a decade		

(continued)

## Secondary Domain: Selected Transformational Social Innovations Since 1900

Year	Transformational social innovations	Innovator	Significance
1850 to present	Rural to urban migration due to the Industrial Revolution, making cities the major centers of employment and technological innovation		Created a variety of social and health problems in cities
1889	Introduced in Germany by Bismarck in 1883, a new system of income security, social security, quickly spread from Germany to all of Europe and, today, to more than 170 countries worldwide	Otto von Bismarck	Social security has been the most successful system of income security protecting the largest number of people with the economic shocks associated with sickness and disability, maternity, old age, involuntary joblessness and, in some countries, support for children and families
1889	The Hull House is founded in Chicago, the United States, and was instrumental in understanding social problems in the area	Jane Addams	Considered the founder of social work in the United States
1900	Emergence of cities as the major centers of employment, education, health care, and technological innovation	Multiple sites	Process of urbanization began around 1860, continued through the Industrial Revolution, and even today the process is ongoing such that 80 % of the world's total population now resides in metropolitan communities consisting of a major city, contiguous suburbs, and related townships, villages, and boroughs
1906	<i>The Jungle</i> was published in the United States, which exposed labor exploitation in meat packing	Upton Sinclair	Spurred regulations in industry to stop mistreatment
1935	The United States adopts a form of social security, the result of the worldwide Great Depression, which had brought unemployment to millions		At this point most European nations already have a form of social security in place as well

1948	Passage by the UN General Assembly of the <i>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</i>		Laid the foundation for extension of human rights and human rights protection to most historically disadvantaged population groups
	Emergence of private voluntary sector as major actors in promoting broad-based social, political, economic, and technological development		
1950	Emergence of urban agglomerations, i.e., populations of at least 10 million people. More than 100 of such agglomerations currently exist and the number is expected to increase	Began with the earliest migrations of rural dwellers to urban cities, especially in economically developing countries	Unite Nations Population Division begins to closely monitor these trends and makes annual reports to the UN General Assembly. Major publication is UNPOP, World Urbanization Prospects: <a href="http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf">http://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/Highlights/WUP2014-Highlights.pdf</a>
1950 > 1960	The ability of people to live “anonymously,” i.e., without direct control of their lives by extended kinship systems, local community requirements, and the like		This is one of the most important aspects of urbanization, even as migrants maintain relationships with their extended kinship networks
1960 > 1970	Reorganization of family from extended to nuclear and subnuclear		Though more economically and emotionally vulnerable, families can move more easily in search of work and other economic opportunities
1900 > present	Bismarck’s social insurance proves to be so successful that variations have been adopted by more than 100 nations worldwide	Emperor Otto von Bismarck and the International Social Security Association with its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland	Social security now includes five basic modal programs, at least three of which are directly related to employment and employer contributions to the financing of the programs: (1) old age, invalidity, and disability; (2) work injury; (3) health care, especially for pregnancy; (4) involuntary employment; and (5) large family size
			The concept underlying each of these programs is to provide financial security to job-related workers and their families during periods when income revenues are severely interrupted

(continued)

Year	Transformational social innovations	Innovator	Significance
1967 > 1980	Launching of the War on Poverty directed at the poor living in urban areas	John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson—both Presidents of the United States who worked to extend similar programs to other impoverished countries and world regions	Subsequently extended to rural communities in both economically advanced and socially least developing countries. The United Nations Development Programme monitors and reports annually on social gains and losses experienced in attaining these goals, especially in the educational, health, and income sectors
1995	Launching by the United Nations of the <i>Millennium Development Campaign</i> (MDC) with its specification eight <i>Millennium Development Goals</i> (MDGs) and at least 21 fully operationalized indicators associated with these goals	UN General Assembly and the UN Development Programme in partnerships with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) along with more than 100 formal programs of development assistance to socially developing and least developing countries	Attributed to be the most effective program of financial aid and technical assistance mounted by the United Nations in collaboration with other intergovernmental, governmental, and major nonstate development focused entities  Outcomes associated with the implementation of this international strategic plan are reported annually in the theme-focused UNDP <i>Human Development Reports</i> that have been cited extensively throughout this book
2000 forward	An entirely new series of sector-specific technical reports have been introduced that monitor global progress in international development	Various	Examples include: Anderson, R. <i>Human suffering index</i> Freedom House: <i>Freedom throughout the world indexes</i> Gallup Polls and Gallup-Heathway's Polls: <i>annually include international and comparative questions on individual, familial, and collective well-being</i> International Institute for Economic and Peace: <i>Terrorism Index, World Peace Index, Peace Index</i> National Economic Foundation (NEF), <i>Happy Planet Index</i> Regional Barometer Index focuses on well-being in selected regions of the world: Asia, Europe, and so on Transparency International: <i>Perceived Corruptions Index</i>

Year	Transformational social innovations	Innovator	Significance
1950 forward	United Nations creates and funds 14 separate entities dealing with well-being associated with different aspects of sectoral development	United Nations General Assembly	Among the sectoral agencies created are:
			International Labour Organization (ILO)
			United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
			United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
			United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM)
			United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
			World Health Organization (WHO)
			World Meteorological Organization (UNWMO)
1997	Dolly the sheep cloned	Roslin Institute	Opened the door for even more profound medical intervention
1997	Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) developed	Various	A powerful and unique application essential to the laptop community
1998	Google is born	Google labs	Birth of one of Internet’s primary search mechanisms. Many other systems follow, but Google remains dominant
2015 and forward	Web 2.0	Multiple scientific work group and individual scholars	Major advances in quality of individual and collective life
	Human Genome Project completed		
	Facebook		
	Wikipedia, etc.		
	First artificial knee and livers created		
2010–2015	Virtual object reality (Oculus Rift, Magic Leap, HoloLens)	Various	Speed of technological innovation increases dramatically and across all major sectors of communal life
	Car to car communication, brain organoids		
	Internet of DNA supercharged photosynthesis liquid biopsies ubiquitous Internet access nano-architecture		

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## Appendices D and E: Index and Subindex Scores on the Weighted Index of Social Progress

This appendix and the one that follows report index and subindex scores and score rankings on the *Index* and *Weighed Index of Social Progress* (ISP/WISP) for 162 countries for the period 1970–2010. The ISP and WISP were created in 1973 by Richard J. Estes of the University of Pennsylvania in response to an invitation from the Secretary-General of the International Council of Social Welfare, Kate Katzi, to develop an alternative approach to measuring *social* rather than purely *economic* development (Estes 2013, 2015). The outcome of a 2-year effort to develop such a comprehensive, more socially sensitive index of social development was the *Index of Social Progress* (Estes 1976, 1984, 1988, 2014a-c). Country performances on the ISP and WISP have been updated every 5 and 10 years; the index reports social performances of countries at the national (Estes 1984, 1988, 1998a, 1998b), regional (Estes 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1998a, 2004, 2007a, 2007b), and global levels (Estes 1984, 1988, 1998b, 2010, 2015). The ISP/WISP also has been used to analyze the underlying causes of

selected factors that threaten national, regional, and global peace and development (Estes and Tiliouine 2014; Estes and Sirgy 2014).

The ISP/WISP consists of 41 social indicators that have been subdivided into 10 subindexes (Appendix Table D1): *Education* (N = 4); *Health Status* (N = 7); *Women Status* (N = 5); *Defense Effort* (N = 1); *Economic* (N = 5); *Demographic* (N = 3); *Environmental* (N = 3); *Social Chaos* (N = 5); *Cultural Diversity* (N = 3); and *Welfare Effort* (N = 5). The 41 discrete indicators used in the construction of the WISP are identified in Appendix Table D1, and the system of statistical weights used in creating each of the indexes and the index as a whole is identified in Appendix Table D2. Correlation coefficients for each of the WSP's 10 subindexes and the WISP as a whole are reported in Appendix Table D3.

## Data Sources for the ISP/WISP

The majority of the data used to operationalize the ISP/WISP were obtained from the annual reports supplied by individual countries to specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank (WB), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Social Security Association (ISSA), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and other major international data collection and reporting organizations. Data for the *Environmental* subindex were obtained from the World Resources Institute (WRI), the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), and the World Bank. Data for the *Social Chaos* subindex were obtained from Amnesty International (AI), Freedom House (FH), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRCRCS), the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI), and Transparency International (TI). Data for the *Cultural Diversity* subindex were gathered from the *CIA World Factbook* and the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and from the work of independent scholars in the fields of comparative language, religion, and ethnology.



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**Appendix Table D1** Indicators on the Weighted Index of Social Progress (WISP), by Subindex (N = 10 Subindexes, 40 Indicators)

Subindex indicators
Education subindex (N = 3)
Primary School Completion Rate, 1992–2000 (+)
Average years of schooling, 2000 (+)
Adult literacy rate, 2000 (+)
Health status subindex (N = 7)
Physicians per 100,000 population, 1990–1999 (+)
Percent of children immunized against DPT at age 1, 1999 (+)
Percent of population using improved water sources, 2000 (+)
Percent of population undernourished, 1996–1998 (–)
Infant mortality rate, 2000 (–)
Under-five child mortality rate, 2000 (–)
Life expectation at birth, 2000 (+)
Women status subindex (N = 5)
Female secondary school enrollment as percent of males, 1995–1997 (+)
Seats in parliament held by women as percent of total, 1991–2000 (+)
Contraceptive prevalence among married women, 1990–2000 (+)
Maternal mortality ratio, 1990–1998 (–)
Female adult literacy as percent of males, 2000 (+)
Defense effort subindex (N = 1)
Military expenditures as percent of gross domestic product, 2000 (–)
Economic subindex (N = 5)
Per capita gross national income (PPP), 2000 (+)
Percent growth in gross domestic product (GDP), 1999–2000 (+)
Total external debt service as percent of exports of goods and services, 2000 (–)
Unemployment rate, 1998–2000 (–)

(continued)

Subindex indicators
GINI index score, most recent year (–)
Demography subindex (N = 3)
Average annual population growth rate, 1990–1900 (–)
Percent of population aged <15 years, 2000 (–)
Percent of population aged >64 years, 2000 (+)
Environmental subindex (N = 3)
Nationally protected areas (%), 1996 (+)
Per capita metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions, 1998 (–)
Average annual disaster-related deaths per million population, 1990–2000 (–)
Social chaos subindex (N = 5)
Strength of political rights, 2000 (+)
Strength of civil liberties, 2000 (+)
Perceived corruption index, 2000 (–)
Total deaths in major armed conflicts since inception, 2000 (–)
Number of externally displaced persons per 100,000 population, 1999 (–)
Cultural diversity subindex (N = 3)
Largest percentage of population sharing the same or similar racial/ethnic origins, 2000 (+)
Largest percentage of population sharing the same or similar religious beliefs, 2000 (+)
Largest share of population sharing the same mother tongue, 2000 (+)
Welfare effort subindex (N = 5)
Age first national law—old age, invalidity and death, 1999 (+)
Age first national law—sickness and maternity, 1999 (+)
Age first national law—work injury, 1999 (+)
Age first national law—unemployment, 1999 (+)
Age first national law—family allowance, 1999 (+)

**Appendix Table D2** Statistical Weights Used in Constructing the Weighted Index of Social Progress<sup>a</sup>

$$WISP2000 = \{[(\text{Factor 1}) * .697]\} + \{[(\text{Factor 2}) * .163]\} + \{[(\text{Factor 3}) * .140]\}$$

where:

$$\text{Factor 1} = [(\text{Health} * 0.92) + (\text{Education} * 0.91) + (\text{Welfare} * 0.72) + (\text{Woman} * 0.91) + (\text{Social Chaos} * 0.84) + (\text{Economic} * 0.71) + (\text{Diversity} * 0.64) + (\text{Demographic} * 0.93)]$$

$$\text{Factor 2} = [(\text{Defense Effort} * 0.93)]$$

$$\text{Factor 3} = [(\text{Environmental} * 0.98)]$$

<sup>a</sup>Derived from factor analysis using Varimax rotation. For purposes of comparability across the time series, the same statistical weights were used in all four time periods: 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000

**Appendix Table D3** Weighted Index of Social Progress Subindex Pearson Correlation Coefficients (N = 162)

Pearson correlation matrix												
	STNED10	STNHL10	STNWOM10	STNDEF10	STNEC10	STNDEM10	STNENV10	RSTNSC10	STNCUL10	STNWEL10	RISP10	FNL_WISP10
STNED10	1.000											
STNHL10	0.870	1.000										
STNWOM10	0.844	0.837	1.000									
STNDEF10	0.023	0.075	0.116	1.000								
STNEC10	0.380	0.455	0.301	0.066	1.000							
STNDEM10	0.756	0.824	0.717	0.156	0.461	1.000						
STNENV10	-0.151	-0.167	-0.089	0.149	-0.257	-0.145	1.000					
RSTNSC10	0.504	0.566	0.513	0.220	0.265	0.550	-0.022	1.000				
STNCUL10	0.439	0.522	0.514	0.064	0.185	0.436	-0.047	0.288	1.000			
STNWEL10	0.497	0.651	0.482	0.279	0.345	0.705	0.022	0.543	0.348	1.000		
RISP10	0.813	0.890	0.828	0.373	0.467	0.869	0.024	0.688	0.590	0.779	1.000	
FNL_WISP10	0.871	0.938	0.864	0.214	0.491	0.901	-0.095	0.685	0.588	0.756	0.981	1.000

## Appendix E: Alphabetical Listing of Country Subinex Rankings in 2010 (N = 162)

Country	ISP10 rank (N = 162)	Educ status rank (N = 162)	Health status rank (N = 162)	Women status rank (N = 162)	Defense effort rank (N = 162)	Econ status rank (N = 162)	Demographic rank (N = 162)	Environmental rank (N = 162)	Social chaos rank (N = 162)	Cultural diversity rank (N = 162)	Welfare effort rank (N = 162)	WISP10 rank (N = 162)
Afghanistan <sup>a</sup>	160	158	162	161	115	5	162	119	158	105	143	162
Albania	51	73	55	90	42	42	49	71	69	34	75	53
Algeria	76	89	82	99	115	56	80	119	147	7	41	73
Angola <sup>a</sup>	159	149	152	149	151	129	147	48	131	152	143	157
Argentina	35	60	37	8	23	94	52	71	51	13	31	39
Armenia	40	73	76	81	106	29	29	48	91	1	31	43
Australia	28	36	16	19	58	29	42	139	1	65	20	27
Austria	3	15	3	30	23	56	20	23	13	34	1	6
Azerbaijan	54	83	76	90	106	2	56	95	140	22	44	54
Bahamas	60	47	62	38	115	102	66	131	35	13	103	55
Bahrain	95	36	62	53	133	56	80	156	91	71	135	81
Bangladesh <sup>a</sup>	99	131	116	105	23	42	103	119	110	13	95	107
Belarus	27	15	24	13	42	5	10	95	131	34	40	29
Belgium	23	15	3	8	23	94	15	139	13	105	1	11
Belize	102	73	62	81	156	94	106	3	42	122	129	100
Benin <sup>a</sup>	121	149	127	156	42	102	147	9	51	96	81	134
Bhutan <sup>a</sup>	121	103	121	133	115	94	115	7	100	137	143	120
Bolivia	85	36	102	90	58	129	106	13	69	122	49	94
Botswana	79	15	108	81	115	129	75	7	35	71	129	86
Brazil	47	47	46	38	58	120	66	23	51	65	27	50
Bulgaria	21	47	33	19	93	29	1	71	42	42	20	16
Burkina Faso <sup>a</sup>	117	158	139	140	42	67	66	37	80	122	61	124
Burundi <sup>a</sup>	149	139	159	135	153	120	150	57	131	82	95	147
Cambodia <sup>a</sup>	106	123	127	124	58	29	106	9	121	13	143	112
Cameroon	138	139	139	138	42	94	115	48	121	157	75	141
Canada	39	36	16	19	23	14	35	153	1	137	31	33

Cape Verde <sup>a</sup>	73	73	91	72	8	129	115	95	25	52	81	81
Cen African Rep <sup>a</sup>	151	160	155	149	23	152	106	23	110	155	61	153
Chad <sup>a</sup>	155	161	155	162	23	14	158	48	140	161	75	159
Chile	43	47	46	72	138	102	56	95	13	22	20	43
China	98	89	76	72	85	29	49	158	131	135	81	87
Colombia	60	73	42	38	133	129	80	1	159	71	41	73
Comoros <sup>a</sup>	126	144	133	124	115	129	130	9	80	82	143	131
Congo, DR <sup>a</sup>	153	149	159	144	93	102	147	57	151	137	91	154
Congo, Rep	128	123	139	138	42	129	150	23	121	137	54	136
Costa Rica	32	36	42	1	1	84	80	13	25	22	54	40
Cote D'Ivoire	148	144	139	149	58	141	115	23	153	161	81	151
Croatia	28	47	33	30	58	42	5	95	51	13	49	29
Cuba	47	2	1	4	138	84	35	95	131	82	75	41
Cyprus	44	9	42	81	42	56	45	119	25	71	61	45
Czech Rep	24	23	11	38	58	8	15	71	25	103	13	19
Denmark	1	3	11	4	58	42	25	37	1	1	1	1
Djibouti <sup>a</sup>	142	119	127	144	144	150	122	95	100	96	143	141
Dominican Rep	62	110	91	19	8	120	92	13	51	34	81	70
Ecuador	62	106	62	30	106	102	80	13	80	65	41	65
Egypt	88	89	91	114	115	67	95	71	110	32	61	89
El Salvador	72	110	62	53	8	120	95	71	51	22	95	73
Eritrea <sup>a</sup>	162	128	139	140	161	129	161	57	140	145	143	159
Estonia	37	15	55	30	58	8	5	71	42	137	31	33
Ethiopia <sup>a</sup>	137	136	139	144	106	29	130	23	100	148	121	140
Fiji	99	23	76	90	42	141	75	95	110	137	129	101
Finland	7	9	24	3	42	14	20	131	1	22	36	7
France	15	9	3	38	106	67	25	145	13	13	5	8
Gabon	113	110	108	120	58	129	106	71	100	152	61	114
Gambia <sup>a</sup>	128	144	133	144	8	129	130	71	100	71	121	137
Georgia	54	89	55	81	133	56	10	71	69	52	95	50
Germany	3	36	3	13	42	56	5	37	13	42	1	4
Ghana	110	117	116	128	8	67	115	23	42	148	114	116

(continued)

Country	1SP10 rank	Educ status rank	Health status rank	Women status rank	Defense effort rank	Econ status rank	Demographic rank	Environmental rank	Social chaos rank	Cultural diversity rank	Welfare effort rank	WISP10 rank
	(N = 162)	(N = 162)	(N = 162)	(N = 162)	(N = 162)	(N = 162)	(N = 162)	(N = 162)	(N = 162)	(N = 162)	(N = 162)	(N = 162)
Greece	28	36	16	72	138	14	10	131	35	1	31	23
Guatemala	106	123	102	114	4	120	130	13	91	122	103	112
Guinea-Bissau <sup>a</sup>	158	153	155	149	138	155	150	95	91	117	143	156
Guinea <sup>a</sup>	144	156	147	155	85	150	122	57	121	132	61	148
Guyana	70	1	91	81	58	141	56	95	62	132	81	63
Haiti <sup>a</sup>	127	152	121	114	115	161	95	95	110	7	121	127
Honduras	65	106	82	13	8	102	122	13	69	13	103	81
Hong Kong	31	36	16	53	1	56	34	23	35	22	81	35
Hungary	10	23	24	53	58	14	10	71	25	34	13	11
Iceland	5	3	1	8	1	3	45	119	1	22	27	5
India	112	110	113	124	115	29	80	154	147	122	49	109
Indonesia	116	106	102	99	42	56	66	161	91	122	112	105
Iran	101	73	82	90	152	67	75	149	131	96	49	89
Iraq	146	116	102	110	115	141	138	119	161	88	143	143
Ireland	36	23	24	19	8	158	52	139	13	34	5	35
Israel	64	6	11	53	158	56	63	57	42	71	49	46
Italy	10	23	3	53	85	42	5	139	25	7	13	8
Jamaica	53	83	82	38	8	120	61	48	62	42	61	55
Japan	8	36	24	72	23	5	1	95	19	13	36	11
Jordan	91	47	46	90	149	67	122	57	80	42	135	89
Kazakhstan	79	47	62	90	23	14	45	145	121	112	121	67
Kenya	124	89	137	120	58	147	138	37	91	155	103	120
Korea, North	157	73	91	38	162	94	52	145	131	71	143	109
Korea, South	50	23	42	53	106	8	41	131	35	96	103	49
Kuwait	103	47	55	90	148	3	106	159	80	88	135	89
Kyrgyzstan	67	47	76	105	115	56	66	71	100	105	20	63
Lao, PDR <sup>a</sup>	114	123	113	114	85	42	106	23	140	112	141	117
Latvia	37	23	37	53	58	29	1	37	25	132	44	35
Lebanon	88	100	46	99	145	94	63	119	110	52	61	73
Lesotho <sup>a</sup>	95	36	116	13	93	158	66	71	62	42	143	98



Liberia <sup>a</sup>	161	136	149	148	155	162	130	23	160	137	121	161
Libya	90	89	55	90	85	94	95	139	140	1	103	89
Lithuania	18	23	24	38	42	14	10	57	25	42	36	19
Luxembourg	9	60	11	19	8	1	35	149	1	52	7	10
Macedonia	82	60	37	81	93	141	35	71	69	105	143	67
Madagascar <sup>a</sup>	117	136	133	120	23	102	145	71	69	135	54	120
Malawi <sup>a</sup>	110	119	113	128	8	67	138	13	80	112	135	117
Malaysia	83	47	62	72	93	67	95	13	70	148	81	87
Mali <sup>a</sup>	133	153	149	156	93	67	150	57	51	82	61	137
Mauritania <sup>a</sup>	131	153	116	135	133	102	145	95	100	71	95	131
Mauritius	58	60	62	38	4	84	56	95	35	105	75	55
Mexico	54	60	62	38	4	84	66	95	62	71	61	55
Moldova	46	60	46	30	4	42	20	95	80	71	112	46
Mongolia	70	36	82	53	58	29	80	48	51	65	143	67
Morocco	91	110	91	124	145	84	75	95	91	22	54	98
Mozambique <sup>a</sup>	140	156	152	120	23	129	130	57	80	122	143	145
Myanmar <sup>a</sup>	136	119	121	105	58	67	66	160	153	88	143	117
Namibia	105	100	108	13	132	155	106	57	42	82	143	105
Nepal <sup>a</sup>	131	128	108	128	85	102	115	23	153	145	121	134
Netherlands	15	23	16	4	58	84	29	37	1	88	13	19
New Zealand	12	9	24	8	23	29	42	37	1	88	24	19
Nicaragua	65	117	91	19	8	102	95	9	69	34	61	81
Niger <sup>a</sup>	142	161	139	159	42	102	159	57	131	112	81	148
Nigeria	147	131	147	140	8	67	138	71	69	160	114	152
Norway	6	3	3	4	58	8	29	149	1	7	11	3
Oman	134	89	62	110	160	67	95	149	100	117	139	108
Pakistan	134	144	121	128	133	42	122	156	121	96	95	124
Panama	54	83	55	53	23	120	80	23	42	42	61	59
Papua-NG	128	119	108	135	8	120	122	71	80	157	129	131
Paraguay	69	89	82	53	8	129	106	71	69	7	75	73
Peru	67	89	82	38	42	102	80	23	62	96	61	70
Philippines	85	100	91	30	23	84	103	71	100	88	103	94

(continued)

Country	1SP10 rank (N = 162)	Educ status rank (N = 162)	Health status rank (N = 162)	Women status rank (N = 162)	Defense effort rank (N = 162)	Econ status rank (N = 162)	Demographic rank (N = 162)	Environmental rank (N = 162)	Social chaos rank (N = 162)	Cultural diversity rank (N = 162)	Welfare effort rank (N = 162)	WISP10 rank (N = 162)
Poland	25	15	37	53	85	56	25	37	35	1	36	27
Portugal	21	23	11	30	93	84	20	119	19	7	27	16
Qatar	152	83	55	105	159	29	150	162	91	105	143	114
Romania	32	73	46	72	85	29	5	95	51	13	27	31
Russia	51	47	37	72	138	42	15	131	151	117	11	46
Rwanda <sup>a</sup>	120	144	149	114	115	84	138	48	110	22	114	120
Saudi Arabia	103	60	62	110	156	29	122	13	121	52	114	101
Senegal <sup>a</sup>	121	139	116	140	58	102	130	48	62	117	95	127
Sierra Leone <sup>a</sup>	154	131	161	158	23	147	150	57	80	117	129	155
Singapore	79	47	46	53	145	14	52	139	42	137	91	61
Slovak Republic	18	23	33	30	58	14	29	37	25	65	13	23
Slovenia	15	9	24	53	58	14	15	71	19	71	24	16
Somalia <sup>a</sup>	156	131	158	160	115	154	150	119	153	65	143	157
South Africa	83	73	107	19	58	141	80	131	42	122	54	81
Spain	12	23	16	8	23	42	29	131	19	52	13	11
Sri Lanka	76	60	91	81	106	67	49	57	110	88	103	73
Sudan <sup>a</sup>	149	123	127	128	93	42	115	71	162	122	121	150
Suriname	95	60	82	13	58	102	63	95	51	148	143	94
Swaziland	109	110	127	53	58	152	103	71	121	52	129	111
Sweden	2	6	3	2	58	14	15	71	1	32	7	1
Switzerland	18	23	3	19	23	102	25	13	1	96	24	23
Syria	108	83	62	99	149	67	122	119	140	82	121	104
Taiwan	41	60	16	53	115	14	35	119	25	52	61	41
Tajikistan	92	60	121	99	93	8	95	23	121	42	143	103
Tanzania <sup>a</sup>	114	139	139	114	23	42	138	3	69	147	114	127
Thailand	74	83	91	53	23	42	56	57	110	88	114	73
Togo <sup>a</sup>	140	139	127	149	58	155	138	37	121	122	81	145
Trinidad & Tobago	85	60	102	38	115	14	45	154	51	152	54	65

Country	1SP10 rank (N = 162)	Educ status rank (N = 162)	Health status rank (N = 162)	Women status rank (N = 162)	Defense effort rank (N = 162)	Econ status rank (N = 162)	Demographic rank (N = 162)	Environmental rank (N = 162)	Social chaos rank (N = 162)	Cultural diversity rank (N = 162)	Welfare effort rank (N = 162)	WISP10 rank (N = 162)
Tunisia	49	47	62	53	58	84	61	95	100	1	44	52
Turkey	75	89	46	105	115	67	66	95	110	22	91	70
Turkmenistan	91	60	62	81	115	147	80	131	140	42	91	94
Uganda <sup>a</sup>	139	128	133	110	93	67	159	6	157	157	114	143
Ukraine	26	9	46	72	93	8	1	119	62	52	13	26
United Kingdom	12	15	16	19	106	102	20	48	1	52	7	11
United States	42	15	24	38	138	14	42	145	19	52	44	35
Uruguay	32	73	33	38	42	102	35	95	19	52	7	31
Uzbekistan	59	6	91	53	8	42	80	95	147	52	54	61
Venezuela	45	89	76	19	42	102	92	2	91	34	44	59
Viet Nam	76	103	82	38	106	14	75	71	131	42	103	73
Yemen <sup>a</sup>	145	103	121	149	154	67	150	95	110	105	139	137
Zambia <sup>a</sup>	117	131	152	133	93	120	130	3	80	112	95	130
Zimbabwe	125	106	137	99	93	160	92	37	147	103	141	124
<b>Median</b>	81	73	79	81	58	67	80	71	80	77	81	81
<b>Average</b>	81	78	78	78	75	76	79	75	78	78	78	81
<b>SD</b>	47	48	47	48	49	47	47	47	47	48	45	47

<sup>a</sup>Indicates countries officially classified by the United Nations as “Least Developing” (UNDP, 2009)

## Appendix F: Selected Supplemental Readings on the History of Human Well-Being

### Part 1: Theoretical and Philosophical Issues in Well-Being

#### General Readings on the Meaning of Life, the Good Life, and Life Satisfaction

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### Part 3: Popular Books on Quality of Life, Life Satisfaction, and Happiness

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### Appendix G: List of Chapter Anonymous Reviewers

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